S. 2817

119 S2817 IS: Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025
 U.S. Senate
 2025-09-16
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 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 II
 119th CONGRESS  1st Session
 S. 2817
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 September 16, 2025
  Mr. Gallego  (for himself,  Mr. Kim ,  Ms. Warren ,  Ms. Alsobrooks ,  Mr. Van Hollen ,  Ms. Cortez Masto ,  Ms. Blunt Rochester , and  Mr. Warnock ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the  Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
 A BILL
To amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit dual appointments of employees of the Federal Reserve System, and for other purposes.
1.
Short title
This Act may be cited as the   Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025  .
2.
Sense of Congress
(a)
Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Federal Reserve System plays a critical role in maintaining the stability of the economy of the United States by conducting monetary policy, supervising and regulating financial institutions, and supporting the payments system;
(2)
historically, the insulation of the Federal Reserve System from political interference has been essential in preventing an electoral consideration or partisan agenda from driving any monetary policy decision;
(3)
the credibility and effectiveness of the Federal Reserve System depend on the ability of the Federal Reserve System to operate independently of any short-term political pressure, particularly from an elected official or individual in a position of public trust;
(4)
the presence of a current government official, Member of Congress, or other politically affiliated individual in a role within the Federal Reserve System raises legitimate concerns about conflict of interest and undue influence; and
(5)
the purpose of this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, is to strengthen the institutional integrity and independence of the Federal Reserve System by more categorically prohibiting dual appointments, preventing conflicts of interest, and ensuring a clear separation between a political actor and a monetary policy decision.
3.
Prohibition of Dual Appointment
(a)
Board of Governors
The fourth sentence of the first undesignated paragraph of section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act ( 12 U.S.C. 241 ) is amended by striking  business of the Board and shall each receive  and inserting  business of the Board, may not simultaneously hold any other office, position, or employment for which the member is appointed by the President, including under a leave of absence from such other office, position, or employment, and shall each receive .
(b)
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, Vice Presidents, Officers, and Employees
The fifth subparagraph of the fourth undesignated paragraph of section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act ( 12 U.S.C. 341 ) is amended by adding at the end the following:  A president, vice president, officer, or employee of the bank may not simultaneously hold any other office, position, or employment for which the president, vice president, officer, or employee is appointed by the President, including under a leave of absence from such other office, position, or employment. .
(c)
Federal Reserve Bank Board of Directors
The ninth undesignated paragraph of section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act ( 12 U.S.C. 302 ) is amended by adding at the end the following:  A member of such board of directors may not simultaneously hold any other office, position, or employment for which the member is appointed by the President, including under a leave of absence from such other office, position, or employment. .