S. 2930

119 S2930 IS: Smarter Approaches to Nuclear Expenditures Act
 U.S. Senate
 2025-09-29
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 II  119th CONGRESS  1st Session  S. 2930  IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES   September 29, 2025   Mr. Markey  (for himself and  Mr. Sanders ) introduced the following bill; which was
  read twice and referred to the  Committee on
  Armed Services    A BILL
To reduce spending on nuclear weapons and related defense spending and to
  prohibit the procurement and deployment of low-yield nuclear warheads, and for other
 purposes.
1.
Short title
This Act may be cited as the   Smarter Approaches to Nuclear Expenditures Act  .
2.
Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The United States continues to maintain an excessively large and costly arsenal of nuclear delivery systems and warheads that are a holdover from the Cold War.
(2)
The current nuclear arsenal of the United States includes approximately 3,748 total nuclear warheads in its military stockpile, of which approximately 1,770 are deployed with five delivery components: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear gravity bombs, long-range strategic bomber aircraft armed with nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and short-range fighter aircraft that can deliver nuclear gravity bombs. The strategic bomber fleet of the United States comprises 87 B–52 and 20 B–2 aircraft, over 66 of which contribute to the nuclear mission. The United States also maintains 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14 Ohio-class submarines, up to 12 of which are deployed. Each of those submarines is armed with approximately 90 nuclear warheads.
(3)
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States nuclear arsenal has increased significantly. From 2025 to 2034, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost will be $946,000,000,000 to operate, sustain, and modernize current nuclear forces, an average of $95,000,000,000 annually. When accounting for inflation and rising program expenses, the cost could easily surpass $1,000,000,000,000 in the 10 year period after the date of the enactment of this Act. Current estimates from the Congressional Budget Office for the period between 2025 and 2034 have already ballooned by 25 percent, or $190,000,000,000, more than the 2023 estimate for the period between 2023 and 2032. Further calls to increase the nuclear arsenal would increase these projections.
(4)
According to the Government Accountability Office, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has still not factored affordability concerns into its planning as was recommended by the Government Accountability Office in 2017, with the warning that  it is essential for NNSA to present information to Congress and other key decision makers indicating whether the agency has prioritized certain modernization programs or considered trade-offs (such as deferring or cancelling specific modernization programs) . Instead, the budget estimate of the Department of Energy for nuclear modernization activities during the period of fiscal years 2021 through 2025 was $83,619,000,000—$15,410,000,000 more than the 2020 budget estimate of the Department for the same period.
(5)
A December 2020 Congressional Budget Office analysis showed that the projected costs of nuclear forces over the next decade can be reduced by $15,380,000,000 to $16,870,000,000 by trimming back current plans, while still maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Even larger savings would accrue over the subsequent decade.
(6)
The Department of Defense’s June 2013 nuclear policy guidance entitled  Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States  found that force levels under the April 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and the Russian Federation (commonly known as the  New START Treaty )  are more than adequate for what the United States needs to fulfill its national security objectives  and can be reduced by up to  1⁄3  below levels under the New START Treaty to 1,000 to 1,100 warheads.
(7)
President Trump expanded the role of, and spending on, nuclear weapons in United States policy at the same time that he withdrew from, unsigned, or otherwise terminated a series of important arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
3.
Reductions in nuclear forces
(a)
Reduction of nuclear-Armed submarines
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than eight Columbia-class submarines.
(b)
Reduction of ground-Based missiles
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2026, the forces of the Air Force shall include not more than 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(c)
Reduction of deployed strategic warheads
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning in fiscal year 2026, the forces of the United States Military shall include not more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, as that term is defined in the New START Treaty.
(d)
Limitation on new long-Range penetrating bomber aircraft
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any of fiscal years 2024 through 2030 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for purchasing more than 80 B–21 long-range penetrating bomber aircraft.
(e)
Prohibition on F–35 nuclear mission
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be used to make the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
(f)
Prohibition on new air-Launched cruise missile
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of the long-range stand-off weapon or any other new air-launched cruise missile or for the W80 warhead life extension program.
(g)
Prohibition on new intercontinental ballistic missile
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of the LGM–35 Sentinel, previously known as the ground-based strategic deterrent, or any new intercontinental ballistic missile.
(h)
Termination of Uranium Processing Facility
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the Uranium Processing Facility located at the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(i)
Prohibition on procurement and deployment of new low-Yield warhead
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended to deploy the W76–2 low-yield nuclear warhead or any other low-yield or nonstrategic nuclear warhead.
(j)
Prohibition on new submarine-Launched cruise missile
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of a new submarine-launched cruise missile capable of carrying a low-yield or nonstrategic nuclear warhead, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review found this system  no longer necessary .
(k)
Limitation on plutonium pit production
(1)
In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for expanding production of plutonium pits at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, or the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, until the Administrator for Nuclear Security submits to the appropriate committees of Congress an integrated master schedule and total estimated cost for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s overall plutonium pit production effort during the period of 2026 through 2036.
(2)
Requirements for schedule
The schedule required to be submitted under paragraph (1) shall—
(A)
include timelines, resources, and budgets for planned work; and
(B)
be consistent with modern management standards and best practices as described in guidelines of the Government Accountability Office.
(l)
Prohibition on sustainment of B83–1 bomb
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the sustainment of the B83–1 bomb, as the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review declared the B83–1  will be retired .
(m)
Prohibition on space-Based missile defense
Notwithstanding other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement of a space-based missile defense system.
(n)
Prohibition on the W–93 warhead
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or expended for the procurement and deployment of a W–93 warhead on a submarine launched ballistic missile.
4.
Reports required
(a)
Initial report
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3.
(b)
Annual report
Not later than March 1, 2026, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the plan of each Secretary to carry out section 3, including any updates to previously submitted reports.
(c)
Annual nuclear weapons accounting
Not later than September 30, 2026, and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing a comprehensive accounting by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget of the amounts obligated and expended by the Federal Government for each nuclear weapon and related nuclear program during—
(1)
the fiscal year covered by the report; and
(2)
the life cycle of such weapon or program.
(d)
Cost estimate report
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report outlining the estimated cost savings that result from carrying out section 3.
5.
Appropriate committees of Congress defined
In this Act, the term  appropriate committees of Congress  means—
(1)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives.