S.Hrg.119-37

1[Senate Hearing 119-37]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                        S. Hrg. 119-3756                  AFTER ASSAD: NAVIGATING SYRIA POLICY78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               BEFORE THE1314                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS1516                          UNITED STATES SENATE1718                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1920                             FIRST SESSION2122                               __________2324                           FEBRUARY 13, 20252526                               __________2728       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations2930 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3132                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov3334                                __________3536                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3759-893 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20253839-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4041                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS4243                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman4445PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire46DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware47STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut48BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia49JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon50RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey51TED CRUZ, Texas                        BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii52MIKE LEE, Utah                         CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland53RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois54JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada55JOHN CORNYN, Texas5657             Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director58           Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director59                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk6061                              (ii)6263                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S6465                              ----------66                                                                   Page6768                               Statements6970Risch, Hon. James E., Chairman, U.S. Senator From Idaho..........     17172Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, Ranking Member, U.S. Senator From New73  Hampshire......................................................     37475                               Witnesses7677Singh, Michael, Managing Director and Lane-Swig Senior Fellow,78  The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC..     679    Prepared statement...........................................     88081Stroul, Dana, Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen82  Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,83  Washington, DC.................................................    1384    Prepared statement...........................................    158586              Additional Material Submitted for the Record8788Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Gen.89  Mazloum Abdi, Command-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces,90  February 13, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen.........    409192Statement for the Record from Citizens for a Safe and Secure93  America et al., February 13, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne94  Shaheen........................................................    429596Letter to Senator Shaheen from the Access Centre For Human Rights97  (ACHR) et al., February 10, 2025, submitted by Senator Jeanne98  Shaheen........................................................    5299100Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance in Syria, submitted by Senator Jeanne101  Shaheen........................................................    60102103The White House's wildly inaccurate claims about USAID spending,104  the Washington Post, February 7, 2025, submitted by Senator105  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    62106107                                (iii)108109                  AFTER ASSAD: NAVIGATING SYRIA POLICY110111                              ----------112113                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2025114115                                       U.S. Senate,116                            Committee on Foreign Relations,117                                                    Washington, DC.118    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m., in119room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.120Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.121    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,122Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Van Hollen, Duckworth, and Rosen.123124           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,125               CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO126127    Senator Risch. Today we are going to talk about Syria. I128would call it opportunities that we want to look at--this is an129important hearing.130    For those of you in the audience, we are glad to have you.131This is a public hearing, and we appreciate you attending and132watching what we do, but participation is not allowed.133    So as I have said over and over again, if you interrupt the134proceedings, if you try to get attention, if you try to135distract the committee or witnesses in any way, you will136immediately be removed by our friends here who are working137security and be charged, and also you will be banned from the138committee for a year.139    So with that, on a zero tolerance policy, I have got a few140remarks I would like to make to open. Then I am going to yield141to the distinguished ranking member for remarks.142    Then we have two excellent witnesses here, one alumni of143the staff of this committee, and so, obviously, well trained,144and we are anxious to hear their thoughts.145    The ranking member and I have been discussing this issue146for some time, and I think there are opportunities here.147    Since the Hamas October 7 terror attack in Israel, long148held policy assumptions governing the Middle East have been149turned on their head. Iran's ring of fire, which had encircled150Israel with terror proxies and instability for decades, is now151in ruins.152    Thanks to our ally, Israel, Hamas is on its deathbed. The153crown jewel of Tehran's terror groups, Hezbollah, is in154tatters. Iran's weapons superhighway through Syria has been155severed, and perhaps, most shockingly, the Assad regime, a156fixture of brutality, collapsed in what seems like an instant.157    The fall of the Assad regime presents policymakers with a158dilemma. How should the United States engage with Syria? Should159we engage with Syria and at the same time safeguard U.S.160national security interests now that the Assad regime is gone?161    There is a very real tradeoff between opportunity and risk.162Too much engagement too soon could create more security163dilemmas but no or little engagement164    Too little engagement could give Russia and Iran the165ability to wield substantial influence again and also signal166that the U.S. has no interest, which would be an incorrect167assumption.168    Make no mistake, there are very real dangers to lifting169sanctions too quickly. After all, Syria's interim leader al-170Sharaa has rebranded himself as a moderate, but he has171supported some of the most violent terror groups in the Middle172East. He fought under al-Qaeda in Iraq, worked under the173Islamic State, and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda all in the174past.175    In addition, Syria is rightly subject to a vast array of176sanctions to include sanctions placed on the Caesar Act, which177I drew and all of us supported to get in place.178    Before the United States expands its engagement, several179vital security interests need to be addressed, and I am going180to list four of those in just a minute.181    Going back to al-Sharaa--and we should be fair that he has182been saying the right things, and much of the bad behavior that183he committed, admittedly, is quite a ways in the past.184    So let us talk about the things that need to be addressed185if we are going to engage with Syria.186    Number one, following the tragic attacks in New Orleans,187which was inspired by the Islamic State, and troubling reports188of ISIS infiltration across the southern border during the189Biden administration, we need evidence that the interim190government will not allow Syria to be a launching pad for191terror attacks against the United States or our partners.192    This includes full accountability and elimination of the193Assad regime's chemical weapons stockpiles.194    Second, Russia and Iran must be permanently ejected from195Syria. Moscow must not have use of its port on the196Mediterranean to threaten the United States or our allies. I am197particularly troubled by Damascus recently hosting a Russian198delegation to explore basing agreements.199    Third, the Assad regime tragically turned Syria into a200narco state, flooding the region with illegal drugs and fueling201corruption and instability in the region. Additionally, this202trade of methamphetamine and Captagon served as a source of203revenue for the Assad regime, undermining the impact of U.S.204and international sanctions and wreaking havoc on Syria's205neighbors.206    Assad's methamphetamine empire, and with its sprawling207infrastructure and literal mountains of inventory, has to be208destroyed.209    Fourth, the interim government must account for American210citizens detained by the Assad regime, including Austin Tice.211This is a top priority for the United States and should be a212top priority for Syrian leaders if they truly wish to work213toward change in our bilateral relationship.214    Finally, al-Sharaa dissolved the Syrian constitution and215appointed himself president for 4 years. Syrians deserve a216realistic political roadmap that returns power to the Syrian217people and does not fall back into a brutal dictatorship that218threatens them or American security.219    On all of these fronts the United States requires more than220promises. If the new Syrian regime wants to have a friend in221the United States, which the new interim government says that222they do, we need to see action on the items I have laid out. If223they do that they will find a willing partner in the United224States.225    In short, we must help and do enough to show the new226interim government we are sincere in our desire to build an227alliance, and at the same time we must, with clear eyes,228maintain the ability to disengage if they prove to be nothing229more than just another authoritarian government with no respect230for human rights or religious diversity.231    So I know the National Security Council at the White House232is working on a Syrian policy. I am happy they are doing that.233    We are giving them our input, and what I would propose that234they seriously consider what we are going to say here today,235and I am not talking about United States taxpayer dollars.236    What I am talking about is a gradual lifting of the Caesar237sanctions that we have put in place. Let them come into place.238Let us see how we are doing.239    Let us see how the new interim government acts, and if that240happens we will continue in a stream of lifting those241sanctions, and I am urging, because time is of the essence242here, that the National Security Council take this up as soon243as possible. Until that happens this is the policy of the244United States I believe we should follow that I will be245pursuing.246    With that, I know the ranking member and I share some247common thoughts in this regard. We have spoken about it a lot,248and like myself she has spoken with a lot of the Syrian people249and other people who have interests in the region.250    So with that, let me yield to Senator Shaheen.251252               STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,253        RANKING MEMBER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE254255    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Risch,256and welcome to our witnesses.257    Thank you both for joining us today.258    Let me also recognize--I understand we have some259representatives from the White Helmets who are in the audience260today.261    Let me thank you for your service to the people of Syria.262    I would like to begin by asking for consent to enter three263statements into the record, Mr. Chairman.264    The first is from General Mazloum who is the commanding265general of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the second is from the266Syrian American diaspora, and the third is from NGOs who have267been working on Syria assistance.268    Senator Risch. Without objection.269    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be270found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''271section at the end of this document.]272    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.273    Senator Risch and I, as he indicated, have spent a number274of years working toward a better Syria. We are both relieved275that after 50 years the Assad regime has finally fallen.276    This was a regime that tortured and killed hundreds of277thousands of Syrians. They forced millions to flee their homes.278They gave an opening for terror groups like ISIS. They extended279Vladimir Putin's reach and power into the Middle East.280    Assad's fall was a defeat for Putin. We want to make sure281that it continues to be a defeat for Putin. He not only lost a282deepwater port that allowed him to threaten NATO's southern283flank, but he lost a reliable defense partner who gave Russia a284decade to practice the military tactics in Syria that they are285using today in Ukraine.286    So Assad's fall, as Chairman Risch has pointed out, creates287an opportunity. It is a chance for us to rebuild from the288rubble, a chance for the economy to recover, a chance for289refugees to come home, and a chance to deny Putin, as well as290Iran's Revolutionary Guard, a strategic foothold in the region.291    Tehran wants the Syrian land bridge to the Mediterranean292and to its proxies. They want their UAV development and missile293sites back. They want to return to training security forces in294Syria.295    Stopping them, I believe, is critical to U.S. interests and296to our partners in the region like Lebanon and Israel.297    U.S. efforts in Syria are also key to preventing ISIS from298taking advantage of the vacuum. ISIS has terrorized people299across Syria and the region, and ISIS has radicalized and300inspired lone wolf terrorists who have struck inside the301American homeland--San Bernardino, California; Orlando,302Florida; Garland, Texas; Ohio State University; New York; New303Orleans.304    It is a very long list, and we should be doing everything305we can to prevent this terrorist group from reconstituting306itself.307    And it is not enough to leave the mission up to Turkey. We308need to stand with our Kurdish allies and the entire global309coalition to defeat ISIS. We cannot cut and run at this310critical moment.311    That is why the foreign aid freeze and recent attempts to312shut down the United States Agency for International313Development are so disturbing.314    Mr. Chairman, I would ask for consent to enter a summary on315assistance blocked in Syria for the record as well.316    Senator Risch. Without objection.317    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be318found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''319section at the end of this document.]320    Senator Shaheen. Not only have these efforts meant cutting321off programs to educate women and girls and help the very basic322needs like delivering babies, they have directly undermined323efforts to combat ISIS, to preserve evidence, to hold Assad and324his regime accountable for their crimes.325    We have heard that security guards have been at risk at Al-326Hol, which is a huge detention camp in Syria where ISIS is327looking to reconstitute itself. We cannot allow that to happen.328    Evidence that could help bring Austin Tice and recover329Americans who have been murdered in Syria needs to be330addressed. That is why I have asked Secretary Rubio to331immediately issue waivers for aid to Syria including to support332the security of ISIS detention facilities.333    At the same time, we need to move quickly toward targeted334sanctions relief, and we are not talking about throwing open335the doors to the U.S. banking system.336    These sanctions were put in place on the Assad regime. That337regime is gone. If we do not reevaluate those sanctions we338punish all Syrians for the sentence of Assad.339    Syria's transitional government needs to understand the340expectations of the United States and the international341community, and that means we need clear, measurable benchmarks342for an inclusive government that respects the rule of law and343protects the Syrian people.344    Sanctions relief will also help bring in the investments345from regional partners and the international community that346Syria needs to rebuild.347    This is a once in a generation opportunity, but it will not348last forever.349    So I hope our witnesses will speak to the challenges there350and the opportunities and help us think about how we can move351swiftly to take advantage of the situation.352    How can we incentivize inclusive governance, transparency,353and the rule of law? How can we support stability in Syria and354prevent our adversaries like Russia and Iran from regaining a355foothold?356    And what steps can we take in this short window of357opportunity to keep Americans safe from the threat of terrorist358groups like ISIS?359    So I look forward to hearing your testimony today and to360our conversation. Thank you.361    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.362    And the matters of expenditures of U.S. taxpayer dollars on363a lot of these matters, as you know, were fluid and being364reviewed. I have no doubt that this will get resolved365appropriately in the not too distant future.366    So with that, we are going to turn to our distinguished367panel.368    First of all, we are going to start with Mr. Michael Singh.369He is the managing director and Lane-Swig senior fellow at the370Washington Institute for Near East Policy.371    He was senior director of the Middle East affairs at the372White House from 2007 to 2008 and a director on the National373Security Council staff from 2005 to 2007. Mr. Singh co-chaired374the bipartisan congressionally appointed Syria Study Group with375Ms. Stroul, who also joins us here today.376    The group released its final report on U.S. policy toward377the conflict in Syria in September 2019. Much has changed since378then, which is why we are here today, and I suspect both of you379are surprised, as a lot of us were, at the breathtaking speed380and pace at which Syria changed.381    So with that, Mr. Singh, the floor is yours.382383  STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR AND LANE-SWIG384 SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY,385                         WASHINGTON, DC386387    Mr. Singh. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member388Shaheen, members of the committee. It is great to be back with389you to discuss this subject at a time that I agree is fraught390with risk but is also full of hope. The question before us,391really, is how do we seize this opportunity that both of you, I392think, have eloquently and accurately described while getting393around the many obstacles that there are to actually realizing394some of these positive benefits. I, frankly, find a lot to395agree with in both of your statements, and I will try to avoid396repeating it.397    First, the opportunity. You both described it. Syria has398been for years a Star Wars bar for U.S. adversaries in the399region, whether that is ISIS and al-Qaeda, Iran, Russia.400    It has been the platform for power projection for those401adversaries, where their actions have not just been confined to402Syria, but they have used Syria to try to attack Israel, to403destabilize Lebanon, and so on and so forth.404    And the conflict in Syria over the past 14 years has not405remained confined to Syria. It has drawn in numerous foreign406forces, including ours. It has sparked massive refugee flows to407Europe and to Syria's neighbors.408    It has led to, as you mentioned, to Syria's rise as a major409narco trafficking state, something which we had not seen410before, and even saw the first use of chemical weapons in war411for decades since, I think, World War I.412    And when you go through that list, it is absolutely clear413that the emergence of a new and better government in Syria414would represent probably the starkest and most positive change415of the many changes that the Middle East has seen since the416heinous attacks of October 7, 2023.417    But we are a long way from realizing that opportunity. We418can see it, but it is not yet within our grasp. What are the419obstacles?420    First, both of you mentioned Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the421group that has taken Damascus, and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa422and his background.423    It does seem as though Sharaa and HTS have sincerely, as424far as we can tell, broken ties with ISIS and with al-Qaeda,425and even cracked down on those groups within the territory they426previously controlled in Idlib.427    But HTS continues, as far as we can tell, to adhere to a428rigid and intolerant Islamist ideology, and it is reflected in429the way that they governed Idlib, which was repressive toward430minorities and toward women, toward dissent, and it was also431authoritarian. Sharaa's rule was unchallenged in Idlib.432    HTS for the past several years, since at least 2018, has433tried to reassure us that we are not their enemy and that they434want to work with the West.435    But there, I would say, are unmistakable parallels between436the rise of HTS and the rerise of the Taliban in Afghanistan,437which made a lot of the same promises that we are seeing now438from HTS and has not, obviously, followed through on those439promises.440    The second obstacle, as both of you mentioned, ISIS is not441defeated, and in fact, we have seen a resurgence in ISIS442attacks, according to CENTCOM, over the past year, and I think443there is a lot of reason to worry just from initial reports444that ISIS is trying to use this time--this time of instability445and transition, to mount a comeback, and there is a lot of446reason to worry that they could try to free those fighters and447those family members that both of you mentioned who are in448northeastern Syria hoping that, you know, we will take our eye449off the ball or otherwise the situation will break down.450    Third, I think there is a real risk that a new chapter of451conflict could open in Syria, whether that is between Syrian452factions, as HTS tries to consolidate its power, or as Turkey453tries to seize territory and target Kurdish fighters, including454those making up the SDF with which, as you know, we work.455    And then, fourth and finally, my view is our adversaries456are going to try to regain their footing in Syria.457    As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Russia wants to salvage a458role for itself. China's role was modest under the Assad459regime, but they may see strategic and economic opportunities460here. And even Iran, which the--I do not think the new461government of Syria is going to like, will try to take462advantage as it often does, of this poorly governed space and463to try to work through proxies.464    So what do we do? How can we seize the opportunity and get465around these obstacles?466    Briefly, let me recommend the following. First, we need to467continue to prioritize our counterterrorism operations and468partnerships. We cannot ease up the pressure on ISIS.469    Second, I do think we should engage pragmatically with HTS470and test its willingness to cooperate on areas of shared471concern like countering Iran and ISIS, counter narcotics,472border security and so forth, and we need to watch and see if473HTS is truly committed to more inclusive governance, which is,474I think, the key to long term peace and stability and the key475to our interests as well.476    Third, we should take a phased and performance based477approach to the relief of sanctions, which is something478absolutely Syrians will need as they go forward.479    And then, finally, as we look at the bigger regional480picture, I lay out a full agenda in my written testimony, but481several things are key.482    First and foremost, we have to work assiduously to ensure483that Syria never again falls into the orbit of Iran, and we484cannot cede the ground of Syria to Russia and China.485    Second, we need to work in lockstep with our Arab partners.486We did not do this in Iraq after 2003. And what happened was487those partners shunned Baghdad, and we and they left it exposed488to Iranian domination. We do not want to see that happen here.489    Third, we need to reach an understanding with Turkey that490it should respect Syrian sovereignty and refrain from actions491that are going to undermine stability or our interests there.492    And then, finally, we need to take this opportunity to try493to cement Israeli-Syrian nonaggression understandings, which494could eventually lead to actual peace between Israel and Syria,495which is something we have sought for a long time.496    It is a full agenda but I agree it is a historic497opportunity, and seizing it, I think, is going to take498patience, pragmatism, but most of all American leadership.499    Thanks very much.500    [The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]501502                Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Singh503504    Since Hamas' heinous attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the505geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has shifted dramatically. Yet506many of these changes are tentative or incomplete--Hamas in Gaza and507Hezbollah in Lebanon will seek to rebuild with Iran's help, and Iran508itself will look to Russia and China as it aims to rearm. In each509place, whether the changes wrought by a year-and-a-half of war are510lasting or fleeting depends heavily on the actions and determination of511local and external actors.512    In Syria, on the other hand, change is not only certain, it is513unfolding swiftly. More than fifty years of Assad family rule has come514to an abrupt end. It is cause for satisfaction in Washington--the Assad515regime sponsored terrorism against the United States and Israel, served516as a base of operations for Iran and Russia, brutally repressed the517Syrian people, employed chemical weapons and clandestinely sought518nuclear weapons, and in recent years became a leading trafficker of519illegal narcotics. Whatever Syria's next chapter may hold, it will be a520sharp break from the past five decades.521    Yet there is good reason for unease regarding what Syria's future522holds and its implications for American interests. The new government523in Damascus is dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a US-designated524terrorist group whose roots lie in the global jihadist movement525spearheaded by Al-Qaida and whose leader--now appointed as Syria's526president--spent time in prison for fighting against US forces in Iraq.527Even if the group's intentions are good, the task facing it is528enormous--Syrian history between its independence in 1946 the rise of529Hafez al-Assad in 1970 was marked by numerous coups and communal530violence, and since 2011 the country has been effectively divided into531statelets and occupied by foreign forces. The divisions which Syrians532will need to surmount if they are to come together and rebuild their533society and economy are deep indeed, and extend beyond the country's534own borders.535    While putting Syria on a better path may be a daunting challenge,536it is also an opportunity--not just for Syrians themselves, but for the537Middle East, the West, and the United States. The Assad regime was538implicated in many of the most serious national security threats539emanating from the region and contributed to threats globally. The540United States should, through pragmatic but cautious engagement,541explore whether the Assad regime's collapse could represent a542meaningful reduction in these threats.543                        threats to us interests544    In a world full of conflicts, the war in Syria has long stood out545for the threats it posed to US interests. As detailed in the September5462019 report of the congressionally mandated Syria Study Group \1\,547numerous threats have long originated in the country. ISIS, Al-Qaida,548and other terrorist groups--including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has549historical links to both--have long operated out of Syria. Though ISIS550is diminished, it continues to mount attacks. Syria has also been a551forward operating base for Iran, which used the country both to552coordinate with regional terrorist proxies and for the transshipment of553arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and groups in the West Bank; and for554Russia, whose 2015 intervention in Syria aimed to thwart US objectives555there and reestablish Moscow as a regional player. The conflict saw the556open use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and raised questions557about the disposition of any residual elements of Syria's nuclear558program, which was largely destroyed by Israel in 2007.559---------------------------------------------------------------------------560    \1\ The Syria Study Group report can be found here: https://561www.usip.org/syria-study-group-final-report562---------------------------------------------------------------------------563    Nor were the Syrian conflict's effects confined within the564country's own borders--Syrian refugees flooded and imposed a565significant economic burden on the region and Europe. The conflict drew566in Turkey, Israel, and of course the United States, among others, and567placed US partners like the Syrian Democratic Forces into direct568conflict with Turkish and Russian-backed forces, the latter of which569also used Syria to project power into the Mediterranean and Africa.570More recently, Syria has also become a major global narco-trafficking571hub, producing eighty percent of the world's captagon supply and572generating illicit revenues worth three times those earned by Mexican573drug cartels, according to the British government. \2\574---------------------------------------------------------------------------575    \2\ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-the-illicit-drug-576trade-fuelling-assads-war-machine577---------------------------------------------------------------------------578    These threats have evolved but not disappeared with the collapse of579the Assad regime. Several risks stand out in the current situation:580581     The Rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The Assad regime's582overthrow came at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which had583for several years ruled over the city and province of Idlib in northern584Syria. HTS presents a complex case for US counter-terrorism policy, and585in many respects a novel one, though its rise has parallels to the586Taliban in Afghanistan. HTS' leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, at one point587fought with Al-Qaida in Iraq (which later became ISIS) against US588forces, subsequently spending 7 years in an American-run prison. From589there, he traveled a circuitous path, breaking from ISIS and590affiliating with Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, with whom he also591subsequently broke ties pursuant to his decision to focus on fighting592the Assad regime rather than engaging in international terrorism.593    While HTS and Sharaa eschewed attacks abroad, their record594governing Idlib gives cause for concern. Though the group acted against595jihadists in its territory who sought to mount overseas attacks, HTS596fighters also clashed as recently as 2022 with US forces pursuing ISIS597leaders. In addition, Sharaa and HTS have praised the use of terrorism598elsewhere, such as Hamas' attacks against Israel. In addition, Sharaa599in the past characterized HTS as defending not just Syria, but600defending Sunni Muslims globally, and the HTS government in Idlib601persecuted non-Sunni minorities, executed dissenting Sunni scholars,602repressed women, and even imprisoned and tortured Western journalists.603Furthermore, the HTS government of Idlib was essentially authoritarian,604with Sharaa as its unchallenged leader.605    In recent years however--even before taking control of Damascus in606December 2024--Sharaa and HTS have sought to project moderation. The607group reportedly provided assurances to US envoys in 2018 that it did608not consider the United States an enemy, softened its policies toward609the Christian and Druze residents of Idlib, denied plans to enforce a610harsh Islamist agenda, and since assuming control of the Syrian611government placed women in a handful of senior positions and welcomed612envoys from the West and elsewhere. Yet there is reason to worry that613HTS' shifts may simply represent new means for accomplishing614longstanding ends. HTS ideologues have compared the group to the615Taliban, with Washington Institute scholar Aaron Zelin noting, ``The616Taliban's successful negotiation of the United States' exit from617Afghanistan in August 2021 and the prior talks that occurred in Doha,618Qatar, provide a potential example of new strategies that jihadist619groups might employ to further their ultimate goals.'' \3\620---------------------------------------------------------------------------621    \3\ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/622PolicyFocus175Zelinv2.pdf623624     A Possible Resurgence of ISIS. While ISIS no longer625controls significant territories in Syria, the group is not defeated.626Indeed, as of June 2024, ISIS was on track to double the number of627attacks it conducted in 2023, according to Centcom. \4\ There is good628reason to worry that ISIS may seize upon current events to mount a629broader comeback. In the days following the fall of the Assad regime,630ISIS reportedly seized significant numbers of weapons in formerly631regime-held areas. Among other purposes, those weapons could be used in632any effort to free the thousands of ISIS fighters imprisoned in633northeastern Syria, of the tens of thousands of ISIS family members--634spouses but especially children--from the Al-Hol and Roj camps. These635prisons and camps are guarded by the US-partnered Syrian Democratic636Forces, who have already come under new pressures since the regime's637collapse.638---------------------------------------------------------------------------639    \4\ https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-640View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-641june-2024/642---------------------------------------------------------------------------643    There is also a risk that Syria could become a safe haven for other644terrorist groups. In its campaign to oust Assad and focus on Syria645first and foremost, HTS did not just break from but clashed with AQ,646ISIS, and other externally focused groups in recent years. Now that it647has accomplished its proximate goal of overthrowing Assad, however, its648will and ability to persist in this approach will be tested. Western649policymakers will doubtless be mindful of the fact that the Afghan650Taliban also pledged not to permit territory they controlled to be used651in overseas terror plots, but has not honored that promise. Nor is it652clear that HTS, now that it is in control of Damascus, will adopt the653same disapproving attitude toward Palestinian terrorist groups active654there as they have done toward jihadist groups targeting the West,655especially given Sharaa's past praise for Hamas attacks on Israel.656657     Renewed Intra-Syrian Conflict. In abolishing Syria's658constitution and declaring himself president, Ahmed al-Sharaa also659called for the dissolution of the country's numerous armed groups.660While this putatively included his own group, HTS, it also implied that661groups such as the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army (SNA) and US-662partnered Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) should cease to exist as663independent entities and somehow be integrated into a national664military. While talks are reportedly ongoing between the new government665and the SDF, it is not clear whether an agreement will be reached;666Syria's Kurdish minority not only faces possible attack by Turkish-667backed forces and ISIS remnants, but has a history of persecution at668the hands of Damascus which will likely diminish its willingness to669disband its forces.670    Other flashpoints in post-Assad Syria include the Syria-Turkey671border, where Turkey and its local partners have sought to expand the672territory they control; the Golan Heights, where Israel has moved into673territories previously controlled by forces allied with the Syrian674regime; and the Iraq-Syria border, which remains closed by the Iraqi675government and patrolled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.676    Role of Iran, Russia, and China. The fall of the Assad regime was a677blow to Russia, for whom Syria was a traditional locus of Soviet678influence in the Middle East and then a last bastion of post-Soviet679Russian influence. Syria was also touted by Moscow as an example of680Russia's steadfastness as an ally, something US partners in the region681were quick to echo when seeking commitments from Washington. Syria also682served more pragmatic ends for Russia--it provided both an air base and683a warm-water port, a showcase for Russian arms sales, and a proving684ground for Russian commanders, many of whom subsequently fought in685Ukraine. Despite Assad's fall, however, the new Syrian government and686the Russian government have already held multiple high-level contacts,687and Sharaa has expressed a certain pragmatism in approaching Moscow,688noting the Syrian military equipment and energy facilities are Russian689in origin. If Syria cannot obtain what it needs in the defense, energy,690industrial, and other sectors from the West--or cannot do so at a691competitive price--it may turn to Russia despite Moscow's past support692for Assad.693    For Iran, Syria even more important than it was for Russia.694Damascus was the closest thing that Tehran had to a state ally in the695region, its other key partners all being nonstate actors. Syria696provided strategic depth to Iranian efforts in Lebanon and the West697Bank: a transshipment point, operations room, and source of revenue all698in one. When the Syrian revolution erupted in 2011, Iran provided the699Assad regime with the shock troops it needed to survive, in the form of700Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, militants and conscripts from Iraq,701Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and even officers of the Islamic702Revolutionary Guard Corps itself. The loss of the Assad regime is703grievous for Iran's so-called ``forward defense'' model, interrupting704the land and air bridge from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon705and the West Bank. Without a compliant government in Damascus, Iran706will be hard pressed to rebuild Hezbollah or liaise as it did before707with Palestinian terrorist groups.708    It seems unlikely that any new Syrian government will want to709replicate Assad's cozy relationship with Tehran. While Sharaa has710called for normal relations with Tehran, this is in itself something of711a rebuke, as it carries the implicit accusation that the prior712arrangement disrespected Syrian sovereignty. More significantly, the713Iranian embassy was ransacked during the storming of Damascus, and the714new Syrian authorities have reportedly seized Iranian weapons bound for715Hezbollah on more than one occasion. More likely than a close Syrian-716Iranian security relationship under HTS rule would be Iran seeking to717capitalize on security and governance vacuums in Syria by working with718non-state actors in poorly governed regions or in the Lebanese and719Iraqi border regions where Iranian proxies are influential, or even720seeking to use them to weaken or destabilize a fledgling Syrian721government.722    While China has not been nearly as involved in Syria as either723Russia or Iran, it may perceive economic and strategic opportunities in724Syria--as it has in Iraq and Afghanistan--if the country seems to be725stabilizing to the point where Chinese officials and businessmen could726operate safely. China frequently used its Security Council veto to727protect the Assad regime and reportedly engaged in intelligence728cooperation with Syrian counterparts, but is likely not nearly as729associated with the former government as are Russia or China in the730minds of Syrians. While Beijing may be discomfited by HTS' past731associations with Uyghur foreign fighters, it will not consider HTS'732ideology an insurmountable obstacle to good relations, especially if it733can crowd out Western influence in cultivating them.734                      considerations for us policy735    The fall of the Syrian regime is a vindication of a sustained,736bipartisan US policy opposing Assad's continued rule and supporting his737opponents. US sanctions undoubtedly helped to weaken Assad, as did738American pressure on his key supporters--Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.739At the same time, American support for and partnership with Syrian740opposition groups not only isolated the regime, but helped to suppress741ISIS and other terrorist groups. Nevertheless, US policy must now742inevitably shift in response to events and in order to ensure the743advancement of American interests.744745     Engagement with HTS. It is not the case, unfortunately,746that simply because the Assad regime was an enemy of the United States747that the new Syrian government will be a friend. Even if HTS maintains748its opposition to international terrorism having accomplished its749proximate goal of overthrowing Assad, it remains an Islamist movement750with a record of intolerance, repression, and authoritarianism. How--751and if--it will work with other groups and factions in Syria and US752partners in the region remains to be seen.753    In approaching HTS, the US should be patient, pragmatic, and754interests-focused. This was the approach of the Trump administration in755its first term toward HTS in Idlib, when then-Special Envoy Ambassador756Jim Jeffrey held back-channel talks with Ahmed al-Sharaa. This757pragmatism also characterized the initial approach the Biden758administration took toward HTS and Sharaa, lifting the bounty on the759latter but otherwise insisting that US policy would be based on HTS'760actions, not its words.761    In our dealings with Sharaa and his government, the US should look762for areas of common interest where HTS' intentions can be tested and763trust can be built. These include sharing intelligence on border764security, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the Iranian threat network,765against which the new Syrian authorities have already reportedly been766acting. When it comes to issues of Syrian governance, Washington should767be patient and take our lead from Syrians themselves. While a Syria768that is governed in an authoritarian or sectarian manner is unlikely to769be stable, prosperous, or friendly to the West, the US should avoid770seeking to impose our views regarding precisely what form of government771Syria must have or how it should arrive at it. Likewise, it should be772up to Syrians to decide how to balance backward-looking accountability773for the many heinous crimes committed during a decade-plus of war774against the need to move forward as a unified society.775776     Sanctions. The highest-priority request of the new Syrian777government has been for the US and the West to lift sanctions, and778understandably so--Syria's economy and infrastructure have been779devastated by war, causing the previously middle-income country to780descend into wrack and ruin. The Biden administration provided modest781initial sanctions relief, largely to support humanitarian relief and782the provision of essential services in Syria. Yet extensive sanctions783remain targeting both the Syrian government and HTS itself.784    Washington should adopt a phased and performance-based approach to785relieving sanctions--as HTS and Syrian authorities demonstrate that the786original grounds for the sanctions no longer apply, Congress and the787Trump administration should consider waiving or lifting them. Sanctions788that were intended primarily to isolate the Assad regime might be the789first to be eased, whereas those prohibiting sensitive defense and790related exports might remain in place for some time, for example.791    Just as importantly, however, the US approach to sanctions relief792should be tied clearly to US interests rather than to any well-793intentioned efforts at political engineering. While Washington would be794wise to use sanctions to incentivize the Syrian government to break795from extremism, shun Iran, and govern inclusively, placing too many796conditions on sanctions relief, especially those not clearly connected797to US national security interests, risks alienating the new Syrian798government and pushing them toward US rivals. Conversely ``Not Assad''799is an insufficient condition for sanctions relief, and moving too800quickly would risk setting a precedent that extremist groups elsewhere801might hope to emulate.802803     Counter-terrorism. Sharaa has called the US presence in804Syria ``illegal'' and has called for the US-partnered Syrian Democratic805Forces (SDF) to dissolve, disarm, and integrate into the new Syrian806military. At least superficially, Sharaa's apparent goal of a unified807Syria under a single authority could well align with US interests; in808the long run, the best way to prevent an ISIS resurgence or the809establishment of terrorist safe havens is for Syria to be well and810capably governed, to cultivate professional and effective security811forces, and to eschew the use of terrorism as a policy tool. The US812should support Syria's movement in this direction, for example by813encouraging the SDF to reach appropriate understandings with any new814government in Damascus whose legitimacy is internationally recognized.815But in the meantime the US should continue to prioritize counter-816terrorism operations in order to prevent a resurgence of ISIS or817related groups.818819     Geopolitical Concerns. While the Assad regime's collapse820has been followed by popular expectations that Syria's diplomatic821alignment would shift, the reality is likely to be more complex. While822the new Syrian government may, as noted above, have pragmatic reasons823for good relations with Moscow and Beijing, it is important to US824interests that Syria durably leave the orbit of Iran and its proxies.825    While Sharaa and HTS have reached out to Arab neighbors--many of826whom were in the process of normalizing with Assad before he fled to827Russia--their strongest regional relationship is with Turkey, whose828influence in Syria is resented by Arab Gulf states in particular and829which may yet harbor designs on portions of Syrian territory occupied830by Turkish forces or proxies. The Arab states themselves, which regard831political Islamism as nearly great a threat as they do Iran, are likely832to be wary in their own engagement with Damascus. This has been833demonstrated by the divergent approaches that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have834adopted toward Sharaa thus far, with the former offering aid and the835latter holding back. For its part, Israel acted swiftly after Assad's836fall to defend its interests, but Sharaa and other Syrian officials837have suggested an openness toward better relations with Jerusalem.838    It is up to HTS to satisfy their neighbors that they pose no839threat, but the US has an undeniable stake in the outcome. Assuming840Damascus can assuage their concerns, Washington should encourage its841Arab allies to partner closely with Syria in order to avoid a repeat of842post-2003 Iraq, which was shunned by fellow Arab states and became easy843pickings for Iran and other malign actors. For Washington, several844priorities stand out:845    1) Ensuring that Syria never again becomes a conduit for Iranian846power projection in the region, working as necessary with the Syrian847government to this end;848    2) Limiting the security and defense relationship between Damascus,849Moscow, and Beijing, while recognizing that, as elsewhere in the850region, these relationships are likely to be cordial ones;851    3) Coordinating with Arab partners to present Damascus with common852benchmarks for sanctions relief and economic and security partnership853and Syria's eventual integration into regional security frameworks;854    4) Ensuring that Turkey respects Syrian sovereignty and does not855seek to capitalize on this transitional period in ways that undermine856the country's future stability or US interests;857    5) Brokering Israel-Syria non-aggression understandings that could858lead to eventual peace and normalization, as well as working to improve859Israel-Turkey relations to prevent the two US allies from increased860friction; and861    6) Working closely with US partners in Europe--particularly862France--and elsewhere to ensure a common Western approach to the Syrian863transition.864                               conclusion865    The fall of the Assad regime in Syria is a watershed moment for the866Middle East and could be a boon for US interests and those of our867regional partners. In recent years the US has been torn between868excessive intervention and exasperated neglect in our approach to the869Middle East. The current situation in Syria calls for neither, but870instead requires policymakers to recognize that vital American871interests are implicated there, and advancing them will require872patience, pragmatism, and US leadership.873874    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.875    Now we will turn to Ms. Stroul. She is the director of876research and Shelly and Michael Kassen senior fellow at the877Washington Institute for Near East Policy.878    As mentioned, she co-chaired the Syria Study Group with Mr.879Singh in 2019 before leaving the institute from 2021 through8802023 to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the881Middle East, the Pentagon's top civilian official with882responsibility for the region.883    Prior to joining the institute in 2018 she served for 5884years as a senior professional staff member of this885distinguished committee where she covered the Middle East,886North Africa, and Turkey.887    Undoubtedly, you have some thoughts on this, and we would888love to hear you, and welcome back.889890 STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND SHELLY AND891MICHAEL KASSEN SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR892                  EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC893894    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much, Senator.895    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the896committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.897    Five years ago, serving as a co-chair of the Syria Study898Group alongside Mr. Singh, what we testified then was that899Syria and a robust U.S. engagement in Syria is in the American900national security interest, and we also said at the time that901the drivers of conflict in Syria remained even though there was902an assumption that the Assad regime had won, the drivers of903conflict would leave Syria perpetually unstable, and I think904those recommendations have borne out.905    The Assad regime had not won. We failed to understand how906hollowed out his tenuous hold over Syria was. But the main907point that I want to make here is that those drivers of908conflict remain today, and if there is not a concise,909coordinated effort to address those drivers of conflict, the910risk is that Syria falls back into conflict, which is what911happens in most post-conflict societies that have experienced912this kind of deadly conflict for as long as the Syrian people913have.914    The risks are too high and I think it is worth noting,915again, both of you mentioned these in your opening statements,916what the risks are because of how Syria under Assad served as a917base from which terrorism and instability radiated across the918region, affecting our national security as well as that of919Europe and the Middle East.920    Under Assad, Syria had a nuclear weapons and a chemical921weapons program. He emptied his prisons of violent Sunni922extremists during the U.S. war in Iraq, which led to al-Qaeda923in Iraq and an insurgency against U.S. forces.924    He used chemical weapons, which remain in the country925today. Torture, barrel bombs, starvation, and other brutal926measures against the Syrian people, sending millions of927refugees fleeing for safety, which still affect the stability928of our partners today.929    He granted Russia a naval base on the eastern930Mediterranean, remained Iran's one strategic ally in the931region, and allowed Hezbollah and various Iran backed groups to932attack U.S. forces and Israel from within Syria.933    His regime produced and smuggled the narcotic Captagon on934across the Middle East, and finally, his brutality and935unwillingness to address the drivers of conflict in Syria made936the seizure of Syrian territory by ISIS and al-Qaeda a reality.937    With Assad out and a new transitional government in, we938have an opportunity to shape outcomes in Syria that protect939American interests, specifically with respect to940counterterrorism and counter Iran objectives.941    But events on the ground and international engagement with942Ahmed al-Sharaa are outpacing U.S. policy. We must urgently943update our approach to the post-Assad Syria.944    No surprise I am going to agree with a lot of what Mr.945Singh said. I think a U.S. policy review must answer the946following three questions.947    Engagement--what commitments does Washington seek from948Damascus's new leaders?949    Sanctions--what actions are required in order to begin the950process of providing expanded sanctions relief and lifting951state level sanctions on Syria?952    And three is the U.S. military presence. What are the953necessary conditions in order for the U.S. military to transfer954its counterterrorism mission in northeast Syria without risking955the reemergence of ISIS?956    We should engage the new government in Damascus and set out957a series of benchmarks to assess whether Ahmed al-Sharaa,958Syria's unelected president who grew out of al-Qaeda, is959willing and able to govern in a manner that does not further960destabilize Syria and the region or threaten American961interests.962    Examples of benchmarks--appropriate counterterrorism action963against ISIS, al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and Iran associated964groups; limiting acts of violence outside the rule of law and965enabling transitional justice and accountability; holding him966accountable for the transition timeline he set out himself,967including drafting a new constitution, ensuring equitable968representation in governance and resource distribution, and969recommitting to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel.970    Now, building on what Mr. Singh said about971counterterrorism, there is no alternative to the U.S. military972and its local partner, the SDF, for the defeat ISIS mission.973    The U.S. should reaffirm our commitment to maintaining U.S.974forces in Syria lest all the gains against ISIS be squandered.975We should also begin consultations and planning for the976conditions under which we could transfer the military mission977without breathing new life into ISIS.978    Though the Administration announced important exemptions to979the assistance freeze for lifesaving humanitarian aid,980nonhumanitarian aid is just as important.981    This committee has played a critical role for more than a982decade in oversight of assistance to groups like the White983Helmets, NGOs working at ISIS detention camps, stabilization984programs in communities liberated from ISIS, and the985documentation of war crimes.986    Cutting off programs that help communities recover after987surviving the brutalities of either Assad's rule or ISIS988without plans to transition funding or services to non-U.S.989actors will exacerbate the drivers of conflict that will keep990Syria unsafe.991    Moreover, the dismantling of USAID and anticipated992reduction in State Department career personnel, the U.S.993Government risks losing critical technical expertise in994implementing U.S. programs and the delicate work of engaging995post-conflict countries.996    The United States is safer if Syria is stable and can997address threats rising from within its territory without998outside intervention.999    In turn, a more resilient Syria promotes greater security1000across the Middle East, leading to more stable countries and1001prospects for widened economic and security cooperation with1002the United States.1003    Finally, a Syria that is not destabilizing, attacking, or1004antagonizing its neighbors--Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and1005Turkey--is also in the U.S. national security interest.1006    Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify today.1007    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]10081009                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Dana Stroul10101011    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, members of the committee,1012thank you for the opportunity to testify on the future of U.S. policy1013toward Syria. Five years ago, while serving as a co-chair of the Syria1014Study Group, I testified before this committee on the enduring1015importance of Syria for U.S. national security. Today, not only do1016developments in Syria remain critical for protecting Americans at home,1017but they also present real opportunities for the Syrian people, for the1018Middle East, and for the United States.1019    In order to grasp the stakes for Middle East stability, and the1020safety of Americans, it is important to recall how Syria--under the1021rule of Bashar al-Assad--was long a base from which terrorism and1022instability radiated across the region and U.S. adversaries thrived.1023    Under Assad's rule:10241025     Syria developed a covert nuclear weapons program, which1026was eliminated by Israel in 2007.10271028     Syria developed a chemical weapons program, which to date1029has not been entirely dismantled.10301031     Syria emptied its prisons of violent Sunni extremists1032during the second Gulf war, which began in 2003, and facilitated their1033movement to Iraq, leading to the establishment of al-Qaeda in Iraq and1034an insurgency against U.S. forces that killed and wounded thousands.10351036     The Assad regime used chemical weapons, torture, barrel1037bombs, starvation, and other brutal measures to suppress peaceful1038protests by Syrian citizens, sending millions of refugees fleeing for1039safety across the Middle East and into Europe.10401041     The Assad regime welcomed Russian and Iranian support,1042allowing both to gain access to the Mediterranean and use land routes1043to arm Lebanese Hezbollah and disperse increasingly sophisticated1044weapons across the region.10451046     Assad, as Iran's one strategic ally in the Middle East,1047allowed the use of Syrian territory by Hezbollah and various Iran-1048backed militia groups to attack U.S. forces and Israel.10491050     The drivers of conflict related to the Assad regime's1051brutal rule facilitated the seizure of Syrian territory by the Islamic1052State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda affiliates. For years, ISIS has flourished1053most in Assad-regime-held areas.10541055     Assad-regime forces produced and smuggled the narcotic1056Captagon across the Middle East, utilizing criminal and terrorist1057networks.10581059    With Bashar al-Assad out and a new transitional government in1060Damascus, the United States has an opportunity to work with its allies1061and partners to shape outcomes in Syria that promote regional security1062and protect American interests, specifically with respect to1063counterterrorism and counter-Iran objectives. U.S. engagement toward1064the new Syrian leadership is fraught: its leaders grew out of al-Qaeda1065and many are designated as terrorists, while others espouse extremist1066views. But events on the ground and international engagement with the1067new leadership in Syria are outpacing U.S. policy. America must1068urgently update its approach to post-Assad Syria, and test the new1069Syrian leadership to determine the opportunities and risks associated1070with engagement. The United States retains significant levers of1071influence: military pressure against ISIS through its continued1072presence in northeast Syria; the U.S.-led sanctions architecture, the1073unlocking of which could facilitate meaningful economic recovery and1074reconstruction; U.S. diplomatic leadership and its unmatched ability to1075convene like-minded partners; and U.S. foreign and technical1076assistance.1077    A U.S. policy review must address the following issues:10781079     Engagement. What actions and commitments does Washington1080seek from Damascus's new leaders in order to acknowledge the new1081government as the internationally recognized representative of Syria?10821083     Sanctions. What actions and commitments are required in1084order to begin the process of providing expanded sanctions relief and1085lifting state-level sanctions on Syria?10861087     U.S. military presence. What are the necessary conditions1088in order for the U.S. military to transfer its counterterrorism mission1089in northeast Syria without risking the reemergence of ISIS?10901091    Engagement. The self-appointed transitional president of Syria,1092Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre--Muhammad al-Jolani--1093is moving quickly to signal his commitment to governing in an inclusive1094manner, disarming and integrating all armed groups, stabilizing Syria's1095economy, and reintegrating Syria into the international community. Al-1096Sharaa emphasizes his commitment to not imposing strict Islamic law on1097Syria's religiously and ethnically diverse society, and to preventing1098both terrorist activity at home and Syria serving as a base for1099terrorist operations abroad. The challenge for the United States is1100determining if his nascent government is appropriately separated from1101its al-Qaeda/ISIS roots and both willing and able to counter terrorism,1102resist malign Iranian influence, and govern Syria in a manner that does1103not lead to further cycles of violence.1104    While the United States has not yet determined if the new Damascus1105leaders' early moves meet benchmarks for support, an emerging coalition1106of U.S. allies and partners across the Middle East, Europe, and Turkey1107is moving quickly to engage him. These governments, however, are not1108coordinating messaging or expectations with each other or with America;1109the risk is that Damascus hears mixed messages and does not feel1110compelled to commit to any program of action that can prevent future1111instability and violence. It is noteworthy that while the United States1112has engaged Sharaa only at the assistant secretary level in December11132024, the Qatari emir recently visited him in Damascus, and Sharaa'1114first trip abroad was to meet with the crown prince of Saudi Arabia1115followed by the president of Turkey. Al-Sharaa now has invitations to1116Paris and Berlin, and may attend the Egypt-hosted emergency summit on1117the Palestinians in late February.1118    The United States should engage the new government in Damascus at1119the political level, and set out a series of benchmarks to assess1120whether Sharaa and his government are willing and able to govern Syria1121in a manner that does not further destabilize Syria or the region, or1122threaten American interests. Benchmarks include:11231124     Holding the government accountable for its own transition1125timeline of three to 5 years, including the national dialogue and1126drafting of a new constitution.11271128     Taking appropriate counterterrorism actions against ISIS/1129al-Qaeda/affiliates and Iran-associated non-state groups. (Here, the1130new government's actions to counter Hezbollah-associated networks'1131operations on the Lebanon-Syria border is an encouraging early1132indicator.)11331134     Consolidating security control over formerly regime-held1135areas of Syria and demobilizing armed groups.11361137     Working to limit acts of retributive violence outside the1138rule of law, and enable transitional justice and accountability for all1139Syrians who suffered under the Assad regime.11401141     Ensuring equitable representation at the national and1142local levels in Syria's governance, and fair distribution of resources.11431144     Upholding commitments that ensure the security of U.S.1145allies, including recommitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with1146Israel.11471148    Sanctions. Before Assad's ouster, U.S.-led sanctions only permitted1149humanitarian aid delivery to regime-held areas, otherwise blocking all1150economic engagement or reconstruction. In early January of this year,1151the United States issued General License 24 for a 6-month period to1152allow certain transactions with the Syrian government and personal1153remittances through the Syrian Central Bank. It also provided a waiver1154to the Foreign Assistance Act in order for America's partners to1155provide aid to Syria without the risk of violating U.S. sanctions. But1156the U.S. designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, and1157other state-level sanctions like the congressional Caesar sanctions,1158will reduce appetites for the kind of economic engagement necessary to1159effect real change in Syria. The United States should urgently initiate1160a thorough and deliberative process regarding the state-level terrorism1161designations on Syria and sanctions tied to the behavior of the Assad1162regime.1163    In the short term, the United States can do more to ease Syria's1164economic recovery by getting out of the way: partners in Europe and the1165Middle East can fill in gaps and provide assistance even if America1166will not, as long as they are assured of not violating U.S. sanctions.1167U.N. technical experts, as well as international financial1168institutions, can also play a role in stabilizing Syria's economy and1169setting it on a path to recovery. This will require targeted sanctions1170relief and waivers, and a clearly communicated strategy. A process1171should be initiated soon to expand the waivers granted in General1172License 24.1173    In the medium-to-long term, more expansive sanctions relief should1174be tied to the performance of the new government and its commitment to1175following through on its promising reform and stabilization agenda.1176    U.S. military presence. About two thousand U.S. military personnel1177remain in northeast Syria under the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.1178These forces are sustaining pressure on ISIS through unilateral and1179partnered military strikes, and supporting the Kurdish-majority Syrian1180Democratic Forces (SDF), who maintain custody of nearly nine thousand1181ISIS detainees and forty thousand ISIS-affiliated families in displaced1182persons camps. The U.S. partnership with the SDF is the main irritant1183with NATO ally Turkey, which considers the SDF part of the Turkey-based1184Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)--an entity designated as a terrorist1185group by the United States, Turkey, and others. Ankara in turn opposes1186SDF ambitions to establish a semiautonomous region within Syria, on1187Turkey's border. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) is1188currently engaged in a military offensive against the SDF in northeast1189Syria.1190    The new leadership in Damascus has stated its commitment to1191preventing Syria from being exploited for transnational terrorism, a1192willingness to take over security at the ISIS detention facilities and1193displaced persons camps, and an openness to absorbing the SDF into the1194new national Syrian security forces. But this is a significant1195undertaking that will require training, equipment, intelligence1196support, and time. In the near term, there is no viable, combat-1197credible alternative to the United States and the SDF to take over the1198defeat-ISIS mission. Therefore, the U.S. should urgently initiate a1199political and military dialogue with key stakeholders on the timeline1200and conditions under which it could transfer the military mission, and1201underscore its commitment to maintaining U.S. forces in Syria for the1202short-to-medium term lest all the battlefield gains against ISIS be1203squandered.12041205     With the SDF, the United States needs to back its local1206partner while facilitating dialogue with the new government in1207Damascus. The SDF leadership has already acknowledged its commitment to1208a future within a unified Syria; the U.S. should support the SDF's1209leaders in seeking reasonable assurances to integrate into the new1210Syrian national forces and secure commitments for Syrian Kurdish1211representation in the central government along with a local-level role.1212The SDF should immediately take steps to separate its forces from non-1213Syrian fighters like those from the PKK.12141215     With the Damascus government, the United States is already1216testing its commitment to countering terrorism by providing operational1217intelligence against ISIS threats. If the new government demonstrates1218will and capability for targeting ISIS and al-Qaeda threats within1219Syria, the United States should begin a multiyear process to transfer1220the on-the-ground mission and determine how it can still support1221counterterrorism activities without such a presence. This supporting1222role could include intelligence sharing, training, and the provision of1223limited kinds of equipment.12241225     With Turkey, the United States should initiate a political1226and military dialogue that takes stock of the Islamic State's ability1227to reconstitute in Syria, and formulates the conditions and timeline1228under which America could safely redeploy out of Syria. As part of this1229dialogue, the U.S. should seek commitments from Turkey to stop1230targeting the SDF and direct the SNA to cease attacking the SDF and1231terrorizing communities in the northeast: these actions are threatening1232hard-fought gains against ISIS.12331234     With Damascus and with Ankara, the U.S. must have credible1235assurances that ISIS detainees, as well as families in displaced1236persons camps, will be treated securely and humanely in accordance with1237international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. The U.S.1238should also reenergize efforts to repatriate Iraqi and third-country1239nationals from these facilities, so that the population is more1240manageable.12411242    U.S. foreign assistance freeze. Though the Trump administration1243announced exemptions to the assistance freeze for lifesaving1244humanitarian aid, the impact of this policy is harming U.S. interests1245in Syria and further destabilizing a fragile situation. Consider that1246before Assad's ouster 16.7 million Syrians required humanitarian1247assistance, the highest level inside the country since the civil war1248started in 2011. Before the freeze, the United States was the largest1249bilateral donor for Syria's humanitarian needs, providing $1.2 billion1250in 2024 and more than $18 billion since 2011.1251    Non-humanitarian U.S. aid goes to Syrian civil society groups like1252the White Helmets, whose members conduct search-and-rescue missions and1253clear unexploded ordnance. At displaced persons camps in northeast1254Syria, American assistance supports water and sanitation services, and1255administrative management and security. The United States provides1256stabilization funds, separate from humanitarian aid, to communities1257liberated from ISIS in northeast Syria. This kind of support is1258critical to mitigate conditions that make communities vulnerable to1259violent extremist propaganda and actions. Another area of U.S. support1260currently frozen is funding for documentation of war crimes and crimes1261against humanity. For years, the United States has provided funding and1262training to preserve evidence of the Assad regime's crimes, which sent1263an important signal to Syrians suffering from Assad-regime brutality.1264    This committee can encourage the State Department to prioritize1265Syria in the ninety-day review of all U.S. programs, and quickly make1266determinations as to which programs make America stronger, safer, and1267more prosperous based on the criteria articulated by Secretary of State1268Rubio. Put simply, cutting off programs that help communities recover1269after surviving the brutalities of either Assad's rule or the Islamic1270State--without plans to transition funding or continuity in services to1271non-U.S. actors--risks exacerbating drivers of conflict that could1272undermine stability in Syria and in the Middle East. The United States1273is safer if Syria is stable and can address threats rising from within1274its territory; a more resilient Syria promotes greater security across1275the Middle East, leading to more stable countries and prospects for1276widened economic and security cooperation with the United States. A1277Syria that is not destabilizing, attacking, or antagonizing its1278neighbors--Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey--is also in the1279U.S. national security interest.1280    Beyond funding, the U.S. Government possesses deep technical1281expertise and knowledge in post-conflict stabilization and1282reconstruction. The first Trump administration produced a Stabilization1283Assistance Review (SAR) in 2018 calling for the selective use of1284taxpayer dollars and the expectation of burden sharing by partners. It1285also correctly identified stabilization as an inherently political1286endeavor, the goal of which is to ``create conditions where legitimate1287authorities and systems can manage conflict and prevent violence.'' The1288SAR identified the State Department as the lead agency for1289stabilization efforts--it has an entire bureau focused on conflict and1290stabilization policy--and the U.S. Agency for International Development1291(USAID) as the lead implementing agency. With the dismantling of USAID1292and the removal of most of its civil servants, the U.S. Government1293risks losing critical technical expertise in implementing U.S. programs1294and overseeing the distribution of U.S. funds to local groups.1295    Blocking adversaries/working with partners. From 2015 until1296recently, a widely held assumption was that Russian and Iranian backing1297for the Assad regime was more decisive than any support offered to the1298opposition by the United States, Europe, or Arab governments. The U.S.1299has an opportunity to further undermine Russian and Iranian positions1300in the Middle East, building upon their failure to back Assad, which1301dealt a strategic blow, and the widespread resentment across Syria of1302their support for his brutal campaign against his own people.1303    While the assumption of an unbreakable Damascus-Tehran-Moscow axis1304has been disproven, the networks that sustained this alliance remain1305intact, from commercial relationships, smuggling routes, and1306agricultural ties to remaining Soviet influence in Syria's armed forces1307and Iran's work to project soft power influence. Tehran and Moscow will1308look to these networks of influence as they seek to protect their own1309interests in post-Assad Syria, from retaining Russia's naval base on1310the Mediterranean to securing commercial contracts to Iran's land route1311for rearming Hezbollah. Russia and Iran are well positioned to play1312spoiler to Syria's recovery and reintegration into the international1313fold. Therefore, it will be critical for the United States to1314coordinate an approach to post-Assad Syria that can keep Europe, Arab1315governments, and Turkey aligned sufficiently to deny adversaries1316opportunities to play this spoiler role.1317    Aligning with like-minded partners on Syria is imperative. Turkey,1318a NATO ally, maintains the closest ties to the new Damascus leadership1319and is positioned to shape the policies of Syria's leaders, but1320Washington should seek clarification from Ankara on its objectives in1321Syria considering its well-known support for Islamist and Muslim1322Brotherhood groups and movements across the Middle East. Even as Turkey1323maintains significant influence, it lacks the resources given its own1324fragile economy to fund Syria's recovery. Here, U.S. strategic partners1325in the Gulf are critical because of their strong economies and1326assistance pledges. Gulf leaders are already engaging the Sharaa1327government though without agreement on or articulation of a strategy or1328vision for Syria and its future role in the Middle East. The United1329States should be working to convene, organize, and align its partners1330in the region and outside--particularly in Europe--on metrics and1331indicators that Syria's post-Assad recovery is on a stable path, while1332also consistently raising problematic actions that can undermine1333progress.1334    Conclusion. Five years ago, members of the bipartisan Syria Study1335Group argued that the threats posed by the conflict in Syria were1336sufficiently serious to merit a determined response from the United1337States. The report presciently argued that the Assad regime had not won1338the war, and the drivers of conflict in Syria remained. The final1339report argued that American engagement in Syria can lead to better1340outcomes for America, for Syria, for the Middle East, and for like-1341minded allies and partners. The challenge then remains relevant and1342urgent today: development of a realistic strategy and application of an1343appropriate mix of U.S. tools, along with prioritization of Syria by1344high-level U.S. officials with their counterparts. Today's hearing is a1345critical step forward toward addressing these urgent goals.13461347    Senator Risch. Well, thank you to both of you.1348    It is obvious we have the right people here to talk about1349this, and I think it is also obvious this is not a partisan1350issue, and I think we ought to all work together to get to a1351place on foreign policy as it relates to Syria and move forward1352with it and move forward with it quickly.1353    As you have indicated, the door is ajar, but it is going to1354close on us if we do not take advantage of where we are.1355    I have got a couple of questions I would like to get to. I1356do want to say one thing.1357    Mr. Singh, you had referenced the fact that the interim1358government and its leader had not done very well in Idlib, and1359I have heard the same thing.1360    But interestingly enough, I met and I think maybe the1361ranking member also met with maybe even the same group, but1362probably 25 or 30 people from Syria who all were interested in1363doing the right thing and building Syria back up again.1364    And at the table there were Sunnis. There were Shi'a. There1365were Christians. There were Druze. There were Alawites. It was1366across the board.1367    They were not at all interested in talking about their1368religious persuasion, and I asked them that question, and they1369pointed out, hey, in Syria we have been living together for1370centuries. You guys are new to this, OK. We have been living1371together for centuries, and we can go back to living again1372together if things are done right.1373    So, again, the experience you referred to in Idlib is1374troubling. Nonetheless, I think the new leadership understands1375that we are looking for something different than that.1376    If you do not have religious tolerance in this region, the1377country has got a big problem, and we all know that from the1378other things that happened.1379    Well, let me tell you one of the things I am concerned1380about, and that is--you know, when you look at the map of1381Syria, I mean, it looks like a flat Rubik's cube because of the1382way that the country is divided up, and what we are talking1383about is mainly the governance of the western part of the1384country.1385    And certainly that is important, and without that you are1386not going to have anything else. But I would like to hear your1387thoughts on how we thread the needle because we do have these1388other parts of the country that we are going to have to deal1389with.1390    I guess my idea is we need to focus on this western part1391and continue to look at the others. But the first objective is1392if you do not get a handle on this you are not going to get a1393handle on the rest of the country.1394    Mr. Singh, your thoughts?1395    Mr. Singh. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.1396    I think that is right. Look, obviously, in Syria, as you1397mentioned, the bulk of the population is in the west, and so1398that has been the focus of many things and is the focus right1399now of the new government.1400    They came down from Idlib to the south and have, largely,1401taken over that sort of western strip of the country. And in1402the northeast, of course, you have Kurdish forces, you have1403some other forces, but you also have some pretty vast areas1404which are lightly inhabited, and ISIS actually has been able to1405use those areas to sort of regroup and conduct its activities.1406    I would say that the question in my mind is, you know, HTS,1407which has maybe tens of thousands of fighters, has swept down1408from Idlib, maybe had more success than even they anticipated.1409    It does not seem to me that they could actually right now1410assert their authority over the entire country. So they will1411need to reach understandings with groups in the other parts of1412Syria, and of course, the one that is of greatest interest to1413us are the Kurds and others in northeastern Syria with whom we1414work.1415    I think that we can focus on what is happening in western1416Syria, deal with the government there, while also trying to1417encourage and maybe facilitate this process of coming together1418among these groups.1419    You know, the new self-appointed president of Syria, Ahmed1420al-Sharaa, has asked these other groups to dissolve. The1421reality is, though, if they did not exist, I am not sure that1422HTS could come in and fill in for them.1423    And so you have to have this kind of internal negotiation1424process. Ultimately, we want, in the long run, one authority in1425Syria, one authority in Damascus, that can exercise its control1426over the entire state.1427    That is an ideal outcome from us, but it is going to happen1428in stages, and it is going to happen through these1429negotiations.1430    Senator Risch. Well said.1431    Ms. Stroul, your thoughts?1432    Ms. Stroul. He has set out--Mr. al-Sharaa, the self-1433appointed president of Syria--a series of benchmarks for1434himself in terms of reasserting control over Syria, and he is1435making some progress in these early days of this transitional1436government.1437    He is working to disarm and integrate the non-HTS aligned1438armed groups. He is working on border security. In the past1439couple days many of us have been closely following the clashes1440on the Lebanon-Syria border.1441    This is actually forces aligned with President al-Sharaa1442working on stopping residual Hezbollah trafficking networks1443from using that border area to rearm Hezbollah.1444    So actually he is doing things that are in our interest,1445which is cutting down that weapons proliferation. I think we1446should watch very carefully what he is doing to reassert1447security control over the parts of Syria and set out our1448expectations for not seeing revenge violence, and that there1449should be local participation in governance as he reasserts1450control.1451    And then the longer pole in the tent I agree with Mr. Singh1452is the SDF, and we obviously, because of our military presence1453and our commitments to them, because they have bled and died1454for what we share is an objective of making sure ISIS is1455enduringly defeated, we need to work to facilitate dialogue1456between the SDF and the Sharaa government in Damascus about how1457they eventually reintegrate into the fabric of the Syrian1458government.1459    Senator Risch. Well said.1460    You mentioned it, and the next round of questions I am1461going to ask a little bit about Lebanon because, again, it is a1462similar situation than what we have.1463    There is opportunity there, we need to engage, and the1464relationship between these two countries is incredibly1465important. So we will talk about that next.1466    But in the meantime, Senator Coons.1467    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1468    Thank you both for your testimony today and for your1469service.1470    As the Chairman and Ranking Member have both laid out, and1471as you have painted more detail, for more than a decade Syria1472has been a hotbed of extremism, a source of massive regional1473destabilization through migration, a base from which both Iran1474and Russia projected malign power, and today we have a narrow1475window of opportunity.1476    It is critical that we get it right. No one should mourn1477the fall of the Assad regime of decades, but there is a lot of1478reconstruction and reconciliation to do. There are, roughly, 21479million children out of the school system.1480    Ninety percent of Syrians living in poverty. The medical1481system is in tatters. There are no real jobs or electricity or1482support.1483    The agricultural fields are littered with unexploded1484ordnance and land mines, and entire towns lay almost completely1485in rubble.1486    In these circumstances a small amount of support can go a1487long way to rebuilding homes, trust, and engagement, to work on1488demining, to provide food and water, and this outcome really is1489zero sum.1490    If the al-Sharaa government continues to move in a1491direction that meets the strategic objectives the chairman laid1492out we should be willing to engage with them, both indirectly1493through U.N. and international NGOs and maybe ultimately1494directly by the United States, because if they do not get1495assistance from us and our Western partners, they will get it1496from Iran, from Russia, and from China, and ISIS will reemerge1497as a very real threat.1498    But at the moment, because of the freeze in all U.S.1499foreign assistance, we are withholding exactly what the Syrian1500people need to see the American people engaging with them--1501food, medicine, education.1502    We have even pulled away in the first days of what I view1503as a disastrous foreign aid freeze, security from guarding ISIS1504prisoners at the Al-Hol prison, although that funding1505mercifully has been turned back on.1506    So, Ms. Stroul, you know the stakes here better than1507anyone, certainly better than I do. What assistance should we1508be considering to provide in the interest of stability and1509security with this new Syrian state, and what are the risks if1510we do not provide some leadership in this area?1511    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.1512    First of all, I think this committee has played and should1513continue to play an incredibly important oversight role into1514all of the assistance, both the humanitarian and the1515nonhumanitarian assistance going into Syria.1516    As a former staffer I can tell you we put USAID and the1517State Department through its paces, and I know you all are1518continuing to do that.1519    My recommendation is that we encourage Secretary Rubio and1520the State Department to accelerate that 90 day review. All U.S.1521assistance should be subject to oversight and whether or not it1522is in line with U.S. priorities.1523    But the nonhumanitarian aid going to Syria is as important1524for arresting those drivers of instability that could sink1525Syria back into conflict and again make it a proliferator of1526terrorism instability across the region.1527    So in a post-conflict environment the most important thing1528is local security and law enforcement, then clearing out the1529unexploded ordnance, then getting communities back, lights on,1530services, kids in school.1531    All of this requires nonhumanitarian aid, and it also1532requires coordination with others. What we know----1533    Senator Coons. To be clear, if I could, Ms. Stroul, while1534there are waivers for humanitarian assistance, there is no1535funding flowing. In the last 48 hours I have spoken with the1536leaders of each of the major NGOs that implements humanitarian1537work around the world.1538    Almost none of them--and 98 percent of the programs that we1539discussed under things like PEPFAR working to fight malaria or1540TB, to contain Ebola, demonstrably humanitarian, the money is1541not flowing yet because the aid freeze has not yet translated,1542largely, because the key people who need to turn the financial1543system back on and approve the reversal of the stop work orders1544are not there.1545    So not just longer term development aid after some aid1546review, but the humanitarian relief is not flowing.1547    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that clarification. I1548could not agree with you more. The loss of the career civil1549servants inside USAID, the threats of a reduction in the State1550Department staff--what we know about post-conflict societies is1551that reconstruction and stabilization are inherently political1552tasks.1553    It is not something the U.S. military could do, which is1554why we need to get this funding turned back on.1555    Senator Coons. Could I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?1556    I am alarmed by speculation that the Administration is1557considering a hasty withdrawal of our troops from Syria. I am1558concerned about the stability and the future of the SDF and of1559northeastern Syria.1560    If both of you could briefly answer what are the risks of a1561hasty departure of the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria,1562particularly vis-a-vis our hard fought gains against ISIS, and1563who would fill that vacuum?1564    Ms. Stroul. Mr. Singh.1565    Ms. Stroul. The about 2,000 U.S. military forces are both1566supporting the SDF and keeping pressure on ISIS. They are still1567doing their own unilateral strikes, our U.S. military against1568ISIS. They are also supporting the SDF who maintain custody of1569nearly 9,000 ISIS fighters in detention facilities.1570    ISIS is looking at them to replenish its ranks, and it is1571looking at the young children and families in the Al-Hol1572detention camp as ISIS 2.0.1573    If we are not there to provide intelligence and support to1574the SDF and the SDF are being attacked both by the Syrian1575National Army--the SNA--and our NATO ally Turkey, they will1576prioritize focusing on their own communities, and they will1577take pressure off ISIS.1578    ISIS will then have an opportunity to retake territory and1579not only terrorize people in Syria, but direct transnational1580terrorism abroad including against the United States.1581    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Coons.1582    And Ms. Stroul, I do not think you could have said it more1583clearly. I think most everyone who deals with this has a clear1584understanding of that. I do not share the immediate concerns1585you do about them pulling out of there. I think that there is1586an understanding of what would happen.1587    Look, we have minimal troops there at 2,000--1,900,1588whatever it is--and their keeping 9,000 ISIS people in the1589prison is critical.1590    So with that----1591    Senator Coons. Glad to hear that, Mr. Chairman.1592    Senator Risch. Thank you.1593    Senator Ricketts, you are up.1594    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.1595    As we see what is unfolding in Syria we know that the1596ramifications are from Putin's war in Russia. His1597miscalculation there is rippling through the system.1598    We see it in Nagorno-Karabakh. We see it here in Syria, how1599he was not able to support the Assad regime. But we know in1600years past that Russia was critical to keeping Assad afloat and1601basically responsible for killing Syrians.1602    And so with HTS victory, Russia has been set back on its1603heels, and we discussed or you mentioned, Mr. Singh, the1604Russian naval base Tartus. You have got the Latakia air base1605just outside of there.1606    So Russia has got some key assets. I think they moved some1607equipment out of the Latakia area, but obviously, that was how1608they were doing their power projection, and they have had to1609really flee with their tails between their legs here.1610    And the question is what will happen going forward here1611with regard to how will Russia engage. I mean, al-Sharaa has1612got to stabilize his country. He is seeking legitimacy both1613internationally and with his own people.1614    How is this all going to play together with regard to the1615role of Russia? Will Russia be completely kicked out?1616Obviously, things like oil, grain, even military weapons is1617something that Syria is going to need.1618    They have been getting that historically from Russia. But1619recently we have been reading reports that the Europeans have1620been in conversations with al-Sharaa about, again, lifting some1621of the sanctions, and one of the conditions being kicking the1622Russians, basically, out of their naval base and the air base.1623    So what do you see as the role for us in this? Should we be1624making that a condition of lifting our sanctions as we look at1625this, that the Russians have to withdraw and what is the1626practicality of that?1627    Can you just kind of give us an assessment of what you1628think we should be thinking about with regard to our sanctions1629and Russia's presence and the military presence in these naval1630bases?1631    Mr. Singh. Sure. Thanks a lot, Senator.1632    And look, you are right. I mean, Russia has had, even going1633back to Soviet times, a long standing relationship with Syria1634and with the Assad regime ever since Hafez al-Assad took over1635in 1970.1636    Assad was Moscow's guy. He was also Tehran's guy. But you1637see where he ended up. He ended up in Moscow. That is how close1638that relationship was.1639    At the same time, my sense of the Russians has always been1640that they kind of view Syria as their last bastion, as it were,1641of their influence in this region, and they are going to be1642loath to give that up. And we already see, as several of you1643have mentioned, a pretty sort of high tempo of engagement1644between Russia and this new transitional Syrian government.1645    I worry, frankly, that it is a higher tempo than ours or1646the Europeans' or even the region's. The Russians are really1647going to Damascus, and the Syrians are coming to them. And part1648of that, I think, is due to the fact that you have this1649integration of sort of Russian stuff, as it were, into Syria.1650You have defense equipment, you have energy facilities, and so1651forth.1652    And so, you know, if you have got this military equipment1653you have captured from the Assad regime, and it is Russian,1654well, you are going to have to turn to the Russians, perhaps,1655to service it, to update it, and so forth.1656    We have to somehow kind of put a wedge into that, and so I1657think part of that is going to be carrot, and part of that is1658going to be stick. The carrot part is, obviously, we are going1659to through this kind of patient, pragmatic engagement and1660setting of benchmarks, which Ms. Stroul also talked about, hold1661out the prospect of Western cooperation.1662    I do think it should be conditional, and I do think one of1663those conditions has to be, look----1664    Senator Ricketts. If I could just interrupt you for a1665second.1666    Mr. Singh. Yes.1667    Senator Ricketts. When you say Western help you are also1668saying Western military aid----1669    Mr. Singh. So we have----1670    Senator Ricketts [continuing]. Like weapons and equipment?1671That sort of thing?1672    Mr. Singh. We have sanctions preventing that now, and I1673think it is very--those will probably be some of the last we1674would want to consider lifting.1675    But I think you have to hold out the prospect that there1676could be, under the right conditions, a much more robust1677relationship across the board, a security relationship1678including--security broadly defined.1679    But if that is ever going to happen, they cannot also be1680hosting Russian forces. But I think that there is a stick side1681of it as well, which is where the sanctions come in, and you1682know, my own view is we need a phased and gradual withdrawal of1683those sanctions, and we need to see performance on this issue1684in addition to others.1685    I would just say do not leave out of this conversation the1686Chinese because, you know, they supported Assad in other ways1687through the use of their veto, for example. They tend to be1688cautious about going into places that are in conflict.1689    But if they perceive the situation as having changed, they1690will also see both the economic and strategic opportunity here.1691And I think that has to be on the list of conditions.1692    Senator Ricketts. So I am running out of time here. But1693just briefly, what is the risk for al-Sharaa if he cuts a deal1694with the Russians?1695    I mean, Russia was complicit with what Assad did--you know,1696the killing of their own people. Does he have a risk internally1697with his own people if he cuts a deal even if, say, he gets1698Assad extracted back to Syria? Does he have a risk there?1699    Mr. Singh. I think there certainly is a risk. How he1700perceives that risk, how big a risk he perceives it compared1701to, say, the risk of dealing with Iran is hard to say.1702    But certainly there are a lot of sore feelings about the1703way Russia conducted itself, bombing hospitals and schools and1704things like that in Syria.1705    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Singh.1706    Senator Risch. FYI for the committee, we heard the same1707thing from the Syrians, that the populace is not happy with1708either Iran or Russia, who conducted themselves very poorly in1709colluding with the Assad regime.1710    So that is a good thing for us, for the people that are1711getting that understanding.1712    So with that, Senator Duckworth.1713    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1714    I am going to start off with just a little bit of an1715opening statement.1716    In the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime's fall,1717Syria faces a pivotal and fragile moment in its history that1718will not only determine the fate of its people for decades to1719come but will also hold immense consequence for the trajectory1720of its role on the global stage.1721    This is a moment of cautious hope for Syrians and1722democracies around the world alike, a moment of opportunity for1723a democratic transition of power and of hope for the millions1724of displaced Syrians who wish to finally return home to safety.1725    But instead of recognizing this opportunity for the U.S. to1726flex its muscle and showcase its strength, the U.S. is notably1727absent amid a dire need for a stabilizing force.1728    Our adversaries, as we have already discussed today, Russia1729and Iran are closely watching, and they are eager to step in to1730fill the vacuum left behind by the United States.1731    This is a dangerous consequence of President Trump's attack1732on U.S. foreign assistance and a clear reflection of his1733blatant disregard for the importance of U.S. global leadership1734and participation as a national security imperative.1735    His attack on USAID will jeopardize the safety and well1736being of innocent people in Syria who rely on USAID for1737critical humanitarian assistance and leaves an already1738vulnerable state at a greater risk of malign influence.1739    So no, we are not talking dollars wasted. There are direct1740investments in U.S. national security and a projection of U.S.1741strength through USAID's work.1742    As the largest global donor in humanitarian aid and1743development, the U.S. plays a critical role in supporting the1744development of infrastructure that provides space for a1745democratic transition of power, which is only possible if Syria1746has the proper resources to strengthen its internal policies to1747build that future for themselves.1748    An unstable Syria not only means more suffering for its1749people, it becomes a potential breeding ground for terrorism in1750the Middle East.1751    Now more than ever the United States cannot abandon our1752commitment to the Syrian people, and I hope that all of my1753colleagues will agree that a stable Syria is clearly in our own1754national security interests.1755    Every U.S. dollar spent on stabilization, importantly on1756humanitarian aid, is an investment that requires less funding1757down the line for security and fewer U.S. troops who have to be1758deployed in a way that puts their lives at risk, and we know1759that a dollar goes a very long way in Syria.1760    We are hearing that Syrian hospitals are struggling and1761even closing during a time when the need and demand for medical1762resources is high due to the sudden cut in funding as1763lifesaving grants programs under USAID are now paused.1764    One such hospital that relies on USAID funding is the Al-1765Shifa hospital located in the majority Kurdish city of Afrin,1766Syria. This hospital serves as a critical area, given the1767native Kurdish population as well as internally displaced1768persons.1769    Your 2019 report talked about energizing efforts to address1770the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Right now the money is not1771flowing. How do you assess the current freeze will impact our1772Kurdish partners in Syria and specifically regarding access to1773humanitarian assistance and medical care?1774    I think, Mr. Singh, if you could talk about that, I would1775appreciate it.1776    Mr. Singh. Well, thanks, Senator.1777    So look, I think that my own view is we need to distinguish1778between sort of the dollars that are going in the programs1779themselves. We are not talking about huge chunks of money here.1780    Senator Duckworth. No.1781    Mr. Singh. And where the money comes from, whether it is1782from the United States or from, say, a regional partner, look,1783for the amount of money that we have spent yearly in Syria on1784USAID programs, for example, you could get one LIV golfer, I1785think.1786    And so Saudi Arabia and other regional states could step1787forward and provide revenues. I think when you think about the1788U.S. contribution sanctions relief, for example, is going to be1789much more powerful for the Syrian economy than any infusion of1790U.S. taxpayer dollars.1791    The mechanisms that we create that others can pay into, and1792some of the technical expertise we offer, I think, is, in a way1793much more powerful than the actual money.1794    So I think there is a conversation you could have about1795where is this money going to come from. Is it going to come1796from the Saudis, Emiratis, who I think do need to bear some of1797the burden of stability in their own region, and they have been1798too reluctant to do that in the past.1799    And then the question, for example, of sanctions relief,1800which could open up free markets to come in and help Syria.1801    But again, I think that that has to happen under certain1802conditions, and I think that is the most powerful tool that we1803have.1804    Senator Duckworth. I could not agree with you more on1805sanctions. I had a very long conversation with the Syrian1806American community leaders from Illinois this week on this very1807issue.1808    Since you already addressed this, for both of you how do1809you perceive the current sanctions impede Syria's ability to1810obtain relief needed to rebuild and heal, and what would you1811recommend to members of this committee in revisiting those1812sanctions?1813    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.1814    There is no doubt that the state level sanctions on Syria,1815both Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and1816then legislation like the Caesar Act, are preventing both1817others from coming in to further stabilize and reconstruct1818Syria, are difficult for Syrians abroad to send remittances1819home, and are creating nervousness within the NGO community on1820how much they can engage.1821    I think the General License 24 issued in early January was1822an important first step. Six months is not a lot of time to1823build confidence in the networks to expand that humanitarian1824aid.1825    So number one, the sanctions, I think, are incredibly1826significant, and they are preventing the kind of money,1827funding, and contracting that will be necessary to stabilize1828Syria.1829    I will agree with Mr. Singh. I do not think we should rush1830in and lift all the sanctions now. I think how we provide that1831relief should be performance based, and that is one of the main1832sources the United States has in terms of influencing the1833development of a more stable Syria and a more responsible1834governance.1835    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.1836    Senator Risch. Thank you.1837    Well said, Ms. Stroul.1838    The important thing here, I think, today or something that1839is noteworthy is how unanimous we are in thinking about what1840should be done and how we ought to go about it.1841    Obviously, the devil is always in the details, but there is1842really unanimity here as far as how to proceed, and that is1843good. I think that as we go forward that the unanimity will be1844helpful.1845    So with that, speaking of helpful, Senator Shaheen.1846    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.1847    And again, thank you both, and I think everyone has done a1848good job of pointing out the opportunities this presents to1849prevent Russia and Iran from coming back in and regaining a1850foothold in Syria.1851    So I want to talk a little bit about the role of Turkey,1852because Turkey asserts that they could lead counter ISIS1853efforts in northeast Syria, that we do not need to back the1854Syrian Democratic Forces that are led by the Kurds.1855    So how real is that, and how concerned should we be about1856Syria increasing their presence in a way that would actually1857result in conflict with the Kurds?1858    Whoever.1859    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.1860    When ISIS first took over large swaths of Iraq and Syria,1861the U.S. military did look to Turkey, thinking through how we1862could dislodge ISIS from Syria, and there was no presentation1863of an immediate combat credible viable force of Turkish1864military that could be sent in.1865    And if you look at what Turkey is doing right now, it is1866working through nonstate groups like the Syrian National Army--1867the SNA--who is terrorizing local communities and committing1868terrible atrocities and human rights violations against the1869communities there. And because our local partner, the SDF, is1870now having to defend its forces and its communities from the1871SNA, there is less focus on ISIS, which gives ISIS more of an1872opportunity to reconstitute.1873    Turkey is a NATO ally, and I do think we should be engaging1874very soon in a political and military dialogue with Turkey1875about what I think is a shared interest. Nobody wants to see1876ISIS reconstitute, and we should be looking at what the1877conditions are under which the U.S. military could at some1878point transition that mission.1879    But there is no near term alternative or viable combat1880credible alternative to the U.S. military and the SDF right1881now, and part of that also is that Turkey does not have the1882forces to maintain custody of those 9,000 ISIS fighters in1883detention facilities.1884    Senator Shaheen. And so what leverage have we got with1885Turkey in trying to engage them?1886    Ms. Stroul. The U.S.-SDF relationship has been the main1887irritant in our relationship with Turkey, but they do have some1888legitimate concerns.1889    Their concerns are that the SDF has absorbed non-Syrian1890Kurdish groups like the Turkish Kurdish PKK, which seeks to1891create a state or an autonomous area on Turkey's border and1892threaten Turkey. I think that is a legitimate concern.1893    The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the1894United States. So we should have a conversation with Turkey1895about its security needs and requirements, and ultimately, the1896future of the SDF is within a unified Syria, and because of our1897relationship with the SDF and the leverage and influence we1898have because of our sanctions and what our proactive engagement1899could bring to the table with Damascus, which Damascus wants,1900we are positioned to play a key facilitator and mediation role.1901    Turkey can also be a huge spoiler and undermine the hard1902fought gains against ISIS. So I think this will require1903hardnosed, tough diplomacy but acknowledgement of their1904legitimate security concerns.1905    Senator Shaheen. And assuming the United States withdraws1906our military from Syria, how long will it take for ISIS to1907reconstitute itself in ways that threaten the United States?1908    Ms. Stroul. Well, we have seen this before. We saw it in1909Afghanistan. When the United States withdrew hastily and1910without a plan, the local--the Afghan Security Forces that we1911worked to train collapsed, and the Taliban has reimposed brutal1912rule over Afghanistan.1913    And we know that when ISIS has territory in Iraq and Syria1914it used it to inspire, direct, plan, and launch attacks from1915that territory, and ISIS has its army in waiting already in1916Syria.1917    It is those 9,000 fighters in detention facilities, and it1918has the next generation of ISIS. It is the 40,000 ISIS1919affiliated families in a detention camp, and there is no plan1920right now to rapidly reduce either of those populations in a1921way that would not jeopardize our security.1922    Senator Shaheen. Well, so let us talk about that a little1923bit, because one of the things--my understanding is that we1924have turned back on the foreign assistance that supports1925security at Al-Hol, but that we have not continued to support1926the other assistance that engages families that helps with the1927radicalization that is going on.1928    And so how much of a concern is that? And I would say1929yesterday we had a chance to talk to General Kurilla, who is1930the head of Central Command, who indicated that there is a plan1931to reduce the number of people in the camps and how important1932is it going to be to ensure that the foreign assistance1933programs that are available for those camps are there if we are1934going to reduce the numbers?1935    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for those questions.1936    So we also know how this works because of our post-conflict1937experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, among many others even1938from Europe in the 1990s.1939    So after deadly conflict, if communities do not understand1940what the plan is for them to remain safe, to be protected from1941the underlying drivers of conflict, to know that their kids1942will not step on unexploded ordnance, to know that they will1943have assistance in their homes and communities being rebuilt,1944that they will be able to purchase food, that they will have1945jobs, that their kids can go back to school, those communities1946remain perpetually vulnerable and weak, and that is exactly1947what ISIS wants, which is why the nonhumanitarian assistance1948should be turned back on, or/and we should be working with1949allies and partners who also share an interest in ISIS not1950reconstituting.1951    I would agree with General Kurilla. One of the ways in1952which--what families want to know when they are leaving these1953camps is that wherever they go they are going to have those1954assurances.1955    They want what we want, which is safety and a better future1956for their families and their kids. That requires funding, it1957requires leadership, and it requires assistance coordination1958with our partners and allies, and that is what I hope comes out1959of the Syria policy review that this Administration is1960conducting.1961    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1962    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.1963    Your reference--and I will get back to this in the next1964round of questions. But the relationship between the Turks and1965the Kurds cause us no end of grief there. Turkey is allegedly1966an ally of ours, sometimes--at best a recalcitrant ally,1967particularly when it comes to that relationship. We will1968explore that a little bit more.1969    But right now I would like to recognize Senator Kaine.1970    Senator Kaine. Thank you.1971    And I will be brief because I am going to ask you about1972something I bet you have covered a whole lot while I was1973toggling between two other hearings and this one, but that is1974with respect to the sanctions, it sounds like there is a pretty1975good consensus here that we should not miss this opportunity to1976engage with the new Syrian government.1977    If we are too slow in engaging, or too miserly in engaging,1978we run the risk of creating a vacuum that others will fill who1979are adversaries, and one of the keys to this is the sanctions--1980Caesar sanctions that are currently in place.1981    I should know the answer to this question, but I do not. To1982what extent can sanctions be--I think we all agree that they1983should be lifted in a phased way based on performance criteria,1984but to what extent can they be lifted by the Administration1985versus would there need to be congressional action to lift1986sanctions?1987    Senator Risch. I can answer that. That will not take1988congressional action. When we passed the bill it was--as1989anything you passed the President will not sign it unless he1990has full authority to put them on and take them off. We are1991good there.1992    Senator Kaine. My understanding, and correct me on this if1993I am wrong, is that that is the case for most of the sanctions1994but there may have been sanctions directed against individuals1995that the Administration could not waive and that would need1996congressional action. Is that right or not?1997    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.1998    If I could offer what I think the different layers of1999decisions are.2000    First of all, what the executive branch can do now is think2001through more waivers or an expanded waiver beyond what it has2002done with General License 24, not necessarily to permanently2003lift sanctions but basically to get out of the way so that2004allies or partners that we would like to see engaging in Syria2005responsibly can do that.2006    Number two, it is the state level sanctions that are2007preventing economic recovery and stabilization in Syria. One of2008the big ones is that under Assad, Syria was designated as a2009state sponsor of terrorism. That would require executive2010action.2011    The Caesar Act has several criteria in it for the executive2012branch to determine if the government of Syria, then the Assad2013government, has met certain benchmarks in order to receive2014sanctions relief, and here I think there is clearly an active2015role for Members of Congress who were the initiators of this2016very important piece of legislation to engage about what their2017intent is for measured sanctions relief.2018    Senator Kaine. Well, I hope that we might do something2019together as a committee to express an opinion to the2020Administration. It does seem like there is a lot of meeting of2021the minds on this side.2022    Senator Risch. And I agree with that, Senator Kaine. I2023think that--the Administration has wide, wide authority here.2024Having said that, because of the Caesar legislation we passed2025and others, they are going to be looking for us, and I am going2026to be anxious to give them my--I already have given part of my2027input on this.2028    So I think your inquiry is absolutely valid, but I do not2029think that is a problem. I really do not, but thank you for2030that.2031    Senator Kaine. Yield back.2032    Senator Risch. Thank you.2033    Let us see. Senator McCormick.2034    Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you2035to our speakers today.2036    Michael, good to see you again after many years.2037    This hearing comes at such a critical time for the Syrian2038people and to thousands of Syrian Americans living in2039Pennsylvania in the Lehigh Valley. I share your joy at the fall2040of the butcher of Syria.2041    But even with Assad gone significant challenges, to state2042the obvious, remain and it was discussed today the new interim2043president in Damascus and many of his advisers are U.S.2044designated terrorists with longstanding links to al-Qaeda.2045    We do not yet know whether this transition process underway2046will lead to a government that will protect all Syrians, and2047this process will matter a great deal, of course, to Israel's2048security and to America's security.2049    So, Mr. Singh, I would like to start with you on the topic2050of counter terrorism. From the truck attack in New Orleans to2051the 2016 shooting of a Philadelphia police officer, Jesse2052Arnett, our nation has seen firsthand how terrorist groups like2053ISIS can use Syria as a safe haven and inspire acts of violence2054in the United States.2055    How concerned are you about the enduring presence of ISIS2056in Syria, and what would take, and we have talked about some of2057this already, but what would take, if you were going to do the2058couple key points, from Syria reemerging as a sanctuary for2059global terrorist groups?2060    Mr. Singh. Well, thanks a lot, Senator McCormick. It is2061great to see you up there.2062    Look, I think one thing we can take away from not just the2063Syria situation but the past 18 months of war in the Middle2064East is as much as we may want to move on to other issues and2065other challenges, terrorism remains a top threat to U.S.2066national security and to the security of our allies, and we2067have to take it seriously.2068    We cannot afford to sort of ease up on the pressure on2069groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, which remain active and2070determined to attack us around the world.2071    I mean, one of the--we have talked in this hearing about2072the break between HTS and some of these groups, and one of the2073reasons they broke apart was over this question of attacks2074globally against the West, where ISIS and al-Qaeda are2075determined to keep doing that.2076    And those groups are active every day in Syria, and it is2077through the joint efforts of a lot of different actors who we2078have mentioned here today, the United States for sure.2079    Also our local partners like the SDF. Also other forces in2080northern and southern Syria that prevent those actors from2081mounting terrorist attacks.2082    I would say that it would not take a lot. If you have the2083opportunity because you have the absence of legitimate2084governing or security forces, if you have a thriving radical2085ideology and a system that is kind of nurturing that because--2086you know, Senator you have served in war zones. You know that2087ideological piece is, in a way, just as important if not more2088so than the actual weapons and plots.2089    If you have those pieces you could absolutely have a2090resurgence of ISIS, and they could absolutely direct attacks2091against the United States. We have to be vigilant against that.2092    Senator McCormick. Thank you.2093    Ms. Stroul, two quick questions that I hope you can respond2094to. The first is we talked a little bit--Michael, you talked2095about this a bit--of this phasing out of sanctions based on the2096performance of the new government.2097    And if you were going to think about the sequencing of that2098what would be sort of the first milestone, and what would be2099the first set of sanctions that you would consider withdrawing?2100    The second topic is repatriation of refugees. My wife and I2101and my kids had the chance a couple years ago to work in the2102camps in Jordan, where there is millions--as you know, millions2103of Syrian refugees that have been there for years and also have2104put a huge burden on the Jordanian government and economy.2105    Is there any talk of repatriation? Has any of that started2106to happen? What has been the posture of the new government on2107that topic?2108    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for those questions.2109    With respect to sanctions, the most significant sanctions2110are these state level sanctions, the state sponsor of terrorism2111designation on the Syrian central government, and then the2112Caesar sanctions. Those are--when you lift the state sponsor of2113terrorism it is a onetime shot.2114    So my recommendation would be to work on successive2115expansions of the waivers and exemptions to facilitate2116stabilization and to facilitate allies, partners, and financial2117institutions like the IMF and World Bank, who will not want to2118run afoul of U.S. law and sanctions first.2119    But because this is about terrorism, we need to test them2120on the criteria of these designations, and we are doing some of2121that now.2122    There was a Washington Post article about some operational2123counterterrorism intelligence that the U.S. military has2124provided to the al-Sharaa government to go after ISIS cells. We2125should continue to test that premise.2126    Senator McCormick. And the Hezbollah transition too you2127talked about, which is important. Yes.2128    Ms. Stroul. I think they are doing the right thing, and we2129should test when operationally relevant what information we can2130provide to them to go after threats that threaten Syria,2131threaten our neighbors and partners in the region, and threaten2132our national security.2133    And with respect to refugees, President al-Sharaa has made2134very clear that he would like Syrians to be able to return to2135their home, and we know that a lot of these refugees in Jordan2136and Lebanon and Iraq and Turkey would want to come home, and a2137lot of them are already testing the premise.2138    So they are coming in for short periods of time to see what2139is happening in their home. Some of them are flying home from2140Europe.2141    But they are going to need to be assured that if they are2142really going to go repatriate, that there is going to be2143services, the rubble is going to be cleared, Syrian currency is2144not going to crash. There will be jobs. There will be food.2145    And this, again, comes back to the kinds of engagement that2146we can facilitate in order to address those underlying drivers2147of conflict.2148    Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you.2149    Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Senator Van Hollen.2150    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, and thank2151both of you for your testimony and sharing your expertise on2152these issues, and I am glad we are having this hearing on2153Syria, given the perilous moment we are in. Also a moment of2154opportunity.2155    I really think this committee also has to have an emergency2156hearing on what is happening at the State Department with2157respect to foreign assistance and specifically the2158dismantlement of AID.2159    I am really shocked we have not had a hearing yet. I am2160thankful to Senator Shaheen who organized an alternative2161hearing yesterday. We had four great witnesses. Unfortunately,2162none of our Republican colleagues were there to hear them.2163    But we are facing a mountain of disinformation about AID2164from Elon Musk and others, and I would like, Senator Shaheen,2165to ask unanimous consent to put in the record a Washington Post2166fact checked article on claims being made about AID. It is2167entitled, ``The White House's wildly inaccurate claims about2168USAID spending.''2169    Senator Shaheen. I am sure that is without objection.2170    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be2171found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''2172section at the end of this document.]2173    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.2174    So this does not even include the big lie that we heard2175from the White House podium about the $50 million worth of2176condoms to Gaza, which was just absolutely untrue. I think my2177colleagues should understand that Elon Musk called AID a,2178quote, ``criminal enterprise.''2179    That makes at least the members who have served on this2180committee for a long time and those who have served in the2181Senate longer co-conspirators in a criminal enterprise because2182we authorize and appropriate funds for AID.2183    And we all know that is not the case, but we really need as2184a committee on a bipartisan basis to stand up to Elon Musk. And2185it is outrageous that we have not done that yet, because he is2186doing great damage around the world.2187    I think most agree that AID is an important part of our2188overall national and foreign policy, and I would just like to2189ask you, Ms. Stroul, with respect to Syria.2190    Syria has had its assistance frozen. It appears we might2191get an exemption for some of the UNHCR refugee issues, which2192are obviously critical at this point in time.2193    I think Senator Shaheen mentioned al-Hol prison camp that2194detains a lot of ISIS fighters. If they all get out Americans2195are in peril.2196    So could you just speak briefly to how at this critical2197moment in Syria, which is also a moment of opportunity but also2198peril, this freeze on U.S. assistance is emboldening our2199adversaries and preventing the United States from really trying2200to seize this opportunity?2201    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.2202    First of all, so there are different layers to the, in my2203view, negative impact of the targeting of USAID.2204    First of all, it is the dismantlement of the staff. So the2205staff in the headquarters possess tremendous technical2206expertise in how to distribute, conduct oversight, conduct2207audits, and how to do assistance in a unique, fragile, post-2208conflict environment.2209    Number two is that stop work order. So what is happening is2210USAID and longtime U.S. partners--as a former staffer of this2211committee we conducted rigorous oversight over how USAID2212partners on the ground, and there were many instances even when2213I was on the committee where here were concerns about a2214specific partner or a specific program, and we stopped those2215programs but we found ways to safely continue programs that we2216thought were in the interest of American security and good2217stewards of U.S. taxpayer dollars.2218    But the stop work order and the firing of our implementing2219partners on the ground will dismantle the ecosystem around this2220very important work. Then there is the funding, which is not2221flowing.2222    The humanitarian work is, obviously, critical immediately2223but over the long term we need to be helping societies and2224communities recover. They want more than a handout from2225humanitarian aid.2226    And finally, it is the oversight. None of our partners2227possess the kind of technical expertise that we do in2228monitoring dollars and monitoring performance benchmarks for2229these programs, and we have seen in plenty of other scenarios2230when the funds of our partners have led to poor outcomes.2231    So all of these different ways in which I think the freeze2232in USAID and the funding and the stop work order are very2233detrimental to our interests.2234    And finally, there is the question of U.S. leadership. So2235when a community or an individual or a mother who needs formula2236for her child or a diaper or medicine is in need, and they see2237a U.S. flag or a stamp on that box, they think of the United2238States and know that we had a role in saving their lives, and2239then that feeds into positive views of the United States, and2240when we want to partner with that government or a community in2241the future, the door is more open. So we are closing doors that2242could impact our security and our interest for generations to2243come.2244    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.2245    Thank you all.2246    Senator Shaheen. Senator Rosen.2247    Senator Rosen. OK. Well, thank you.2248    Thank you, Senator McCormick.2249    Thank you. I want to thank Chairman Risch, Ranking Member2250Shaheen, of course, for holding this hearing.2251    Thank you for to our witnesses for your work, for2252testifying today.2253    I also want to thank Senator Shaheen for highlighting the2254positive impact that USAID has around the world, the difference2255that we know we are making on the ground for so many--keeping2256children alive, feeding hungry people, preventing disease. So I2257want to just thank Senator Shaheen for that.2258    And I want to move on and talk a little bit about2259empowering women in Syria because the U.S. does have an2260opportunity to play a critical role in supporting Syria's2261political transition following the fall of Assad's regime.2262    So I believe we should be ready to use all the tools in our2263toolbox to push that transitional government to be inclusive,2264democratic, nonsectarian, and I am particularly interested in2265the role women can play in supporting the new Syria, and how2266the U.S. could and should help to facilitate this.2267    So, Ms. Stroul, can you talk about the current role of2268women in Syria's new leadership and how the Administration2269could work with the transitional government to ensure that2270women are empowered to play a critical role in governance,2271peace building, reconstruction?2272    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.2273    And, of course, Ranking Member Shaheen must be acknowledged2274for her leadership and important work on women, peace, and2275security in this element.2276    If only 50 percent of Syrian society is engaged in a2277conversation about the future of Syria, meaning the other 502278percent, women, are not included, then you are not listening to2279half of your society and that will not lead to a stable2280outcome.2281    Generally speaking, across most all post-conflict societies2282when transitional justice, reconstruction, and stabilization2283are critical, women have unique peace building roles, unique2284perspectives, tend to think more about the needs of their2285communities.2286    If their voices and recommendations are not taken into2287account, which means that less than 50 percent of Syrian2288society would be involved in the decisionmaking and dialogue2289about the future of Syria, it will not be stable and inclusive2290over the long term.2291    President al-Sharaa yesterday announced the committee that2292will be responsible for organizing and making recommendations2293for the national dialogue for Syria, that he announced in his2294transition timeline of 3 to 5 years, there are two women on a2295committee of seven.2296    Good start. We should see more, and we should expect more.2297The main areas of leverage, of course, are that U.S. leadership2298can help facilitate Syria's entry back into the international2299community.2300    We should demand that more women have a seat at that table,2301and of course, through either sanctions, waivers relief, and2302eventually lifting.2303    Senator Rosen. Thank you.2304    I want to move on and talk a little bit about Iran and the2305resurgence of Iran possibly with the fall of Assad's brutal2306dictatorship. It is going to have profound implications for2307Iran, which has supported Assad's regime since about 2011.2308    So coupled with Hamas' defeat in Gaza, the decapitation of2309Hezbollah, the leadership there in Lebanon, Assad's collapse2310has left Tehran weaker, more isolated than it has been in2311decades, and I believe we cannot squander this opportunity.2312    Iran must be kept out of Syria, denied the opportunity to2313terrorize our partners, allies in the region, and we also at2314the same time cannot allow our adversaries like China and2315Russia to swoop in and fill those gaps. We know they are2316waiting.2317    Dr. Singh, in Syria, President Trump's aid freeze only2318serves to further Iran's malicious intent, right? And so the2319aid freeze stops the programs that directly address the2320instability, and which we know IRGC they thrive on instability,2321right?2322    So, again, we know Iran wants to exploit the aid freeze for2323its own gain. So in your opinion how do you think it might do2324that, and what proactive steps should we be looking at to stop2325Iran from potentially doing that?2326    Mr. Singh. Well, thanks a lot, Senator.2327    I think you are right that where Iran sees a poorly2328governed or ungoverned space in the Middle East, it tries to2329fill that space, and it fills that space with its proxies,2330proxies sometimes that it creates out of whole cloth.2331    You know, we have seen Iran, for example, in Syria import2332fighters from places like Afghanistan and Pakistan and so2333forth, and we do not want to see that happen again.2334    And so I would say, look, as we think about how we are2335going to relate to this new government with all the tools of2336our power--diplomatically, intelligence sharing across the2337board, military--we need to set out areas of shared concern2338where we can try to engage pragmatically with this new2339government that is dominated by HTS, and this is certainly one2340of them.2341    So I think--you know, Ms. Stroul mentioned before2342intelligence sharing, for example. I think this is an area2343where we can test them. Are they willing to work2344collaboratively with us on this area of shared concern?2345    And if the answer is yes, we have just gained another new,2346powerful tool in our toolkit to counter Iran in the region.2347    Senator Rosen. Thank you.2348    I yield back.2349    Senator Risch [presiding]. Thank you very much.2350    Senator Shaheen, you had a follow up.2351    Senator Shaheen. I do.2352    I actually have a brief comment and then a follow up2353question, and I want to just point out, thank you for your2354comments, Ms. Stroul, relative to the importance of women being2355at the table, and to Senator Rosen for her question.2356    And I think it is important to point out that the reason2357that makes a difference is because it does make a difference.2358    It makes a difference in conflict resolution. We know that2359when women are at the table the negotiations are likely to last2360a third more--for 15 years or longer than if they are not at2361the table.2362    So there is good data to show that this makes a difference,2363and I would argue that one of the reasons that we saw the fall2364happen so fast in Afghanistan is because women were excluded2365from that negotiating process. But that is another issue.2366    I did want to get back--I know this is about Syria, but2367yesterday we heard some testimony about the impact in Lebanon,2368that like Syria, this is also an opportunity for us in Lebanon2369because there is a new government that is not affiliated with2370Hezbollah, and they have been resistant despite the pressure,2371and that the halt to many of our foreign assistance programs2372are having real implications in Lebanon for the ability of that2373new government to be able to maintain power.2374    The failure to continue to support the Lebanese Armed2375Forces, which have been the one stable institution in the2376country, have real ramifications.2377    So I do not know if either of you could speak to that and2378to the importance of addressing the issues in Lebanon as well.2379    Mr. Singh. Look, so I think we have talked about the2380opportunity in Syria. There is an opportunity in Lebanon for2381sure because with Hezbollah decimated, you know, thanks to2382Israel, that kind of loosens their grip on that government, and2383taking advantage of that opportunity should be something that2384we want to do, and it is going to require tremendous investment2385of--you know, we are talking a lot about resources, but it is2386going to take time. It is going to take attention as well at a2387moment where we have lots of priorities around the world.2388    So I was very happy to see Morgan Ortagus, the deputy2389special envoy for the Middle East, go there and spend some time2390there with the government, and she got, I think, quite positive2391reviews for the time that she spent there.2392    That is a good first step, and I think what we really need2393to see is that kind of engagement, and it needs to be done in2394partnership with key allies, and that includes allies like2395France but also allies in the region.2396    And when it comes down to it we are going to need to2397support these institutions--security institutions but also the2398other institutions of the state, and I would say we can do that2399collaboratively with our allies, and we are going to have to do2400that collaboratively with our allies going forward, otherwise2401we are going to lose that opportunity.2402    Senator Shaheen. Well, I would agree, and I would also2403argue that it is going to cost us a lot less to do this now and2404when we have this opening than it would to fail and to see2405Hezbollah and our other adversaries come back not only in Syria2406but in Lebanon.2407    Ms. Stroul. If I could add to what Mr. Singh said.2408    The past several years of assistance we have actually2409approached it quite cautiously by the executive branch in2410consultation with Congress, which is that U.S. assistance has2411gone around the central government in Beirut only for2412humanitarian because Beirut port blast, collapsed economy--all2413of the reasons why we did not have confidence in the central2414government in Beirut.2415    So our assistance actually adapted around that, and then we2416provided security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces.2417    So the challenge now is, one, is the security aid to the2418Lebanese Armed Forces is halted at the exact moment when by the2419terms of the ceasefire with Israel they need to be deploying2420south and disarming Hezbollah.2421    So we are asking them to take on a significant undertaking2422and putting nothing in it and telling them they need to do it2423anyway.2424    Number two, humanitarian--that needs to flow, obviously,2425because the Lebanese people are suffering and have suffered for2426a very long time.2427    And then, three, because we have not yet provided2428assistance through the government in Beirut, we have an2429opportunity to incentivize the kind of behavior we would like2430to see with this new leadership.2431    We can also encourage the World Bank and the IMF, who have2432held off because of the lack of meaningful economic reform2433measures.2434    So this is actually an example where we have used2435assistance effectively to say we are not going to support this2436bad behavior, and now we can use it as an incentive.2437    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both.2438    Mr. Singh. Senator, with your forbearance I just want to2439vehemently agree with the idea that a society that oppresses2440its women is not going to be a successful society.2441    Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. Thank you.2442    Senator Risch. Thank you.2443    Thank you to the witnesses.2444    And you know, I raised the Lebanon issue when we started,2445and that is something we maybe ought to have a hearing on too,2446because it is just as important as this.2447    I think it is a little less complicated but not very much2448less complicated. So that is the important thing.2449    There has been--as far as your raising the issue of women2450being involved you, like I, have met with the diaspora here.2451There are some very competent and ready to engage women who are2452ready to do that.2453    When we were in Munich this weekend, if we meet with these2454people you may want to raise that with them, and I think that2455would be important.2456    A couple of things that were raised here during the hearing2457was USAID freeze. In fact, they even drug Elon Musk, I guess,2458through the ringer while I was not here.2459    Look, everybody needs to stay calm. We are going to get2460through this, and one thing that we never talk about and should2461is we are going in debt a trillion dollars every hundred days,2462and it has got to stop.2463    And yes, there is going to be some angst getting there but2464we will get there, and the things that are necessary for best2465interest of the United States will continue. I am convinced of2466that.2467    But there are things--and I am not going to go through the2468list now so we do not start a fight--but there is money been2469spent that should not have been spent.2470    So in any event, with that thank you to the witnesses. I2471think this was a very good hearing and very helpful to us. We2472do a lot of these, and very seldom do we see the kind of2473progress, I think, and unanimity that we have seen today.2474    So with that, thanks to the witnesses for attending today,2475providing us with the benefit of your testimony. For the2476information of members, the record will remain open until the2477close of business tomorrow.2478    We ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as possible2479with your responses. That will be very helpful to us. So thank2480you for that.2481    And with that, the hearing is adjourned.2482    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]24832484                              ----------24852486              Additional Material Submitted for the Record24872488[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]24892490                                 [all]