S.Hrg.119-51

1[Senate Hearing 119-51]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                         S. Hrg. 119-5156                      ADVANCING AMERICAN INTERESTS7                       IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS1617                          UNITED STATES SENATE1819                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021                             FIRST SESSION2223                               __________2425                             MARCH 5, 20252627                               __________2829       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations3031[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3233                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov3435                                __________3637                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3860-032 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20253940-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4142                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS4344                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman45PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire46DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware47STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut48BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia49JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon50RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey51TED CRUZ, Texas                        BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii52MIKE LEE, Utah                         CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland53RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois54JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada55JOHN CORNYN, Texas56             Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director57           Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director58                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk5960                              (ii)6162                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S6364                              ----------65                                                                   Page6667                               Statements6869Risch, Hon. James E., Chairman, U.S. Senator From Idaho..........     17071Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, Ranking Member, U.S. Senator From New72  Hampshire......................................................     37374                               Witnesses7576Ledford, Dr. Joseph, Fellow and Assistant Director, Hoover77  History Lab, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford,78  California.....................................................     57980    Prepared statement...........................................     68182Myers, Margaret, Senior Advisor, Inter-American Dialogue Global83  Fellow, Wilson Center, Washington, DC..........................    148485    Prepared statement...........................................    168687              Additional Material Submitted for the Record8889Responses of Dr. Joseph Ledford to Questions Submitted by Senator90  John Cornyn....................................................    389192Responses of Ms. Margaret Myers to Questions Submitted by Senator93  John Cornyn....................................................    429495                                 (iii)9697         ADVANCING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE9899                              ----------100101                        WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2025102103                                       U.S. Senate,104                            Committee on Foreign Relations,105                                                    Washington, DC.106    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in107room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.108Risch presiding.109    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], McCormick, Scott,110Curtis, Cornyn, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, Booker, and Van Hollen.111112           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,113               CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO114115    Senator Risch. Good morning, everyone.116    The Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate will117come to order.118    Today we are going to have a very interesting hearing on119the Western Hemisphere, an area that we do not spend nearly120enough attention to primarily because there is so much else121going on in the world.122    But we, obviously, need to do that, and we want to123welcome--we have a number of students it looks like to me. I do124not know if we have a group here from somewhere. It is a125different kind of crowd than we usually get, and I usually give126a speech about you cannot disrupt the hearing or you will get127arrested and thrown out and banned for a year.128    But I am not going to give that speech because it looks to129me like a very orderly crowd. So, thank you. You are welcome130here, and we are glad to have you and glad to have you watch131these proceedings.132    We have a couple of very good witnesses today that--one133chosen by the Republicans, one chosen by the Democrats--who134will give us some insight into what is going on in Latin135America, and I am going to start by making an opening136statement.137    I am then going to yield to the distinguished Ranking138Member to make an opening statement, and after that we will139hear from our witnesses, and after that we will open it up to140questions from the committee.141    So, with that, in 1823 President Monroe asserted the right142and interest of the United States to oppose foreign powers143meddling with the emerging independent nations in the Western144Hemisphere.145    Monroe's vision was an America that protects the Western146Hemisphere from foreign domination. Of course, Monroe lived in147a different era before world wars, before an increasingly148global economy, even, of course, before airplanes and any other149rapid transportation.150    But his point is still relevant today. Prioritizing151America's national security interests means prioritizing a152stable and prosperous Western Hemisphere because America has153adversaries who look to undermine our interests and our154security by interfering in the affairs of our closest155neighbors.156    As our enemies and competitors like Russia, China, and Iran157expand their footprint in our hemisphere we need to strengthen158security and economic cooperation with our democratic neighbors159to protect our interests.160    It was interesting to hear yesterday on our panel the161people that were up for the ambassadorships focusing on the162importance of economic cooperation and bringing that back into163the equation, which has gotten a little lost, again, because164there are so many other problems.165    The most pressing long term threat in the Western166Hemisphere is China. It has displaced the United States as the167top trading partner for almost every country in South America.168    Across Latin America, China is extracting valuable critical169minerals, building strategic ports and deepening military170cooperation.171    China remains the single greatest supplier of fentanyl to172Mexican cartels. It is illegal for Chinese companies to sell173these chemicals in China, but the Chinese government permits174the same companies to send chemicals to Mexico for production175of fentanyl.176    The production of these opioids and the cartels who shuttle177them across our border are killing over 100,000 Americans every178year. That is a staggering number, particularly when you put it179on a daily and weekly basis.180    Further south, China is meddling in the Panama Canal as it181seeks to control the shipping companies that move the cargo182through it.183    President Trump is right to focus on China's involvement in184this critical infrastructure that we have spent so much185treasure and blood constructing. The fact of the matter is186China has and will use footholds in Latin America to threaten187the U.S. We must counter their presence today to ensure it is188not a vulnerability tomorrow.189    Beyond China, Iran has expanded its reach into our190hemisphere. Iran warships have docked in Brazil, and Iranian191proxies have built networks across Latin America. Meanwhile,192Russia meddles in the region, conducting information operations193and deploying troops, military aircraft, and naval vessels to194Cuba and Nicaragua.195    Chinese money supports the governments in Cuba and196Venezuela, and Russian personnel ensure they stay in power. We197cannot allow these authoritarian expansions of influence so198close to home.199    While we need to push back we also need to protect200Americans by securing our border. President Trump and his team201are working aggressively at this, as we all know, and I202strongly support his efforts.203    Monroe had the right idea. Let us prioritize solving the204problems right in front of us and redouble our efforts to205protect American national security by making sure our206hemisphere is stable.207    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can208do that.209    I will now turn to my friend, the distinguished Ranking210Member, Senator Shaheen.211212               STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,213        RANKING MEMBER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE214215    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch.216    Before I get to my opening statement, I just wanted to make217a couple of announcements.218    One is I brought up these maps of Latin America, and219Senator Kaine will recognize them because we saw them in the220Armed Services Committee, and they are actually a couple of221years old, but I think they speak to the challenges that we222have in Latin America.223    As you can see the far map shows the PRC's regional224presence and activities, and you can see by how much of Latin225America is colored in a dark crimson the influence that China226has.227    Anybody who wants to come up and look at some of the detail228after the hearing will find it very interesting.229    The other map is Russia's influence in Latin America.230Again, you can see from the orangey red the extent to which231Russia is influencing Latin America, and as I said, while these232maps are a couple of years old I think they speak to the233challenge that we have in Latin America, which I am sure we234will hear from our witnesses.235    So, thank you both for being here.236    I also wanted to just announce--I am sure that most members237have seen it--but because so much of the last couple of238hearings has focused on what is happening with USAID and the239programs and services of foreign assistance, the Supreme Court240today sided with restoring the funding for those programs. So,241if folks have not seen that decision, it is probably worth our242all of us looking at.243    So, now, to get to my official remarks.244    After President Trump's tariffs on Canada and Mexico and245his address to Congress last night I think the question of how246the United States approaches the Western Hemisphere is more247important than ever.248    This region offers incredible opportunity for the United249States, as the Chairman has said. It is home to one of our250largest trading partners in the world, Mexico. That trading251relationship amounted to about $800 billion recently.252    Latin America also includes some of our closest allies.253Colombia became a NATO partner country in 2017, for example.254But whether it is the 25 percent tariffs that will affect255American businesses and consumers, or threats against Panama,256these actions undermine trust in the United States and push257away our allies when we need them.258    Curbing immigration to our southern border and fighting259drug cartels, stopping the flow of illegal weapons and260fentanyl, all of those are critical issues, and we want261countries like Mexico and Canada to help us tackle these262challenges.263    But undermining trust in the United States gives our264adversaries, like China and Russia, more of an opening across265the hemisphere. Even before the tariff threats trade with China266was surging across Latin America.267    According to the World Economic Forum, China's trade with268Latin American countries could reach more than $700 billion in269the next decade.270    At the same time, Vladimir Putin's propaganda machine has271flooded Latin America. According to the University of Oxford,272the Spanish language version of the program Russia Today is273Putin's most successful, more than RT in English, Arabic,274German, or French.275    Not only is Putin trying to undermine democratically276elected governments in the region with disinformation, but277Russia's spy services have also been expanding their footprint.278    As former CIA director Bill Burns explained, and I am279quoting, part of this is a function of the fact that so many280Russian intelligence officers have been kicked out of Europe.281    In the face of these challenges it is deeply concerning282that the Administration has frozen foreign aid and attacked the283United States Agency for International Development, and as I284said, hopefully those issues are going to be worked out.285    These programs stabilized societies. They gave people in286places like Colombia or Haiti incentives to stay home and to287not migrate to our borders. They supported women struggling288with gender based violence in places confronting a wave of289femicides.290    As one U.N. report put it, at least 11 women were murdered291every day for gender related reasons in Latin America and the292Caribbean.293    The foreign aid freeze has also thrown counter narcotics294programs from Guatemala to Mexico into chaos. One program with295the United Nations had been scanning for contraband and296fentanyl chemicals in Mexican ports, and that work has stalled.297    Cuts to USAID and the Inter-American Foundation also make298it harder for the United States to compete with China's Belt299and Road infrastructure initiatives. Deep water ports, rail300lines, solar energy plants--these are the kinds of projects301that increase China's influence in the region.302    So, Dr. Myers, Dr. Ledford, I appreciate you both coming to303testify before us today, and I think my basic question to both304of you is how do we keep from giving China and Russia complete305free rein in this atmosphere--I am sorry, in this hemisphere.306    How does all of what we are doing make America safer, more307secure, and more prosperous? In the long term it is in our308interest to ensure that we have close relationships and growing309ties in the Western Hemisphere.310    So, I look forward to hearing your thoughts. Thank you311both.312    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.313    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.314    We will now hear from our witnesses. We are going to start315with Dr. Ledford.316    Dr. Ledford is a Hoover Fellow and assistant director of317the Hoover History Lab at the Hoover Institution. His work318focuses on the exercise of American power abroad, particularly319in the Western Hemisphere, obviously in our wheelhouse today.320    So, Dr. Ledford, we are glad you are here. We would like to321hear from you.322323STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH LEDFORD, FELLOW AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,324 HOOVER HISTORY LAB, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,325                      STANFORD, CALIFORNIA326327    Dr. Ledford. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and328distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this329invitation to testify before you on this critical matter.330    The views I express today are mine and not the Hoover331Institution nor Stanford University.332    The Western Hemisphere is foundational to American national333security. As the late great Secretary of State George Shultz334often said, foreign policy starts in your own neighborhood.335    Indeed, throughout our nation's history policymakers336understood this guiding principle of statecraft. If the Western337Hemisphere is without security the United States cannot338continue to support its allies while confronting its339adversaries.340    To ensure regional stability, preventing hostile foreign341powers from spreading their malign influence in the Western342Hemisphere must serve as the cornerstone of American foreign343policy.344    It has in the past, and it should guide national security345strategy today. To be sure, the defensive principles enshrined346in the Monroe Doctrine have functioned as the enduring347bipartisan consensus until recently.348    During the first quarter of the 21st century the United349States gradually became estranged from its neighbors and350America's enemies noticed the neglect.351    Strategic competition has come to our neighborhood. In352America's absence, China has moved into the Western Hemisphere353to spread its economic, military, and political influence deep354and wide, complemented by the footprints of its despotic355partners Iran, Russia, and North Korea. You could have two more356maps up here to my left.357    Chinese trade has soared in Latin America and the358Caribbean. China is the region's second largest trading partner359and South America's largest. Billions in investment have360targeted the sectors of energy, mining, manufacturing,361infrastructure, and technology.362    Take, for instance, Huawei's market share or the mega port363that just opened in Peru, majority owned by a Chinese military364company, or the encroachment on the Panama Canal by Chinese365state enterprises.366    The potential ramifications of such dual use infrastructure367should alarm every American. Beyond economics, Chinese military368and intelligence presence grows from spy stations in Cuba to369arms sales and military training programs to surveillance370technology exports to authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua,371and Venezuela.372    Compounding these challenges, transnational criminal373organizations wreak havoc from South America to Canada. Drug374cartels present an intractable threat to the American homeland.375    Their enterprises drive the opioid crisis that devastates376our communities and kills 200 Americans every day.377    China contributes to this crisis by not only supplying the378precursor chemicals and the pill press equipment needed to379produce fentanyl but also the money laundering services to wash380the ill gotten gains.381    With all these problems Americans may ask what are we doing382to advance our interests in the Western Hemisphere.383    Well, Congress has led the way with bipartisan resolve,384especially on this committee, exemplified by the Western385Hemisphere Partnership Act enacted in December. This landmark386legislation mandates a comprehensive 5 year strategy due by387June to promote security, prosperity, and the rule of law.388    It provides an overarching framework to address the very389issues that we discussed today. At the outset of President390Trump's second term, the United States appears now to be391pursuing an America first approach.392    The Administration aims to eliminate drug cartels, roll393back Chinese malign influence in the region, and deepen our394partnerships with the Americas to bring about security and395prosperity.396    These efforts signal a nascent strategic reorientation, but397more must be done, and I believe it can be accomplished with398bipartisanship and through cooperation between Congress and the399White House.400    In closing, I will offer a few high level recommendations,401though, of course, they are easier said than done.402    America must develop a 21st century framework for403hemispheric defense and development. To do so, the United404States must craft a realistic and attainable 5 year strategy as405mandated by legislation.406    It must include the ways and means for America to secure407binding and sustainable long term economic agreements to408further regional integration.409    It must also include revitalized security measures that410address these acute challenges of the 21st century. The United411States must compel China to end its involvement in the fentanyl412crisis.413    The United States must seek a workable security framework414with Mexico. The United States must exercise leadership to415resolve the crisis in Haiti.416    The United States must continue to isolate pressure and417encourage democracy in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.418    The United States must consistently engage its neighbors.419Here, the President must nominate high quality diplomats to420serve and Congress must expedite their nominations--their421confirmations.422    And last, Congress must continue working on the Western423Hemisphere in a bipartisan manner. This sends the strongest424signal to America's enemies.425    Of course, what I have just laid out is easier said than426done, but I am an optimist.427    With that, I yield, and I look forward to your questions.428    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ledford follows:]429430                Prepared Statement of Dr. Joseph Ledford431432    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members433of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you and434testify on these critical issues. \1\435---------------------------------------------------------------------------436    \1\ The views and opinions expressed in this testimony are solely437those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Hoover438Institution or Stanford University.439---------------------------------------------------------------------------440    I will begin with the obvious strategic rationale for this hearing:441The Western Hemisphere is foundational to American national security.442\2\ As the late Secretary of State George Shultz often said, ``foreign443policy starts in your own neighborhood.'' \3\ Indeed, throughout this444nation's history, policymakers understood this guiding principle of445American foreign affairs. If the Western Hemisphere is without446stability and security, the United States faces grave challenges at447home and abroad. How can the United States continue to support its448allies and partners while confronting its adversaries if malign foreign449influence disrupts its hemisphere and disorder prevails?450---------------------------------------------------------------------------451    \2\ For instance, the 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy452declared, ``No region impacts the United States more directly than the453Western Hemisphere.'' For the 2022 National Security Strategy, see454National Security Council, U.S., National Security Strategy (The White455House, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/4562022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.457    \3\ Quoted from James E. Goodby, ``Groundbreaking Diplomacy: An458Interview with George Shultz,'' Foreign Service Journal 93, no. 10459(December 2016): 58-59; See also, pp. 9-10 of George P. Shultz,460interview by Stephen F. Knott, Marc Selverstone, and James Sterling461Young, December 18, 2002, Stanford, California, Ronald Reagan Oral462History Project, Presidential Oral History Program, Miller center of463Public Affairs, University of Virginia, https://millercenter.org/the-464presidency/Presidential-oral-histories/ronald-reagan.465---------------------------------------------------------------------------466    Preventing hostile foreign powers from meddling in the Western467Hemisphere to ensure regional stability must serve as the cornerstone468of American foreign policy. It has in the past and should guide469national security strategy today. As Chairman Risch emphasized last470year in a speech at George Mason University, ``the Monroe Doctrine is471more vital than ever.'' \4\ To be sure, the principles enshrined in the472Monroe Doctrine have functioned as the enduring bipartisan consensus473throughout American history--until recently. During the first quarter474of the 21st century, the United States gradually became estranged from475its neighbors, and America's enemies noticed the neglect.476---------------------------------------------------------------------------477    \4\ See text of keynote address ``The Monroe Doctrine: An Evolving478Legacy'' at the National Security Institute at George Mason479University's Antonin Scalia Law School, April 15, 2024, https://480www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-monroe-doctrine-is-481vital-as-ever-as-china-russia-iran-exert-influence-in-our-hemisphere.482---------------------------------------------------------------------------483    In America's absence, China moved into the Western Hemisphere. \5\484Here, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) opportunistically spread its485economic, military, and political influence deep and wide, complemented486by the expanded footprints of its despotic partners Iran, Russia, and487North Korea.488---------------------------------------------------------------------------489    \5\ James T. Areddy, Ryan Dube, and Roque Ruiz, ``How China490Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America,'' Wall Street491Journal, November 14, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china-xi-jinping-492latin-america-acf6dbc1.493---------------------------------------------------------------------------494    The United States, however, must contend with more than mere495strategic competition in its hemisphere. Transnational Criminal496Organizations (TCO) wreak havoc from South America to Canada. Latin497America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not the only areas profoundly498affected by TCOs. Drug cartels present an intractable threat to the499American homeland. The opioid crisis devastates communities, ruins500families, and kills far too many Americans on a daily basis.501    Given the nature of the challenges from hostile foreign powers and502TCOs, America's inattention to the Western Hemisphere has proven ironic503and unfortunate. Americans care immensely about the Western Hemisphere,504even if the foreign policy priorities of administrations focus505elsewhere, often for important reasons. They care not only because of506cultural, political, and social connections, but also became of the507problems: illegal immigration and drugs consistently poll as their508chief concerns. This is the duality of America's hemispheric dilemma.509The United States ranks as both one of the largest Spanish speaking510countries in the world and the world's leader in deaths by drug511overdose. \6\512---------------------------------------------------------------------------513    \6\ Mark A. Green, ``The US is the World's Fourth Largest Spanish514Speaking Country,'' Stubborn Things, Wilson Center, September 6, 2022,515https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/us-worlds-fourth-largest-516spanish-speaking-country; Evan D. Gumas, ``U.S. Overdose Deaths Remain517Higher Than in Other Countries--Trend-Tracking and Harm-Reduction518Policies Could Help,'' To the Point (blog), Commonwealth Fund, January5199, 2025, https://doi.org/10.26099/ppdk-qy10.520---------------------------------------------------------------------------521    The United States finds itself at an inflection point in its522relationship with the Western Hemisphere. The decisions made now will523either chart the course for America to reestablish hemispheric security524or abandon the region to America's adversaries. America must prioritize525the Americas again. The United States must reorient its foreign policy526toward an ``Americas First'' approach. \7\ America possesses the527capabilities and resources to execute this strategic reorientation.528Legislators and policymakers understand its necessity. And, I believe,529it can be accomplished with bipartisanship and through cooperation530between Congress and the White House.531---------------------------------------------------------------------------532    \7\ Joseph Ledford, Americas First: Reorienting US Foreign Policy533(Hoover Institution Press, October 2024), https://www.hoover.org/534research/americas-first-reorienting-us-foreign-policy-ledford.535---------------------------------------------------------------------------536    On Capitol Hill, and within this Committee especially, the Western537Hemisphere summons the fierce spirit of bipartisanship. Congress has538been proactive in reengaging America's neighbors. Recently, for539example, the Western Hemisphere Partnership Act (P.L. 118-159) became540law through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year5412025. \8\ It required 2 years of tough legislative wrangling. Now, the542United States has the statutory requirements for a clear-eyed,543measurable long-term strategy for promoting security, democracy, trade,544investment, and development in the Western Hemisphere. This much-needed545strategy will be delivered by June 2025.546---------------------------------------------------------------------------547    \8\ Western Hemisphere Partnership Act of 2023, S. 1325, 118th548Cong. (2023-2024), https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-549bill/1325.550---------------------------------------------------------------------------551    Supporting a secure and prosperous Western Hemisphere is also a552priority for the White House. On this matter, Congress and the553president are aligned. At the outset of his second term, President554Donald Trump and his foreign policy team have put a strategic focus on555the Americas. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's first trip abroad556signaled a positive direction for US-LAC relations.557    Today, then, I will briefly address strategic competition in the558Western Hemisphere, the perils of transnational organized crime, and559current U.S. policies for promoting security and prosperity. In560conclusion, I will offer a few general recommendations for bolstering561America's position in its geopolitical neighborhood. These aims, taken562together, offer a path toward a new hemispheric order.563            strategic competition in the western hemisphere564    The Western Hemisphere is the paramount arena for the contest over565world order between China and the United States. China has sought566regional dominance while the United States bid for peace and stability567in other theaters. In doing so, China has forged formidable economic,568military, and political ties in the Americas. \9\569---------------------------------------------------------------------------570    \9\ For a brief overview, see Diana Roy, ``China's Growing571Influence in Latin America,'' Council on Foreign Relations, January 10,5722025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-573argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri; See also, U.S. Library574of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China's Engagement with575Latin America and the Caribbean, by Ricardo Barrios and Karla I. Rios,576IF10982 (2023), https://crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982/57720.578---------------------------------------------------------------------------579    The CCP has made staggering economic gains. 21 LAC countries joined580the Belt and Road Initiative (Panama has withdrawn). \10\ China's trade581with LAC ballooned from $12 billion in 2000 to $315 billion in 2020,582and it is projected to double in the next 10 years. \11\ In 2023,583estimates put the total around $478 billion. China's aggressive584economic efforts in LAC has resulted in it becoming the region's585second-largest trading partner as well as the largest trading partner586for South America. China is also Mexico's second-largest trading587partner, right behind the United States. In the last twenty-five years,588China's investments in LAC business sectors--energy, mining,589manufacturing, infrastructure, and technology--have reached roughly590$240 billion. Business has been good for the CCP, and it has placed the591United States at a strategic disadvantage in its own hemisphere. \12\592---------------------------------------------------------------------------593    \10\ Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Green Finance594& Development Center, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-595road-initiative-bri/.596    \11\ Tatiana Lacerda Prazeres and Pepe Zhang, ``China's Trade with597Latin America is Bound to Keep Growing. Here's Why that Matters,''598World Economic Forum, June 17, 2021, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/5992021/06/china-trade-latin-america-caribbean/.600    \12\ Briefing, China's increasing presence in Latin America:601Implications for the European Union, Marc Jutten, European602Parliamentary Research Service, PE 769.504, February 2025, https://603www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769504/604EPRS_BRI(2025)769504_EN.pdf; This is a rough estimate. For an up-to-605date estimate, see American Enterprise Institute's China Global606Investment Tracker, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-607tracker/; China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin, 2024608Edition, Rebecca Ray, Zara C. Albright and Enrique Dussel Peters, July60929, 2024, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/07/29/china-latin-america-and-610the-caribbean-economic-bulletin-2024-edition/.611---------------------------------------------------------------------------612    China targets new and old infrastructure, seeking to both build it613and embedded itself in it--telecommunications, electricity, and ports614alike. \13\ The most striking recent examples have been in Peru and615Panama, where American concerns with China dominating ``old616infrastructure'' have overtaken the dilemma of Huawei's market share in617LAC. In November 2024, Peru opened a brand-new $3.5 billion megaport in618Chancay, which could become the third biggest port in LAC based on its619potential capacity. But this engineering feat should not be celebrated.620COSCO Shipping is the majority-owner, a corporation identified by the621Department of Defense as a Chinese military company. With the622electrical grid in Lima already owned by two Chinese companies, a623Chinese military company now owns and operates Peru's largest strategic624asset in Chancay, which transforms the nature and volume of trade625between China and LAC. \14\ China has not shied away from boasting626about its purpose. China's Ambassador to Peru, Song Yong, proudly627declared the CCP's goal: ``China is betting on Chancay to become the628Shanghai of Peru.'' \15\629---------------------------------------------------------------------------630    \13\ Margaret Myers, Angel Melguizo, and Yifang Wang, ``'New631Infrastructure': Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment632in Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Dialogue, China-LAC633Report, January 2024, https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/6342024/01/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-635LAC.pdf; Congressional Testimony, ``Examining the PRC's Strategic Port636Investments in the Western Hemisphere and the Implications for Homeland637Security,'' Part I, Ryan C. Berg, CSIS, February 11, 2025, https://638www.csis.org/analysis/examining-prcs-strategic-port-investments-639western-hemisphere-and-implications-homeland.640    \14\ ``Xi Jinping opens huge port in Peru funded by China,'' NBC641News, November 15, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-jinping-642opens-huge-port-peru-funded-china-rcna180289; Entities Identified as643Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance644with Section 1260H of the William M. (``Mac'') Thornberry National645Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283)1,646https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-647IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-648STATES.PDF; Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, and Henry649Ziemer, ``China-owned Chancay Port Set to Become Latin America's Third650Largest,'' CSIS, February 25, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/651china-owned-chancay-port-set-become-latin-americas-third-largest; Ryan652Dube and James T. Areddy, ``A New Chinese Megaport in South America Is653Rattling the U.S.,'' Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2024, https://654www.wsj.com/world/chancay-peru-port-china-south-america-trade-ffc75d32;655See also Julieta Pelcastre, ``China Gains Foothold in Peru with656Critical Infrastructure,'' Dialogo Americas, April 4, 2024, https://657dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-gains-foothold-in-peru-with-658critical-infrastructure/; ``Enel agrees to sell two Peruvian assets to659China's CSGI for $2.9 bln,'' Reuters, April 7, 2023, https://660www.reuters.com/markets/deals/enel-agrees-sell-two-peruvian-assets-661chinas-csgi-29-bln-2023-04-07/; Juan Pablo Cardenal, ``China in Peru:662The Unspoken Costs of an Unequal Relationship,'' United States663Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 531 (July 2024), https://664www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/sr-531_china-peru-unspoken-665costs-unequal-relationship.pdf.666    \15\ Sergey Sukhankin, `` `From Chancay to Shanghai': Peru's667Strategic Role in PRC Maritime Strategy,'' China Brief, Vol. 24, No. 6,668Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/669from-chancay-to-shanghai-perus-strategic-role-in-prc-maritime-670strategy/.671---------------------------------------------------------------------------672    In Panama, China likewise achieved symbolic and material gains in673its strategic competition with the United States. The CCP has turned a674LAC country with strong historical, economical, and security ties to675the United States into ``a strategic hub.'' \16\ Panama was the676inaugural LAC signatory to Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. Since6772017, moreover, Panama withdrew diplomatic recognition of Taiwan,678opened a Beijing embassy, heavily increased Sino-Panamanian trade,679investments, and connections across all sectors. Panama welcomed many680Chinese companies to locate their regional headquarters in the Colon681Free Zone, and the CCP took advantage of the misplaced hospitality. Of682these troublesome activities, the footprint of Chinese state-owned683enterprises around the Panama Canal has caused the most alarm.684Beginning in March 1997, Hong Kong-Based CK Hutchison Holdings has685operated the Balboa and Cristobal ports at the Pacific and Atlantic686entryways, respectively. Such potential dual-use infrastructure687threatens the sovereignty of the Canal and violates the 1977 Torrijos-688Carter Treaties. \17\689---------------------------------------------------------------------------690    \16\ Sabina Nicholls, ``Panama: China's Strategic Hub,'' Dilogo691Americas, March 29, 2024, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/panama-692chinas-strategic-hub/.693    \17\ ``Panama cuts ties with Taiwan in favour of China,'' BBC, June69413, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40256499;695``Panama opens embassy in Beijing after break with Taiwan,'' Reuters,696July 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/panama-opens-697embassy-in-beijing-after-break-with-taiwan-idUSKBN1AA2V6/; On Sino-698Panamanian trade, see China/Panama data, Observatory of Economic699Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/700pan; Alexandra Stevenson and Keith Bradsher, ``Trump, the Panama Canal701and the Hong Kong Firm at the Heart of a Showdown,'' New York Times,702February 6, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/06/business/panama-703canal-ck-hutchison.html; John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, ``Trump and the704Panama Canal: Why He Should Invoke the Monroe Doctrine,'' Civitas705Outlook, January 9, 2025, https://www.civitasinstitute.org/research/706trump-and-the-panama-canal-why-he-should-invoke-the-monroe-doctrine.707---------------------------------------------------------------------------708    Worse still, the CCP has established a military and intelligence709footprint in LAC. China prioritizes security and defense measures in710the region. \18\ From Cuba, China performs electronic surveillance711operations out of four newly renovated spy stations, capturing signals712intelligence on the U.S. military, space and commercial industries, and713citizens. \19\ Beyond intelligence, China created the China-Latin714America High-Level Defense Forum, and Chinese military officials have715been busy making several hundred visits to LAC over the last 20 years.716The People's Liberation Army operates military training programs and717conducts military exercises with LAC countries. China also provides law718enforcement training exchanges and dispatches its police forces and719private security companies into the region. The CCP sends a steady720supply of weaponry and equipment to LAC, as well. Authoritarian regimes721are the most frequent customers. So, too, does China export722surveillance technology to these regimes in Venezuela and Cuba, further723entrenching their dictatorial control. \20\724---------------------------------------------------------------------------725    \18\ See the CCP's 2016 Defense Strategy paper, http://726english.www.gov.cn/archive/white--paper/2016/11/24/727content_81475499069158.htm.728    \19\ Matthew P. Funaiole, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Henry729Ziemer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ryan C. Berg, and Christopher730Hernandez-Roy, ``Secret Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence731Activities in Cuba,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies,732July 1, 2024, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-733sigint/; Warren P. Strobel, ``Satellite Images Show Expansion of734Suspected Chinese Spy Bases in Cuba,'' Wall Street Journal, https://735www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-cuba-suspected-spy-bases-736da1d6ec9.737    \20\ ``Why Is China Bolstering Military Ties in Latin America and738the Caribbean?,'' The Dialogue, March 28, 2022, https://739thedialogue.org/analysis/why-is-china-bolstering-military-ties-in-740latin-america-and-the-caribbean/; Benjamin Kurylo, ``Comparative741Analysis of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Military Cooperation with Latin742America and the Caribbean,'' Military Review, July 2024, https://743www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2024-744ole/kurylo-comparative-analysis/; Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer,745Exporting Autocracy: China's Role in Democratic Backsliding in Latin746America and the Caribbean, Report of the CSIS Americas Program, Center747for Strategic and International Studies (February 2024), https://748www.csis.org/analysis/exporting-autocracy; Evan Ellis, Chinese Security749Engagement in Latin America, Report, Center for Strategic and750International Studies (November 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/751chinese-security-engagement-latin-america; On arms transfers, see data752in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Data base, https://armstransfers.sipri.org/753ArmsTransfer/.754---------------------------------------------------------------------------755                  transnational criminal organizations756    If mere strategic competition were not alarming enough, the United757States faces a severe hemisphere-wide problem from TCOs, particularly758Mexican drug cartels. These cartels dominate the trafficking into the759United States of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine,760leading to an unbearable human toll: an average of 200 deaths overdoses761per day. The nefarious operations of cartels also extend to arms762dealing, commodities theft, extortion, human smuggling, kidnapping,763money laundering, murder, and sex trafficking. Cartels engage in764rampant corruption and violence, undermining governance in Colombia,765Ecuador, and Mexico, among others. One can also look at the766humanitarian catastrophe taking place at US-Mexico border to see the767ills of their labor. \21\768---------------------------------------------------------------------------769    \21\ See page 36 in the transnational criminal organization section770of the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community771in Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office772of the Director of National Intelligence, February 5, 2024, https://773www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-774Report.pdf; See also the National Intelligence Council's Transnational775Organized Crime Foldout, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/776NIC_toc_foldout.pdf; See also, United Nations Office on Drugs and777Crime, Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean,778UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/779data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf; For overdose780statistics, see ``Drug Overdose Death Rates,'' National Institute on781Drug Abuse, https://nida.nih.gov/research-topics/trends-statistics/782overdose-death-rates; On the cartels contributing to migration crisis,783see Daina Beth Solomon and Laura Gottesdiener, ``Insight: Rise in784Mexican cartel violence drives record migration to the US,'' Reuters,785December 15, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rise-mexican-786cartel-violence-drives-record-migration-us-2023-12-15/; On Mexican drug787cartels, see also U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research788Service, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by789June S. Beittel R41576 (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/790pdf/R/R41576/47.791---------------------------------------------------------------------------792    As identified by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Sinaloa and793Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion cartels are the principal threats. The794Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels manage global operations. They are795established in every American State and preside over every aspect of796the drug trade. Undoubtedly, their manufacturing and selling of797fentanyl have created and continue to drive the opioid crisis. In the798last 4 years, Mexican authorities have intercepted 5.4 tons of799fentanyl, with areas controlled by the Sinaloa cartel being the800locations for nearly all of it. \22\801---------------------------------------------------------------------------802    \22\ Drug Enforcement Administration, 2024 National Drug Threat803Assessment, May 2024, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/804NDTA_2024.pdf; Zedryk Raziel and Patricia San Juan Flores, ``Sinaloa,805inundada de fentanilo: Mexico golpea a Los Chapitos en el bastion de la806droga que parte a Estados Unidos,'' El Pais, February 22, 2024, https:/807/elpais.com/mexico/2025-02-23/sinaloa-inundada-de-fentanilo-mexico-808golpea-a-los-chapitos-en-el-bastion-de-la-droga-que-parte-a-estados-809unidos.html.810---------------------------------------------------------------------------811    China plays a critical role in facilitating this fentanyl trade out812of Mexico. The United States considers China to be a major illicit drug813producing country for its actions. \23\ ``The fentanyl crisis starts in814China,'' DEA Acting Chief of Operations Jarod Forget has stated, ``and815it ends in China.'' The process begins with Chinese companies supplying816the precursor chemicals and pill press equipment to produce fentanyl.817The House Select Committee on the CCP found that the CCP subsidizes and818owns partial stakes in the companies providing these materials to819cartels. Despite mild cooperation with the United States through a820counternarcotics working group, the CCP has not seriously cracked down821on their sales. Furthermore, once cartels have distributed the fentanyl822in America, Chinese Money Laundering Organizations (CMLO) offer the823financial services to launder the profits. Using the Chinese824underground banking system, cartels deliver dollars to CMLO assets in825the United States in an elaborate laundering scheme that circumvents826Chinese capital controls and U.S. law enforcement. In short, CMLOs use827WeChat to sell dollars to Chinese customers in exchange for yuan, which828they transfer into pesos for the cartels in Mexico. It reaps829multibillions for the cartels. \24\830---------------------------------------------------------------------------831    \23\ Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major832Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2025, September 15,8332024, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/24/2024-21951/834presidential-determination-on-major-drug-transit-or-major-illicit-drug-835producing-countries-for.836    \24\ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,837China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China's Role, by Ricardo Barrios,838Susan V. Lawrence, and Liana W. Rosen, IF10890 (2024), https://839crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890; U.S. Congress, The840Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States841and the Chinese Communist Party, The CCP's Role in the Fentanyl Crisis,842118th Cong., 2d sess., 2024, H. Rep, https://843selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/844selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/845The%20CCP%27s%20Role%20in%20the%20Fentanyl%20Crisis%204.16.24%20%281%29.846pdf; Patricia Jowsmann, Dylan Tokar, and Brian Spegele, ``How Dirty847Money From Fentanyl Sales Is Flowing Through China,'' Wall Street848Journal, February 18, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-849fentanyl-trade-network-9685fde2; Press Release, ``Treasury Sanctions850Mexico- and China-Based Money Launderers Linked to the Sinaloa851Cartel,'' U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 1, 2024, https://852home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2439; See pages 19-20 and 29-30853in Department of Treasury, 2024 National Money Laundering Risk854Assessment, February 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/8552024-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf; U.S. Immigration856and Customs Enforcement, Cornerstone Report Issue #45, ``Chinese Money857Laundering,'' October 5, 2023, https://content.govdelivery.com/858bulletins/gd/USDHSICE-3714ed3?wgt_ref=USDHSICE_WIDGET_217; On how859Chinese crime syndicates launder money for drug cartels, see Lisa860Cavazuti, ``Marijuana and Mexican Cartels: Inside the Stunning Rise of861Chinese Money Launderers,'' NBC News, August 3, 2024, https://862www.nbcnews.com/investigations/marijuana-mexican-cartels-stunning-rise-863chinese-money-launderers-rcna158030; See also, Joe Miller and James864Kynge, ``The New Money Laundering Network Fueling the Fentanyl865Crisis,'' Financial Times, June 26, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/866acaf6a57-4c3b-1c-89c4-c70d683a6619; For U.S. estimate on Chinese money867laundering totals, see pages 72-74 in U.S. Department of State Bureau868of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International869Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II: Money Laundering (March8702022), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00768-INCSR-87192022-Vol-2.pdf.872---------------------------------------------------------------------------873          u.s. policies for promoting security and prosperity874    As the United States grapples with manifold challenges, what is875being done to advance American interests in the Western Hemisphere? In876a bipartisan manner, I believe, Congress has been at the forefront of877reasserting America in its own hemisphere with purpose and direction.878Senators and Representatives have generated positive, workable ideas879for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, whether in the Americas Act880of the 118th Congress or the recent HALT Fentanyl Act, which several881members of this Committee co-sponsored. \25\ More consequentially,882though, Congress has passed monumental legislation.883---------------------------------------------------------------------------884    \25\ Americas Act, S. 3878, 118th Cong. (2023-2024), https://885www.congress.gov/118/bills/s3878/BILLS-118s3878is.pdf; HALT Fentanyl886Act, S. 331, 119th Cong. (2025-2026), https://www.congress.gov/bill/887119th-congress/senate-bill/331.888---------------------------------------------------------------------------889    Enacted in late December, the Western Hemisphere Partnership Act is890the most significant legislation passed on U.S. policy in the Western891Hemisphere in decades. The law requires the administration to develop892the policy framework under which it can craft and implement policies to893strengthen America's relationship with its neighbors. It ensures that894American foreign policy will no longer be rudderless in the Americas.895    Crucially, as the law mandates, the United States will soon possess896not only ``a 5-year strategy to promote security and the rule of law in897the Western Hemisphere,'' but also clear guidelines for encouraging898investment, trade, and development in LAC. This comprehensive strategy,899which features a public diplomacy component, will address the most900pressing issues facing US-LAC relations, including TCOs, cybersecurity,901stable governance, development, and migration. Importantly, too, it902will contain a detailed assessment of the ways and means for attaining903concrete ends, in addition to the benchmarks by which the House Foreign904Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can judge905the results during yearly briefings. None other than a co-sponsor of906the legislation, Secretary Rubio, is tasked with creating it in907consultation with the relevant agency heads. Given the stakes of908strategic competition in the Western Hemisphere, and the threats909America faces from TCOs, the U.S. Government must get this strategy910right to execute on a long-term vision for hemispheric security. \26\911---------------------------------------------------------------------------912    \26\ For the final version of the Western Hemisphere Partnership913Act, see fiscal year 2025 NDAA, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/914BILLS-118hr5009enr/pdf/BILLS-118hr5009enr.pdf.915---------------------------------------------------------------------------916    To this end, the White House appears to be pursuing an ``Americas917First'' approach in foreign policy, aligning the executive branch with918congressional aims. \27\ In the opening weeks on his second term, the919Trump administration has prioritized the Americas, resolving to920eliminate drug cartels, rollback Chinese influence, and deepen regional921partnerships. At the outset, the administration strived to secure the922US-Mexico border and reduce illegal immigration. To more effectively923target TCOs, the administration designated six cartels and two924transnational gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and925Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), including the Sinaloa926and Jalisco cartels. These actions are matched by a total-elimination927campaign at the Department of Justice and enhanced intelligence928operations against TCOs by the Central Intelligence Agency, which929include drone flights over Mexico, and U.S. Northern Command. \28\930---------------------------------------------------------------------------931    \27\ Marco Rubio, ``An Americas First Foreign Policy,'' Wall Street932Journal, January 30, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/an-americas-933first-foreign-policy-secretary-of-state-rubio-writes-western-934hemisphere-too-long-neglected-a81707b0?mod=opinion_lead_pos7.935    \28\ Rebecca Santana, Elliot Spagat, and Gisela Salomon, ``Trump936rolls out his blueprint on border security, but his orders will face937challenges,'' AP, January 20, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-938deportation-immigration-homan-asylum-inauguration-939ac10480dc636b758ab3c435b974aeb19; Eric Schmitt, ``Pentagon Sending940Combat Forces to the Border in Line With Trump Directive,'' New York941Times, March 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/01/us/politics/942military-border-immigration.html; ``US Military Ramping Up Surveillance943of Mexican Cartels, General Says,'' Reuters, February 13, 2025, https:/944/www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-military-ramping-up-surveillance-945mexican-cartels-general-says-2025-02-13/; Julian E. Barnes, Maria Abi-946Habib, Edward Wong, and Eric Schmitt, ``C.I.A. Expands Secret Drone947Flights Over Mexico,'' New York Times, February 18, 2025, https://948www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/us/politics/cia-drone-flights-mexico.html;949U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Foreign950Terrorist Organization (FTO) List, by John Rollins and Liana W. Rosen,951IF10613 (February 25, 2025), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/952pdf/IF/IF10613; Memorandum for All Department Employees, Attorney953General, Subject: Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational954Criminal Organizations, February 5, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/ag/955media/1388546/dl?inline.956---------------------------------------------------------------------------957    Additionally, the president has proposed implementing 25 percent958tariffs on imports into the United States from Canada and Mexico to959spur aggressive anti-narcotics campaigns at America's northern and960southern borders. The diplomatic pressure has thus far resulted in961increased efforts. Mexico has sent 10,000 troops to the US-Mexico962border, extradited 29 sought-after cartel members, and considered963imposing tariffs on Chinese goods to augment those from the United964States. Canada, in turn, launched Operation Blizzard to fight narcotics965trafficking at the US-Canada border and designated cartels as FTOs to966aid the initiative. Based on the enhanced measures, Canada and Mexico967are seeking to work in tandem with the United States. The Trump968administration should proactively but sternly continue to engage with969these American allies to further counter TCOs as well as China. \29\970---------------------------------------------------------------------------971    \29\ Drazen Jorgic, Laura Gottesdiener and Lizbeth Diaz, ``Mexico972sends major drug capos to US as Trump tariff threat looms,'' Reuters,973February 28, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-974extradite-us-convicted-drug-kingpin-caro-quintero-other-suspected-975cartel-2025-02-27/; Jasper Ward, ``Mexico has proposed matching US976tariffs on China, Bessent says,'' Reuters, February 28, 2025, https://977www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-has-proposed-matching-us-tariffs-978china-bessent-says-2025-02-28/; Randy Thanthong-Knight, ``Canada Lists979Cartels as Terrorists to Stall Trump Tariffs,'' Bloomberg, February 20,9802025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-20/canada-lists-981cartels-as-terrorists-to-try-to-avert-trump-tariffs; Gabe Gutierrez and982Erika Angulo, ``Inside Mexico's border troop deployment following983Trump's tariff threats: Can it make a difference?,'' NBC News, February98420, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/mexico-troops-border-985trump-tariff-threat-rcna192924; News Release, ``CBSA launches Operation986Blizzard to target fentanyl and other synthetic narcotics,'' Canada987Border Services Agency, February 27, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/988border-services-agency/news/2025/02/cbsa-launches-operation-blizzard-989to-target-fentanyl-and-other-synthetic-narcotics.html.990---------------------------------------------------------------------------991    The White House has directly confronted China for its involvement992in the fentanyl crisis. In an opening move, the president has imposed99320 percent tariffs on Chinese imports into the United States. Despite994the punitive measure, the CCP has not indicated that China will yield995in its contribution to the fentanyl crisis in the face of economic996consequences. \30\997---------------------------------------------------------------------------998    \30\ Gavin Bade and Lingling Wei, ``Trump Plans Another 10% Tariff999on Products from China,'' Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2025,1000https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-plans-another-10-tariff-on-1001products-from-china-f7c0d4d9.1002---------------------------------------------------------------------------1003    As for regional engagement, and rolling back Chinese malign1004influence, the Trump administration has both sought to reestablish the1005Panama Canal's sovereignty and build stronger regional partnerships.1006During Secretary Rubio's historic first trip abroad, he visited Panama,1007El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. There,1008Secretary Rubio first brought some resolution to the Canal issue in1009consultation with President Jose Raul Mulino, who subsequently acted to1010withdraw Panama from the Belt and Road Initiative. The Panama Canal1011Authority then signed a Cyber Cooperation Arrangement with U.S.1012Southern Command, and Panama's Attorney General Luis Carlos Gomez1013declared the port lease with CK Hutchison unconstitutional in a move to1014terminate it. Elsewhere on the trip, Secretary Rubio advanced1015agreements on transnational crime, development, and migration,1016including a nuclear energy partnership, cybersecurity agreements, and1017anti-narcotics initiatives. Such productive visits, which demonstrates1018the importance of America's neighbors, should continue in the Americas,1019as both symbolic gestures and cooperative agreements that advance1020American interests. \31\1021---------------------------------------------------------------------------1022    \31\ Joseph Ledford, ``Trump's Americas Doctrine Starts at the1023Canal,'' Defining Ideas, February 12, 2025, https://www.hoover.org/1024research/trumps-americas-doctrine-starts-canal; ``Panama AG Agrees Hong1025Kong Firm's Canal Concession Is 'Unconstitutional','' Barron's,1026February 26, 2025, https://www.barrons.com/news/panama-ag-agrees-hong-1027kong-firm-s-canal-concession-is-unconstitutional-30142ec3; Press1028Release, Marco Rubio, ``Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Salvadoran1029Foreign Minister Alexandra Hill Tinoco at the Signing of a Memorandum1030of Understanding Concerning Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation,'' U.S.1031Department of State, February 3, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-1032of-state-marco-rubio-and-salvadoran-foreign-minister-alexandra-hill-1033tinoco-at-the-signing-of-a-memorandum-of-understanding-concerning-1034strategic-civil-nuclear-cooperation/; Press Release, Marco Rubio,1035``Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Costa Rican President Rodrigo1036Chaves Robles at a Joint Press Availability,'' U.S. Department of1037State, February 4, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-1038marco-rubio-and-costa-rican-president-rodrigo-chaves-robles-at-a-joint-1039press-availability/; Press Release, Marco Rubio, ``Secretary of State1040Marco Rubio and Guatemalan President Bernardo Arevalo at a Joint Press1041Availability,'' U.S. Department of State, February 5, 2025, https://1042www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-guatemalan-president-1043bernardo-arevalo-at-a-joint-press-availability/; Press Release, Marco1044Rubio, ``Secretary of State Marco Rubio And Dominican President Luis1045Abinader At a Joint Press Availability,'' U.S. Department of State,1046February 6, 2025, https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-1047and-dominican-president-luis-abinader-at-a-joint-press-availability/.1048---------------------------------------------------------------------------1049    In conjunction with rejuvenated diplomacy, the United States1050adopted a tougher posture toward its perennial adversaries in the1051region. Maximum pressure has returned. Venezuela and Cuba face renewed1052isolation and sanctions. President Trump revoked a license permitting1053Chevron to operate in Venezuela, removing the Maduro regime's financial1054buttress. Following the Venezuelan Navy's threat to ExxonMobil's1055operations in Guayana, the State Department warned of steep1056consequences. The Maduro regime will not persist without challenge. In1057a similar fashion, the administration also reimposed economic and1058travel restrictions on Cuba and relisted it as a State Sponsor of1059Terrorism. \32\1060---------------------------------------------------------------------------1061    \32\ Press Release, Marco Rubio, ``Restoring a Tough U.S.-Cuba1062Policy,'' U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2025, https://1063www.state.gov/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy/; Antonio Maria1064Delgado, ``US warns Maduro of 'consequences' following incursion of1065Venezuelan warship into Guyana,'' Miami Herald, March 1, 2025, https://1066www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/1067article301242254.html ; Ben Lefebvre, ``Trump Pulls Chevron License to1068Export Venezuela Oil, Reversing Biden Deal,'' Politico, February 26,10692025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/26/trump-reverses-biden-1070era-concessions-allowing-venezuela-oil-exports-00206273.1071---------------------------------------------------------------------------1072    Beyond security, the contours of this administration's regional1073economic engagement have emerged in recent weeks. Presented by the U.S.1074Special Envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, America Crece10752.0 seeks to increase America's stake in strategic assets in LAC as a1076counter to the CCP. The initiative will involve the United States1077reconstituting the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation1078to promote private investment in energy and infrastructure, as well as1079potentially enhancing America's six regional free trade agreements.1080\33\ The key to its success, however, will be securing long-term,1081sustainable binding agreements.1082---------------------------------------------------------------------------1083    \33\ Ari Hawkins, ``Trump Ditches Biden's Latin American Trade1084Framework,'' PoliticoPro, February 15, 2025, https://1085subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/02/trump-ditches-bidens-latin-1086american-trade-framework-00204539.1087---------------------------------------------------------------------------1088       general recommendations for advancing american interests1089                       in the western hemisphere1090     The United States must continue to prioritize combating1091malign influence in the Western Hemisphere. America must develop a109221st-century framework for hemispheric defense and development.1093American strategy must align resources, policies, and actions to1094achieve both short-term and long-term objectives in the Western1095Hemisphere.10961097     To execute on such a framework, the United States must1098craft a realistic and attainable 5-year strategy as mandated by the1099Western Hemisphere Partnership Act. Due by June 21, 2025, this strategy1100will guide U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, with Congress and the1101State Department working in concert. It must include the ways and means1102for America to secure binding and sustainable long-term economic1103cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to further regional integration1104in conjunction with revitalized security measures that address the1105acute challenges from China and TCOs.11061107     The United States must compel China to end its involvement1108in the production and selling of Fentanyl. In the context of a1109strategic competition, the United States is engaged in a proxy war with1110China over the drug cartels. The United States cannot dismantle and1111eliminate the cartels without disrupting China's financial and material1112contributions to the fentanyl trade.11131114     The United States must seek a workable security framework1115with Mexico to bring about stability and prosperity. It must have1116attainable benchmarks and metrics to measure success in both the near1117and long-term horizon, with a complete buy-in from Mexico.11181119     The fentanyl crisis presents a supply and demand problem,1120and it requires a supply and demand solution. Aggressive efforts to1121degrade and dismantle drugs cartels must be matched with compassion for1122Americans who suffer from the disease of addiction. The U.S. Government1123must increase the Federal funding available for substance abuse1124prevention and treatment programs.11251126     The collapse of Haiti poses a severe threat to the United1127States. The U.S. Government must not only increase its financial and1128material support for restoring order in Haiti but also exercise1129leadership on the issue to coordinate a larger coalition of regional1130partners to bring adequate force to bear on the gangs destabilizing the1131country. In doing so, U.S. policy must have metrics by which1132legislators, policymakers, and citizens can judge the progress made1133toward a stable Haiti.11341135     The United States and Panama must jointly maintain the1136sovereignty of the Panama Canal.11371138     The United States must continue to isolate and pressure1139the adversarial regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.11401141     The United States must deter war between Venezuela and1142Guayana. To prevent a conflict, the U.S. Government should consider a1143Defense Cooperation Agreement with Guayana.11441145     The United States must consistently and actively engage1146its neighbors to ensure long-term prosperity and stability. This1147requires prioritizing the cultivation and maintenance of relationships1148in the Western Hemisphere. The president must nominate high-quality,1149seasoned diplomats to serve in the Western Hemisphere, and Congress1150must expediate their confirmations.11511152     Congress should reauthorize the Development Finance1153Corporation and enact changes to make the institution better suited to1154advance American national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.11551156     Congress must continue working on Western Hemisphere1157related issues in a robust bipartisan manner. It sends a strong signal1158to America's enemies.11591160    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.1161    Now we will hear from Ms. Myers. Margaret Myers is a senior1162advisor at the Inter-American Dialogue and the United States1163Institute of Peace, and a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson1164Center.1165    Ms. Myers also serves in the faculties of Georgetown1166University and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced1167International Studies, and previously worked as Latin America1168and China analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense.1169    Ms. Myers, the floor is yours.11701171  STATEMENT OF MARGARET MYERS, SENIOR ADVISOR, INTER-AMERICAN1172     DIALOGUE GLOBAL FELLOW, WILSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC11731174    Ms. Myers. Thank you very much, and good morning. I would1175especially like to thank Senator Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen,1176and the distinguished members of the committee for the1177opportunity to testify today.1178    Hemispheric developments in U.S. national interests are1179deeply intertwined. Shared borders, interpersonal ties,1180economic interests, and security alliances have bound the1181nations and people of our hemisphere for much of our recent1182history.1183    We derive tremendous economic and other benefit from these1184ties. At the same time, developments in the hemisphere present1185some challenges to U.S. interests. Political shifts, violence,1186natural disasters, and other difficulties have exacerbated1187irregular migration, an issue that has tested the United States1188across Administrations and overshadowed much of our substantive1189engagement.1190    Other critical issues for the United States include1191transnational crime, including the trafficking of illegal goods1192and substances such as fentanyl, which has had a dramatic1193wasting effect on the U.S. population.1194    As someone who has followed China's engagement with the1195region for upwards of two decades now, I am also concerned1196about the progress that China and Russia, for that matter, have1197made toward dismantling U.S. ties in the region, whether1198through targeted messaging campaigns, disinformation campaigns,1199political alliances, or because of now extensive economic1200footprint in the hemisphere that China maintains.1201    Fortunately, there is much that the United States can do to1202maintain and grow its partnerships in the region to address1203shared security and other challenges and also to compete1204effectively with China and other extra regional actors.1205    But doing so begins with a commitment to constructive1206engagement, carefully employing the widest range of economic1207and diplomatic tools and platforms including new, innovative1208mechanisms to bolster American competitiveness.1209    In this sense, the Supreme Court decision is quite1210heartening. Engagement through the many U.S. and multilateral1211organizations that provide economic and other forms of1212assistance to the region should be an indispensable part of any1213effort to advance American interest in the Western Hemisphere.1214    In fact, only by forging constructive partnerships with the1215region can we hope to address the full range of challenges and1216opportunities inherent in the Western Hemisphere-U.S.1217relationship.1218    Forceful measures will generate immediate effects, but only1219for so long. Reliance on sticks alone is not sustainable and1220will not yield desirable long term outcomes whether for the1221U.S. or our partners.1222    The United States is not the only viable economic or1223political partner for Latin American nations. Unless we1224recognize the strategic value of our hemispheric relations and1225demonstrate that we have something substantial to offer,1226including in the form of investment and development assistance,1227Latin American nations will increasingly turn toward China or1228other actors.1229    With this in mind we must pursue our many national economic1230and security objectives--national and economic security1231objectives in ways that support and reinforce our soft power1232and economic stability and not undermine them.1233    Our foreign assistance, security cooperation, and1234diversified economic engagement have historically distinguished1235us from China.1236    If we hope to make the case that we are a more reliable,1237trustworthy, and steadfast partner, then we must demonstrate1238that to the region.1239    Equally, failing to invest meaningfully in our1240relationships with Latin America will exacerbate the challenges1241we face.1242    Finally, if we are serious about competing with China, this1243is a definitive moment. China continues to engage across the1244region, bringing wide ranging diplomatic and economic tools to1245bear in support of its interests. Recently, it has aggressively1246entered into the venture capital ecosystem in Latin America,1247focusing on technology startups including fintech and AI1248enabled companies.1249    If this sounds familiar it is because we have seen the same1250playbook in strategic infrastructure, critical minerals, and1251ICT.1252    The good news, again, is that there is considerable1253opportunity for the United States to be a significant player1254across many different sectors in Latin America while also1255furthering regional integration and challenging China in the1256process.1257    For instance, through the Development Finance Corporation1258the U.S. Government has the capabilities to leverage trusted1259and knowledgeable institutional partners like the Inter-1260American Development Bank to present solutions to U.S. national1261security challenges with relatively small investment.1262    At the same time, preserving our existing strengths, our1263partnerships, programming, and relatedly, trust in our country1264is fundamental.1265    It is very likely that we will look back on this moment as1266a definitive one in our hemispheric relations and a possible1267inflection point in China's global affairs. This is not a time1268to sacrifice our hard won gains in partnerships.1269    It is a moment to think critically and carefully about what1270constitutes power, what we stand for, and how we can creatively1271and constructively achieve that.1272    Thank you very much.1273    [The prepared statement of Ms. Myers follows:]12741275                Prepared Statement of Ms. Margaret Myers12761277    Senator Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members of the1278committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.1279    Hemispheric developments and U.S. national interests are deeply1280intertwined. Shared borders, interpersonal ties, economic interests,1281and security alliances have bound the nations and people of our1282hemisphere for much of our recent history.1283    Our economic ties are expansive, facilitated by U.S. company1284engagement, free trade agreements with 11 Latin American and Caribbean1285nations, and countless other forms of economic outreach. Since NAFTA1286entered into force in 1994, U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin1287America and the Caribbean and regional FDI in the United States have1288both increased almost ninefold, according to Congressional Research1289Service calculations. The region accounted for over 21 percent of U.S.1290total trade in goods in 2023. Mexico is the top trading partner of the1291U.S. worldwide, representing about 16 percent of our goods trade.1292    U.S. economic and other ties to the region are also of considerable1293strategic importance. Hemispheric trade and supply chain development1294are critical to reducing U.S. overreliance on Chinese goods, for1295instance. And South America is a major source of the inputs needed for1296U.S. AI and other high-tech industries. It contains 40 percent of the1297world's copper reserves, 35 to 40 percent of lithium reserves, and1298significant deposits of nickel, cobalt, and other critical minerals and1299metals. Beyond our economic ties, our historic partnerships security1300and development have been vital to hemispheric stability and our1301collective ability to address security, humanitarian, and other issues.1302    Developments in the hemisphere also present some challenges to U.S.1303interests. The region has experienced major political and socioeconomic1304shifts in recent years and continues to grapple with the many effects1305of transnational crime, lingering Covid-19 shocks, natural disasters,1306and other difficulties. All of this has exacerbated irregular1307migration--an issue that has tested the United States across1308administrations and overshadowed much of substantive engagement with1309the region. Other critical issues include transnational crime,1310including the trafficking of illegal goods and substances, such as1311fentanyl, which has had a dramatic, wasting effect on the U.S.1312population.1313    Also of concern is the progress that China has made toward1314dismantling U.S. ties in the region, whether through targeted messaging1315campaigns, political alliances, or as a result if its now-extensive1316economic footprint in the hemisphere. In just a matter of decades,1317China has assumed a dominant economic position in certain sectors and1318parts of the region. Trade underpins the China-Latin America1319relationship, as many nations rely heavily on China's demand for their1320raw materials and on often-artificially low-cost Chinese imports. Latin1321American nations also look to China for other forms of economic1322opportunity, including finance and investment. China's economic1323presence ensures that Beijing's interests now factor prominently in the1324region's economic and political decisionmaking.1325    Fortunately, there is much that the United States can still do to1326maintain and grow its strategic hemispheric partnerships, to address1327shared security and other challenges, and to compete effectively with1328China in the Western Hemisphere. Doing so begins with a commitment to1329constructive engagement, carefully employing the widest possible range1330of economic and diplomatic tools and platforms, including new,1331innovative mechanisms to bolster American competitiveness in the1332hemisphere.1333 1. engage constructively, leveraging the many invaluable tools at our1334                                disposal1335    Engagement, including through the many U.S. and multilateral1336organizations that provide economic and other forms of assistance to1337the region, will be an indispensable part of any effort to advance1338American interests in the Western Hemisphere. Only by forging1339constructive partnerships within the region can the United States1340address the full range of challenges and opportunities inherent in the1341U.S.-Latin America dynamic.1342    Our country's recent demands on Latin American nations have1343prompted immediate action on certain issues of U.S. concern, but1344reliance on ``sticks'' alone is not sustainable, and will not yield1345desirable long-term outcomes, whether for the United States or our1346partners. The United States is no longer the only viable economic or1347political partner for Latin American nations. Unless we recognize the1348strategic value of our hemispheric relations and demonstrate that we1349have something substantial to offer, Latin American nations will1350increasingly look to diversify their partnerships, leaning toward1351China.1352    Lasting solutions to issues that have concerned our electorate--1353migration, rule of law, transnational crime, drug flows--are also best1354achieved through constructive engagement with our Western Hemisphere1355partners. Progress on transnational crime requires law enforcement1356cooperation, certainly, but also work within the region to address1357common underlying problems such as weak rule of law, inadequate1358security forces, and poor governance. Relying on force-based solutions1359alone--especially unilateral ones--will fail to achieve desired1360outcomes in the long-term, all while undermining international trust in1361the United States. Sustained U.S. efforts to promote stability and1362prosperity in Mexico, Central America, and other parts of the region,1363through security cooperation and other forms of foreign assistance,1364will produce greater and longer-lasting dividends in rooting out1365lawlessness.1366    We must pursue our many national and economic security objectives1367in ways that support and reinforce our soft power and economic1368stability, not undermine them. Our foreign assistance, security1369cooperation, and diversified economic engagement have historically1370distinguished us from China. They are indications of our long-term and1371sincere commitment to hemispheric stability. If we hope to make the1372case that we are a more reliable, trustworthy, and steadfast partner1373than other extra-hemispheric actors, then we must demonstrate that to1374the region.1375    Equally, failing to invest meaningfully in our relationships with1376Latin America will exacerbate the challenges we face, including China's1377rise, democratic erosion, irregular migration, and organized crime. We1378must pursue long-term solutions, and we need partnerships to achieve1379real progress. Absent these, China is ready and waiting to seize upon1380perceived U.S. departure from the region, by maintaining and furthering1381its economic interests, certainly, but also through massive diplomatic1382outreach, technical and security cooperation agreements, and efforts to1383shape regional policymaking--all of which are part of the Belt and Road1384Initiative. China's promises, however hollow, to address Latin America1385economic, security, and other needs, must be met with constructive U.S.1386proposals.1387         2. explore new, innovative solutions to advance u.s.1388                   and broader hemispheric interests1389    China's engagement with Latin America is not static. It is ever-1390evolving, consistent with China's own interests and opportunities in1391the region. As a result, the United States must be creative and nimble1392in its efforts to compete with China in the region, anticipating1393China's next steps in Latin America, and crowding in resources where1394possible.1395    Most recently, China has aggressively entered the venture capital1396ecosystem in Latin America, focused on technology startups, including1397fintech and AI-enabled companies. It is an open secret among Latin1398American fund managers that China has been scouring funds' data rooms1399for tech startups, particularly in Mexico. And, now we are seeing1400wholly owned Chinese general partners entering the region. Meanwhile,1401fund managers and entrepreneurs in the region are wary of taking1402Chinese capital, but they are struggling to find alternatives. If this1403sounds familiar, it's because we have seen this same Chinese playbook1404in strategic infrastructure, critical minerals, and ICT (5G).1405    The good news is that there is considerable opportunity for the1406United States to be a significant player across many different sectors1407in Latin America, while also furthering regional integration, and1408challenging China's inherently neocolonial model of engagement with the1409hemisphere.1410    In addition to U.S. development assistance and technical1411cooperation, which help to create the conditions for investment in the1412region, the U.S. Government has the capabilities to leverage trusted1413and knowledgeable institutional partners like the Inter-American1414Development Bank and CAF-Development Bank of Latin America to provide1415solutions to this challenge with a relatively small investment. Using a1416collaborative capital model, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation1417can create a pathway through which to deploy and crowd-in institutional1418capital, including that of IDB, and especially IDB Invest. When1419competing with China in the region, partnership with the Inter-American1420Development Bank is among our most powerful and cost-effective options.1421There, the United States pays a fraction of total cost, while1422leveraging the IDB's excellent reputation and know-how in the region.1423Additionally, the vast majority of the IDB's scaled projects are1424squarely in the interests of the United States.1425    Through a DFC-led collaborative capital model, the U.S. can create1426vehicles targeting sectors of strategic and national security interest1427to the United States and partners, such as transport infrastructure,1428venture capital, and critical minerals. The DFC's recent $25 million1429deal with Techmet in Brazil, to develop a Brazilian nickel and cobalt1430project that aims to supply the electric car industry, is a critical1431example of the work that can be done through this mechanism. Scaling1432this and other efforts--including by crowding in additional regional1433financial institutions, such as the CAF--would be transformative for1434the United States and the region. Passage of the Americas Act, which1435has bipartisan support, would importantly complement these efforts and1436bolster regional integration by facilitating regional trade,1437encouraging reshoring of key industries to the United States, and1438generating related supply chains across the Americas.1439       3. accurately diagnose china's prospects in latin america1440    The United States should aim to diagnose China-Latin America1441developments correctly, accounting for China's many economic and1442political advances, but also its missteps and deficiencies. Despite1443China's substantial and growing relations with the region, this is a1444moment when many in our hemisphere are seriously contemplating the1445relative benefits and drawbacks of expanded relations with China.1446    China's massive industrial policy is altering the global economic1447landscape in profound ways, provoking isolationist policymaking in the1448developed and developing worlds alike. Latin America is not immune from1449these effects. Latin American nations are increasingly overwhelmed with1450artificially low-cost Chinese goods, including in sectors and1451industries where they may hope to maintain some degree of industrial1452capacity.1453    After three decades of enhanced engagement by Chinese companies,1454banks, and other actors, the region is also assessing the effects of1455Chinese activity across economic sectors. While most countries are1456still interested in expanding their exports to China and attracting new1457investment, especially in growth-promoting sectors, concerns about1458project quality and debt levels are evident in parts of the region. In1459other cases, Latin American nations are grappling with projects gone1460wrong and general overdependence on China's economy, which limits their1461decisionmaking prospects.1462    Beyond all of this is a reckoning in the region with China's own1463economic limitations and what it can realistically bring to bear at1464this juncture in support of the region's development. Chinese economic1465activity, technical cooperation, and donations still feature1466prominently in Latin America and the Caribbean, but countries such as1467Honduras--which sacrificed its ties with Taiwan in 2023 in pursuit of1468new, China-backed infrastructure investment--may very well be left1469waiting. Moving ahead, Latin American nations will need to consider1470whether their expectations for engagement from China are consistent1471with their own national planning objectives, and also in line with1472China's current economic realities and priorities.1473    China is clearly committed to continued engagement with the region,1474but if we look beyond the headlines, this would seem a moment of great1475opportunity for the United States to compete more effectively with1476China in Latin America, bringing vast U.S. public and private sector1477resources to bear in innovative ways. We must be bold in recalibrating1478our approach and show up for our partners in the region. Doing so will1479be critical to our country's continued international leadership and our1480ability to compete with China and other increasingly influential extra-1481regional actors.1482    I firmly believe that we will look back on this moment as a1483definitive one in our hemispheric relations--and a possible inflection1484point in China's global affairs. This is not the time to sacrifice our1485hard-won gains and partnerships. It is a moment to think critically and1486carefully about what constitutes power, what we stand for, and how we1487can creatively and constructively achieve that.14881489    Senator Risch. Well, thank you.1490    We are going to do a round of 5 minute questions and then1491have a second round if there is interest in doing that.1492    And so I want to start with a basic question for both of1493you, and that is that I think most Americans would be shocked1494to hear that now, on this map, China has replaced the United1495States as being the trade partner that is first.1496    And it is surprising, it is shocking in a lot of respects,1497and admittedly--the Chinese is a communist government, and they1498obviously--the government actually owns, controls and deploys1499the capital.1500    In a capitalist system like ours it is the private sector1501that does that. Well, the private sector only goes and invests1502and puts their money where there is going to be a profit.1503    Communist countries do not have that same restriction. They1504go and spend money, and we see it over and over again with the1505Chinese, they will underbid our people.1506    They will pay money under the table. They will do all kinds1507of things to replace the United States as a purveyor of goods1508or services, or whatever it is.1509    And that is what is causing this is is they have the1510ability to do this, whereas a capitalist system does not. And1511so that is a real challenge for us, because we do not do it. We1512will never do it.1513    It is just not in our DNA to do that, and we have become1514the most successful country in the history of the world by1515doing the things we do in a free market and a capitalist way.1516    So, how do you--how do you overcome that in a situation1517like this? Because, look, these countries are going to go--when1518it is particularly a country that is destitute or close to it,1519if there is money on the table, they are going to take it.1520    They do not care whether the Devil himself puts it there or1521the Chinese Communist Party. They are going to take it and do1522the kinds of things they need to do to get their hands on it.1523    So, Doctor, why do we not start with you and give us your1524thoughts on that line of thinking?1525    Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator.1526    It is a great question and one that policymakers have been1527grappling with for decades or at least the last decade.1528    I think there are ways that we can leverage our1529institutions for public-private partnerships, whether it is the1530DFC or new programs and some ideas that have been generated in1531Congress about creating a development fund that leverages1532private equity to invest in critical infrastructure in Latin1533America and provide terms and remove barriers to do so.1534    In regards to the DFC, Congress should not have to sign off1535on every loan that is over $10 million. We should remove those1536barriers. There have to be national security waivers for every1537country but four.1538    Let us remove those barriers, and let us catalyze our1539powerful capital inside the United States with the backing of1540the government to invest in these industries.1541    We just have to provide the alternative, and without1542providing it and without leveraging our strengths in the United1543States, the Chinese Communist Party will just continue to fill1544the void.1545    Thank you.1546    Senator Risch. Ms. Myers.1547    Ms. Myers. Thank you.1548    It is a--this is sort of the critical question, right, for1549us in terms of our ability to compete with China effectively1550across sectors in the Latin American region.1551    The first point I would make is that we are at something of1552a shifting moment in the China-Latin America dynamic in which1553Latin America is looking at China a bit differently, right,1554more seriously, thinking, contemplating much more seriously1555both the benefits and especially the drawbacks of engagement1556with China.1557    Many decades now have experienced dealing with China, of1558projects gone wrong, of complicated debt obligations, have1559changed somewhat the tenor of the relationship over time.1560    In addition to this, you know, there are now concerns about1561what China can even bring to bear as it struggles with its own1562economic development. A lot of what the region is expecting1563will not come to pass even though China continues to engage in1564serious and important ways across the region.1565    So, for me, this really is a period of strategic1566opportunity for the U.S. to engage more extensively through1567messaging, through collaboration with our partners, right, but1568also to begin to engage through creative mechanisms in various1569forms.1570    A lot of the work that is already being done to even the1571playing field, right, to work on institutional capacity, to1572work on the possibility of bringing in investment review1573mechanisms, right, in countries, and there is some receptivity1574to that is really quite critical.1575    State Department, Commerce, many others are working very1576hard to make this happen, and I hope they will continue to be1577able to do so.1578    In other cases, I agree--you know, I agree entirely that we1579need to pursue some new creative mechanisms, and you know,1580collaborative capital models of the sort that were described--1581you know, crowding in venture capital, crowding in1582institutional capital, is a terrific mechanism through which to1583do this.1584    This can be DFC led, incorporating a national security1585lens, but crowding in institutions such as--and resources from1586institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank which1587are critical partners for the United States and which pursue1588programming that is overwhelmingly in the interest of the1589United States.1590    So, both our current trajectory, understanding, right,1591where things stand in the China-Latin America dynamic and1592moving forward with creative solutions would seem to me a good1593strategy.1594    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate both your thoughts on1595that. I think everybody on this committee meets regularly with1596heads of state and on down from other countries.1597    And the thing that always strikes me is we are the partner1598of choice. They want to do business with America. Having said1599that, like I said, if the Chinese come along with free money or1600what have you, and we have all seen what has happened in the1601ports where they build a port, loan them the money, and it1602turns out to be a predatory loan, and Chinese wind up with a1603port.1604    These stories have gone around the world, and people1605understand that. They like dealing with us because of the fact1606that we have a rule of law, and that is the biggest strength1607that we have is the rule of law.1608    It also is a weakness because we have laws that prohibit1609paying money from under the table. In certain Third World1610countries that is the only way you get a contract is by paying1611the government official who is making the decision under the1612table.1613    And it is--again, Americans really do not have a real idea1614of how ubiquitous this is around the world, and that includes1615Latin America as well as other continents. So, this is1616something that hopefully we continue to gain on, and I think we1617are making gain on it.1618    It is what I call reputational business, and they want to1619do business with us because we have the reputation. But we will1620have to see as time goes on whether that carries the day or1621not.1622    Senator Shaheen.1623    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.1624    And just to follow up on that a little bit, 2 years ago I1625joined Senator Cornyn at a congressional delegation to Latin1626America.1627    We visited four countries--Panama, Colombia, Argentina, and1628Brazil--and I think Senator Cornyn, it is fair to say that1629everywhere we went what we heard from officials is they would1630like to have a trade agreement with the United States.1631    And it seems to me that that is a tool that we have ignored1632as we have looked at those opportunities for investment in1633Latin America.1634    And so could both of you speak to the importance of trade1635agreements and what we should be thinking about, and why that1636would be helpful for us to look at those as opportunities for1637American investment in Latin America?1638    And I will ask you to start, Ms. Myers.1639    Ms. Myers. Certainly. Thank you, Senator.1640    Yes. I mean, as we know and as was mentioned in the opening1641remarks, China's trade engagement with Latin America is1642expansive, especially in South America.1643    It is the top trade partner for most of the countries in1644the region at this juncture, and those very trade dynamics1645contribute extensively to its influence in the region.1646    When you are exporting almost all of your goods, right, or1647major commodities to China you think twice before rocking the1648boat or challenging China on wide ranging policy issues.1649    And so, you know, with that in mind it is critical both1650from an economic perspective, certainly, but also in terms of1651our interests in pursuing certain policy agendas and areas of1652political cooperation that the U.S. also engage in trade, grow1653trade where possible.1654    We have been in something of a stasis on this for a number1655of years now, and there are efforts underway to try to think1656creatively about how these partnerships can be expanded1657including through the Americas Act, for example, and through1658other mechanisms that fall, you know, somewhat short of a free1659trade agreement.1660    But without this, without these trade dynamics even, you1661know, expanded investment is not going to fundamentally alter1662the power dynamics at play in the region when China is indeed1663the top, you know, trade partner for so many countries in the1664region, and that dependency dynamic is there and has profound1665effects on decisionmaking.1666    So, I think absolutely this is a priority to whatever1667extent possible. It is one that needs to be advanced.1668    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1669    Dr. Ledford, do you agree with that?1670    Dr. Ledford. Yes. We should pursue free trade agreements.1671In fact, I think we could secure one with Argentina right now.1672They are certainly seeking one.1673    We should also revisit the agreements we currently have.1674DR-CAFTA--Nicaragua should not be in DR-CAFTA and I know the1675Administration----1676    Senator Shaheen. Amen.1677    Dr. Ledford [continuing]. Is looking seriously at removing1678Nicaragua from DR-CAFTA. I know the other member countries are1679also seriously considering backing that.1680    So, that is something that everyone should pay attention to1681and certainly encourage the Administration to pursue, if1682possible.1683    Long term, secure binding agreements is a step forward. We1684are not going to change the balance in the trade dynamics in1685Latin America vis-a-vis China in the near term, but if we do1686not do anything we will just continue to lose economic ground1687in our own hemisphere.1688    Thank you.1689    Senator Shaheen. Well, and staying with you, Dr. Ledford,1690you noted in your essay last year ``Americas First: Reorienting1691U.S. Foreign Policy'' that Russia sought to exert anti-American1692influence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and they1693have done that through a range of things. Launching propaganda1694about Russia's war in Ukraine has been one of those.1695    So, how do we--are you continuing to be concerned about1696Russia's malign influence in the hemisphere, and what steps can1697we take to counter that influence?1698    And as we are thinking about the war in Ukraine is there1699anything that we think is relevant to what is happening now in1700terms of peace negotiations that those Latin American countries1701can be helpful with?1702    Dr. Ledford. Yes, I am very concerned about Russian malign1703influence in the Western Hemisphere. I think, first and1704foremost, we can continue to isolate the countries that are1705most closely associated with Russia, Venezuela, for example,1706and Cuba.1707    As far as the effect from the Ukraine war, I am not1708prepared to comment on that. I do not know enough about Latin1709American influence on that, although I will say that Russia1710uses economic coercion to further its aims.1711    It has pressured Latin American countries not to support1712Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, Ecuador1713being the most striking case in which Vladimir Putin refused to1714buy bananas because Ecuador was going to ship old weapons in1715exchange for new weapons with the United States.1716    So, it actually prevented the United States from combating1717gains that are destabilizing Ecuador.1718    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1719    I just want to--I am over my time, but I just want to1720follow up really quickly because last week the United States1721sided with Russia in a resolution before the U.N. condemning1722Russia's invasion in Ukraine, and we sided with countries like1723North Korea and Nicaragua, some of those countries that are our1724adversaries with respect to most issues that we are working on.1725    What kind of message does that send to the other countries1726in Latin America?1727    Dr. Ledford. Well, I am not in the Administration. I am not1728privy to the conversations that went on behind the decision to1729do that. I would recommend, in general, that the United States1730not side with our adversaries in the Western Hemisphere.1731    But occasionally there are trade offs in the pursuit of1732larger goals, such as peace negotiations.1733    Senator Shaheen. Ms. Myers, did you have anything to add to1734that?1735    Ms. Myers. In terms of the signal it sends to our partners1736in the region, I think it is deeply concerning. It has sowed1737tremendous confusion. Certainly, is a departure from U.S.1738foreign policy objectives and U.S. foreign policy messaging and1739interest.1740    Over many years and decades and in many cases, I think,1741undermines the extensive and effective work that we have been1742doing to challenge the influence, not just of China but of1743Russia, right, and many other actors in the region to date.1744    Will this be taken seriously? Looking ahead, will we find1745partnerships on these issues? Will we pursue partnerships on1746these issues? All of these are critical questions, and so I1747think it has sowed tremendous confusion and reduced somewhat1748trust in our foreign policy.1749    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1750    Senator Risch. Senator Cornyn.1751    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1752    If you do not mind, I would like to give you a homework1753assignment.1754    So, back in 1823 the Monroe Doctrine was announced, the1755official policy of the U.S. Government with regards to the1756Western Hemisphere and the activities of other countries in the1757region.1758    Obviously, that has evolved over many, many years. But I1759would like for you to tell us what do you think instead of the1760Monroe Doctrine what the Trump doctrine should be for the1761Western Hemisphere, and maybe with the students here maybe they1762can come up with some ideas as well. That would be, I think, a1763useful exercise.1764    So, Blackrock just purchased two ports in and around Panama1765from a Hong Kong company which obviously is a front for the1766Chinese government and their activities in the area.1767    I think you alluded to this a little bit, Dr. Ledford.1768    But how can we access the capital markets? How can Congress1769encourage U.S. capital markets, which are a tremendous source1770of strength for the country? We do not have a lot of money to1771spend because we are looking at $36 trillion plus in debt.1772    But if we can access our capital markets to encourage1773purchasing of facilities in Central and South America by the1774United States or our friends, it seems to me that would be a1775good idea.1776    And maybe Senator McCormick, having come from maybe a1777little bit of that background, has some ideas as well. But if1778you could tell us what can we do to encourage more of that.1779    Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. It is an excellent1780question.1781    I think Congress has developed some workable ideas. The1782conceptual framework behind the Americas Act, I think there is1783much Congress could do to incentivize a program through the1784Commerce Department to work on capital, catalyzing the private1785capital to purchase the facilities that we are discussing. and1786I certainly would encourage all of you to look at that.1787    Senator Cornyn. One of the things that on our trip that1788Senator Shaheen mentioned a couple years ago that we heard from1789Southern Command--General Laura Richardson at the time--was1790that the absence of U.S. Ambassadors in the region was a big1791problem because there was not somebody that leaders of these1792countries could talk to knowing that they were a representative1793of the United States President.1794    And how important--maybe I will start with you, Dr. Myers--1795how important is it for us to have representation there in1796these countries of the President of the United States in the1797form of a U.S. Ambassador?1798    Ms. Myers. Thank you very much.1799    It is absolutely of paramount importance, both symbolically1800as we aim to demonstrate our commitment to engagement with1801these countries, with our partners in the region, but also1802operationally, as you have noted.1803    If there is nobody to talk to, if there is nobody to1804express concerns to, if there is nobody to negotiate with, then1805these countries are at a loss and our partnerships and our1806bilateral relations suffer.1807    So critically important to get people in place, and if we1808do not, then this provides an opportunity for others to step1809into the fold and to do so during those periods where, you1810know, truly our leadership is absent.1811    Senator Cornyn. Yes. It seems like if the Chinese and the1812Russians have high level representatives there in the region,1813and we do not, that sounds like a sort of a self-inflicted1814wound.1815    I still remember when General Kelly was head of Southern1816Command years ago, talked about the counter drug issue. And of1817course, a lot of the drugs do not just start in Mexico. They1818end up there and then are brought to the United States, and1819obviously, Columbia's role in the cocaine trade is well known.1820    But I still remember General Kelly when he was head of1821Southern Command, he said as a result of the lack of assets for1822the United States military and the counter drug mission that1823they only were able to interdict about 17 percent, I think, is1824the number that sticks in my mind, of the drugs that make their1825way from South America through Central America through Mexico1826into the United States.1827    And of course, I think it is entirely appropriate that1828Senator Shaheen has these maps from the Armed Services1829Committee. Obviously, the American military has to cover a lot1830of territory.1831    But how important is it for the U.S. Government in the form1832of the U.S. military Southern Command to provide assets there1833to interdict the drugs that make their way from South America,1834Central America, and Mexico and into the United States?1835    Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. That is an excellent1836point.1837    I think it is incredibly important and vital that the1838Defense Department work with our partner countries in Latin1839America to interdict drugs, and I encourage deployment of all1840available assets, sharing intelligence, giving capabilities.1841    Many of these efforts need to be host country led, and we1842have seen the most successful ones led by the countries1843themselves.1844    But the United States should be there to provide guidance1845and the capabilities and the intelligence to do so, and the1846assets, if necessary.1847    Senator Risch. Thank you. And that is an appropriate point,1848particularly when it comes to drugs.1849    You know, there is so much money involved in the drug trade1850that the corruption is staggering in places where they are--1851where they do produce a lot of drugs and, yet, sometimes it is1852very difficult for the people who are trying to do the right1853thing to do the right thing because of that.1854    Senator Kaine, you know a little bit about Latin America.1855Would you care to share with us?1856    Senator Kaine. Thank you. Well, I am really happy to be1857here with the witnesses, and you know, just a thought about the1858Monroe Doctrine.1859    One of the things we need to be a little bit careful of is1860in Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine is viewed as--the U.S.1861was not really interested in Latin America. It was interested1862in Europe.1863    And it was a doctrine that ``we are going to keep Europe1864out,'' not ``you are important.'' It was ``we are going to keep1865Europe out,'' and sometimes I think that Latin American1866countries believe that U.S. pays attention when others are1867interested, like China or Russia, but we are not paying1868attention because we value the relationships.1869    And I think any new doctrine is one that certainly, we1870ought to be worrying about this, but we also need to be1871communicating the message that we value the relationship, and1872that should be first. And we do need more attention.1873    I am worried about the USAID cuts. I am worried about--1874Secretary Hegseth gave a directive to departments in the1875Pentagon to develop a cut plan, and then he exempted certain1876parts of the Pentagon from the cut plan but not SOUTHCOM.1877SOUTHCOM always complains about not having enough resources.1878    We will see what the cut plan actually is. But if1879SOUTHCOM's resources are degraded further, that is a problem.1880    And then the other thing I am concerned about is the1881Administration has announced, not with respect to the Americas1882but more generally, a desire to shrink the number of consular1883offices around the world.1884    So, if there begins to be less of a presence in Latin1885America or elsewhere that could have a challenge. So, I hope we1886can work on those.1887    Let me tell you from really loving this area and having1888lived there, three challenges that I see, and I may ask you to1889pick any of them and address them, and give us some advice.1890    Number one, in the Americas I think China sometimes gets1891more credit than they really deserve for this reason. China1892will come with a pretty big checkbook, and a Chinese company is1893viewed as part of the Chinese government. They got a big1894checkbook.1895    The U.S. Government comes with a small checkbook but then1896U.S. businesses are all over Latin America with a big1897checkbook. But the Government--the U.S. Government--does not1898get credit for the U.S. investment. That is kind of all--well,1899that is kind of happening, you know, because of free markets,1900et cetera.1901    So, when you hear Latin American leaders say, well, you1902know, China has got a lot on the table--what about you guys?1903    What do you have on the table? They are giving us credit1904for the U.S. Government check. They are not really considering1905the total investment.1906    So, I think one challenge we have is figuring out a way1907through financing tools and others to really help message that,1908hey, we are more present than China. If you consider whole of1909society and measure that against whole of Chinese society, we1910are more present.1911    We are not getting credit for the private sector1912investment. I am really thrilled about this Blackrock1913investment that Senator Cornyn discussed.1914    Second--here is another problem in the Americas--we pay1915attention to the trouble spots and not the successes. And of1916course, we ought to pay attention the trouble spots--Nicaragua,1917Cuba, Venezuela.1918    But when you have got Uruguay doing some things well,1919Panama doing some things well--Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican1920Republic, Chile, Colombia, military to military very strong1921even though we have got some challenges on the civilian side.1922    We are more paying attention to the headaches, and we are1923not paying attention to the success stories, and some of the1924successful nations are, like, hey, we would be we would be1925better off being your adversary. You would pay more attention1926to us.1927    Our humanitarian aid--once nations get to sort of a middle1928income place, the tools of USAID, even if we turn on the funds,1929they do not get them.1930    They can get a security deal but not development1931assistance. China is not stopping development assistance to1932nations when they get to be middle income. They are, like, we1933are glad to be there.1934    So, I think the way to--if we are worried about Latin1935American like democracy and success, the best thing is to help1936the successful nations even be more successful because then1937their next door neighbors will look at them and say, yes, we1938want to be more like that.1939    So, us lecturing them about how to be successful is not1940going to be near as successful as seeing a successful neighbor1941next door. We ought to figure out ways to take the nations that1942are doing things right and give them more resources and1943attention.1944    And then the third thing--and I blame myself for this, I am1945very guilty of this--talk about the Americas. We do not do1946enough in the Caribbean, and then we end up with all these1947Caribbean nations voting against us in the U.N. on all kinds of1948things.1949    Because when we think about the Americas, I know I am1950always thinking about Central America and South America, and I1951put that on myself.1952    We need to broaden the aperture a little bit to maybe1953invest more in the Caribbean, and they are very hungry for us1954to put more attention in.1955    So, address either of those. How can we get more credit for1956what we do society wide? How can we pay more attention to the1957successes than the headaches, and what should we be doing more1958in the Caribbean?1959    If you could each pick one of those and give a quick1960answer.1961    Dr. Ledford. I will begin. Excellent points. Maybe I can1962touch on all three.1963    I think what you are really hinting at is what has to be1964included in the strategy that will be due in June is a public1965diplomacy component to message the success cases while also1966combating democratic backsliding and so forth--to put the1967message across of the points that you have hit on.1968    And I very much agree about the Caribbean, and as I pointed1969out in my opening statement the crisis in Haiti is the looming1970crisis that is going to challenge the United States that we are1971not paying enough attention to in the Western Hemisphere.1972    If Haiti completely collapses as a country of 12 million to197313 million people where do you think they are headed? It1974creates a humanitarian catastrophe. The Dominican Republic next1975door, another nation of 12 million to 13 million people, will1976be on the verge of collapse.1977    And sticking with the Dominican Republic, great success1978case. We should strengthen our strategic partnership with the1979Dominican Republic across all sectors. They are hungry for it.1980    There has been a lot of progress made on that front with1981Secretary Rubio's recent trip. We can--in fact, they are asking1982us and inviting us to help them develop their critical1983minerals, rare earth industry. This is a nation that is1984projected to have 5 percent GDP growth.1985    Senator Kaine. Might I have Ms. Myers just say something1986really quick, Mr. Chair?1987    Senator Risch. Sure.1988    Senator Kaine. Thank you.1989    Please, Ms. Myers.1990    Ms. Myers. No, I would love to--first of all, I agree1991wholeheartedly on all of these points. They are absolutely1992fundamental, you know, and especially the conceptualization of1993the Monroe Doctrine and how that is problematic and how we have1994to ensure that our Latin America policy does not come across as1995a China policy or as a Russia policy or any other form of1996alignment with our adversaries.1997    On the issue of China getting more credit than it deserves1998this is a--I mean, to me, largely a messaging issue, right.1999China comes to the table with big numbers.2000    Many of those numbers are not met, right. It comes to the2001table with a lot of promises. A lot of those promises do not2002come to pass. I am thinking about the lithium sector right now2003where there have been promises to build factories to build2004lithium batteries all over Argentina and elsewhere.2005    None of that has happened. None of that--there is no2006intention for that to happen, right.2007    So, making that clear, demonstrating that those promises2008indeed are unlikely to come to pass, I think, is absolutely2009fundamental while also working on our own communication2010strategy.2011    We do so much in the region. We have historically. We do2012not toot our own horn enough, right, often. There are2013obviously, you know, ways to do this that are more--some are2014more effective than others. Depends on the context, depends on2015the country.2016    But we need to think very critically about the types of2017projects we are pursuing through development assistance, right,2018and how best to amplify the gains and communicate the value of2019those both here domestically to justify their continuation but2020also overseas.2021    Senator Kaine. Thank you.2022    I yield back, Mr. Chair.2023    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.2024    Senator Kaine. He always says, you have nothing to yield2025back, Kaine--you have gone way over your time. He said that to2026me yesterday.2027    Senator Risch. Thank you.2028    Senator McCormick.2029    Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking2030Member Shaheen, for calling this hearing and thank you to our2031distinguished guests.2032    Over the past 4 years communities in Pennsylvania, my home2033State, and across the country have first hand experienced the2034consequences of a vacuum, a lack of leadership in Latin2035America, and the traffic in fentanyl and other illicit drugs in2036particular and the flow of illegal immigrants from around the2037world across the southern border have affected the entire2038region.2039    The Mexican drug cartels and the other transnational2040criminal organizations rake in massive profits, as the Chairman2041has said, in a variety of ways.2042    To make matters worse, as has been discussed, the Chinese2043Communist Party has stepped into that vacuum left by2044uninterested leaders in Washington to expand its activity and2045influence in Latin America.2046    And for Beijing the calculation simple--gain access to2047resources and critical infrastructure to support the CCP's2048global ambitions while undermining the influence and economic2049priorities of the United States in its own backyard.2050    This cannot continue, and that is why I am so glad that2051Secretary Rubio and the Trump administration have focused on2052these challenges.2053    With that backdrop, Ms. Myers, I would like to start with2054you. Mexico is both the third largest recipient of Chinese2055investment in Latin America and the largest trading partner of2056the United States, and I am particularly concerned about the2057investment by China in strategic industries, important sectors2058in Mexico that could undermine our national security, and for2059that matter, their national security.2060    What is your assessment of how the new Mexican government2061is addressing these concerns? And in the United States we, of2062course, have CFIUS as the process. What are the Mexican2063officials--what is the Mexican government doing to address2064this?2065    Ms. Myers. Thank you. That is a critical question.2066    My assessment is that, you know, for a number of years now2067there has been a concerted effort on the part of Chinese2068officials to engage far more extensively with Mexico to build2069ties, to strengthen partnerships, to upgrade the overall2070relationship, to be able to achieve various aims in strategic2071sectors.2072    This has worked to some degree, right. There has been2073movement. There have been new deals struck including in2074critical minerals, for example, and critical infrastructure, as2075you have mentioned, and we have seen as we have seen elsewhere2076in the region a real effort on localization, right.2077    China is not just engaging with presidents. It is not just2078engaging with heads of state. It is engaging at the state2079level, at the municipal level, with tiny towns in certain2080cases, if there are projects of strategic interest there.2081    And so so much is happening in Jalisco. It is happening in2082other, you know, Mexican states. And so, you know, the2083challenge is a bit bigger when you are dealing with different2084administrative levels and having to manage that and account for2085it.2086    What I do see now, though, is a real effort to respond to2087U.S. concerns about, you know, the extent of Chinese2088involvement, the extent of Chinese investment, using the USMCA2089as a back door, potentially, for--to, you know, ship goods to2090the United States that would otherwise be subject to tariffs,2091and we will see how far that goes.2092    But there does seem to me a willingness to at least sit2093down and have these discussions, and an openness to investment2094review mechanisms of some form, even if they do not look2095exactly like CFIUS.2096    Senator McCormick. Great. Thank you.2097    Dr. Ledford, I was very happy to see Secretary Rubio2098designate the cartels as terrorist organizations, and of2099course, as you know that unlocks a whole new set of authorities2100and possibilities for how the United States can engage on the2101security threat--national security threat.2102    Now what? How would you suggest--what is the framework for2103how the United States military, border patrol, national2104security infrastructure should engage with the Mexican2105government in pursuit of addressing the cartels, particularly2106given what the Chairman mentioned about the deep seated2107corruption that exists within Mexico and the cartels?2108    Dr. Ledford. Thank you for the question, Senator.2109    I think this is the million dollar question, how do we have2110a long term stable and prosperous Mexico that is free and2111secure. It is going to be on the Mexican authorities' side to2112decide how deep the engagement goes with the United States.2113    We have the tools and the resources and the volition. We2114need to renegotiate our security framework with Mexico, and I2115have been heartened by the recent moves by the president of2116Mexico to deploy more guards to the border, turn over cartel2117members.2118    But we need new legal authorities to deepen security2119cooperation on intelligence, on providing equipment. But it has2120to be Mexican led, and this has always been the issue, I think,2121less on our side and more on the Mexican government's side, and2122it is my understanding the Administration is engaged in these2123kind of conversations, and it is part of the tense negotiations2124that are bound up in tariffs and so forth.2125    But I am optimistic that we can develop a new framework. As2126far as the FTO designation goes, I think one positive aspect of2127that will be reducing the flow of illicit arms southbound,2128because now if someone sells arms to someone associated with an2129organization that is designated under the FTO they will be2130prosecuted for it under Federal guidelines.2131    Senator McCormick. That is a good point. Thank you.2132    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.2133    Senator Booker.2134    Senator Booker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to2135the Ranking Member for holding this important hearing.2136    I am really grateful for the two colleagues to be here but2137I want to--Dr. Ledford, I am really excited that you are here,2138not just because of your great haircut but also because you are2139from the Hoover Institution.2140    And I was a Stanford student--Stanford graduate student.2141Took classes over there. Larry Diamond was one of the more2142influential people in my early life, taking his classes. I2143think his last book--I wish it could make it--hand it out to2144everybody.2145    The title alone is pretty cutting--``Ill Winds'' I think it2146was, countering Russia's rage, China's, I think, opportunism.2147    But then he talks a lot about American complacency and that2148this erosion of the global democracy is a failure in many ways2149for us to counter the Russian-Chinese influence and these2150charts, in so many ways, really speak to that.2151    And I just really worry. I have traveled around the world2152and have seen how when we step up--I was in east Africa and2153seeing how it was American State Department programs that2154really created a better environment for U.S. business2155investment, and I saw some extraordinary partnerships between2156American investors and east African leaders that transformed2157entire communities, literally millions of them, bringing2158stability, rising people out of poverty, whether it was the2159agricultural input, the marketing of those products, the2160bringing them overseas in trade relationships.2161    Without that, though, and very candidly people would tell2162me in that context, you create this environment for chaos, for2163terrorism, or for Chinese opportunism.2164    And so as we look at this hemisphere I am just wondering--I2165do not know your relationship with my professor who gave me an2166A---you could tell him I am still upset about that--in his2167extraordinary class.2168    But can you--do you agree with him that there is an urgent2169role for the use--as he would call it, the reduction of our2170using of soft power--not just military power but really the2171soft power necessary to counter China?2172    Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator. Glad to be here all the2173way from the farm. I will tell Larry you said hello.2174    Senator Booker. Please.2175    Dr. Ledford. Yes, I very much agree with Professor2176Diamond--the exercise of soft power--and that can be done2177through the State Department.2178    And it is to a point that others have raised and that I2179have raised myself about constant engagement, that we have to2180have both high level engagement and mid-level engagement,2181ambassadors on the ground, secretaries there, but the2182institutions that you have talked about to further that kind of2183engagement.2184    So, I am in agreement. I do not have much more to add on2185that.2186    Senator Booker. And let me double down there then.2187    So, I remember when Secretary Mattis sat before us and2188said, if you make cuts at the State Department buy me more2189bullets, and when I see us now cutting programs, some of which2190I have visited and other of my colleagues have visited, that2191provide some basic health care and stability, and then we2192decide to do the far more expensive intervention when it comes2193to suddenly mass migration coming out of these unstable2194countries.2195    If you were just an investor--forget advising Senators--but2196if you were, like, a business investor it seems much more wise2197to invest on a lot of the root causes of this global crisis of2198migration than to be responding to the cartels that2199opportunistically exploit people, the drugs that are related to2200that, and more.2201    Am I correct?2202    Dr. Ledford. Yes, Senator. We always have to pair any sort2203of security measures with long term development to address, as2204you say, the root cause strategy.2205    Of course, the success rate is on a long term horizon. We2206do not see those results as quick as we do as aggressive2207efforts on the law enforcement side. But we have to pair those2208together because you are not going to have security without2209development.2210    Senator Booker. I am so grateful you said that.2211    And the last thing I really want to address, and I was so2212grateful to my colleague for bringing up the importance of2213expanding the aperture to the Caribbean, and Haiti is one of2214these crises that is--and I know the sort of faith traditions2215of a lot of my colleagues here--the moral urgency alone.2216    But should we not be engaged in stability there, in trying2217to bring about some kind of restoration of governance or2218dealing with the humanitarian crisis?2219    The consequences for our country seem to be dire. To ignore2220it, to pull back from using U.S. soft power and the strength of2221our nation, it seems to come with consequences. Would you agree2222with that?2223    Dr. Ledford. Yes. Dire consequences. The United States has2224to take a leadership role to bring democracy and order to2225Haiti.2226    Senator Booker. I really appreciate it, and thank you very2227much. Please tell Professor Diamond he really shaped my view of2228the world, and I am privileged that I am in a position now that2229I could use the wisdom and all the good things he taught me2230when I was a student there.2231    Thank you.2232    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator.2233    Senator.2234    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you2235both.2236    And I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Booker's2237question regarding soft power but also direct assistance in the2238form of foreign assistance.2239    As Senator Shaheen mentioned at the outset of this hearing,2240we did get a step forward in terms of a court order. The2241Supreme Court 5 to 4 ordered that AID and others pay funds2242already due and owing under contracts, which seems pretty2243straightforward. The U.S. Government should make good on its2244obligations that have already been incurred.2245    But the outstanding question, of course, remains the freeze2246on other foreign assistance, whether it is AID funds or other2247forms of foreign assistance, military security assistance.2248    So, Ms. Myers, would you agree that by stopping this2249assistance we not only do not provide important help to our2250friends in Latin America but we open the door even wider to2251China and other adversaries?2252    Ms. Myers. I could not agree more. Certainly, I mean, not2253only is this detrimental to us as a--to our partnerships, to2254our relations with the region, to trust in the United States to2255fulfill its obligations and to support, you know, hemispheric2256affairs, which it is so--for so many years committed to do.2257    But we have, on the other hand, you know, a China that is2258coming to the region with a very comprehensive Belt and Road2259strategy underway which has continued for upwards of a decade2260now and which contains at this point, and I would say over the2261past 3 or 4 years, an expansion of activity in the people to2262people space, in diplomatic activity, in technical cooperation,2263military assistance, in all of these areas that we have been2264really dominant in for so many years.2265    So, taking a step back now is essentially akin to shooting2266ourselves in the foot.2267    Senator Van Hollen. I agree.2268    And Dr. Ledford, I have been listening in terms of the2269points you have been making. I agree entirely. We need a2270comprehensive strategy here.2271    We need an economic strategy engaging with the private2272sector. We sort of need to approach this from all angles to2273both, you know, make sure that our interests are served, that2274our values are advanced, and that we do our best to keep our2275adversaries from further advancing in the region.2276    And so as part of that would you agree that the foreign2277assistance that we have provided has been a useful tool among2278many in terms of advancing our interests?2279    Dr. Ledford. Thank you, Senator.2280    Yes, I agree that foreign assistance aligned with the2281aims--the political aims and the values of our country is an2282effective tool amongst other tools in bringing a comprehensive2283framework to bear on hemispheric security and prosperity.2284    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, and of course, it is2285one tool, but I believe it is a very important tool, and it is2286especially dangerous when we are seen to be retreating or2287forfeiting one of our many tools.2288    I was here at the beginning when Senator Shaheen pointed2289out these maps, and I apologize if this has been covered, but2290in which countries in Latin America do you believe that China2291has gained the most leverage and the most influence through its2292efforts?2293    And if I can just start with you, Ms. Myers.2294    Ms. Myers. You know, if I were asked that 5 years ago I2295would have a different answer than today. But at this juncture,2296China has considerable leverage across the entirety of the2297region in some form or another.2298    There are some countries, and I would say particularly2299South American countries, where China has, you know, expansive2300trade relations that underpin the dynamic and which ensure some2301degree of dependence, and therefore more overall influence.2302    Also, those countries that are smaller and have received2303infusions of capital from China that are--make essentially an2304outsized contribution to the overall economic development tend2305to also align more closely with China on wide ranging issues.2306    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.2307    Dr. Ledford.2308    Dr. Ledford. I concur with my brilliant co-panelist, but I2309just want to highlight the gains made in Peru.2310    It is not just the mega port which will fundamentally2311change trade routes between China and Latin America, but they--2312China--own the electrical grids, business, potential2313corruption.2314    So, we want to look at in terms of Chinese influence,2315particular choke points in Latin America. But, again, it is2316across the entire region.2317    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.2318    Thank you, Mr. Chair.2319    Senator Risch. Thank you.2320    Senator Scott.2321    Senator Scott of Florida. Thank you, Chairman.2322    Thanks for being here.2323    How much do you think we have spent in foreign aid in2324Central and South America in the last 10 years? What is your--2325do you guys have any idea?2326    Dr. Ledford. In totality? I will just take a stab in the2327dark. Maybe $20 billion. I think $2.2 billion was authorized2328for fiscal year 2025.2329    Senator Scott of Florida. Is that--do you think that is2330what the number is?2331    Ms. Myers. I do not have the numbers, Senator. Apologies.2332    Senator Scott of Florida. OK. So, what if you--so let us2333say it is $20 billion. So, if I went to the taxpayers back in2334my State and said, this is what you got for $20 billion what2335would you say we got? What would a Florida taxpayer say we got2336out of that $20 billion expenditures?2337    Senator Risch. You might have----2338    Dr. Ledford. If I had to guess I would say that they would2339probably say not enough.2340    Senator Scott of Florida. Like, what would be something2341concrete that we could say that so--that we got out of the--you2342know, if I went back to talk to taxpayers, and they would say,2343so with that $20 billion this is what we got?2344    Dr. Ledford. We fund law enforcement measures in Mexico.2345Now, given they are not as productive as we would like them to2346be.2347    We have given millions recently to support the multilateral2348security support mission in Haiti to prevent the collapse of2349the country. So, in terms of the security measures, we do2350support anti-narcotic efforts.2351    Senator Scott of Florida. What would you say that--if I2352have to go back to a taxpayer and tell him I got a return2353somehow what would you say I got?2354    Ms. Myers. I mean, obviously, some of these taxpayers may2355be looking for, you know, immediate solutions to the problems2356that they are witnessing and encountering.2357    The challenge is that a lot of this is medium to long term2358in nature, right? It is an effort to work overtime with our2359partners to address issues that are enormously complex and2360require multifaceted solutions. That is hard to explain to a2361taxpayer.2362    But I mean, truly the across the board it is health, it is2363education, it is addressing the root causes of migration to2364over time reduce overall flows of irregular migration to the2365United States. It is addressing insecurity. It is building2366ties. It is building trust. It is building----2367    Senator Scott of Florida. Let us go through that for a2368second. So, if I went back to Florida and say, I just spent $202369billion of your money, and we prevented drugs from coming in,2370they would say, wait a minute.2371    Seventy thousand people died of fentanyl last year. They2372would say, you have not been very successful. They would say,2373we are worried about crime in our country, and you are worried2374about--you are paying for police in another country when we do2375not have enough police on the streets in our country.2376    In, I think, 2023 something like one out of every 432377Americans were subject to a violent crime. They would say, you2378know, we have got--you know, you spent money, you said, on2379health care, and they say, we have people in our country that2380do not have enough health.2381    I mean, or food, all these things. I mean, I have been up2382here 6 years. This is the busiest time since I have been up2383here. Everybody in my office is asking for money, and I just--2384and here is my pitch to them.2385    I say, I just went through a campaign. There is not one2386person--almost on every issue that people are talking about2387they are worried about cutting spending--that one Floridian2388brought up that we got to make sure we do that. There is not2389one, and then my problem is I cannot go back to Florida and2390say, boy, I am excited about how much money we have spent on2391foreign aid because I got--something could happen.2392    Let us see, the Castro regime still controls Cuba.2393Venezuela just stole another election. Ortega is getting2394stronger in Nicaragua. Petro is a terrorist. Name it. Lula is2395trying to destroy Brazil. I do not know--did we help Milei get2396elected? I do not think so.2397    We got to--so I look at it and say, what did we--so short2398term, long term, 20 years, I cannot see what we did in Latin2399America that we spent--if we spent $20 billion that we got a2400return.2401    And that is what I have to do. I have to go home and say,2402here is your--here is how your tax dollars are going to get2403spent. I mean, what would you be thinking how--if you think2404that way, like, citizens that does not--that thinks their taxes2405are too high what do you say to them?2406    Ms. Myers. Again, I think--I mean, this is not a--there is2407not a country that does not struggle with this to some degree.2408    I mean, these debates are ongoing everywhere including in2409China, right, where they say what is this Belt and Road2410Initiative about--stop spending our money on it, and do2411something at home, right? These are the--this is the problem2412that many, many countries are experiencing.2413    Nevertheless, most have conceded that foreign aid achieves2414wide ranging objectives--you know, strategic, security related,2415you know, health and safety related. I mean, really, you name2416it.2417    And in terms of building our partnerships with the region,2418if we believe that there is strength in numbers, right, these2419are--a lot of this is intangible. A lot of this is, again, you2420know, medium to long term, and so it is very difficult to2421explain to an electorate.2422    But I think we need to determine whether we believe that2423this is the right course of action ourselves, right, and then2424make the effort to come up with narratives that do demonstrate2425the value over time of these commitments.2426    And I am sure--I am not particularly equipped to offer2427concrete, you know, evidence at this particular moment, but I2428am sure that the many institutions that do these things have,2429you know, countless examples of the ways in which they have2430impacted the region positively and U.S. citizens positively,2431directly as a result. I wish I had something more concrete to2432offer in the way of messaging.2433    Senator Risch. I hate to cut off this debate because this2434is a really, really important debate.2435    Unfortunately, we are in the process of voting. They are2436going to call all of us down there in a minute, and Senator2437Curtis, I want to give you a shot at this, please.2438    Senator Curtis. Thank you. I will be careful with my time.2439    I would like to note--thank you for doing this hearing--I2440would like to note that it is my honor to replace Secretary2441Rubio as the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chair and really2442look forward to delving in on some of these issues and working2443with the Secretary on these.2444    I would like to know, in your view, the primary strategic2445goals of both Russia and China in the Western Hemisphere--how2446those goals differ between the two, and how can the United2447States better position ourselves to counterbalance those goals.2448    Go ahead.2449    Ms. Myers. I am happy to begin.2450    It is my view that China's goals in the region are largely2451the same as they were. Around the 1990s during this moment of2452the going out strategy, right, which wherein China was seeking2453resources, it was seeking markets for its products, and it was2454seeking to internationalize its companies to make them more2455competitive, right.2456    We are seeing the same dynamic at play now. Resources are2457absolutely fundamental. Markets are more important than ever as2458China looks to export its excess capacity, especially in high2459tech goods, which is fundamental to its economic growth.2460    It is an existential challenge for China at the moment, and2461we continue to see efforts to try to ensure that Chinese2462companies are not only competitive but dominant across certain2463strategic sectors including in the high tech space. This is2464something that China is looking to pursue in Latin America and2465has pursued for many, many years.2466    In addition to this, of course, are other interests that2467facilitate these objectives. Reducing U.S. influence, U.S.2468ability to engage, creates an environment in which China is2469able to pursue its objectives more extensively, more easily.2470    And so wide ranging communications, you know, campaigns,2471people to people contacts, other forms of engagement have2472sought to do that and have done so very effectively in certain2473instances.2474    So, China--I mean, I still see China's engagement as2475largely economic in nature, but obviously with a political2476component to it and a strategic component to it in that all of2477these things are dramatically interrelated.2478    For Russia, my sense--and I do not follow Russia as2479carefully as China--is that, you know, this is much more2480directed at undermining U.S. influence, U.S. interests at all2481junctures, right, with or without an economic interest, you2482know, accompanying that.2483    And we see that across the board in terms of the ways that2484Russia pursues certain deals, the types of agreements that it2485is striking, the folks that it engages with in the Latin2486American context.2487    China engages with everyone, as we mentioned earlier.2488Russia really is very targeted in its engagements in an effort2489to undermine U.S. interests across the board.2490    Senator Curtis. Thank you.2491    Doctor, if you can give me the short version. This way I2492can try to squeeze another question in. Thank you.2493    Dr. Ledford. I would just like to add Iran.2494    Senator Curtis. Thank you. Yes.2495    Dr. Ledford. I think we have not focused enough on the2496Ayatollah. Iran has deepened its engagement to undermine the2497U.S. specifically, and also its proxy Hezbollah which operates2498in the tri-border region to the tune of about $300 million to2499$400 million a year to fund its terrorist activities in the2500Middle East. So, it is very much about undermining the U.S. in2501its own hemisphere.2502    Senator Curtis. Thank you both.2503    Let me shift to a similar topic. Several Latin American and2504Caribbean nations have recently shifted considering their2505diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of2506China.2507    Can you both just briefly touch on how the U.S. can reward2508those who are more aligned with our position? What2509opportunities, diplomatic or otherwise, do we have to2510strengthen our friend Taiwan?2511    Doctor, why do you not start?2512    Dr. Ledford. Yes. I think we should reward our allies in2513the region that continue to recognize Taiwan with closer2514engagement and the benefits that come with being a close2515strategic partner with the United States and to continue to2516encourage their engagement with Taiwan and dissuade them from2517giving in to PRC influence to derecognize Taiwan.2518    Ms. Myers. And if I could add to that.2519    In addition to continuing to work with them in substantive2520ways, offering assistance in the areas that they are2521prioritizing from a developmental perspective, it will be2522critical also for us to communicate sort of the lack of2523progress that some of those countries that have made this2524recent decision to cut ties with Taiwan have had with China,2525right?2526    There is not a lot happening or at least, certainly, what2527is happening is not what was anticipated. And so, you know,2528that is a critical message for us to convey as well. It is not2529necessarily that you are going to get everything you want from2530China once you play this critical economic and diplomatic card.2531    Senator Curtis. Thank you. I am out of time, and I will not2532push this. I have a lot of questions and hopefully we can have2533a continued dialogue. Thank you very much. I yield my time.2534    Senator Risch. Thank you. The record is going to stay open2535until close of business tomorrow so if you want to submit some2536questions for the record, I am sure our witnesses will respond.2537    Senator Curtis. We certainly will. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2538    Senator Risch. A sincere thank you to our witnesses on2539behalf of both Senator Shaheen and I. This has been a very2540enlightening discussion. I think a lot more talk about problems2541than solutions but possible solutions.2542    This is an area that USG has got to spend more time on. We2543just really do. If you not there you cannot play in the game,2544and so we are--Senator Shaheen and I are committed to getting2545ambassadors there where we do not have ambassadors. That is2546critical.2547    We had a good hearing yesterday with three of the people2548that are going to the State Department. All three of them were2549committed to the proposition that we talked about today, and2550that is how important economic engagement is to your2551relationship with a country, and they are all committed to see2552that USG is there at the table, if necessary, with U.S.2553companies to try to make things happen down there.2554    So, a sincere thank you to both of you for attending today2555and providing us with the benefit of your testimony.2556    For the information of members, the record will remain open2557until the close of business tomorrow.2558    We would ask the witnesses to respond to those questions as2559rapidly as possible, and again, with thanks to the committee,2560this committee is now adjourned.2561    [Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]25622563                              ----------25642565              Additional Material Submitted for the Record25662567             Responses of Dr. Joseph Ledford to Questions2568                    Submitted by Senator John Cornyn25692570    Question. What steps can Congress and the administration take to2571develop CFIUS-like mechanisms with our partners to curb PRC investment2572in our hemisphere?25732574    Answer. In the Western Hemisphere, the United States must export to2575regional partners the protocols, principles, and best practices of the2576Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to2577restrain and eventually restrict investments from the People's Republic2578of China (PRC) in sectors with national security ramifications--2579agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and technology.2580    With the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review2581Modernization Act of 2018, it has been the ``Sense of Congress'' that2582presidents should engage with American allies and partners to create2583CFIUS-like processes to review foreign investments that threaten2584national security. Now, Congress must pass legislation to expand and2585formalize a broader scope of collaboration for CFIUS. It must extend2586beyond information sharing and into capacity building for regional2587partners due to the scale and intent of Chinese investment in the2588Western Hemisphere.2589    In expanding the role and authorities of CFIUS by amending2590legislation, Congress could establish and fund a hemispheric2591cooperation council (or another appropriate title), whereby CFIUS2592provides the technical knowhow and resources to equip hemispheric2593partners with a CFIUS-type body. Each CFIUS-like mechanism should be2594suited for the partner nation's institutions and laws, but it must2595function in accordance with American standards.2596    Under such hemispheric cooperation, CFIUS could advise, train, and2597offer tools for partner countries to establish their respective inter-2598agency bodies. CFIUS could dispatch American experts from the2599Department of Treasury or other relevant agencies to assist partner2600countries with screening investments, especially if Chinese investments2601will have an impact on the US supply chain or strategic chokepoints.2602Congress could require an annual classified briefing on CFIUS2603hemispheric joint investment review efforts to assess the progress and2604identify any potential implementation challenges.2605    To incentivize regional partners to participate, Congress could2606allocate a sufficient budget for the hemispheric cooperation council,2607including funds to offset the costs for establishing new screening2608committees in partner countries. Congress could also offer economic2609incentives for regional collaborators, including but not limited to2610tariff reductions, aid packages and/or preferential treatment for2611American investment through public-private partnerships.2612    In lieu of new CFIUS legislation, however, President Donald Trump2613could pursue bilateral agreements with hemispheric partners to review2614foreign investments in the Americas. Using CFIUS as a model, the United2615States and regional partners could negotiate agreements to engage in2616joint screening of PRC investments in critical sectors, either2617leveraging existing frameworks or creating new ones. Mexico should take2618precedence for the first in a series of investment security agreements,2619given its outsized economic and security importance to the United2620States.2621    The United States and Mexico have flexibility for pursuing a2622partnership on investment reviews. A joint investment screening process2623with Mexico could be embedded within the USMCA framework. The Essential2624Security exception under Article 32.2 of the USMCA would permit the2625United States and Mexico to undertake a joint investment security2626initiative with a CFIUS-like mechanism.2627    Beyond the USMCA, President Trump and President Claudia Sheinbaum2628could establish protocols for jointly reviewing Chinese investments in2629critical sectors as a component of a new security cooperation2630framework. In fact, any new security framework replacing the2631Bicentennial Framework must include an explicit economic pillar to2632address the hemispheric security risks posed by PRC investments.26332634    Question. Do you think the Trump administration should negotiate a2635new security cooperation framework with Mexico, and what should be2636included in such framework?26372638    Answer. Yes, the Trump administration must seek a reenvisioned2639binational security cooperation framework with Mexico to replace the2640Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health and Safe Communities2641negotiated by the Biden administration.2642    In doing so, the United States and Mexico should not only integrate2643the effective elements of prior security cooperation frameworks but2644also adapt the purpose to confront 21st-century threats to North2645America. A new US-Mexico security cooperation framework should combine2646the Merida Initiative's emphasis on intelligence, training, and2647equipment support with the Bicentennial Framework's focus on curbing2648arms and human trafficking, drug use, and economic insecurity, while2649expanding its aim to counter both transnational criminal organizations2650and the PRC.2651    Aimed at revitalizing the US-Mexico security relationship, this2652framework should contain realistic benchmarks, like monthly arrests of2653high-profile targets and drug seizures, alongside annual reductions in2654murders and overdoses, to achieve measurable near and long-term2655results.2656    The United States and Mexico should not delay negotiations.2657Presidents Trump and Sheinbaum should promptly convene high-level2658meetings to fashion this security cooperation framework. It should rest2659on five mutually reinforcing pillars that blend past goals with the2660present challenges of strategic competition:26612662     Eliminating Cartels26632664     Enhancing Border Security26652666     Strengthening Institutions26672668     Building Communities26692670     Fortifying North America26712672    Derived from the effective elements of the Merida Initiative and2673Bicentennial Framework, the first four pillars would pursue familiar2674objectives. These encompass dismantling cartels, securing ports of2675entry, eradicating corruption and bolstering the rule of law, and2676increasing economic opportunities.2677    The fifth pillar on strategic competition, however, merits further2678explanation.2679    Because of mutual national security interests, the United States2680and Mexico must collaborate to counter China's malign influence in the2681Western Hemisphere, especially to disrupt and destroy the cartels.2682China's crucial role in the fentanyl crisis as well as Chinese2683investments in Mexico present paramount threats to North America.2684    Under the fifth pillar of the US-Mexico security cooperation2685framework, then, joint efforts could be undertaken to prevent fentanyl2686precursors from entering Mexico and crack down on cartel money2687laundering facilitated by Chinese brokers. Moreover, the United States2688and Mexico could coordinate economic retaliation against China for its2689continued involvement in the drug trade, including synchronized tariffs2690on Chinese imports. To complement the anti-narcotic component with2691economic pressure, the framework could establish a CFIUS-like entity to2692screen Chinese investments in critical sectors (see response to2693question 1).2694    Shared interests, priorities, and threats underscore the need for a2695reenvisioned US-Mexico security cooperation framework. To be sure, the2696ambitious framework outlined here will require from both countries2697expanded legal authorities, unprecedented law enforcement cooperation,2698greater financial contributions--and, above all, renewed binational2699trust.27002701    Question. What can the U.S. do to induce the Sheinbaum government2702to improve its ability to counter transnational criminal organizations,2703specifically to prevent the flow of fentanyl?27042705    Answer. Outside of negotiating a new US-Mexico security cooperation2706framework, the United States can use old-fashioned diplomacy and2707conditional material support to encourage a more robust anti-narcotics2708campaign from the Sheinbaum government.2709    At the outset of his administration, President Trump tackled the2710fentanyl crisis using tariffs as a diplomatic tool, proposing tariffs2711on Mexican imports to spur a greater effort from the Sheinbaum2712government. In response, President Sheinbaum sent thousands of national2713guardsmen to the border, requested additional US drone flights to2714acquire intelligence on cartels, and extradited high-profile criminals.2715During their multiple exchanges on trade, migration, and drugs,2716Presidents Trump and Sheinbaum have formed a working relationship based2717on shared interests that has impressed observers. It should not,2718however, come as a surprise, as Sheinbaum governs pragmatically and2719sees the benefits to her domestic agenda from stronger collaboration2720with the United States. Degrading the cartels is a surefire way to2721boost the prospects of Sheinbaum's economic program, Plan Mexico.2722    The Trump administration can grow this nascent partnership through2723sustained high-level engagement, befitting of a close ally, to2724strengthen Mexico's anti-narcotics efforts. Indeed, close US-Mexico2725relations can be the foundation for this administration's ``Americas2726First'' approach to foreign policy. To support this aim, the Senate2727must expedite Ronald D. Johnson's confirmation as US Ambassador to2728Mexico while the administration must continue sending delegations to2729Mexico. Building on Secretary Kristi Noem's recent meeting with2730President Sheinbaum in Mexico City, Deputy Secretary of State2731Christopher Landau, a former US Ambassador to Mexico, and Secretary of2732State Marco Rubio should travel to Mexico City to reinforce the US-2733Mexico partnership. Ultimately, President Trump should make a state2734visit to Mexico. If only Richard Nixon could go to China, only Trump2735can go to Mexico. The president should seize the opportunity to2736invigorate US-Mexico relations for the 21st century.2737    In conjunction with diplomacy, the Trump administration must2738dedicate sufficient financial resources to assist the Sheinbaum2739government. Nothing signals cooperation and commitment quite like more2740money, training, and equipment, provided Mexico demonstrates results.2741The United States could increase the budget of the State Department's2742Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to2743provide a substantially larger amount of aid to Mexico. In return, the2744Trump administration could condition this assistance on the Sheinbaum2745government increasing the security portion of Mexico's budget to2746properly fund its new National Security Strategy. Furthermore, the2747United States could require Mexico to conduct more aggressive anti-2748corruption operations, supply more reliable data on interdictions, and2749commit to greater military and law enforcement collaboration.2750    Since the United States and Mexico have shared security concerns,2751and Sheinbaum's domestic programs depend on a reduction in crime, the2752challenges to Mexican anti-narcotics efforts are not insurmountable.2753With deft diplomacy and conditional aid, the United States can persuade2754Mexico to intensify its anti-narcotics operations to advance its own2755national interest. The United States, for its part, must devote2756appropriate attention and considerable resources to show commitment and2757facilitate cooperation. In turn, Mexico must provide a reciprocal2758investment.27592760    Question. How do you perceive the challenges presented by illicit2761gold mining in Latin America?27622763    Answer. In the Western Hemisphere, illicit gold mining, like drug2764trafficking, presents a series of interconnected and widespread2765challenges with criminal, environmental, political, and social2766dimensions. In remote areas, the shadowy enterprise is pursued through2767illegal small, medium, and large-scale operations. It provides a major2768source of funding for transnational criminal organizations, terrorist2769groups, and the authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua and Venezuela.2770    In the last decade, due in part to the global demand for gold,2771illicit gold mining has become increasingly profitable, encouraging2772malign actors to further engage in the damaging activity. It affects2773many countries in the region, occurring in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,2774Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, and2775Venezuela. In the cases of Colombian and Peruvian illicit gold mining,2776for instance, it generates higher profits than cocaine production.2777    In addition to propping up dictatorships and financing criminal2778outfits, illicit gold mining destroys the environment and encourages2779human rights violations. Used by miners to extract gold, mercury2780contaminates the air, land, and water of mining regions, poisoning2781workers and locals alike, even those far afield. Illegal gold mining2782operations also cause deforestation, particularly in the Amazon2783rainforest, and drive the widespread displacement of populations2784located in mining areas, of which the greatest impact has been on2785indigenous communities.2786    Furthermore, labor exploitation and human trafficking accompany2787illegal mining operations. Either through deception, recruitment or2788coercion, criminal organizations make workers, including children,2789labor long hours in hazardous conditions. These same groups engage in2790sex trafficking, luring--and forcing--women and young girls into2791prostitution at the mining sites.2792    As a result of the diverse, transnational nature of the threat2793posed by illicit gold mining, the United States faces several barriers2794to ending the practice.2795    Easy profits fuel the underground industry. At an average of $30002796per ounce, the value of gold offers a lucrative incentive for its2797unlawful extraction. Poverty, alongside a longstanding dependence on2798artisanal and small-scale mining, continues to push individuals into2799seeking out mining work, though many are forced into it.2800    The gold business is conducive to illicit practices. A commodity2801with a nearly impossible to trace origin, the global gold supply chain,2802which includes refineries in China, India, Italy, Switzerland, United2803Arab Emirates, and the United States, permits easy laundering through2804intermediaries that sell the illicit gold to legitimate, commercial2805suppliers.2806    A diminished state capacity proves incapable of dealing with the2807problem. Weak governance in remote regions, as well as corrupt2808officials, facilitate the illegal gold trade.2809    Despite the complex and intractable problems created by illicit2810gold mining, they are solvable if the United States acts swiftly. Three2811actions would have an immediate effect.2812    Congress must pass the United States Legal Gold and Mining2813Partnership Act (S. 799) introduced by Senator John Cornyn and co-2814sponsored by Senator Tim Kaine. This would create a statutory2815requirement for a ``Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Strategy,'' which2816would provide the United States with a holistic, long-term set of2817policies for working with regional partners to curb the mining of2818illicit gold, disrupt the financial networks enabling the enterprise,2819and prevent the regimes in Venezuela and Nicaragua from profiting off2820it. To this end, the United States must cease all gold imports from2821Nicaragua, and the Trump administration must impose tougher sanctions2822on the Nicaraguan gold sector under Executive Order 14088. Last, the2823United States should build on the Memoranda of Understanding with2824Colombia and Peru by pursuing additional MOUs with countries contending2825with an increase in illicit gold mining, such as Brazil, Ecuador,2826Guyana, and Panama.2827    This would only be the beginning. Since illicit gold mining2828presents a range of challenges akin to drug trafficking, the United2829States must be likewise aggressive and forward-thinking in developing2830the policies to combat it. So, too, must American policymakers be aware2831that the scourge of illicit gold mining will not be resolved overnight.28322833    Question. How can we better elucidate the harms of overreliance on2834the PRC in the minerals sector to our neighbors in the Western2835Hemisphere, and encourage de-risking and collaboration with the United2836States in the critical minerals sector?28372838    Answer. Containing the world's largest copper and lithium deposits,2839as well as vast reserves of silver, tin, zinc, nickel, bauxite,2840graphite, gold, and rare earth elements, Latin America has enormous2841potential for economic growth by contributing to the global energy and2842technology sectors. To facilitate such growth while reducing the2843region's reliance on China, the United States must develop an effective2844public diplomacy campaign in conjunction with a novel policy agenda for2845developing, expanding, and securing the critical minerals sector2846throughout the Americas.2847    In short, America must provide the Americas with a viable strategic2848alternative from China, which requires not only a message and2849attention, but also the capital and commitment.2850    Launching an ``all that glitters is not gold'' public diplomacy2851campaign would prove useful in highlighting how China's predatory2852involvement in Latin America's critical mineral sector will not result,2853over the long term, in desirable economic benefits, especially given2854China's hostile behavior and willingness to use economic coercion.2855Through media, events, and diplomatic engagements, this campaign should2856drive the message that the investments and profits from China today2857undermine Latin America's economy and sovereignty tomorrow.2858    Due to recent legislation, a statutory requirement exists for a2859public diplomacy initiative in the Western Hemisphere, which offers a2860framework for the Trump administration. The Western Hemisphere2861Partnership Act (P.L. 118-159), enacted in December 2024 via the2862National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, mandates a2863comprehensive 5-year strategy that contains a public diplomacy2864component. In crafting this strategy, the Trump administration should2865include a multi-year plan for encouraging America's neighbors to engage2866in hemispheric partnerships to further the region's critical mineral2867industry without a reliance on Chinese investment and purchasing. The2868Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee2869can monitor how well the United States conveys this message during the2870mandated yearly briefings on the strategy's implementation.2871    Yet the United States must do more than inform regional partners2872that China offers nothing but coercion and dependency. America must2873offer concrete opportunities for prosperity and independence.2874    With varying degrees of risk and sizable reserves, Argentina,2875Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,2876Mexico, Panama, and Peru possess critical mineral industries worthy of2877American investment. The United States must commit to initiatives that2878channel private capital into these nations' critical mineral sectors to2879spur development and secure the regional supply chain.2880    Such programs can incentivize American investment in exploration,2881refineries, and infrastructure. The United States is now pursuing an2882economic program in the Americas that would catalyze it. Under America2883Crece 2.0, the Trump administration seeks to facilitate investments in2884energy and infrastructure from US private capital. To support the2885administration's private-sector led approach to the Americas and2886bolster the Americas-centric critical mineral supply chain, Congress2887must consider legislation to create an Americas specific fund located2888in the Commerce Department to stimulate private equity investments in2889Latin American mining and processing. Through the reauthorization of2890the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress can2891also help promote investments in critical minerals by easing2892restrictions on DFC involvement in Latin America, which includes2893raising its cap and permitting investments in middle and high-income2894countries without a waiver.2895    In addition, Congress should consider drafting a tailored version2896of the Critical Minerals Security Act of 2025 for the Western2897Hemisphere. Like the global version, this Act could direct the2898Secretary of the Interior to submit a report on the vast critical2899mineral and rare earth element resources located in the Western2900Hemisphere, including which foreign entities control them, and how the2901United States can work with regional partners to strengthen the Western2902Hemisphere supply chain.2903    The Act could also require a strategy from the Secretary of the2904Interior for the United States to work with regional partners to2905develop clean mining, refining, separation, and processing2906technologies. This report and strategy would inform both the public2907diplomacy and capital campaigns designed to encourage Latin American2908countries to de-risk and collaborate with the United States in the2909critical minerals sector.2910    Diversifying America's critical mineral supply chain through2911regional partnerships will augment domestic production, leading to a2912self-reliant hemisphere that breaks China's dominance of the market.2913Slowly but surely, Latin America can end its critical mineral exports2914to China, and the United States can stop importing critical minerals2915from China.29162917             Responses of Ms. Margaret Myers to Questions2918                    Submitted by Senator John Cornyn29192920    Question. What steps can Congress and the administration take to2921develop CFIUS-like mechanisms with our partners to curb PRC investment2922in our hemisphere?29232924    Answer. There is considerable resistance in the region to the2925implementation of CFIUS-like mechanisms. Many stakeholders fear2926economic retaliation from China. It will be important to continue2927discussions with the private sector, government agencies, and others2928about the value of investment review, especially at a moment when China2929is poised to affect even those industries in which Latin American2930nations have retained some degree of competitiveness, and noting that2931there are many models of investment review that countries can adopt in2932support of their economic and national security interests.2933    That said, we can easily reduce concerns about economic retaliation2934from China by providing viable alternatives to Chinese investment and2935finance. The United States will be far more convincing on investment-2936related and other policymaking if we can demonstrate the economic value2937of U.S. partnership, especially at a moment when some in the region are2938viewing their trade and other agreements with the United States as2939liabilities.29402941    Question. Do you think the Trump administration should negotiate a2942new security cooperation framework with Mexico, and what should be2943included in such framework?29442945    Answer. Cooperation is the very best way to address the wide-2946ranging security challenges that Mexico and the United States are2947facing at present. This is an optimal moment for the Trump2948administration to pursue a strategy of cooperation, while also2949requesting that Mexico take certain steps to remedy a worsening2950situation, moving away from AMLO's historically reluctant approach to2951battling crime.2952    A new security cooperation framework would necessarily involve2953systemic mechanisms for intelligence sharing, surveillance, law2954enforcement cooperation, including on discrete operations, and the2955provision of resources and equipment to ensure effective control of2956organized crime.29572958    Question. What can the U.S. do to induce the Sheinbaum government2959to improve its ability to counter transnational criminal organizations,2960specifically to prevent the flow of fentanyl?29612962    Answer. As present, there is considerable U.S. interest in2963leveraging the trade and broader economic relationship to ensure2964Mexican compliance with U.S. demands. And Mexico may very well concede,2965noting its commitment to achieving certain mutual objectives. But2966Mexico's resources and ability to control the problem are limited.2967Strategic and tactical cooperation will be critical to ensuring real2968progress. A degree of trust in the bilateral relationship will also be2969important to achieving future gains. Here, the relationship would2970benefit from a sincere and concerted effort on both sides of the border2971to address the wide-ranging demand and supply side factors that are2972driving trade in drugs and other illicit activities.29732974    Question. How do you perceive the challenges presented by illicit2975gold mining in Latin America?29762977    Answer. Illicit gold mining in Latin America has been enormously2978impactful from an environmental, health, security-related, and economic2979perspective--and for a matter of many decades. Unfortunately, countries2980in the region appear increasingly ill-equipped to address the2981challenge, especially as illegal mining expands across parts of the2982region.29832984    Question. How can we better elucidate the harms of overreliance on2985the PRC in the minerals sector to our neighbors in the Western2986Hemisphere, and encourage de-risking and collaboration with the United2987States in the critical minerals sector?29882989    Answer. We must invest. We must be present in these sectors by2990helping to derisk these investments for U.S. companies. As we have2991seen, absent viable alternatives, Latin American governments,2992regardless of their political leanings, will continue to pursue2993economic opportunity with China, whether in critical minerals or other2994frontier industries. Argentina is a perfect case in point, despite2995Argentine President Javier Milei's apparent affinity for the Trump2996administration. Absent investment in the lithium triangle or elsewhere,2997the United States might consider encouraging countries to take more2998ownership of their resources. Chile's efforts to do so have naturally2999limited Chinese engagement in that country's lithium industry.30003001                                 [all]