S.Hrg.119-56

1[Senate Hearing 119-56]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                         S. Hrg. 119-5656                  UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND7                    UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES16                          UNITED STATES SENATE1718                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1920                             FIRST SESSION2122                               __________2324                           FEBRUARY 13, 20252526                               __________2728         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services2930[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3132                 Available via http: //www.govinfo.gov3334                                __________3536                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3760-170 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20253839-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4041                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES4243  			ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman4445DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JACK REED, Rhode Island46TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire47MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York48JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut49DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii50KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia51RICK SCOTT, Florida			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine52TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts53MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan54TED BUDD, North Carolina		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois55ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			JACKY ROSEN, Nevada56JIM BANKS, INDIANA			MARK KELLY, Arizona57TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA                  	ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN5859		   John P. Keast, Staff Director60		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director6162                                  (ii)6364                         C O N T E N T S6566_________________________________________________________________6768                           february 13, 20256970                                                                   Page7172United States Northern Command and United States Southern             173  Command.7475                           Member Statements7677Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................     17879Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     38081                           Witness Statements8283Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF Commander, United States            584  Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.8586Holsey, Admiral Alvin, USN Commander, United States Southern         1587  Command.8889Questions for the Record.........................................    699091                                 (iii)9293   UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND9495                              ----------9697                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 20259899                              United States Senate,100                               Committee on Armed Services,101                                                    Washington, DC.102    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room103SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker104(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.105    Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,106Cotton, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Banks, Reed,107Shaheen, Gillibrand, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,108Duckworth, Rosen, and Kelly.109110          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER111112    Chairman Wicker. This hearing will come to order and I113thank our witnesses for being here today. We're joined by114General Gregory Guillot. Thank you for being here from Northern115Command and Admiral Alvin Holsey from Southern Command.116    The United States faces the most dangerous security117environment it has entered since World War II. We know about118the threats in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, but we must119not lose sight of threats in our own hemisphere. Both of these120commanders face an increasingly complex set of actors who seek121to harm Americans and undermine our interests.122    The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has exploited our poorest123southern border to facilitate the trafficking of fentanyl and124other deadly drugs. Beijing has brazenly violated United States125airspace; it has burrowed its cyber payloads into core United126States telecommunications infrastructure and spread its127predatory economic practices to South America. China, Russia,128and North Korea pose an increasing nuclear and conventional129threat to key United States cities. Not to be outdone, Iran130continues to try to kill Americans on our own soil.131    General Guillot, I would like to hear your updates in three132key areas: first, border security is a priority for the133President, and I agree with his decision to declare a national134emergency at the southern border. President Trump has asked you135to deliver an updated plan to ensure border security. He's also136directed you to assist law enforcement in its security and137deportation operations. Department of Defense (DOD) has a lot138to offer to support law enforcement.139    The 2022 National Defense Strategy published by President140Biden, listed Homeland Defense as the military's first141priority, so this is bipartisan. It is clear that the American142people do believe that border security is national security. I143look forward to hearing from you on your work in this area.144    Second, President Trump has asked you to contribute to a145new plan for Homeland Air and Missile Defense. I would welcome146your insights in this effort. Please tell us where in your147opinion, new investments should be targeted. Do they involve148updating our ground-based radars and building out new missile149warning satellites? Perhaps they involve developing the most150cost-effective methods of intercepting incoming cruise and151ballistic missiles.152    Third, you have led on the development of a new strategy153for countering drones here in the Homeland. My friend and154Ranking Member, Jack Reed, held a great classified briefing on155the Langley Incursions. There have been numerous similar156incidents since, all of them troubling. Senators Cotton and157Gillibrand are working together on ways to counter drones. I158would appreciate your comments on how we can be more effective159in this space. Tell us what new authorities you need.160    Admiral Holsey, I would appreciate an update from you on161how your adversaries are using economic coercion against key162Latin American partners. The CCP aims to drive a wedge between163the United States and our neighbors. China hopes to reverse164longstanding policy recognizing Taiwan's independence, and it165wants our allies to look the other way as it builds so-called166``Gray Zone'' dual use civil--military infrastructure.167    Beijing is also trying to force our friends to rely on168Huawei for telecommunications. Even as numerous Latin American169leaders have adopted this CCP controlled TikTok app. We need170look no further than the Panama Canal. President Trump has171rightly172expressed concern about the People's Republic of China (PRC)173state-owned port infrastructure on either end of this vital174maritime artery.175    Those PRC facilities pose a risk to the free flow of United176States flag merchant ships and U.S. naval vessels. This issue177must be addressed. There are additional troubling PRC178developments in the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)179region. The PRC has leased a space port in the remote Patagonia180region of Argentina. That perch provides the Communist Chinese181with unprecedented surveillance capabilities in our own182hemisphere.183    Since at least 2019, Beijing has operated a spy base out of184Cuba and has done so with impunity. Just last year in Lima,185Peru, a PRC State owned power company purchased the city's186entire power grid. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping presided over the187opening of a Chinese funded deep water port just north of Lima,188which is capable of holding PRC warships.189    So, Admiral Holsey, I would like for you to update this190Committee on how you are integrating military and non-military191tools to fight against these predatory techniques. Despite the192significant and growing security threats in the region,193SOUTHCOM is consistently under-resourced to fulfill its many194critical national security missions.195    I look forward to hearing from you about how these resource196constraints are affecting SOUTHCOM. I would also like to learn197how innovative solutions like the Office of Strategic Capital,198can be leveraged to close this resource gap.199    Again, I thank our witnesses for being here and for their200earlier meetings with Members of this Committee, and I now201recognize my friend and the distinguished Ranking Member of the202Committee, Senator Reed.203204                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED205206    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me207join you in welcoming General Gregory Guillot, the Commander of208United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Admiral Holsey to209today's posture hearing--the Commander of the U.S. SOUTHCOM.210    Gentlemen, over the past month, both of your commands have211been ordered to conduct new missions in support of U.S. border212of security and immigration enforcement. President Trump has213deployed over 2,000 Active Duty soldiers and marines to214supplement the 2,500 guard members and Reservists already215deployed to the southern border and has directed NORTHCOM to216seal the southern border.217    Additionally, last week, President Trump ordered the218Defense Department to expand the Department of Homeland219Securities Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station,220Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to accommodate up to 30,000 migrants and221to begin transporting migrants via military aircraft to that222facility.223    Thus, I understand that around 100 migrants have been224transported to Guantanamo, at least half of whom are being225detained, not at the Migrant Operation Center, but at the226detention center where alleged and convicted international war227criminals are also housed.228    Border security and immigration enforcement is critical to229our National Security, but Guantanamo Bay is a dubious location230to detain immigrants. The detention center has only been used231for war detainees, and it is unfortunate to equate immigrants232with international war criminals. Further, the facilities at233Guantanamo are in poor condition and are extremely234understaffed.235    The U.S. military, which is already stretched for236resources, is now spending millions of dollars to use military237aircraft and burning thousands of dollars of military personnel238time for these operations. While a naval station in Guantanamo239does prepare for mass migration operations, these operations240are for saving people, leaving dire situations in Cuba or Haiti241on unsafe craft, not moving individuals already in the United242States to a place where the status of their rights is243ambiguous.244    I have questions about the legality of this operation, and245I'm concerned that this is part of a broader effort by246President Trump to militarize immigration enforcement. I hope247the President and Secretary Hegseth will use common sense to248follow the law and stop spending significant amounts of249taxpayers' dollars on performative deportation activities.250    General Guillot, Admiral Holsey, I would like to know how251these Immigration Force submissions are impacting the readiness252of your forces. Physically, I would ask for your estimates of253the course personnel and resources required thus far, and any254concerns you have about the limitations you have to continue255conducting such operations, particularly in light of your other256critical missions.257    Indeed, U.S. Northern Command is key to our national258security as the principal command for protecting the American259Homeland. As we consider threats from China and other260competitors, our very concept of Homeland defense must evolve.261General Guillot, NORTHCOM publishes its Homeland defense policy262guidance to address this challenge, and we're going to ask for263an update on the status of its implementation and how it will264transform the Homeland defense plans of the Department.265    The urgency of this mission has been made clear with the266recent incursion of drones and unidentified aerial phenomenon267in our airspace. America's skies and seas must be secured to268protect our citizens, and the Department must pursue269technologies that provide adequate detection.270    The Trump administration has proposed an Iron Dome program271for North America and issued an executive order to develop272additional defenses against cruise, ballistic and hypersonic273missiles. I would note that many of these efforts have already274been underway by the Missile Defense Agency for years, and that275the concept of space-based interceptive that President Trump is276interested in, has been debated, and tested at enormous277financial course without significant promise.278    General Guillot, I would ask for an update on how the279Homeland Missile Defense mission is proceeding and your view on280how a space-based interceptive system could affect Russia's281pursuit of a nuclear weapon in space.282    Turning to Southern Command, Admiral Holsey, your command283faces growing challenges from China and Russia in Latin284America. The political and economic instability in the region285presents a situation that our adversaries are seeking to286exploit, to increase their own influence.287    China in particular, is expanding its presence in the288region, including through investments in strategic289infrastructure, 5G telecommunications, and an expanding network290of space tracking installations.291    Admiral, you testified last year that the PRC and Russia292are strategic competitors who seek to undermine democracy while293gaining power and influence in the region, and that294partnerships are our best deterrent to countering shared295security and economic concern. But that for now, the U.S.296remains a trusted partner or the trusted partner.297    U.S. International Development Programs strengthen U.S.298partnership in the region, which advance U.S. national security299objectives. Now that USAID [United States Agency for300International Development] has been dismantled, I'm interested301in your assessment of whether the United States will remain the302partner of choice in your AOR [area of responsibility] or303whether China and Russia will use this as an opportunity to304gain further inroads with our partners.305    I'm also interested in your assessment of how we might work306strategically with our partners in the region to build307resilience against these activities. SOUTHCOM, like NORTHCOM,308continues to work closely with U.S. interagency to support309counter-narcotics and counter transnational criminal310organizations, or TCOs.311    I'm concerned about the threats from TCOs and synthetic312opioid trafficking, including fentanyl, which are contributing313to more than 100,000 overdose deaths each year in the United314States.315    Admiral, I would ask for an update on SOUTHCOM's work with316partner nations and other U.S. Government agencies to counter317narcotic and counter TCO efforts given SOUTHCOM's limited force318posture and resources.319    Finally, we know that insecurity throughout SOUTHCOM area320is contributing to the flow of migrant North to the U.S.321border. Economic instability, violence and corruption continue322to be a major source of insecurity in much of the region,323especially in the northern triangle countries of Honduras,324Guatemala, and El Salvador. Admiral Holsey, I would like to325know your views on what more can be done to help improve the326situation and strengthen our broader securities throughout the327region.328    Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to your329testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.330    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and we're now ready for331testimony from our witnesses. Before we begin, as members know,332there are votes, two votes beginning at 10:30 a.m., and we'll333keep the hearing going. When the vote begins, I'll try to run334over very quickly and come right back. In the meantime, a335member of our committee will preside and we'll keep going.336    So, we are ready to begin testimony. General Guillot, you337are recognized with the thanks of the Committee.338339STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF COMMANDER, UNITED340 STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE341                            COMMAND342343    General Guillot. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member344Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It's my honor345to command the men and women of North American Aerospace346Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command. I'm347also pleased to appear alongside my U.S. SOUTHCOM shipmate,348Admiral Alvin ``Bull'' Holsey.349    I'd like to highlight three trends of particular that NORAD350and NORTHCOM face with direct implications for Homeland351Defense. First, is the growing cooperation between China,352Russia, North Korea, and Iran to challenge the United States.353While their cooperation does not approach the level of complete354integration demonstrated by the United States and Canada, their355transfer of weapons, military technology and basing access has356cause for significant concern.357    The associated risks to North America have also grown, as358the number of Russian bomber incursions into the Alaska and359Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones has returned to360levels not seen since before the Russian invasion of Ukraine,361and Russian Navy surface and subsurface vessels conducted out362of area deployments off both U.S. coasts, including in the363vicinity of Alaska.364    Second, evolving technologies demand that NORAD and365NORTHCOM rapidly adjust our defense posture. Small uncrewed366aircraft systems or UAS [unmanned aerial system], proliferate367the open market and in the hands of malign actors pose a368growing threat to safety and security. Likewise, as competitors369continue to target U.S. networks and critical infrastructure in370cyberspace, a whole-of-government effort is increasingly371necessary to mitigate potential harm.372    Finally, non-State actors continue to target our Homeland.373Radical Islamic terrorist groups have rejuvenated attack374planning and anti-American rhetoric, intended to inspire lone375wolf attacks. Like the daily New Year's Day attack in New376Orleans, and transnational criminal cartels based in Mexico377threatened United States territorial integrity and the safety378of our citizens.379    With that strategic backdrop, Homeland defense is our380command's top priority and essential task, and in mindset and381action, nobody waits on NORAD or NORTHCOM. The mantra proved382true over the last year as the command's planning and383preparation generated swift and effective responses to384competitor actions, major disasters, and emerging requirements.385    Over the past 12 months, NORAD and NORTHCOM: intercepted386joint Russian and Chinese bombers off the Alaska coast, tracked387Russian surface vessels off both coasts, detected and assessed388numerous North Korean missile launches, tracked multiple389Chinese dual use military and research vessels in the bearing390sea and Arctic Ocean, supported Americans in need following391hurricane Helene and wildfires in California, postured to392support a hurricane Milton response.393    Deployed troops and unique military capabilities such as394airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)395along the U.S. southern border, illuminated transnational396criminal networks, deployed military personnel to assist U.S.397Secret Service in securing 195 Presidential campaign events and398improved defensive capabilities against all threats ranging399from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to small400drones.401    Looking forward, NORAD and NORTHCOM modernization is402crucial to outpacing our competitors. Establishing a layered403domain awareness network from seabed to space to detect and404track threats approaching North America, is critical to405immediate and future mission requirements because you can't406defeat what you can't see.407    To that end, I appreciate the department and congressional408support for fielding all domain capabilities such as Airborne409Moving Target Indicator satellites, Over-The-Horizon Radars,410the E-7 Wedgetail, and an Integrated Undersea Surveillance411System.412    Defending our borders, establishing a continental missile413shield, protecting critical infrastructure and force projection414capability, and safeguarding our citizens will require the best415our nations have to offer.416    I'm grateful to the committee for your ongoing support of417NORAD and NORTHCOM's vital Missions. Thank you again for the418opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your419questions. We have the watch.420    [The prepared statement of General Guillot follows:]421422            Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot423    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of424the Committee: I am honored to appear today and to represent the men425and women of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North426American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both commands continue to427defend North America through what is arguably the most complicated and428rapidly evolving operational environment we have seen. The USNORTHCOM429and NORAD operational environment remains diverse and dynamic, ranging430from persistent competitor activity in the vicinity of North America to431major natural disasters that have impacted millions of Americans. I am432proud to report that the service members and civilian Federal employees433at the heart of every USNORTHCOM and NORAD endeavor have risen to each434challenge as they stand their unending watch over our Homelands.435    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands linked by history,436collaboration, and a shared commitment to defending North America.437USNORTHCOM was established in 2002 as the U.S. geographic combatant438command responsible for homeland defense, security cooperation with439allies and partners in the command's area of responsibility, and440Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the continental United441States and Alaska. USNORTHCOM is responsible for defending the United442States--to include Hawaii and Alaska--from ballistic missile attacks,443while the Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated by the Unified444Command Plan as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic445Capabilities. Finally, in accordance with Presidential Executive Orders446issued on 20 January, 2025, USNORTHCOM is rapidly integrating447additional requested military personnel and assets to work with the448Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs & Border449Protection (USCBP) along the southern border, employing unique military450capabilities in all domains, and developing plans for establishing451territorial integrity along the southern border. USNORTHCOM's current452mission is to seal the borders and repel all forms of invasion453including illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, migrant smuggling454and human trafficking, and other criminal activities.455    Established in 1958 to counter the threat of Soviet long-range456bombers, NORAD is the bi-national United States and Canadian command457responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime458warning for North America. For nearly 67 years, the United States and459Canadian personnel assigned to NORAD have worked side-by-side in a460shared commitment to continental defense. Forged through operational461experience and a common vision, NORAD consistently demonstrates world-462class professional standards while executing its critical defense463mission 24 hours a day. Today, NORAD remains the world's only bi-464national command, safeguarding the United States and Canada while465routinely demonstrating seamless interoperability and operational466excellence that our competitors can only hope to match.467    Together, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's experience, expertise, and468dedication to homeland defense are more critical today than ever.469Following years of steady investment, our strategic competitors have470the means to overcome U.S. advantages provided by our favorable471geography and advanced technology. Today, our competitors have the472capability and capacity to threaten all of North America with a range473of advanced nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic systems while474employing disruptive grey-zone, cyber, and information operations475against the United States and our international partners. As part of476that effort, competitors have formed strategic relationships that477increase their collective ability to challenge U.S. and allied478interests around the world with growing disregard of international479norms or the sovereignty of nations that challenge their expansionist480ambitions. Meanwhile, unprecedented flows of illicit drugs and migrant481smuggling across the U.S. southern border have created a crisis that482undermines national security and the safety of citizens and communities483across the country.484    The dynamic operational environment and evolving threats to North485America require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to execute new missions on a486moment's notice without sacrificing ongoing operations and future487planning. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fortunate to draw upon decades of488shared history and lessons learned to shape the commands' plans and489operations, and defending the Homelands in the coming years will490require forward thinking, advanced capabilities, and a professional491workforce with the experience and technical knowledge necessary to492plan, resource, and execute the commands' crucial missions in493tremendously demanding conditions.494    The homeland defense enterprise will continue to rely on realistic495planning, targeted investment, and forward-looking policies that ensure496the Commands' ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in497all domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working in close synchronization498with each of the commands' interagency, international, and DOD partners499to improve shared all-domain awareness, interoperability, and the500defeat mechanisms required for a layered all-domain defense capable of501deterring and defeating a wide range of threats to critical502infrastructure, force projection capability, and our citizens.503    As competitor ambitions and capabilities grow, USNORTHCOM and NORAD504remain committed to improving all-domain awareness, reinforcing our505vital network of allies and partners, and fostering a workforce of506skilled and dedicated civilian and military professionals. Each of507these focus areas are critical to ensuring the homeland defense508enterprise remains ready to deter and defeat any threat to our nations509today and well into the future, and both commands have made significant510strides in building the capabilities, networks, and people needed to511execute their vital missions.512                        threats to north america513    The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile,514characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and515mounting threats to the U.S. national interests. Among the myriad516developments that are reshaping the strategic environment, three trends517are of particular concern to NORAD and USNORTHCOM due to their518immediate implications for our Homeland Defense mission.519    First, the likelihood of a direct conflict between the United520States and one of its four principal adversaries is increasing. While521the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran each seek to avoid armed522conflict with the United States, their misperception of a Western523decline fosters a growing willingness to challenge the United States on524the global stage and increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.525As Russia's brutal and misguided invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth526year, there remain several plausible pathways by which the war could527escalate into a direct military conflict with the United States.528Similarly, the conflict ignited by Hamas' October 2023 attack on Israel529has expanded to encompass much of the Middle East and threatens to530embroil the United States in a direct military conflict with Iran and531its proxies.532    Meanwhile, simmering tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China533Sea carry a persistent risk of escalation into armed conflict between534China and the United States, with consequences that could span a535generation. Finally, Kim Jong Un's public abandonment of peaceful536reunification as a national goal and growing assertiveness on the537global stage risks sparking renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula538after more than seven decades of uneasy Armistice.539    Second, strategic cooperation between and among our four principal540adversaries has grown substantially since the beginning of the Ukraine541War, increasing the risk that war with one adversary could quickly542expand into war with an enemy coalition. To date, each of these543relationships has remained mostly transactional, and none has advanced544to the level of a formal military alliance. Nonetheless, these545countries' shared perceptions of the West as a global destabilizing546force could form the foundation of a wartime partnership. At the center547of this concerning dynamic is a rapidly evolving relationship between548the United States' two most capable adversaries.549    Despite decades of mutual mistrust, Beijing and Moscow seem550determined to advance their strategic partnership and military551cooperation to counter what they perceive as a persistent U.S. threat552to their core security interests. Catalyzed by the onset of a major553war, this nascent military cooperation could quickly expand into554coordinated military operations that complicate U.S. and allied555planning and advance each adversary's ability to threaten North556America. We saw glimpses of this enhanced military cooperation last557summer when Chinese bomber aircraft deployed to a Russian Arctic558airbase and flew a combined patrol with Russian heavy bombers over the559Bering Sea.560    Such ``access transfer'' accelerates and extends China's ability to561threaten North America in the air domain and raises the specter of562coordinated military operations in the event of a strategic conflict.563Separately, North Korea's willingness to risk its own troops in support564of Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates the lengths to which these565partners are willing to go to advance their strategic positions. It566also raises concerning questions about the quid pro quo that Moscow may567offer in return, potentially including expertise that could accelerate568Pyongyang's development of advanced strategic weapons.569    Third, each of our adversaries is advancing its ability--and, in570some cases, rehearsing its plans--to threaten North America in multiple571domains and from multiple vectors, increasing the likelihood that an572armed conflict would include direct strikes on the Homeland. The PRC is573expanding its ability to hold portions of North America at risk with574conventionally armed weapons, providing Beijing a strike option against575our Homeland that is above its demonstrated robust cyberattack576capabilities but below its threshold for nuclear use. Last July,577Chinese surface combatants deployed to the Bering Sea for the fourth578straight year and operated within cruise missile range of critical579infrastructure throughout Alaska. Since 2023, China has launched two580hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile581submarines (SSGN), which in the coming years could provide Beijing a582clandestine land-attack option against critical infrastructure in583Alaska and the U.S. West Coast.584    In November, China incorporated air-refuellable H-6N medium bombers585into a Sino-Russian combined bomber patrol, marking the first long-586range use of a platform that will extend the PLA Air Force's strike587range to include portions of Alaska even without basing or overflight588permissions from the Russians. Finally, China may be exploring the589development of conventionally armed ICBMs that could allow Beijing to590strike targets in Alaska and the continental United States without591crossing the nuclear threshold.592    Meanwhile, China is advancing the quantity and sophistication of593its North America-threatening nuclear delivery platforms. Chinese594missile developers are probably developing nuclear-armed ICBMs equipped595with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) or the ability to fly a596fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) trajectory that approaches597North America from the south rather than the traditional northerly598vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed. Such599systems, if fielded, would erode strategic stability by degrading our600ability to provide granular and actionable warning of an inbound601attack.602    Despite the degradation of its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine,603Russia has enhanced its already formidable capability to threaten North604America with conventionally armed air-and sea-based cruise missiles.605Three years of strike operations into Ukraine have provided valuable606operational experience to Russian aircrews and naval forces. In the607last year, Russia's heavy bomber fleet has resumed its pre-war pace of608strategic deterrence patrols--including multiple flights along the609North American coastline--while simultaneously intensifying its strike610operations into Ukraine. In the maritime domain, the Russian submarine611force conducted its first port call in Cuba since the cold war and612further integrated advanced Severodvinsk-class SSGNs into the Russian613Pacific Fleet, portending regular--and potentially concurrent--patrols614by cruise missile-capable submarines off North America's Atlantic and615Pacific coasts.616    In the nuclear domain, Russia fielded the world's first HGV-617equipped ICBM over 5 years ago and continues to develop and test other618novel nuclear delivery systems, like the FOBS-capable Sarmat heavy619ICBM, the Poseidon transoceanic torpedo, and the Burevestnik nuclear-620propelled cruise missile. If fielded, these advanced weapons will621severely challenge our ability to detect and characterize an inbound622attack and determine an appropriate response during a conflict.623    North Korea continues to defy the international nonproliferation624regime and advance its strategic weapons program. Kim Jong Un's newest625ICBM--the Hwasong-19 he first tested last October--probably can deliver626a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America while minimizing627our ability to provide pre-launch warning due to the shortened launch628preparation timelines afforded by its solid-propellant design. Regime629rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim is eager to transition630his strategic weapons program from research and development to serial631production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North632Korea's inventory and narrow my confidence in USNORTHCOM's existing633ballistic missile defense capacity in the coming years.634    Finally, Iran retains the capability to strike the United States in635the cyber domain and through its asymmetric and proxy operations.636Meanwhile, Iran's burgeoning nuclear and space launch programs provide637a viable pathway for developing a North America-threatening ICBM should638its leaders determine that they need a more forceful means of639challenging the United States.640    Separately, we face a variety of non-traditional threats that could641disrupt critical services in the Homeland and degrade NORAD and642USNORTHCOM's ability to carry out our no-fail missions. Key among these643is a spate of activity over the past year involving small uncrewed644aircraft systems (sUAS) operating over sensitive DOD installations and645other Defense Critical Infrastructure. While much of this activity may646be attributable to hobbyists, peer adversaries clearly have incentive647to collect intelligence on these installations, and our law enforcement648partners have uncovered evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus in649some of these incidents.650    Meanwhile, our principal adversaries are concentrating their651increasingly sophisticated offensive cyberoperations on U.S. defense652and civilian infrastructure. Over the last year, Russian-affiliated653cyber actors have conducted attacks on water supply, wastewater,654hydroelectric, and energy facilities in the United States, while PRC-655sponsored cyber actors have positioned themselves on IT networks in656multiple U.S. sectors, potentially enabling them to rapidly transition657to disruptive attacks in the event of a crisis or conflict.658    Finally, I remain highly concerned by threats presented by non-659state actors. USNORTHCOM assesses the threat of a foreign terrorist660attack in North America is at the highest level in at least 5 years, as661the Israel-Hamas conflict has motivated foreign terrorist organizations662to rejuvenate their attack planning against the United States. These663groups have also redoubled their propaganda efforts in the last 18664months to inspire lone-wolf terrorists to pursue attacks within the665Homeland, as seen with the deadly January 1st 2025 attack in New666Orleans.667    Separately, transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico668continue to threaten U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity through669the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit drugs and670the facilitation of unlawful mass migration toward the U.S. southern671border. Drug-related violence has escalated in recent years as rival672cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and migrant smuggling673routes and demonstrate a growing willingness to directly engage Mexican674security forces, increasing the risk of spillover violence into the675United States.676                         defending the homeland677    Homeland defense remains USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top priority and678essential task. Strategic competitors continue their rapid testing and679fielding of precision weapons systems capable of striking targets well680into the U.S and Canadian interior. As those threats increase,681USNORTHCOM and NORAD are tasked with defending critical defense682infrastructure in the Homeland from attack in order to preserve U.S.683force projection capability and mitigating risks to vital684transportation, energy, and manufacturing hubs. Addressing threats from685long-range missiles, cyberattacks, and unmanned aerial systems requires686close coordination and collaboration with a host of interagency,687international, and DOD partners, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are ideally688situated to serve as the synchronizer and integrator for that crucial689whole-of-government enterprise.690    Over the course of the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have691expanded on already robust efforts to improve the capability of the692Joint Force and the interagency community to defend key sites--from693military installations to civilian transportation and energy nodes--694from attack. That effort is making significant progress thanks in large695part to the expertise, cooperation, and commitment of our DOD and696interagency partners. As this critical effort moves forward, success697will depend on collaboration across the interagency community, as well698as on developing the forward-looking capabilities and policies699necessary to ensure a seamless and well-coordinated defensive700enterprise that accounts for the unique requirements of conducting701defensive operations inside the United States and Canada.702    In the event of combat operations or attacks against the United703States, USNORTHCOM has a role in protecting DOD installations--along704with airports, seaports, rail networks, and highway infrastructure705necessary to project forces into overseas geographic combatant706commands--from both kinetic and cyber threats. USNORTHCOM is actively707engaged with the whole-of-government enterprise involved in this708nationwide effort to refine the plans and deployable, low-collateral709capabilities required to mitigate the wide range of threats to these710key sites inside the United States.711Protecting Territorial Integrity712    Following the January 20, 2025 Presidential declaration of a713national emergency on the U.S. southern border, and executive order,714Clarifying the Military's Role in Protecting the Territorial Integrity715of the United States, USNORTHCOM was assigned the mission to seal the716borders and maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the717United States. In accordance with Presidential Executive Orders and718Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential719Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with720Presidential Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM721immediately with Presidential Executive Orders and Department722directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential Executive Orders723and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with Presidential724Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately with725Presidential Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM726immediately with Presidential Executive Orders and Department727directives, USNORTHCOM immediately728Defending Against Air and Missile Threats729    The DPRK continues to test increasingly capable ICBMs, while Russia730and the PRC have steadily expanded their stockpiles of highly capable731long-range land-attack cruise missiles and the fleets of the delivery732platforms that launch them. The risks to the Homeland posed by nuclear-733armed ICBMs are clear, while advanced PRC and Russian cruise missiles734are difficult to detect and can carry both nuclear and conventional735payloads. All of these weapons can be launched against the United736States and Canada in an effort to degrade the infrastructure enabling737U.S. military force projection, inflict economic harm, and weaken738public support for U.S. intervention in overseas conflicts.739    As air and missile threats to the Homeland will continue to mount,740USNORTHCOM and NORAD are actively engaged in ongoing DOD efforts to741implement the January 27, 2025 Executive Order directing the building742of a next-generation Missile Defense Shield for North America. Until743the Secretary presents the Department's integrated plan forward to the744White House, I would like to focus on some of USNORTHCOM's current745activities that help protect the Homeland from air and missile threats.746    Domain awareness is a particularly important part of protection the747Nation from air and missile threats. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working748closely with the U.S. Air Force, which has been tasked as the executive749agent for air-and cruise-missile defense of the Homeland to identify750potential solutions to domain awareness challenges. It is vital that751the domain awareness network provide the ability to detect,752discriminate, and deliver crucial real-time information and a single753common operational picture to leaders at all appropriate levels.754Command modernization initiatives, including the establishment of a755layered system of sensors such as space-based Airborne Moving Target756Indicator (AMTI), Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR), the E-7 Wedgetail, and757Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), remain critical to758continental defense in order to detect, track, and prosecute adversary759submarines, aircraft and surface vessels, as well as inbound missiles.760    Beyond domain awareness, USNORTHCOM continues to defend the United761States--to include Alaska and Hawaii--from attacks from ballistic762missiles as well as emerging threat systems. The U.S. ground-based763midcourse defense system has a long record of success and remains fully764capable of defending against a potential DPRK missile attack.765Additionally, the on-time fielding of the Next-Generation Interceptor766(NGI) remains a major USNORTHCOM priority, and I am working closely767with the Missile Defense Agency and the Department to ensure that768program remains on track.769    NORAD and USNORTHCOM will also defend against air-breathing770threats, to include unmanned aerial systems, threat aircraft, advanced771land-attack cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles designed to772challenge U.S. Homeland defense systems from lower altitudes. The773commands will continue working with the Department to prioritize these774efforts in the context of all of NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions.775                      operation noble eagle (one)776    While some of the capabilities required for comprehensive air and777missile defense of the Homeland remain in development, Operation NOBLE778Eagle (ONE) and NORAD's aerospace control mission have secured North779American airspace for decades, adapting constantly to ever-evolving780threats including Russian--and now PRC--bombers, violent extremist781threats to civilian aviation, and advanced cruise missiles launched782from the air and sea. NORAD's ability to adapt to and outpace emerging783challenges is a cornerstone of the command's longstanding reputation as784a pillar of continental defense.785    The threats to North American airspace have steadily grown more786complex, and now include a spectrum of competitor capabilities that787range from modernized long-range bombers and hypersonic cruise missiles788down to small unmanned systems that can fit into a backpack. While two789decades of whole-of-government response have reduced the threat of790terrorist threats to civil aircraft, NORAD maintains the ability to791deter and defeat nation-state threats from every avenue of approach to792North America while safeguarding national leaders from aerial threats,793both in the National Capital Region and around the country.794    NORAD will optimize protection of prioritized Defense Critical795Infrastructure while maintaining adequate national response capability796in support of civilian air traffic, and cooperate with the Air Force797and the Air National Guard to generate greater readiness against high-798end threats though enhanced campaigning and training while remaining799available to NORAD when indications and warning triggers are met.800    I am grateful to the Committee for your support for these key801USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities, as we work to identify effective and802affordable capabilities that will meet this important challenge now and803well into the future. The same can be said of our Canadian partners, as804the Government of Canada has committed to fielding long-range sensors805and weapons system to deter and defeat potential air, sea, and missile806threats in the approaches to North America. Integration and807collaboration with Canada--through NORAD and in broader continental808defense initiatives--will grow even more necessary as our competitor809field greater numbers of increasingly advanced long-range cruise810missiles.811Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems812    There is perhaps no better example of the rapidly evolving813strategic environment than the emergence of small unmanned aerial814systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the815Homeland. The availability and utility of small drones has grown816exponentially over the last decade, and some have repeatedly employed817these systems for illicit purposes. While U.S. and coalition forces818overseas have faced the threat of weaponized unmanned systems for819years, small drones have emerged as a significant risk to820infrastructure and safety in the United States in a relatively short821period of time. The widespread availability of small drones, coupled822with a complicated regulatory structure and limitations on UAS823countermeasures based on concerns for flight safety and privacy, has824created significant vulnerabilities that have been exploited by known825and unknown actors.826    There have been multiple incursions by UAS over military827installations in the United States over the past year. To mitigate the828potential threats to safety and security presented by UAS overflight of829DOD facilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in close coordination with the830military Services and DOD, resourced equipment and analytic tools to831installation commanders to assist with detection, tracking, and832mitigation of potential UAS threats. In November 2024, then-Secretary833of Defense Austin directed USNORTHCOM to serve as the synchronizer,834integrator, and/or coordinator of domestic counter-small UAS (C-sUAS)835activities within the continental United States and Alaska for DOD and,836when requested and approved, for the interagency. USNORTHCOM will play837a critical role in an enduring whole-of-government effort to protect838people, infrastructure, aircraft, and facilities from malign sUAS839incursions. This effort will require investment in robust and evolving840mitigation technologies suitable for use in the United States,841alignment with interagency and industry partners, and policy and842statutory changes that balance safety, privacy, and defensive843requirements.844    In October 2024, USNORTHCOM and NORAD were proud to host845Demonstration FALCON PEAK 25.1, which brought together DOD,846interagency, and industry partners seeking to demonstrate counter-sUAS847sensors and defeat mechanisms. Thanks to extraordinary support from the848U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, 10th Special Forces Group849(Airborne), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Colorado850National Guard, and many others, demonstration participants tracked and851engaged live sUAS targets in complex, realistic scenarios over a number852of days and nights within military Special Use Airspace. The853demonstration provided important insights that the Commands and our854partners will continue to build on, including during Falcon Peak 25.2,855which will include a larger slate of vendors, participants, and systems856in August 2025, meeting Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization857Act direction.858    In recognition of the sUAS threat and the Commands' increased859responsibilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted resources and860personnel to establish a C-UAS operations branch within our861headquarters. This Committee has long been aware of the potential862threat presented by sUAS, and I would like to extend my appreciation863for your ongoing support for C-UAS research and acquisitions. That864support will remain critical as success in the Homeland C-sUAS mission865will depend on improved C-UAS technology, interagency collaboration,866and corresponding authorities and resourcing for the mission to defend867against this significant risk to safety and security.868Cyber Domain Roles and Responses869    Threats to civil and military infrastructure are a direct and870constant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While not directly871responsible for the defense of non-USNORTHCOM networks, cyberattacks872against U.S. and Canadian infrastructure carry the potential to873negatively impact DOD force projection and could require significant874defense support to civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of a875damaging cyberattack against transportation, energy, or economic876networks.877    Any direct action against the United States by a major competitor878would almost certainly involve cyberattacks against strategic North879American infrastructure, and USNORTHCOM collaborates daily with U.S.880Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure881Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and882any number of other intergovernmental partners to deter, defend, and--883if necessary--respond to cyberattacks.884Defense Operations in the Arctic885    Defending North America is inherently linked to the ability of the886Joint Force to operate effectively across the entire USNORTHCOM area of887responsibility--to include the Arctic. Russia is expanding its888capability and capacity to conduct military operations in the Arctic,889seeking to control access to northern sea lanes and threaten North890America from the northern approaches. In 2024, Russian and PRC aircraft891and surface vessels conducted joint patrols in the Bering Sea, while892the PRC repeatedly deployed dual-purpose vessels into the Arctic as893part of a longstanding effort to expand the ability of the People's894Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct multi-domain operations in the895high north.896    Arctic responsibilities are shared across multiple geographic and897functional combatant commands, and as competition in the region898increases, safeguarding Arctic access and freedom of maneuver will899depend on Joint Force Arctic operational capabilities and build on the900already strong ties between Arctic partners. USNORTHCOM places enormous901value on the ability to conduct operations and exercises in the high902north and to execute assigned missions in coordination with fellow903combatant commands.904    The annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise is a key example of a USNORTHCOM905event that evaluates combatant command planning, communications, and906operational oversight while simultaneously providing warfighters and907enablers with valuable operational experience as they test the people,908equipment, and logistics trains needed to execute their missions in909remote and austere locations. Regular exercises and real-world910operations in the Arctic remain critically important and generate911valuable lessons learned for participants from the combatant command912and components headquarters down to the operational and tactical913levels. Effective operations in the Arctic require specialized training914and equipment under the best of conditions, and there is no substitute915for real-world experience in the region. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will916continue to advocate for designated Arctic units that are specifically917trained and equipped to execute their assigned missions in all918conditions.919    As inter-reliance between allies and partners grows increasingly920vital to ensuring a secure and open Arctic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain921strength and capability from our military partnerships. In particular,922the Canadian Armed Forces' expertise in Arctic operations and the923government of Canada's longstanding commitment to Arctic security are924of enormous value to continental defense. Canada's Arctic Foreign925Policy (CAFP), announced in December 2024, clearly recognizes the926significance of Russia-PRC collaboration in the Arctic as well as the927vast importance of the North American Arctic to both the United States928and Canada.929    This policy will directly support NORAD through international930diplomatic engagement and a series of important Canadian defense931investments that will strengthen shared continental defense932capabilities. The extraordinary value of the U.S.-Canadian defense933relationship has proven itself time and again over the course of six934decades, and I have every confidence that the strategic vision and935commitment to North American defense articulated in the CAFP, when936resourced, will pay dividends for the defense of North America for many937years to come.938              security cooperation with regional partners939    USNORTHCOM's regional security cooperation relationships remain a940critical element of the command's missions. USNORTHCOM's military941partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas enhance our own942Homeland defense while building the capacity of those partners to943operate and communicate with U.S. forces. Those relationships are vital944to countering competitor influence and presence in the Western945Hemisphere while improving intelligence sharing, border security, and946domain awareness.947    Decades of information sharing, combined exercises, and routine948direct engagement between USNORTHCOM senior leaders and our Canadian,949Mexican, and Bahamian military counterparts has brought North American950defense cooperation to a historic high point. The bilateral and951multilateral ties between our militaries will be of critical importance952over the next 18 months as the United States, Mexico, and Canada953prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026. USNORTHCOM's954capacity to synchronize interagency and international partners will be955crucial to ensuring the safety and security of this quadrennial global956tournament. That work--which will involve dozens of military,957intelligence community, and law-enforcement partners from all three958host nations--is already well underway and will grow in scope and scale959through the end of the competition.960    In the meantime, USNORTHCOM's routine engagements and exercises961with our regional partners have produced operational capability with962direct benefits for the defense of North America. In 2024, as a Russian963Navy surface action group (SAG) transited the Atlantic Ocean,964USNORTHCOM, NORAD, the Canadian Armed Forces, U.S. European Command,965and U.S. Southern Command maintained constant common situational966awareness of the SAG's location, while executing seamless operations967across multiple international and combatant command boundaries. The968execution of this mission was the direct result of the close ties969between USNORTHCOM and our international and cross-command partners and970demonstrated a degree of commonality and interoperability that our971competitors are years from being able to match.972    Building our partners' ability to operate with U.S. forces has led973directly to improved regional domain awareness, information sharing,974and cooperation against shared security challenges, especially given975the efforts of peer competitors to gain influence with the United976States' nearest neighbors. USNORTHCOM's dedicated efforts to support977our partners' defense requirements over the years have played an978important role in maintaining the United States as the clear partner of979choice while simultaneously improving our partners' capability and980capacity for addressing internal security challenges. USNORTHCOM981remains committed to these essential relationships.982              defense support of civil authorities (dsca)983    USNORTHCOM's support to civilian Federal agencies in times of need984stands as the command's most visible mission to American citizens.985USNORTHCOM provides support by leveraging the command's expertise in986planning, synchronization, and operations to prepare for, assess,987respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. In 2024, USNORTHCOM988provided air assets and ground forces to fight major wildfires in the989western United States, to include the recent fires in Los Angeles;990delivered relief to Americans in need following major hurricanes and991flooding along the Atlantic coast; supported Federal law enforcement in992securing National Special Security Events (NSSE); reinforced Federal993counter-drug efforts; and augmented USCBP border operations.994    USNORTHCOM is proud to support each Federal partner, and delivering995relief to American citizens exercises the same planning, operations,996and communications mechanisms required to conduct homeland defense997operations during periods of crisis and conflict. Drawing on the998Command's expertise, specialized capabilities, and robust interagency999networks, USNORTHCOM will lead and work alongside U.S. Federal law1000enforcement partners to safeguard U.S. borders and citizens by1001leveraging the command's specialized intelligence collection1002capabilities abroad.1003    Those capabilities also allow USNORTHCOM to play an increasing role1004in illuminating the illicit networks used by criminal cartels to1005launder money, smuggle migrants, and traffic illicit drugs. The1006narcotics smuggled into the United States by transnational criminal1007organizations are directly responsible for tens of thousands of deaths1008each year, and USNORTHCOM will continue to work with partners in1009reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.1010    In the aftermath of the catastrophic flooding that struck eastern1011North Carolina in October 2024, USNORTHCOM supported the Federal1012Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with ground forces and aviation1013assets for search and rescue, delivery of relief supplies, route1014clearance, and other key missions that directly assisted residents of1015the affected areas. I want to specifically recognize the extraordinary1016response of leaders and Soldiers from the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne1017Corps, to include units from the 101st Airborne Division and the 82d1018Airborne Division. Thanks to their readiness, skill, and devotion to1019their mission, every USNORTHCOM request for forces was executed well1020ahead of required timelines and enabled an extraordinary response to a1021historic disaster. While there were certainly lessons learned for an1022even more effective response in future contingencies, I am extremely1023proud of the work done by USNORTHCOM, U.S. Army North, and the deployed1024U.S. Army units whose incredible efforts helped so many Americans in1025need.1026    A similar level of support from across the Department enabled1027USNORTHCOM to augment U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protection of the1028major Presidential and vice-Presidential candidates during the last1029several months of the 2024 Presidential campaign. In response to a USSS1030request for assistance following the attempted assassination of1031President Trump, USNORTHCOM, in concert with the Joint Staff and the1032military Services, provided explosive ordinance technicians, military1033working dog teams, and rotary-wing assets to ensure the safety and1034security of the candidates at nearly 200 locations. Successfully1035deploying dozens of highly specialized security teams to hundreds of1036event sites was a testament to the professional planners and operators1037involved with the mission, and I am proud of USNORTHCOM's support for1038this critical effort.1039                               conclusion1040    I am honored and privileged to lead the men and women of USNORTHCOM1041and NORAD. I thank our service members and civilian employees for their1042efforts while executing our noble mission of defending the United1043States and Canada as both commands continue to expand our bi-national,1044whole-of-government, continental approach to homeland defense. I1045appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring our service1046members remain ready to defend our Homeland now and in the future, and1047I look forward to continued collaboration with all of our critical1048partners in defending our great nations.1049                                  We Have the Watch10501051    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, General. Admiral Holsey, you're1052recognized.10531054STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ALVIN HOLSEY, USN COMMANDER, UNITED STATES1055                        SOUTHERN COMMAND10561057    Admiral Holsey. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,1058distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm humbled to appear1059before today as the 33d Commander of United States Southern1060Command.1061    We're a war fighting organization, and I've moved forward1062to lead this command, servicemembers, surveillance contractors1063and their families, as we've foster democracy, security, shared1064prosperity throughout the Western hemisphere. I'm honored to1065testify alongside General Guillot as a relationship between1066NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM is vital to the safety and security of1067our Homeland.1068    The United States and our partners in Latin America and the1069Korean are linked together, not simply by history and1070geography, but by family bonds, cultural traditions, security1071and economic cooperation, and a steadfast devotion to1072democratic values. This enduring commitment to these values is1073a cornerstone of our collective partnership. Together we seek1074to achieve lasting security, stability, and prosperity1075throughout the Americas.1076    Today, this vision is imperiled by a host of threats. These1077threats include strategic competition from China and Russia,1078the impact of transnational criminal organizations and the1079complex transboundary challenges such as irregular migration,1080natural disasters, eroded democracies, food, and water1081insecurity. China is outpacing threat and continues its1082methodical encouragement into our shared neighborhood, welding1083diplomatic informational, military, and economic influence to1084export its authoritarian model to the region,1085    Most focused to the east and west when they think of great1086power competition. A look to our south reveals that China has1087already established a strong presence. It's predatory and1088opaque investment practices, resource extraction, and potential1089dual use projects from ports to space, threaten the security1090and sovereignty of our partners while jeopardizing the United1091States National Security.1092    Simultaneously, Russia supports like-minded regimes like1093Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, using disinformation military1094engagements, arms sales, force protection. Moscow is now1095attempting to undermine the United States leadership interest1096and influence in the region.1097    Meanwhile, TCOs continue to fuel instability throughout the1098region. They exploit the permissive environment and engage in1099brutal violence, illicit trafficking, and other criminal1100activities to undermine the rule of law and disrupt the1101legitimate government functions. They're having devastating1102effects, which has spilled over into our Homeland, destroying1103lives.1104    Border security is a concern for us all. SOUTHCOM recently1105stood up Joint Task force--guard in at Naval Station Guantanamo1106Bay (GTMO), in support of Department of Homeland Security to1107provide safe and humane care of illegal aliens until they're1108returned to their countries of origin. Our time is now.1109Deliberate and meaningful action to address these threats is1110required or this region, our neighborhood will continue to1111change.1112    Partnerships are our most effective approach to countering1113shared security and economic concerns to enable our enduring1114trust in the region. However, we cannot take this for granted.1115To be a trusted partner, we must be credible, present, and1116engaged.1117    During my tenure at SOUTHCOM, I've witnessed how enduring1118presence builds trust. As a result, partners prefer to work1119with us over China, Russia, and other nations to overcome their1120most pressing challenges. SOUTHCOM continue to stand shoulders1121to shoulder with our partners. We have and will continue to1122respond rapidly to crises in any form.1123    Together with our partners, we're building their1124capability, capacity to mitigate, respond, and recover from our1125collective threats. Sustained investment and security1126operation, joint exercises, disaster assistance among other1127initiatives enable us to innovate and deliver at the point of1128need.1129    As this Department sharpens its war fighting edge, I'm1130grateful for the continued support of Congress. Today, this1131vital support to defending the democratic principles and1132interests that underpins the stability of prosperity and the1133region and ultimately the security of our Nation.1134    Thank you again, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and1135Members of the Committee for this opportunity. I look forward1136to your questions.1137    [The prepared statement of Admiral Alvin Holsey follows:]11381139               Prepared Statement by Admiral Alvin Holsey1140    Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Committee1141Members, it is a distinct honor and privilege to serve as United States1142Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) 33d Combatant Commander. In assuming1143this role, I have leveraged 22 months of insight as the USSOUTHCOM1144Military Deputy Commander and have moved forward to lead this command's1145servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and their families, as we1146strengthen democracy, security, and stability throughout the Western1147Hemisphere.1148    The United States of America and the many nations and territories1149that comprise Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are bound together1150by rich cultural traditions, family bonds, economic endeavors, and an1151enduring commitment to democratic principles. Upon this foundation,1152USSOUTHCOM builds lasting trust across the region through engaged and1153credible presence. Together, with our Allies and Partners, we seek to1154engender security, capability, democratic norms, and resilience that1155fuel regional peace, prosperity, and sovereignty.1156    There are several threats to this vision. I assess the most1157concerning to be the actions of nations such as China and Russia. These1158authoritarian regimes continue their methodical incursion into the1159region using varying tools toward separate end states. While China's1160long-term global campaign to become the world's dominant geostrategic1161power is evident in the Western Hemisphere, ``Russia continues to1162support anti-American authoritarian regimes militarily and spread1163disinformation throughout the region to undermine [U.S.] interests.''1164The consequences not only run counter to U.S. national interests, but1165also threaten sovereignty, and advance our Strategic Competitors'1166economic, political, and military objectives. Their malign actions here1167in the Western Hemisphere have ``ramifications that stretch far beyond1168the region, posing a global risk.'' \1\1169---------------------------------------------------------------------------1170    \1\ Pettus, E. L. (2023). The Expanding Leverage of the People's1171Republic of China in Latin America: Implications for the Region.1172Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Retrieved from https://1173www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540614/the-expanding-1174leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implic/.1175---------------------------------------------------------------------------1176    Simultaneously, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and1177violent gangs, as well as Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), use1178enormous revenue from drug trafficking and other illicit activity to1179corrupt and co-opt portions of regional governments, degrading the1180region's democratic institutions. Criminal violence drives drugs,1181illegal migration, and lawlessness to our border and imperils citizen1182security. TCOs are linked to the deaths of thousands of Americans every1183year. Both threaten the safety, stability, security, and sovereignty of1184all nations in our shared neighborhood. Time is not on our side. The1185Western Hemisphere is suffering from an ``erosion of democratic1186capitalism, which in too many countries is being replaced by . . .1187authoritarianism.'' \2\1188---------------------------------------------------------------------------1189    \2\ O'Grady, M. A. (2024). Brazil and Latin America's Decline. The1190Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/opinion/brazil-1191and-latin-americas-decline-president-lula- economy-policy-119204585c64?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s.1193---------------------------------------------------------------------------1194    We can stem this tide by standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our1195Allies and Partners. Our Partners want to work with us, but to maintain1196their trust and confidence they must feel and see our presence and1197commitment before it is too late. USSOUTHCOM will continue to campaign1198along its three lines of effort: Strengthening Partnerships, Countering1199Threats, and Building our Team. Under this framework, we are taking1200swift action, rising to the occasion to bolster like-minded1201democracies, outmaneuver our Strategic Competitors, and thwart our1202adversaries.1203    Success relies on taking a holistic approach to our operations,1204activities, and investments. To be effective, each must be nested with1205the contributions and capabilities of our Allies, Partners, U.S.1206Interagency, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private1207sector. To this end, we have redoubled our efforts to nest military1208engagement with diplomatic, informational and economic initiatives1209across the whole-of-government. Together, we will build a safer and1210stronger Western Hemisphere while ensuring the national security of our1211Homeland.1212                        challenges in the region1213Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China1214    The United States and China are locked in a fierce strategic1215competition, pitting democracy against authoritarianism. Over the1216course of the last decade, the United States has focused predominantly1217on the Indo-Pacific, while the China has taken a global approach. The1218LAC region is on the front lines of a decisive and urgent contest to1219define the future of our world. China is assailing United States1220interests from all directions, in all domains, and increasingly in the1221Caribbean archipelago--a potential offensive island chain. Failure to1222adequately compete here and now ``will leave the region under the1223influence of America's chief authoritarian rivals,''\3\ which directly1224threatens the ``U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific . . . jeopardizing1225freedom of maneuver, access, and influence in our near-abroad.'' \4\1226---------------------------------------------------------------------------1227    \3\ Cimmino, J., Kroenig, M., & Marczak, J. (2024). A strategy to1228counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in Latin America and the1229Caribbean. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://1230www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-1231series/a-strategy-to-counter-malign-chinese-and-russian- influence-in-1232latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.1233    \4\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 3).1234---------------------------------------------------------------------------1235    While the United States is looking to the Far East, China is1236plowing fertile ground to our south. The region is home to abundant1237natural resources, including 20 percent of the world's oil reserves, 251238percent of its strategic metals, 30 percent of its forest area, 311239percent of its fishing areas and 32 percent of its renewable freshwater1240resources.\5\ Economics plays a central role in China's interest in the1241region. Understanding this, China has used its Belt and Road Initiative1242(BRI) to become South America's largest trading partner and second1243largest in Central America and the Caribbean.\6\ \7\ A bold strategy1244governs its trade ``beyond raw materials and commodities to include1245traditional infrastructure (road, bridges, ports) and `new1246infrastructure': electric vehicles, telecommunication, and renewable1247energy.'' \8\1248---------------------------------------------------------------------------1249    \5\ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the1250Caribbean. (2024). Natural resources outlook in Latin America and the1251Caribbean, 2023. Retrieved from https://repositorio.cepal.org/entities/1252publication/d42a8514-9145-4f2a-b46b-b0187bb913e0.1253    \6\ Foreign Affairs Committee. (2022). China regional snapshot:1254South America. Retrieved from https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-1255regional-snapshot-south-america/#:8: text = China's % 201256Influence%20in%20South%20America,South%20America's%20top%20trading%20par1257tner.1258    \7\ Carr, E., & Lazarus, L. (2024). China's BRI and the U.S.1259response: Contest in the Caribbean. Hinrich Foundation. Retrieved from1260https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/us-china/contest-in-the-1261caribbean/.1262    \8\ Ellis, E., Lazarus, L., Piccone, T., & Wirtschafter, V. (2024).1263How are the United States and China Intersecting in Latin America?1264Brookings Institute. Retrieved from https://www. brookings.edu/1265articles/how-are-the-united-states-and-china-intersecting-in-latin-1266america/.1267---------------------------------------------------------------------------1268    China has not broadened its reach into this hemisphere as a1269benevolent gesture. Rather, through the BRI, it is engaged in a1270``global campaign to monopolize strategic natural resources'' and use1271them for political control.\9\ Under the guise of investment, China1272continues to displace Taiwan's recognition in the region. Seven of the127312 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, are1274found in LAC, four in the Caribbean. Having already successfully1275courted 21 of the 31 countries in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility1276(AOR) to join the BRI, Beijing has gained ground by offering our1277Partners short-term gains that leave them vulnerable to unsustainable1278debt, environmental degradation, and informational security risks.\10\1279---------------------------------------------------------------------------1280    \9\ Gallagher, M. (2023). American Influence is Needed in Latin1281America Now Like Never Before--to Combat China. Newsweek. Retrieved1282from https: / / www.newsweek.com / american- influence-needed-latin-1283america-now-like-never-before-combat-china-opinion-1830950.1284    \10\ (Ellis, Lazarus, Piccone, Wirtschafter, 2024).1285---------------------------------------------------------------------------1286    China claims to have ``always been a member of the Global South''1287\11\ and is using the BRI to set the theater and expand its access to1288rare earth metals and control of ports, space facilities, and1289telecommunications infrastructure for a potential dual civilian-1290military purpose.\12\ Fifty percent of the world's lithium reserves are1291found in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.\13\ Chinese State-Owned1292Entities (SOEs) have monopoly on rare earth mining and refining in the1293region.\14\ Between 2000 and 2018, China invested $73 billion in Latin1294American and Caribbean markets, leaving supply chains for advanced1295technology and everyday items in its control, and garnering influence1296that makes the United States and our Partners vulnerable to Beijing's1297malign agenda.\15\ \16\1298---------------------------------------------------------------------------1299    \11\ Baptista, E. (2024). China's Xi announces steps to support1300'global south' at G20 summit. Reuters. Retrieved from https://1301www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-announces-steps-support-global-south-1302g20-summit-2024-11-18/.1303    \12\ (Gallagher, M., 2024).1304    \13\ Vander Molen, I. (2022). Bolivia: Pursuing Sustainable Lithium1305Mining. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved from1306https: / / www.csis.org / blogs / development-dispatch /bolivia-1307pursuing-sustainable-lithium-mining.1308    \14\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).1309    \15\ (Cimmino, Kroenig, & Marczak, 2024).1310    \16\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).1311---------------------------------------------------------------------------1312    Chinese telecommunications SOEs continue to proliferate, with1313Huawei, ``expanding its presence as one of the main information and1314communications technology (ICT) enterprises in the region.'' \17\ Eight1315of our Partner Nations have installed Chinese 5G equipment to date, and131624 others use Chinese 3G/4G infrastructure, perhaps making future 5G1317upgrades with Western companies cost-prohibitive.\18\ \19\ Multiple1318governments, organizations, and companies have accused Chinese SOEs,1319most notably, Huawei, of assisting in Chinese espionage campaigns,1320jeopardizing United States and Partner Nation security and1321sovereignty.\20\ \21\1322---------------------------------------------------------------------------1323    \17\ Alvarado, P. D. (2024). Huawei's Expansion in Latin America1324and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of1325Peace. Retrieved from https: / / www.usip.org /1326publications/2024/04/huaweis-expansion-latin-america-and-caribbean-1327views-region.1328    \18\ Duarte, L. (2021). Latin America: China's Huawei Maintains its1329Foothold. AULA Blog. Retrieved from https://aulablog.net/2021/11/19/1330latin-america-chinas-huawei-maintains-itsfoothold/.1331    \19\ Roy, D. (2023). China's Growing Influence in Latin America.1332Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/1333backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-1334security-energy-bri.1335    \20\ U.S. Department of Justice. (2019). Huawei Charged with1336Conspiring to Steal Trade Secrets from T-Mobile United States.1337Retrieved from https: // www.justice.gov / opa / pr / chinese-1338telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-1339theft-trade.1340    \21\ Barnes, J. E. (2023). Allied Spy Chiefs Warn of Chinese1341Espionage Targeting Tech Firms. The New York Times. Retrieved from1342https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/us/politics/china-spying-1343technology.html.1344---------------------------------------------------------------------------1345    Winning the strategic competition with China in the Western1346Hemisphere is essential to securing the defense of our Homeland,1347maintaining regional stability, and advancing United States national1348interests. Increasing Chinese presence creates vulnerabilities and a1349potential ability to exploit global chokepoints--such as the Panama1350Canal, sea lines of communication, space, and supply chains--in future1351conflicts.\22\ Moreover, the malign activities, harmful influence, and1352autocratic philosophy of China are a direct threat to the democratic1353will of this region's people. The United States offers economic1354prosperity, sustainable development, and true partnership in our shared1355hemisphere. Broadening innovation efforts and attracting transparent1356foreign investment will assist in meeting the needs of our Partners,1357while reducing poverty and improving living standards. By amplifying1358these benefits and doubling down on our strategy of strengthening1359partnerships with engaged and credible presence, we will do more than1360manage this strategic competition, we will ``win it.'' \23\1361---------------------------------------------------------------------------1362    \22\ (Pettus, 2023, p. 4).1363    \23\ Gallagher, M., & Pottinger, M. (2024). No Substitute for1364Victory: America's Competition with China Must Be Won, Not Managed.1365Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www. foreignaffairs.com/united-1366states/no-substitute-victory-pottinger-gallagher.1367---------------------------------------------------------------------------1368Russia's Strategy in the West1369    Russia's malign activities in the Western Hemisphere have global1370security consequences as it seeks to ``position itself at the heart of1371a new world order.'' \24\ Moscow views strategic competition in the1372region as analogous to that in Europe and is engaged in a campaign to1373challenge United States leadership and influence.\25\ Consequently,1374Russia seeks to undermine the United States regional interests, support1375like-minded authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela,1376and foster stronger relations with other potentially receptive nations.1377To do so, Moscow leverages malign propaganda, military engagements,1378arms sales, and force projection, along with diplomatic and1379economically coercive practices to demonstrate its global reach.1380---------------------------------------------------------------------------1381    \24\ Russia's Strategy for Latin America: Strengthening Ties in the1382Light of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (Russia). (2024). European1383Parliament Think Tank. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/1384thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)762473.1385    \25\ Levaggi, A. G., & Rouvinski, V. (2024). The Kremlin's1386Caribbean Gambit: A Great Power Competition Spillover? Center for1387Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://1388www.csis.org/analysis/kremlins-caribbean-gambit-great-power-1389competition-spillover.1390---------------------------------------------------------------------------1391    Russia uses state-controlled media to disseminate disinformation1392and propaganda widely through outlets such as RT and Sputnik Mundo in1393an attempt to destabilize Partner Nation governments,\26\ spread biased1394and false narratives that criticize the United States, and downplay1395Russian global malfeasance, especially as it relates to its war with1396Ukraine.\27\ These messages are communicated across other forms of1397traditional and social media, and with the assistance of Russian1398embassies, are now incorporated into regional academia through1399educational exchanges--creating conditions for the indoctrination of1400future regional leaders.\28\ \29\1401---------------------------------------------------------------------------1402    \26\ United States Department of State. (2024). Alerting the World1403to RT's Global Covert Activities. Retrieved from https://www.State.gov/1404alerting-the-world-to-rts-global-covert-activities/.1405    \27\ (European Parliament Think Tank, 2024).1406    \28\ Douglas, F., & Roman D. Ortiz, R. (2024). Russian Influence1407Campaigns in Latin America. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved1408from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/ russian-influence-1409campaigns-latin-america.1410    \29\ Chaguaceda, A., & Rouvinski, V. (2024). Russia's Capture of1411Intellectual Elites in Latin America. Wilson Center. Retrieved from1412https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-1413capture-intellectual-elites-latin-america.1414---------------------------------------------------------------------------1415    Although Russia does not enjoy the same level of economic and1416military power as China, it continues to make its presence felt. Since14172008, 15 of the 41 visits by the Russian Navy to the region have1418included warships. Last June, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by1419the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and cruise missile submarine Kazan docked1420in Havana, Cuba, passing within 30 miles of the Florida Keys.\30\ This1421follows visits by the Admiral Gorshkov to the western Atlantic Ocean in14222023 and the Russian training ship Perekop to Cuba, Nicaragua, and1423Venezuela later that year.1424---------------------------------------------------------------------------1425    \30\ Wilner, M., & Torres, N. G. (2024). Russia's Nuclear Submarine1426Tracks Back Up Florida's Coast as Warships Head to Caribbean. The Miami1427Herald. Retrieved from https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/1428world/americas/cuba/article289380600.html.1429---------------------------------------------------------------------------1430    ``The Russian state and para-state cyber penetration of much of1431Latin America is far broader, deeper, and more successful than is1432general understood.'' \31\ The region also hosts Russian military/1433security infrastructure and personnel. In Nicaragua, Russia maintains1434its GLONASS navigation system--Russia's alternative to the United1435States global positioning system, as well as ``a multimillion-dollar1436vaccination plant that produces no vaccines, a police academy that does1437little of what it advertises, a cyber warfare and training center in1438the State telecommunications building, and a Russian Ministry of1439Interior building that enjoys the diplomatic status of an embassy.''1440\32\1441---------------------------------------------------------------------------1442    \31\ Farah, D. (2024). How Russian Surveillance Tech is Reshaping1443Latin America. Digital Commons. Retrieved from https://1444digitalcommons.fiu.edu/jgi_research/67.1445    \32\ Farah, D., & Richardson, M. (2022). Dangerous Alliances:1446Russia's Strategic Inroads in Latin America. National Defense1447University Press. Retrieved from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/1448Article/3252479/dangerous-alliances-russias-strategic-inroads-in-latin-1449america/.1450---------------------------------------------------------------------------1451    On the economic front, last year Russia sharply wielded its trade1452policy to suspend banana imports from five Ecuadorian companies,1453preventing the country from exchanging aging Russian military equipment1454for $200 million in reliable United States alternatives.\33\ Although1455Russia maintains a small trade presence and has no trade agreements in1456Latin America, this is a powerful example of the economic leverage and1457influence it deploys against our Partners to further its interests.\34\1458---------------------------------------------------------------------------1459    \33\ Reuters. (2024). Russia Buys Bananas from India after Ecuador1460Military Hardware Spat. Retrieved from https: / / www.reuters.com /1461world / russia-buys-bananas-india-after-ecuadormilitary-hardware-spat-14622024-02-06/.1463    \34\ (European Parliament Think Tank, 2024).1464---------------------------------------------------------------------------1465    Russia continues its attempts to solidify and strengthen diplomatic1466relationships across the region. In 2023, Moscow hosted more than 2001467delegates from Latin America at its Russia-Latin America International1468Parliamentary Conference. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has traveled1469to LAC three times since 2023 to advance Russia's malign agenda with1470leaders from ideological acolytes in Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and1471Venezuela. Diplomatic visits as well as participation in the BRICS and1472G20 Summits appear to be paying dividends, as official communiques from1473these gatherings diminish or fail to condemn Russia's culpability in1474Ukraine. \35\ \36\1475---------------------------------------------------------------------------1476    \35\ Elgot, J., & Leyland Cecco, L. (2024). Ukraine Allies1477Criticize G20 Statement for not Naming Russia's Role in Conflict. The1478Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2024/nov/147919/ukraine-russia-g20-communique.1480    \36\ (European Parliament, 2024).1481---------------------------------------------------------------------------1482Transnational Criminal Organizations1483    TCOs create and exploit regional instability throughout LAC. Their1484illicit actions threaten good governance and the economic,1485environmental, and citizen security of every society in the Western1486Hemisphere. There are 35 TCOs sanctioned by the United States based in1487the region. In 2023, they amassed an assessed revenue of $358 billion1488by engaging in the trafficking of humans, drugs, weapons, and wildlife,1489as well as the counterfeiting of goods and illegal logging, mining, and1490fishing. This staggering number is six times higher than the defense1491budgets of all countries in the region combined, including Mexico. TCO-1492driven corruption and instability open space for China, Russia, and1493other malign actors to achieve strategic ends and further their1494agendas.1495    Meanwhile, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and1496Crime (UNODC), cocaine production is reaching record highs, with1497markets and TCO operations expanding in Europe, Africa, and Asia.\37\1498The global revolution in illicit synthetic drugs has direct1499implications in the region, with fentanyl increasingly trafficked1500throughout the Western Hemisphere. As Congress recognizes, China1501``strategically and economically benefits'' from our Nation's fentanyl1502crisis, and we remain concerned that criminal actors will exploit the1503region's vulnerabilities to expand precursor smuggling or fentanyl1504production into other countries.\38\1505---------------------------------------------------------------------------1506    \37\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2024). World drug1507report 2024: Key Findings and Conclusions. Retrieved from https://1508www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2024/1509WDR24_Key_findings_and_conclusions.pdf.1510    \38\ Select Committee Unveils Findings on CCP's Role in American1511Fentanyl Epidemic--Report & Hearing. (2024). Select Committee on the1512CCP. Retrieved from https://select committee ontheccp.house.gov/media/1513press-releases/select-committee-unveils-findings-ccps-role-american-1514fentanyl-epidemic-report.1515---------------------------------------------------------------------------1516    According to the UNODC, the Americas have the highest regional1517homicide rates in the world, with high rates of violence related to1518organized crime.\39\ Illegal smuggling of weapons contributes to1519increasing violence and instability while providing TCOs or regional1520terrorist groups with an arsenal that often exceeds that of the1521legitimate state. Gang violence is becoming deadlier, especially in1522Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.\40\ One-third of the world's1523homicides occur in the Caribbean, with firearms used in more than half1524of these crimes.\41\ \42\1525---------------------------------------------------------------------------1526    \39\ Global Study on Homicide 2023. (2024). United Nations Office1527on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/1528data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_ on_homicide_2023_web.pdf.1529    \40\ Small Arms Survey. (2023). New Joint Report with CARICOM1530IMPACS--the Caribbean Firearms Study. Retrieved from https://1531www.smallarmssurvey.org/ highlight/new-joint-report- caricom-impacs-1532caribbean- firearms-study.1533    \41\ Pistolesi, A., & Sacchi, M. (2024). Narcos, Gangs and Crisis1534in the Caribbean. Atlas of Wars. Retrieved from https://1535www.atlasofwars.com/ narcos-gangs-and-crisis-in-the-caribbean/.1536    \42\ (Small Arms Survey, 2023).1537---------------------------------------------------------------------------1538    Additionally, both regional and foreign terrorist actors are1539equally active in the region. Four United States-designated regional1540terrorist organizations (Regional Armed Forces of Colombia--People's1541Army, Segunda Marquetalia, the National Liberation Army, and Shining1542Path) routinely collaborate with TCOs to further destabilize the1543region. Over 10,000 members of these groups are found in Colombia and1544Peru undermining state sovereignty while waging war with security1545forces. Colombian terrorist groups are leveraging emerging technology,1546and in 2024, they conducted more than 140 Unmanned Systems aerial1547attacks. Members and supporters of four United States-designated1548foreign terrorist organizations (Lebanese Hizballah, Islamic1549Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force, ISIS, and al Qaeda) continue to1550operate in the Western Hemisphere.1551Iran1552    Iran seeks to build political, military, and economic clout in1553Latin America with the assistance of sympathetic authoritarian regimes1554and states where it believes cooperation is achievable. Tehran views1555United States engagement in the region as a ``foreign occupation'' and1556parallels it to its own strife with the West as a commonality and1557avenue for shared opposition to the United States influence. \43\ Iran1558has also increasingly developed criminal networks in Latin America in1559an attempt to kill or kidnap enemies of the regime, including Israeli1560citizens.1561---------------------------------------------------------------------------1562    \43\ Citrinowicz, D. (2024). Iran in Latin America. Institute for1563National Strategic Studies. Retrieved from https://www.inss.org.il/1564publication/iran-south-america/.1565---------------------------------------------------------------------------1566    Although the theocratic regime works primarily with Venezuela on1567the diplomatic and military front to provide drones and warships to1568Caracas, it also has expanded security cooperation with Bolivia. Iran1569has provided drones and river boats to Bolivia, and it has assisted1570Bolivia with cybersecurity matters and participated in combined1571military training exercises. \44\ Iran has expanded overtures to1572Brazil, and in January 2024 joined BRICS. In 2023, Brazil was the only1573country in the region to permit Iran's 86th Surface Action Group to1574make a port call, allowing the vessels to stay for a week before1575continuing its 8-month mission to circumnavigate the globe.1576---------------------------------------------------------------------------1577    \44\ (Citrinowicz, 2024).1578---------------------------------------------------------------------------1579    Iranian partner Lebanese Hizballah (LH) has had a presence in Latin1580America since the 1980's. The group has plotted attacks against targets1581in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, and Peru. LH launders1582money, extorts local populations, and profits from drug trafficking,1583primarily in the tri-border area between Argentina, Brazil, and1584Paraguay. These illicit activities threaten regional stability and1585raise millions of dollars for the terrorist organization to plan1586attacks worldwide.1587Regional Humanitarian Crises1588    Irregular Migration. Regional instability has fueled unprecedented1589levels of irregular migration throughout LAC and placed significant1590political, economic, and social burdens on our Partners throughout the1591region. This humanitarian crisis is the result of numerous factors1592including TCO violence, lack of economic opportunity, extreme weather1593events, and food shortages. TCOs are taking advantage of migrants,1594engaging in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, extortion, and other1595criminal activities. The Venezuela-based Tren de Aragua organization is1596one such group and its abhorrent operations pose a significant threat1597to the region and have expanded its reach beyond the treacherous routes1598taken by migrants and into the United States.1599    During fiscal year 2024, 374,409 migrants trekked through Panama's1600dangerous Darien region enroute to the United States in the same year,1601with over 247,000 originating from Venezuela. \45\ The large numbers of1602migrants transiting the region strains our Partner Nations' resources1603and creates new challenges for countries already grappling with1604economic development and security issues.1605---------------------------------------------------------------------------1606    \45\ Online Data base; Panama National Migration Service; 2023;1607TRANSITO IRREGULAR POR DARIEN; https://www.migracion.gob.pa/1608estadisticas/.1609---------------------------------------------------------------------------1610    Haiti. Security underlies governance and is the foundation for the1611broad investment in the youth, education, and strategic economic1612development that Haiti desperately needs to achieve its potential. \46\1613Endemic corruption and violent criminal gangs have left the country at1614a ``dire crossroads.'' \47\ More than 700,000 Haitians have been1615displaced since at least 2021.\48\ Gangs control nearly 85 percent of1616Port-au-Prince, and their presence and influence is growing, as they1617are ``spreading terror and fear, committing murders, kidnappings and1618sexual violence of unprecedented brutality in the affected1619regions.''\49\ Children ``account for 30 to 50 percent of armed group1620members . . . [and are being] used as informants, cooks, and sex slaves1621. . . [in addition to being] forced to perpetrate armed violence1622themselves.'' \50\1623---------------------------------------------------------------------------1624    \46\ Michon, X. (2024). Despite a Grim Today, Prosperity Is Still1625Possible in Haiti. Americas Quarterly. Retrieved from https://1626www.americasquarterly.org/article/despite-a-grim-todayprosperity-is-1627still-possible-in-haiti/.1628    \47\ Amid Rising Violence in Haiti, Security Council Urges States1629to Bolster Funding for Security Support Mission. (2024). United1630Nations. Retrieved from https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15908.doc.htm.1631    \48\ International Organization for Migration. (2024). Over 700,0001632Displaced in Haiti, Half Are Children, as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens.1633Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/news/over-700000-displaced-haiti-1634half-are-children-humanitarian-crisis-worsens.1635    \49\ United Nations. Press Release. (2024). Rising Displacement,1636Criminal Gangs and Corruption Continue to Plague Haitian Life, Slowing1637Democratic Reform, Speakers Tell Security Council. Retrieved from1638https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15859.doc.htm.1639    \50\ (United Nations, 2024).1640---------------------------------------------------------------------------1641    The United Nations (UN) authorized Multinational Security Support1642(MSS) Mission, and a potential future UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO),1643represent options for a continued role for the international community1644in seeking to bring stability to the island nation. While USSOUTHCOM is1645providing logistical support to the MSS, as of January, our Partner1646Nations in Kenya, the Bahamas, Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and1647Jamaica have sourced a ground force of approximately 1,000 personnel to1648assist the Haitian National Police (HNP) in countering the pervasive1649gang violence. But more must be done. The HNP is ``outgunned and1650outnumbered.'' \51\ A transition to a UN PKO or UN support office are1651options that could enable the operation of a multinational force in a1652size and scale necessary to bring stability. \52\ Nevertheless, China1653and Russia have disregarded support from the Caribbean Community1654(CARICOM), the Organization of American States, and Haiti for the1655transition of the MSS into a UN PKO.\53\ \54\1656---------------------------------------------------------------------------1657    \51\ Lederer, E. M. (2024). U.N. to Send Kenya Police Force to1658Haiti to Fight Gangs. AP News. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/1659article/un-haiti-gangs-kenya-force-peacekeeping-violence-d91660ebed4a6a809d080511009b39b1b1ac.1661    \52\ (Lederer, 2024).1662    \53\ (Lederer, 2024).1663    \54\ United Nations. Press Release. (2024). Amid Rising Violence in1664Haiti, Security Council Urges States to Bolster Funding for Security1665Support Mission, Transfer to U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, Meetings1666Coverage and Press Releases,'' November 20, 2024. https://press.un.org/1667en/2024/sc15908.doc.htm.1668---------------------------------------------------------------------------1669    Our Strategic Competitors are capitalizing on instability in the1670Western Hemisphere and are using all tools at their disposal to do so.1671Security on the island must be restored to set conditions for vital1672governance and economic reforms, thus incentivizing educational,1673technological, and infrastructure investment. USSOUTHCOM continues to1674work with allies, partners, and the Department of State on related1675initiatives that aim to alleviate suffering, create sustainable1676development, and build toward a more resilient, democratic, and1677prosperous future.1678    Venezuela. Venezuela exemplifies the devastating effects and1679consequences of authoritarian rule. The authoritarian Nicolas Maduro1680and his regime are engaged in narcoterrorism, corruption, drug1681trafficking, money laundering, human rights abuses, and other nefarious1682activities, which have contributed to the destabilization of1683Venezuela.\55\ Ruthless repression and widespread inability to access1684life-sustaining necessities have resulted in an exodus of more than 7.71685million Venezuelan citizens. \56\ TCOs and gangs have taken advantage1686of this crisis to expand their operations, while Maduro's1687representatives increasingly embraces drug trafficking and other1688illicit activity for personal enrichment while the Venezuelan people1689suffer. Under Maduro, Venezuela has become a major cocaine and arms1690trafficking hub, ``transform[ing] the country into a destabilizing1691force in the Western Hemisphere.'' \57\1692---------------------------------------------------------------------------1693    \55\ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2020). 15 Current,1694Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-terrorism, Corruption,1695Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges. Retrieved from https://1696www.ice.gov/news/releases/15-current-former-venezuelan-officials-1697charged-narco-terrorism-corruption-drug.1698    \56\ Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and1699Migrants from Venezuela. (2024). Refugee and Migrant Response.1700Retrieved from https://www.r4v.info/en/refugee andmigrants.1701    \57\ Young, B.R. (2024). It's Time to Designate Venezuela as a1702State Sponsor of Terrorism. Rand Corporation. Retrieved from https://1703www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/its-time-to-designate-venezuela-1704as-a-state-sponsor.html.1705---------------------------------------------------------------------------1706    Maduro's fraudulent election in July 2024 and the subsequent1707detentions, disappearances, and reprisals against the Venezuelan1708population have been met with international condemnation. \58\ Anti-1709democratic practices and authoritarian ideology unite this illegitimate1710regime with our Strategic Competitors and like-minded states across the1711globe. The backing of malign State actors may embolden Maduro to1712escalate propaganda and saber rattling related to his claim to Guyana's1713Essequibo region. The United States, alongside our Allies and Partners1714in the region, remain vigilant. We maintain a united front in the face1715of these acts of unwarranted aggression and reject the oppressive and1716illegal tactics of the Maduro regime.1717---------------------------------------------------------------------------1718    \58\ United States Department of State. (2025). Condemning Nicolas1719Maduro's Illegitimate Attempt to Seize Power in Venezuela and1720Announcing New Actions Against Maduro and his Representatives and to1721Support the Venezuelan People. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/1722office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/condemning-nicolas-maduros-1723illegitimate-attempt-to-1724seize-power-in-venezuela-and-announcing-new-actions-against-maduro-and-1725his-representatives-and-to-support-the-venezuelan-people.1726---------------------------------------------------------------------------1727    Cuba. Instead of addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises, the1728Diaz-Canel regime is strengthening ties with our Strategic Competitors1729and adversaries. Cuba's malign actions undercut democratic values,1730encourage irregular migration, and threaten the sovereignty and safety1731of our Allies, Partners, and the United States. By the Cuban regime's1732own statistics, more than one million Cubans fled the country between17332022 and 2023, creating a further strain at the United States Southwest1734border. \59\ \60\ The long-suffering populace does not have sufficient1735access to medicine, food, and essential services such as fuel and1736electricity. \61\While the Cuban military-owned companies invest in1737empty high-rise hotels and retain billions of dollars in bank accounts,1738its antiquated energy infrastructure struggles to meet even half of1739Cubans energy demands, resulting in frequent electrical blackouts,1740especially outside the capital.1741---------------------------------------------------------------------------1742    \59\ Torres, N.G. (2022). Cuba Protests Point to Growing Discontent1743with Communist Government. The Miami Herald. Retrieved from https://1744www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/1745article290249799.html.1746    \60\ LeoGrande, W.M. (2024). Blackouts and Humanitarian Crisis in1747Cuba: Why the United States Should Help. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from1748https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/22/cuba-united-states-electrical-1749grid-outage-humanitarian-crisis-migration/.1750    \61\ LeoGrande, W.M. (2024). Cuba's Humanitarian Crisis is a United1751States Problem Too. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://1752foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/22/cuba-united-states-electrical-grid-outage-1753humanitarian-crisis-migration/.1754---------------------------------------------------------------------------1755    China is poised to capitalize upon its diplomatic, economic, and1756military initiatives with Cuba's support. Cuba has advocated at the UN1757``in support of China's counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures1758in Xinjiang,'' served as an important trade partner by selling Cuban1759zinc and nickel to China, and signed on to the BRI, receiving Huawei,1760TP-Link, and ZTE-built telecommunications infrastructure used to spy on1761its population and discourage political dissent.\62\ Cuba also serves1762as a proximate location for intelligence gathering and force projection1763by our adversaries. USSOUTHCOM prioritizes monitoring and assessing the1764malign activities of this regime just 90 miles from our Homeland.1765---------------------------------------------------------------------------1766    \62\ MacDonald, Scott B. (2024). Cuba Emerges as Flashpoint Amid1767United States-China Rivalry. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from https://1768eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/24/cuba-emerges-as-flashpoint-amid-us-china-1769rivalry/.1770---------------------------------------------------------------------------1771    Nicaragua. Democratic, political, religious, and personal freedoms1772are all under attack from the repressive Ortega-Murillo regime. Human1773rights violations, crack downs on dissent, property seizure from, and1774incarceration of, political opponents are all hallmarks of President1775Daniel Ortega's and Co-President and First Lady Rosario Murillo's1776governance. \63\ Initiated in November 2024 and ratified in January17772025, the Ortega-Murillo regime ushered in 100 constitutional1778amendments to hasten the demise of the Nicaraguan democratic republic,1779including naming the two leaders co-presidents and extending their term1780to 6 years.\64\ Nicaragua is expanding ties with authoritarian regimes1781such as China, Russia, and Iran. A signatory to the BRI and a new free1782trade agreement, Nicaragua is developing plans with a Chinse SOE to1783build a massive solar power plant in El Hato, further cementing their1784``strategic partnership.'' \65\ Nicaragua also hosts Russian troops and1785aims to strengthen military cooperation with Iran.1786---------------------------------------------------------------------------1787    \63\ Selser, G. (2024). Nicaragua Strips Citizenship from 1351788Prisoners Released to Guatemala. Associated Press. Retrieved from1789https://apnews.com/article/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-citizenship-1790political-prisoners-expropriation-c37c6e65cc4c6c97596d37d77709de68.1791    \64\ United Nations. (2024). Nicaragua: U.N. Group of Experts1792Alarmed by Far-reaching Change to the Constitution. Retrieved from1793https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/11/1794nicaragua-un-group-experts-alarmed-far-reaching-change-constitution.1795    \65\ The Tico Times. (2024). China to Build Massive Solar Power1796Plant in Nicaragua. Retrieved from https://ticotimes.net/2024/04/30/1797china-to-build-massive-solar-power-plant-in-nicaragua.1798---------------------------------------------------------------------------1799          levers: overcoming threats and challenges in the aor1800    The threats and challenges within the Western Hemisphere have1801global implications. For instance, Chinese access, presence, and1802influence across the region and at strategic chokepoints such as the1803Panama Canal imperil the United States's ability to rapidly respond in1804the Indo-Pacific should a crisis unfold. The key to overcoming the1805challenges of our Strategic Competitors and host of adversaries is1806partnership.1807    Partnership goes beyond traditional bilateral relations. It means1808leveraging the talents and equities of our broad coalition of allies,1809partners, and U.S. Interagency, as well as non-governmental, private1810sector, and academic organizations, to meet our Partner's needs and1811create the conditions for enduring prosperity in the Americas. SOUTHCOM1812will continue to collaborate across the whole-of-government in the use1813of all instruments of national power--diplomacy, information sharing,1814military engagement, and economic cooperation--in all domains, to1815maintain and strengthen the partnerships which form an advantage1816unmatched by our Strategic Competitors.1817    Each day USSOUTHCOM is taking action to strengthen partnerships and1818counter threats by being engaged, credible, and present in the region.1819We devote precious resources to Security Cooperation and Department of1820State Security Assistance to build interoperability and the1821capabilities of our Partners. Additionally, initiatives like the1822Framework for Western Hemisphere Allied Collaboration (F-WHAC) are1823synchronizing and coordinating Allied efforts to improve regional1824stability and align strategic goals. These initiatives, among many1825others, highlight USSOUTHCOM's relentless effort to forge trust, the1826foundation of partnership.1827Strengthening Partnership and Countering Threats1828    Security Cooperation and Security Assistance. Security Cooperation1829and Department of State Security Assistance are USSOUTHCOM's main1830levers that enable us to strengthen partnerships. We stand shoulder-to-1831shoulder with our Partners to build their capacity and capability.1832Congress plays a vital role in providing the funding for Partner Nation1833military equipment, training, and professionalization efforts that1834cultivate interoperability and enhance combined operations to1835outcompete Strategic Competitors and defeat our common threats.1836    In fiscal year 2024, we executed 1,125 Security Cooperation1837activities and another 1,171 are planned for fiscal year 2025. Our1838commitment to hemispheric security is highlighted by fiscal year 20241839efforts to meet our partner nation equipping needs. Our $35 million1840program to enhance Peru's maritime domain awareness is on track and we1841are currently building Peruvian capacity to receive the delivery of one1842of two maritime patrol aircraft in 2025. This investment will greatly1843enhance their maritime domain awareness to help protect the Global1844Commons in the region.1845    Additionally, we coordinated with the United States Interagency to1846train and equip the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security with a1847critical shipping container scanner capability to counter illicit1848trafficking. This $16 million investment is projected to be operational1849by early 2025. Additionally, we have invested $13 million in the1850modernization of Ecuadorian Air Force surveillance radars to enhance1851their air domain awareness and expand their capacity to feed raw data1852to our regional operational picture through Joint Interagency Task1853Force--South (JIATF-S).1854    Likewise, Security Assistance is imperative to meet the needs of1855our Partners at the speed of relevance. Through Foreign Military1856Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Excess Defense Articles programs1857we are better posturing our Partners to combat the malign activities of1858those who seek to destabilize region, while also providing United1859States and western alternatives to China. This past year, Security1860Assistance played a vital role in Argentina's acquisition of 24 F-16s1861from Denmark, with the approval of a $941 million sustainment package1862from the United States. This investment not only ensures the1863procurement is properly maintained and equipped, but also proved1864essential in preventing China from further embedding itself in the1865military apparatus of a key Partner. Similarly, in November 2024,1866Brazil announced the acquisition of 12 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters.1867This $950 million deal provides our Brazilian partners with a proven1868system to counter TCOs and deliver disaster assistance to their people.1869Security Cooperation and Security Assistance funding provides ongoing1870opportunities for lasting United States' presence and demonstrates the1871benefits of western alignment. Ongoing congressional support for these1872programs is indispensable to creating conditions for long-term1873stability in the Western Hemisphere that makes the United States safer,1874stronger, and more prosperous.1875    Additionally, USSOUTHCOM' International Military Education and1876Training (IMET) program spans 27 countries and serves as a catalyst for1877fostering strategic relationships that promote U.S. security interests,1878enhance Partner Nations' self-defense capabilities, and facilitate1879seamless collaboration in multinational operations. Fiscal year 20241880saw investment in the professional development of 630 international1881military leaders and another 600 projected in fiscal year 2025. IMET1882enables the growth of a global network of like-minded partners,1883ultimately contributing to increased access and cooperation during1884peacetime and contingency operations. The outcomes of IMET also1885facilitate higher levels of interoperability with U.S. forces, as1886evidenced by enhanced performance during joint training exercises, key1887leader engagements, and other collaborative activities. As a result,1888participating nations and the United States achieve a heightened state1889of strategic readiness, better equipping them to address shared1890security challenges and respond to emerging threats.1891    Joint Exercise Program. USSOUTHCOM is building robust1892interoperability, capacity, and readiness with Allies and Partners1893under our Joint Exercise Program. During fiscal year 2024, USSOUTHCOM1894successfully executed eight joint exercises in seven different1895countries touching the Southern Cone, Andean Ridge, Central America,1896and the Caribbean. With over 10,000 participants from 38 countries,1897these joint exercises enhanced our collective resolve to counter malign1898influence, protect the global commons, and promote stability across all1899domains.1900    The $54 million that support our Joint Exercise Program are1901critical to building our readiness and strengthening the partnerships1902that enable USSOUTHCOM to achieve our Campaign Plan Objectives. Over1903the course of 2024 we executed four exercises in support of the United1904States European Command-led Large Scale Global Exercise. These events1905included CENTAM GUARDIAN in Honduras and Costa Rica, TRADEWINDS in1906Barbados, RESOLUTE SENTINEL in Peru, and FUERZAS COMANDO in Panama.1907These four exercises showcased our ability to work with 29 Partner1908Nations from South America, Central America, and the Caribbean and1909included the United States Interagency and Allies from North America1910and Europe. These opportunities to exercise as a team demonstrated a1911comprehensive approach to training that reinforced our unrivaled1912commitment to this region.1913    Our remaining exercises included FUSED RESPONSE in Colombia,1914PANAMAX at the USSOUTHCOM headquarters, PANAMAX ALPHA Phase II in1915Panama, and UNITAS hosted in Chile. These exercises were a combination1916of staff crisis response training and field training exercises that not1917only prepared the USSOUTHCOM Enterprise for contingency response, but1918also enabled U.S. access, presence, and influence across the entire1919region.1920    UNITAS enabled over 4,300 participants from 24 Allied and Partner1921Nations to train in a complex multi-domain environment and was a1922fitting culminating event for fiscal year 2024. The operations1923conducted in the Southern Cone demonstrated that the United States, our1924allies, and partners can rapidly deploy, integrate, and sustain combat1925operations against peer and near peer competitors.1926    Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster1927Response (HA/DR) operations, activities, and investments are a critical1928component of USSOUTHCOM's strategy to assist our partners during both1929steady-state and crisis. We meet the needs of civilian populations,1930increase governmental legitimacy, strengthen partnerships, and1931cultivate trust across a network of Allies, Partners, U.S. Interagency,1932and non-governmental and private organizations.1933    Since 2021, USSOUTHCOM has delivered $985 million-worth of top-1934quality humanitarian assistance projects to address the basic needs of1935the civil populace while simultaneously building Partner Nation1936capacity. This includes an investment of $4.8 million in building1937partner health through the donation of 27 containerized clinics with1938general practice, surgical, maternity, and dental capabilities to six1939countries in LAC. Last year, USSOUTHCOM enhanced Colombia's ability to1940meet humanitarian needs and responded in the aftermath of natural1941disasters by donating 10 mobile bridges representing a value of $11.91942million--the largest humanitarian assistance project in USSOUTHCOM's1943history.1944    Additionally, our commitment to humanitarian assistance extends to1945planned and executed operations such as CONTINUING PROMISE and the1946Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team (LAMAT). During the 59-day1947Continuing Promise mission this past year, the USNS Burlington sailed1948to Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, and Panama, where the team1949aboard supported the delivery of vital healthcare services to 21,2221950medical patients, repaired $1.6 million of medical equipment, and1951treated 1,925 animals. The mission also conducted numerous HA/DR1952seminars, and in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl, delivered 35 pallets1953of medical and disaster supplies donated by non-Federal entities to the1954Jamaican Ministry of Health and Jamaica's Office of Disaster1955Preparedness and Emergency Management.1956    Likewise, LAMAT 2024 deployed to four locations in the Caribbean1957(Suriname, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and St. Kitts and Nevis) during the195843-day mission that brought $3.57 million of health services support by1959treating 3,573 patients and conducting 6,126 procedures. Today,1960planning for Continuing Promise 2025 and LAMAT 2025 are underway.1961    Humanitarian Assistance is an essential soft power tool that1962engenders goodwill. In future conflict or crisis, the goodwill and1963trust of our Partners will be of paramount importance. We recognize1964that similar advances by our Strategic Competitors aim to displace our1965standing as the most trusted partner. Accordingly, we must continue to1966invest in building regional capability and capacity to reduce,1967mitigate, and overcome the inherent risks encountered in our shared1968neighborhood. Doing so will enhance the security, stability, and1969resiliency of us all.1970    Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative. USSOUTHCOM's Theater1971Maintenance Partnership Initiative (TMPI) has sustained momentum1972teaching and building a culture of maintenance readiness with our1973Partners. This 7-year program fortifies existing Partner Nation1974tactical and operational level maintenance programs through educational1975exchanges and the development of nine TMPI Centers of Excellence1976throughout the region. TMPI is a paradigm shift in maintenance culture1977and is significantly enhancing the readiness, interoperability, and1978professionalism of our Partners, while paving the way for future export1979of logistics maintenance capability. In fiscal year 2025, we are moving1980toward initial operating capability in both Colombia and Jamaica.1981Colombia will host a Rotary Aviation and Communications Electronics1982Center of Excellence as well as a Multinational Logistics Officers1983Course at its war college. Jamaica will host an all-domain Anglophone1984Center of Excellence with initial focus on air and maritime challenges1985common to Caribbean states. Jamaica will also hold a Multinational1986Logistics Officer Course. These Centers of Excellence are being1987outfitted with the tools, kits, training aids, and the formation of1988Technical Assistance Field Teams which will further their capability,1989readiness, and professionalization.1990    As we look forward to fiscal year 2026, Chile will focus on the air1991domain with C-130 cargo aircraft, Ecuador's attention on the ground1992domain, Paraguay with Riverine vessels, and Panama centering on1993maritime domain and surface patrol craft such as the Near Coastal1994Patrol Vessel and interceptor vessels that are critical to patrol and1995interdiction. Assessment and socialization visits have already been1996completed with our final two planned partners, Argentina and Peru.1997    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The efforts of the dedicated men and1998women of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) are facilitating1999partnership, building key infrastructure, and increasing the capacity2000of our Partners throughout the hemisphere. USACE activities remain2001constant in 17 of our Partner Nations. In addition to larger2002construction projects at Fort Tolemaida in Colombia and the Port of2003Callao in Peru, their agreement with the Panama Canal Authority is2004contributing to a tremendous effort that is developing the preliminary2005designs to ensure the canal operates openly and successfully for the2006next 50 years. Ongoing humanitarian assistance projects in Belize and2007Guatemala, military construction in Honduras, projects in support of2008exercises in Guyana, and the Corps' growing technical support in2009Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Dominica, all illustrate examples2010of their contributions to building the team and partner capacity.2011However, their efforts in water security may yield the largest effects2012long-term, as they contribute directly to community wellness and local2013economies. Overall, in a financially transparent manner, USACE is2014executing projects with partners having complex engineering challenges2015and providing an environmentally conscious and more technically sound2016alternative to China. Our projects regularly incorporate allies and the2017U.S. Interagency, while working to select contractors internal to that2018country or region. These efforts increase our regional competitiveness2019and actively increase the momentum of USSOUTHCOM's theater strategy.2020    National Guard State Partnership Program. USSOUTHCOM and our2021Partner Nations continue to succeed together through the National Guard2022State Partnership Program (SPP). These 24 State Partnerships with 302023Partner Nations are critical to increasing Partner Nation security2024capacity and developing the resilient teams required to take on the2025threats and challenges in our shared neighborhood. Teamwork made the2026316 events completed in fiscal year 2024 a reality with SPP delivering2027an engaged and credible presence throughout the region. Approximately202830 percent of USSOUTHCOM's fiscal year 2024 operations, activities, and2029investments were supported by the SPP. With another 311 engagements2030planned thus far for fiscal year 2025, SPP is building interoperability2031and serving as a vital link to the region's security forces and civil2032entities. Our continued investment and participation in the SPP sustain2033these long-term relationships and creates enduring opportunities for2034cooperation and collaboration with our Partners. By doing so, we2035demonstrate our commitment to meeting their needs and build the trust2036that is essential to outcompeting our adversaries.2037    Countering TCOs. Drug trafficking and the illicit activities of2038TCOs in the region remain a complex threat, not only to our Partners,2039but to our Homeland. In coordination with our Allies, Partners, and the2040U.S. Interagency, USSOUTHCOM is confronting this menace head-on. JIATF-2041S continues to lead the way in disrupting illicit drug flow with our2042Allies and Partners, who participated in 80 percent of interdiction2043efforts. Last year, they successfully disrupted 302 narcotics2044shipments, including the interdiction of over 328 metric tons of2045cocaine and 67 metric tons of marijuana with a wholesale value at $8.42046billion.2047    In the Caribbean, Operation BUFALO NK, a collaborative effort2048between USSOUTHCOM, JIATF-S, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and2049the Dominican Republic, exemplified the benefits of cooperation in2050combatting drug trafficking and money laundering. The operation, which2051targeted a criminal organization with extensive international2052connections to Colombia, Venezuela, the United States, and Europe,2053resulted in the seizure of over two metric tons of cocaine headed to2054the United States with 28 persons arrested, including TCO leadership.2055    While JIATF-S will continue to maximize the CN resources received,2056CN surge operations in 2020 demonstrated that with more, we can do2057more, and help secure our seas and borders, dismantle the drug cartels2058responsible for the death of thousands of Americans, and send a clear2059message to our adversaries and our partners. Fiscal year 2020 saw 3,5842060U.S. Ship Days resulting in 572 persons detained for U.S. prosecution,2061while in fiscal year 2024, U.S. Ship Days reduced to 1,542 and only 2522062persons were detained for U.S. prosecution. Increased resourcing2063directly increases our ability to advance investigations, support2064indictments, dismantle networks, and recharge the intelligence cycle.2065Should resources become available, we will seek to replicate the2066successes of 2020's CN operations. We are also examining the long-term2067sustainment of our Pale Ale aircraft and identifying non-traditional2068ISR capabilities that could help mitigate shortfalls in the D&M2069mission.2070    Thanks to the support from Congress, the Ship Special Mission (SSM)2071is a significant asset in the fight against TCOs. During Operation2072PULPO from 21 May to 9 June 2024, the SSM enabled Ecuadorian surface2073assets to conduct combined counter drug operations off their west coast2074and disrupt narco-traffickers transiting the area. Over 9.168 metric2075tons of cocaine was disrupted, along with the interdiction of four2076vessels, and detainment of 12 individuals.2077    Additionally, our Partners are taking a leading role in addressing2078the illicit synthetic drug threat. Argentina is working to establish a2079regional center for information sharing and cooperation to counter2080illicit synthetic drugs and to divert precursor chemicals. Likewise,2081the Dominican Republic has committed to leading the Caribbean in2082formulating coordinated strategies to counter the production and2083trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, including fentanyl.2084    Counternarcotics (CN) assets are the principal way USSOUTHCOM2085projects force and maintains a visible presence to assure our Partners2086and deter our adversaries. Since 2020, we have seen a steady decline in2087available resources to support the CN mission because of competing2088global requirements. Thanks to support from Congress, assets like SSM2089and PALE ALE aircraft are essential detection and monitoring assets2090that keep illicit drugs far from our shores. However, the fact remains2091that JIATF-S suspects more than 3,200 maritime movements of illicit2092narcotics were bound for the United States last year but was only able2093to act on a fraction--9 percent--of that number.2094    USSOUTHCOM as an Innovation Hub. As strategic competition within2095our AOR creates global challenges, innovative solutions are essential2096to address these threats. USSOUTHCOM continues to position the region2097as a hub for innovation, supported by the favorable environment2098fostered through our partnerships with the nations and territories of2099LAC. The region's proximity to the United States, coupled with its2100geography, provides an ideal setting for demonstrating new technologies2101through experimentation, evaluation, operational adaptation, and the2102refinement of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Additionally, joint2103exercises and military utility assignments further enhance our2104capabilities in this dynamic landscape.2105    Following the initial success of integrating air, surface, and2106subsurface robotic systems into the international exercise UNITAS 24,2107U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSOUTH/4th Fleet) has continued2108to explore these technologies through both short, targeted tests and2109extended operational trials. USNAVSOUTH/U.S. 4th Fleet is2110operationalizing robotic autonomous systems in support of the United2111States Navy. During 2024's Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, USNAVSOUTH/U.S.21124th Fleet combined manned and unmanned systems and Artificial2113Intelligence tools to bolster maritime domain awareness, counter2114narcotics flow, and counter illegal, unregulated, and unreported2115fishing (IUU Fishing), while demonstrating these capabilities to our2116Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian partners.2117    We are assessing the integration of robotic systems into JIATF-S'2118detection & monitoring (D&M) operations out of Cooperative Security2119Location Comalapa. As the Navy seeks to inform its hybrid fleet of the21202030's, USSOUTHCOM will seek ``win-win'' opportunities that support2121this effort while enabling D&M and interdiction operations.2122    Operationalizing Data to Enhance Decision-Making and Partnerships.2123Data is a strategic asset. Decisions should be augmented with rigorous2124analysis based on high-quality data. USSOUTHCOM is working diligently2125to harness the power of our data to drive operations, planning, and2126engagements. Our ability to operationalize data is critical to our2127success, and we are committed to leveraging cutting-edge techniques to2128enable us, our allies and partners to rapidly respond to challenges and2129actively counter threats posed by our adversaries.2130    Our Enhanced Domain Awareness (EDA) initiative is a prime example2131of how we are applying data analytics and artificial intelligence to2132better understand our operating environment. By integrating data from2133various sources, we are able to gain a more complete picture of the2134situation and make more informed decisions. By leveraging our EDA2135system, we are facilitating coordination between partner nations on a2136common platform. This enables the secure sharing and collaboration of2137information in near real-time, which is critical to enabling multi-2138domain operations.\66\2139---------------------------------------------------------------------------2140    \66\ Reed-Cox, S. (2023). U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Command2141Spearhead Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchange in El Salvador.2142DVIDS. Retrieved from https://www.dvidshub.net/news/477097/us-army-2143south-us-southern-command-spearhead-intelligence-subject-matter-2144expert-exchange-el-salvador.2145---------------------------------------------------------------------------2146    However, operationalizing data is not without its challenges. It2147requires a unique blend of talent, skills, and experience, as well as2148access to cutting-edge computing capabilities. It also requires support2149from our Allies and Partners, and a commitment to investing in the2150right people, processes, and technologies. As we move forward, we will2151continue to push the boundaries of what is possible with data. We will2152work to attract and retain the best talent, invest in the latest2153technologies, and build partnerships that will help us stay ahead of2154the curve. By operationalizing our data and enhancing our partnerships,2155we are not only enhancing our own operations, but also contributing to2156a broader effort to build a more secure, stable, and prosperous region.2157    Space Domain Awareness: A Critical Component of Global Security.2158Space domain awareness is critical to maintaining global security and2159advancing the capabilities of Partner Nations. The establishment of2160United States Space Forces--Southern at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in2161Arizona, this year, is a testament to our commitment to this principle.2162Moreover, we continue to integrate the space domain throughout or Joint2163Exercise Program, exemplified by Exercise RESOLUTE SENTINEL 2024, where2164we gathered with our Allies to conduct space domain awareness training2165and collaborate on space operations. \67\ The exercise demonstrated the2166importance of space domain awareness in providing essential near real-2167time information to troops on the ground.2168---------------------------------------------------------------------------2169    \67\ Sebastianelli, C. (2024). RS24 Enhances Global Space Domain2170Awareness with Partner Nations. SOUTHCOM Press Release. Retrieved from2171https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3802887/rs24-2172enhances-global-space-domain-awareness-with-partnernations/.2173---------------------------------------------------------------------------2174    Our teams worked tirelessly to track satellite launches,2175operations, and maneuvers, and to understand the overall space picture.2176This awareness is critical to responding to nefarious actions that may2177impact satellites and missions. By leveraging commercial capabilities2178and fostering open communication, we are enhancing interoperability and2179strengthening partnerships among emerging space powers.2180    Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. IUU Fishing is a2181pervasive menace which poses a threat beyond simply destroying the2182diverse ecosystems of our Partners. Aside from threatening food2183security, harming legitimate commercial fishers, and undermining2184fisheries management, it contributes to migrant smuggling, labor2185exploitation, and facilitates the illegal proliferation of drugs,2186weapons, and wildlife.\68\ Distant-water fishing fleets, primarily from2187China, travel to the pristine waters of LAC to extract precious2188resources. However, this practice is becoming more localized and2189constant.\69\ Our Partner Nation Coast Guards and Navies are2190increasingly monitoring and interdicting domestic vessels engaged in2191IUU Fishing, as was the case in January 2024 when a Colombian vessel2192was stopped for its illegal taking of 1.2 tons of clams from the2193Magdalena River.\70\ IUU Fishing results in the annual loss of2194approximately $6 billion in the region and $36 billion globally.\71\2195---------------------------------------------------------------------------2196    \68\ Keating-Bitonti, C., & Marshak, A. R. (2024). Latin America2197and the Caribbean: Facts and Figures. Congressional Research Service.2198Retrieved from https://crsreports.Congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R48215.2199    \69\ Sanchez, W.A. (2024). How Latin America Navies Combat Illegal,2200Unreported, or Unregulated Fishing. Center for Strategic Studies.2201Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-latin-american-navies-2202combat-illegal-unreported-or-unregulated-fishing.2203    \70\ (Sanchez, 2024).2204    \71\ The Economist. (2023). South American Governments Are Trying2205to Curb Illegal Fishing''. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/2206the-americas/2023/10/05/south-american-governments-are-trying-to-curb-2207illegal-fishing.2208---------------------------------------------------------------------------2209    IUU Fishing's lucrative nature and operational limitations to2210combat it means that it is likely to expand. This provides the United2211States with an opportunity to lead and demonstrate our commitment to2212democratic values and supporting the territorial sovereignty of our2213Partners. We can do so by assisting our Partners in the acquisition and2214maintenance of offshore patrol vessels and working side-by-side to2215develop and implement innovative technology such as unmanned aerial2216vessels, unmanned surface vessels, and the Enhanced Domain Awareness2217program to better understand the size and location of these fleets.2218\72\ Moreover, we can augment our Partner Nations' efforts by expanding2219``shiprider'' agreements and supporting United States Coast Guard2220counter IUU Fishing operations in concert with Partners, as we2221successfully did off the coast of Peru during last year's Operation2222Southern Shield. \73\2223---------------------------------------------------------------------------2224    \72\ (Sanchez, 2024).2225    \73\ U.S. Coast Guard District 11. (2023). Coast Guard Cutter Crews2226Conduct First High Seas Boardings Off the Coast of Peru, Under New2227SPRFMO Measure. Retrieved from https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-2228ARTICLES/Article/3562470/coast-guard-cutter-crews-2229conduct-first-high-seas-boardings-off-the-coast-of-per/.2230---------------------------------------------------------------------------2231    Competing in the Information Space: In the face of adversarial2232attacks that inundate the information domain with falsehoods and2233disinformation, USSOUTHCOM takes a proactive approach to disseminating2234and promoting facts. We are committed to expanding coordination with2235Allies, Partners, and the U.S. Interagency to showcase the positive2236impacts of U.S.-led initiatives in the region, while countering the2237malign narratives and exposing the nefarious activities of our2238Strategic Competitors and other adversaries. USSOUTHCOM's media2239platform, Dialogo Americas, exposes the predatory economic practices,2240environmental degradation, and political and military interference of2241China, Russia, and Iran, while promoting transparency and the benefits2242of regional cooperation to reinforce common interests and counter2243common threats.2244    Cyber. The cyber domain continues to grow in importance to modern2245life. It has reshaped how individuals, organizations, and governments2246interact with one another. Communication, economics, healthcare,2247technology, governance, and national security are just a few of the2248areas vulnerable to and being disrupted by malicious cyber activities.2249Its consequences endanger the democratic values and freedoms that form2250the foundation of our societies. In LAC, China, Russia, and Iran and2251their proxies deploy cyber espionage and information operations to2252gather intelligence and persuade audiences to support their interests.2253Cyber threat intelligence demonstrates that financially motivated2254actors are pursuing various schemes throughout the region, including2255the rising use of ransomware to incorporate data theft and extortion2256into their operations.2257    USSOUTHCOM is committed to assisting our Allies and Partners to2258counter the growing threat and build resiliency in the face of2259cybercrime. Our Joint Combatant Command Cyber Assistance Teams and2260Defend Forward Operations are making a difference by providing our2261Partners with the capability and equipment necessary to prepare,2262defend, mitigate, and recover from malicious cyberattacks. Another2263notable example is our joint cyber security review with the government2264of Paraguay, which identified a Chinese-based cyber espionage group,2265Flax Typhoon, infiltrating Paraguayan government systems. This2266successful collaboration demonstrates the importance of working2267together to strengthen our cyber defenses and protect critical2268infrastructure. We continue to invest in developing strategies and best2269practices with our Partners through successive engagements and2270symposiums, including last December's Caribbean Nations Security2271Conference in Trinidad and Tobago.2272    Economic Cooperation. Economic cooperation plays a crucial role in2273supporting state sovereignty and democracy in Latin America by creating2274opportunity for prosperity. To that end, we must double-down on a2275collaborative approach that improves the region's access to economic2276development, foreign direct investment, and access to international2277financing.\74\ Our Partners are asking for our help and if we truly2278wish to compete, we must deliver. USSOUTHCOM is not the lead Federal2279agency for economic engagement, but by furthering our communication and2280collaboration with institutions and agencies like the International2281Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the U.S. Export-2282Import Bank (EXIM), and the Development Finance Corporation, we can2283attract Western-based private investment and provide financing2284solutions for our Partners' critical infrastructure projects and other2285initiatives that are untethered from expectations of quid-pro-quo2286support of anti-democratic measures or political fealty. One such2287example of this wider coordination is EXIM's recent memorandum of2288understanding to loan up to $500 million to Trinidad and Tobago,2289financing priority projects, beginning with the enhancement of its2290maritime domain capability. This is the type of economic-based solution2291our Partners are looking for to enable economic opportunity, security,2292and stability in the region.2293---------------------------------------------------------------------------2294    \74\ Alvarado, P. D. (2024). Huawei's Expansion in Latin America2295and the Caribbean: Views from the Region. United States Institute of2296Peace, 17. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/2297huaweis-expansion-latin-america-and-caribbean-views-region.2298---------------------------------------------------------------------------2299    Moreover, it is incumbent upon us to better emphasize and advocate2300for the presence and investment of U.S. and western companies in LAC.2301These companies bring the benefits of transparency, fair labor2302practices, and the hiring and training of local residents, that our2303adversaries choose not to offer. By adhering to the rule of law and2304respect for human rights, U.S. and Western presence empower, rather2305than erode, our common democratic values.2306                           building our team2307    Every day is an opportunity to achieve greatness. At USSOUTHCOM, we2308achieve excellence in all we do through preparation and an ongoing2309investment to build our team. Alongside our Allies and Partners, each2310service member, civilian, and contractor is an integral link to our2311collective success. With empathy and compassion at the forefront, this2312command works tirelessly to develop talent, address challenges, and2313realize the promise of each team member. Together we are stronger and2314united in our common cause, to deliver upon our Enduring Promise to the2315Americas.2316    Housing and Cost of Living. Miami rose one spot since last year and2317is now the third most expensive place to live in the United States.\75\2318We appreciate the support of Congress for our privatized housing2319project, located across the street from the Headquarters, which will2320alleviate some of this stress by lodging more than 200 service members2321and their families. It remains on schedule, with completion anticipated2322between the summers of 2026 and 2027. Additionally, the increasingly2323high costs associated with local living negatively impacts USSOUTHCOM's2324ability to attract and retain top civilian talent. USSOUTHCOM continues2325collaboration with our local, State, and Federal leaders and agencies2326to address the difficult financial realities of working and residing in2327our South Florida community.2328---------------------------------------------------------------------------2329    \75\  U.S. News & World Report. (n.d.). Most Expensive Places to2330Live. Retrieved from https://realestate.usnews.com/places/rankings/2331most-expensive-places-to-live.2332---------------------------------------------------------------------------2333    Total Force. USSOUTHCOM's investment in and utilization of Active2334Duty, Reserve, and the National Guard service members enables an2335enduring presence throughout the region that our competitors struggle2336to match. Reservists and National Guardsmen comprise 28 percent of the2337manpower at USSOUTHCOM's headquarters, making them integral to2338headquarters operations. In theater they are having an outsized impact,2339illustrated by USSOUTHCOM's Civil Affairs Persistent Engagement2340initiative. Composed of seven U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs elements2341and four Liaison Officers, they currently work hand-in-hand with United2342States Country Teams and our Partner Nations in Central America--with2343planned expansion in the Caribbean to build capacity and deliver2344Humanitarian Assistance at the point of need. Reserve and National2345Guard forces extend USSOUTHCOM's operational reach through its robust2346SPP and significant integration in the command's Joint Exercise2347Program. USSOUTHCOM's assigned Reservists also ensure critical surge2348capacity for largescale contingency operations should the need arise.2349                  what resources does ussouthcom need?2350    USSOUTHCOM is on the frontlines of significant threats in our2351hemisphere that directly impact our safety at home. The Command2352leverages military capabilities and expertise in our region to provide2353the United States a strategic advantage in countering threats from2354wherever they arise, in whatever form they take. This region is one2355where a little goes a long way. This high return on investment presents2356an opportunity: while USSOUTHCOM has been executing the mission2357effectively in a resource-constrained environment for a number of2358years, with more we can do more. There are some key gaps that would2359help USSOUTHCOM be more effective in addressing these key threats in2360our hemisphere and in enabling like-minded partners to do the same.2361    Assets--Presence with Presence. TCOs create widespread instability2362and violence throughout the region that have forced millions to leave2363their home countries for the United States while costing American lives2364with their illicit drugs that flood our country. Over the past several2365years, USSOUTHCOM has seen a decline in available resources for the2366counterdrug mission due to competing global requirements. For example,2367there are zero Navy P-8 aircraft available due to being pulled to other2368theaters, and ships available in the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean2369are far below optimal presence to interdict most of the illicit drugs2370that endanger our citizens and enrich the TCOs. USSOUTHCOM has utilized2371innovative solutions to fill these gaps, from contracting maritime2372patrol aircraft and vessels to utilizing U.S. Navy ships transiting the2373area to provide presence. Providing more assets toward the fight2374against TCOs will keep this threat further from our Homeland:2375preventing more illicit drugs from reaching our shores, targeting a2376major source of TCO revenue, and increasing gathered intelligence2377necessary to dismantle these organizations.2378    These efforts have produced results, but one thing is clear: with2379more we can do more. We must meet presence with presence. China,2380Russia, Iran, TCOs, and our Allies and Partners all recognize the value2381and power of presence. Simply put, we are better able to compete,2382foster diplomatic engagement, strengthen partnerships, and enable2383effective interdiction through robust and persistent presence.2384    Able Partners--Security Cooperation. Security Cooperation continues2385to be one of the primary means USSOUTHCOM uses to execute its mission.2386Through increasing our partner militaries' proficiency, we support our2387Partner Nations' efforts to provide for their own security, addressing2388potential threats further away from our borders. While Security2389Cooperation has been incredibly effective in building partner capacity,2390with more we can do more. Partner Nations have been participating in an2391increasing percentage of illicit drug interdictions--currently over 802392percent--serving as a key force multiplier. With more Security2393Cooperation resources, we can develop more lethal, more effective2394partners, build interoperability and provide for our collective2395regional security.2396    Advocacy--Sustained congressional Support. We appreciate Congress'2397continued support of USSOUTHCOM, our missions and our efforts.2398Congress' recognition of such requirements and support of our programs,2399particularly those that expand cooperation, share operational2400information, advance interoperability, and improve the capabilities of2401our Allies and Partners, has been a key ally to our efforts. Notably,2402the recent increase of congressional visits to the region has been an2403important signal to our partner nations. We welcome more delegation2404visits which provide important first-hand context to policy decisions2405while maintaining high-level American presence. With congressional2406delegations and support, USSOUTHCOM can more effectively execute the2407vital missions critical to keeping the United States safe.2408                               conclusion2409    The time is now. The decisions we make today will impact the future2410of the Western Hemisphere for generations. The current threats and2411challenges will not subside on their own; they demand collective2412attention and action. With our Allies and Partners by our side,2413USSOUTHCOM is ready to rise to the challenge. The Americas is a rich2414tapestry of opportunity, poised for growth and prosperity, but it is2415the power of partnership that will unlock the region's full potential.2416Bound by shared ground, shared values, and commitment to a shared2417purpose, we will achieve far more together than we could alone. United,2418we will achieve a freer and more secure future for all.24192420    Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much for your testimony.2421Let's get restarted quickly. General Guillot, you can see from2422Senator Reed and me we're interested in the executive order to2423renew America's aging missile Defense architecture. So, I'll2424jump right in there.2425    So, how are we going to do this? What are the options? What2426are your top priorities with respect to upgrading our air and2427missile defenses? What role do you see space-based capabilities2428in this effort? And is our industrial base primed to execute2429this mission? So, what are your top priorities?2430    General Guillot. Chairman, the top priority in our efforts2431to meet the direction of the executive order is first and2432foremost, to establish increased domain awareness. As I2433mentioned in the opening comments, you can't defeat what you2434can't see, and the adversaries have an increasing capability of2435reaching us and threatening us from ranges beyond what some of2436our current systems can detect and track.2437    So, the first layer of any approach to defending the, the2438United States or North America from the NORAD perspective would2439be a sensor layer from seabed to space, of systems that can2440detect threats from a further distance. Those are seabed,2441ground-based, air base, such as the E-7 and then space-based2442systems for detecting tracking and warning.2443    Inside of that, I think we build on our existing GBI2444[ground-based interceptors] and NGI [next generation2445interceptors] capabilities via ground-based interceptors and2446next generation interceptors to defeat intercontinental2447ballistic missiles.2448    Chairman Wicker. Let me interject on the sensor layer. How2449soon can we get there?2450    General Guillot. Chairman, some of those capabilities are2451right on the edge. Others are probably three to 5 years out,2452but I think within inside of a year, we could have a2453significant capability that could network those into a single2454sensor grid.2455    Chairman Wicker. All right, well then go ahead if you've2456got anything to say about space-based or our industrial base2457capabilities.2458    General Guillot. Chairman, cooperation with the industrial2459base is critical, so they can keep pace with not only our2460requirements, but those requirements are based on the2461capabilities of the adversaries, which are rapidly increasing.2462So, I can't emphasize enough the need to develop systems and2463move them left on the timeline to field them more quickly to2464achieve our goal.2465    Chairman Wicker. Okay, and again, the Ranking Member and I2466spoke about fentanyl deaths. The estimate I have is more than2467225,000 Americans are estimated to have been killed because of2468fentanyl overdoses from 2021 to 2023. So, what progress are we2469making there? Who's to blame? I understand that we've been told2470in the past there are more Russian ``Chief Intelligence2471Office'' (GRU) spies operating in Mexico City than anywhere in2472the world. Is that true? What's NORTHCOM doing and needing to2473do?2474    General Guillot. Chairman, the fentanyl crisis is a2475significant concern to our command. We have a number of Intel2476analysts that work with the interagency and lead Federal2477agencies to provide intelligence that gets after the cartel2478networks that drive the production and distribution of fentanyl2479and pushes it across the border. Recently we've been permitted2480to increase our ISR, our intelligence surveillance and2481reconnaissance (ISR) to----2482    Chairman Wicker. Permitted by Mexico?2483    General Guillot. No, by the Department, sir. But we do have2484intelligence sharing with Mexico to show them what we see. We2485have increased cooperation with Mexico to go address the cartel2486violence in terms of sending more troops----2487    Chairman Wicker. Because time is limited, we had 2022-20252488a 3-year space, are we making any progress now? Now it's 2025.2489    General Guillot. From our perspective----2490    Chairman Wicker. Has it gotten better?2491    General Guillot. No, I wouldn't say it's better, but I do2492think Chairman, that we have a better foundation now that we've2493increased the intelligence to make rapid progress against this2494threat.2495    Chairman Wicker. It definitely needs to get better. And so,2496tell us what you need and thank you for your efforts. You got 82497seconds.2498    [Laughter.]2499    General Guillot. More ISR is the first, and then expanded2500authorities would be required for more advise and assist types2501of operations between our forces and the tier one Mexican2502forces.2503    Chairman Wicker. We want to be your teammate there. Senator2504Reed.2505    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and General2506Guillot, following along in the questioning of the chairman2507with respect to the space-based systems and use, both for2508acquisition of targets and perhaps for contact with targets,2509you need to unfettered access to be expanded. Is that fair to2510say?2511    General Guillot. Senator, to properly employ all those2512systems, we would have to have uninterrupted and complete2513access to the entire spectrum.2514    Senator Reed. As a result, the proposed spectrum options2515would complicate significantly your ability to carry out that2516mission?2517    General Guillot. Senator, compromising that part of the2518spectrum is a significant concern to me and the systems2519necessary for Homeland Defense.2520    Senator Reed. Thank you, General, and General, also there's2521approximately 2,000 Active Duty personnel now down at the2522border, and there's always an opportunity cost, whatever you2523do. One of the opportunity costs obviously, is the readiness2524and training of these troops. Are you aware of what training is2525being missed, deferred or ignored because of this deployment?2526    General Guillot. Senator, first, all of the forces that2527come to us from the services are extremely well-trained,2528disciplined, and highly qualified. If they are conducting2529missions that are outside their normal specialty, we have a2530series of five work days, one training day, and then 1 day off2531each week.2532    In that training day we prescribe our leadership to make2533sure that the forces that are operating outside of their2534standard specialty have the opportunity to train and maintain2535some of those skills.2536    Some of the others, such as helicopter pilots, and some of2537the infantries are doing work that is already in line with2538theirs, and I think they maintain their readiness.2539    Senator Reed. So, you know, in a rough metric, one out of 52540days, it's my math is terrible, I went to West Point. If so,2541now they're doing 20 percent of the training they would've done2542at home base.2543    General Guillot. Yes, sir.2544    Senator Reed. Thank you. I didn't have the privilege of2545going to Navy or the Air Force, so I forgive my math. Admiral2546Holsey, can you give us a concise but detailed description of2547your role, SOUTHCOM's role at Guantanamo's Migrant Detention2548Center and the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)?2549    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. So, SOUTHCOM plans and2550postures has always over the years, to conduct migrant2551operations. In fact, one of our enduring missions is to plan2552for a mass migration scenario. Under the current situation,2553what we're doing is modifying our existing plan to be able to2554support the migrant ops at GTMO, the Naval station, and to2555provide safe and humane care in support of Department of2556Homeland Security.2557    Now, to be clear, there are two different sides of the2558base. One is the Naval station, both is Naval Station GTMO, but2559you have one which is the MOC, Migrant Operation Center where2560we're actually setting up tents and have JTF-GTMO on the other2561side of the island, which we have the war detainees.2562    Senator Reed. Now have you estimated that you're going to2563incur DOD SOUTHCOM for your operations? You have to construct2564facilities for 30,000 individuals, which would include mess2565halls, which would include healthcare centers, sanitation2566provisions, et cetera. How much money is that going to cost us?2567    Admiral Holsey. So, right now, sir, we're in the initial2568phase of this process. It's a tailored approach to get to256930,000, if that is desired. Right now, where we stand, we're in2570initial phases, I guess some numbers to you, but right now2571we're still building out, we have forces on the ground and that2572process still in place, sir.2573    Senator Reed. Thank you. Going back General Guillot to the2574concept of Iron Dome, unlike the Israelis, this is not a2575missile defense system. This is a system of systems and one of2576the most important aspects of the system; I think you've2577already alluded to is detection rather than interception. Is2578that fair?2579    General Guillot. Senator, I agree with you. The first and2580most critical part is the detection capability.2581    Senator Reed. I met recently with the defense minister from2582Canada. They're very much interested in participating. They2583have legal obstacles, but they assume they can jump over them2584very much participating in the missile defense system, and2585their best contribution could come in what way, sir?2586    General Guillot. Senator, I welcome their participation. I2587think the first would be to buy into our domain awareness2588expansion, whether ground-based or space-based, and then2589further down the line, if they get defeat mechanisms, see how2590they would mesh with our existing defense mechanisms in a2591similar way that we employ fighter aircraft with NORAD. Perhaps2592we could do the same with missile defeat systems from the2593ground.2594    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you,2595Chairman.2596    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Ranking Member, perhaps that2597would be one way that Canada could begin to meet its North2598Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirement is as far as2599defense spending as a portion of their Gross Domestic Product2600(GDP). Let me ask both witnesses to move the microphones a2601little closer, and then I recognize Senator Fischer and then2602Senator Shaheen.2603    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you2604Admiral, thank you General for your service to this country.2605The work you do is extremely important. Thank you.2606    General, you're going to hear I think a lot about spectrum2607because here in the Senate we're discussing that and General,2608you were talking about, that many think that the Iron Dome for2609America is similar to what we see in Israel. It is not. What2610we're looking at, as you said, we can't defeat what we can't2611see, so we have to be able to increase domain awareness, and2612increasing domain awareness means that we need additional2613radars, terrestrial, airborne space base, underwater.2614    You hit that in your opening comments, I'm trying to hit it2615more here to make a point not just with the media, but with my2616colleagues as well. All of those systems depend on spectrum,2617the spectrum that the Department of Defense has. Is that true?2618    General Guillot. Yes, Senator. That's exactly correct.2619    Senator Fischer. Can those systems function if there's a2620lot of noise, which means additional users close by in creating2621a lot of noise?2622    General Guillot. No, Senator, we have to have complete2623control of the spectrum to operate our systems effectively.2624    Senator Fischer. Operating those systems effectively means2625protecting the Homeland. Correct?2626    General Guillot. Yes, ma'am. That's the purpose for, for2627all of our systems, it all centers on Homeland Defense.2628    Senator Fischer. Thank you. To move to a different topic2629General, you predicted during the posture hearing last year2630that Chinese and Russian aircraft, you said that they flew a2631mission into Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. Do you2632assess that the United States will see more of this from China,2633whether it's aircraft or ships or submarines?2634    General Guillot. Senator, I do think that they'll increase2635their presence both independently as well as increase2636cooperation with the Russians in the air, in the maritime and2637under sea.2638    Senator Fischer. In that cooperation with the Russians,2639what do you worry about the most?2640    General Guillot. What I worry about the most is that2641instead of just weapons and technology, that they will trade2642access, which would shorten our timelines to react to either2643country military capabilities.2644    Senator Fischer. Are there any authorities or capabilities2645that NORTHCOM and NORAD would need in order to protect your2646AOR?2647    General Guillot. Senator, the most important capability we2648would need is the improved domain awareness to allow us to see2649at further ranges, as the military capabilities improve by the2650adversaries, we have to match that with our detection2651capability. At this time, I do not lack any authorities.2652    Senator Fischer. Admiral, since you took over command late2653last year, what is your assessment of China's long-term2654strategic objectives in your AOR?2655    Admiral Holsey. Thank you, Senator. The PRC's has continued2656to do their, expanding their economic engagement to having more2657influence and diplomatic and political influence in the region.2658They're continuing with their Belt and Road initiative2659throughout. Currently, 22 countries are members of the Belt and2660Road Initiative, and so they continue to go down this path,2661they stayed on enterprises, the Huawei hold, the whole nine2662yards. So that's just one aspect of it.2663    The aspect that is more critical to me as a military2664officer is the military view, right? So, right now, when I2665think about deep water ports, dual use sites facilities, so2666deep water ports, like the port of Chancay in Peru. I think2667about the space enabling infrastructure throughout the AOR, at2668least 10 PRC's-linked space sites across five countries in the2669region.2670    Then you get into the 5G, the Huawei, right? You get into2671the safe city technology. So, they continue to do this, and2672when our partners use Huawei and Safe City Technology, now2673they're having threat of having Chinese technology on their2674critical infrastructure.2675    So, again, we have to continue to block them out and find2676ways to deliver for our partners. I do that by engaging2677security cooperation as well as trying to make sure, from an2678economic standpoint, working throughout the region and working2679with the Office of Security strategic Capital--Bank and others2680to find ways to block out the PRC.2681    Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Thank you both.2682    Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen and then Cotton.2683    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your2684service to the country. General Guillot, I'm not sure if any2685resources are coming from the operations in your area of2686responsibility to address some of the flights that have been2687transporting migrants out of the country, but I understand that2688last week, an Air Force C-17 transported 104 migrants from the2689United States to India.2690    That flight cost the American taxpayers $2.5 million, and I2691understand that we're currently spending nearly $30,000 an hour2692for every deportation flight that's being run by the military,2693when Homeland Security used to charter flights like these at2694less than one-third the cost or $8,500 an hour.2695    Doesn't seem to me like a very effective use of our2696dollars, given the needs that you and Admiral Holsey talked2697about in terms of what you require for additional resources to2698address the threats facing the country.2699    So, can I ask, are you seeing any of the impacts of those2700costs yet on NORTHCOM's budget? Do you know how those costs are2701being paid?2702    General Guillot. Senator, I have not seen any impact at2703this point, but I'll remain transparent with the committee if I2704do feel strained in that area. As you alluded to at the2705beginning, those flights are flown by United States2706Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), so we coordinate with the2707border patrol to have the migrants available but we do not2708operate those flights.2709    Senator Shaheen. Do you know if those flights are coming2710out of TRANSCOM's budget?2711    General Guillot. Ma'am, I can't say for sure, but I assume2712they are.2713    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that this2714committee would request information about the cost of those2715flights and why the military is doing them, as opposed to doing2716them the way we used to at one third, the cost.2717    Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that suggestion. Senator.2718    Senator Shaheen. Admiral Holsey, over the last year, we've2719actually seen an almost 15 percent decrease in drug overdose2720deaths. Illegal drugs, however, as you pointed out, and General2721Guillot pointed out, are still killing nearly 90,000 Americans2722every year.2723    Both of your commands rely on partnerships with governments2724and militaries in the region to help stop the flow of illegal2725drugs. So, can you talk, Admiral Holsey, in particular, about2726whether you're seeing any impact of the stop on our foreign2727assistance in countries in Latin America on the willingness of2728those countries to cooperate?2729    Then are you seeing, or do you see the concern that China2730may move in some of those areas where our presence is being2731discontinued?2732    Admiral Holsey. Senator, thank you for that. China2733continues to look incredibly hard at every opportunity to come2734in and engage, so we can't take that for granted.2735    With regard to our partners in engaging in the counter drug2736piece, they're very resilient. Some of our training that do the2737security operation, the exercises specifically focus on the2738counter drug flight fight. If you look into the Eastern Pacific2739right now in the first 90 days, I'm sorry, since the 1st of2740January, we've already interdicted 50 metric tons of cocaine,2741right? And, and actually arrested 84 detainees.2742    Again, when you think about this piece, our partners are2743with us. Eighty percent of our interdiction last year was done2744by our partners using actually a ship special mission. We2745actually bring out interceptors from our partners along with us2746and get after the fight. So, they're all in with us.2747    I would like to continue to do that security operation. I2748haven't seen any impacts at this point, but we'll look and I'd2749be happy to let the committee know.2750    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and General Guillot, as you're2751looking at the challenges with our northern border, are you2752finding Canada willing to cooperate in all of the ways that are2753important as we're looking at the interdiction of drugs and2754other illegal activities across our border?2755    General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I am. I find that my2756counterparts in Canada are very open to planning potential2757partnering on the northern border to detect illegal crossings2758both ways in the future.2759    Senator Shaheen. Canada has developed a plan to address2760their commitments to NORTHCOM. Are you seeing that beginning to2761be built out at this point, or is all that still in the future?2762Did we participate in the development of that plan?2763    General Guillot. Senator, they were very collaborative on2764defining the NORAD requirements and their NORAD modernization2765is at the very, in beginning stages. We are seeing improved F-276618 radars and missile capabilities already. The next step we'll2767see is the arrival of the F-35 in the next 2 years. So, they're2768well on the track, but we do have some immediate improvements2769with their2770F-18.2771    Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you both.2772    Chairman Wicker. Again, I'm looking forward to our friends2773in Canada fulfilling their commitment to NATO. Senator Cotton.2774    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. General Guillot, as2775the chairman mentioned his opening statements, I have2776legislation with Senator Gillibrand to address the drone threat2777here in America. We seem to have drones just flying around2778everywhere and many times people don't know what's going on.2779Most notably in the public eye late last year in New Jersey.2780    This is also happening around our military bases a lot.2781You've had drone incursions over Joint Base Langley, Wright-2782Patterson Air Force Base, Vandenberg Space Force Base,2783Picatinny Arsenal, Andersen Air Force Base. Could you explain2784to us briefly what is the threat that these drones pose to U.S.2785military operations facilities, and personnel?2786    General Guillot. Senator, the primary threat I see for them2787in the way they've been operating is detection and perhaps2788surveillance of sensitive capabilities on our installations.2789    Senator Cotton. That's all installation, not just super2790sensitive ones like nuclear sites. It could be our fighter2791bases or army bases or naval bases or what have you?2792    General Guillot. Yes, sir. There were 350 detections2793reported last year on military installations, and that was 3502794over a total of hundred different installations of all types2795and levels of security.2796    Senator Cotton. Yes, but it's the case right now that only2797at certain sites, which you might call the supersensitive sites2798like nuclear bases, do commanders have the authority to protect2799their airspace from these drone incursions?2800    General Guillot. That's correct, Senator. We call those2801covered installations and not all the ins about half are2802covered2803    Senator Cotton. Which sounds crazy to me, and I think most2804Americans would think it, it doesn't show a lot of common2805sense. I mean, base commanders at every base around America,2806they have the authority and they have the capability to protect2807their perimeters.2808    Say if some terrorist got a dump truck and drove it through2809the front gate or we're trying to breach the perimeter fence,2810we would expect base commanders to protect their base with2811force if necessary. Is that correct?2812    General Guillot. That's correct, sir, and I would propose2813and advocate for expansion of 130i to include all military2814installations, not just covered installations.2815    Senator Cotton. I'm glad to hear you say that because I2816have legislation to do just that, the counteract with Senator2817Gillibrand that, again, would give these commanders the legal2818authority they need, plus the capability required to protect2819their bases from these kinds of incursions and then hold them2820accountable for doing so. Is that exactly what you're2821advocating for?2822    General Guillot. That is, sir and if I could add, I'd also2823like to see the range expanded to slightly beyond the2824installation, so they don't have to wait for the threat to get2825over the installation before they can address it. Because many2826of these systems can use side looking or slant range, and so2827they could surveil the base from outside the perimeter and2828under the current authorities, we can't address that.2829    Senator Cotton. Even better. Now, last year, you also said2830there were thousands of drone incursions over the southern2831border, and just last week, Mexican cartel leaders were2832reportedly authorized used drones to equipment with explosives2833against U.S. border patrol agents. Now I know that this is2834primarily a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)2835responsibility at the southern border, but do you need2836authorization for DOD to share information with DHS and the2837border authorities about these incursions?2838    General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I would like 130i to be2839expanded to allow a seamless exchange of data on drones.2840    Senator Cotton. Again, sounds like a great idea. I'm glad2841that Senator Gillibrand and I have legislation to do just that,2842and I hope that we can pass into law this year. Thank you,2843General.2844    Admiral, I know that the Navy is responsible for Guantanamo2845Bay, but Southern Command is responsible for some of the2846operations there to include the operations I gather of the2847violent illegal migrants who are recently transported. Could2848you give us a little bit of sense of the security measures in2849place that protects against any risk of violent criminals and2850terrorists being held at GTMO?2851    Admiral Holsey. Senator, the JTF-GTMO is the detention2852facility, we have a highly trained military police who come2853down on rotation with the guard's force. They're on a 1-year2854rotation, they're highly qualified, they've been trained to do2855their mission, they've been doing it for years throughout. So,2856again, I think they're very capable of force and they're ready2857to deal with any situation.2858    Senator Cotton. You're confident that your personnel are2859trained and ready to do that and are safe in doing so?2860    Admiral Holsey. One hundred percent, sir.2861    Senator Cotton. That's great because I'm also very2862confident that it's much safer to have depraved savage2863criminals from other countries waiting at Guantanamo Bay for2864deportation than it is to have them waiting at a base on the2865American mainland soil where we hope they'd never be able to2866cause any problems, but you never know there are American2867citizens on those bases and just outside those bases.2868Gentlemen, thank you again both for your appearance, sir.2869    Chairman Wicker. Excellent point Senator Cotton. Senator2870Hirono, and then Senator Sullivan.2871    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot,2872the President's recent missile defense executive order tasks2873you with providing ``an updated assessment of the strategic2874missile threat to the Homeland'' that is the President's2875direction to you.2876    I remain concerned about the viability of DOD'S strategy to2877defend Hawaii, specifically from missile threats. We're looking2878at China, North Korea examples. Will you commit to include the2879missile defense of Hawaii as part of your assessment?2880    General Guillot. Senator, I absolutely will. Hawaii and the2881defense from ballistic missiles for Hawaii is part of my2882responsibility.2883    Senator Hirono. Thank you again. For you General, last2884year, the former National Guard Bureau chief testified that the2885border security mission provides no military training value to2886guardsmen and does not prepare troops for great power2887competition.2888    Additionally, a Government Accountability Office (GAO)2889report from 2021 found that multiple units lost critical2890training opportunities due to deployments to the border. That2891of course impacts military and operational readiness. General,2892do you agree with the assessment that these missions provide no2893military training value to guardsmen?2894    General Guillot. Senator, I don't agree. I think that2895specifically in the helicopters and in our intel specialties2896that are conducting missions on the southern border, those are2897exactly in line with their training specialty. However, I2898certainly recognize there are areas where they're cross-trained2899and they are not getting immediate benefit to their primary2900specialty in about half of those roles.2901    Senator Hirono. So, your testimony is that using military2902troops at the border, that is not going to have an impact on2903readiness. How many troops are do we have on the border right2904now and do you expect that number to grow?2905    General Guillot. Senator, we have 5,000 title 10 forces on2906the southern border right now, and I do expect that number to2907grow.2908    Senator Hirono. As the Ranking Member on the Readiness2909Committee, I do have concerns about what these kinds of troop2910movements will do to readiness. What specific military training2911events and readiness exercises will NORTHCOM forego due to the2912resource demands of the Board of Mission?2913    General Guillot. Senator to this point none have been2914altered and we don't project that we would lose any of our2915exercises as the forces are provided by the services. We still2916have the capabilities to conduct all of our scheduled2917exercises.2918    Senator Hirono. Well, the GAO report noted that there will2919be some critical training opportunities that will be lost and I2920am going to followup with you as to whether that is also what2921is happening.2922    For Admiral Holsey, in your confirmation hearing last2923September, you stated that SOUTHCOM's main campaigning tool is2924security cooperation utilizing a whole-of-government approach2925that includes USAID. How will President Trump's decision to2926freeze foreign assistance and dismantle USAID affect SOUTHCOM's2927security cooperation Mission?2928    Admiral Holsey. Senator for right now, we're still2929assessing the impacts of USAID, I'll tell you from a military2930standpoint, I still can do my security cooperation at this time2931and so I look to Tradewinds exercise, right?2932    So, that's one we do yearly, and it's focuses on the2933humanitarian assistance just released in the Caribbean, right?2934So, we go out there, we do these missions, we're training our2935forces for earthquakes, hurricanes, and the like. So, those2936type of opportunities give our partners a chance to develop2937their skills for you know emergencies or contingencies.2938    Senator Hirono. I really don't see how an action like2939closing USAID would not have a negative impact on part of your2940mission. Regarding Guantanamo Bay, this is again, for Admiral2941Holsey. SOUTHCOM is responsible for implementing the2942President's directive to expand the detention center in2943Guantanamo Bay to hold 30,000 migrants.2944    Admiral Holsey, who are these migrants and where will they2945be coming from and what is the estimated cost to lead the2946expansion and support of this development, Department of2947Homeland Security mission, including food, medical care,2948construction, and sustainment?2949    We're talking about a big, I would say, infrastructure that2950we're going to need to house 30,000 migrants. Can you explain2951how all this is happening? How much it will cost? How it will2952impact SOUTHCOM's mission? Briefly, I've run out time.2953    Admiral Holsey. So very, very briefly. From the standpoint2954of who decides, that's DHS who decide who comes to the base for2955the migrants, they decide at that point and we just support2956them. We're in support of DHS with regard to the pricing. We're2957still understanding it's a phase approach right now, and so2958we're going to build it up and as we understand how large we'll2959get, we'll have a better focus on the price.2960    Senator Hirono. So even if this is DHS, we're going to want2961to know how much this is actually going to cost. I know that2962you were asked about the amount of money that went to deporting2963104 people to India, and whether or not that was an appropriate2964use of your funds.2965    Chairman Wicker. Perhaps witnesses can take that for the2966record.29672968    [The information referred to follows:]2969    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has centralized cost2970estimating and reporting. I defer to OSD Comptroller for2971further details.29722973    Chairman Wicker. Also, we'll have another round, if we need2974to, then we have Senator Sullivan and Senator King.2975    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank2976you for your testimony. I want to echo what the chairman's been2977saying, we do need Canada to step up, you know, when they don't2978meet their 2 percent GDP NATO commitments, it undermines the2979entire alliance. So I appreciate the chairman mentioning that.2980    General, it was good to meet with you. The other day we had2981a meeting with senior Trump administration officials just a2982couple days ago, a number of senators who were focused on the2983border, and they focused like your testimony, a lot on the2984northern border, which I really appreciate.2985    I have a chart here that depicts a lot of the air and sea2986incursions that we've seen in the last few years. It's been2987quite remarkable, particularly the Joint Chinese, Russian2988strategic bomber missions into our air and the joint Chinese2989Russian naval task force quite big, a 12-ship naval task force2990last summer.2991    President Trump himself commented recently, and we need to2992increase military investments in Alaska as Russian and China2993make more menacing moves in the region. That's just an example2994of all the different incursions air and sea just in the last 32995years, which is quite astounding.2996    General, I want to go into a little bit more detail. Your2997troops have done a great job of intercepting these strategic2998bombers by the way. They come with armed Mikoyan-Gurevich2999(MiGs), right? This is a serious incursion, not easy to do. Our3000navy's done a good job, although the first time we had that3001joint Russian Chinese task force, we didn't have any Navy3002response. Nothing, which was ridiculous in my view, 150-foot3003Coast Guard cutter.3004    But these are difficult missions made more difficult, for3005example, when you're intercepting strategic bombers, a lot of3006times our fighters are having to fly over a thousand miles just3007to get to the end of the--is to intercept them.3008    So, my question. Do you agree we need more infrastructure?3009You and I have talked about reopening the airfield in the navy3010base at Adak, this out here on the Aleutians Island chain, or--3011Utqiagvik and Barrow Alaska to help with the search and rescue3012(SAR) emissions. Can you explain that in a little bit more3013detail?3014    Admiral Paparo is in agreement with you on this, where3015these incursions are going to increase. This is America, our3016northern border, and yet the infrastructure we have for the3017young men and women who are doing these dangerous intercept3018missions, both at sea and in the air, they need more3019infrastructure for their safety and for our rapid response.3020    Do you agree with me that they do? Would you support3021reopening the Adak Naval base in the extension of the Barrow3022Runway, which is way up there, in the northern part of America.3023    General Guillot. Senator, I do agree with you, and as you3024mentioned, Admiral Paparo and I are very closely linked and3025aligned on all issues in the Pacific. I would support Adak for3026sure, for maritime and air access, and as you pointed out, dead3027horse or a point at the far north part of Alaska, because those3028missions aren't only long, a thousand miles or more with five3029or six or seven air fuelings usually at night.3030    But also, the harsh conditions if a pilot should have to3031eject having those forward points that you mentioned would3032allow us to pre-position search and rescue aircraft or be able3033to land there in an emergency, which are capabilities that we3034just don't have right now.3035    Senator Sullivan. Great, thank you on that. Again, I want3036to thank the men and women under your command. They do these3037intercept missions all the time. They're very tough, they're3038dangerous. They don't make a lot of news down here in the lower303948, but they're doing a great job.3040    Let me turn to missile defense. Senator Cramer and I3041recently introduced our Iron Dome Act that reinforces what3042President Trump's executive order does. That's a depiction of3043that covering the whole United States with integrated missile3044defense systems to protect our Homeland. I'd love to get co-3045sponsorship from all my colleagues, my 2017 advancing America's3046Missile Defense Act, which pretty much became law in the3047National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), had 30 co-sponsors,304810 Democrats, 20 Republicans.3049    But can I get your sense to first a commitment to work with3050me and Senator Cramer on that? Then you mentioned the NGIs and3051the ground-based missile interceptors. Those are almost all3052based in Alaska. Why is it taking so long to fill those 203053silos that we just filled out that are needed? Can I get your3054commitment to work with me as part of this Iron Dome Act to3055accelerate that?3056    General Guillot. Senator, you have my full commitment to3057work with you on the Iron Dome, it's the core mission of NORAD3058and NORTHCOM is to defend just as you described there. You also3059have my full commitment to work to move all defense industrial3060based capabilities to the left, to bring these capabilities3061earlier as our adversaries are advancing their capability, and3062we must keep pace.3063    Chairman Wicker. Great. Thank you, General. I ask unanimous3064consent that the three charts that Senator Sullivan referred to3065be admitted to the record at this point. Without objection,3066it's so ordered.3067    [The information referred to follows:]3068    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]30693070    Chairman Wicker. Senator Kaine, and then Senator Scott.3071    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our3072witnesses for your service. This morning, I received an email3073from one of my long-standing staff members. Mark runs3074constituent services from me, and he did so when I was Governor3075as well. Mark graduated in Richmond from J.R. Tucker High3076School. Kind of looked in the mirror and decided he wasn't3077college material yet, and enlisted in the United States Marine3078Corps.3079    Mark served for 4 years as an enlistee in the United States3080Marine Corps, and it put him on a path. It's been an amazing3081path. He finished his marine service, and then went and got a3082social work degree at Virginia Commonwealth University, and3083advice to any of my colleagues, if you want somebody great in3084constituent services, pick a marine with a social work degree.3085The dogged persistence of the Marines, and the skill in working3086with organizations and listening to people of a social worker,3087Mark exemplifies that.3088    Mark sent me this morning, he reached out to send me this3089article that appeared on the 10th of January in military.com,3090``Military drops recruiting efforts at prestigious Black3091Engineering Awards event''. I'd like it entered into the3092record, Mr. Chair.3093    Chairman Wicker. No objection.3094    [The information referred to follows:]30953096    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]30973098    Senator Kaine. First two paragraphs of the article. Here3099they are, ``The Army and other service branches are abandoning3100recruiting efforts at a prestigious Black engineering event3101this week, turning down access to a key pool of highly3102qualified potential applicants amid President Donald Trump's3103purge of diversity initiatives in the military.3104    Until this week, army Recruiting Command had a longstanding3105public partnership with the Black Engineer of the Year Awards3106or BEA, an annual conference that draws students, academics,3107and professionals in science, technology, engineering, and3108math, also known as STEM. The event which takes place in3109Baltimore has historically been a key venue for the Pentagon to3110recruit talent, including awarding Reserve Officers Training3111Corps (ROTC) Corps scholarships and pitching military service3112to rising engineers.3113    Past BEA events have included the Army Chief of Staff and3114the Defense Secretary. This is one of the most talent dense3115events we do, when Army Recruiter told military.com, on the3116condition that their name not be used, ``our footprint there3117has always been significant. We need the talent''.3118    My staffer, Mark, said to me when he sent me this article,3119I would never have served in the military if there weren't men3120and women who looked like me in the recruiting process.3121Limiting military recruitment to avoid qualified Black3122applicants in the name of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion3123(DEI) will ultimately hurt our all-voluntary military. I was3124intending to ask questions about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM until I3125got Mark's email this morning.3126    Intentionally avoiding an event chockfull of STEM Talent3127and Engineers, because it happens to be a draw for Black3128engineers, is more than an anti-DEI initiative. It is an3129intentional effort to avoid certain kinds of people in3130recruiting. The article goes on to say, it's not just the army3131that has pulled out of this event. All the service branches3132have pulled out of this event.3133    I just want to put this on the record. Two things happened3134on January 31st that I found very unusual. The President of the3135United States, Donald J. Trump, did what every President since3136Gerald Ford has done on January 31st, he declared February3137Black History Month.3138    On January 31st, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth,3139put out a directive, ``Identity months are dead at DOD.'' That3140was not the newspaper headline summarizing the directive, that3141was the directive from the Secretary of Defense. ``Identity3142Months are Dead at DOD,'' including Black History Month.3143    So, we have two events on January 31st, we have the3144President and Commander in Chief issuing the standard Black3145History Month proclamation for the Nation, but apparently at3146DOD it's different. At DOD, Black History Month is dead, at3147DOD, we won't go and recruit engineers who happen to be Black3148to come in and serve at a time when we need more people serving3149in the military and all of our service branches are struggling3150with attracting talent.3151    There's a lot of issues dealing with NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM.3152I'm glad my colleague Senator Cotton asked about Unmanned3153Aircraft Systems (UASs), I had a whole series of questions I3154wanted to ask about Haiti and other SOUTHCOM priorities,3155Admiral Holsey, I'm glad we had the chance to talk about those3156in my office. The United States military has been at the3157forefront of including talent of all kinds, with the actions on3158January 31 the President acknowledging Black History Month, but3159within the DOD family, now this is dead.3160    I worry that the military will no longer be at the3161forefront, won't even be at the average, but will be behind.3162That would be a terrible sellout of an amazing tradition that3163our United States military should be very, very proud of. With3164that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.3165    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Scott.3166    Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for being3167here. Thank you for all the servicemen and women that serve3168with you. So all these hearings are important. This is3169important one, I like this one a lot because SOUTHCOM's here3170and it's from my home State of Florida. I was hoping my good3171friend Senator Sullivan was still here because all he talks3172about is Alaska all the time.3173    So one thing I would always like is if people understood3174the risk that we're having in Latin America, and I think we3175have to put more effort into it. I know Admiral Holsey, we3176talked about that yesterday, and I know you're focused on it.3177So after years of Joe Biden's open border crisis wreaking havoc3178on our domestic security, with millions of illegal alien3179encounters at our border, an appeasement dangerous of dangerous3180regimes, the safety of our Nation in communities are top of3181mind, I think for all of us.3182    I think you have a very important job here as we bring back3183peace through strength. So let me just get to the questions3184first. General, President Trump recently signed two executive3185orders, one to seal the southern border, which is right, and3186another deploying 1,500 service men and women to the southern3187border, which none of us hoped he would have to do, but3188unfortunately, he'll have to do to secure the border.3189    Can you speak to how the administration's preparing for and3190do you feel you have the capability to face down the cartels3191and other U.S. enemies present in Mexico?3192    General Guillot. Senator, I do think that we have the3193capability and the support to meet the requirements established3194in the executive orders. As you might know, we've doubled the3195number of title 10 forces inside of a week, down there in their3196operating in seven roles in support of the Department of3197Homeland Security.3198    Then we've also increased some uniquely military3199capabilities that will get after the point you made, the3200cartels, which are driving the illegal migration. That's3201primarily through Airborne ISR to get more information on those3202and figure out how we can counter their actions.3203    Senator Scott. You think there's any chance you're going to3204need a carrier strike group in the Gulf of America?3205    General Guillot. Senator at this time I haven't gotten to a3206carrier strike group, but I will need a significant increased3207maritime presence in cooperation with the Coast Guard.3208    Senator Scott. Are the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at3209Mayport helpful at all?3210    General Guillot. Yes, sir. Those would be right in line3211with what we're looking to do in the Maritime. Thanks.3212    Senator Scott. So Admiral Holsey, I've been up here about a3213little over 6 years and it seems like, and I think we talked3214about this a little bit, Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and3215Synchronous Communication Satellite (Syncom) receive a majority3216of this Committee's attention and a lot of their assets. I3217think we're seeing a little bit of change under President3218Trump.3219    SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility faces real threats to3220national security as we all know, we've got problems in Cuba,3221Venezuela, Nicaragua, and potentially Columbia. So you might3222need additional assets, especially with what China, Russia,3223Iran are doing in the region. Can you talk about the importance3224of having the right assets at SOUTHCOM to be able to deal with3225the threats?3226    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator, to be clear, presence means3227power, presence mean relationships, and so not only when out of3228area deployers come, or the Transnational Criminal3229Organizations (TCOs) are moving drugs, when they see presence,3230it gives them pause. But also, when we come down and work with3231our friends and partners in the region, they look for us as3232leadership.3233    So when they see our ships, our aircraft, you know, our3234boots on the ground working with them again and again, it3235builds those partnerships and it shows that we are there3236enduring, and we can block out the PRC and others.3237    Senator Scott. Thanks. Can you talk about the importance of3238Homestead Air Force Base and its mission?3239    Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. For Homestead Air Force Base3240located there in south of Miami right now, we've used it in the3241past. We used it in our Haiti operations as a jump off point.3242We use it in exercises as well. So again, it's a key location3243when I think about contingencies down range and how I engage3244and using that as a base to forward deploy, if you will. Also,3245I'm looking at some opportunities coming up for unmanned assets3246as well. So I continue to work on that.3247    Senator Scott. You think it needs to be returned as an3248Active Duty base?3249    Admiral Holsey. I think it's more in the AirForce lane to3250answer that, but I could definitely use an Active Duty base,3251sir.3252    Senator Scott. [Presiding.] Thank you, Chairman. Now3253Senator King.3254    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Appreciate3255it.3256    Senator Scott. First time, big promotion.3257    Senator King. As we're sitting here, news feeds often come3258across and I just saw one that the Department of Defense has3259indicated in its February in its 2025 procurement plan to buy3260$400 million worth of Tesla trucks. I'm going to just let that3261fact sink in, that's all I'm going to say about that.3262    Admiral, you talked about the activity of the Chinese in3263Latin America. Do you believe that that activity is number one3264significant and number two increasing? The nature of the3265activity, as I understand it is public works projects ports,3266two ports in Panama, for example, is this significant activity3267on behalf of China and Latin America?3268    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. I think all their efforts3269from an infrastructure standpoint, the development of dual use3270sites and facilities, is a challenge, and we should be3271concerned about that.3272    Senator King. I would point out to the committee that 23273weeks ago we unilaterally disarmed in Latin America when we3274destroyed the Agency for International Development, because3275that's the agency that provides funds for these kinds of3276projects. So, basically, we've left the field in Latin America,3277and I think that should be understood.3278    We're always talking about competition with China and the3279outpacing threat. But here is a place where we basically have,3280as I say, left the field, we've abdicated, we've surrendered to3281China in Latin America by unilaterally and illegally and3282unconstitutionally abandoning the vehicle by which we were3283competing with them in terms of development and work in Latin3284America. I just think that should be noted.3285    We've gone almost entirely through this hearing and not3286talked much about terrorism. I believe that in all the talk3287about pivoting to great power competition, the Indo-Pacific,3288we've taken our eye off terrorism, and it worries me that3289that's still a threat. General, is terrorism's still a threat3290to this country? I believe you mentioned lone wolfs, which is3291the most difficult kind of terrorism to combat.3292    General Guillot. Senator it's still a threat and a concern3293and one of the primary focus in the NORTHCOM part of my job. To3294address that we have very close ties with central command and3295special operations command to follow their operations in3296overseas, and they give me any indication of activities moving3297toward the United States that we'd have to plan for.3298    Of course, we have great relations across the intel and3299interagency to ensure that we have a consolidated look at any3300terror threats to the U.S.3301    Senator King. Well, I hope that there is significant3302emphasis because I worry that this is one of those things we're3303going to wake up and find ourselves under attack, and3304everybody's going to say, well, what happened? It's a matter of3305taking our eye off the terrorism ball. That's one of the3306greatest threats to this country, particularly if terrorists3307get a hold of nuclear material.3308    There's a growing nuclear family, including Iran and North3309Korea where nuclear material might become available, and that's3310the nightmare scenario because deterrence doesn't work with3311terrorists. They don't care about dying, and they don't have a3312capital city to destroy. So, intelligence and awareness of what3313the terrorists are thinking and planning and plotting, I think3314is absolutely critical.3315    Admiral, every year when we have this hearing, I talk to3316the SOUTHCOM commander about the fact that we have intelligence3317reports about drug shipments coming to the U.S. in the maritime3318domain, and we have the assets to interdict 25 percent of them.3319To me, that is just straight up unconscionable.3320    There are people dying in my State from fentanyl overdoses,3321from drug overdoses generally, and we are not meeting because3322of a lack of basically allocation of assets, the drug shipments3323that we know about. That's what's so objectionable about this.3324Is that percentage still reasonable? Seventy-five percent is3325not being interdicted that we know of?3326    Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. About 10 to 20 percent is what we3327can get after what we see. Yes, sir.3328    Senator King. That's because of a lack of assets. Is that3329not, correct? We don't have enough boats, ships?3330    Admiral Holsey. Primary lack of assets, the lack of3331resources ISR capability, yes, sir.3332    Senator King. Well, I would argue that, again, this is a3333misallocation of resources. That here is an active attack on3334America that's killing our citizens and we don't have enough3335ships and whether it's Coast Guard or Navy in the region to3336interject these drug shipments.3337    I think that's basically a dereliction of duty, not of you,3338but of the entire policy apparatus, and this goes back three,3339four administrations. But it's one that I hope that this3340Administration might pay some attention to, and correct. Maybe3341there's a second round we'll talk about icebreakers General.3342Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.3343    Senator Scott. Thanks Senator King. One thing did, was it3344secretary, was it State or defense about the Tesla's? Do you3345know?3346    Senator King. My understanding it was the Department of3347Defense armored Tesla Cyber trucks. Okay.3348    Senator Scott. All right. Senator Budd.3349    Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman, congrats on the3350promotion.3351    [Laughter.]3352    Senator Budd. Admiral, General, thank you all for being3353here. General, I enjoyed our conversation earlier this week,3354and also, just want to thank you on behalf of those in Western3355North Carolina for your efforts there. In the early days, late3356September of last year, early October, there was some3357bureaucratic hand wringing at the top, but that was not from3358you, that was not from our military. So again, thank you for3359all those in uniform who served those out west.3360    I want to shift to the southern border, and we've heard3361this a lot from our colleagues this morning, and I share the3362concern about fentanyl. In North Carolina we lose every single3363year the totality of what we lost on 9/11 just in North3364Carolina, and that's our whole country compared to just my3365great State.3366    I'm interested in stopping the supply of these Chinese3367precursors and chemicals that end up in Mexico and make their3368way here. Also stopping the Chinese nationals that are being3369caught illegally crossing our southern border in record3370numbers, I think it's up by a factor of 50 from 2021 to 2023.3371    So, what concerns do you have, if any, that foreign actors,3372not just South American immigrants, but they're using the3373southern border to access our nation? We'll start with you,3374Admiral.3375    Admiral Holsey. Senator, as I look at the daring gap over3376the last year or so, we did see an increase in number of3377Chinese actors coming across. Typically, what we do is we've3378been working with the Panamanians as well as Colombian to kind3379of support them in stopping the flow of migration. Now, it's3380slowed down this year, I think President Mulino was pretty3381clear to try to stop migration when he got in office.3382    We've supported from a logistics intelligence and training3383equipment standpoint, with the Columbia and Panamanians. We saw3384the drop about 90 percent coming through the daring right now,3385but we have to keep our eye on it,3386    Senator Budd. Of course. Thank you, General?3387    General Guillot. Senator, I want thank you for your3388comments for the men and women of primarily the 18th Airborne3389Corps that did an outstanding job supporting their teammates in3390the western part of North Carolina. I appreciate that. I share3391the concern on the intent of many that are crossing the border3392and in particular, work closely with the Border Patrol to3393figure out why the Chinese migrants, one, are so many and two,3394through such a narrow corridor in the San Diego region.3395    My concern there is a wolf and sheep's clothing coming3396across having someone who intends us harm. So we work very3397closely with the border patrol to see who is coming across and3398making sure that our intel agencies are tracking them. I'm3399encouraged by the recent decrease in detections and incursions3400across the border. But as I've mentioned before, the increase3401in military presence down there and some of the unique military3402capabilities, I hope will continue to seal that border.3403    Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Let's go to another topic3404which was previously discussed in regards to Unmanned Aircraft3405Systems (UAS). As you mentioned in your opening statement and3406in the discussion with Senator Cotton, we've seen UAS3407incursions over sensitive sites, military bases, it's an3408alarming amount. Can you briefly, briefly describe how bases3409are determined to be ``covered facilities''? Under title 10,3410section 130i and titling them to an active defense.3411    General Guillot. Yes, Senator. To become a covered3412installation, there's nine criteria that any one of those could3413allow the base to be covered, ranges from nuclear deterrence,3414missile defense, all the way down to if it's a test facility3415there, roughly half of the 360 installations in the U.S. meet3416those criteria.3417    My request and proposal would be is if we look at 130i3418again, would be to expand coverage to all military3419installations and not just those that are covered.3420    Senator Budd. Thank you. So, as the lead synchronizer of3421counter unmanned aerial system operations in the U.S., how are3422you preparing our bases to defend themselves from these3423threats? I know there's a policy discussion in your prior3424answer, but what are you doing right now?3425    General Guillot. Senator, since we received this3426responsibility in November, we're responsible for coordinating3427any response. The authority to defend a base as Senator Cotton3428mentioned, remains with the installation commander and the3429services. But we can be a synchronizer role and are a3430synchronizer role to ensure standardized training response,3431tactical techniques, and procedures.3432    If the base and the service aren't able to handle the3433incursion, we can bring in help from across the interagency and3434DOD to support, and perhaps most critically is we can work3435closely with the interagency to give them the authority to3436operate the systems once they arrive due to our close3437relationship with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).3438    In the near future, I think we will have our own3439capabilities to bring in from NORTHCOM once we procured them to3440assist if the service and the installation cannot handle the3441incursions.3442    Chairman Wicker. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.3443    Senator King. Mr. Chairman, in your absence, I made a3444statement about the purchase of Tesla trucks I was misinformed,3445it was not the Department of Defense that's announced this3446purchase, it's the Department of State. So, I just wanted to3447clarify the record.3448    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and thank you very much for3449that. Senator Warren.3450    Senator Warren Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Trump3451administration is sending troops to the southern border and3452holding immigrants at Guantanamo, redirecting Active Duty3453military personnel from critical missions and costing taxpayers3454several times more than when DHS does the same job. That seems3455to be bad for national security, bad for our military families3456and bad for America's bottom line.3457    We've seen this before. When the first Trump administration3458deployed troops to the border, it pegged the cost at a billion3459dollars over 3 years. But the GAO found that the Department of3460Defense estimates were not ``reliable'' and excluded3461``significant costs''. DOD reports to Congress missed more than3462half the actual total for entire fiscal years.3463    GAO made seven detailed recommendations for the Department3464of Defense to improve its cost estimates, but 4 years later,3465the Department of Defense has not executed a single one. Now,3466DOD estimates that this new border deployment will cost almost3467a billion dollars over the next 8 months, but that may be3468another underestimate. So, general Guillot, you are overseeing3469the border deployment, does underestimating the cost of an3470operation put future missions and future readiness at risk?3471    General Guillot. Senator, I would assume so, but I think I3472need to point out that NORTHCOM is not appropriated funds for3473the Southwest border, and we've never had reprogramming or pass3474through funding. This is all done through the department3475comptroller and the services.3476    Senator Warren I appreciate that, but I'm asking the3477question about running past the limits and the consequences of3478that, because the money has to come from somewhere, and I'm3479concerned that we're going to see the same problem that we saw3480the last time, big costs and little transparency and3481accountability.3482    When DOD has been tasked with doing DHS's job, it has cost3483taxpayers a lot more money. It costs three times more to deport3484migrants on military aircraft than civilian planes that3485Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) often uses, and has3486cost ICE at least five times more per detention bed to hold3487migrants at Guantanamo Naval Base than at facilities in the3488United States.3489    Anytime civilian authorities ask DOD for help, DOD is3490supposed to evaluate the request based on six criteria,3491including cost, but we don't even have a cost estimate for the3492new Guantanamo operations. So, Admiral Holsey, what do you3493expect the budgetary cost of SOUTHCOM Guantanamo operations3494will be through the end of this fiscal year?3495    Admiral Holsey. Senator, we're new into the process right3496now, we surged assets down there to start building out the3497camp. It's a phased approach, so it's not automatically going3498up to 30,000. So right now----3499    Senator Warren So, you're telling me you actually don't3500know the cost yet?3501    Admiral Holsey. Not at this point, ma'am.3502    Senator Warren Not at this point. So, the decision to3503deploy DOD personnel and assets was made without knowing the3504cost, which is exactly what DOD is supposed to consider in3505making the decision to deploy. Will you at least commit to3506provide that estimate to Congress as soon as you have it?3507    Admiral Holsey. Yes. Senator.3508    Senator Warren All right.3509    Admiral Holsey. Yes, I'll work with the Office of the3510Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD to get that to you.3511    Senator Warren All right. I will hold you to that. I'm3512relying on both of you also to tell us if, DOD blows past3513whatever estimates you give us, given the potentially3514astronomical costs, will you commit to informing this Committee3515if you determine that these operations are not militarily3516effective?3517    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator.3518    Senator Warren All right. You know, we need to know if the3519operations are having an unmanageable impact on readiness and3520morale. Political stunts like this can easily damage troop3521morale. Many Texas National Guard members who deployed to the3522southern border have felt isolated without purpose and some3523have even committed suicide. I think it is important that we3524have better oversight over these plans and that we make these3525plans that conform to the law. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3526    Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Yes, Senator King.3527    Senator King. One followup, General. Give us an outline of3528the Russian activity and militarization of the Northern Arctic3529Ocean. I don't know how to define Northern and Southern when3530you're coming from the North Pole, but on the Russian3531shoreline.3532    General Guillot. Senator, over the last year, we've seen a3533significant increase in both Russian air and maritime activity3534in the vicinity of Alaska, both in the bearing and up in the3535Arctic Ocean. In fact, the incursions in the number of ships3536this past year equal or exceeded the rate that it was before3537the Ukraine invasion, after which I think we all know the3538numbers dropped.3539    We've also seen increase in air patrols on the eastern3540side, what we call the two o'clock approach through the3541Greenland and Iceland gap toward Maine and the northeast3542portion of the United States. So I'm certainly concerned by3543that and I would expect the numbers on both sides of our coast3544to increase in the coming year.3545    Then also sir, along those lines also the Russian out of3546area patrols for both surface and undersea was significant last3547year, and I expect to see that on both coasts again this year.3548    Senator King. The Chinese are increasingly active, are they3549not?3550    General Guillot. Yes, sir. Last year we saw the most3551Chinese vessels off the coast of Alaska than we've ever seen3552and simultaneously.3553    Senator King. I was at a conference some years ago on the3554Arctic, and there was a huge delegation from China, and I said3555what is China's interest? They said, we are a near Arctic3556nation. My response was, Maine is a near Caribbean State. They3557are very active in increasing their actions. Now how about3558where are we? Do we have a port for a facility, for example in3559the Arctic? Second, give us a breakdown of the status of3560icebreakers. We are woefully inadequate in terms of3561icebreakers, particularly for the use of the Northwest passage.3562    General Guillot. Senator, I was going to use the same word.3563We're in a woeful situation with icebreakers. The Coast Guard3564is working very hard to increase that for us, but at this time3565we're completely outnumbered with icebreakers.3566    Senator King. They're building one new icebreaker, but it's3567really merely a replacement for the ancient one that's about to3568go out of service, is that not correct?3569    General Guillot. It is.3570    Senator King. So, there's no net gain in icebreakers?3571    General Guillot. That right, Senator.3572    Senator King. The icebreakers, we have commute between the3573Arctic and the Antarctic, is that not correct?3574    General Guillot. That that's correct as well.3575    Senator King. How many icebreakers do you estimate the3576Russians have in the Arctic?3577    General Guillot. Between 20 and 40?3578    Senator King. Twenty and fourty to less than one?3579    General Guillot. Yes, sir.3580    Senator King. I would argue that the icebreakers are the3581essential infrastructure of the Arctic region and to say we are3582inadequate and behind where we should be as I believe is an3583understatement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3584    Chairman Wicker. Senator King, let me just say, I think3585you'll find a lot of bipartisan support, both in the Congress3586and in the administration for a substantial increase quickly in3587our number of icebreakers.3588    Senator King. I believe that's the case, and I appreciate3589that, Mr. Chairman. All right.3590    Chairman Wicker. We have Senator Peters, and then Senator3591Rosen.3592    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank3593you for your service to our country and for being here today.3594As Ranking Member of the Homeland Security and Governmental3595Affairs Committee, as well as having served in the U.S. Navy3596Reserve, I want to echo some of my colleagues concerns on the3597dangers of increasing the Department of Defense's role in3598border security and civil immigration enforcement.3599    I'm going to be following up with both the Department of3600the Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to get3601additional information, related to the DOD deportation flights3602and DHS's use of naval station Guantanamo Bay.3603    But my questions first, General Guillot, as you have3604previously stated, the successful execution of your mission as3605commander of both NORTHCOM and NORAD, ``relies on cohesive3606strategies, integrated planning, and collaboration across the3607whole-of-government.'' I completely agree with that, and with3608your assessment, and believe this also applies to executing3609SOUTHCOM missions as all.3610    So, my question for you, General, how do your commands3611collaborate with several intergovernmental agencies, including3612the Department of Homeland Security, Missile Defense Agency,3613and the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency in executing3614your missions? How do you coordinate with these agencies and3615deconflict efforts to ensure the successful defense of our3616Homeland while certainly maintaining a Left-of-Launch3617framework?3618    General Guillot. Senator, our partnership with DOD, other3619combatant commands and the interagency is critical to us. The3620way we approach it is we have well over 100 liaison officers,3621usually very high ranking, highly placed and trusted from their3622home agencies that work in our headquarters and participate in3623every one of our morning updates, Intel and operations updates,3624commander's updates, as well as all of our planning efforts.3625    Then for the combatant commands, we meet regularly, we talk3626regularly, and just for example, in this southern border the3627responsibility is widely shared between us, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM,3628and TRANSCOM, and the commanders. At all levels of our command,3629we integrate daily in a number of different planning groups and3630sessions.3631    Senator Peters. Wonderful. Question for both of you, you3632both know about the importance of artificial intelligence3633systems (AI) and the pivotal role that they play in informing3634commanders' decisions by providing predictive analysis, real-3635time decision support and enhanced situational awareness in a3636future conflict.3637    Earlier this week, we received a classified briefing from3638U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Kurilla who3639shared those views as well. So, my question to each of you is,3640given the rapid advancements in AI, how do you see AI shaping3641the future of commanders' decisions-making ability, defensive3642operations, and weapons integration for both SOUTHCOM and3643NORTHCOM? How can we be helpful in your efforts to accelerate3644the use of these new technologies?3645    General Guillot. Senator, the use of AI is becoming more3646and more important in NORAD and NORTHCOM. We currently use some3647capabilities in helping us look at imagery and find assets or3648activities with imagery using AI to help alert our intel3649analysts. Anything in the future that you'll see from us3650incorporating artificial intelligence certainly will always3651have what we call the man on the loop. We will always have men3652and women that are quality controlling (QC-ing) it, but we're3653finding that we can go through reams and reams of information3654much quicker.3655    I think that I should point out, we're also looking to see3656what the adversary is doing with AI and how we might be3657vulnerable to them and their use of AI in our defensive3658capabilities.3659    Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral?3660    Admiral Holsey. Senator at SOUTHCOM, we're in the process3661now of sending some of our senior leaders through training to3662actually learn more about AI so we can continue to use it.3663Another thing, we're doing it at South Joint Interagency Task3664Force South, we actually have AI marine machine learning battle3665lab.3666    We're able to take 15 years of data based off a ship size.3667You think about a drug smuggled ship size, location, time of3668year, expected route, and now we can use that predictably to3669locate our assets to interdict them and that's been very3670successful, and we'll continue to look for some more support to3671get after that even faster.3672    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3673    Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Peters. Senator3674Duckworth.3675    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman3676    [Laughter.].3677    Chairman Wicker. I'm sorry, I should recognized Senator3678Rosen first.3679    Senator Duckworth. I am more than happy to.3680    Chairman Wicker. The first mistake I've made. Unanimous3681consent to my left. Senator Kelly.3682    Senator Kelly. Thank you, Senator Rosen, thank you, Senator3683Duckworth. Really appreciate it. So, General Guillot, and for3684both of you, Admiral, you as well, so both NORTHCOM and3685SOUTHCOM have been tasked with supporting a border security and3686immigration enforcement mission. While I agree that our3687immigration system's broken and that we have to do more to3688secure the southern border, I'm concerned about the effect of3689these missions on our military readiness.3690    General Guillot, last week, over a hundred migrants were3691flown to India on a C-17, costing the American taxpayer3692approximately $2.5 million dollars, and using up the limited3693flight hours allocated to that aircraft. Using military air3694costs around $28,000 an hour or so, for a C-17, that's four3695times as much if ICE would've chartered a flight.3696    Given the strain on strategic airlift assets, are you3697concerned that continued use of C-17s and C-130's, and C-130's3698are less expensive, but still there are readiness issues with3699that? Are you concerned that using these for deportation3700flights could impact availability for higher priority missions?3701    General Guillot. Senator, we work closely with the3702transportation command that operates these flights and are3703always looking to see if there are the authorities to contract3704that capability.3705    Senator Kelly. Do you know what missions were dropped? And3706Admiral Holsey, same for you. Do you know if we dropped any3707missions to be able to support the flights to India or GTMO?3708    Admiral Holsey. I do not know, sir.3709    General Guillot. Senator, I'm not aware either.3710    Senator Kelly. Are you aware what the chain of custody3711looks like for detainees as we transfer them?3712    Admiral Holsey. As far as right now, the DHS has the chain3713of custody for the detainees as far as those coming to GTMO.3714    Senator Kelly. So that's not a military responsibility at3715all?3716    Admiral Holsey. No, sir.3717    Senator Kelly. All right, and then, Admiral, I've got a3718question. We talked a little bit in my office about this3719yesterday. We're in the midst of a global strategic competition3720with China and China continues efforts to influence politics3721and societies in the Western Hemisphere in our neighborhood,3722and they use economic engagement to gain access and influence3723in countries in Latin America and in the Caribbean.3724    So, what's your assessment of the security situation in3725Panama, and what is your strategy to deter CCP influence in the3726region without contesting Panama's control over the Panama3727Canal?3728    Admiral Holsey. Senator, just like all places around the3729world now, China continues to gain their economic and3730infrastructure influence, and so we know they have some3731controlling interests in ports on both ends of the canal. We3732know that they have infrastructure projects as well. My role as3733the SOUTHCOM commander is to defend the Panama Canal in time of3734crisis or contingency. And I intend to do that.3735    Senator Kelly. Do you agree that working with our partners3736would be part of this strategy?3737    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Sir, it is.3738    Senator Kelly. Our partners, meaning the Panamanians?3739    Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. The Panamanians are key to3740working with us. In fact, right now we have an exercise called3741Panamax we do every year. That's an exercise where we work with3742the Panamanians and our allies and partners in the region to do3743a scenario where we defend the Panama Canal. Just recently, the3744Panamanian President mentioned that he wants to do Panamax in3745Panama. So, that's a change, right? So, we'll continue to work3746with allies and partners continue to work with Panamanians as3747we go forward.3748    Senator Kelly. Can you describe a little bit what that3749exercise would look like in Panama?3750    Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir. So, we think about nefarious3751actors trying to create an explosion on something in the canal3752or stop up the canal. So again, as we're working in the3753approaches to the canal, so it's whole, entire thing to include3754cyber activity as well. So again, in every exercise we do3755throughout the region, there's always some cyber component, and3756so, we continue to work that.3757    Senator Kelly. So, we do have a strategy and this exercise3758being part of the strategy to counter the PRCs influence in the3759region as it is today.3760    Admiral Holsey. Yes, sir, and to be clear, I think I go3761back to a statement I made earlier about presence, right? Any3762presence in the region, presence means power, presence, blocks3763out the PRC, and so, I'll continue to do that.3764    Senator Kelly. All right, thank you, and thank you, Mr.3765Chairman.3766    Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Kelly. General and3767Admiral, Senator Kelly was not the first to mention the cost of3768Mill Aris as compared to the cost of a charter flight to your3769knowledge are those figures correct?3770    General Guillot. Senator, to tell you the truth, I don't3771have knowledge of that because those are all run through U.S.3772transportation command. I don't have access to those numbers.3773    Chairman Wicker. Okay, but you'll get that to us, will you3774not?3775    General Guillot. Senator chairman, of course. I'll be very3776transparent.3777    Chairman Wicker. How about you, Admiral?3778    Admiral Holsey. I don't know the figure Senator but we can3779work to get that.3780    [The information referred to follows:]37813782    General Guillot. Mr. Chairman, per data provided by3783USTRANSCOM, the total actual cost for the India flight in3784question was $2,070,745.37853786    Senator Kelly. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one3787comment.3788    Chairman Wicker. Absolutely.3789    Senator Kelly. Just from experience, about 21,000 pounds an3790hour of fuel for C-17, 737 is about 5,000 pounds per hour for3791fuel costs. So just in fuel costs, it's about four times.3792    Chairman Wicker. Okay. Thank you. But you'll followup. The3793witnesses will followup. I think we now have Senator Banks.3794    Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot,3795the President's executive order to establish the Iron Dome for3796America stresses the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy3797missiles and also the satellites to track them. The Executive3798Order (EO) called for the ``acceleration of the deployment of3799the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor layer.''3800    If NORTHCOM is going to have an effective Iron Dome for the3801U.S. Homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of3802ballistic and hypersonic missile tracking satellites and space-3803based sensors?3804    General Guillot. Senator, expanding those capabilities3805would be imperative to having a successful shield over the3806North American continent.3807    Senator Banks. You expand on that, why that's important.3808    General Guillot. First and foremost, Senator, we have to3809detect anything that we want to defeat, and so, the HBTSS that3810you described is the first capability that we think will3811reliably and accurately track hypersonic missile.3812    We have some capability already that can detect3813intercontinental ballistic missiles, but those are fairly easy3814to track because their ballistic profile, whereas the3815hypersonic are both maneuverable and much faster. So getting3816the space-based capability to detect and track those that could3817cue defeat mechanisms in the end is imperative.3818    Senator Banks. How fast do we need them?3819    General Guillot. How fast do we need the capability?3820    Senator Banks. Yes.3821    General Guillot. Immediately.3822    Senator Banks. Thank you for that. Admiral, some of my3823colleagues have said that the U.S. military operations to3824defend the neutrality of the Panama Canal would be3825unprecedented or illegal. Do you agree with that?3826    Admiral Holsey. Senator, that's more of a policy3827discussion. I think Department of State is better equipped to3828handle that.3829    Senator Banks. So, no opinion on whether or not that's--if3830you were ordered to defend the Panama Canal that would be legal3831to do so.3832    Admiral Holsey. So, my job as commander is to provide3833options to the President, sir.3834    Senator Banks. Fair enough. Mr. Chairman, that's all I've3835got. I yield back.3836    Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Rosen.3837    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member3838Reed for holding this hearing. I'd like to thank General3839Guillot and Admiral Holsey for testifying today and for your3840service to our country. We really appreciate you.3841    I want to talk a little bit about Guantanamo Bay. So,3842Admiral Holsey, the Administration has announced it's using our3843naval base at Guantanamo Bay to house undocumented individuals3844detained in the United States. Although I have deep concerns3845about this cruel and misguided policy, including about whether3846we can trust that ICE is not detaining American citizens, legal3847permanent residents, Temporary Protected Status (TPS)3848recipients, dreamers, or children in these facilities.3849    But Admiral Holsey, understanding that you are only3850implementing policy decided to be by others, how is DOD3851planning to pay for the transport and care? More importantly,3852what are the divisions of the missions and the responsibilities3853between DOD and ICE? Are military personnel charged with the3854guarding, carrying, feeding of people, or Guantanamo base? Are3855you paying to get them there? Are you staffing when they are3856there?3857    Admiral Holsey. So, Senator, we're not paying for them to3858arrive. I guess TRANSCOM would probably be able to answer that3859question there. As far as our role is to provide safe, humane3860treatment of those in the facility. To be clear, we've done3861this mission before, from a migrant standpoint, I plan every3862year for a mass migration scenario. So, it's kind of a3863modification to the existing mission, and again, to bring them3864on board. The role of the military forces there is to provide3865supplies, food care, shelter medical support at this time.3866    Senator Rosen. Well, I guess we have a lot of things to3867worry about in that, whether it impedes our readiness from a3868readiness perspective, having to take care of migrants takes3869you away from your mission. But I'll move on because we only3870have 3 minutes.3871    I want to talk to you, Admiral Holsey, now about critical3872language skills, because the Department of Defense is3873increasingly making investments on countering the people's3874Republic of China. We know they are a major threat to us. Are3875there any concerns regarding a lack of language expertise3876needed for countries in SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,3877especially considering the involving situation at GTMO, the3878potential need for more Spanish speakers?3879    How will the elimination of some of these diversity3880initiatives impact your ability to recruit and retain3881linguists, people who speak all of the different languages,3882speak Chinese to enable your critical mission?3883    Admiral Holsey. To be clear Senator, we're a war fighting3884organization. So, our most fundamental duty is supported within3885the Constitution, ensure the safety and security of the3886American people. We look for talent throughout.3887    So, I think right now, as I look at the critical skills,3888language skills in the SOUTHCOM or throughout my entire3889headquarters, I have several multilingual people. Then we've3890been able to hire folks as well. We'll continue to do that and3891that's kind of my point to be made there.3892    Senator Rosen. Well, we just want to be sure you're not3893hampered in doing that because it is critical to have those3894language skills. I want to move on and talk about with general3895Guillot, psych guarding, domain awareness. You know, our3896competitors continue to feel advanced capabilities across3897domains that have the potential to threaten the Homeland.3898    In light of these threats, NORTHCOM and NORAD have to3899ensure the system providing the Homeland with domain awareness3900are survivable, adaptable, and modern. In addition, the systems3901must be hardened as they're going to be subject to an array of3902cyber-attacks during any contingency. I'm encouraged by your3903efforts to modernize, but what steps are you currently taking3904to harden our command-and-control nodes, particularly in the3905cyber domain, so that we're able to effectively share3906operational picture during a potential conflict?3907    General Guillot. Senator, as you alluded to, the most3908persistent and present threat that we face in the NORTHCOM area3909of responsibility every day is in the cyber domain, with3910hundreds or maybe even thousands attacks or attempted attacks3911on our networks.3912    So, the way we harden that is primarily through cyber3913protection teams, that we have that first look at our unique3914NORAD and NORTHCOM computer systems and networks, and then3915across the DOD network in partnership with Cyber Command to3916make sure that those are protected.3917    Then when you go outside of that ring, we look at critical3918infrastructure for capabilities that not only help the American3919citizens, but also help the DOD. Then it's four partners we3920have there, or three others in addition to NORTHCOM, Cyber3921Command (CYBERCOM), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),3922and Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA). We worked3923very well with them to monitor the cyber domain to ensure that3924all of those systems are protected.3925    Senator Rosen. Thank you.3926    Chairman Wicker. Thank You. Senator Rosen. Senator3927Tuberville.3928    Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,3929thank you for being here, and thanks for your service. Good3930visiting with you, both of you. You got tough jobs.3931    General, you talked in your opening statement about the3932cooperation and the coming together of our adversaries. What do3933we need to do and what do you need to do for the next 3 or 43934years to protect our country from those coalitions that are3935coming together, possibly for a threat to us?3936    General Guillot. Senator, first, we need to continue to3937work on our ability to detect their activities. Not only are3938they working together, but even independently, they're3939increasing their own capabilities and they can affect us from3940further ranges than they could in years past, individually, and3941certainly combined, that just magnifies that challenge.3942    Our ability to detect them from all domains, undersea all3943the way to space is the first. So we can watch what they're3944doing and have awareness of what they're doing. Then after that3945is just presence, not only with the U.S. Forces, but within our3946command. Anything that we can do with the Canadian forces to3947show that we can, one, detect them and two respond to them in3948order to deter their activities, would be the second emphasis3949that I have.3950    Senator Tuberville. That's the other question I want to ask3951you, as we speak how is our working relationship with our3952Canadian partners up North?3953    General Guillot. Senator, on a military-to-military basis,3954it's outstanding. NORAD is a binational command, and so they're3955partnered with the United States at every level of the command.3956We talked earlier about the first time ever, the Chinese and3957the Russians flew together in the Arctic, our intercept of that3958was with United States and Canadian fighters that were3959completely integrated.3960    So, at the mil-to-mil level in NORAD, it's excellent. Then3961also between NORTHCOM and CJOC, the Canadian Joint Operations3962Command, there's several times where we have Russian or Chinese3963ships out in the Arctic that are being patrolled by the3964Canadians out of United States bases to build that strength and3965relationship we have.3966    Senator Tuberville. Yes. Speaking of the Arctic, do we3967actually have an icebreaker that works now?3968    General Guillot. The Coast Guard has one that was just3969repaired, but unfortunately it was out of service for a period3970of time over the last few months.3971    Senator Tuberville. We obviously need to add to that. I3972would imagine. Admiral, you and I talked about saildrones,3973which were made in my great State of Alabama. Can you give us3974this group a kind of a rundown of what you think about3975saildrones, your experience and the need probably for more all3976over the world? We have them in the Indo-Pacific, and we have3977them in the Caribbean and your experience with saildrone?3978    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator. Over the last couple years,3979we've seen a decrement in navy assets in the region, and one3980thing that Navy has done with this new hybrid fleet out of the3981United States Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSOUTH), we've3982been able to incorporate saildrones into our mission sets. They3983provide great domain awareness.3984    Right now, we're doing operation Southern Sphere where at3985this point, we'll have saildrones in the Caribbean and in the3986Eastern Pacific, along with other unmanned assets to counter3987drug fight, right? So, it gives me more maritime domain3988awareness, and it helps our partners as well because we're3989trying to bring them into this piece and so have a better3990understanding.3991    One thing our partners continue to ask for is domain3992awareness, intel sharing. So again, having those assets in the3993region for a lack of other assets is making a difference for3994me.3995    Senator Tuberville. What main reason are they used for, as3996we speak for, drug runners?3997    Admiral Holsey. So right now, it's maritime domain3998awareness, so overall surveillance, right? They actually have3999the capability to patch back to our MOC, our Maritime4000Operations Center, in NAVSOUTH. So again, they can pick up4001contacts and it completes the picture, right? The information4002can sell. So, if you spread these assets out, they can cover4003more domain as opposed to just one ship.4004    Senator Tuberville. As we speak, how many do you have4005Operatable in the Caribbean?4006    Admiral Holsey. So right now, I have eight operational in4007the Caribbean and three in the Eastern Pacific and more flowing4008in. So, I have a total of 20 here in the next couple days.4009    Senator Tuberville. That's great. Well, we appreciate what4010both of you do and anything we can do to help let us know.4011Thank you, Mr. Chairman.4012    Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator4013Duckworth.4014    Senator Duckworth. Yay. It's my turn. Thank you. Mr.4015Chairman and Ranking Member Reed. The number of troops assigned4016to the Board of Mission continues to grow. We've had this4017discussion today, but I want to emphasize it, with the total4018expected to reach at least 3,600. I think General, you4019testified that it'll be maybe even upwards getting closer to40205,000 potentially. This number includes some of our most4021experienced infantry and support units.4022    Are we really preparing for great power competition with4023the communist PRC? Or are we asking our Marines to lay4024Constantino wire at the border? Are we asking our pilots to be4025combat ready, or are they supporting deportation flights?4026    As we consider the ways that responding to these missions4027in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM impacting the military's ability to4028focus on the primary mission of great power competition and war4029fighting, we need to also factor in uncertain, but rapidly4030increasing costs of DOD support at Guantanamo Bay.4031    On January 29th, President Trump green lighted the4032expansion of the Migrant Operations Center, or MOC, at4033Guantanamo Bay. As you're likely where this expansion comes4034with the range of costs that will impact the overall budget,4035everything from medical care and sanitation to education for4036migrants, as well as expenses tied to deploying military4037personnel to GTMO.4038    Admiral Holsey, could you provide a breakdown of the4039timeline and projected construction costs for increasing4040Gitmo's capacity to 30,000 people as outlined by the4041President's directive?4042    Admiral Holsey. Senator at this time we're doing a phase4043approach. So right now, we're going to have a capability for4044about 2,500 cots, and that plan's going to go up if we continue4045to phase it in. We haven't decided that yet, I'm waiting4046further direction. So, at the initial point, I don't have a4047cost estimate of what would take for 30,000. So right now,4048we're still in the infancy phase of it.4049    Senator Duckworth. Well, you have a Presidential directive,4050have you not started planning to fulfill that directive?4051    Admiral Holsey. So right now, again, it's a stage approach,4052a tailor approach, right? So right now, we won't necessarily4053go, we don't know. We're working with DHS to understand the4054flow of migrants. So, we're not going to go, we won't go to405530,000 unless we know that migrant flow will come. So, we're4056waiting at this point.4057    Senator Duckworth. Well, as that planning process moves4058forward, can you get me those data, figures?4059    Admiral Holsey. Yes, Senator4060    [The information referred to follows:]40614062    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services4063and Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs4064of the mission. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.40654066    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. The Fiscal Year 2017 Military4067Construction (MILCON) actually a project for mass migration4068complex was actually for 13,000 migrants, and it cost $334069million in fiscal year 2017, just as a comparison. It stands to4070reason that an expansion to more than double that capacity4071nearly 10 years later would mostly, most certainly cost much4072more than the $33 million that was projected to cost in fiscal4073year 2017.4074    In addition to facilities costs in 2019, the commander of4075detentions estimated that it cost more than $100,000 for each4076guard, each guard's 9-month deployment to GTMO cost taxpayers a4077hundred thousand dollars. Admiral Holsey, do you have, as4078you're doing this, do you have an estimate for the personnel4079costs associated with this effort, even for the first 2,500?4080    Admiral Holsey. No, we do not yet. But I can say that the4081cost of running GTMO at this point, just the facility the last4082several years been approximately $100 million.4083    Senator Duckworth. One hundred million dollars per year?4084    Admiral Holsey. Yes, for the JTF-GTMO facility along with4085the rotational enforcers that comes in.4086    Senator Duckworth. How many detainees are there?4087    Admiral Holsey. Currently, there are 30 detainees, and 154088war detainees, and then approximately, 68 other detainees, so4089not detainees, but migrants from the DHS.4090    Senator Duckworth. So, to house 118 detainees there and to4091maintain GTMO, it's costing taxpayers $100 million dollars4092currently, and we're going to project to go up to $30 million?4093    Admiral Holsey. For the GTMO facility.4094    Senator Duckworth. Just the facility, so the cost would be4095much higher than that. What is the source of funding for the4096expansion of the MOC?4097    Admiral Holsey. Right now, as the forces flow in, the4098services are bearing the initial cost for the initial flow, and4099so that's where it's at right now, the services.4100    Senator Duckworth. So, it's coming out of the services4101pockets. What priorities will be left unfunded as a result of4102this shift in priorities?4103    Admiral Holsey. I can't answer that, ma'am. I think we have4104to ask the services.4105    Senator Duckworth. Okay. I would also like to address4106accountability on the DOD flights. Admiral Holsey, what is4107being done to ensure that risk mitigated is mitigated for4108pilots and what security measures are in place to manage the4109personnel on board?4110    Admiral Holsey. Right now, the DHS actually, or is4111controlled those flights along with TRANSCOM probably have a4112better understanding of the flow of migrants to what they do on4113the aircraft.4114    Senator Duckworth. So TRANSCOM is responsible for the4115safety of the crew of the aircraft on those flights?4116    Admiral Holsey. Yes, ma'am.4117    Senator Duckworth. I do think that we need to run this4118down, and if the DOD does not take ownership of migrants4119boarding their aircraft, who onboard the aircraft is4120responsible for the passengers?4121    Admiral Holsey. Again, I would say that TRANSCOM has a plan4122in place and TRANSCOM would better have that the understanding4123of how they protect their aircraft in flight.4124    Senator Duckworth. A lot of unanswered questions. Thank4125you, Admiral.4126    Chairman Wicker. Indeed, and Senator Duckworth, this is4127part of our oversight responsibility, and so I appreciate the4128members participation today. This concludes the open portion of4129today's hearing. I'd like to thank our witnesses for their4130testimony. For the information of Members, questions for the4131record will be due to the Committee within two business days of4132the conclusion of this hearing.4133    We will commence the closed portion of this hearing in4134Senate Security in 15 minutes. We have until 11:45 a.m.4135    [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]41364137    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]41384139               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton4140                  manned fighters in homeland defense4141    1. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, we've learned from the Chinese4142spy balloon and several drone incursions that our Homeland is4143dangerously exposed to attack. What role do you believe manned fighters4144play in securing our National Airspace?4145    General Guillot. Manned fighters are a critical and indispensable4146piece of layered defense employed by NORAD and USNORTHCOM in the4147defense of the Homeland. The vast majority of air-breathing threats can4148be defeated by employing manned fighters under an ``eyes on'' construct4149in which trained fighter pilots obtain positive visual identification4150and assessments of potential threats, which can range from civilian4151aircraft to long-range Russian and Chinese bombers and cruise missiles.4152Positive visual identifications remain the best way to judge the intent4153of potential threats and are critical to making accurate assessments4154and taking appropriate action. Fighter aircraft remain the most4155capable, versatile, and flexible means to defeat the majority of air4156threats we face.41574158    2. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, do you believe fighter aircraft4159play a necessary and complementary role to ballistic missile4160interceptors in defending the Homeland from air and missile threats?4161    General Guillot. Yes. I see manned fighters operating in a4162complementary role to ballistic missile interceptors in defending the4163Homeland from air and missile threats. Manned fighters are employed to4164respond to threats ranging from general aviation aircraft to advanced4165cruise missiles. Manned fighters are not the answer to every air and4166missile threat to the Homeland, but they do play a critical role and4167remain a critical asset for our ability to defend the Homeland.41684169    3. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, in 3 decades, the Air Force4170fighter fleet has shrunk to less than half its size. Will you have4171enough aircraft over the next decade to keep our airspace secure and4172meet the China threat?4173    General Guillot. Department of Defense force management processes4174provide USNORTHCOM sufficient resources to conduct its day-to-day4175aerospace control mission for the United States, including the4176allocation of additional aircraft and other capabilities as necessary4177to meet heightened operational requirements. I anticipate this will4178continue to be the case in the coming years given the primacy of the4179homeland defense mission and continued fielding of innovative4180capabilities and implementation of novel homeland defense concepts. I4181will remain a vocal advocate for sufficient fighter allocation to the4182Homeland Defense mission.4183                         cruise missile threat4184    4. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, can you explain how Russia and4185China can use conventionally armed cruise missiles to threaten and4186coerce the United States?4187    General Guillot. Cruise missiles pose unique warning and defense4188challenges due to their reduced signatures and flexible flight4189profiles. Conventionally armed cruise missiles--launched from the air4190or sea--provide Russia and China a viable strike option against the4191United States Homeland without the escalatory risks associated with4192nuclear strikes. Today, Russian long-range heavy bombers can employ4193air-launched cruise missiles against U.S. critical infrastructure from4194multiple axes. Russian Navy surface combatants and the growing fleet of4195ultra-quiet Severodvinsk II-class guided missile submarines can employ4196land-attack cruise missiles against the Homeland from the Atlantic and4197the Pacific.4198    The PLA Navy will soon have the ability to conduct long-range4199precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface4200combatants using land-attack cruise missiles. It is also possible the4201PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial4202shipping container for employing these missiles aboard merchant ships.4203In the air domain, the PRC is developing a new generation of long-range4204bombers that may debut sometime in the next decade and be capable of4205launching conventional weapons.4206    During a conflict, Russian and PRC military leaders would likely4207consider employing these conventional strike capabilities against North4208American critical economic and military infrastructure as part of an4209effort to degrade our political will, disrupt our force flows to4210regional conflicts, and compel negotiations to end those conflicts.42114212    5. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, are the services moving quickly4213enough to field capabilities to detect and defend against these cruise4214missiles? In other words, are we pacing the threat?4215    General Guillot. No, legacy acquisition processes are not4216maintaining pace with the rapidly shifting landscape of potential4217threats. However, I am encouraged by the Department's renewed emphasis4218on leveraging flexible authorities provided by Congress to accelerate4219fielding of advanced capabilities. For example, the Golden Dome for4220America will be a pivotal opportunity to correctly prioritize and align4221our efforts to deliver and field capabilities at a much faster rate.4222Specific to cruise missiles, I view the ability to defeat cruise4223missiles that threaten critical infrastructure as the biggest4224capability gap we face. I support increased development of new4225capabilities, including directed energy and other low-collateral, non-4226kinetic means.42274228    6. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, what additional resources do4229you need to address this threat?4230    General Guillot. Defense of the Homeland will require a layered,4231integrated, multi-domain architecture that includes next generation4232sensors and effectors. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are considering the full4233range of threats and mitigation methods in developing Golden Dome for4234America. Investment in advanced capabilities remains critical to4235addressing present and future threats. The primary capabilities we need4236are space-based Airborne Moving Target Indicator, over-the-horizon4237radar, E-7 Wedgetail, and cruise missile defeat mechanisms.4238                        counter drone authority4239    7. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, you mentioned expanding4240authorities for detecting unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) beyond the4241perimeter of military installations to improve the identification and4242tracking of threats. Could you briefly describe what a layered defense4243would look like, and how detection capabilities beyond the fence lines4244would strengthen efforts to counter hostile drone threats?4245    General Guillot. A layered defense against unmanned aerial systems4246consists of passive and active detection as well as kinetic and non-4247kinetic defeat capability. Detection capabilities should include active4248or passive radars, radio-frequency sensors, electro-optical and4249infrared cameras, and low collateral defeat systems such as low-4250collateral interceptors, high-powered microwaves, and high-energy laser4251systems. It is important to detect, track, and identify potential4252threats before a UAS crosses an installation boundary because4253unauthorized UASs operating over installations present an immediate4254risk to safety and security and because acquiring an inbound UAS prior4255to an installation incursion greatly increases the likelihood of4256successful mitigation.42574258    8. Senator Cotton. General Guillot, how far beyond the perimeter of4259a military installation would Department of Defense (DOD) need to4260detect UAS threats in order to defend against intruders crossing the4261fence line?4262    General Guillot. Installation commanders would ideally have the4263ability to detect and track unmanned aerial systems five miles from4264installation boundaries to allow base force protection teams to4265determine the best method for defeating potential threat UAS and the4266time to employ appropriate defeat mechanisms.4267                              panama canal4268    9. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, how can China use its ports near4269the canal to disrupt or shut down canal operations?4270    Admiral Holsey. As we saw with the 2021 Suez Canal disruption by a4271cargo ship running aground, or the impact of last year's drought4272conditions in Panama, it doesn't take much to impact the flow of4273traffic through these critical maritime chokepoints. In the event of4274hostilities, China might leverage its current port access near the4275canal, which includes access to physical infrastructure and human4276connections, to choose and disrupt canal operations via sabotage,4277cyberattack, or even Global Positioning System jamming that might4278result in an accidental blockage.42794280    10. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, has U.S. Southern Command4281(SOUTHCOM) allocated sufficient resources to help Panama properly4282defend the Canal?4283    Admiral Holsey. The SOUTHCOM team dedicates significant attention4284to the security of the Canal, as we strive to be credible, present, and4285engaged with our Panamanian partners.4286    SOUTHCOM has detailed plans to preserve neutrality of the Canal and4287continuously monitors for threats. Should a specific credible threat4288emerge, it could potentially lead to a request for additional forces or4289capabilities.4290    We endeavor to provide persistent presence in Panama primarily4291through our Army Security Force Assistance teams and other rotational4292assets. We capitalize on a long history and close partnership with our4293Panamanian counterparts. We conduct bi-lateral Operations, Activities4294and Investments with our Panamanian counterparts and employ theater4295security cooperation efforts to build Panamanian defensive capabilities4296and capacities as well as enhance our interoperability to execute bi-4297lateral operations in defense of the Panama Canal. Finally, we exercise4298our Defense of the Canal Concept of Operations Plan every 2 years as a4299major regional exercise. Panama has agreed to host our major security4300exercise PANAMAX in 2026.43014302    11. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, has SOUTHCOM conducted planning4303for defense of the Panama Canal in a potential Taiwan conflict4304scenario?4305    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM conducts prudent planning for the Defense4306of the Panama Canal as directed by the Joint Staff and in accordance4307with U.S. obligations from the 1977 Neutrality Treaty. Our planning4308addresses several potential threats. I recently signed an updated plan4309and am happy to discuss in the appropriate setting.4310                        russia/cuba cooperation4311    12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, what military advantage does4312Russia gain by increasingly cooperating with Cuba?4313    Admiral Holsey. By increasing cooperating with Cuba, Russia4314solidifies its foothold in the United States' near abroad, 90 miles4315from the Homeland. Cuba's geographic location is appealing to Moscow as4316it seeks to enhance its regional intelligence-gathering capabilities.4317Moscow also may leverage its cooperative relationship with Havana to4318ensure acceptance of additional Russian navy port call requests, such4319as the submarine and surface combatant port visits Russia conducted in43202024. These port calls help expand Russian access to Cuban ports or4321airfields for Russian power projection that could be weaponized against4322the Homeland.43234324    13. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, should the United States be4325concerned about Russian submarine access to a port so close to the4326Homeland in event of a conflict with Russia--or even with China, for4327that matter?4328    Admiral Holsey. The U.S. military's primary mission is to defend4329the Homeland. We take adversary combatant movements into our hemisphere4330very seriously and monitor them very closely.4331    That said, I could use additional maritime and ISR capability to4332better monitor, track and respond to potential threats.43334334    14. Senator Cotton. Admiral Holsey, what additional resources do4335you need to deter Russian military activity around Cuba?4336    Admiral Holsey. In the SOUTHCOM AOR, presence means power. SOUTHCOM4337needs additional resources to better deter Russian activities and4338presence in and around Cuba. Russia deploying a nuclear-powered4339submarine to Cuba last summer illustrates our deterrence challenges. To4340improve our posture, SOUTHCOM has consistently requested U.S. Navy4341assets to provide presence, reassure our partners and Allies, and deter4342our adversaries. Additionally, SOUTHCOM has requested, through the4343annual Global Force Management process, intelligence, surveillance, and4344reconnaissance assets to better understand adversary activities in the4345AOR.4346    Given SOUTHCOM's limited air and naval presence, we coordinate with4347NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard to share assets to help mitigate risk and4348meet mission critical needs. We have streamlined the force sharing4349procedures that NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have put in place to enable force4350sharing between our two Commands to address threats in the Western4351Hemisphere. Our work with Allies has been another way we are working to4352better integrate and synchronize efforts in the Western Hemisphere to4353address threats together.43544355                               __________4356             Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds4357                                spectrum4358    15. Senator Rounds. General Guillot, how critical is unimpeded use4359of the electromagnetic spectrum to our current Homeland defense4360architecture?4361    General Guillot. Uninterrupted access to the electromagnetic4362spectrum is essential for homeland defense, as it underpins crucial4363communications, radar, surveillance, and missile defense systems.4364Disruptions or interference with the spectrum will significantly impair4365military operations, intelligence gathering, and overall national4366security. Secure spectrum access is vital for ensuring the4367effectiveness of defense capabilities for the Homeland and timely4368threat response.43694370    16. Senator Rounds. General Guillot, on January 27, President Trump4371issued an Executive Order directing the building of an ``Iron Dome4372Missile Defense Shield for America.'' In your professional military4373opinion, would an Iron Dome for America be feasible if DOD was forced4374to vacate portions of the Lower-3 GHz and 7-8 GHz bands of the4375spectrum?4376    General Guillot. Developing a Golden Dome for America would be4377severely challenged if the DOD was forced to vacate the Lower-3 GHz and43787-8 GHz bands. These frequencies are essential for radar systems used4379in missile detection and interception. Without access to these bands,4380radar effectiveness would be compromised, reducing detection4381capabilities and increasing susceptibility to interference.4382u.s. northern command and cyber authorities vs. transnational criminal4383                             organizations4384    17. Senator Rounds. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, section43851505 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)4386grants the Secretary of Defense the authority for ``countering illegal4387trafficking by Mexican transnational criminal organizations in4388cyberspace.'' Is there anything preventing you from coordinating with4389U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), National Security Agency (NSA), and4390other relevant agencies to exercise those authorities?4391    General Guillot. USNORTHCOM has not received an implementing4392directive or been delegated authorities related to section 1505 of the4393Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. However, USNORTHCOM is coordinating closely with4394USCYBERCOM and NSA to use other authorities in the cyber domain until4395authorization to use Section 1505 is received.4396    Admiral Holsey. NORTHCOM leads Department of Defense operations and4397activities involving Mexican transnational criminal organizations. I4398will defer to General Guillot.43994400    18. Senator Rounds. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, is anyone4401in the Department using those section 1505 Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA4402authorities?4403    General Guillot. Not to my knowledge. Implementation of section44041505 authorities is pending a Department of Defense implementing4405directive. USNORTHCOM is evaluating options that include current4406authorities, as well as potential integration of Sec. 1505 authority to4407counter transnational criminal organizations.4408    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM does not use Section 1505 Fiscal Year 20244409NDAA authorities.4410                               __________4411               Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst4412                     united states northern command4413    19. Senator Ernst. General Guillot, in Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, I4414secured a provision that more clearly defines the DOD's4415responsibilities under title 10 to safeguard our skies against the4416threats posed by drug cartels using drones at our borders. Has U.S.4417Northern Command (NORTHCOM) started implementing the policies outlined4418in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA to address the threat of drug cartels4419using drones at our borders?4420    General Guillot. USNORTHCOM is using all relevant authorities to4421address the potential threat presented by cartel drones operating along4422the U.S. southern border. In accordance with directives from the4423President and the Secretary of Defense to secure the southern border,4424USNORTHCOM is providing unique military capabilities to the Department4425of Homeland Security to augment Customs and Border Protection4426operations.4427                               __________4428              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan4429   missile defense and increasing response options and deterrence of4430                          missile engagements4431    20. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, in response to President4432Trump's executive order on an ``Iron Dome for America,'' myself and4433Senator Cramer introduced the Increasing Response Options and4434Deterrence of Missile Engagements (IRONDOME) Act in the Senate. The act4435does three things: enhances domain awareness; bolsters existing missile4436defeat capacity; and accelerates new capabilities, including in space,4437to counter future threats. In your opinion, what are the necessary4438investments we need to make for increasing our domain awareness?4439    General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM require a system of layered4440sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide persistent4441all-domain awareness. NORAD and USNORTHCOM's domain awareness4442investment priorities include space-based multi-domain Air Moving4443Target Indicator (AMTI) systems, E-7 Wedgetail, Over-the-Horizon Radar4444(OTHR), terrestrial-and space-borne missile warning and tracking4445sensors, and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. Additionally,4446N&NC requires an integrated Command, Control, and Communications4447architecture to tie these systems together and present the Commands4448with an effective system to employ defeat mechanisms.44494450    21. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, currently there are 204451missile silos at Fort Greely, AK sitting empty because of delays to the4452Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program. These ground-based4453interceptors give our Nation the necessary capacity to defeat missiles4454launched at the Homeland. How will you work to increase production of4455those ground-based interceptors and accelerate development and4456procurement of the Next-Generation Interceptor program?4457    General Guillot. The President's Executive Order on Golden Dome for4458America has made the fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)4459an even more vital element in defending the United States against a4460Long-Range Ballistic Missile attack. USNORTHCOM will continue to work4461with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to energize the industrial base4462and identify and exploit efficiencies in the fielding process to pull4463the delivery timeline to the left. I will also further advocate for an4464objectives-based NGI inventory informed by policy and threat4465assessments with the DOD and Joint Staff.44664467    22. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Holsey, in 2021 the Chinese tested a4468Hypersonic Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) which could4469theoretically reach the Homeland by going over the South Pole, making4470it much more difficult to detect and defeat with our existing4471infrastructure. One of the provisions in my Increasing Response Options4472and Deterrence of Missile Engagements (IRONDOME) Act is a Southern4473hemisphere-facing early warning radar in the Homeland. However, we know4474that having partners in an integrated missile defense system can help4475provide the early warning that we need to notice weapons before they4476hit the Homeland. Do you believe that there are viable options or4477partners in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility that we could build4478relationships with to provide for early warning detection?4479    Admiral Holsey. When considering partners in the SOUTHCOM AOR who4480could assist in the provisioning of early warning detection, there are4481two elements that we examine--capability and willingness. Regarding4482capability, there are Partners within the AOR, or Allies who have4483interest in the region, that could potentially provide sensors to4484contribute to early warning detection.4485    However, from a willingness perspective, other than Allies, Chile4486might be the only Partner who has both the willingness and capability.4487That said, in the absence of organic capabilities, I think there are4488several partner nations in the SOUTHCOM AOR who might agree to host4489U.S. systems, if asked.44904491    23. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe that a4492southern hemisphere-facing sensor or radar system is an essential4493element of homeland missile defense given current threats?4494    General Guillot. Domain awareness is my top priority for fulfilling4495the President's Golden Dome for America Executive Order. A terrestrial4496southern hemisphere-oriented array of sensors capable of tracking4497ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and other advanced threats is an4498important element of the layered approach to domain awareness.4499Developing and fielding 360+ all-domain awareness capability from the4500seafloor to space is paramount to defending the Homeland from advanced4501threats.4502   air defense identification zone/exclusive economic zone incursions4503    24. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, over the past 5 years we4504have seen over 140 foreign vessels and aircraft penetrate the Air4505Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at4506our Northern Border in Alaska. Of these, a third have occurred in the4507last year alone. To what do you attribute the increased aggression from4508the Russians and Chinese over the past year, and do you expect it to4509continue?4510    General Guillot. Russia's ADIZ penetrations over the past year4511likely represent a return to pre-COVID and pre-Ukraine conflict levels4512of activities and is a reminder that Russia is a global power. This4513level of activity is likely to continue. The majority of recent PRC4514activity near Alaska has been in the maritime domain, to include the4515three PRC state-owned research vessels that operated in international4516waters within the U.S. EEZ in 2024. This Chinese activity is dual use4517with both military and scientific applications, and NORAD and4518USNORTHCOM characterize PRC maritime activity as a continuation of4519Beijing's desire to normalize its presence in the region and4520demonstrate relevance as a noteworthy voice on issues pertaining to the4521Arctic. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are also closely monitoring the steady4522increase in combined air and maritime PRC-Russian military activity in4523and over the Bering and Chukchi Seas near Alaska. I also expect the4524level of Chinese activity near Alaska to increase.45254526    25. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, the Russians and Chinese4527have sailed together several times over the last few years near our4528Northern Border in Alaska. In July 2024, however, they also conducted4529the first joint strategic bomber incursion into our ADIZ. How concerned4530are you about the increasing cooperation between the Russians and4531Chinese and how do you think we should change our posture to compete4532strategically in the region?4533    General Guillot. I am concerned about the growing cooperation4534between Russia and the PRC in the Arctic. The Arctic is a region of4535critical security and economic importance to Russia, while the PRC sees4536tremendous opportunity for accessing vital natural resources in the4537region. These converging interests, along with a shared desire to4538counter the U.S. worldview, have driven them closer--not just4539economically, but militarily--in a region that constitutes the closest4540avenue of approach for striking North America. This growing cooperation4541could ultimately result in Russia allowing PRC military access to4542Arctic airfields and ports, providing PRC the ability to project4543conventional forces toward North America as was demonstrated during4544their combined bomber incursion into the Alaskan ADIZ. To give them4545pause, NORAD made a concerted effort to showcase a highly professional4546and binationally integrated response to the relatively rudimentary4547combined Russian-PRC patrol. I believe that demonstrating readiness4548through presence; increased patrols and exercises with Artic-trained4549and equipped forces; updated infrastructure; and modernized all-domain4550awareness will make it clear that the U.S. is committed to defending4551the Arctic.45524553    26. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, the men and women of4554NORTHCOM do an outstanding job each and every time these intercepts4555occur. These aircraft sortie from interior Alaska at Eielson Air Force4556Base (AFB) or Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) and fly thousands4557of miles, tanking multiple times in order to make the intercept.4558Luckily these intercepts have occurred largely without incident, but4559what steps should we take to reduce the risk to our aircrews, decrease4560search and rescue response time, and give you operational flexibility4561for responding to the continued aggression of Russian and Chinese4562patrols?4563    General Guillot. Decreasing search and rescue (SAR) response time4564is a threefold challenge of timely incident reporting, coordinating a4565response, and executing the rescue. The impeccable reporting and4566coordination between the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, U.S. Coast4567Guard District 17, and State emergency management and law enforcement4568agencies informs and activates the military and civil SAR enterprises4569supporting NORAD and USNORTHCOM operations. As missions continue to4570expand in both scope and scale, we should further bolster SAR4571capabilities by revitalizing dispersed operating locations that4572increase forward operating capabilities along the Aleutians and4573Northern Alaska. Additionally, as the Department's Arctic advocate, I4574support continued training and exercise opportunities in the Joint4575Pacific Alaska Range Complex that provide our Joint force access to the4576largest and most relevant training and exercise venue in the DOD and4577introduce them to the force generation and power projection challenges4578within the Arctic region, all while continuing our deterrence presence4579throughout the region.45804581    27. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, notwithstanding your close4582relationship with Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific4583Command (INDOPACOM), do you believe that Congress should reevaluate the4584Unified Command Plan with respect to the Northern Pacific and Arctic to4585streamline operational handoff of assets in the region between future4586NORTHCOM commanders and INDOPACOM?4587    General Guillot. I do not see the need to adjust the Unified4588Command Plan assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundary in the4589Northern Pacific between USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM. NORAD and4590USNORTHCOM coordinate on a regular basis with the USINDOPACOM for the4591seamless hand-off of tracking responsibility for adversary maritime and4592air assets and share resources without regard for the UCP boundary in4593order to defend Alaska, the Arctic, and Western U.S.45944595    28. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, do you believe that we need4596to increase our anti-submarine sensor capabilities in the northern4597pacific?4598    General Guillot. Yes, I believe it is necessary to increase anti-4599submarine sensor capability in the northern Pacific. These sensors are4600crucial to undersea domain awareness as peer competitors continue to4601develop and deploy advanced attack submarines and unmanned underwater4602vehicles (UUVs) that could threaten the Homeland. A robust undersea4603sensor system is crucial to maintaining a comprehensive understanding4604of the underwater domain and deterring a spectrum of threats to the4605Homeland.4606                             arctic basing4607    29. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, I know you are aware of the4608increased authoritarian aggression on our Nation's border near the4609State of Alaska. Russia and China are increasing collaboration in the4610air and on the sea. In 2022, 7 Russian and Chinese naval vessels were4611spotted 75 miles from Alaska. In 2023, a flotilla of 11 ships sailed4612near the Aleutians. In 2024, the first joint Russian and Chinese bomber4613task force flew into our Alaskan ADIZ. The same year, we saw the4614Chinese Coast Guard traverse through the Bering Strait, the first time4615we've seen them near Alaska. I have concerns that we are not adequately4616postured to respond to these threats posed by Russia and China in the4617Arctic Region and to our Homeland. Perhaps my biggest concern is that4618every time we respond to these threats, fighter aircraft fly over one-4619thousand miles, sometimes requiring multiple refueling operations along4620the way, because of lack of basing. Additionally, for the U.S. Navy and4621Coast Guard to maintain a constant presence in the Bering Sea and meet4622the Russians and Chinese where they are, they have to refuel at4623locations hundreds of miles away, such as Dutch Harbor. Can I get you4624to commit to helping me reopen basing on Adak?4625    General Guillot. Yes, I am very interested in conducting operations4626from Adak, and our command has just completed an assessment of the Adak4627facilities and infrastructure. Further, USNORTHCOM and Alaskan Command4628(ALCOM) are working to identify infrastructure and logistics4629requirements in Alaska with a focus on Forward Operating Locations4630(FOLs) situated along the North Slope, Western Coast, and Aleutian4631Islands.46324633    30. Senator Sullivan. General Guillot, how will this island assist4634you in strategic response in our ADIZ/EEZ?4635    General Guillot. A Forward Operating Location (FOL) proximate to4636operating locations presents many benefits such as reduced air4637refueling tanker requirements, more rapid turn-around of fighters, and4638Naval port operations. As mentioned, Adak is included in our analysis4639of needed military infrastructure in Alaska.4640                               __________4641               Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott4642   intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and counter4643                               narcotics4644    31. Senator Scott. General Guillot, to provide airborne coverage in4645support of stopping the flow of illegal migration, the Department has4646reportedly deployed high-end airborne assets such as P-8 Poseidon and4647RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft to patrol the border with Mexico. As we4648continue to manage priorities in INDOPACOM and elsewhere that require4649such assets for Great Power Competition-focused missions, are there4650other cost-effective airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and4651Reconnaissance (ISR) assets DOD is considering to add capacity to4652patrolling our border?4653    General Guillot. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance4654(ISR) capability in support of USNORTHCOM requirements along the4655southern border have proven to be critical. Sustainable operational4656costs are an important consideration for long-range planning, and4657USNORTHCOM is researching various platforms that can provide affordable4658and capable operations. Those options include unmanned systems of all4659sizes, especially novel long endurance platforms that can be used to4660complement, and potentially reduce the reliance on, systems such as the4661P-8 and RC-135.46624663    32. Senator Scott. Admiral Holsey, the Administration has4664prioritized countering Transnational Criminal Organizations, including4665Latin American drug cartels, from threatening U.S. interests. What4666additional assets could you deploy to support Joint Interagency Task4667Force South (JIATF-S) to increase the frequency and success rate of4668cocaine interdiction operations, including commercially available4669support that DOD's counter-drug fund had previously funded?4670    Admiral Holsey. I believe that with increased investment, JIATF-S4671can make a significant impact in the fight against TCOs and aid in4672securing our Nation's borders. Additional surface assets and Maritime4673Patrol Aircraft would immediately increase the success rate of cocaine4674interdictions. As demonstrated by our CN surge operations in 2020, with4675more assets, JIATF-S can increase the success rate of illicit drug4676interdictions. Deploying more Coast Guard Cutters, particularly4677National Security Cutters, and Navy CRUDES with USCG Law Enforcement4678Detachments would significantly bolster the Task Force's capabilities.4679The sensor capabilities on these types of vessels make them very4680effective for the CN mission.4681    Commercial capabilities, such as the Ship Special Mission (SSM), a4682contracted mothership that extends Partner Nation interceptors' range4683for high-seas interdictions, have helped offset gaps in DOD surface4684assets for unsourced validated requirements. For example, the SSM4685supported 23 disruptions in FY24, a 56 percent increase from FY22 and4686FY23.4687    In addition to surface assets, increasing the availability of4688Maritime Patrol Aircraft is crucial to enhancing JIATFS interdiction4689capabilities. Commercial air ISR capabilities can help offset these DOD4690resourcing gaps and provide critical support to our operations.4691                               __________4692                Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd4693                              panama canal4694    33. Senator Budd. Admiral Holsey, if conflict broke out in the4695Pacific, can SOUTHCOM ensure freedom of passage for our Navy through4696the Panama Canal with their assigned forces? If not, what additional4697forces or capabilities would you need?4698    Admiral Holsey. My number one priority is warfighter readiness.4699SOUTHCOM has comprehensive plans to preserve neutrality of the Canal4700and ensure unimpeded access. Should a specific credible threat emerge,4701I would request additional forces or capabilities.4702    SOUTHCOM works by, with and through our Allies and Partners to4703address defense of the canal to ensure freedom of passage. I need4704presence across all domains--air, sea, space, and cyber space to be4705effective.4706                      resourcing southern command4707    34. Senator Budd. Admiral Holsey, understanding that SOUTHCOM is4708often resourced at less-than desired levels, what military options do4709you recommend to mitigate national security risks as efficiently as4710possible?4711    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM must be credible, present, and engaged4712with our regional partners for us to be successful. Working together4713with our Allies and partners to address common security challenges4714throughout the region is a significant force multiplier. Our allies add4715operational depth and significant maritime capacity to ongoing4716missions, especially in support of Counter Illicit Trafficking efforts.4717We must continue to prioritize our efforts to build partner capacity4718and ensure interoperability of key partners. Our side-by-side4719cooperation bolsters US security and blocks out adversaries. I need4720presence across all domains--air, sea, space, and cyber space to be4721effective.4722                               __________4723           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal4724               communication with the mexican government4725    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, the4726Mexican Government recently announced it would be deploying 10,0004727troops from its National Guard to the border to counter the flow of4728drugs and illegal migration. At certain points along the border, U.S.4729servicemembers are stationed less than 50 yards from the wall. To what4730extent is the Mexican Government sharing information with you?4731Specifically, how is that information relayed to the non-commissioned4732officers (NCOs) and junior soldiers manning the Military Sealift4733Command (MSC) on the border?4734    General Guillot. Information from the Mexican Government is shared4735with and through our military forces, interagency partners, such as the4736Department of State, Customs and Border Protection, and other law4737enforcement agencies. From there, information is rapidly communicated4738to the appropriate military personnel on the border. We currently4739benefit from heightened information sharing with Mexican military4740forces, both on the border and at sea.4741    Admiral Holsey. Operational coordination with the Mexican military4742is under the purview of NORTHCOM. I will defer to General Guillot.47434744    36. General Guillot, the Mexican State police, Mexican Federal4745police, Mexican National Guard, transnational criminal organizations,4746including the cartels are all operating on the Mexican side of the4747border near MSC Asarco, near El Paso, Texas. Border Patrol, Immigration4748and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Active Duty troops, Federalized National4749Guard troops, and the Texas National Guard supporting Operation Lone4750Star are all operating on the U.S. side of the border at MSC Ascaro.4751Can personnel from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and4752Department of Defense communicate their operations at the tactical4753level? If so, how are commanders and DHS leaders deconflicting4754operations at all echelons?4755    General Guillot. Operational information between the Department of4756Homeland Security and Department of Defense is shared regularly at4757various echelons of command. DOD personnel have been supporting Customs4758and Border Patrol agents directly, with communication and tactical4759coordination occurring regularly. Regarding communicating operational4760information from the U.S. side of the border to Mexican officials, that4761information is shared with and through JTF-Southern Border,4762USNORTHCOM's interagency partners, such as the Department of State, and4763Border Protection, and other law enforcement agencies.4764                               __________4765            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren4766                      scope of domestic operations4767    37. Senator Warren. General Guillot, please provide a complete list4768of Active Duty units deployed to the southern border and the estimated4769length of deployment for each.4770    General Guillot.4771Active Duty Army Units (as of 17 March 2025)4772    89th Military Police (MP) Brigade (BDE) HQ until 30 September 202547734774    41st Combat Engineer Company (CO) until 30 September 202547754776    23d MP CO until 30 September 202547774778    401st MP CO until 30 September 202547794780    530th Combat Engineer Co (CEC) until 30 September 202547814782    716th MP Battalion (BN) until 30 September 202547834784    66th MP CO until 30 September 202547854786    202d MP CO until 30 September 202547874788    720th MP BN until 30 September 202547894790    759th MP BN until 30 September 202547914792    977th MP CO until 30 September 202547934794    549th MP CO until 30 September 202547954796    569th CEC until 30 September 202547974798    24th Press Camp HQ until 30 September 202547994800    10th Mountain Division HQ until 30 September 202548014802    2-4ID Stryker BDE Combat Team until 30 September 202548034804    101st Division Sustainment BDE until 30 September 202548054806    264th Combat Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September 202548074808    A CO, 189th DSSB until 30 September 202548094810    B CO, 68th Division Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September4811202548124813    C CO, 129th Division Sustainment Support BN (-) until 30 September4814202548154816    Field Feeding Company, 61st Quartermaster BN until 30 September4817202548184819    70th Movement Control Team until 30 September 202548204821    19th Public Affairs Detachment until 30 September 202548224823    3d Combat Aviation BDE until 15 October 202548244825    2-3 GSAB until 30 September 202548264827Allocated, not yet deployed:48284829    20th Engineer BDE HHC until 30 September 202548304831    19th Engineer BN until 30 September 202548324833    15th Engineer CO until 30 September 202548344835    687th Engineer CO until 30 September 202548364837U.S. Marine Corps4838    1st Combat Engineer Battalion until 30 September 202548394840U.S. Navy4841    Patrol Squadron 5 (2 P-8A AAS detachment) until 30 April 20254842Joint Sourcing4843    Joint Intelligence Company (Multiple units from Active Duty and4844Service Reserve Components sourced ISO CBP RFA25)4845    24x USMC, 44x USA, 34x USAF, 30x USN, 6x USSF until 30 September4846202548474848    Joint Intelligence Task Force--Southern Border (Multiple units from4849Active Duty and Service Reserve Components)4850    29x USMC, 3x USSF, 38x USAF (currently still sourcing)48514852Army Reserve Units4853    90th Combat Sustainment BDE until 30 September 20254854    489th Engineering (EN) BN CO until 30 September 20254855    214th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment until 30 September 20254856    346th MP CO until 30 September 20254857    192d Quartermaster (QM) CO until 30 September 20254858    313th Army Band CO until 27 October 20254859    808th EN CO until 30 September 202548604861    38. Senator Warren. General Guillot, please list all National Guard4862forces that are currently participating in southern border operations4863and the authority under which they have deployed.4864    General Guillot. The following National Guard Units are deployed to4865the Southern Border. These units are activated in a Title 10 authority.4866    3-140th Aviation (AV) BN until 30 September 202548674868    277th Ordnance (OD) CO until 30 September 202548694870    724th EN BN until 30 September 202548714872    152th MP CO until 30 September 202548734874    877th EN CO until 30 September 202548754876    144th Transportation CO until 30 September 202548774878    168th MP BN until 30 September 202548794880    1463th Transportation CO until 30 September 202548814882    157th MP CO until 30 September 202548834884    142d EN BN until 30 September 202548854886    109th EN BN until 30 September 202548874888    132d MP CO until 30 September 202548894890    1055th Transportation CO until September 202548914892    118th Transportation CO until 30 September 202548934894    39. Senator Warren. General Guillot, is DOD considering using any4895military bases or DOD-contracted facilities within the United States4896for migrant detention operations?4897    General Guillot. DHS is conducting Pre-Deployment Site Surveys at4898several DOD locations but have yet to provide a RFA for proposed DOD4899support sites for OSD approval. I understand the sites under4900consideration include Camp Atterbury, IN; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-4901Lakehurst, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Camp Parks, CA; and Travis AFB, CA.4902Additionally, the Department of the Army has received OSD approval to4903support the expansion of the DHS-ICE Montana facility in El Paso, TX.49044905    40. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, please4906provide a full list of tasks to which Active Duty Forces, DOD4907contractors, and DOD civilian employees will be assigned at the border4908and Guantanamo, along with a summary of functions to date and a summary4909of upcoming functions DOD troops will engage in.4910    General Guillot. DOD border tasks are approved within Secretary of4911Defense Action Memorandums in support of DHS requests for assistance.4912Expanded and additional (e.g., upcoming) tasks are pending Secretary of4913Defense approval on a case-by-case basis. These tasks, collectively,4914function to establish, maintain, and seal the border to ensure4915territorial integrity of the United States.4916    Current tasks include:4917      Detection and Monitoring4918      Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance4919      Maritime Patrol4920      Warehousing / Logistical supply chain support4921      Transportation support4922      Vehicle maintenance support4923      Training Support such as range safety officer, role4924players, and basic classroom preparation and maintenance4925      Data entry support4926      Light rotary wing aerial reconnaissance4927      Medium rotary wing lift4928      Provide airlift support to DHS to repatriate illegal4929aliens4930      General Engineering support4931      Intelligence analysis4932      All-domain Intelligence Preparation of the Environment4933    Admiral Holsey. The primary function of the Department of Defense4934(DOD) forces at GTMO is to support Department of Homeland Security4935(DHS)/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). We provide the4936facilities and some services/logistical support to include on island4937transportation of the illegal aliens (IA)'s. Control and custody remain4938with ICE. Our tasks include:4939      Expand migrant operations, as directed, to provide4940additional holding space for IAs.4941      Establish camp operation and expansion of camps on the4942leeward side of NSGB and support operations on the Windward side to4943meet IA holding operations.4944      Enhance IA Holding Operation at the Windward Holding4945Facility (Camp VI).4946      Conduct IA holding operations at NSGB to provide care,4947safety, security, and transportation as required.49484949    41. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how will4950DOD assess whether its southern border and Guantanamo operations are4951militarily effective?4952    General Guillot. The USNORTHCOM southern border concept plan4953defines measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and clear4954objectives for each line of effort in the southern border mission.4955USNORTHCOM headquarters and supporting joint task forces, in4956coordination with our interagency partners, develop and track metrics4957daily to refine military operations and improve effectiveness.4958    Admiral Holsey. I have been tasked with increasing capacity to hold4959illegal aliens at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB) as repatriation4960efforts occur in support of DHS and ICE. At the same time, I am working4961with NORTHCOM to address defense of the Homeland as we look further out4962into the SOUTHCOM AOR and work to counter threats and address security4963challenges that pose a threat to the Homeland before they reach our4964borders. I will assess SOUTHCOM's effectiveness through that lens and4965our overall contributions to defense of the Homeland. Our operation's4966effectiveness will be measured in coordination with DOD and DHS4967objectives.49684969    42. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please describe DOD's precise4970role(s) in Guantanamo's migrant detention operations.4971    Admiral Holsey. The DOD has tasked SOUTHCOM to support the DHS in4972response to the President's Executive Order and declaration of a4973national emergency for the border. SOUTHCOM is supporting DHS with the4974transport, care and safety of illegal aliens with final deportation4975orders at Guantanamo Bay until they are repatriated or accepted by4976another country.49774978    43. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how, if at all, are DOD4979personnel directly involved in the detention of any migrants at4980Guantanamo?4981    Admiral Holsey. DOD's role is in support to DHS/ICE. ICE maintains4982custody of illegal aliens and DOD helps by providing facilities and4983other approved services and logistics support, e.g. food, laundry,4984medical services, security, and utilities. To this effort, our force is4985comprised primarily of security personnel (Miliary Police), HQs staff,4986and logistical support.49874988    44. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD (or any of its4989components) signed any memoranda of understanding or similar agreements4990with DHS regarding the detention of migrants at Guantanamo? Please4991provide a copy of any agreements if so.4992    Admiral Holsey. DOD and DHS signed a Memorandum of Understanding on49937 March 2025 that clarifies the scope of DOD support. Defer to OSD to4994provide the signed MOU.49954996    45. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, describe DOD's precise role at4997the Migrant Operations Center (MOC) and Camp VI and how this role is4998currently projected to evolve.4999    Admiral Holsey. DHS operates the MOC building. SOUTHCOM is5000providing external security around the MOC building to support DHS/ICE5001with holding the low threat IAs. At Camp VI, SOUTHCOM supports DHS/ICE5002by providing the facility to hold High Threat Illegal Aliens and5003assisting with internal security. DOD supports operations at both5004locations by providing other approved services and logistics support.5005ICE retains full custody of all IAs.50065007    46. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, there are reports that DOD5008personnel are guarding migrants at Camp VI. Please explain in detail5009who is currently guarding Camp VI and whether there are plans to change5010the personnel stationed at Camp VI.5011    Admiral Holsey. Camp VI is being used to support DHS/ICE with5012holding of high threat illegal aliens. For DOD, we have Army Military5013Police that provides external security and assist ICE with internal5014security. These Military Police are under the operational control of5015Joint Task Force Southern Guard.50165017    47. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please provide a summary of the5018age and gender of migrants currently being held at Guantanamo's MOC.5019    Admiral Holsey. I defer to the DHS to provide current status and5020numbers regarding illegal aliens at NSGB.50215022    48. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD been informed of any5023plan to detain women or children at Guantanamo?5024    Admiral Holsey. At this point, SOUTHCOM has not been informed of5025any plans by DHS to transfer any persons but unaccompanied adult males5026for holding at NSGB.50275028    49. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how will DOD assess whether its5029Guantanamo operations are militarily effective?5030    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is in support of DHS for this operation.5031Camp operations have been sufficient to meet DHS current and projected5032need. We will strive to meet our obligations to support DHS while5033remaining good stewards of financial resources, equipment, and5034personnel assigned to the mission while continuing to meet our theater5035requirements.5036                      cost and private contractors5037    50. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how is DOD5038tracking border and Guantanamo support activity costs and ensuring the5039accuracy of cost tallies?5040    General Guillot. USNORTHCOM provides inputs on expenditures by the5041combatant command headquarters for southern border operations to the5042Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) in accordance5043with the 13 April 2018 ``Reporting Requirements for the Department of5044Defense Support to Department of Homeland Security in Securing the5045Southern Border.'' For questions on broader DOD cost tracking,5046USNORTHCOM defers to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense5047(Comptroller), which is responsible for capturing and tracking overall5048costs for border operations.5049    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services and5050Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs of the5051mission. I've directed my Headquarters staff and Components to collect5052and report costs back to their Service Comptrollers and OSD5053Comptroller. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.50545055    51. Senator Warren. General Guillot, what was the total cost of5056DOD's border deployment between 2018 to 2020?5057    General Guillot. The border deployment activation is Service5058funded. Costs are captured and reported to the Office of the5059Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) using Standard Financial5060Information System (SFIS). USNORTHCOM does not have visibility into5061Service financial systems to track costs.50625063    52. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what does5064DOD currently project the total cost of border and Guantanamo5065operations will each be this fiscal year?5066    General Guillot. USNORTHCOM defers to OUSD Comptroller which5067projects and tracks total costs.5068    Admiral Holsey. As the Combatant Commander, I execute the directed5069mission, the Services provide the forces and resources, and the5070Services report projected and actual costs to OSD. DOD and DHS signed a5071Memorandum of Understanding on 7 March 2025 that clarifies the scope of5072DOD support. There remain details to be defined such as the standards5073of care and the number of illegal aliens to be held at Naval Station5074Guantanamo Bay. Once defined, OSD Comptroller will work with the5075Services to assess projected costs.50765077    53. Senator Warren. General Guillot, DOD previously informed the5078Senate Armed Services Committee that it estimates the Department will5079spend roughly $900 million on its southern border deployment through5080the end of this fiscal year. How did DOD reach that estimate, and what5081assumptions underlie that estimate?5082    General Guillot. For questions regarding Department projections,5083USNORTHCOM defers to OUSD Comptroller, which is responsible for5084projecting DOD costs.50855086    54. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what does DOD project the total5087cost of Guantanamo's MOC operations will be this fiscal year? If no5088single cost estimate is available, please provide a series of cost5089estimates based on the different scenarios for which DOD is planning.5090    Admiral Holsey. DOD and DHS signed a Memorandum of Understanding on50917 March 2025 that refines the scope of DOD support. There remain5092details to be defined such as the standards of care and the number of5093illegal aliens to be held at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. Once5094defined, OSD Comptroller will work with the Services to assess5095projected costs.50965097    55. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what have5098been the total operational costs of DOD's border and Guantanamo5099deployment since January 20, 2025?5100    General Guillot. For questions regarding Department cost5101assessments, USNORTHCOM defers to the OUSD Comptroller.5102    Admiral Holsey. As Combatant Commander, I execute the mission, and5103the Services provide the forces and resources. I'm appreciative of the5104support received from all the Services. In terms of costs, OSD5105Comptroller has centralized cost reporting and collects costs from all5106Services and Agencies. FY25 obligations for Operation Southern Guard5107are approximately $31M as of 27 March 2025, which covers5108transportation, supplies, facilities improvements and repairs, and base5109operation support.51105111    56. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, what5112budgetary account will be used to pay for the border and Guantanamo5113operations?5114    General Guillot. OUSD Comptroller determines the budgetary accounts5115used for border operations. Costs are captured and reported to the5116Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) using Standard5117Financial Information System (SFIS).5118    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has centralized cost reporting and5119collects costs from all Services and Agencies. Per OSD's cost reporting5120system, Service Operations and Maintenance accounts have been used to5121pay for Operations Southern Guard to date. My Headquarters' costs for5122temporary duty travel and civilian overtime have been paid using Army5123Operations and Maintenance appropriations. I defer to OSD Comptroller5124and the Services for further details.51255126    57. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, which5127border and Guantanamo expenses, if any, is DOD paying for on a non-5128reimbursable basis? If DOD is waiving reimbursement for any expenses5129under title 10 U.S.C. Sec.  277, provide the justification for doing5130so.5131    General Guillot. In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance,5132DOD is supporting Department of Homeland Security on a non-reimbursable5133basis under authorities provided by Section 1059 of the 2016 NDAA.5134    Admiral Holsey. I am presently tasked to provide support to DHS on5135a non-reimbursable basis. The determination of reimbursement is made by5136OSD, and I defer to OSD.51375138    58. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, does DOD5139currently have a contract with any private contractor for migrant-5140related border or Guantanamo operations? If so, for each contract,5141please share the name of the company, the tasks it performs under the5142contract, the amount and duration of the contract, and a copy of the5143contract.5144    General Guillot. USNORTHCOM does not have any contracts with any5145private contractor for migrant-related border operations that directly5146engage in migrant-related activities such as processing, holding,5147transporting, feeding, billeting. Current contracts are limited to5148operations to secure the border, force sustainment, and logistics. Our5149current southern border contract support is conducted through Army5150North (ARNORTH), Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), and Joint Task Force5151Southern Border (JTF-SB).5152    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has not entered into any new contracts to5153support IA holding operations at NSGB. Instead, the Navy has5154temporarily modified existing Base Operating Service (BOS) Contracts to5155meet immediate needs until the requirements have been defined and5156negotiated between DOD and the DHS, namely, the number of IAs to be5157housed at GTMO and the standards of care for those IAs.5158    The contracts that have been modified to support Illegal Alien5159Holding Operations at NSGB up to this point include:51605161--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5162                                                                                                                                  Fiscal Year 2025 Est.5163                           Company                                                           Task                                         Cost5164--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5165Kira Construction Management LLC.............................        Port / Ferry Operation Services: Support increased ferry                  $170,0005166                                                                   operations to/from the airfield and holding facilities and5167                                                                          concrete delivery for security fencing construction5168--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5169Pentad Corporation...........................................                                          Food Galley Services: Leew$2.02 million contract5170                                                                            U.S. Forces for 90 days with two 30 days options.      with $750,000 for 905171                                                                                                                                                   days5172--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5173Vectrus (GCSC)...............................................                                     Security Fencing and Other Limited Serv$3.795 millionted 815174                                                                                       mile of security fencing around Camps L1 and L6, planning5175                                                                                            services, and mobile light plants5176--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5177Vectrus (GCSC)...............................................     Base Operating Services (BOS) Blanket Task Order: Providing                  $300,0005178                                                                                                         sustainment services5179--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------51805181    59. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, given the5182Government Accountability Office's 2021 findings that DOD's estimates5183of the costs of its border operations were ``not reliable'' and5184excluded ``significant costs,'' what steps is DOD now taking to ensure5185the reliability of its cost estimates for border and Guantanamo5186operations?5187    General Guillot. OUSD Comptroller has directed the Department of5188Defense to track costs using a Standard Contingency Code per the 135189April 2018 Reporting Requirements for the Department of Defense Support5190to Department of Homeland Security in Securing the Southern Border.5191    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller is working with the Services to5192establish cost estimates for the operation. I defer to OSD Comptroller5193for details.51945195    60. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what does DOD project the cost5196per bed will be at Guantanamo's MOC and at Guantanamo's Camp VI?5197    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller is working with the Services to5198establish cost estimates for the operation. I defer to OSD Comptroller5199for details.52005201    61. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how much does DOD expect to5202spend to get the permanent infrastructure at Guantanamo up to habitable5203standards this fiscal year?5204    Admiral Holsey. At this time, no permanent structure construction5205is planned or requested.52065207    62. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how much does DOD expect to5208spend on soft-sided facilities at Guantanamo this fiscal year?5209    Admiral Holsey. I defer to OSD for further details.52105211    63. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how much5212does DOD expect to spend on deploying personnel to the border and5213Guantanamo this fiscal year?5214    General Guillot. While I defer to the OUSD Comptroller for its cost5215estimates, it is my understanding that OUSD Comptroller and the Joint5216Staff are currently preparing FY25 DOD estimates to deploy personnel to5217the border.5218    Admiral Holsey. OSD Comptroller has directed the Services and5219Agencies to establish accounting mechanisms to track costs of the5220mission. I defer to OSD Comptroller for further details.5221                               readiness5222    64. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, please5223describe how DOD is assessing the impact of southern border and5224Guantanamo operations on troops' readiness.5225    General Guillot. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I am responsible5226for assessing the readiness to execute the missions assigned to5227USNORTHCOM. To date, the forces I have been provided have been5228performing all assigned missions admirably. I defer to the military5229Services for assessments of troop readiness within their respective5230services as the force providers assess the impact of current and5231emerging requirements and the impact on their readiness to provide5232ready and trained forces for other current and future requirements. I5233will continue to coordinate with force providers to ensure they have an5234accurate picture on current and upcoming requirements.5235    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is monitoring impact to unit and mission5236readiness though monthly readiness reporting in the Defense Readiness5237Reporting System (DRRS). Units, especially JTF GTMO and ARSOUTH5238continue to evaluate and will update impacts during daily updates, if5239urgent, or in the monthly DRRS reports. Additionally, I routinely5240engage my service components and staff to better understand the mission5241impacts on troop readiness in addition to utilizing the official DOD5242system of record to gauge readiness (DRRS).52435244    65. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, have any5245training exercises been delayed or canceled due to the recent5246deployments to the southern border or Guantanamo? Please provide the5247date and type of any affected training exercises and explain which5248units were impacted.5249    General Guillot. No NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercises have been5250delayed or canceled due to recent deployments and Southern Border5251operations. However, although not due to deployments, the Tier 1 ARDENT5252SENTRY 25 exercise that took place 12-18 March 2025 was scaled down to5253a Headquarters-response cell level of participation to meet cross-5254Combatant Command objectives. N&NC Components also scaled their5255participation in AS 25 to a response cell to address competing mission5256demands.5257    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has not canceled or delayed any training5258exercises due to the recent deployments to NSGB.52595260    66. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, is DOD5261separating units when sending personnel to the border or Guantanamo? If5262so, please explain the rationale for doing so, given evidence of how5263doing so between 2018 to 2020 harmed units' readiness.5264    General Guillot. I defer to the Joint Staff regarding the sourcing5265of forces assigned to the mission on the southern border.5266    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM has requested specific capabilities from5267DOD but does not make the overall determination of which units from5268across the military services will meet the request. In some instances,5269the services provide a capability in the appropriate size for the5270mission, such as a Military Police Company or Field Feeding Team, while5271retaining some home station capabilities and depth.52725273    67. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, the5274Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously found that ``DOD has5275not defined what it considers to be a manageable impact on readiness.''5276How is DOD determining when an anticipated impact on readiness is5277``manageable''?5278    General Guillot. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense5279and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Department-5280level assessments of readiness.5281    Admiral Holsey. Within the SOUTHCOM theater, we see this operation5282as having a manageable impact on readiness. As we continue to execute5283our other priority missions SOUTHCOM monitors impact to unit and5284mission readiness through monthly readiness reporting in the Defense5285Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Units continually evaluate readiness5286and will update impacts as appropriate.5287                                 morale5288    68. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, how, if at5289all, is DOD monitoring the impact of the border deployment on troops'5290morale?5291    General Guillot. Troop morale is monitored at all echelons of5292command. All units deployed to the southern border have a commander and5293senior enlisted leader who conduct unit circulation as a means of5294monitoring unit performance and morale. These leaders report their5295assessment of unit morale up the chain of command.5296    Admiral Holsey. Commanders and all leaders routinely assess the5297morale of our highly trained forces to ensure they remain focused on5298the mission.52995300    69. Senator Warren. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, will DOD5301commit to inform the Senate Armed Services Committee if it sees5302patterns of suicide, substance abuse, and other warning signs that the5303border operations are degrading servicemembers' mental health?5304    General Guillot. I commit to working with Department to ensure our5305military personnel receive the necessary care and treatment in support5306of the southern border mission and will always be transparent with the5307Committee.5308    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM will continue to report suicide and5309substance abuse events consistent with established reporting5310requirements and procedures, and Commanders will continue to assess the5311behavioral health and readiness of their units. All servicemembers5312deployed in support of JTF-SG have access to NSGB's hospital, programs5313and services, including Morale, Welfare & Recreation, and Behavioral5314Health. JTF-SG has a mobile hospital with primary care, laboratory, and5315X-Ray capabilities. It is staffed with two (2) behavioral health5316personnel.53175318                         conduct and conditions5319    70. Senator Warren. General Guillot, what are the rules of5320engagement that govern each unit deployed to the border?5321    General Guillot. Units deployed to the Southern Border are5322operating under the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)5323established in CJCSI 3121.01. NORTHCOM has further clarified arming5324guidance, specifically to ensure force protection, for the forces in5325close proximity to the Southern Border.53265327    71. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are servicemembers authorized5328to use force at the border?5329    General Guillot. The SRUF authorizes servicesmembers to use5330appropriate force in self-defense. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of5331Staff Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) apply to actions taken5332by U.S. commanders and their forces during all DOD civil support and5333routine Military Department functions occurring inside U.S. territory5334or territorial seas. SRUF sets out the basic self-defense posture, and5335the use of force is only authorized when applicable pursuant to the5336SRUF.53375338    72. Senator Warren. General Guillot, in 2020, the DOD Inspector5339General found that some troops did not receive Standing Rules for the5340Use of Force (SRUF) training. What percentage of troops currently5341deployed to the border have completed training on when and how they can5342use force? Please describe the training they receive on the5343authorization of military force.5344    General Guillot. All servicemembers arriving for duty at the5345Southern Border receive Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)5346training as part of the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement, and5347Integration (JRSOI) process. The SRUF training consists of5348instructional discussion followed by a series of scenario-based5349vignettes.53505351    73. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are servicemembers under DOD's5352command authorized to use force against unarmed civilians at the5353border?5354    General Guillot. SRUF sets out the basic self-defense posture, and5355the use of force against unarmed civilians is only authorized when5356applicable pursuant to the SRUF.5357    The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules for the Use of5358Force (SRUF) apply to actions taken by U.S. commanders and their forces5359during all DOD civil support and routine Military Department functions5360occurring inside U.S. territory or territorial seas.53615362    74. Senator Warren. General Guillot, under what circumstances, if5363any, are servicemembers under DOD's command authorized to make arrests5364at the border?5365    General Guillot. Servicemembers are not authorized to make arrests5366at the border. CBP conducts all law enforcement functions at the5367border.53685369    75. Senator Warren. General Guillot, how does DOD handle encounters5370with citizens at the border?5371    General Guillot. DOD notifies CBP upon detection of people/groups5372attempting to cross the border illegally and CBP takes appropriate5373actions.53745375    76. Senator Warren. General Guillot, are any noncitizens currently5376being held at the Buckley Space Force Base in Colorado? If so, please5377describe the authority under which they are being held and the protocol5378for them to access legal counsel.5379    General Guillot. According to reporting by Immigration and Customs5380Enforcement, no illegal aliens were held at Buckley Space Force Base.53815382    77. Senator Warren. General Guillot, has DHS informed DOD of5383whether Guantanamo's MOC will be used to hold any migrants who have not5384received final orders of removal?5385    General Guillot. I defer to the Commander of U.S. Southern Command5386regarding matters related to Guantanamo Bay, and to the Office of the5387Secretary of Defense regarding Department-level discussions.53885389    78. Senator Warren. General Guillot, have any migrants currently at5390the MOC not received final removal orders?5391    General Guillot. I defer to the Commander of U.S. Southern Command5392regarding matters related to Guantanamo Bay.53935394    79. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are migrants at the MOC or Camp5395VI free to leave or are they being formally detained? If they are5396detained, under what legal authority are migrants being detained at5397Guantanamo's Camp VI?5398    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is providing DOD facilities and limited5399types of services/logistics to DHS in response to a Request for5400Assistance from the Secretary of DHS. DHS detains these IAs in5401enforcement of U.S. immigration law, and DHS retains full legal custody5402and control over the illegal aliens at the MOC and Camp VI on NSGB. At5403this point, DHS has transferred only those illegal aliens with a final5404removal status to NSGB. Historically, any migrants encountered at sea5405by USCG are under full custody of DHS or their custody is transferred5406to the Department of State while held at the MOC.54075408    80. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, GAO has found that DHS has5409detained U.S. citizens after mistaking them for foreign nationals. What5410steps, if any, does DOD take to confirm the identity of an individual5411before taking them into custody at a military facility or on a military5412aircraft?5413    Admiral Holsey. All individuals transferred to NSGB have been5414evaluated through DHS and ICE procedures and are the subject of final5415removal orders and remain in the full legal custody and control of DHS/5416ICE.54175418    81. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, to date, has DOD, to the5419Department's knowledge, accidentally or otherwise, taken any U.S.5420citizens into custody at a military facility or on a military aircraft?5421If so, please list all such circumstances, including an explanation for5422how and why these individuals were taken into custody, and how long5423they were in DOD custody.5424    Admiral Holsey. We are not aware of any U.S. citizens transported5425to NSGB under DHS control or custody. We are informed by DHS that all5426persons transferred to NSGB have been the subject of final removal5427orders under U.S. immigration law.54285429    82. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's timeline for5430constructing permanent structures at the MOC and what will be the5431capacity of the permanent structures that DOD is constructing?5432    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is still assessing future Illegal Alien5433holding options at Naval Station Guantanamo. At this time, no permanent5434structure construction is planned or requested.54355436    83. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how long on average do you5437anticipate a migrant will be held in a tent or other soft-sided5438facility?5439    Admiral Holsey. Currently, no IAs are being held in the tents or5440soft-sided facilities.54415442    84. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what term is being used to5443describe noncitizens deported from the United States to Guantanamo?5444    Admiral Holsey. The term being used to describe noncitizens removed5445by DHS from the U.S. to NSGB is `illegal alien.'54465447    85. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's plan for migrants5448held at Guantanamo whose home country will not accept their5449repatriation?5450    Admiral Holsey. I defer to the DHS to answer this question.54515452    86. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is DOD's plan for5453evacuating the MOC during extreme weather events?5454    Admiral Holsey. Naval Region South-East is finalizing an extreme5455weather shelter plan with all stakeholders at NSGB. We will develop5456options, tailored to the extreme weather threat, to include shelter in5457place options and evacuation options.54585459    87. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what Government entities, if5460any, will conduct onsite inspections of Guantanamo's MOC and Camp VI,5461and at what frequency? Will they publicly report on findings?5462    Admiral Holsey. Our standards of care for both Camp VI and the MOC5463are based on interim Standard Operating Procedures utilized by DHS as5464the lead Federal agency, with the DOD supporting. The frequency of5465inspections and any reporting process within DOD/DHS still needs to be5466determined, consistent with the newly signed MOU between the5467departments.54685469    88. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has DOD received requests for5470access to the MOC or Camp VI by legal service providers, humanitarian5471organizations, press, or other members of the public and how have5472requests been handled?5473    Admiral Holsey. DHS is the lead Federal agency for immigration5474enforcement. SOUTHCOM is providing support to DHS illegal alien holding5475operations on Guantanamo Bay. DHS/ICE retains legal, physical, and5476administrative custody of illegal aliens in their charge, and the roles5477and responsibilities for support are dictated by a Memorandum of5478Agreement and ICE Detention Standards. All requests for access are5479immediately forwarded to DHS and DOD Policy for coordination with DHS/5480ICE and JTF Southern Guard personnel co-located on Guantanamo Bay for5481their action as appropriate.54825483    89. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, describe DOD's plans for5484facilitating migrants' access to counsel.5485    Admiral Holsey. DOD is in support of DHS requirements, to include5486access to counsel. On February 19, 2025, DHS posted written notice, in5487English and Spanish, of the procedure for illegal aliens to request to5488place a private, unmonitored telephone call to counsel. For illegal5489aliens housed at Camp VI, counsel calls are conducted in a building5490adjacent to Camp VI. It has six telephones in six separate rooms, each5491with a table and chair. During the calls, guards maintain line of sight5492through the use of video monitoring (which does not include sound). DOD5493facilitates DHS movements of the illegal aliens for these calls as5494needed. For low threat illegal aliens housed at the MOC on the Leeward5495side of the Naval Station, counsel calls occur from a private room in5496the MOC, which is under the control of DHS.54975498    90. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, has the Department of Homeland5499Security requested that DOD facilitate confidential legal phone calls5500or legal visits?5501    Admiral Holsey. See above response for coordination with DHS for5502use of DOD facilities.55035504    91. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what steps is DOD taking to5505make the MOC and Camp VI facilities habitable for the number of5506migrants expected to be held at Guantanamo?5507    Admiral Holsey. DHS is responsible for the MOC building. SOUTHCOM5508and JTF-SG are responsible for the Camp VI facility, with ICE5509responsible for maintaining custody of IAs. SOUTHCOM has a facilities5510maintenance team that responds to any maintenance requirements for5511cells in Camp VI, or to assist ICE. DOD is committed to meeting5512standards of care for IAs to include meals and hygiene.55135514    92. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are any migrants currently5515housed in spaces with black mold, leaks, electrical fires, other5516housing quality issues?5517    Admiral Holsey. JTF-SG relocated some IAs after individual cells5518began to experience clogged toilets and plumbing issues after excessive5519use or misuse. The damaged cells have been repaired and are currently5520available for reoccupation. I defer to DHS to provide information on5521conditions in the MOC building.55225523    93. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, as of the date of your5524response, what is the current capacity of the MOC at Guantanamo?5525    Admiral Holsey. The DHS/ICE run MOC building capacity is 50 IAs.5526JTF-SG has established tents with cots in the MOC West and East5527overflow areas that could house an additional 520 IAs. These are the5528same tents and cots U.S. service members routinely live in.55295530    94. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, how long does DOD anticipate it5531will take DOD to complete the first phase of the MOC expansion to 2,0005532migrants?5533    Admiral Holsey. JTF-SG has already established the physical space5534for holding up to 2,500 IAs if needed.55355536    95. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is the maximum number of5537migrants for whom Guantanamo's MOC currently has the capacity and5538resources to provide sanitary facilities, medical care, food, and5539potable water?5540    Admiral Holsey. We currently have combined capacity for 570 IAs in5541the MOC building and MOC overflow tents, with restrooms, showers, food,5542water, and cots. DHS is responsible for medical and plans to meter5543their medical footprint based on the IA population in the MOC. DOD is5544available to provide other authorized medical care if needed.55455546    96. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, please explain the standards of5547care that DOD personnel are bound to provide at Guantanamo and provide5548a copy of DOD's protocol, if any, on standards of care.5549    Admiral Holsey. Illegal Alien Holding Operations on NSGB are in5550support of DHS execution of national immigration law, ICE maintains5551legal custody of the illegal alien population and is responsible for5552applying standards of care consistent with care required to provide5553under US law and regulations. An MOU between DOD and DHS on roles and5554responsibilities for holding illegal aliens at NSGB was signed on March55557, 2025. It provides for broad standards of care with a goal to have5556DOD and DHS agree additional requirements within 15 days. Those5557discussions are underway to ensure proper custody with care and5558treatment in accordance with U.S. law.55595560    97. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what emergency and non-5561emergency medical services are provided to migrants at Guantanamo?5562    Admiral Holsey. DOD may provide IAs with preventative health5563services, first aid and emergent life-saving medical care if needed5564subject to capability and availability on NSGB. DHS is responsible for5565MEDEVAC for any higher level of care needed that is not provided by DOD5566for IAs at NSGB.55675568    98. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, what is the number of medical5569providers available to treat migrants at Guantanamo?5570    Admiral Holsey. As are pre-screened to prevent any medically5571fragile adult males from being held at GTMO. DHS is the lead agency for5572medical care of IAs and currently has more than 15 providers at NSGB.5573DOD is available to provide preventative health services, first aid and5574emergent life-saving medical care if needed.5575    99. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, are there plans to downgrade5576the naval hospital at Guantanamo to a clinic? If so, what services5577would no longer be available to migrants?5578    Admiral Holsey. DOD may provide IAs with preventative health5579services, first aid and emergent life-saving medical care if needed5580subject to capability and availability on NSGB. DHS is responsible for5581MEDEVAC for any higher level of care needed that is not provided by DOD5582for IAs at NSGB.55835584    100. Senator Warren. Admiral Holsey, to date, have there been any5585injuries, medical events, or fatalities of migrants at Guantanamo? If5586so, please provide a list of all such incidents.5587    Admiral Holsey. DHS is the lead agency for medical care of IAs.5588There have been no fatalities of IAs at NSGB but there have been 105589cases of IAs committing acts of self-harm, 3 IAs treated for5590hyperglycemia, and 5 cases of dental work. All cases were provided5591appropriate medical treatment for their corresponding condition.55925593                               __________5594               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly5595       joint task force guantanamo expansion effects on readiness5596    101. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, SOUTHCOM has been asked to5597dramatically expand the Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station5598Guantanamo to accommodate up to 30,000 migrants, well beyond the level5599ever held there. When you consider the cost of transporting a migrant5600there before deporting them to Cuba, it's clear this is about headlines5601and intimidation. SOUTHCOM is already balancing many critical missions,5602including counter-narcotics operations. Any resources dedicated to5603expanding detention capacity at Guantanamo--whether personnel, funding,5604or infrastructure--must come from somewhere. What are specific5605tradeoffs that SOUTHCOM must make to accommodate this mission?5606    Admiral Holsey. SOUTHCOM is monitoring impact to unit and mission5607readiness though monthly readiness reporting in the Defense Readiness5608Reporting System (DRRS). As of the 1 March report, SOUTHCOM components5609have not reflected any impact to their readiness, apart from the need5610for additional augmentees from force providers, if an additional5611contingency should arise. Units, especially JTF GTMO and ARSOUTH are5612continuing to evaluate and will update impacts during daily updates, if5613urgent, or in monthly DRRS reports.56145615    102. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, how many ICE personnel are5616stationed at Guantanamo now?5617    Admiral Holsey. ICE personnel currently supporting this mission at5618NSGB fall under DHS. At the time of this response, there are 20 ICE5619officers and 70 ICE contracted guards.56205621    103. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, what is the division of duties5622between SOUTHCOM and DHS as it relates to the immigration detainees?5623    Admiral Holsey. DOD and SOUTHCOM are in a support role to DHS and5624ICE. ICE is responsible for the custody of all IAs at NSGB. DOD5625military police augment the ICE contract guards with interior security,5626whereas U.S. Marines provide perimeter security exterior to the camps.56275628    104. Senator Kelly. Admiral Holsey, are the U.S. servicemembers5629serving in Guantanamo Bay trained on non-combatant detainee operations5630in accordance with applicable laws and regulations?5631    Admiral Holsey. Yes, but this is not a DOD non-combatant detainee5632operation under DODD 2310.01E. I want to clearly distinguish the5633Illegal Alien Holding Operations in support of DHS from the Law of War5634Detention Operations and Military Commissions. They have separate guard5635forces and are completely different missions. For the Illegal Alien5636Holding Operations, specific training in line with ICE detention5637standards is being reviewed. All interactions with the illegal alien5638population in ICE custody ensure their humane treatment and safety and5639security of all personnel.5640            fentanyl / transnational criminal organizations5641    105. Senator Kelly. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, I am deeply5642concerned about cartels and the flow of drugs across the southern5643border. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are uniquely positioned to provide5644counter narcotics support to prevent the manufacturing of fentanyl with5645precursors imported from China. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have long5646supported counter narcotics and human trafficking operations across the5647southern border. What have you seen within your areas regarding the5648importation of Fentanyl precursors from China?5649    General Guillot. China continues to be the primary source for5650precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl. These precursor chemicals5651make their way to Mexico through air and maritime conveyances and are5652often concealed in legitimate goods that are mislabeled or routed5653through third party countries. However, not all precursors used in the5654production of illegal drugs are themselves illegal. Supply chain5655disruption is made more difficult by the unlawful diversion of5656otherwise lawful dual-use chemicals imported for legitimate business5657purposes. Additionally, the chemical companies often communicate5658directly with customers through encrypted platforms and accept5659cryptocurrency payments which reduce their risk of detection by law5660enforcement.5661    Admiral Holsey. We are not seeing fentanyl trafficking in the5662maritime domain. Legal fentanyl precursors are shipped into Mexico.5663Mexican Cartels produce finished fentanyl in Mexico and traffic it over5664the Southwest U.S. land border. Maritime interdictions directly support5665investigations into transnational criminal networks involved in5666fentanyl productions/trafficking and other criminal activity.5667    The majority of illicit fentanyl synthesis occurs in Mexico, and we5668do not have confirmed cases of any illicit fentanyl synthesis in the5669SOUTHCOM AOR. However, Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Guatemala are5670identified as potential hotspots for fentanyl supply manufacturing.56715672    106. Senator Kelly. General Guillot and Admiral Holsey, I know much5673of your work on counter narcotics efforts requires collaboration and5674cooperation from our partners in the region. I worry the5675Administration's actions using the military for deportations and5676threatening tariffs appear to be creating unnecessary tensions with our5677regional partners. What does that cooperation look like today and what5678can be done to improve cooperation toward your efforts in the region?5679    General Guillot. The United States-Mexico military-to-military5680relationship is strong and resilient. My Mexican military counterparts5681and I have regular communications to facilitate transparency and5682coordination, to reiterate mutual respect for sovereignty, and to5683ensure the combined security of the border. USNORTHCOM security5684cooperation efforts with Mexico focus on homeland defense and5685addressing the following mutual defense priorities: (1) Domain5686Awareness, (2) Domain Control, and (3) Institutional Strengthening.5687USNORTHCOM invests over $25 million annually in Title 10 security5688cooperation funding with the Mexican military and includes significant5689investments in air interception, intel sharing, ISR, cUAS, riverine and5690littoral capabilities, counter-WMD, SOF capabilities, logistics,5691training, equipment, exercises, and subject matter expert exchanges5692with the Mexican Secretariats of National Defense and Navy. These5693security cooperation efforts address long-term North American defense5694priorities while enabling Mexico's border security and counter5695transnational criminal organization operations. With sufficient5696resources, our existing USNORTHCOM managed bilateral framework could be5697increasingly leveraged to support emerging southern border and5698territorial integrity requirements.5699    Admiral Holsey. Overall, our mil-mil engagements in the region5700remain strong, especially in areas like counternarcotics and targeting5701cartels that threaten both the United States and our partners. Our5702approach to strengthening military and security partnerships takes the5703'long view;' through joint operations, multinational exercises, and5704training, we build a foundation of trust and mutual understanding that5705endures despite any geopolitical changes.5706    In the area of counternarcotics, our partners are eager to work5707with us to counter the flow of drugs, people, and other illicit traffic5708by cartels and criminal groups, and our collaboration in this area has5709never been stronger. Partners and Allies now contribute to 880 percent5710of JIATF South interdictions, and we are deepening CN cooperation5711nations like the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, who5712welcome our engagement and share our commitment to hemispheric5713security. With the recent designation of certain cartels and criminal5714groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), many nations are5715expressing an interest in even greater CN cooperation. Simply put, our5716partners are with us in this fight, and I anticipate a deepening of our5717defense and security relationships in the year ahead.5718    Working by, with, and through our partners to address security5719challenges in the hemisphere is what we do every day. But we see5720increasing competition in security cooperation with malign State actors5721like the China and Russia. That is why it is so critical for us to5722continue to meet our partners at their needs, delivering security5723solutions to address common security challenges that also impacts5724United States national security interests.57255726                                 [all]