The Role of Special Operations in Great Power Competition

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                          [H.A.S.C. No. 119-4]5=======================================================================6                    THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN7                        GREAT POWER COMPETITION89                               __________1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND16                             SPECIAL OPERATIONS1718                                 OF THE1920                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES2122                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2324                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2526                             FIRST SESSION2728                               __________2930                              HEARING HELD3132                           FEBRUARY 26, 20253334[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3536                              __________3738                U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3963-873                  WASHINGTON : 202640=======================================================================4142          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS4344                     RONNY JACKSON, Texas, Chairman4546AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                JASON CROW, Colorado47TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts48NANCY MACE, South Carolina           JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine49MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               SARA JACOBS, California50CORY MILLS, Florida                  PATRICK RYAN, New York51DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin         GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,52PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina             California53ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona          DEREK TRAN, California5455                Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member56               Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member57                  Austin Richards, Research Assistant5859                           C O N T E N T S6061                              ----------62                                                                   Page6364              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS6566Crow, Hon. Jason, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking Member,67  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     368Jackson, Hon. Ronny, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,69  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     17071                               WITNESSES7273Braga, LTG Jonathan P., USA, Commander, United States Army74  Special Operations Command.....................................     475Conley, Lt Gen Michael E. USAF, Commander, Air Force Special76  Operations Command,............................................     577Huntley, MajGen Peter D., USMC, Commander, Marine Forces Special78  Operations Command.............................................     879Sands III, Rear Admiral Milton J., USN, Commander, Naval Special80  Warfare Command................................................     78182                                APPENDIX8384Prepared Statements:8586    Braga, LTG Jonathan P........................................    3387    Conley, Lt Gen Michael E.....................................    4188    Huntley, MajGen Peter D......................................    5389    Jackson, Hon. Ronny..........................................    2990    Sands III, Rear Admiral Milton J.............................    489192Documents Submitted for the Record:9394    [There were no Documents submitted.]9596Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:9798    Dr. Jackson..................................................    6799100Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:101102    Dr. Jackson..................................................    71103    Mr. Hamadeh..................................................    72104105      THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION106107                              ----------108109                  House of Representatives,110                       Committee on Armed Services,111       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,112                      Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 26, 2025.113    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in114room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ronny Jackson115[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.116117OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RONNY JACKSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM118   TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL119                           OPERATIONS120121    Dr. Jackson. The subcommittee will come to order.122    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to123declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered.124    We have a few members that aren't here yet, but one of the125things about this committee going forward is we're going to126start on time. So, we're starting on time.127    Today, we'll hear from our witnesses on the role of Special128Operations Forces in great power competition. The United States129is facing a dramatically different geopolitical environment now130than at any other time in recent decades. While this century131has been dominated by our efforts in the Global War on132Terrorism, the new era of great power competition presents133strategic challenges from revisionist states in China and134Russia and their rogue state allies in Iran and North Korea.135    Over the past several years, as our Nation has confronted136the evolving landscape of great power competition, our special137operators have adapted to meet the challenges posed by our138adversaries, while continuing to combat the continuous and139evolving threats posed by violent extremist organizations,140military proxies, and non-state actors.141    U.S. Special Operations Forces are ideally suited and142organized for great power competition. The core activities of143our Special Operations Units, from working with our partners144around the world to help bolster their defenses in145unconventional warfare capabilities to counterproliferation and146special reconnaissance, is more needed today than ever before147or decades in the past and offers the ability to present148significant strategic and operational challenges to our149adversaries, while simultaneously enabling our allies and150partners to resist outside aggression.151    The relationship our Special Operations Forces have built152and sustained through decades of partnership with our allies is153critical for our access and placement to counter our154adversaries. The United States will continue to rely on the men155and women throughout the Special Operations Forces community to156prepare future battle spaces, rapidly respond to contingencies157in multiple theaters, and extend American influence by158operating across the spectrum of competition, including below159the threshold of traditional military conflict and in the gray160zone.161    To address this continuously changing environment,162Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-163Intensity Conflict and Special Operations Command recently164released the Joint Special Operations Forces Operating Concept165for Force Development and Design Guide to the Special166Operations Forces community and the Department to ensure we167develop, and I quote, "a Joint Special Operations Force that168rapidly fuses all-domain capabilities for tailored and169simultaneous missions across the full spectrum from competition170to conflict, enabled by persistent campaigning for global171advantage." That sounds a little verbose and a little academic,172but if you read it slowly, it makes sense.173    This concept will require the Special Operations Forces174community to be culturally literate in dynamic regions across175the globe and proficient across evolving domains in the cyber,176space, and information realms -- all while maintaining the177ability to provide unique tactical combat capabilities for the178Joint Force.179    Today's hearing is focused on the role of Special180Operations Forces as the United States embraces an era of great181power competition. The subcommittee will seek to examine the182unique capabilities of the Special Operations Forces service183components and how Special Operations Forces' core activities184may complement and enable the Joint Force to operate against185strategic adversaries.186    We hope to further understand how the Special Operations187Force components determine what the appropriate capabilities188and force structure are to support and respond to the189Geographic Combatant Command requirements for great power190competition and counter adversaries and non-state actors.191    Our witnesses today are the commanders of the Special192Operations service components and have decades of experience193with the Special Operations community. I want to welcome194Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga, Commander of the United195States Army Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General196Michael Conley, Commander of the Air Force Special Operations197Command; Major General Peter Huntley, U.S. Marine Corps,198Commander, Marine Forces Special Operations Command, and Rear199Admiral Milton Sands, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command.200    In the interest of time, I will ask the witnesses to keep201your opening statements or your opening remarks to 5 minutes or202less, so that we have sufficient time for questions and203answers.204    With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing before205us today.206    I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for his opening207remarks.208    [The opening statement of Dr. Jackson can be found on page20929.]210211 STATEMENT OF HON. JASON CROW, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,212   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL213                           OPERATIONS214215    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Dr. Jackson.216    And thank you to our Special Operations Forces Component217Commanders for being here today to provide testimony on the218role of U.S. Special Operations in great power competition.219    The global security environment is changing rapidly. Our220adversaries regularly engage in malign gray zone activities221intended to challenge the United States in the global order.222    As stated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, countries223like China and Russia use a broad range of diplomatic,224informational, economic, and military tools to undermine our225national interests.226    So, to address and to protect our national interests and to227combat these malign activities, we have to find various ways to228counter these efforts.229    Although the authority to leverage irregular warfare is not230unique to Special Operations, it is essential. Irregular231warfare highlights core Special Operations Forces activities232like foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, Military233Information Support operations, Civil Affairs operations, and234others which are essential if we are to successfully counter235our competitors in the gray zone.236    Indeed, our Special Operations Forces are uniquely237qualified to support the whole-of-government approach of238integrated deterrence when it comes to great power competition.239    Our partners and allies remain key to addressing these240challenges. The history of our Special Operations Forces is241rooted in partnership. The generational relationships that242Special Operations Forces develops with our partners gives243these forces a unique understanding of the global operating244environment, allowing them to work in some of the most245difficult locations around the world.246    These relationships also help us to identify key247vulnerabilities, mitigate security concerns, and alter248competitor perceptions of risks, costs, and benefits of certain249actions.250    So today, we will examine the core activities of Special251Operations Forces and how they apply to great power competition252after over two decades of Special Operations Forces focus on253counterterrorism and countering threats from non-state actors254and violent extremist organizations.255    We must not forget the hard-won lessons of the last 20256years and we should endeavor to maintain Special Operations257Forces ability to conduct counterterrorism operations, while258ensuring they can support the Joint Force in great power259competition.260    We will examine how the new Joint Special Operations Forces261Operating Concept for Force Development and Design will assist262the components in shaping force requirements to focus on great263power competition.264    Lastly, I want to take a moment to recognize the key265successes of our Special Operation Forces and what makes them266the best at what they do; it's the people, and it's their267families, and it's the support network. Because we would be268nothing, and our Special Operations Forces would be nothing, if269it weren't for the exceptional talent of Americans who step up270day-in and day-out, at great risk to themselves and at great271sacrifice, to perform the hardest missions that our country272asks them to do.273    So, thank you, Dr. Jackson, and to our witnesses.274    And as always, Rangers, lead the way.275    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.276    We will hear from our witnesses now, and, then we will move277into a question-and-answer session. Immediately following one278round of questions, we will reconvene for the classified279session, which will take place in Rayburn 2337. We are going to280try to set a stop time of 2:30. So, I think everybody should281get their questions in, based on the number of folks here, but282if we don't, any questions that we don't get to, we will ask in283the classified session.284    So, with that, Lieutenant General Braga, we will begin with285you.286287    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONATHAN P. BRAGA, USA,288    COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND289290    General Braga. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow,291distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks so much for292the opportunity to represent the 36,000 members of the United293States Army Special Operations Command here today. I look294forward to highlighting just who we are; how we are295transforming for the future, and what we require to protect the296homeland and enable the Joint Force.297    United States Army Special Operations Command generates298combat-ready forces and innovates for today's fight and299modernizes for tomorrow's challenges, while also caring for our300soldiers and families in an uncertain fiscal environment.301Although there is tension between these efforts, we continue to302generate exceptionally high return on investment with303Regionally Aligned Forces and unique capabilities.304    United States Army Special Operations Command comprises305less than 10 percent of the Army and receives one-half of a306percent of the Army's budget, and similarly, we constitute over307half of Special Operations Command and are standing with 16308percent of the budget.309    Our Green Berets, Rangers, Aviators, Civil Affairs, and310Psychological Operations Soldiers are lethal warriors who311provide a unique value proposition and options for the Nation.312We are in the contact layer with approximately 3,000 soldiers313deployed every day in 80 different countries, where the defense314of the homeland begins.315    Our people maintain generational relationships and sustain316the connective tissue with our interagency and international317partners.318    Forces assigned to United States Army Special Operations319Command also stand ready to execute crisis response activities320anywhere in the world on short notice. Our formations have321supported an exponential increase in crisis response322requirements over the last several years.323    Army Special Operations' role today is clear and the value324proposition for tomorrow is valid. The future of conflict will325find our forces operating in the contested, in the deep, and326the denied areas supporting the Joint Force.327    United States Army Special Operations Command is undergoing328its largest transformation in decades. We're updating our329doctrine; developing multi-domain-capable units of action;330creating battle labs; consolidating lessons learned, and331innovating forward with our partners.332    For the first time in decades, we have created a new333occupational specialty and courses focused on technology and334unmanned systems.335    United States Army Special Operations Command established336an Irregular Warfare Task Force to buy down risk associated337with transregional threats from our adversaries.338    We also cofounded the Soft-Space-Cyber Triad. This modern-339day deterrence concept ensures Army Special Operations' Space340and Missile Defense, and Cyber Command can serve as the eyes,341ears, and teeth of the Joint Force and the Army.342    Our people are innovation pathfinders. They are343professional and patient problem-solvers, and their observation344of today's battlefields make it clear to me that we still have345much work to do.346    The innovation cycle is measured in days and weeks, not347months or years. Yet, our funding, acquisition processes, and348bureaucracies are not optimized to innovate at the speed of349need.350    We must position our people in proximity to the problem351with the right authorities and right resources to identify352emerging capability gaps, pioneer solutions, and disseminate353lessons learned to all theaters.354    United States Army Special Operations Command remains355committed to our top priority, our people, who are the linchpin356of our success. Army Special Operations soldiers serve with357distinction around the world in harm's way. And since 2001,358United States Army Special Operation Command soldiers have been359awarded nine Medals of Honor, three of which of those360servicemembers and warriors still serve within our formation.361And over the last two decades, 382 of our soldiers paid the362ultimate sacrifice on behalf of the Nation.363    As we work to balance readiness requirements and364modernization imperatives, we remain invested in caring for our365people and never forget the sacrifices that they and their366families make. It is our solemn responsibility to take care of367our people; set conditions for future battlefield success, and368to generate the highest return on investment for the American369people.370    Thank you for your invitation to testify today and your371continued support.372    [The prepared statement of General Braga can be found in373the Appendix on page 33.]374    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.375    Lieutenant General Conley, you are now recognized.376377   STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. CONLEY, USAF,378        COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND379380    General Conley. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and381distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the382opportunity to discuss the role of Air Force Special Operations383in today's strategic environment.384    On behalf of Command Chief Green, myself, and the more than38520,000 men and women of Air Force Special Operations Command,386I'm grateful for the opportunity to present an overview of the387capabilities your Air Commandos provide in safeguarding the388interests of America.389    Simply put, Air Force Special Operations Command exists to390support our Nation's priorities by supporting the Joint Force391and our Special Operations Forces partners. We do this through392four primary mission areas that have evolved throughout our393history: specialized mobility, strike, intelligence,394surveillance, reconnaissance, and air-to-ground integration.395    This year, Air Force Special Operations Command reaches a396milestone, its 35th anniversary as a major command. We started397as a collection of helicopters, cargo aircraft, and special398tactics focused on long-range penetration, establishing399airfields, and personnel recovery.400    After 9/11, we evolved into a force exquisitely tailored to401counterterrorism. By fielding new intelligence platforms,402extensive intel networks, and advancing our interdiction403capability, we honed our ability to strike terrorists at their404source.405    Today's Air Commandos are evolving again, using the406ingenuity of our people and unique capabilities to meet our407Nation's needs across four key priorities: homeland defense,408crisis response, countering violent extremists, and support to409theater Special Operations Forces commands.410    The common theme across each phase of our history is our411ability to adopt. Air Commandos repeatedly demonstrate their412ability to become what the Nation needs at that time at that413place.414    Today, we face new challenges as we continue to adapt to415the changing threat environment. We are seeing an increased416demand for Air Force Special Operations Command capabilities.417Since 2019, demand for your Air Commandos has surged -- in some418cases even exceeding the peak levels seen during the Global War419on Terror.420    As we sit here today, our airmen are forward-based in421strategic locations and forward-deployed in harm's way,422countering malign activities and actively preventing attacks on423our homeland.424    And while Special Operations Forces aviation is an425irreplaceable asset, it is expensive and our budget has426remained largely flat in the face of rising costs. The more427complex the threat environment, the more expensive it is to428develop capability and maintain readiness to operate in these429environments.430    I contend that Air Force Special Operations Command431provides a high return on investment, accounting for less than432one-half of 1 percent of the Air Force's budget and a433proportional part of Special Operations Command's budget, which434is, roughly, only 2 percent of the Department of Defense's435overall budget. For a small cost, the Nation sees an outsized436return from its investment in Air Force Special Operations437Command.438    Air Commandos are present around the globe 24/7/365. Our439Indo-Pacific-based wing is located within the first island440chain -- actively building relationships with allies and441partners; setting conditions for future Joint Force operations,442and creating dilemmas for our adversaries.443    Our wing in Europe is actually training with and supporting444NATO allies, to include mentoring partnerships with our new445North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces446partners, as we work together to identify both the challenges447and opportunities of operating in the Arctic.448    On top of all this, Air Commandos maintain a persistent449deployed presence, targeting non-state actors capable of450threatening American interests and our homeland, all while451remaining in a 24/7 alert posture back here in the states to452respond to crisis at the direction of our President.453    And while we face challenges, I also see incredible454opportunity and take pride in our ability to respond quickly455wherever our Nation needs us. Air Force Special Operations456Command is built to win. We're informed by, but not beholden457to, past missions. We remain ready and adaptable.458    Thank you for your continued support of America's Air459Commandos who remain a cornerstone of America's competitive460edge, and I look forward to your questions.461    [The prepared statement of General Conley can be found in462the Appendix on page 41.]463    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, General.464    Rear Admiral Sands, you are recognized for 5 minutes.465466STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL MILTON J. SANDS III, USN, COMMANDER,467                 NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND468469    Admiral Sands. I'm proud to be here with my fellow Special470Operations Component Commanders.471    Naval Special Warfare is a maritime component of Special472Operations Command's Joint Force and an integral part of473America's warfighting Navy.474    I'm here with Force Master Chief Walter Dittmar, and we are475honored to represent the 10,000 men and women of Naval Special476Warfare.477    Thank you for your continued support to our mission, our478force, and our families.479    Naval Special Warfare's purpose is to provide maritime480Special Operations Forces capability to enable Joint Force481lethality and survivability inside denied and contested areas.482    We prioritize three capabilities: support to long-range483fires, maritime kinetic effects, and maritime non-kinetic484effects. The latter is our most decisive Naval Special Warfare485capability.486    Our ability to operate in the maritime provides the Nation487with unique access across the globe. Our maritime training488allows us to go where others cannot. Our operators and support489personnel use combatant craft and submersibles to conduct490decisive operations in support of the Joint Force.491    Our people are the foundation of our capability, and these492bespoke maritime assets allow us to close with the enemy.493    In Naval Special Warfare, we exploit our tactical and494technological advantages. Manned/unmanned teaming is our495future. We will integrate this capability into our tactical496formations to maximize our scale and our lethality.497    We own the water; we embrace the robots, and we win every498fight. Maritime Special Operations Forcesvactivities have an499outsized impact on Joint Force operations. This can be a SEAL500dive pair placing explosives in the dark of night to protect501Navy ships and submarines. It can look like special boat502operators in low-visibility craft stalking an enemy vessel to503enable lethal effects. Naval Special Warfare gnaws down504opponent advantages of scale.505    The Nation remains underinvested in our Maritime Special506Operations Account. In Naval Special Warfare, we refine our507capabilities with a clear-eyed discussion of risk to bridge the508gap between operations and resourcing.509    Current fiscal constraints and increased deployment costs510are challenging our ability to balance modernization and511readiness. Our Nation maintains an advantage in the maritime512domain, but our opponents are closing fast.513    Naval Special Warfare represents less than 1 percent of the514Navy's budget and 14 percent of Special Operations Command515funding. Like each of my Special Operations teammates here, we516provide a high return on investment. With that investment comes517solution for some of the Nation's toughest problems.518    Agility has been a hallmark of Naval Special Warfare since519our inception. The return to the maritime is a return to our520original identity. The first frogmen cleared lanes across521Europe and the Pacific, so our forces could close with the522enemy. Today, our commitment to the Nation is to be ready to do523it again.524    To conclude, Naval Special Warfare's purpose is our North525Star. It guides us as we decide what to do and what not to do.526As the Nation's Maritime Special Operations Force, we shoulder527the responsibility to own the water and execute the Nation's528most challenging and decisive operations.529    Thank you and I look forward to our discussion.530    [The prepared statement of Admiral Sands can be found in531the Appendix on page 48.]532    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Admiral.533    Major General Huntley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.534535 STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL PETER D. HUNTLEY, USMC, COMMANDER,536            MARINE FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND537538    General Huntley. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and539distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this540opportunity to discuss the future of Marine Forces Special541Operations Command.542    For two decades, Marine Forces Special Operations Command543has maintained a persistent forward presence, strengthening our544relationships with strategic partners and allies, and also,545defeating threats across the globe.546    Our Raiders, our Special Operations Capability Specialists,547and, of course, our Navy Corpsmen represent the very best of548the United States Marine Corps and the broader U.S. Naval549Service. And as always, we continue to embody a proud legacy,550uphold the Marine Corps reputation for efficiency,551effectiveness, and a high return on investment.552    As national security priorities shift, Marine Forces553Special Operations Command stands at the forefront of a554critical transformation. We have adapted to the landscape of555future conflict and prioritized modernization efforts which556will enhance our ability to counter adversaries across every557domain.558    To do this, your continued support is foundational, and we559ask for the investment necessary to cement Marine Forces560Special Operation Command's role and to help our Nation win.561This is not just about buying new equipment or kit. This is562about maintaining and enhancing an elite, persistent inside563force that has the generational relationship with strategic564partners and the capability to sense, make sense, and act565faster than our adversaries.566    Raiders continue to be persistently deployed in key567locations and our capability of surviving and thriving in568contested and, of course, denied spaces -- all this while569facilitating the success of the broader Joint Force.570    In order to continue this, there are three things that we571must do.572    First, we must continue to equip and further develop the573capabilities of our Raiders with cutting-edge technologies,574such as advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, and575networking to not only link every sensor to every shooter, but576to turn small, disaggregated teams into the cornerstone of an577overwhelming Joint Force.578    These tools will radically increase our ability to detect579and exploit adversaries' weaknesses, which will give the Joint580Force the eyes and ears it will need to defeat the most581advanced threats. Imagine, if you will, a small team of Raiders582deployed to a small, remote island chain, capable of monitoring583adversaries' movements, disrupting communications, and584providing deadly, accurate, and real-time targeting information585to joint assets that may be operating hundreds of miles away.586    Second, your continued support for expanding our precision587strike capabilities is crucial. On the modern battlefield,588characterized by distributed forces, dynamic employment, and589degraded communications, Marine Forces Special Operations590Command will not just be the Joint Force's eyes and ears; we591must also provide our own lethal and accurate fires. This will592require continued investment in multi-domain strike platforms593and the associated munitions to position with our forces that594are in theater now. This will allow us to maintain our595competitive advantage against all adversaries.596    Finally, but certainly not last, we must continue investing597in our people. Our rigorous training pipeline ensures we598recruit and develop operators not only capable of mastering599these new technologies, but also seamlessly supporting and600integrating with the broader Joint Force to deliver decisive601effects.602    Our Raiders represent a critical asset for our Nation at603the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Their skills604are essential now in competition, as they will be in crisis and605conflict.606    These investments not only benefit Marine Forces Special607Operations Command, but they will pay dividends across the608entire Joint Force by providing a more lethal, agile, and609integrated force that stands ready in theater today. We present610a deterring threat in competition and, of course, and always, a611lethal asset in conflict.612    I look forward to working with this committee to ensure613your investments in Marine Forces Special Operations Command614continue to pay outsized dividends. Thank you very much.615    [The prepared statement of General Huntley can be found in616the Appendix on page 53.]617    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, General.618    We will begin with questions now, and I will start by619recognizing myself for 5 minutes.620    This is to all our witnesses here today. Can each of you621describe what you think is the one critical capability that622your special operators and organizations contribute to great623power competition and counter our No. 1 adversary China?624    We will start with you, General Braga.625    General Braga. Chairman, I think our transregional626footprint and relationships, generational relationships, in the627deep and contact layer out there at the near abroad to all628those other places really across every Global Command and629Control System, where we find the footprint of the People's630Republic of China using all forms of their national power to631erode international rules, norms, and behavior, and ultimately,632address our national security advantage that we have out there.633    We find ourselves working with our interagency partners and634our international partners to push back with the ready warfare635options. So, in different cases, this could be an information636environment; it could be in more clandestine efforts; it could637be a better understanding to inform policymakers of what638efforts our adversaries are taking to erode these national639security advantages.640    So, we are like global sensors for the Joint Force. We641provide pushback in the competition phase, but we also provide642value, should it go to a high-end conflict phase.643    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.644    General Conley?645    General Conley. Chairman, much like General Braga's646comment, I would say our greatest attribute in the Pacific is647our presence. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have a648wing located in Kadena that has been there in some way, shape,649or form for decades. So, we understand the operational650environment. We have longstanding, decades-long relationships651with key partners over there, and we understand the652battlespace.653    As I prep the rest of the Air Force Special Operations654Command formation for potential conflict in new theaters,655having that core capability and knowledge set allows me to flow656airmen in and out of that theater, pairing with partnerships of657our own formation that allow us to quickly get up-to-speed and658deliberately train back here in the states. So, when we move659forward, we are ready to go.660    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, General.661    Admiral?662    Admiral Sands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.663    Our biggest Navel Special Warfare contribution to great664power competition, especially when you think of China, is our665access to the maritime. As our Nation's only Maritime Special666Operations Force, we provide the ability to access areas, both667undersea and on the sea, that no one else can go. And this668enables us to do a variety of things and support the Joint669Force lethality and survivability. We view our role in the670maritime to enable our Department of Defense forces, our larger671Joint Force, to close with the enemy and survive as they do it.672    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.673    General?674    General Huntley. Yes, Mr. Chairman.675    As I spoke about in my opening remarks, we have the ability676and we do live, thrive, and survive in contested and denied677spaces. And as I talked about before, the ability to link any678sensor with any shooter. What does that mean? That in places679like the Western Pacific, or really anywhere on the globe that680is going to be contested and will be difficult for Joint Forces681to project power into, we are already there living, developing682relationships with partners and allies, but also bring along683the capabilities to link not only our organic sensing684capabilities, but also the capabilities of coalition, host685nation, or even our own surrogates, in order to be able to686illuminate the operating space at scale to facilitate Joint687Force fires and maneuver.688    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.689    And I'm going to ask this question. This is a two-part690question. It can be pretty short. But how would each of you691assess your parent Service's understanding of the capabilities692that you each bring to the integrated deterrence in U.S.693efforts to compete against our strategic adversaries? And can694you provide us a sense of the number or the percentage of695requests that you receive from the combatant commanders for696support that you were not able to execute and, generally, why697you were not able to fulfill this request?698    General Braga. Chairman, I can get you the exact number in699a follow-up, but it is increasing, the number of operational700requests that we cannot meet due to force size and/or701resources, because it is more expensive to deploy and meet this702demand. That is a challenge.703    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix704on page 67.]705    Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir.706    General Conley. Mr. Chairman, in reverse order, I would707echo what General Braga said. We commit almost 100 percent of708our forces in each deployment cycle. So, there's no excess709left. In order to do other things, it means tradeoffs for what710we are currently tasked to do. And I can discuss more of that711in the next session.712    From a parent Service view, I certainly don't want to speak713for my Chief, but I would say it is improving; it is good and714improving. I think there was a post-Global War On Terrorism715perspective that Special Operations might not be needed as much716in a great power competition setting, but over the last few717years I think the realization -- based on our presence, our718access, and our relationships -- is that they need us more than719ever. So, that relationship is strong and growing.720    Dr. Jackson. Thanks.721    And, General Braga, you agree that you think that your722Service understands your unique capabilities?723    General Braga. Absolutely, Chairman. We feel fully724integrated, interoperable, and we are innovating on behalf of725the United States Army, and we are fully integrated with the726transforming contact efforts of the United States Army.727    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.728    Admiral?729    Admiral Sands. I would begin by saying the Navy has really730a deep understanding of our capabilities. But, like my731teammates, over the last two years, in particular, this has732really improved. The Navy is looking to us and saying what are733your five Ws? What are the things that you are specifically734going to do for us in conflict, God forbid, with China?735    And so, I think we are integrated well with the Navy,736especially with our submarine force, and that is only737improving.738    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.739    General?740    General Huntley. Yes, Mr. Chairman.741    We enjoy significant and great support from the Commandant742of the Marine Corps and his team. We work very closely with our743sister Marine Forces, specifically Marine Corps Forces,744Pacific, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, and Marine745Corps Forces Space Command, to include Marine Expeditionary746Forces as well, both I Marine Expeditionary Forces on the West747Coast, III Marine Expeditionary Forces in Okinawa, and II748Marine Expeditionary Forces here on the East Coast. So, yes, we749are providing great support.750    In terms of how we are marbled into the Marine Corps force751design, we are making good progress there, but we definitely752are part of that team, and we look forward to working with the753broader Marine Corps going forward.754    In terms of demands from the Joint Force, right now, we are755at max capacity. We are putting everything out the door that we756can in order to still maintain and train the force properly.757So, there's probably more things we should be doing, and758there's definitely more things that the Combatant Commands759would like us to do, but we are at max capacity at this time.760    Over.761    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.762    And with that, I'm going to yield back and recognize763Ranking Member Crow for questioning.764    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Dr. Jackson.765    I wanted to continue the conversation that we have had766before about the issue of lessons learned, because we can't767afford not to learn lessons learned in real time out in the768world as things are rapidly evolving. The failure to do that769would just be too costly.770    And perhaps one of the best laboratories, although I771hesitate to use that term because it is a brutal hellscape of a772battle in Ukraine, but it is the Russia-Ukraine conflict and773Russia's invasion of Ukraine, where we are seeing new tactics,774new techniques, entirely new ways of fighting being developed775on a weekly and monthly basis, and both forces evolving776quickly.777    I'm concerned that we are not structured to do that. I778mean, you all have the agility and can evolve quicker than779most, given your size and the talent of your forces. But, even780still, I think there are very real barriers to doing that.781    So, I would love each of you to comment on what are those782barriers to learning quickly. And if you could change something783today to allow us to adapt more quickly to what we are learning784and seeing overseas, what would it be?785    And I will start on the other end with General Huntley.786    General Huntley. Thank you, Congressman.787    I would say that, first of all, we do have a very rigorous788after-action program that allows us to identify lessons. The789challenge that I will talk about here in a second is being able790to implement those upgrades, if you will, to our capabilities.791    We do enjoy good, I would describe, acquisition792authorities, but right now the pace of modernization in the793tactical space across the globe, whether it is Ukraine, whether794it is in Colombia, or whether it is anywhere else in the world,795is moving very fast. Our ability to modernize on pace is796something that concerns me; it concerns me greatly.797    And I think that would be one of the biggest challenges,798particularly for Special Operations Forces going forward, is799being able to keep up with the rapidly evolving. For instance,800you know, artificial intelligence is moving fast.801    The difference in today's operating environment than what802we saw in the past 20 years is that we have always enjoyed a803great advantage of being able to sense the enemy before they804sense us. But with the proliferation of technologies, that is a805two-way street.806    Whether you are fighting against a peer competitor or807whether you are fighting against a narco organization somewhere808else in the world, it is out there. You see al-Shabaab, ISIS,809even Clan del Golfo in Colombia, they have these capabilities810at the tactical edge. They are moving fast in terms of811upgrading. We need to be able to move just as fast. That is our812main challenge going forward.813    Admiral Sands. Congressman, I think our lessons learned814capability is good. We see rapid turnover of things happening815at the front edge from our allies and partners. So, I think816that is a good system that we have got, at least within Special817Operations Command.818    The challenge, and really our priority, is getting819equipment that is required for the modern battlefield rapidly820into the hands of our operators. And the reason is because they821need it to survive. And so, we would like to see -- I think822that is the challenge, not just the lessons learned, but taking823what we are learning and turning it quickly into real824capability within our force.825    General Conley. Congressman, I would answer that in two826parts.827    The first, from my air-to-ground integration force, which828is my special tactics community, I would say they are829phenomenal at taking lessons learned and turning them into830actionable things, whether that is off-the-shelf technology.831They do run into some of the same challenges that my colleagues832have mentioned. When we try to scale some of that stuff, we run833into harder procurement challenges. But they are exceptional at834learning real-time, adapting especially with small unmanned835aerial systems, both offensive and defensive.836    On the other hand, I would say, for my aircraft fleet, our837modifications take too long. They are pricey and just the838nature of our depot system, our procurement system, they take a839long time. And my concern is that, by the time we get a fleet840of 50 aircraft of any flavor updated to where they need to be,841the technology is already irrelevant. So, it is this constant842loop of trying to catch up with the enemy threat.843    We largely overcome that by training our way out of it to844the extent we can through developing of new tactics and845procedures, but that is only a small piece of what we really846need as far as advanced modifications.847    General Braga. Yes, Congressman.848    Approximating the problem is critical. Regardless of where849modern warfare is happening around the globe, we garner these850lessons learned and pass them back to the Joint Force very851well.852    Our people are great at innovating, have fantastic ideas,853but we struggle with rapid innovation, I would say funding, and854even processes, where we treat similar modifications of drones,855commercial off-the-shelf drones, and do a modification, but it856is treated as a major end item in the acquisition kind of lens,857which sometimes can take months or years. And we are not858existentially motivated like some of our partners are in859different theaters out there. So, we have a lot of work to do860on the innovation funding and the oversight processes to make861them more streamlined.862    Mr. Crow. Thank you.863    And very briefly, one additional question. I would ask you864all to keep it to 30 seconds, so we can make sure the other865members have some time.866    But, you know, I said in my opening that the quality of the867people is our biggest asset. Can you just speak briefly, each868of you in your Services, about the challenge of recruiting and869maintaining the force right now? Because I know everyone is870challenged across the board.871    We will start on this side, General Braga.872    General Braga. Thank you, Congressman.873    First of all, retention is very high in Special Operations874Forces, from data pulling that we do, because of a sense of875purpose and, honestly, family support. Everyone who is getting876out of Special Operations at the end of their time highlights877those two pluses of serving inside Special Operations. If you878want to be surrounded by people who want to perform above the879mid-standard and have missions of consequence and purpose, you880come to Special Operations Forces and this high satisfaction881level.882    We do need help recruiting. We do need help in everyone's883constituencies of getting our word out. We need to do a better884job of telling our story, both nationally and at the local885level. And we are working with the Army for that to tell our886story better. We haven't always been good at that. So, we do887have some work to do to improve our recruiting numbers, but888retention is as high as it has ever been.889    General Conley. I would say for both recruiting and890retention, we are stable. There's room for improvement on both891sides.892    I will go back to special tactics. That is an area where we893deliberately recruit, put them through assessment and894selection, as they come through. So, that is a small subset of895a small subset of American population that has a propensity to896serve and the physical condition to serve.897    So, we have always had a little bit of a struggle898recruiting enough to meet the attrition rates, but we are okay899there. Retention is stable, but we have high-quality900individuals in our formation, and the same people, the same901reasons we want them in our formation are the same reasons the902private sector wants to hire them. They want airline pilots.903So, we try to incentivize them through just the quality of life904and quality of mission they have.905    Like General Braga said, there is an attraction to this906mission. So, people want to serve. They want to be part of907something bigger than themselves. So, I'm not overly concerned908on the retention piece.909    For our families, I think it is universal; they care about910schools; they care about affordable housing, and they care911about medical care in the area. So, that is stuff we try to912focus on with our local civic leaders.913    Admiral Sands. Congressman, our numbers really reflect the914intake through the Navy. So, we are really grateful to the915Navy, and especially Navy Recruiting Command, because they916bring the talent in through the front door. Once it comes to917us, we have our Naval Special Warfare Center, which I consider918to be our most important command. That is where we actually919make SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen. Our numbers920are good. Our retention is good. But, again, it is just all921about getting the right people coming through the front door922into the Navy, and then, into our selection and assessment923programs.924    General Huntley. Congressman, we are a little bit925different. We don't recruit straight from the civilian926population. We only recruit from within the Marine Corps. As927you are well aware, the Marine Corps has made mission each928year. More than that, for our purposes, they have kept the929quality very high. So, our recruiting environment has been very930good. We haven't had any problems. So, we are in good shape931regarding that.932    In terms of retention, like my sister components here, we933have had a high level of retention. Once Marines are able to934get into Marine Forces Special Operations Command, they have a935tendency to stay. So, we are in good shape.936    Thank you.937    Mr. Crow. Thank you. I yield back.938    Dr. Jackson. Mr. Scott, you are recognized for 5 minutes.939    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.940    General Braga, you mentioned this, but I want to reiterate941this number. You provide just over 50 percent of Special942Operations Forces, and you are one-half of 1 percent of the943U.S. Army budget. Is that correct? Is that what I heard you944say?945    General Braga. Yes, sir, we receive the majority of our946budget from Special Operations Command through P11 funding.947    Mr. Scott. Okay. One of the things that we don't talk about948enough, I don't believe, because it is a very big place, is949partner forces. Can you speak to the role that you play in950building capacity abroad and how you measure success in those951fields?952    General Braga. Yes, Congressman.953    Ultimately, we have a fantastic relationship, global and954generational relationship around the world, built on the955bedrock of the last 20 years of counterterrorism missions that956are now being applied against nation-state adversaries where we957have a confluence of priorities and aligned strategic958competitors. So, these same relationships that we work on in959actually sharing blood and sweat on the battlefield are now960being applied against new problem sets. So, it is reaping961dividends there.962    I would say a measure of effectiveness, when we have963partner forces who are doing equivalent missions as good as us,964and sometimes better than us, on the battlefield that are965aligned with U.S. national security interests.966    Mr. Scott. So, Admiral, one of the things that you spoke967about -- and this is surprising to hear coming from somebody968with a trident -- you are not necessarily known for your non-969kinetic actions. And you said that non-kinetic was today one of970the most important decisive capabilities.971    Could you speak -- what I'm interested in is, as we have972watched the Russians, they have been experts at this for years,973misinformation, and that is part of what we are talking about.974But, then, we have space; we have cyber; we have spectrum.975Could you speak to that issue and why you, as a Navy SEAL, feel976like that your non-kinetic actions are your most important977actions in today's warfare? As we have learned from Putin, as978Patton said, "Russians have no regard for human life."979    Admiral Sands. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.980    The reason I say that non-kinetic effects are the most981powerful thing that Navel Special Warfare can do for modern982warfare is because that is where the modern war takes place.983The most important regions are space, and then, cyber.984    And so, our ability to get into places where other folks985can't do to enable those activities on behalf of others is986maybe our biggest value proposition. And so, it is not as much987about us taking on a target or a single-point structure; it is988more about us enabling a larger effect for the Nation.989    Mr. Scott. I'm worried about -- and I will give you a990specific example. I believe it was Mali where the French991Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance picked up where992Russians had killed several people, mass graves, and before the993information could be gotten to the government, the Russians had994spread through social media that it was the French that had995killed the people.996    General Braga, you are shaking your head. Do you know the997situation that I'm talking about?998    And the end result of that, if I'm not mistaken, is that999the French were kicked out of the country. Is that correct?1000    General Braga. That's correct, Congressman.1001    Mr. Scott. I mean, this speaks to the importance of speed1002with regard to this new type of warfare that we are talking1003about. And my question is, have our authorities changed, so1004that we can operate fast enough when we see these things, these1005messages, happening in real time to get the countermessage out1006from what the Russians are doing? It seems to me that, by the1007time we get our message out or our countermessage out, which1008would be the truth out, that the effect of the Russian1009disinformation has already occurred and forced the good guys1010out of the country. How do we fix that?1011    General Braga. Congressman, we cede the information1012environment at our own peril. It is more important to be first1013in the information environment, to set the narrative,1014especially when you are dealing with nation-states with nation-1015state-sized resources against it who leverage artificial1016intelligence, bot farms, and the rest of it. It is critical1017terrain to dominate in the information environment.1018Traditionally, it has been held at a very high level throughout1019the world of perhaps an older lens of risk acceptance. A lower1020level of risk would be very beneficial.1021    Mr. Scott. I'm almost out of time. I do think this is just1022the area we have got to improve on with the authorities and how1023we train our partner forces to address the issues in those1024countries.1025    Thank you all for your time.1026    Dr. Jackson. Mr. Keating, you are recognized for 5 minutes.1027    Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1028    I thank all of you for your service.1029    And certainly demand, I think, for Special Operations1030Forces presence all around the globe is higher than ever, given1031those demands. I mean, even in Special Operations Forces Week10322024, General Fenton really reiterated during that period the1033greater demand for the character, as the character of the1034warfare evolves, as well as the convergence of our adversaries.1035    You mentioned, General Braga, too, the bond that we have1036had with our allies and partners, how important that is. How is1037the interoperability, given what you have all said about the1038need to get specific assets in a timely fashion? What is the1039interoperability with our allies and partners and how can that1040be improved?1041    General Conley. Congressman, I can take that one first.1042    I would say just continued sets and reps. The more access,1043the more time we spend forward -- you know, I would say to my1044formation that virtual presence is actual absence, and there is1045no replacement for being forward. So, our ability to continue1046to be funded and supported, to be in a forward presence gives1047us those touchpoints.1048    And right now, we are reaping benefits of lieutenants and1049senior airmen that had interactions as lieutenants and senior1050airmen that are now lieutenant colonels and chief master1051sergeants that have had those relationships now for 20 years.1052    Mr. Keating. And I just want to shift to, General Braga1053mentioned the role as global sensors. I think that is a very1054important phrase that is there. That just doesn't mean working1055with our partners and our allies; it also means working with1056other American entities, among them, the State Department, and1057among them, USAID. And given the cutbacks we have had with1058USAID, can you speak to, particularly General Braga, the1059importance, as part of those global sensors and your ability to1060work in very difficult places in the world, having the presence1061of USAID and other American entities?1062    General Braga. Yes, Congressman. I have had the benefit to1063work with multiple embassy teams around the globe, and I think1064we are strongest when we have a unified, synchronized effort of1065all elements of national power for the United States national1066security interests.1067    Mr. Keating. Yes, the communication together, and making1068sure there is no seam, there's a seamlessness with that, can1069you comment on that, General Huntley, too?1070    General Huntley. Yes, Congressman. Although I can't speak1071directly to USAID, I will say that, outside of areas of1072declared hostility, the interface and being tied into the local1073country team, and specifically, their country plan, then helps1074Special Operations Forces with their capabilities. Whether it1075is civil affairs, whether it is information, or whether it is1076building partnership capacity, if you are integrated with that1077country team's country plan, that is the right way to do it,1078and that is also in a lot of places on the globe where we1079provide a significant amount of value.1080    Mr. Keating. Yes, I think it is not only being able to get1081information, sense things in terms of being a global sensor,1082but it is also a situation where you are building trust, and1083that trust is important when you are dealing with our other1084allies around the world.1085    Quickly, you know, a lot of this is going to be focused on1086the shift to great power and what we have to do there. Can you1087speak to what is occurring, too, with non-state actors and some1088of those challenges that still remain? The shift that we made1089is important, given what is happening and the character of1090warfare, but also we still have these non-state actors that are1091so difficult. Can anyone give us a little insight in terms of1092those challenges now?1093    General Braga. The nexus of non-state and state is, I would1094suggest, growing and I think our nation-state actors will take1095every advantage they can. Whether it is relationships with drug1096cartels or terrorist organizations, violent extremist1097organizations, every facet of power that is available will be1098leveraged by our nation-state adversaries, but the standalone1099non-governmental ones are still threats to the homeland. We1100look at Special Operations Forces as part of that solution to1101address those challenges.1102    Mr. Keating. I don't know if anyone else wants to comment1103on that.1104    General Huntley. Congressman, I talked about this a little1105bit before in my opening comments. But what we are seeing is,1106particularly non-state actors, their capabilities are1107increasing and evolving relatively fast.1108    You know, just a quick, casual look at al-Shabaab or ISIS1109in Eastern African, or even some of the narco organizations in1110South America, what they bring to the tactical fight is,1111frankly, pretty impressive. And they seem to be upgrading and1112improving quickly. That is just kind of where the tactical1113world is right now and that is where it is going. Our ability1114to keep up with that, we can identify that; we know what we1115have to do, but to be able to get those capabilities into the1116hands of our operators or a small tactical units, I would1117describe as critical.1118    Mr. Keating. I think that is important, given the nature of1119their ability to deal with AI and other assets.1120    I yield back.1121    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.1122    Mr. Kelly, you are recognized for 5 minutes.1123    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman, Dr. Jackson.1124    I, first, want to thank each of you. We conduct several1125operations in Mississippi. We do Southern Strike, which is Air-1126Force-centric and Special Operations Forces-specific. It is1127very valuable with international partners. I think that is so1128good.1129    I talked about earlier, General Huntley, our Marine1130Raiders' training and using those resources. We have Stennis.1131We have several locations. I really appreciate that and I think1132that partnership is really good. I think it helps in a state1133like Mississippi where we have the 20th Group or portions of1134the 20th Group.1135    Talking about that, I know, General Braga, that you plug1136into the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups to help you1137support global things. Is there anything we can do to improve1138those relationships? Against all Reserve and National Guard,1139Special Operations Forces forces that plug into you, what can1140we do to improve that?1141    General Braga. Congressman, thank you for the question.1142    Like the active duty component entities underneath my1143command, we do struggle with making choices on O&M, operational1144and maintenance, funding for readiness, as well as innovation.1145So, whether it is training for pre-deployment or developing a1146new drone or a new munition, it is the same tension on the1147funding there. So, we do find ourselves making difficult1148decisions of getting our National Guard Forces ready for combat1149and ready for deployment.1150    Mr. Kelly. And if any of you have comments? If not, I will1151move to the next question.1152    Admiral Sands?1153    Admiral Sands. Thanks, Congressman. Just a brief comment1154maybe on our Reserve Forces.1155    I would also offer that the condition of our Reserve1156Forces, whether it is in the Army or in the Navy, especially1157our Special Operations Reserve Forces, has really improved and1158it is a huge advantage to us now.1159    I was a U.S. Special Operations Command Africa commander1160before this. So, I had the 20th Group deploying out.1161Unbelievable capability and they are really able to back up our1162active duty forces.1163    Mr. Kelly. Thank you.1164    And just really quick, you know, we have the 127e; we have1165several different authorities that each of you use. Are there1166any new authorities that you think that we can help you get1167that help you operate? Or are there improvements or1168modifications that we could make to the current authorities1169that would help you be better at great power competition?1170    General Braga. Congressman, I would say the authorities are1171fantastic. The ability to blend those authorities on one1172singular deployment would be advantageous for us. Whether you1173are deployed and leveraging 127d or 127e, 333, or to build1174partner capacity, the ability to switch between those would be1175very advantageous for us, more flexibility. And I would argue1176again for innovation-type funding that wouldn't challenge what1177we need to build ready combat forces.1178    Mr. Kelly. And talking about that, International Military1179Education and Training, our State Department I think has1180prevented us from training almost a decade worth of people,1181military training for foreigners to come here and train, which1182later those guys wind up being the president or a minister of1183defense or the general of their armies or navy or admirals of1184their navies. How important is International Military Education1185and Training in building relationships with states, which we1186need to have great relationships to win great power competition1187in the Pacific and Africa and South America?1188    General Huntley. Yes, Congressman, like my colleague to my1189right, I'm a former TSOC commander, Theater Special Operations1190Command. I'll tell you, in South America, International1191Military Education and Training alumni are critical. The1192relationship, just the connection that builds, the affinity,1193frankly, for the United States, its culture, our way of1194government, I think pays in incredible dividends. So, I am a1195huge fan of International Military Education and Training.1196    Mr. Kelly. If we don't do that, do our competitors go give1197them training, which is lesser quality, but also changes their1198culture and values by what they learn through the military1199training that they get in our country or another country?1200    General Huntley. They will actively exploit that space.1201    Mr. Kelly. And then, the final thing is, one of the things1202I really push for is fungible funds that you guys -- and I1203think it needs to be at the two- or three-star level, whatever1204theater we are talking about -- that you can do projects,1205military-type projects, that go through the State Department.1206The ambassador would need to sign off. But we do lots of money,1207we send money to places and we send these things, but there's1208no tangible results that communities can see.1209    And I think of what I was in Djibouti and all they needed1210was a foot bridge for some kids. And it cost like $80,000 to1211do, but it was going to take us three years to do it. So, the1212Chinese just built it.1213    Would just small-amount projects where you could build a1214foot bridge, so kids don't get run over going to school, or1215those things, would that be helpful to you to build1216relationships?1217    General Braga. Congressman, it absolutely would.1218    And to answer your other question, International Military1219Education and Training is critical. I stay in contact with two1220of my foreign classmates from the Special Forces Qualification1221course three decades ago. It is absolutely critical to expand1222access and influence with true relationships, not partnerships,1223but these are real relationships.1224    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.1225    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.1226    Mr. Ryan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.1227    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1228    Thank you all for being here.1229    Building on my esteemed colleague from the South with my1230Yankee accent here, can you talk -- we have talked a lot about1231our capabilities and our capacities, rightly so. Can you1232assess, in maybe 30 seconds each, how do you assess our1233adversaries on where their Special Operations Forcecs1234capabilities are at; where they are going, whether that is in1235some of the influence operations on other continents or,1236specifically, within United States Indo-Pacific Command? I know1237that is a lot in 30 seconds. But just how do we match up and1238what should we learn from our adversaries that you all are1239implementing?1240    General Braga. Congressman, thanks for the question.1241    I don't focus solely on Special Operations Forces versus1242Special Operations Forces. I do focus on their regular warfare1243approaches and their ability to use all facets of national1244power -- economic, informational, diplomacy, lawfare,1245psychological warfare. And that concerns me, their ease of1246blending all that together for a more holistic effect.1247    Mr. Ryan. And are they way ahead of us on that? Or1248significantly ahead of us?1249    General Braga. I think there are success stories around the1250globe where they have succeeded.1251    General Conley. Congressman, I would say, from a threat1252lens, they continue to improve every day. And it goes back to1253my opening statement, where we can't keep up with the threat1254because it takes us a long time to modify.1255    But from a Special Operations lens, I think we remain the1256partner of choice, but that is fragile. You know, our lack of1257investment, or if we take our eye off a particular country or1258partnership, it is at risk of someone else exploiting that.1259    Admiral Sands. Mr. Congressman, as General Braga said, it1260is not really a Special 0perations Forces-on-Special Operations1261Forces fight most of the time, right? So, we are going at1262really assessing our adversary capabilities as the larger1263nation.1264    And what we see, certainly in United States Indo-Pacific1265Command, is we see increasing capabilities across the board. I1266think everybody is, obviously, tracking on that.1267    And then, what you are seeing, also, in places like Russia1268is they are getting greater experience through combat, through1269actual operations. And that is going to improve any country's1270capabilities. So, we are keeping a close eye on that.1271    But I would say, at least in the maritime environment, we1272still are out in front.1273    General Huntley. I will echo what my fellow commanders have1274talked about, sir. That is really their ability to diffuse1275everything, but also the freedom that they have, or freedom of1276actions they have, to, basically, turn on issues relatively1277quickly. In other words, whatever the authorities they have,1278they seem to be quicker than ours.1279    Mr. Ryan. And just kind of building on that, as you were1280saying, General Braga, before, this well-intentioned, but self-1281imposed rigidity around our different authorities and what you1282can do, when, and where, I think it is fair to say our1283adversaries are not thinking the same way, to put it lightly.1284    And any recommendations that you have to us, building on1285other questions from my colleagues, of how we can give more1286flexibility to you all to match that is something I think we1287are all very supportive of and wanting to hear and push on.1288    Switching gears with the small remaining time I have,1289General Braga, I appreciate the time we spent the other week.1290    Many of my colleagues may know this, and if so, I1291apologize, but could you just share the 18 X-Ray lessons1292learned around, not just recruitment for you all, but,1293actually, how that has affected the larger Army recruitment1294piece?1295    General Braga. Thank you, Congressman.1296    Yes, the 18 X-Ray program is critical to Special Forces.1297That is the off-the-street recruiting for Special Forces Green1298Berets, which makes up over 50 percent of our force now. We had1299a different model 20-25 years ago where it was only from the1300Army, but it is a critical lifeblood to our Special Forces1301Green Berets.1302    Since we are a high-standards organization, four out of1303five both Special Forces Green Berets and Rangers do not1304successfully make it through our rigorous assessment and1305selection. Yet, they end up being successful non-commissioned1306officers of the United States Army, which is a benefit for the1307Army and recruiting efforts.1308    Mr. Ryan. Thank you.1309    And again, a lot of you are probably not aware, but I just1310thought it was important to think about, as we are all dealing1311-- other than the Marines, of course, where I was on -- dealing1312with the recruitment challenge. And I thought it was really1313creative and impressive.1314    So, I will yield back the balance of my time. Thanks, Mr.1315Chairman.1316    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.1317    Mr. Van Orden, you are recognized for 5 minutes.1318    Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1319    Thank you, gentlemen, for coming -- and, ma'am, in the1320back. It is great to see you.1321    This is hard for me to articulate properly. We just, as Mr.1322Crow said, got done with a couple of decades' worth of,1323essentially, Counter Terrorism operations, and right now, it1324seems like Special Operations Forces is kind of looking for,1325you know, trying to find a new home.1326    And I would just caution you guys, you know, we talk a lot1327about Unmanned Arial Vehicles and Artificial Intelligence, and1328all these neato-torpedo -- information warfare, and all those1329things. But, really, at the end of the day, a frogman and a1330Raider and a Green Beret and a Ranger has got to be the guy1331that is going to go into a room and bludgeon someone to death1332with their hands. And we can't get away from that. Like we are1333a different breed of people and we have to focus on our core1334competency and that is killing the enemy, up close and1335personal, for real. And so, I just want to make sure that we1336don't lose focus on that, or we will lose, and that will not be1337tolerated.1338    So, we have a conflict between the First and Fifth Special1339Operations Forces Truths. You know, "Humans are more important1340than hardware," but also most Special Operations Force missions1341have to be enabled by non-special operations force operators,1342right? And so, I just want to caution you, gentlemen, to1343remember. There is a reason that those are written down. They1344are written in blood.1345    So, of course, we need to have enablers. We have to have1346mission specialists. We need to have people that are operating1347these technologies. But we have to have the rifleman, General.1348So, that is just a word of warning. Never forget who we are. A1349tip of the spear, the spear is held in a hand and it is thrust1350into the enemy's chest. And that is how a war is won.1351    So, when we are talking about this great power competition1352stuff, we are trying to avoid a global conflagration, right?1353Like we want to stop World War III from happening.1354    And my concern is this: if you are not posturing yourselves1355to be able to act in these denied areas without direct1356communications -- we have become so dependent on communications1357and asking for the appropriate permissions, right? So, when we1358are talking about operating in a denied area where command,1359control, communications, computers, and intelligence is,1360essentially, gone electronically, what are you guys doing, as1361component commanders, to push down execution authorities to the1362lowest possible level?1363    General?1364    General Huntley. Congressman, thank you for the question.1365    And if I could address first the part about lethality, at1366our very core, now and forever, we are a lethal force. We have1367talked about the character of war changing, but what hasn't1368changed is the nature of war. So, even though technology is1369rapidly advancing and we are doing our best to keep up, the1370nature of war demands that we still be able to fight close and1371personal.1372    Mr. Van Orden. Right on.1373    General Huntley. So, we have not changed in that regard.1374    I would have to defer questions in terms of what level the1375authorities are to the combatant commanders, to my brothers in1376the Theater of Special Operations Command, but the more1377flexibility that we have, the more that we can provide to those1378combatant commanders.1379    Thank you.1380    Mr. Van Orden. Very well. Thank you.1381    Admiral?1382    Admiral Sands. Thank you, Congressman.1383    To add onto the General's comments, and especially as a1384fellow SEAL, our basic core competencies are never going to go1385away. Like we can't ever forget that. We don't. When you talk1386about Navel Special Warfare's identity, that is fundamental.1387    And then, we also have to do these other things where we1388have to get to the target and it is really difficult to get1389there. And we need to do things that are decisive.1390    So, it is not an either/or for us. It's an all of the1391above. And I know you recognize that.1392    As far as pushing down the authorities, what we see,1393especially in United States Indo-Pacific Command, is a1394requirement -- it is going to be a different kind of fight. We1395are going to be fighting more disperse. We are going to have1396smaller elements and we have to fight through commander's1397intent, right?1398    Mr. Van Orden. Right.1399    Admiral Sands. Purpose, method, end state, we have to push1400that down, or we will have commanders who are just wondering1401what to do. So, in the absence of leadership --1402    Mr. Van Orden. That has been my experience.1403    Admiral Sands. Yes, in the absence of leadership, we lead.1404Or in the absence of orders and direction, right, we lead. So,1405that is the way that we are moving, I think, and I think I can1406say that for all of Special Operations Command.1407    Mr. Van Orden. General?1408    General Conley. Thank you, Congressman.1409    To the first point, well, outside of our special tactics1410community, which is, you know, usually partnered with --1411    Mr. Van Orden. I'm totally done.1412    A group of your guys saved one squad from SEAL Team 4 in1413Afghanistan in 20 by removing his shirt and waving his arms1414because an Apache got wings level and was going to smoke him1415with the Hellfire. So, thank you very much for saving our1416brother's life, sir.1417    General Conley. Yes, Congressman. I mean, I have the honor1418and blessing of working among heroes every day. But we also1419have --1420    Mr. Van Orden. I used to.1421    General Conley. We haven't talked much about -- I mentioned1422it as a core mission to strike, but we also have a very lethal1423force that is above our Special Operations Forces partners.1424Whether that is AC-130s, MQ-9s, or other things, we remain good1425at that job.1426    Mr. Van Orden. General, I apologize, but my time has1427expired, and I would like to give my colleagues the1428opportunity. Thank you very much for coming here today.1429    I yield back.1430    Dr. Jackson. Thank you.1431    Well, we have reached our time here. So, what we are going1432to do right now is we are going to adjourn the open session and1433we are going to immediately reconvene in 2337 for the1434classified session.1435    We will pick up in the order where we left off. So,1436everyone can ask their questions in the classified session.1437    Before we leave, I just want to make one comment. I want to1438thank you all for your time today. I want to thank you for your1439service to our country.1440    I want to thank everybody in this room that is in uniform1441right now for your service to our country, for the sacrifice1442that you and your families endure on a daily basis to keep us1443safe. So, thank you all.1444    And with that, we are adjourned.1445    [Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]1446=======================================================================14471448                            A P P E N D I X14491450                           February 26, 20251451=======================================================================14521453              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD14541455                           February 26, 202514561457=======================================================================14581459    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]14601461=======================================================================14621463              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING14641465                              THE HEARING14661467                           February 26, 202514681469=======================================================================14701471             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON14721473    General Braga. The Army views their Special Operations1474Forces as integrated, interoperable, and innovating across the1475spectrum of conflict on behalf of the Joint Force. Special1476Operations Command and ASD SO/LIC are currently assisting OSD1477and the services with accurately modeling SOF through wargaming1478and simulation analysis.ARSOF are in high demand. USASOC was1479able to fill 95.46% of validated requirements from Theater1480Special Operations Commands and Geographic Combatant Commands1481for the current fiscal year. We fill what requirements we can1482while maintaining unit integrity, regional alignment, and1483appropriate deploy-to-dwell ratios. If we do not fill a1484requirement, it is either in order to maintain those tenants,1485or, due to a lack of personnel.  [See page 11.]1486=======================================================================14871488              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING14891490                           February 26, 202514911492=======================================================================14931494             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON14951496    Dr. Jackson. Can you provide us the number or percentage of1497requests you receive from the GCC's for support that were not able to1498execute and generally why you are not able to fulfill the request?1499Please include the total number of requests for forces/capability.1500    General Braga. USASOC receives requirements from Geographic1501Combatant Commanders or Theater Special Operations Commanders once1502validated by Special Operations Command. USASOC was able to fill all1503but 37 of 816 (95.46%) validated requirements from Theater Special1504Operations Commands and Geographic Combatant Commands for the current1505fiscal year. We fill what requirements we can while maintaining unit1506integrity, regional alignment, and appropriate deploy-to-dwell ratios.1507If we do not fill a requirement, it is either in order to maintain1508those tenants, or, due to a lack of personnel.1509    Dr. Jackson. What impact will the cuts to Army SOF have on your1510ability to meet GCC requirements and support the joint force?1511    General Braga. Further cuts will have an impact on USASOC's ability1512to generate forces in support of Theater Special Operations Commands1513and the Geographic Combatant Commands. USASOC will continue to commit1514available personnel against prioritized requirements while balancing1515our mandate to generate trained and ready forces. Additionally, to1516mitigate the effects of any potential cuts, USASOC is providing conus-1517based support by centralizing select capabilities to conduct analysis1518and planning support to deployed units from home station.1519    Dr. Jackson. Can you provide us the number or percentage of1520requests you receive from the GCC's for support that were not able to1521execute and generally why you are not able to fulfill the request?1522Please include the total number of requests for forces/capability.1523    General Conley. In Fiscal Year 2025, Air Force Special Operations1524Command received a total of 61 requests from 5 Geographic Combatant1525Commanders to deploy a total of 5,601 personnel - the Command was able1526to fill 47 (77%) of these requests (2,585 Air Commandos). The Command1527remains 100% committed for Force Elements, in addition to Department of1528the Air Force Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and Special Operations1529Forces ad-hoc requirements. In support of EUCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM,1530SOUTHCOM, and AFRICOM, the Command has deployed 3.5 Special Operations1531Task Groups, 11 Special Operations Task Units, and 6.5 Special Tactics1532Teams, in addition to 66 ad-hoc and AEF taskings. My objective is to1533provide a lethal, capable, and responsive force to the Geographic1534Combatant Commanders to protect the Homeland and support the1535President's objectives.1536    Dr. Jackson. Can you provide us the number or percentage of1537requests you receive from the GCC's for support that were not able to1538execute and generally why you are not able to fulfill the request?1539Please include the total number of requests for forces/capability.1540    General Huntley. In Fiscal Year 2024, we received a total of 571541requests from the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to deploy an1542additional 134 personnel across all seven GCCs beyond those already1543scheduled to deploy. After carefully evaluating each request, we were1544able to fulfill 3 staff support requests, accounting for 7 personnel,1545with 2 requests supporting INDOPACOM and 1 supporting EUCOM.To provide1546further context, we actively review and prioritize all requests based1547on operational requirements and resource availability. Unfortunately,1548we were unable to execute 54 of the 57 requests (94.73%) due to various1549constraints, including competing operational demands, limited personnel1550and unit of action availability, and existing deployment commitments.1551We are working closely with the GCCs to understand their priorities and1552requirements, and we are exploring ways to enhance our support to these1553critical commands. By doing so, we aim to increase our responsiveness1554to emerging requests and improve our overall support to the GCCs and1555the Joint Force.1556    Dr. Jackson. Can you provide us the number or percentage of1557requests you receive from the GCC's for support that were not able to1558execute and generally why you are not able to fulfill the request?1559Please include the total number of requests for forces/capability.1560    Admiral Sands. In Fiscal Year 2025 to date, GCCs have requested1561Naval Special Warfare (NSW) force elements and Individual Augmentation1562in support of 79 theater campaign activities validated by the Joint1563Staff.Of these 79 total requirements, 50 were baseline requirements1564(submitted via the annual requirements cycle) and 29 have been emergent1565(out-of-cycle) requirements.Of the 50 baseline requirements, NSW did1566not source 10 (20% unfulfilled). Of the 29 emergent requirements thus1567far, NSW did not source 7 (24% unfulfilled). (Note: Request for1568Individual Augmentation normally include multiple personnel under a1569single requirement.)In aggregate, NSW was unable to source1570approximately 22% of the requirements, generally due to a lack of1571inventory of the force element or service member specialty requested or1572lack of ability to provide the forces on an enduring (vice episodic)1573basis if required.1574                                 ______15751576             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAMADEH1577    Mr. Hamadeh. The Army recently announced a reduction of 3,0001578positions in Special Operations Forces, including cuts to the 8th1579Psychological Operations Group. This decision comes at a time when1580adversaries like China and Iran are heavily investing in information1581warfare and propaganda efforts.Why is the Army reducing its information1582warfare capabilities instead of expanding them to counter these1583threats?1584    General Braga. USASOC, as a Title 10 Headquarters, provided inputs1585to HQDA's Total Army Analysis throughout the process. With respect to1586psychological operations forces, USASOC examined where to divest of1587legacy capabilities to invest for the future operating environment.Of1588note, we are also committed to and participate in the Army's Continuous1589Transformation initiatives. To that end, USASOC is integrating its1590psychological operations capabilities within our Special Forces Groups1591to enable more cohesive information operations.1592    Mr. Hamadeh. Did the Army conduct an analysis of how these cuts to1593Special Operations Forces might impact our ability to compete in1594information warfare against adversaries like China?1595    General Braga. The Army did conduct analysis-and included USASOC in1596the dialogue-on how cuts to SOF might impact the US Government's1597ability to compete against our adversaries. The Army also trusted all1598of its subordinate headquarters, such as USASOC, with deciding how to1599establish the right mitigation methods to meet the intent of TAA while1600preserving capabilities.With respect to psychological operations1601forces, USASOC examined where to divest of legacy capabilities to1602invest for the future operating environment. Of note, USASOC is1603integrating its psychological operations capabilities within our1604Special Forces Groups to enable more cohesive information operations.1605    Mr. Hamadeh. Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga 8) Mr. Hamadeh. The1606Army's white paper on force structure transformation states that1607reductions prioritize positions that are "historically vacant or hard1608to fill." However, recent data shows record-high enlistment under1609President Trump's administration.If recruitment challenges are no1610longer a primary issue, why is the Army still pursuing these cuts to1611SOF?1612    General Braga. Recruiting remains a top priority for the Army and1613USASOC. US Army Recruiting Command and HQDA are best postured to1614address the broader state of recruiting and separately, the future Army1615End Strength.TAA cycles do not wholly align with other variables, such1616as SOF recruiting and retention-which has its own unique timeline.1617Specifically, given ARSOF's unique training pipelines for our various1618military occupational specialties, broader successes may not manifest1619in our formations for 1 to 3 years. Despite these challenges, our1620standards remain high.1621    Mr. Hamadeh. Will you commit to reversing these reductions and1622rebuilding psychological operations teams? If not, will you at least1623commit to halting further reductions without consulting Congress?1624    General Braga. HQDA is best postured to address the broader state1625of future Army End Strength. As the USASOC Commander, I understand the1626value of psychological operations and continue to commit to advocating1627for our capabilities based on lessons learned throughout the operating1628environment wherever possible.Additionally, all commanders have a1629responsibility to contribute to information operations. As the1630commander of ARSOF and proponent for three specific military1631occupational specialties, I further commit to increasing the1632cohesiveness of information operations wherever able and making the1633most capable PSYOP forces with the resources provided.1634    Mr. Hamadeh. As adversaries like China and Iran continue to expand1635their influence through unconventional means, how is SOCOM adapting its1636core activities-such as unconventional warfare and information1637operations-to maintain a competitive edge in contested environments?1638    General Braga. US Special Operations Command addressed its1639adaptation of its core activities in the SOF Renaissance publication in1640late 2024. It is "returning to its roots of unconventional warfare"1641while balancing the needs of readiness, modernization, and operations.1642ARSOF were created for this era and are well postured moving forward.1643    Mr. Hamadeh. Given rising demands on Special Operations Forces1644amidst finite resources, what specific investments or policy changes1645are needed to ensure SOF remains ready, lethal, and adaptable in this1646era of great power competition?1647    General Braga. Investments and policy are the purview of others1648(such as Congress, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special1649Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the Military Department1650Secretaries, and Commander, United States Special Operations Command).1651To address the challenges previously described in my testimony, I ask1652for your continued support for our efforts to:1653    Establish an irregular warfare headquarters to address1654transregional threats posed by our adversaries.1655    Remove barriers to establishing and training multidomain capable1656units of action and the required and associated individual expertise.1657    Reexamine our doctrine to best integrate with the Army and Joint1658Force Warfighting concepts.1659    Create linkages between USASOC, Space and Missile Defense, and1660Cyber Commands will best enable us to support the Joint Force and the1661Army.As I stated in my testimony, I see several challenges based on1662observations of the current operating environment:1663    DoD's funding, acquisition processes, and bureaucracies are not1664optimized to innovate at the speed of need.1665    Current fiscal authorities are not structured to meet the needs of1666the operating environment.1667    Our people always benefit from the greatest proximity to problems1668but require the right operational and fiscal authorities to identify1669emerging capability gaps, pioneer solutions, share innovations, and1670disseminate lessons learned.1671    Mr. Hamadeh. Arizona's Davis-Monthan Air Force Base has been1672selected as the site for AFSOC's third power projection wing under the1673"Re-Optimization for Great Power Competition" initiative. However, this1674transition is currently paused by the Pentagon.Question: Can you1675provide insight into how this pause will impact the timeline and1676strategic importance of transitioning AFSOC operations to Davis-1677Monthan?1678    General Conley. The establishment of an AFSOC Power Projection Wing1679at Davis Monthan is separate from, and not impacted by, the larger1680Reoptimization efforts currently on pause. The strategic basing1681decision is awaiting National Environmental Policy Act analysis1682completion to move to final decision.The Final EIS Notice of1683Availability was published in the Federal Register on 14 March 20251684with a review period end-date of 14 April 2025. We anticipate an1685Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Record of Decision and the1686Strategic Basing Decision to be made in the Summer of 2025 (FY25/Q3).1687(https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2025-04109/p-6)1688    Mr. Hamadeh. What steps can Congress take to ensure AFSOC's third1689power projection wing transfer remains on track and supports Arizona's16908th District?1691    General Conley. Fund Air Force Military Construction requirements1692within the Future Years Defense Program to ensure the timely completion1693of the planned 492d Special Operations Wing beddown at Davis-Monthan1694AFB1695    Mr. Hamadeh. As adversaries like China and Iran continue to expand1696their influence through unconventional means, how is SOCOM adapting its1697core activities-such as unconventional warfare and information1698operations-to maintain a competitive edge in contested environments?1699    General Conley. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is in1700a state of transformation - adapting into the force needed to operate1701in this new reality. Today, Air Commandos deploy through a force1702generation model, providing a repeatable, predictable, and sustainable1703solution to present AFSOC forces. AFSOC counters our adversaries' use1704of coercive statecraft in competition by, with, and through our Allies1705and partners. Leveraging long-standing relationships, AFSOC uses our1706access and placement to conduct asymmetric activities that challenge1707our competitors' capabilities. AFSOC also supports irregular warfare by1708employing Special Operations Air Advisors and other SOF experts to1709conduct specialized activities to enhance our ally and partners1710capabilities for competition and conflict. This enables them to share1711the burden of their own defense. These activities help develop the1712United States as a partner of choice creating interoperable and1713integrated partnerships. Encouraging our Allies and partners to focus1714on areas in which they have a competitive advantage allows AFSOC to1715focus on areas that support our own national defense.1716    Mr. Hamadeh. Given rising demands on Special Operations Forces1717amidst finite resources, what specific investments or policy changes1718are needed to ensure SOF remains ready, lethal, and adaptable in this1719era of great power competition?1720    General Conley. AFSOC enables the Joint Force by delivering SOF1721mobility, strike, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)1722and air to ground integration across the spectrum of competition and1723conflict. To maintain readiness, lethality, and adaptability, AFSOC1724must be able to invest now in the things it will need later, providing1725our force with the right tools to prevail across the spectrum of1726conflict, supported by agile acquisitions processes, and reducing1727barriers to unit fielding and employment of emerging technologies.1728AFSOC will modernize via resilient and distributed command and control;1729resilient position, navigation, and timing; modernized data links;1730effective radio frequency countermeasures; crypto modernization; and1731proliferated low-earth orbit satellite connectivity. Future all-domain1732effects must be adaptable and modular, allowing them to be tailorable1733to a range of threats while being survivable. Adaptive airborne mission1734networks will allow a single operator to control multiple unmanned1735aerial systems, providing mass ISR and an expanded magazine of kinetic1736and non-kinetic effects. Our aircraft must be updated with capabilities1737enabling long-range penetration and survivability for strike and1738specialized mobility operations. Our Special Tactics Airmen need1739critical sensing and enhanced communication abilities, robust command1740and control, and resilient air-to-ground integration.AFSOC welcomes1741further discussion at higher classification levels.1742    Mr. Hamadeh. As adversaries like China and Iran continue to expand1743their influence through unconventional means, how is SOCOM adapting its1744core activities-such as unconventional warfare and information1745operations-to maintain a competitive edge in contested environments?1746    General Huntley. As adversaries like China and Iran expand their1747influence through unconventional means, U.S. Special Operations Command1748(SOCOM) is adapting its core activities to maintain a competitive edge1749in contested environments. At Marine Forces Special Operations Command1750(MARFORSOC), we are proactively integrating operations in the1751information environment (OIE) capabilities, including cyber, space, and1752influence, to deliver strategic effects in support of Geographic1753Combatant Commanders (GCCs). We developed this integrated employment1754concept in close coordination with the Marine Corps, Joint Force, and1755inter-agency partners, and we are now expanding it to additional GCCs1756to address their most pressing strategic requirements.Additionally, to1757mitigate risks in this contested environment, we are developing and1758implementing new policies that standardize personal and operational1759communication mechanisms, techniques, and procedures for both CONUS1760training and forward-deployed operations. By establishing these1761standardized protocols, we are reducing the risk of adversary1762collection and aggregation of unclassified data, which will1763significantly decrease the overall risk to our force and mission in1764support of GCCs. We are taking a proactive and coordinated approach to1765enhance our unconventional warfare and information operations1766capabilities, ensuring that MARFORSOC remains a key contributor to the1767success of our GCCs and the broader SOCOM enterprise.1768    Mr. Hamadeh. Given rising demands on Special Operations Forces1769amidst finite resources, what specific investments or policy changes1770are needed to ensure SOF remains ready, lethal, and adaptable in this1771era of great power competition?1772    General Huntley. Globally deployed Special Operations Forces1773working with allies and partners in competition and conflict are1774witnessing incredible advances in tactical sensing and lethality,1775especially with small robots. SOF formations are advising and assisting1776allies and partners in the development and employment of capabilities1777that are unavailable to SOF formations because of legacy acquisition1778models (to include requirements generation and test and evaluation) and1779lack of funding to create a small, attritable robot innovation culture.1780    Mr. Hamadeh. As adversaries like China and Iran continue to expand1781their influence through unconventional means, how is SOCOM adapting its1782core activities-such as unconventional warfare and information1783operations-to maintain a competitive edge in contested environments?1784    Admiral Sands. NSW is maintaining its competitive edge by1785incorporating more man-portable, boat-portable, and vehicle-portable1786combat systems into the tactics, techniques, and procedures for our1787core activities. These next-generation combat systems use advanced1788technologies to increase their power density, mobility, reliability,1789survivability, and lethality. With these systems - which can be manned,1790unmanned, or unattended - SOF teams can mitigate combat risks by1791standing off from longer ranges, advising partners remotely, scaling up1792actions with swarms and automation, and minimizing SOF footprints.1793These advancements enable SOF to maneuver deeper into denied1794environments, remain inconspicuous, target more precisely, and gauge1795our lethality better.which enables SOF actions to more effectively1796support our partners and allies as they are less disruptive and1797destructive than conventional wide-area strikes.In the cases of1798Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense, SOF's improving1799survivability and lethality is enabling US forces to provide effective1800support to partners that helps preserve their legitimacy and1801resilience.Smaller, more survivable, and more lethal teams in contested1802environments rely even greater on effective, long range communications1803and information operations.Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC)1804supports the Joint Force through information Operations/Operations in1805the Information Environment (IO/OIE) by incorporating non-kinetic1806effects to complement kinetic actions and asymmetrically counter the1807activities of our adversaries.We may use the following Information1808Related Capabilities to this end:1809    Operations Security1810    Military Deception1811    Military Information Support Operations/Psychological Operations1812    Electronic Warfare1813    Cyber Operations1814    Space Control1815    Strategic Narratives1816    Special Technical Operations1817    Intelligence Support to IO/OIETo better meet operational1818requirements in contested areas, we intend to continue to increase the1819number of personnel trained in IO/OIE and to leverage emergent1820technologies.1821    Mr. Hamadeh. Given rising demands on Special Operations Forces1822amidst finite resources, what specific investments or policy changes1823are needed to ensure SOF remains ready, lethal, and adaptable in this1824era of great power competition?1825    Admiral Sands. We still require strategic investments in personnel,1826platforms, technology, and infrastructure to remain ready, lethal, and1827adaptable in this era of Great Power Competition (GPC). We must1828prioritize talent management, budget stability, and interagency1829collaboration to ensure our special operations forces continue to1830excel.First, humans are more important than hardware - and so is1831software! Platforms, technology, and infrastructure are key enablers of1832SOF lethality. In this next generation of warfare, we will pursue1833investments in maritime mobility, electronic warfare, unmanned systems,1834manned / unmanned teaming and advanced sensors. Our intent is to scale1835our maritime SOF capability with robots to enable Joint Force lethality1836and survivability inside denied and contested areas.Second, the1837acquisition communities supporting NSW require more flexibility and1838agility in our budgeting processes. Continuing Resolutions create major1839disruptions and reduce our ability to man, train, and equip "ready,1840lethal, and adaptable forces." A stable and predictable budget allows1841us to plan and execute with greater precision, as well as partner1842effectively with the Defense Industrial Base, ensuring that our1843personnel receive the training and equipment they need to stay ahead of1844the curve.Third, we must prioritize talent management and retention1845strategies within our active duty and civil service workforce. Our1846personnel are our greatest asset, and it's essential that we continue1847to invest in their development, whether through education, mentorship,1848or career advancement opportunities. NSW will continue to work with the1849Navy to recruit the best talent for assessment and selection. This will1850help us retain top talent and maintain our competitive edge.Finally, we1851need to focus on building stronger relationships with our interagency1852partners and allies. As we face more complex global challenges, it is1853essential that we collaborate more effectively across the spectrum of1854conflict - from crisis response to combat operations.18551856                                  [all]