Assessing the Threat to U.S. Funded Research

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                          ASSESSING THE THREAT5                        TO U.S. FUNDED RESEARCH6=======================================================================7                               HEARING89                             BEFORE THE1011                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS12                             AND OVERSIGHT1314                                 OF THE1516                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,17                             AND TECHNOLOGY1819                                 OF THE2021                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2223                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2425                             FIRST SESSION2627                               __________2829                             MARCH 5, 20253031                               __________3233                            Serial No. 119-43435                               __________3637 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology3839 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4041       Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov4243                               __________4445                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4658-978 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 202647=======================================================================4849              COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY5051                   HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chairman52RANDY WEBER, Texas                   ZOE LOFGREN, California, Ranking53JIM BAIRD, Indiana                       Member54DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon55JAY OBERNOLTE, California            HALEY STEVENS, Michigan56CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee         DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina57DARRELL ISSA, California             ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon58CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York             VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina59SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida              EMILIA SYKES, Ohio60MAX MILLER, Ohio                     MAXWELL FROST, Florida61RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              GABE AMO, Rhode Island62MIKE COLLINS, Georgia                SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia63VINCE FONG, California               LUZ RIVAS, California64DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         SYLVESTER TURNER, Texas65KEITH SELF, Texas                    SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware66PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         LAURA GILLEN, New York67SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          GEORGE WHITESIDES, California,68JEFF HURD, Colorado                       Vice Ranking Member69MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida            LAURA FRIEDMAN, California70MIKE KENNEDY, Utah                   APRIL McCLAIN DELANEY, Maryland71NICK BEGICH, Alaska                  JOSH RILEY, New York72VACANT73                                 ------7475              Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight7677                 HON. RICH McCORMICK, Georgia, Chairman78DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              EMILIA SYKES, Ohio,79DARRELL ISSA, California                 Ranking Member80PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon81NICK BEGICH, Alaska                  LUZ RIVAS, California8283                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S8485                             March 5, 20258687                                                                   Page8889Hearing Charter..................................................     29091                           Opening Statements9293Statement by Representative Rich McCormick, Chairman,94  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on95  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    1096    Written Statement............................................    119798Statement by Representative Emilia Sykes, Ranking Member,99  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on100  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    12101    Written Statement............................................    13102103Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Committee on104  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    14105    Written Statement............................................    16106107Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,108  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of109  Representatives................................................    17110    Written Statement............................................    18111112                               Witnesses:113114Mr. John F. Sargent Jr., Retired, Specialist in Science and115  Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service116    Oral Statement...............................................    19117    Written Statement............................................    22118119Mr. Jeffery Stoff, President, Center for Research Security &120  Integrity121    Oral Statement...............................................    40122    Written Statement............................................    42123124Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and125  Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy, MIT126    Oral Statement...............................................    84127    Written Statement............................................    86128129Discussion.......................................................    95130131             Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions132133Mr. John F. Sargent Jr., Retired, Specialist in Science and134  Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service..............   112135136Mr. Jeffery Stoff, President, Center for Research Security &137  Integrity......................................................   132138139Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and140  Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy, MIT....   139141142            Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record143144Article submitted by Representative Emilia Sykes, Ranking Member,145  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on146  Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives147    ``Exclusive: US intel shows Russia and China are attempting148      to recruit disgruntled federal employees, sources say,''149      Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, CNN...   148150151                          ASSESSING THE THREAT152                        TO U.S. FUNDED RESEARCH153154                              ----------155156                        WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2025157158                  House of Representatives,159      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,160               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,161                                                   Washington, D.C.162163    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in164room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rich165McCormick [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.166[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.001167168    Chairman McCormick. The Subcommittee on Investigations and169Oversight will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is170authorized to declare recess in the Subcommittee at any time.171I'd like to now recognize myself for 5 minutes for opening172remarks.173    And first of all, I'd like to thank you all, my guests, for174coming here today on my first chair. It's exciting to have here175some delightful experts in our oversight, and it's also an176honor to have my Ranking Member Sykes here with me today.177    I want to lay out our objectives and how we're going to run178our Committees from here on out. In reference to former Chair179Gallagher in a Subcommittee I was a part of, we'll start on180time, we'll stay on time, and we'll not use acronyms to the181best of our abilities because most people don't understand182acronyms, even the people that use them, I've found, in the183military.184    I even practiced this too, so this is great.185    All right. Our country is in a unique position to collect186talent from all over the world. I think this is one of our187greatest strengths for the last several decades, and it's made188us this amazing hodgepodge of talent, and it's really189accelerated our country and technologies and our ability to190lead the rest of the world to collect ideas from all over the191world and to accelerate that process through our educational192system.193    It has also made us a target. When you look at the people194who are immigrating here to do education, we have about a195million students here every year. A large portion of them are196from countries that are our peers and our rivals and that take197that technology back to their countries, and we have to be198careful of that or we'll lose our position.199    In case you haven't been keeping up with our educational200system, it's ranked, I think, 40th in the world right now. It's201not a good position to be, even when you're in the lead. You202can't just steal talent and stay in front of everybody else.203And when you're giving your information to other countries204willingly--and I think there's something to be gained from205collaboration. I think that's a good thing, but you have to be206careful. You have to be smart if you're running a business or a207country.208    I think when we have the unique and changing ways,209especially in advanced technologies, AI (artificial210intelligence), quantum, and everything else that we're teaching211our children in schools now, we have to be very, very quick to212put guardrails on that to make sure that we stay in the leading213edge of technologies and that we continue to be competitive and214actually lead the rest of the world.215    One of the things I realized that the CCP (Chinese216Communist Party) has done is they refer to our fruits as their217honey. They literally say they're coming up and suckling at218that nectar if you will, absorbing that pretty much at cost.219They don't have to invest in it. They just get to take it back220to their country and benefit from it. That doesn't necessarily221benefit the United States, though. When you have foreign222companies and professors and other people coming here to pick223the flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China, that224doesn't well--bode well for us. And we need to make sure that225this is not only a quote, but realize that this is the mantra226of the CCP right now.227    I think we need to continue to slow the leaks, make sure we228protect our technologies, and provide opportunities for our229homegrown students who will remain in America and be the future230of our technologies when we talk about developing our oversight231for this--for these technologies.232    Starting with what is firmly within our control, we should233review Federal regulations that are seen both as too burdensome234and also those that are too lenient, work with researchers and235research institutions to implement new methods to ensure236accountability is enhanced and improved as we go forward. And237we also need to ensure that grant awards have contractual238mechanisms to certify that background checks on staff are done.239    And one thing that maybe you don't realize, when I was an240associate professor at Georgia Tech and Morehouse, we had241foreign instructors. We had foreign students, matter of fact, a242large portion of them, and there's a financial advantage to243that. But I was also used as an investigator or to help244investigate from the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) a245foreign national instructor who was then arrested because they246were stealing secrets. This is a real thing, and this--and that247was a couple decades ago. It hasn't gotten better. It's gotten248worse, and we need to be careful.249    Our Nation's premier research institutes have been an all-250you-can-eat buffet for other countries right now, and251especially our adversaries. We cannot let this metaphorical252buffet continue, or we risk ceding our dominance in innovation253in scientific research. I look forward to the witnesses'254testimony today informing our Committee on the steps we can255take to reverse these current vulnerabilities and enlighten us256on what we can do better.257    [The prepared statement of Chairman McCormick follows:]258259    Our country is unique in that we attract the most brilliant260minds around the world to study and learn here. This quality261raises the bar domestically and has allowed us as a nation to262be leaders of innovation. Unfortunately, this has also made us263a target. Countries that do not play fair and want to thwart264our intellectual property laws and other domestic protections265are finding unique and ever-changing ways to acquire our266innovations. This not only unfairly inflates the profitability267of these foreign companies, but it also discourages and stifles268progress at home.269    America's innovation is threatened by carelessness and the270prying eyes of our adversaries. The Chinese Communist Party271(CCP) has made it clear they are taking an ``all of country''272approach to acquire sensitive information as early as possible273and as quickly as possible. They have referred to the fruits of274our innovation as ``honey'' and told the entirety of their275country: researchers, professors, grad students, companies, and276school children alike that they should ``pick flowers in277foreign lands to make honey in China.'' This is not only a278quote, but a mantra by the CCP to their academic and commercial279base.280    The age of this quote and the number of times Congress has281had hearings like this should underscore the fact that research282security is not a new issue. For the last 20 years we as283government have taken the issue seriously, especially as it284applies to the CCP. U.S. taxpayers should not be subsidizing285Chinese research and development, ever. Congress and the286executive branch have made efforts, both legislative and287administrative, to slow the leaks and combat the problem.288    Despite research security being directly tied to our289national security and advancement, our efforts seem to have290achieved limited success.291    We can look at the following opportunities for improvement:292      Starting with ourselves, we should review federal293regulations that are both too ``burdensome'' and ``lenient'' at294the same time.295      Researchers and research institutions are not296diligent enough with mitigating threats of research security,297we need new methods to ensure this accountability is enhanced298and iterated on.299      Grant awards need to be paired with contractual300mechanisms to ensure oversight is conducted and appropriate301enforcement actions are taken on violators.302    Our goal here today is to learn about the state of play and303determine how we can adjust and do better. I fear that our304nation's premier research institutions have been all-you-can-305eat buffets which our adversaries are using to consume untold306numbers of innovative ideas. If this issue is not taken307seriously here, we risk ceding our dominance in innovation and308scientific research.309    In today's hearing, I look forward to the witnesses'310testimony informing the Committee on what steps we need to take311next to reverse the current vulnerabilities.312313    Chairman McCormick. With that, I yield to the Ranking314Member.315    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Chair McCormick, and congratulations316on your chairmanship of this Subcommittee. Your practice rounds317served you well. I also look forward to working with you and318the entire Subcommittee for ensuring that we have robust and319productive meetings in order to help serve the science320community for our country.321    Before I start my remarks, I do want to take the time to322express my condolences for the loss of one of the Members of323our full Committee, Sylvester Turner, who passed away last324night. He represented the State of Texas and was formerly the325Mayor of Houston. And my husband and I have known him for some326time, and I can't even begin to express the sadness that we327feel, not only for the city of Houston, for his family, but for328this country who has lost a great man, a great patron, and a329great American. So if you have a moment to send up a prayer or330thoughts of words of comfort for him and his family and his331community, on behalf of the Democrats in this Committee. And332hopefully, I speak for the full Committee in expressing my333condolences.334    For years, this Committee has led the way in promoting335sensible and responsible research security policy. America did336not become the world leader in science because we cowered from337our adversaries. We became the world leader because we created338a welcoming research environment that set the standard of how339global science is conducted. And while we are proud of these340values, we are also aware that adversarial governments,341including the People's Republic of China (PRC), often take342advantage of our system and exploit its openness. But our343response should not be to let our opponents fundamentally344change our American scientific culture, and in turn, make it345difficult for our researchers to address our most pressing346national challenges.347    As a proud Representative of Ohio's 13th Congressional348District in northeast Ohio, I know what's at stake. Ohio's 13th349is home to a tech hub that received $51 million in CHIPS and350Science investment to leverage Akron's national leadership in351polymer science and sustainable polymers. From sustainable352tires to cutting-edge polymers, the next generation of rubber353and plastic products will happen in my district.354    This opportunity was not, however, created in a vacuum. It355was made possible by fundamental researchers around the world356working together on chemistry and engineering. Researchers at357the University of Akron worked on these fundamental chemistry358problems within a global science community, and we have359benefited from international partnerships, and we welcome the360best minds from around the world to allow our Nation and our361expertise to grow.362    Of course, we recognize that there are valid research363security concerns, and this Committee has worked in a364bipartisan way to address these issues, including through the365landmark CHIPS and Science Act that was passed in a bipartisan366way, and we will continue to fight to maintain the CHIPS and367Science Act. I know we heard some contrary conversation368yesterday at the address from the President.369    Among its many actions, CHIPS and Science authorized the370National Science Foundation (NSF) to maintain a research371security office that works closely with law enforcement372intelligence communities to address many of these concerns from373a Federal agency perspective. This office, in conjunction with374efforts from other SST (Science, Space, and Technology)375agencies in the White House Office of Science and Technology376Policy (OSTP), has created research security training modules,377created frameworks to assess grant proposals for national378security risks, and issued commonsense disclosure forms for use379across grantmaking agencies.380    Since the Committee began looking at this issue in 2018,381universities have also stepped up to the plate, examining their382own research enterprise and identifying ways to make it more383secure. MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), for384example, compiled a report in 2022 that investigates how our385premier research institutions can promote research security386while preserving open scientific research, open intellectual387exchange, and the free flow of ideas and people. I look forward388to hearing about Dr. Zuber's experience co-chairing the389National Academies' roundtable where academies, industry, law390enforcement, and intelligence community worked to come to a391common understanding of research, security threats, and best392practices.393    It is my hope that this Committee continues to be a394productive place to hold these very important conversations,395particularly as we are witnessing attacks to the very core of396our Federal research enterprise. Just as we must be clear-eyed397about the threat posed by foreign adversaries, I hope my398colleagues on both sides of the aisle don't shy away from399speaking out when their own government weakens the United400States' standing on the international stage. If we do not401maintain American leadership in science and technology (S&T),402we will lose what is worth protecting in the first place. And403if we don't lead, someone else will follow. I would prefer the404United States leads.405    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the Committee406Members, to the staff for what I know will be a productive407Congress. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. And, Mr.408Chair, I yield back.409    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Sykes follows:]410411    Thank you, Chairman McCormick--and congratulations on your412Chairmanship of this Subcommittee. Also, thank you to our413witnesses for appearing today. For years, this committee has414led the way in promoting sensible and responsible research415security policy.416    America did not become the world leader in science because417we cowered from our adversaries, we became the world leader418because we created a welcoming research environment that set419the standard of how global science is conducted. While we are420proud of these values, we are also aware that adversarial421governments, including the People's Republic of China, often422take advantage of our system and exploit its openness. But our423response should not be to let our opponents fundamentally424change our American scientific culture, and in turn, make it425difficult for our researchers to address our most pressing426national challenges.427    As a proud representative of Ohio's 13th District, I know428what's at stake. Ohio's 13th is home to a Tech Hub that429received $51 million in CHIPS & Science investment to leverage430Akron's national leadership in polymer science. From431sustainable tires to cutting-edge polymers, the next generation432of rubber and plastics production will happen in my district.433This opportunity was not created in a vacuum. It was made434possible by fundamental researchers around the world working435together on chemistry and engineering. Researchers at the436University of Akron worked on these fundamental chemistry437problems within a global science community. We have benefited438from international partnerships, and we welcome the best minds439from around the world to grow our national expertise.440    Of course, we recognize that there are valid research441security concerns, and this committee has worked in a442bipartisan way to address these issues, including through the443landmark CHIPS and Science Act. Among its many actions, CHIPS444and Science authorized the National Science Foundation to445maintain a Research Security Office that works closely with law446enforcement and intelligence communities to address many of447these concerns from a federal agency perspective.448    This office, in conjunction with efforts from other SST449agencies and the White House Office of Science and Technology450Policy, has created research security training modules, created451frameworks to assess grant proposals for national security452risks, and issued common disclosure forms for use across grant-453making agencies.454    Since the Committee began looking at this issue in 2018,455universities have also stepped up to the plate, examining their456own research enterprise and identifying ways to make it more457secure. MIT, for example, compiled a report in 2022 that458investigates how our premier research institutions can promote459research security while preserving open scientific research,460open intellectual exchange, and the free flow of ideas and461people.462    I look forward to hearing about Dr. Zuber's experience co-463chairing the National Academies roundtable, where academics,464industry, law enforcement, and the intelligence community465worked to come to a common understanding of research security466threats and best practices. It is my hope that this Committee467continues to be a productive place to hold these important468conversations, particularly as we are witnessing attacks to the469very core of our federal research enterprise.470    Just as we must be clear-eyed about the threat posed by471foreign adversaries, I hope that my colleagues on both sides of472the aisle don't shy away from speaking out when our own473government weakens U.S. standing on the international stage. If474we do not maintain American leadership in science and475technology, we will lose what is worth protecting in the first476place.477    Thank you, I yield back.478479    Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member Sykes. It's a480pleasure. And with that, I recognize Chair Babin. And thank you481for joining us today this morning, sir, for your opening482remarks.483    Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, really appreciate484it. And the first thing I want to say is--excuse me. Man, I'm485sorry. I want to thank Ranking Member Sykes for that news, very486sad. I want to express my condolences at the loss of former487Mayor and our fellow Member of this Committee of Sylvester488Turner. I'm absolutely shocked. I knew he had been having some489health problems, but I did not know that we were going to lose490him at this early date like this. I just want to say how sorry491I am about it. I've worked with him for several years now and492really appreciated his service as Mayor of Houston. He was a493go-to guy, and he was nice. He was always a gentleman. I just494want to say how much I appreciated his service. I'm sorry for495his family and just shocked that we've lost him. And anyway,496thank you for telling us about that.497    I want to thank our witnesses as well for being here and498joining us to discuss a very serious, relevant topic, the499security threats to our Federal research enterprise. America's500leadership in science and technology was built on the501foundation of Federal investment in basic research. These502investments have enhanced our national security, strengthened503our economy, and improved the lives of our citizens. Our unique504research ecosystem, which combines Federal, academic, and505private R&D (research and development) efforts, drives506America's advancement in science and technology. However, for507this system to work, we need a degree of open science that508facilitates collaboration and transparency. The challenge is509ensuring this openness does not compromise our research510security.511    Although the United States has greatly profited from512international scientific collaboration and the contributions of513foreign-born scientists, other countries, both friend and foe,514are also benefiting from U.S. investments. And while our goal515is to ensure that all federally funded scientists adhere to the516U.S. principles of scientific fairness and integrity,517regardless of race or citizenship status, it is important to518recognize that not all nations share these values.519    As this Committee is well aware, the Chinese Communist520Party, or CCP, is determined to surpass the United States as521the global leader in science and technology by 2050 and by any522means necessary, including espionage, theft, or forced523acquisition. And I think history has borne that out, that524they're willing to do whatever it takes.525    The theft of our basic research poses a significant risk to526our global competitiveness, handing our cutting-edge527innovations to adversaries and undermining both our economy and528our ability to lead in discovery. This is no idle threat, and529it creates a serious strategic challenge. The CCP has been530explicit about its efforts to steal our research results to531further its technological progress.532    A 2023 survey by the Center for Strategic International533Studies (CSIS) found 224 reported instances of Chinese534espionage directed at the United States, and more than 1,200535lawsuits were filed by U.S. companies against Chinese entities536for intellectual property (IP) theft since 2000. In fact, even537the Chinese consulate was closed in Houston, Texas, where my538district is, from Houston over to Louisiana. It was closed back539during the first Trump Administration for some of these very540reasons. For the instances of espionage where the actor and541intent were known, 49 percent of incidents directly involved542Chinese military or government employees, 46 percent involved543cyber espionage, 29 percent sought to acquire military544technology, and 54 percent targeted commercial technologies.545    This Committee has passed multiple bills to protect546American research. Some of this legislation directed the Office547of Science and Technology Policy to coordinate efforts and548standardize requirements across all Federal science agencies to549provide a strong framework for research security. However, the550previous Administration failed to execute this framework within551the directed timeline, missing deadlines by over a year in some552cases, and provided little to no coordination and no community553engagement.554    The government needs clear and uniform guidance for our555agencies and researchers, and I'm confident that this second556Trump Administration will continue the good work of its557previous term and reopen communication channels. Effective558communication between law enforcement agencies and universities559is paramount to securing our research enterprise. Universities560need to know when researchers are targeted by nefarious actors,561and law enforcement should be aware of the participants and562conflicts of interest within our academic research ecosystem.563    This collaboration should also extend to our technology564transfer systems. Startups are an important part of our S&T565enterprise and present a vulnerability that our global566competitors are exploiting. While universities can track567licenses derived from on-campus research, they lack568transparency about the startup's investors. For instance, a569foreign entity could access sensitive research through early570investment in a startup before the technology license is even571granted, thereby avoiding a review by the Federal Committee on572Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. Clearly,573this is a complex task that requires thoughtful consideration,574but I believe that we are up to this challenge.575    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and how576we can assess and monitor these threats to our scientific577research enterprise. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to yield back.578    [The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]579580    I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today to581discuss a very serious and relevant topic: the security threats582to our federal research enterprise.583    America's leadership in science and technology was built on584the foundation of federal investment in basic research. These585investments have enhanced our national security, strengthened586our economy, and improved the lives of our citizens.587    Our unique research ecosystem, which combines federal,588academic, and private R&D efforts, drives America's advancement589in science and technology.590    However, for this system to work, we need a degree of open591science that facilitates collaboration and transparency. The592challenge is ensuring this openness does not compromise our593research security.594    Although the U.S. has greatly profited from international595scientific collaboration and the contributions of foreign-born596scientists, other countries--both friend and foe--are also597benefiting from U.S. investments.598    While our goal is to ensure that all federally funded599scientists adhere to U.S. principles of scientific fairness and600integrity, regardless of race or citizenship status, it is601important to recognize that not all nations share these values.602    As this Committee is well aware, the Chinese Communist603Party (CCP) is determined to surpass the U.S. as the global604leader in science and technology by 2050 by any means605necessary, including espionage, theft, or forced acquisition.606    The theft of our basic research poses a significant risk to607our global competitiveness, handing our cutting-edge608innovations to adversaries and undermining both our economy and609our ability to lead in discovery.610    This is no idle threat and creates a serious strategic611challenge. The CCP has been explicit about its efforts to steal612our research results to further its technological progress.613    A 2023 survey by the Center for Strategic and International614Studies found 224 reported instances of Chinese espionage615directed at the U.S., and more than 1,200 lawsuits were filed616by U.S. companies against Chinese entities for intellectual617property theft since 2000.618    For the instances of espionage where the actor and intent619were known, 49% of incidents directly involved Chinese military620or government employees, 46% involved cyber espionage, 29%621sought to acquire military technology and 54% targeted622commercial technologies.623    This Committee has passed multiple bills to protect624American research.625    Some of this legislation directed the Office of Science and626Technology Policy to coordinate efforts and standardize627requirements across all federal science agencies to provide a628strong framework for research security.629    However, the previous Administration failed to execute this630framework within the directed timeline--missing deadlines by631over a year in some cases--and provided little to no632coordination and community engagement.633    The government needs clear and uniform guidance for our634agencies and researchers. I am confident this second Trump635Administration will continue the good work of its previous term636and reopen communication channels.637    Effective communication between law enforcement agencies638and universities is paramount to securing our research639enterprise.640    Universities need to know when researchers are targeted by641nefarious actors, and law enforcement should be aware of the642participants and conflicts of interest within our academic643research ecosystem.644    This collaboration should also extend to our technology645transfer systems. Startups are an important part of our S&T646enterprise and present a vulnerability that our global647competitors are exploiting.648    While universities can track licenses derived from on-649campus research, they lack transparency about the startup's650investors.651    For instance, a foreign entity could access sensitive652research through early investment in a startup before the653technology license is granted, thereby avoiding a review by the654federal Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.655    Clearly, this is a complex task that requires thoughtful656consideration, but I believe we are up to the challenge.657    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how658we can assess and monitor the threats to our scientific659research enterprise.660661    Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And right now,662I'd like to recognize Representative Lofgren for her opening663statement.664    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking665Member Sykes. I really do hope that research security will666remain a bipartisan and productive topic for this Committee. We667have an impressive legacy of legislation and oversight on668research security for years. On both sides of the aisle, we669have maintained a deep understanding of and respect for, which670the Chairman has just mentioned, the spirit of openness that671animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike672have taken threats to research security seriously, while673understanding that in order to be the world leader in science674and discovery, we must welcome international collaboration675while guarding against espionage.676    One year ago, we sat in this hearing room and discussed the677progress that had been made on research security. Honestly,678it's difficult to have that same conversation today without679acknowledging how different our scientific enterprise looks.680The past 6 weeks have seen a widespread attack on Federal681science. Science agencies froze their awards at the order of682President Trump and Elon Musk, and recipients of these683prestigious grants were worried not only about continuing their684work, but honestly, about paying their bills. They now only685have certainty for as long as the temporary restraining orders686last.687    Scientists across the Federal Government were fired in688sweeping terminations of probationary employees. And it's worth689noting that, you know, probationary employees are people who690received a merit-based promotion and were in a probationary691status for the promotion, so we have singled out the most692meritorious scientists for termination. And the Administration693is demanding that more be fired. This will impede agencies'694ability to disburse congressionally authorized grant money,695among other crucial functions. The rug has really been pulled696out from under our Federal scientific enterprise, which had697been the envy of the world. Now, it will be naive to think that698this won't affect our ability to attract and retain talent,699both American and foreign-born.700    This Committee has a lot to be proud of when it comes to701commonsense research legislation. CHIPS and Science bolstered702our research security resources, our agencies' resources. It703catalyzed cross-governmental harmonization of research security704policies. More needs to be done. Unfortunately, even the705progress that has been made will be undercut due to recent706decisions.707    CHIPS and Science established a research security office708within NSF. This office was seriously impacted by the709probationary firings and the resignations amidst the hostile710environment Elon Musk and DOGE (Department of Government711Efficiency) has created. CHIPS and Science also mandated that712NSF run the SECURE (Safeguarding the Entire Community of the713U.S. Research Ecosystem) Center to support and empower research714institutions to mitigate foreign interference. That center715lacks a permanent Director, and NSF can't hire one while the716hiring freeze is in place. Now, while probationary employees717are being hired back this week because of the court decisions,718there's no guarantee that the agency will get through the719coming firings without again compromising the research security720office.721    NSF is a pretty efficient agency. Only about 5 percent of722its budget is spent on agency operations and awards management.723By firing NSF employees and coercing others to resign, this724Administration harms our ability to distribute grant money to725meritorious cutting-edge research, and it's kneecapping our726research security capabilities. We might consider the title of727this hearing ``The most pressing threat to U.S.-funded research728is coming from inside the house.''729    For years now when we sat for these hearings, Democrats and730Republicans celebrated the fact that the United States was the731chosen home of world-class talent. We took pride in the fact732that nearly 80 percent of foreign-born STEM (science,733technology, engineering, and mathematics) Ph.D. recipients734chose to remain in the United States. If the destabilization of735our research ecosystem continues, we will tarnish our736reputation, and we will invite brain drain.737    I firmly support the bipartisan work that the Science738Committee has done to bolster research security. I hope we can739all stand up for that work and insist that existing laws are740enforced, and where there are remaining vulnerabilities, I hope741we can work together the way we have for years to find742commonsense solutions that respect the openness of science743first articulated at the Presidential level by Ronald Reagan in7441985. I fear that unless Republicans and Democrats alike stand745against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we will746cede our leadership to China in ways that no research security747policies can prevent.748    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.749    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]750751    Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking Member Sykes. I752really do hope that research security remains a bipartisan and753productive topic for this Committee. We have an impressive754legacy of legislation and oversight on research security. For755years, on both sides of the aisle, we have maintained a deep756understanding of, and respect for, the spirit of openness that757animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike758have taken threats to research security seriously, while759understanding that in order to be the world leader in science760and discovery, we must welcome international collaboration.761    One year ago, we sat in this hearing room and discussed the762progress that had been made across the federal government on763research security. It is difficult to have that same764conversation without acknowledging how different our scientific765enterprise looks today. The past six weeks have seen a766widespread attack on federal science. Science agencies froze767their awards at the order of President Trump and Elon Musk, and768recipients of these prestigious grants were worried not only769about continuing their work, but about paying their bills.770    They now only have certainty for as long as the temporary771restraining order lasts. Scientists across the federal772government were fired in sweeping terminations of probationary773employees, and the Administration is demanding more workforce774cuts, which will seriously impede agencies' ability to disburse775Congressionally authorized grant money, among other crucial776functions. The rug has been pulled out from under our federal777scientific enterprise, which hasbeen the envy of the world. It778would be naive to think that this will not affect our ability779to attract and retain talent, both American- and foreign-born.780    This Committee has a lot to be proud of when it comes to781common sense research securitylegislation. CHIPS & Science782bolstered our research agencies' resources and catalyzed cross-783governmental harmonization of research security policies.784Unfortunately, the progress will backslide due to recent785decisions. CHIPS & Science established a research security786office within NSF, and this office was seriously impacted by787the probationary firings and the resignations amidst the788hostile environment Elon Musk and DOGE has created. CHIPS &789Science also mandated that NSF run the SECURE Center to support790and empower research institutions to mitigate foreign791interference. That Center lacks a permanent director, and NSF792cannot hire one while the hiring freeze is in place. While793probationary employees are being hired back this week, there is794absolutely no guarantee that the agency will get through the795forthcoming RIFs without again compromising the research796security office. NSF is an incredibly efficient agency--only 5%797of its budget is spent on agency operations and awards798management.799    By firing NSF employees and coercing others to resign, this800administration is gutting our ability to distribute grant money801to meritorious, cutting-edge research and kneecapping our802research security capabilities.803    I think that we should reconsider the title of this804hearing. The most pressing ``threat to U.S. funded research''805is coming from inside the house. For years now, when we sat for806these hearings, Democrats and Republicans celebrated the fact807that the United States was the chosen home of world-class808talent. We took pride in the fact that nearly 80% of foreign-809born STEM PhD recipients chose to remain in the U.S. If the810destabilization of our research ecosystem continues, we are811actively tarnishing our reputation and inviting brain drain.812    I firmly support the bipartisan work that the Science813Committee has done to bolster research security. I hope we can814all stand up for that work and insist that existing laws are815enforced. Where there are remaining vulnerabilities, I hope we816can work together the way we have for years to find common-817sense solutions that respect the openness of science first818articulated at the presidential level by Ronald Reagan in 1985.819I fear that unless Republicans and Democrats alike stand820against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we are821ceding our leadership to China in ways that no research822security policies can prevent.823    I yield back.824825    Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member Lofgren. I826appreciate your remarks today.827    With that, Mr. John Sargent, who is not new to the halls of828Congress, has only recently retired from Congressional Research829Service, where he provided Members of Congress and their staffs830with research briefings and expert insight on the litany of831science and technology issues and policies. In addition to832being a long-term expert on our niche issues here in SST, Mr.833Sargent earned a degree in systems engineering from University834of Virginia.835    With that, I yield for your comments.836837         TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN F. SARGENT JR., RETIRED,838839          SPECIALIST IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY,840841                 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE842843    Mr. Sargent. Thank you. Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member844Sykes, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you845for the opportunity to testify today on this issue, which is of846vital importance to U.S. national and economic security.847    Let's get right down to it. China is not our friend. I wish848they were, but they're not. China is an ascendant economic and849military power that seeks global tech leadership in emerging,850enabling, and critical technologies. China has also become an851aspiring hegemonistic power. China first seeks regional852domination in East Asia and, from there, world dominance,853economically and militarily. The path to their aspirations854depends on technological preeminence.855    To realize this future, China is doing three things in856particular. They are building a world-class military and857drawing up battle plans against the United States, Taiwan, and858their regional neighbors. They have adopted a comprehensive859whole-of-nations strategy to acquire foreign technology and are860making massive investments to develop new technologies861indigenously. And they have adopted a civil military fusion862strategy to deploy this technology in both their commercial863industries and their military industrial base. More than ever,864the future of national economic and military power will be865built on technological leadership.866    Speaking broadly, we have it and they don't. That makes867American companies, laboratories, and universities China's868primary targets for the acquisition of leading-edge technology.869And China uses a wide range of--excuse me--tools to get it,870illegal and legal, among them, espionage, theft of U.S.871intellectual property, forced technology transfers from U.S.872companies, talent recruitment programs, and sending students to873study STEM in the United States, some acting as spies.874    The Soviets sought military superiority, the Japanese875economic superiority. China seeks both. China is not only a876potential military adversary like the Soviet Union during the877cold war, it's an economic juggernaut, second in GDP (gross878domestic product) only to the United States, and larger than879Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined. And unlike our880relationship with the Soviets, we are actively engaged in trade881with China, further complicating the relationship and our882ability to limit their access to U.S. technology.883    We have a myriad of academic relationships with China as884well, many on the cutting edge of research and development, and885we are educating hundreds of thousands of the best and886brightest minds from China at American universities, many in887our top graduate science and engineering programs. Much has888been done over the past 8 years to better protect U.S.889universities and their research from nefarious actors, and yet890here we are again, still trying to tamp down the seemingly891ceaseless efforts of China and other adversaries to acquire892U.S. scientific knowledge.893    Too often, government efforts have met resistance from the894academic community, which in large measure would prefer to go895about its business with no restrictions. I believe this896attitude is detrimental to U.S. national security. It should be897a core patriotic duty of every U.S. university to support,898protect, and defend the country that provides them with a home,899physical security, civil liberties, and protection of their IP,900as well as billions of dollars in research and development901funding and billions more for the education of their students.902    America needs its academic community as a full partner in903the protection of our country and its investments in academic904research. We need a sea change in the way researchers905understand their obligations to the country. They need to bring906an attitude toward making this work for America, not just a907check-the-block exercise to be met with minimal compliance. We908need the academic community to work with the Federal Government909to further develop and strengthen research security protocols,910and we need to more fulsomely implement what is already in911place.912    Similarly, we need to better protect private research. For913this, we need U.S. industry to step up as well, especially914given the growing magnitude of the private sector's investment915in R&D and its work on the bleeding edge of dual-use916technologies. In addition, we should consider whether new917regimes are needed altogether.918    Perhaps most importantly, with respect to research funding,919the U.S. Government should start with the rebuttable920presumption that science and technology cooperation with China921is not in the national interest of the United States. We should922be asking first whether any proposed research with China is923absolutely indispensable to U.S. national security, the U.S.924economy, or U.S. public health and the environment; second,925whether China is the only partner in the role with whom we can926do such proposed research; and third, whether the proposed927research advances U.S. national security, economic, or public928health interests more than it does China's. And every decision929we make needs to be informed by the answer to whether our men930and women in uniform will face these U.S.-funded technologies931on the battlefield. In the immortal words of Thomas Jefferson,932``Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.''933    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.934    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sargent follows:]935    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.009936937    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.010938939    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.011940941    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.012942943    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.013944945    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.014946947    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.015948949    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.016950951    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.017952953    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.018954955    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.019956957    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.020958959    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.021960961    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.022962963    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.023964965    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.024966967    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.025968969    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.026970971    Chairman McCormick. And thank you for your testimony.972    Mr. Jeffrey Stoff is the Founder and President at the973Center for Research Security, a not-for-profit organization974dedicated to the protection of research and innovation from975harmful foreign influence and interference. Mr. Stoff976previously spent over 18 years in the U.S. Government as a977China analyst and is recognized as an expert in technology978protection issues.979    Please give your opening statement.980981           TESTIMONY OF MR. JEFFERY STOFF, PRESIDENT,982983            CENTER FOR RESEARCH SECURITY & INTEGRITY984985    Mr. Stoff. Subcommittee Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member986Sykes, distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the987opportunity to testify today on this critically important988topic. Over the last 15 years, I focused on China's research989ecosystem and its state-driven technology transfer apparatus.990While in government, I worked closely with most Federal991agencies that fund scientific research, as well as law992enforcement and intelligence components. That support exposed993me to deficiencies and vulnerabilities in both academia and994government, which I describe in detail in my written testimony.995    For several years, starting in 2019, a few colleagues and I996exerted considerable effort compiling analyses, briefing997government leadership, and proposing programmatic changes to998address knowledge gaps and structural impediments to999safeguarding innovation security. Unfortunately, most of those1000efforts fell on deaf ears. My frustrations with continued1001inaction by agencies charged with protecting Federal research1002investments and our national and economic security drove me to1003leave Federal service in 2021 after 18 years.1004    It is past time we have candid and perhaps uncomfortable1005conversations on how China's largely unfettered access to our1006research ecosystem undermines our national and economic1007security and that China exploits and corrupts our research,1008often through the willing participation of U.S. institutions.1009And because universities are primarily run like businesses in1010that bringing in revenue is their primary objective, the1011financial incentives of universities often run counter to U.S.1012national and economic security interests.1013    Academia continues to demonstrate a systemic disregard for1014national security considerations and an indifference to or lack1015of awareness of ethical risks when collaborating with China.1016These issues persist in part because of a lack of regulatory1017oversight regarding fundamental research, which worked fine1018through the cold war but now fails to address geostrategic1019realities. Even where there are rules in place in terms of1020Federal grant contract conditions, the evidence suggests1021continued and widespread noncompliance by academia.1022    Currently, only NASA (National Aeronautics and Space1023Administration) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have1024certain research funding restrictions concerning collaborations1025with China. No other activities or sources of funding are1026proscribed. Researchers and institutions are free to partner,1027collaborate, establish cooperative programs, et cetera, with1028any PRC entity of their choosing. Academia has claimed that1029they now understand the risks much better and have a good1030handle on security concerns. Empirical studies I've produced1031and data I compiled in my written testimony prove otherwise,1032such as low estimates of over 27,000 articles published in just1033the past 5 years involving collaborations between U.S.1034institutions and PLA (People's Liberation Army) entities, PRC1035defense weapons design and production facilities, state-owned1036defense enterprises and key defense research universities.1037Additionally, neither academia nor the U.S. Government has1038taken any observable policy measures to mitigate PRC practices1039that undermine research integrity issues.1040    In addition to academia's disclosure failures to the1041Department of Education on foreign sources of funding as1042required by law, nondisclosures on Federal grants of current1043and pending support, often coming from China, persist. Many of1044those grants could have gone to other universities that didn't1045have this PRC support. For the universities acting in good1046faith, losing out on these grants can result in smaller budgets1047and fewer resources to hire Ph.D. students, attract top talent,1048et cetera, which in turn makes them less competitive on future1049grant proposals. This also translates to fewer opportunities1050for our children in the United States and an erosion of STEM1051talent pipelines.1052    Compounding these issues are structural problems in the1053government to identify and mitigate threats from China and1054monitor and force academia's noncompliance. These include each1055agency has its own research security and due diligence process.1056A lack of interagency data sharing results in duplicative risk1057assessments when done at all and inconsistent standards for1058assessing risks across Federal agencies. The U.S. Government1059also has few resources or processes in place to monitor for1060national security risks post-award of a grant or contract. And1061further handicapping these efforts is a dearth of subject1062matter expertise within both the intelligence and law1063enforcement communities.1064    A key recommendation in my testimony is to consolidate1065government research security functions into a centralized1066organization that closes persistent knowledge, regulatory, and1067policy gaps; creates efficiencies and cost savings; builds1068subject matter expertise through training analysts and1069investigators; bolsters compliance monitoring and enforcement;1070serves as a resource to assist universities in conducting risk1071assessments; disrupts China's unfettered access to federally1072funded research; and imposes real costs to China when it1073violates values of integrity and reciprocity.1074    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.1075    [The prepared statement of Mr. Stoff follows:]1076    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10771078    Chairman McCormick. Thank you for your testimony.1079    And now Dr. Maria Zuber is a Professor of geophysics and1080Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy at1081Massachusetts Institute of Technology. And from here on, we can1082actually use MIT as an acronym since I've just explained it.1083Most people have never heard of it. She's a leading university1084voice on research security and co-chaired the National1085Academies' National Science, Technology, and Security1086Roundtable. We welcome your remarks.10871088                 TESTIMONY OF DR. MARIA ZUBER,10891090             E.A. GRISWOLD PROFESSOR OF GEOPHYSICS10911092              AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FOR SCIENCE10931094                   AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, MIT10951096    Dr. Zuber. Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, and1097Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to1098testify today.1099    Striking the right balance on how the U.S. research1100enterprise should interact with China is critical to U.S.1101national security and competitiveness. Getting that balance1102right is not easy or obvious. We know that China is an1103economic, geopolitical, and military rival and that China has1104sought to advance through illicit means. Even now, when China1105has considerable strengths of its own, it tries to take undue1106advantage of U.S. research efforts. Yet cutting all ties to1107China would likely hobble the U.S. competitiveness as much as1108it would harm China.1109    Finding the right balance starts with clearly assessing1110current practices at U.S. universities. While many universities1111were slow to appreciate the threat posed by China, that has1112changed. From what I have seen as co-chair of the1113congressionally mandated National Academies' Roundtable on1114Science, Technology, and Security, universities are now largely1115aware of the legitimate concerns about China, and they have put1116in place new procedures, still a work in progress, and many1117coordinate regularly with law enforcement.1118    MIT has been a leader in responding to the changing nature1119of China. MIT was the first university to cut ties with Huawei1120more than 6 years ago. We created a special review process for1121research collaborations with China in 2019 and issued a public1122report laying out our approach to China in 2022. At MIT, any1123proposed collaboration with China is reviewed for its potential1124impact on national security, economic security, and human1125rights.1126    We do not believe, though, that research collaborations1127should be cutoff entirely. Properly structured engagement can1128be beneficial to U.S. researchers. Collaboration is also a way1129to stay abreast of developments in China, which is now a leader1130in key fields. There are also still some areas like climate1131science, food safety, and certain areas of health where there1132is much to gain from joint work and little risk. This is all1133publishable basic research.1134    Research funding from China should, of course, be1135disclosed. Congress has usefully clarified and tightened1136disclosure requirements in recent years, and National Security1137Presidential Memorandum 33 (SPM 33), with input from both the1138Trump and the Biden Administrations, and from me, by the way,1139provides an effective framework for disclosing foreign1140collaborations.1141    Perhaps above all else, it has been a critical competitive1142advantage to the United States that we are able to attract the1143top scientific talent from around the world, including from1144China. The vast majority of Chinese Ph.D. students, more than114580 percent remain in the United States after getting their1146degrees, and more likely would if our policies were more1147supportive. Students pose a relatively low security risk since1148they work in an environment where research is published. Visa1149applicants should be more rigorously vetted, but I am not aware1150of evidence that students are extensively involved in illicit1151activities. If such information exists, I'd love to see it.1152    In my written testimony, I go into some detail on existing1153policies to protect U.S. technology, where they could be shored1154up, and where they should be left alone. But I'd like to close1155here with a broader point. Protective policies are needed, but1156they're not enough. We have to strengthen our own research1157enterprise. One need look no farther than the recent1158announcement by the China--Chinese AI firm DeepSeek to know1159that restrictions may buy us some time but they will not1160prevent Chinese technological advancement.1161    We must win this race by running faster, not just by trying1162to trip up the competition. We must continue to ensure that the1163United States is a magnet for the world's top talent by1164investing in U.S. science and technology and by offering1165reliable funding for competitively awarded research projects.1166That means taking steps like funding the National Science1167Foundation, as envisioned in the CHIPS and Science Act that1168this Committee helped draft on a bipartisan basis. Instead, we1169seem to be fighting about how much to slash its budget and1170personnel, including personnel hired to bolster research1171security.1172    We shouldn't be naive about China, but that includes not1173denying its strengths. We're not going to compete successfully1174just by building a moat around the United States. We'd better1175be sure that everything we need from others, especially talent,1176can get across that moat, and we'd better be sure that nothing1177inside our moat is deteriorating.1178    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.1179    [The prepared statement of Dr. Zuber follows:]1180    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]11811182    Chairman McCormick. Thank you to my witnesses for your1183opening remarks, and now I will recognize Representative1184Harrigan from North Carolina. Welcome to our Committee, and I1185look forward to your questions.1186    Mr. Harrigan. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of1187our witnesses for your testimony today.1188    I wanted to talk about Chinese espionage in science and1189academia from the CSIS report and give you a couple examples1190here that will frame my question. In January 2020, a Harvard1191University professor and two Chinese nationals, Yanqing Ye and1192Zaosong Zheng, were indicted for attempted theft of biological1193research. Dr. Lieber was a participant in the Thousand Talents1194Plan, while actively accepting National Institutes of Health1195(NIH) and Department of Defense funding. Ye, a lieutenant of1196the PLA, compiled information on U.S. military projects for the1197CCP. Zheng committed the theft of 21 biological research vials1198to promote Chinese projects.1199    In July 2020, Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas1200professor, was indicted for wire fraud for his acceptance of1201U.S. contracting funds related to NASA and the Air Force while1202being simultaneously employed by Chinese entities.1203    In August 2020, Zhendong Cheng, a professor at Texas A&M,1204was charged with wire fraud for concealing his affiliation with1205Chinese universities and enterprises while accepting a NASA1206grant. His position allowed him access to sensitive NASA1207projects. He was also a participant of the Thousand Talents1208Plan.1209    I have only 5 minutes, so I cannot read the other countless1210examples of CCP infiltration into our national research1211apparatus, but my team compiled 58 different instances of1212various forms of research espionage that has occurred just in1213the last 6 years. So after reading this report and after1214listening to your testimony today, it is incredibly troubling,1215and I simply want to know one thing. Why do we still have any1216Chinese nationals inside of our research institutions,1217especially within institutions that participate in research1218that is critical to our national interests and our national1219security? Mr. Sargent?1220    Mr. Sargent. I have no idea. I have no idea. I don't think1221it makes any sense at all. I think we need to be far more1222secure in who we allow into this country and who we allow to1223conduct research, especially on U.S. taxpayer-funded dollars.1224And I think it's very dangerous for us not to carefully vet all1225the people that are coming to the United States to study to1226make sure that they in fact are not linked to PLA institutions1227or universities.1228    And one thing we know for sure is that not only is China1229after our technology, they are constantly adapting and adopting1230new strategies to acquire it, so we can't think we have now,1231after 4 years of efforts, reached the pinnacle of security and1232put everything in place we need to do because the Chinese are1233going to adapt to it, and they're going to find ways around it.1234So we need to--as I say, you know, eternal vigilance is the1235price of liberty, and we've got to continue to remain vigilant.1236And, again, going back to the answer to your question, I don't1237think they should be.1238    Mr. Harrigan. Thank you. Mr. Stoff?1239    Mr. Stoff. Obviously, I think this is a very complex issue.1240I think that definitely--and I agree with Mr. Sargent that at1241least within critical technology fields, within STEM fields, a1242far more rigorous process--and I talk about this in my1243testimony--that needs to be done that requires the kind of1244vetting and due diligence and assessments that have.1245    There may be other areas--like, from my perspective, any of1246the humanities and social sciences and other things, I--that's1247not a concern to me. The Chinese should come here and learn how1248our democratic governance systems work, our legal structures,1249things like that. So I think a complete and total ban doesn't--1250isn't necessarily--meet the objectives that you're seeking.1251    But I also want to point out something that I think is not1252really well understood, and that is the examples that you're1253describing relate primarily to these constructs of economic1254espionage, espionage, and intellectual property theft. And most1255of the problems and the threats that were occur--that's1256occurring on campus are none of those things. They're not1257illicit. And the scale and scope of the other ways in which1258they're acquiring technology and knowhow, is often not1259espionage, and that is completely underrepresented, not1260understood in the scale and the scope, and we need to be more1261diligent about that.1262    Mr. Harrigan. I have very limited time, so, Dr. Zuber, I1263don't know that we're going to get to you, but I think we've1264got to keep in mind here, we've got access, and we have1265placement with all of these individuals, and the CCP will exert1266leverage. That is a problem for our country. We need to deal1267with this, and we need to deal with it swiftly in our research1268institutions.1269    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.1270    Chairman McCormick. The gentleman's time has expired.1271    With that, I recognize Ranking Member Sykes for her1272questions.1273    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Dr. Zuber, I am extremely concerned1274that the weakening of our scientific enterprise will lead to1275self-inflicted research security catastrophes. On Friday, CNN1276reported that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service has1277determined that China and Russia are attempting to recruit1278Federal employees who have been laid off. Scientists are1279specifically being targeted by Chinese institutions, as seen in1280advertisements to recruit researchers in institutes in China. I1281ask unanimous consent to enter the article and the1282advertisement into the record.1283    Chairman McCormick. No objections.1284    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1285    And as the Trump Administration casts off scientists and1286destabilizes research in the name of efficiency, our1287adversaries celebrate and look to fill that vacuum. Dr. Zuber,1288can you please describe the relationship between funding our1289research enterprise and bolstering research security?1290    Dr. Zuber. OK. Thank you for that question. So absolutely,1291I mean, the fundamental basis of my testimony was that we1292absolutely need compliance. We absolutely need to keep critical1293and sensitive research secure, agree with that, but we're not1294going to get there if we don't invest, OK? So last week, also1295in the first round of funding cuts, the NSF SECURE Center,1296which was noted in the Member statements, had five out of their1297nine employees laid off in the probationary. They may get one1298back, OK? So in a very--area that we all consider high1299priority, they're laying off people.1300    So I mean, count me at the front of the line that the1301Federal bureaucracy could be more efficient and ought to be1302more efficient, but it ought to be done thoughtfully and1303strategically, and we ought to be thinking about what functions1304the Federal Government really ought to be executing and what1305functions should be done by others, and then we ought to1306identify the jobs and the employee talent that is needed to1307fill those roles.1308    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Dr. Zuber. And thank you for1309highlighting that in your testimony. And I do want to ask you1310all a question, and if you can answer it in maybe 15 words or1311less.1312    Yesterday, during the joint address to Congress, President1313Trump said, quote, ``You should get rid of the CHIPS Act.''1314Your response to that in 15 words or less?1315    Mr. Sargent. I would be happy to start. So I covered the1316CHIPS Act for the Congressional Research Service. I know it----1317    Mrs. Sykes. You're getting a little bit beyond your 151318words. We don't have the time.1319    Mr. Sargent. I think we need to be very judicious in what1320we choose to accept and reject in the CHIPS Act.1321    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Mr. Stoff?1322    Mr. Stoff. I think it needs to be continued, and it's1323really important for our innovation and security.1324    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Dr. Zuber?1325    Dr. Zuber. It needs to be continued, and there's $131326billion of R&D investment, and we have to train a new1327generation of chip makers in this country.1328    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you very much. We have heard rumors that1329DOGE has arrived at the National Science Foundation. This is1330extremely worrying under the guise of making government more1331efficient. I think we all have the idea to make government1332efficient and to curb waste, but as we've identified, some of1333this has been more of a wrecking ball rather than a scalpel.1334    When it comes to research security, that means that any1335information shared between Federal science agencies and1336universities could be ripe for--by hacking of our--by our1337adversaries, including China and Russia. Would you have1338concerns if the information at MIT, Dr. Zuber, has transmitted1339to NSF will transfer to nonsecure data servers, and what is the1340risk of research security-related information being accessed by1341unvetted DOGE representatives and potentially foreign1342adversaries?1343    Dr. Zuber. OK. Well, what I will tell you is that at MIT,1344we don't do any classified research on campus. When technology1345gets to the point where it gets complex and concerning for1346either economic or national security, we send it to a1347classified area. So nothing on campus is classified. However,1348it is intellectual property, and if it were to get out, it1349would compromise the IP of the creators, and it could1350potentially give somebody maybe a 6-month to a year head start1351on something. But ultimately, everything we do on campus is1352unclassified, so it's going to get out there eventually.1353    Mrs. Sykes. And, Mr. Sargent, if you can do it in 101354seconds--not my rule, but the Committee's--do you have any1355concern about keeping this data private?1356    Mr. Sargent. Of course I do.1357    Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Thank you1358for cooperating with me.1359    Chairman McCormick. And obviously, 5 minutes is not much1360time. We'll do a second round of questioning if anybody's1361interested to stay on. It'll be rapid, but I just want to make1362sure that--she's being great, respectful. Thank you, Ranking1363Member, for staying in your time limit. We'll have a second1364round for people who want to ask additional questions.1365    With that, I recognize Chairman Babin for his questions.1366    Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.1367    Mr. Stoff, why is it important for agencies to share1368information regarding research security threats to each other?1369Is there a better system that the Federal Government could1370adopt to analyze research security threats?1371    Mr. Stoff. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. Yes,1372yes to all. There are--it is essential, both from a compliance,1373monitoring, enforcement, investigative function to have1374interagency share in ways that they're not really doing very1375much now because of different sharing rules, authorities, what1376have you. And this is a particular problem with academic1377research because a lot of the issues in the compliance or1378threats that are coming are often involving more than one1379Federal funding agency. You know, there are a lot of scientists1380that get money from NSF but also Department of Defense or NIH1381or others. And so it is really important that there has to be a1382much more centralized sort of structure where these can work in1383a more efficient way where data is shared.1384    Similarly, I think the U.S. Government needs to do a much1385better job at sharing not necessarily specific details, but the1386trends and patterns of behavior when they investigate a lot of1387these activities. And they, in my opinion, have not done a very1388good job, particularly law enforcement, explaining to academia,1389hey, there are all these things that are happening or1390behaviors, not all of which is illicit but compromises the1391integrity, the value system, the honesty that you depend on to1392conduct research and in a trusted fashion.1393    And we see that, and I've seen that. When I worked in1394government, I supported a lot of these investigations. Many of1395them never become an actual public record or an indictment or1396what have you. And so there's all this information that's not1397being adequately shared, so you need to have both. And having a1398centralized structure--in my written testimony, I talk about1399basically building a national center. A crude analogy would be1400an NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center).1401    Chairman Babin. OK. Thank you very much. And Mr. Sargent,1402under the first Trump Administration, OSTP established an1403interagency working group on research security under the Joint1404Committee on Research Environments (JCORE). Under the Biden1405Administration, this effort was discontinued. Could you1406describe the purpose and the role of JCORE Subcommittee on1407Research Security to coordinate activities for identifying and1408addressing threats to our academic research enterprise?1409    Mr. Sargent. Honestly, that's not an area of my expertise.1410However, I will just say that, having had extensive experience1411with the National Science and Technology Council, of which1412JCORE is a part of, that the purpose of these interagency1413activities is the sharing of information, the coordination of1414best practices, so I imagine that's what they were doing in the1415context of our research security.1416    Chairman Babin. Right. OK. Thank you. And then finally, Dr.1417Zuber, what resources are available to universities for1418assessment, identification, and analysis of research security1419threats, and how are these tools informing and promoting1420information sharing of risks among universities?1421    Dr. Zuber. OK. There's a--senior research officers of the1422research universities coordinate information. The presidents1423coordinate information. The NSF SECURE Center, DARPA (Defense1424Advanced Research Projects Agency) has put out guidance, and1425the NIH had put out guidance, and the DOE (Department of1426Energy) had put out guidance. But it's--in many cases, it's1427vague. And National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 was1428meant to standardize a lot of the reporting across and the1429implementation, which is underway but still not finally there.1430So if it were done properly, that would theoretically take care1431of all of the compliance that is--the lack of compliance that's1432accidental, OK, where people thought they reported something,1433but they reported it there, not here, OK? It would not take1434care of somebody who truly wants to do something wrong, OK? And1435those are actually difficult to root out.1436    But the--you know, we're still--despite two Presidential1437Administrations that have gone over and SPM 33, the guidance is1438still sufficiently vague that, you know, universities are1439supposed to put a research integrity plan in place, but they1440don't tell us what the plan should constitute and how a1441university can certify that it's actually meeting those1442criteria that it has to.1443    Chairman Babin. Thank you. I see the others nodding their1444heads. Would you like to add into that as well?1445    Mr. Stoff. No, I just--I strongly agree with Dr. Zuber that1446a lack of clarity, a lack of guidance, a lack of granular sort1447of level, what is it that we need to do, what are the tools,1448infrastructures that need to be placed? The SECURE Center may1449be able to start addressing those issues, but this has been1450going on, as Dr. Zuber said, for multiple Administrations, and1451there's still a lot of work that needs to be done, and I don't1452think we have the time to kind of do this as slow rolling as we1453have.1454    Chairman Babin. Yes. And I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. I'm1455sorry, so I yield back, unless you'll----1456    Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We will have a1457second round for anybody who wants to participate. I just want1458to keep this on track if you don't mind, sir.1459    Chairman McCormick. With that, we recognize Ranking Member1460Lofgren for questions.1461    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1462    And I see a lot of agreement among our witnesses. We do1463need clear standards, we need clarity, we need adherence, we1464need to protect our country. I think there's bipartisan1465agreement on those things. But as Ranking Member Sykes1466mentioned in her statement, there is an unconfirmed report that1467DOGE has arrived at NSF. Now, reportedly, one of the Musk1468hackers setting up shop at headquarters is Edward Coristine.1469Coristine is better known in his various online communities by1470the moniker ``Big Balls.'' Now, this 19-year-old is allegedly1471gaining access to NSF data systems. I'll try and be brief when1472I go through the laundry list of reasons why I believe this1473teenager is unfit to serve in government.1474    I am advised that Mr. Big Balls started a company called1475Tesla.Sexy LLC, a site that allowed users to share images1476confidentially. The URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) created1477redirected images hosted on his website and apparently included1478references to the sale of child sexual abuse material, among1479other really horrible topics. It's reported that in 2022 he was1480fired from an internship after leaking confidential business1481information to competitors. He bragged about this online,1482boasting that he had access to every single machine. It's1483reported that he also participated in chatrooms with U.S. law1484enforcement that have monitored his cybercrimes, investigating1485cybercrimes. And now, apparently, he has access to government1486data systems, most recently, allegedly, NSF.1487    NSF hosts personally identifiable information of employees,1488principal investigators, confidential business information,1489trade secrets when relevant to project proposals and controlled1490unclassified information related to law enforcement, sensitive1491information.1492    Dr. Zuber, you have plenty of 19-year-olds working at MIT1493labs. If an MIT student admitted to stealing data from a lab in1494order to share it with people not authorized to access it, do1495you have disciplinary procedures that would prevent that1496student from ever accessing sensitive information again?1497    Dr. Zuber. Well, so all this is alleged. I----1498    Ms. Lofgren. Correct.1499    Dr. Zuber. I can't vouch for it. But we do have1500disciplinary procedures. It's actually potentially a research1501integrity violation, and we have--you know, there are very1502clear rules for how to deal with research integrity. And when1503there is a finding, there are consequences.1504    Ms. Lofgren. Let me just say, as a hypothetical because1505these have been reported. Obviously, we haven't done an1506independent investigation. But if someone with the alleged1507background that I've just outlined had access to sensitive1508information at U.S. research agencies, would that be a cause1509for concern?1510    Dr. Zuber. Well, even if there were no research involved,1511if there was access to personally identifiable information of,1512you know, any member of our community or any community, that1513would clearly be a great concern.1514    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Sargent, you're an expert on our science1515and technology enterprise, and you feel strongly that certain1516information must be stringently protected, and I agree with1517you. What do you think about allowing an individual access to1518our science agencies' controlled unclassified information if1519that individual had a history of sharing confidential business1520information with competitors, or if that person had been known1521to host images with titles alluding to child sexual abuse, or1522if that person participated in forms monitored by law1523enforcement during cybercrimes investigations? If that were the1524background, would that cause concern?1525    Mr. Sargent. Absolutely.1526    Ms. Lofgren. Well, I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman,1527that while we are of one mind that we must protect ourselves1528from threats from those abroad, we ought to be alert to the1529threat that is being posed by this army of teenage and 20-1530something hackers that have invaded our government, that are1531accessing our private information, and including our science1532information, including individuals such as Mr. Big Balls, who1533is now apparently rooting through the NSF data base.1534    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.1535    Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member. Just to1536clarify as Chair, just to make sure we're on the same page, my1537Committee staff has just been officially told that no one from1538DOGE has entered the NSF. That's official. Eighty-four of 861539probationary employees at NSF have been reinstated. No grants1540at the National Science Foundation have been canceled. There is1541no funding freeze. All those things are now official.1542    Since January 20, nearly 500 awards have gone out, and more1543than 200 panels have taken place. I just want to make sure that1544we're clarifying the details since we're getting real-time1545information, just don't want to confuse or confound any real1546information. And I'm not trying to make this partisan. I just1547want to make sure it's factual. Thank you.1548    With that, I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.1549    Mr. Sargent, this is somewhat of a rhetorical question, but1550are American graduate students any less intelligent or1551qualified than Chinese graduate students?1552    Mr. Sargent. I always forget that. Mr. Chairman, I love1553rhetorical questions.1554    Chairman McCormick. It's a yes or no question, sir.1555    Mr. Sargent. American students are as capable as Chinese1556students, or more so.1557    Chairman McCormick. Of course. And I wouldn't want to be1558the person who said they weren't. But then, why do you think1559that certain universities insist on hiring Chinese graduate1560students when there are plenty of American students available?1561Literally, up to 50 percent of all graduate students hired are1562from foreign areas, that go back to foreign areas. Why do we1563keep doing that?1564    Mr. Sargent. Well, a good question. Part of it is momentum.1565A good deal of universities' prestige is the ability to attract1566the best international students, and it allows for these1567connections and relationships to be made back to the home1568countries of these students. And so by continuing to recruit1569them and allowing them to, you know, be a part of our1570university education system, they develop these relationships,1571and these relationships go on long beyond the time that those1572students are there because those students then matriculate out,1573and they go into other positions in academia, they go into1574industry, and those ties allow that university to benefit from1575that relationship.1576    Chairman McCormick. So there's probably a financial1577incentive of some kind because, otherwise, it doesn't really1578make sense, right? A lot of that talent goes back to their1579foreign national lands, and then a lot of talents goes out into1580the community, but they're not really citizens unless they so--1581go down that path.1582    Mr. Sargent. It's almost always follow the money.1583    Chairman McCormick. Very good. Putting research security1584aside, what is the long-term impact of U.S. students if1585universities continue to fill graduate posts with foreign1586nationals? In other words, we're not filling it with Americans.1587What is the long-term impact?1588    Mr. Sargent. Well, it's been self-fulfilling. You know, if1589you continue to bring foreign students in because they're the1590best, those spots are not available for excellent U.S. students1591to go and become Ph.D.'s and themselves become principal1592investigators. And so then you find yourself in the position of1593not having Americans to fill these positions, and so it's a1594self-fulfilling behavior.1595    Chairman McCormick. And I just want to highlight this. In a1596university system that's ranked not even in the top 30 in the1597world, the United States, which puts more money into education1598than any other country by far, and yet we're spending half of1599the research dollars--half of the money that we spend to1600develop instructors goes to foreign nationals here in the1601United States. We are basically cutting off the head of our1602future teachers, researchers, innovators, and we're going to1603fall further behind. If we're not even the top 30 and we're1604falling further behind, why would we train other countries to1605subvert our education system? I don't understand.1606    Dr. Zuber, one of the things I noticed is that we have a1607lot of money from endowments. Even MIT does. I don't know why,1608but, you know, they happen to have a lot of pride in their1609university. Do you think that that's what they intend? When we1610give U.S. dollars, taxpayers say, hey, you know what? I'm going1611to give you a lot of money to develop--and I think U.S.1612students is what most people think. When they give--when U.S.1613citizens give money to an endowment, they want to see a1614university develop U.S. talent. And we give money to see U.S.1615talent develop. Why are we bringing in so many people from1616other countries when you--literally up to 50 percent of the1617people? Why do you think that is?1618    Dr. Zuber. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.1619So MIT is 97 percent STEM students, OK, and we accept all the1620top U.S. students that apply. And let me tell you, when we have1621a FIRST Robotics Competition for middle school students in the1622United States, we fill up high school gyms. When the Chinese1623hold first robotic competitions, they fill up stadiums, OK? So1624it's a question of students going into STEM, OK?1625    Then, interesting question--or interesting statistic, U.S.1626students who graduate, OK, with STEM fields, only 1/3 of them1627go into STEM careers. So they're----1628    Chairman McCormick. I would make the case that part of that1629is because of the way we influence our students to begin with.1630If you look at even the way that TikTok was used here in1631America, a Chinese-controlled TikTok, by the way, they want to1632develop influencers in America instead of scientists, whereas1633it's used in China on a limited basis to develop people to get1634into science. This is a systemic problem in the education1635system. And we are in a competition with these folks that are--1636we are literally educating and bringing in talent, but we're1637then divesting from that in the way that we're giving up that1638talent. And I think it's a very dangerous precedent.1639    I'm going to go ahead and yield because I'm out of time,1640and I want to stay on and not be a hypocrite.1641    With that, Ms. Bomici out of Oregon--Bonamici, sorry, out1642of Oregon, my hometown, is recognized.1643    Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you have some1644Oregon Connections. And thank you to the Ranking Member. Thank1645you to the witnesses for your expertise and being here today. I1646want to join the Ranking Member Sykes in sending deepest1647condolences to the family of Representative Turner. He will be1648missed.1649    So this hearing, Mr. Chairman, you talked about--I didn't1650have a chance to fact-check your numbers and facts about the1651NSF, but I do know that they have laid off many people. Even1652though they may be trying to bring some of them back, they're1653still facing significant budget cuts, as are most agencies, and1654the disruption and chaos has been really concerning.1655    This hearing is titled ``Assessing the Threat to U.S.1656Funded Research,'' and it is indeed an important topic, but1657threats to American research and research security do not only1658come from foreign actors. They also come from the reckless1659actions of this Administration that are destabilizing our1660scientific enterprise and purging Federal scientists at NOAA1661(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), at NSF, at1662NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), at DOE.1663And Ranking Member Sykes mentioned that intelligence is already1664showing that China and Russia are eager to exploit that by1665trying to recruit some of our scientists, particularly1666scientists with national security experience.1667    And I want to note as well, and to follow up to Ranking1668Member Lofgren's comments that--about DOGE, the Trump1669Administration sent via an unsecure email server the names of1670CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) employees, which is1671incredibly dangerous. You might have seen that there--they seem1672to be pretty good at hacking in but not in protecting data1673bases. And I'm sure everyone saw the takeover of the screens at1674HUD (Housing and Urban Development). They couldn't even figure1675out how to get the images off the screen. They had to go unplug1676the televisions. So, I mean, my point is, what are these people1677doing that--is creating a lot of instability, insecurity, and1678uncertainty about the safety of our data and research.1679    So instead of strengthening our defenses, the1680Administration seems to be gutting key research agencies, as I1681mentioned, and purging experienced scientists, sending a1682chilling message to researchers that their work might be under1683constant suspicion.1684    The so-called China Initiative that was implemented during1685the first Trump Administration as an example of mismanagement1686and certainly some racial profiling, it disproportionately1687targeted scientists of Chinese descent, drove talent away, and1688ultimately did more harm than good. The Brennan Center for1689Justice rightly called it a failure, warning against reviving1690such misguided efforts. And meanwhile, as our institutions are1691struggling with frozen grants and reduced indirect cost support1692and uncertainty about whether international collaboration will1693be discouraged or even criminalized, other nations, especially1694China, as I mentioned, have seized on the opportunity.1695    So the United States cannot afford to keep making these1696mistakes. Our science enterprise thrives on openness,1697collaboration, and stability, not on paranoia and politically1698driven purges. So we need a serious evidence-based discussion.1699We all take this seriously. I want to ask you, Dr. Zuber,1700because I know you've been at MIT for a while. and we think1701back to the China Initiative from the first Trump1702Administration. Assuming that there's going to be something1703similar, what would you change and what would you keep the1704same?1705    Dr. Zuber. Well, I think, actually, Mr. Stoff touched on1706it, I think in his--both in his remarks and in more detail in1707his testimony. But the--I mean, the China Initiative initially1708focused on espionage, and they started with industry, and then1709they moved to universities. And there was very, very little1710espionage in universities. The kinds of indiscretions within1711universities are transmission of information that will be1712published anyway, but it doesn't rise to the level of1713espionage. And so these should be adjudicated by agencies, you1714know, if you're caught----1715    Ms. Bonamici. And you talk about the balance that's needed.1716    Dr. Zuber. If you're caught, you lose funding for 5 years,1717and that will take care of that problem. And, in fact, there1718was a report by the JASONs that put out--that said this sort of1719thing should be treated as a research integrity violation,1720which is----1721    Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And in my remaining half a minute,1722Mr. Stoff, you advocated basically for cutting ties with1723Chinese researchers, but would shutting out top-tier talent1724like an AI or quantum computing limit our potential?1725    Mr. Stoff. Well, I don't necessarily agree that we1726completely cut everything off, but we're not even cutting off--1727we're not even restricting the most high-risk collaborations or1728people. We're still letting them in. We're still collaborating1729with defense and weapons programs and state-owned enterprises1730in China. So can we start with that? And I would say we need to1731start restricting that, and then we can be more nuanced.1732    Ms. Bonamici. Appreciate that. My time is expired. I yield1733back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1734    Chairman McCormick. Thank you. And with that, we recognize1735Representative Begich from Alaska.1736    Mr. Begich. Thank you, Chairman. First question for Mr.1737Stoff. China has labeled itself a near-Arctic State and has1738invested in Arctic research collaborations with U.S.1739institutions. Have Chinese-linked researchers or institutions1740attempted to establish partnerships with Alaska-based Arctic1741research programs.1742    Mr. Stoff. Thank you for the question. Unfortunately, I1743have no knowledge or expertise in the area with regards to1744Alaska, but I can quickly say that China has aggressively done1745this with other polar nations like Norway, for example, where1746their largest state-owned defense conglomerate that builds1747radar systems and communication systems for the PLA established1748ground stations for Norway under the guise of scientific1749purposes. And this is happening, I believe, elsewhere. I don't1750know if it's happening in Alaska, but they have a practice of1751doing this, and it's a big problem because they're actually1752developing more advanced radar systems as a result.1753    Mr. Begich. Thank you. And given that Arctic focus, are you1754aware of any efforts that the Chinese have made with respect to1755Greenland as well?1756    Mr. Stoff. No, not personally. That hasn't--I haven't1757looked into it, but I would be surprised if they were not1758pursuing those regions because of their strategic import that1759they represent.1760    Mr. Begich. Let me ask you this. Given that Alaska hosts1761key U.S. Coast Guard operations and Arctic maritime research,1762are you aware of any instances in which foreign adversaries1763have attempted to infiltrate federally funded programs tied to1764maritime security?1765    Mr. Stoff. Yes, that's actually fairly extensive, but we1766don't get--we don't have a good handle on it. We do know that a1767number of civilian PRC defense institutions that are heavily1768involved in PLA, navy, submarine, underwater warfare,1769underwater weaponry, systems, communications, et cetera,1770collaborate extensively almost without any sort of restriction1771with most U.S. universities, some of which even involve1772Department of Defense funding. Because it's in a fundamental1773research area, as I mentioned earlier, there's really no1774regulatory oversight over it.1775    Mr. Begich. Do you believe that the Coast Guard should be1776given additional resources to protect research collaborations1777involving Arctic defense infrastructure?1778    Mr. Stoff. Possibly, but I do think a better approach is1779what I mentioned my testimony is if you have a centralized1780government entity that kind of does this for all Federal1781agencies, it would be far more efficient and effective.1782    Mr. Begich. Thank you. And an additional question for Mr.1783Sargent. Do you believe that Congress should require enhanced1784security screening for federally funded researchers in critical1785areas such as Arctic security, Arctic energy, or climate1786studies?1787    Mr. Sargent. For U.S. researchers?1788    Mr. Begich. Yes, or any additional researchers that may be1789coming from an--from a place outside the United States but are1790working with U.S. researchers?1791    Mr. Sargent. Yes, absolutely. I think any area that has1792potential national security implications, we need to make sure1793that the people who are working on them don't have any ties1794that make them of--question their loyalty to the United States.1795    Mr. Begich. So you don't believe the current screening1796practices are sufficient in order to address the security1797concerns that we have.1798    Mr. Sargent. I can't speak to the adequacy of the current1799security screenings.1800    Mr. Begich. OK. Thank you. Do you know whether--again, to1801Mr. Sargent. Do you know whether Federal agencies have1802conducted comprehensive research security audits of1803institutions in the Arctic which engage in Arctic science,1804climate research, or strategic defense studies? Do you know if1805that's happening?1806    Mr. Sargent. I don't know anything of that nature, no.1807    Mr. Begich. OK. Thank you. With that, I yield back.1808    Chairman McCormick. And now Representative Rivas from1809California is recognized for 5 minutes.1810    Ms. Rivas. Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking Member1811Sykes.1812    First, I join my colleagues in expressing condolences to1813the family of my fellow freshman colleague, Sylvester Turner.1814He will be missed by all of us.1815    I'd like to start by taking a moment of personal privilege1816and thank Dr. Zuber for appearing before the Subcommittee1817today. As an MIT alum myself, it gives me great pride to see an1818MIT Professor discussing the importance and the challenges1819facing the scientific community and the research ecosystem.1820    Over the last 7 weeks, we have seen a complete disruption1821and attack to one of America's pillars for the future, our1822scientific and academic community. Our research ecosystem1823depends on a steady stream of educated experts. As co-chair of1824the bipartisan STEM Education Caucus, I take great pride in1825America's leadership to produce the next generation of1826researchers and scientists of the future. The future will only1827come from early and continued STEM investments in every ZIP1828code in America. I have spent most of my career engaging and1829preparing students, American students, to get into STEM fields.1830It's our responsibility to provide the current and future1831workforce with the tools to innovate and create technological1832solutions and emerging and essential technologies and1833industries like AI, healthcare, and the environment.1834    However, a major threat to U.S.-funded research is this1835Administration's reckless actions that include layoffs of about1836800 employees at NOAA, up to 2,000 employees at the Department1837of Energy, and more than 150 employees at the National Science1838Foundation. Despite those dizzying acts against our Nation's1839science corps, one of the most worrying cuts has been the NIH1840policy, capping indirect cost at 15 percent. I worry about the1841capacity of smaller institutions to keep up, and that concern1842has only grown in recent weeks, as I hear from constituents and1843organizations serving my district. Indirect costs are1844expenditures that aren't tied directly to research staffing or1845supplies, but they nonetheless support infrastructure and1846activities that are vital to the function of research1847institutions.1848    The reality is that this is a drastic reduction in1849reimbursement that will result in more than 800 million in cuts1850for my home State of California. This will devastate the1851development of lifesaving research, inhibit patient access to1852groundbreaking treatments and clinical trials, and will cede1853American dominance in biomedical research to our foreign1854competitors like China, Russia, and Iran for years to come.1855    Dr. Zuber, I've joined my colleagues in two letters to the1856acting NIH Director, expressing my deep concerns on these NIH1857cuts and how they will impact my State and district. Can you1858elaborate on how these cuts will impact research universities'1859ability to compete and how you anticipate smaller institutions1860will be impacted?1861    Dr. Zuber. OK. Thank you very much. A lot of thoughts1862there, and thank you for raising the indirect cost because1863people don't understand indirect costs, OK? It's--whether a1864cost is a direct cost or an indirect cost, that's determined by1865uniform guidance. Both are the costs of doing research. You1866could put it in one column, or you could put it in the other1867column, but that's what it costs, OK? If we don't get the1868indirect cost reimbursement, the larger schools that have1869endowments have to use their endowments to cover that. And at1870MIT, we already--I won't say subsidize; I will say coinvest in1871research 100 percent, OK? So we--our research volume, we put in1872an equal amount from our endowment to kind of double the impact1873from the Federal and other funding that we receive.1874    Schools with--either smaller schools or R1 research1875institutions with small endowments, especially those with1876medical centers, don't have any funds to draw on, OK? So we1877would do less research, OK, so less impact in the world. And1878MIT grads have started, as you know, tens of thousands of1879companies, OK? But it--for schools without endowments and have1880medical schools, they're going to be out of business, OK? And1881these are economic drivers in their areas and educational--1882important educational institutions producing the workforce for1883tomorrow. So the impacts are potentially huge.1884    Ms. Rivas. Thank you. With that, I yield back.1885    Chairman McCormick. Thank you. And next, we recognize1886Representative McClain Delaney from Maryland for 5 minutes.1887    Mrs. McClain Delaney. So I thank the panelists and our1888Ranking Members for convening this important hearing. Can you1889hear me? Hi. Hello. So thank--I thank the panelists and our1890Ranking Members for convening this important hearing, striking1891the right balance between cyber and research vis-a-vis China1892and Russia with respect to our research universities. And I1893really appreciated Dr. Zuber's comments how there are1894legitimate concerns with respect to China with--and research,1895but how we cannot, you know, throw the, you know, baby out with1896the bath water, and we really need to not cutoff entirely and1897really preserve some of this for U.S. competitiveness.1898    I represent the 6th District of Maryland, and in my1899district is NIST, parts of NIH, the National Institutes of1900Cancer, Fort Detrick, which deals with some of our pathogens,1901you know, our fire academy, and our nearby--my--next door is1902NOAA, of course, so research and innovation through these1903incredible agencies. And the hiring freezes by Rep. Bonamici is1904really important that we drive--continue to understand how1905these freezes and cuts will really undercut both our1906cybersecurity and other institutions.1907    But building on some of the--two questions I have because I1908have only limited time. In terms of under-resourced1909universities--and building on Rep. Rivas' questions concerning1910indirect costs, I ask the panel, but Dr. Zuber first, do1911indirect costs contribute to universities' compliance with1912laws, including those related to research security? And do you1913believe that universities should be able to classify research1914security support as a direct cost so to ensure the protection1915of sensitive research and data?1916    Dr. Zuber. OK. So I don't know all the details, but I can1917tell you that indirect costs, part of it is facilities--the1918larger part of it is facilities and taking care of the1919buildings that you wouldn't have unless you were doing research1920in them, OK? And then the other part is administrative costs.1921And those administrative costs, you know, the compliance has1922been going through the roof for years and years and years. And1923it--you know, more rules come in, and no rules ever seem to go1924away, and so you need staff to be able to handle that.1925    The recent focus on research security has caused a big1926increase. We've had to hire a lot more people to do compliance.1927And most universities in the indirect cost system are out--1928already maxed out in the administrative part, so, obviously, if1929you could--you know, it doesn't matter to me if they're direct1930costed or indirect costed, but all this has got to be paid for.1931    Mrs. McClain Delaney. Yes. Well, our research institutions1932are our Nation's jewels and why we are where we are in America,1933and so just making sure that we are able to protect that1934information and those collaborations.1935    I want to move on to cybersecurity. I worked at the Biden1936Administration as Deputy Secretary at NTIA (National1937Telecommunications and Information Administration) and actually1938worked on a lot of cyber national security issues vis-a-vis1939some of--even Huawei and 5G and AI. But just this week,1940following orders from Defense Secretary--our Defense Secretary,1941DOD's U.S. cyber command suspended operations and planning for1942offensive cyber operations against Russia. And we're--weakening1943our cybersecurity posture with Russia will hurt our national1944security and make us more vulnerable.1945    Research conversations have largely revolved around a1946threat posed by China, but we cannot forget Russia as a serious1947threat. I guess I ask all of you, can--well, Dr. Sargent, what1948potential is there for harm if the Trump Administration1949continues to weaken our offensive cyber operations against1950foreign adversaries? And to the panel, can the Federal1951Government play a role in bolstering the cybersecurity defenses1952of our universities against threats from foreign adversaries?1953    Mr. Sargent. Thank you for the question. First of all, let1954me correct you on one thing. I have not earned my Ph.D. I am1955a--just a mainstream engineer, systems engineer from the1956University of Virginia. But--and, by the way, let me say, with1957NIST in your district, I am a massive fan of NIST. I think1958they're an outstanding----1959    Mrs. McClain Delaney. We are too.1960    Mr. Sargent [continuing]. Institution with great civil1961servant employees who do a fantastic job in a wide range of1962areas.1963    With respect to cybersecurity, I don't think you can begin1964to overstate its importance. And the risk that we face from1965both China and Russia to our--every system in the United1966States, including our water systems, our power systems, our1967transportation systems, all of them are at risk. And China is--1968I'm told, I don't have any inside information, but I am told,1969and I have read that they are dropping all kinds of malware in1970our systems so that if we find ourselves in conflict with them,1971they can flip a switch and cause a lot of internal damage in1972the United States. So I don't think you can overestimate the1973importance of cybersecurity.1974    Mrs. McClain Delaney. Thank you. Any other comments if I1975have time?1976    Chairman McCormick. The Member's time has expired, but1977thank you very much.1978    And with that, I'm going to go and give closing remarks.1979First of all, thank you all for being here today. It's an1980honor. I know it's at your own expense, and I know that1981sometimes it's thankless, but we want to thank you for being1982here today. I thank Ranking Member Sykes for being here and1983being a joy to work with.1984    I want to address a couple things that were brought up1985during the hearing. Obviously, we talked about NSF funding or--1986and also staffing. We understand that DOGE is going to make1987some mistakes along the way. I get it. They're being very1988aggressive, and they've admitted that they're going to make1989mistakes.1990    I want to address the issue of age. Some people say age is1991a concern for DOGE, those members who are--or those people who1992are actually doing the hard work and labor, realizing that1993Einstein, I believe, was, what, 26 years old when he published1994the theory of relativity, that you have--Zuckerberg invented1995Facebook at the age of 19, that we have 17-, 18-, 19-year-olds1996in school right now coming up with brilliant theories on the1997next evolution of science, that my great uncle was, I think,1998about 26 years old when he was a division commander as a B-171999pilot and was shot down in the greatest air war of all time and2000became one of the senior officers in Stalag III.2001    Age is not really the consideration when we talk about2002people who are going to create and sacrifice in this next2003generation. Matter of fact, we should be asking people to step2004in earlier. Matter of fact, coddling our kids certainly doesn't2005help them do what we need them to do for this next generation2006of competition.2007    And I think the only numbers that we talk about when--it's2008not about age, but it's about the numbers we need to say2009because our government is far too invested in waste, fraud, and2010abuse. and we have a $36 trillion deficit right now. The2011interest payments alone on the debt that we have incurred2012exceed not only the military investment we do per year, but2013also the research we do. If we don't do something to trim the2014waste, we won't have the amount of money we need to invest in2015the future generations of America.2016    And I think this hearing is really all about protecting our2017investments, the money we spend on education to develop the2018next generation of science and technologies. When you talk2019about the most transformational technologies that this2020generation has ever seen, in AI, in quantum, in other2021technologies, they're going to literally change the face--the2022way that we employ, the way we explore, the way we create jobs,2023and how we fight the next war. We're on the frontline. You are2024on the frontline.2025    And we need to make sure that our peers aren't getting2026advantages from our hard work and our investments. And I think2027that's what this entire Committee hearing has been about, and I2028hope we continue this dialog because if we don't--if we're not2029careful about what we do, it will result in some catastrophic2030results.2031    God bless you. Thank you for being here. Thank you for2032participating. And with that, we are adjourned.2033    [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]20342035                               Appendix I20362037                              ----------20382039                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions20402041[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]20422043                              Appendix II20442045                              ----------20462047                   Additional Material for the Record20482049           Article submitted by Representative Emilia Sykes2050[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]20512052                                 [all]