“Unmanned and Unchecked: Confronting the Rising Threat of Malicious Drone Use in America”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                        UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:5                    CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF6                      MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               BEFORE THE1314                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL15                         GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE1617                                 OF THE1819                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY2021                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2223                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2425                             FIRST SESSION2627                               __________2829                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 20253031                               __________3233                           Serial No. 119-343435                               __________3637         Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary3839[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4041               Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov4243                                __________4445                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4661-653                     WASHINGTON : 20254748-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4950                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY5152                        JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair5354DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking55ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member56TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York57THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California58THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee59CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,60SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia61BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California62LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California63JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington64TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California65BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania66KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado67HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia68LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina69WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont70RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois71GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California72BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida73MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York74ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas75DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas76BRANDON GILL, Texas77MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington7879                                 ------8081                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL82                        GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE8384                       ANDY BIGGS, Arizona, Chair8586TOM TIFFANY, Wisconsin               LUCY McBATH, Georgia, Ranking87TROY NEHLS, Texas                        Member88BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida89KEVIN KILEY, California              DAN GOLDMAN, New York90LAUREL LEE, Florida                  STEVE COHEN, Tennessee91BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           ERIC SWALWELL, California9293               CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director94                ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director9596                            C O N T E N T S9798                              ----------99100                      Tuesday, September 16, 2025101102                           OPENING STATEMENTS103104                                                                   Page105The Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the Subcommittee on Crime and106  Federal Government Surveillance from the State of Arizona......     1107The Honorable Lucy McBath, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on108  Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from the State of109  Georgia........................................................     3110111                               WITNESSES112113Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida114  Highway Patrol115  Oral Testimony.................................................     5116  Prepared Testimony.............................................     8117Brett Feddersen, Vice President, Strategy and Government Affairs,118  D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc.119  Oral Testimony.................................................    12120  Prepared Testimony.............................................    14121Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle122  Aeronautical University123  Oral Testimony.................................................    18124  Prepared Testimony.............................................    20125Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned126  Aircraft Systems Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute,127  University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)128  Oral Testimony.................................................    28129  Prepared Testimony.............................................    30130131          LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING132133All materials submitted by the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal134  Government Surveillance, for the record........................    49135136Materials submitted by the Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the137  Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from138  the State of Arizona, for the record139    An article entitled, ``Increasing drone incidents near US140        airports, stadiums prompt alarm, officials say,'' Jan.141        22, 2025, Reuters142    An article entitled, ``Drones lifting inmates out of prisons?143        UK inspector says it's a `theoretical possibility,' ''144        Jul. 10, 2025, Corrections1145    An article entitled, ``New video: Cartels drop bombs from146        drones near southern border,'' Feb. 5, 2025, The Hill147    An article entitled, ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How148        Criminals Use UAVs to Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' Jan.149        28, 2025, DroneLife150    An article entitled, ``New State Drone Laws Set Strict151        Operational Boundaries,'' May 2, 2025, DroneLife152153                 QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD154155Questions to Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide UAS/C-UAS Coordinator,156  Florida Highway Patrol, Brett Feddersen, Vice President,157  Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD, Inc., Dr.158  Ryan Wallace, Professor, Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle159  Aeronautical University, and Dr. Catherine F. Cahill, Director,160  Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration161  (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks162  (UAF), submitted by the Honorable Troy Nehls, of the163  Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance from164  the State of Texas, for the record165    A response to questions from Sgt. Robert Dooley, Statewide166        UAS/C-UAS Coordinator, Florida Highway Patrol167    A response to questions from Brett Feddersen, Vice President,168        Strategy and Government Affairs, D-Fend Solutions AD,169        Inc.170    A response to questions from Dr. Catherine F. Cahill,171        Director, Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems172        Integration (ACUASI), Geophysical Institute, University173        of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)174    A response to questions from Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor,175        Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical176        University177178                        UNMANNED AND UNCHECKED:179    CONFRONTING THE RISING THREAT OF MALICIOUS DRONE USE IN AMERICA180181                              ----------182183                      Tuesday, September 16, 2025184185                        House of Representatives186187       Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance188189                       Committee on the Judiciary190191                             Washington, DC192193    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in194Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Andy Biggs195[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.196    Present: Representatives Biggs, Jordan, Tiffany, Nehls,197Kiley, Knott, McBath, Raskin, and Swalwell.198    Mr. Biggs. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without199objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any200time. I apologize to everyone for starting a little over an201hour late. We had votes that kind of took up more time than we202thought. Welcome everyone to today's hearing on the rising203threat of malicious drone use in America.204    I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls, who205will lead us in the pledge of allegiance.206    Mr. Nehls. Will you please stand and join me in honoring207our Nation's flag.208    All. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States209of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one210Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for211all.212    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.213    Mr. Biggs. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.214I appreciate everyone being here today. In this hearing we have215before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how216these systems are being exploited by criminal elements. This217issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield218environments. It is now increasingly disrupting daily life in219America.220    Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly221advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more222capable. While this has fueled innovation and commerce, public223safety and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities224for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike.225    The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical,226they are real, and they demand urgent attention. Between227January and June of this year the FAA recorded more than 1,000228UAS incursions near U.S. airports. A nearly 13 percent increase229from the same period last year, each of these incidents230represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a231potential catastrophe for passenger safety. Despite some232progress like remote ID, our response architecture is233fragmented. Remote ID helps with accountability, but does not234integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide235automatic alerts to airport security.236    Additionally, most of our airports like dedicated counter-237AUS systems. Legal restrictions further complicate matters,238limiting who can respond in real time. The problem does not end239with aviation safety. Criminal networks are adapting to AUS240technology for nefarious purposes dropping contraband into241prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the U.S.-Mexican242border, surveilling law enforcement, and, in some case,243experimenting with weaponization.244    Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging245drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons. The stealth speed246and GDS-guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for247correctional officers to detect or intercept them without248specialized training or technology. These drops enable249organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate250discipline and threaten the safety of the staff and inmates251alike.252    The U.S. Northern Command leadership purported that over2531,000 drones crossed into U.S. airspace from the Mexican border254each month with CBP agents noting that in Texas, along the Rio255Grande Valley alone over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000256drone sightings occurred in 2024.257    Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels258a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads259while avoiding direct encounters with U.S. law enforcement.260    The CBP and DOD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days261around Laredo, prompting the deployment of striker units to262bolster surveillance. Equipped with features like night vision263and the ability to operate below radar thresholds. These drones264present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security.265Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable266or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to267respond effectively in real time.268    National special security events, NSSEs, such as269Presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile270sporting events are increasingly vulnerable to drone-based271threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media272visibility.273    While Federal agencies like the U.S. Secret Service, the274FBI and DHS are authorized to deploy counter-UAS capabilities275and national special security events under the Preventing276Emerging Threats Act of 2018, these efforts are intense and277confined to a limited number of events each year.278    The DOJ officials testified that counter-UAS protections279are typically planned months in advance and require substantial280coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace281operations are not inadvertently affected. As a result,282thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE283designation like any UAS mitigation coverage, even as drone284incidents rise nationally.285    Expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces286new risks for first responders. An active shooter, protest or287hazardous materials scenarios, the presence of unauthorized288drones can obstruct airspace, delay medevac or surveillance289operations, and even be used to track responder positions or290deliver harmful payloads.291    Many of these tools are restricted under Federal law and292cannot be used by State or local entities without explicit293authorization. Additionally, these systems must be294miniaturized, cost-effective, and interoperable with existing295emergency response infrastructure to be viable at scale.296    The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI297and the global drone market raises specific espionage concerns.298Under Chinese law, companies are legally obligated to cooperate299with Chinese national intelligence authorities, which amplifies300the risk that drones supplied by these firms can transmit301sensitive data back to foreign governments.302    As of today, DJI holds nearly 90 percent of the consumer303drone market, and approximately 75 percent in commercial304sectors. Multiple policy reviews and commentaries warn that305adversarial actors may exploit the supply chain306vulnerabilities, together intelligence on U.S. critical307infrastructure, military bases, research facilities, and308emergency operations. The threat is persistent and309accelerating, and it will take a coordinated alignment of310resources, technology and authorities to contain it. This311hearing serves an important step to confront and combat312malicious drone use across the country and beyond.313    I look forward to hearing what our witnesses say in our314lively discussion.315    Now, without objection, I want to enter into the record an316article entitled, ``Increasing Drone Incidents Near U.S.317Airports, Stadiums Prompt Alarm Officials Say''; and ``Drones318Lifting Inmates Out of Prisons? U.K. Inspector Says It Is a319Theoretical Possibility.''320    Without objection. Now, I yield back and recognize the321Ranking Member of the entire Committee, Mr. Raskin, for his322opening statement.323    Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing324on the rising threat posed by an unmanned aircraft systems325commonly known as drones. The FAA reports that over one million326drones are now registered in the U.S. for a broad range of327commercial and recreational purposes; government agencies also328use them to improve diverse public safety operations, including329search and rescue, disaster response, crime scene330investigation, and even traffic enforcement. Like any331technology, including AI-enabled technology, which this332Subcommittee discussed earlier in the summer, drones can also333be used for unlawful purposes, like delivering contraband to334inmates in prison, or ferrying Fentanyl across the Northern and335Southern borders of our country.336    In 2023, in my home State in Maryland, 15 people were337indicted as part of a criminal network that used drones to338smuggle Fentanyl and other drugs, cell phones, tools and other339contraband into the Roxbury Correctional Institution in340Hagerstown. I'm sure that many of my colleagues have similar341stories from their own States.342    The DOJ is one of five Federal agencies with drone343detection and mitigation authority, which allows the Department344to detect, track, and even destroy drones that pose a credible345threat to Federal court houses, prisons, and large gatherings.346The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are also able to347utilize some counter-drone detection systems. In fact, earlier348this year, BOP reported the agency has deployed such systems at34964 facilities which have helped detect malicious drone use,350better inform law enforcement of incoming threats, and locate351suspected criminal drone operators.352    Today, as we discuss law enforcement efforts to respond to353the malicious drone activity and the use of drones to enhance354public safety, we must be mindful of the risks associated with355the detection and mitigation of drones, as well as the need to356respect the privacy interest and civil liberties of the public357in the process. Let's make sure that law enforcement uses both358drone and counter-drone technology correctly, safely, and359always within the bounds of the law. That's why I was pleased360to join the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Transportation361Infrastructure Committee and the Homeland Security Committee to362introduce H.R. 5061, The Counter-UAS Authority Security,363Safety, and Reauthorization Act. The bill, which was reported364favorably by the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee by365remarkable vote of 60-0, would reauthorize, reform and expand366the existing counter unmanned aircraft system or counter-UAS367authorities of Homeland Security Department and the DOJ. Among368other provisions the bipartisan bill would, for the first time,369expand these authorities to State and local law enforcement370through a carefully calibrated pilot program.371    The bill would also establish training program for these372agencies to meet before they can operate counter-UAS systems in373minimum performance requirements for counter-UAS technology374before it can be deployed ensuring these systems are used375safely and solely within the strictures of the law.376    I trust today's hearing will commit to my colleagues the377need to support this bill, and then we will see swift unanimous378passage of it.379    Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks to all our witnesses to being380here. I look forward to hearing from you. I yield back.381    Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Thank you.382    Without objection, all other opening statements will be383included in the record. Now, we will introduce today's384witnesses.385    We will begin with Dr. Catherine Cahill. Dr. Cahill is the386Director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems387Integration, ACUASI, and the Geophysical Institute at the388University of Alaska Fairbanks.389    ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA UAS test sites, as the390FAA's Alaska BEYOND site and is a core university in the FAA's391center of excellence for UAS research. Dr. Cahill has served as392a member of the FAA's drone advisory committee and advanced393aviation advisory committee. Thank you for being here with us394today, Dr. Cahill.395    Dr. Ryan Wallace is a Professor at Embry-Riddle396Aeronautical University. His research focuses on UAS safety,397security, human factors and public policy. Dr. Wallace has398conducted training seminars for Federal agencies on the topics399of UAS safety operations, and counter-UAS techniques. He also400serves as a representative on the FAA's drone safety team and401served in the U.S. Air Force. Thank you for being with us, Dr.402Wallace.403    Mr. Brett Feddersen is the Vice President for strategy and404government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a manufacturer of405counter-drone systems for the military, law enforcement, and406others. He also serves as the Chair of Security Industry407Association's drone security subcommittee. He previously served408as the Executive Director for national security programs and409incident response at the FAA, and in various roles at the410Pentagon, the White House, the U.S. Army, and as a Pennsylvania411State trooper. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen, for being with us412today.413    Next is Sergeant Robert Dooley. Sergeant Dooley has served414for more than 22 years with the Florida highway patrol, where415he is currently the UAS and C-UAS program coordinator. He416developed and has led the FHP's UAS program since its417inception.418    Sergeant Dooley is an expert in law enforcement, UAS419operations, disaster response operations, and special events420and high value target UAS security operations. Thank you all421for being with us today.422    We will begin by swearing you in and ask that you would423each rise and raise your right hand.424    Do you swear or affirm under the penalty of perjury that425the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the426best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you427God?428    The record will reflect that the witnesses have each429answered in the affirmative. Thank you, please be seated.430    Each of you should know that your written testimony will be431entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask432that you summarize your testimony in five minutes. We're going433to begin today with Sergeant Dooley, so you're recognized for434your five minutes. I'll just tell you should see a clock in435front of you. When you're about 10 seconds, before you hit the436five, I will start tapping like this, that means please wrap it437up. We'll try to be a little bit lenient because we appreciate438you being here, but we would ask you to stay five minutes439because we all have your testimony, we've all read your440testimony.441    Sergeant Dooley, you're first.442443                STATEMENT OF SGT. ROBERT DOOLEY444445    Sgt. Dooley. Thank you and good afternoon. Again, I'm446Sergeant Robert Dooley of Florida Highway Patrol. I am our447statewide coordinator for unmanned operations.448    The critical importance of drone detection and mitigation449for public safety as unmanned aircraft systems continue to450proliferate across recreational, commercial, and malicious451domains. The ability of public safety agencies to detect and452mitigate unauthorized or threatening drones has become a453national imperative.454    This statement outlines the growing threat landscape455associated with drones and discuss the current challenges,456detection, and mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration457of counter-UAS capabilities within a broader spectrum of public458safety framework.459    The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology460have transformed industries. revolutionized emergency response,461and public safety operations. However, with this growth comes462an increasing threat of misuse, whether intentional or neglect,463from contraband drops over prison yards to surveillance of464critical infrastructure and interruptions of emergency scenes,465public safety agencies now face the complex airspace risk. The466ability to detect, track, identify, and when necessary,467mitigate rogue drones is essential for protecting lives,468preserving critical infrastructure and ensuring operational469integrity.470    Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety.471As you spoke earlier, criminal exploitation, criminal472organizations increasingly use drones to smuggle drones to473smuggle drugs, weapons, and contraband into correctional474facilities or across the borders, terrorist use, adversarial475State and non-State actors have experimented with drones for476surveillance and weaponization, creating low-cost and low-477detection threat vectors.478    Privacy violations and harassment: Drones can be used to479stalk, harass, or violate the privacy of civilians and law480enforcement officers often in ways that are difficult to detect481and prevent.482    Interference with public safety operations: Unauthorized483drones flying near traffic crashes, fire scenes, disaster zones484can impede emergency response, creating hazardous responses for485both responders and civilians.486    The need for detection and mitigation capabilities: Public487safety agencies must be able to detect, identify and if488authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without this489capability, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace,490increasing risk to both responders and the public. The key491benefits of these capabilities include situational awareness,492drone detection systems enhance airspace awareness, allowing493agencies to monitor aerial activity near sensitive locations or494at the scenes.495    Threat identification: Identifying type, intent and496operator of drone is essential for appropriate response and497legal action. Incident mitigation in critical scenario stopping498or redirecting a drone may be necessary to prevent harm or499disruption, especially during mass gatherings dignitary500protection or major disasters.501    Current limitations in legal barriers: Despite the urgent502need, most State, local, Tribal, and territorial public safety503agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate and often face504limitations even detecting them. Only Federal agencies505currently possess this broad C-UAS authority under 6 U.S.C.506124(n) leaving a gap in homeland security at the local level.507    Additionally: Technology access: C-UAS systems are costly,508complex and often limited to military or Federal use.509    Interagency coordination: There's a lack of real-time data510sharing and standard operating procedures that could hinder511unified responses.512    Policy gaps: Existing Federal laws, including the FAA's513preemption of airspace regulation complicate the rules and514responsibility of our SLTT agencies.515    Legislative reform is needed, granted, limited controlled516UAS authority to vet and train public safety entities under517Federal oversight as proposed in several legislative efforts.518Training and standardization create a standardized C-UAS519training and certification programs ensuring safety,520accountability, and legal compliance.521    Technology deployment: Fund and deploy scalable, nonkinetic522drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those523responsible for critical infrastructure at mass events.524    Public and private collaboration: Encourage partnerships525between technology providers, law enforcement and Federal526agencies to pilot C-UAS tools under lawful frameworks and527community engagement.528    Educate the public on the responsible use of drones and529build awareness of the risks associated with unauthorized530operations. The ability to detect and mitigate rogue drones is531no longer a futuristic concept, it is a present-day necessity.532Public safety professionals stand on the front lines of both533natural and man-made crises and lack a C-UAS capability which534leaves critical vulnerability in our national preparedness.535    Federal agencies play a vital role empowering State local536responders with tools, training and authority to protect their537communities from aerial threats is the next essential step in538securing the homeland.539    I thank you and I await your questions.540    [The prepared statement of Sgt. Dooley follows:]541    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]542543    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Sergeant Dooley. The Chair now544recognizes Mr. Feddersen for his five minutes. Mr. Feddersen,545please.546547                  STATEMENT OF BRETT FEDDERSEN548549    Mr. Feddersen. Good afternoon, Chair Biggs, Ranking Member550Raskin, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.551Thank you for the honor of appearing before you today.552    My name is Brett Feddersen, I am the Vice President for553strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a leading554counter-drone manufacturer. I also serve as the Chair of the555Security Industry Association's drone security Subcommittee, a556group comprised of leading providers and end users of counter557drone technologies available in the world.558    I commend the Subcommittee for its proactive focus on the559threat and has quickly gone from a distant concern to clear and560present danger to our national security, to our critical561infrastructure and to our public safety. The illegal use of562drones has evolved from simple nuisance and trespassing to563sophisticated criminal malicious activity. The accessibility,564affordability, and adaptability of this technology have given565us new capabilities, most often used for good. However, they566also have created significant vulnerabilities that we as a567Nation are not yet prepared to face.568    We can categorize these threats into three primary domains.569First are criminal and illicit activities. The use of drones by570criminal and terrorist organizations is no longer a571hypothetical scenario. Incidents of drones being used to572deliver contraband like drugs and weapons into correctional573facilities are a daily occurrence across America.574    The weaponization of drones has been occurring in the575United States for years. The internet has brought battlefield576tactics to North America, through shared lessons learned in577conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We continue to see578rival cartels repeatedly conduct indiscriminate carpet-bombing579attacks against other cartels using explosive laden drones.580    In 2021, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel created a581dedicated unit of drone operators to attack rival groups in582Mexico. Today, Mexican cartels are reportedly using one-way583attack drones alongside the more traditional explosive carrying584quadcopters. Last year, U.S. Federal authorities detected585approximately 60,000 cartel drones near the border.586    The second category is physical and cyber-attacks on587critical infrastructure. The potential for drone attacks in588critical infrastructure is alarming. A drone with a small589payload could cause widespread disruption and economic turmoil590by damaging power stations, water treatment plants,591communication powers, or data centers.592    The U.S. critical infrastructure is often protected by593trained security professionals, not law enforcement. Any594assumption that State and local law enforcement could fill the595private sector gap is a gross underestimation of reality of596police resources.597    The third category is surveillance and espionage. Drones598offer a low-cost, low-risk platform for persistent599surveillance. They can be equipped with sophisticated cameras600and sensors to gather intelligence from a distance without the601need for physical access.602    Drones can bypass traditional security perimeters, making603them a favorite tool for illicit trade. Domestically, drones604are being used to stalk, harass, and spy on people in their own605homes. This invasion of privacy goes unchecked, as police watch606the drones fly away without leaving a physical footprint for607them to follow.608    Our current legal and technological frameworks have not609kept pace with these clear and growing dangers. The authority610to detect and mitigate malicious drones is fragmented across611the Federal agencies, creating confusion and gaps in response.612    While safe and effective counter-drone technology exists613today, its use is severely restricted by current laws. To614address these challenges, I respectfully offer the following615recommendations to the Subcommittee for consideration. A616comprehensive Federal counter-drone legislation. We need clear617and cohesive framework of nationwide counter-drone operations.618Year after year Congress continues to introduce counter-drone619legislation but never passes it. This legislation should620immediately expand the legal authorities to detect, track, and621identify drone threats to all Federal agencies, States, local,622Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, and trained security623professionals protecting our critical infrastructure.624    This legislation should also expand the existing 2018625Federal pilot program for the mitigation of drone threats to626those same Federal, State, local entities, and trained security627professionals.628    This pilot program must be launched in a robust manner to629enable the rapid scaling of capabilities ahead of the World630Cup, America's 250th anniversary celebration, next year's631elections, and the 2028 Olympics. If these authorities are not632granted by Congress quickly, then these mass gatherings will go633unprotected and require Federal resources to be diverted from634the border, other critical and national infrastructure635missions.636    In conclusion, the threat from malicious drones uses in637real and immediate and growing, we must take decisive action638now.639    I thank you for your time and look forward to your640questions.641    [The prepared statement of Mr. Feddersen follows:]642    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]643644    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen.645    The Chair recognizes Dr. Wallace for his five minutes. Dr.646Wallace.647648                 STATEMENT OF DR. RYAN WALLACE649650    Dr. Wallace. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, and the651other distinguished Committee Members. Thank you for the652opportunity to testify on the important issue of protecting our653Nation from the misuse of unmanned aircraft systems, sometimes654referred to as UAS, or more colloquially, as drones.655    My name is Ryan Wallace, and I currently serve as a656Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. For the past65710 years, my research has focused primarily on UAS safety and658security threats through the use of UAS detection equipment.659This use of unmanned aircraft is not fundamentally a technology660problem, but rather, a people problem. What makes this problem661particularly challenging is the unique aerial capabilities that662UAS provides to their operators, capabilities previously663limited only to those with the resources and training to664operate manned aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and665automation have now placed these capabilities within the reach666of anyone with a few hundred dollars. This creates a667disproportionate force multiplier for bad actors.668    The destructive potential of consumer drones recently came669to global attention in Ukraine during the famed operation670Spiders Web where small drones were used to conduct rapid,671surprising, accurate, and devastating attacks. These attacks672were executed with near impunity, highlighting the critical673vulnerability gap posed by UAS threats. The remote nature of674these attacks left no one to arrest or hold accountable.675    Today, these tactics and technology are being employed both676domestically and near our borders. The FAA estimates there are677currently more than 2.8 million drones in the United States,678nearly double the number of drones in 2018 than when the679Preventing Emerging Threats Act was signed into law.680    Today, UAS outnumber manned aircraft by nearly 13-1. The681agency estimates that within five years, this number will grow682a further 10 percent. Presently, drones are causing three major683domestic problems: (1) Creating a collision risk with aircraft684operating in the National Airspace System; (2) contraband685delivery into prisons and correctional institutions; and (3)686incursions along our borders. The potential consequences of a687midair collision with a drone erode the safety of our skies. As688of the second quarter of 2025, the FAA recorded a total of6891,022 sightings, approximately 170 per month with aircrew690reportedly taking evasive action in 2.8 percent of those cases.691    In January of this year, a Canada Air CL-415 conducting692suppression operations struck a small drone operating at low693altitude within a temporary flight restricted zone near the694Palisades fire. Their operations were suspended to allow that695fire to expand unabated, further enhancing the destruction and696risk to response personnel.697    According to Michael Torphy, the FBI and Christopher Hardy698of the Department of Justice, drone activity has proliferated699to more than half of the Bureau of Prison Federal facilities700with incidents climbing to more than 479 in 2024, nearly 20701times the number since the agency started tracking in 2018.702    Similarly, Steven Willoughby from the Department of703Homeland Security highlighted the extent of the porous UAS704activity along the U.S. border stating, In the last six months705of 2024, more than 27,000 drones were detected within 500706meters of the Southern border.707    To effectively address these challenges, I offer several708observations, foremost that all drone incidents are local709incidents first. Often, first responders to these incidents710will be sworn officers from one of the Nation's nearly 18,000711State and local law enforcement agencies. Most of these712agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents.713Even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection,714tracking, and identification of UAS.715    Currently, no State or local law enforcement agencies are716equipped and authorized to forcibly take down a UAS threat717without the compliance of the operator who may be positioned718miles away from the aerial vehicle.719    Testimony by Michael Torphy from the FBI underscored720resource limitations in providing counter-UAS protection,721highlighting the agency was only able to cover .05 percent of722the more than 240,000 special events eligible for counter-UAS723protection. Ultimately, the widespread immediate need for724counter-UAS protection should be a part of calculus used to725determine future authorities.726    The training is a vital element in protecting our public727safety personnel to respond effectively to drone instances.728Foremost, it is essential to ensure both UAS detection and729mitigation efforts do not create or exacerbate hazards within730the National Airspace System, respect from interference with731navigation or communications infrastructure, or impede air732traffic management functions.733    It is also necessary to educate officers on how to734effectively respond, investigate, document, and charge these735incidents in a manner that leads to successful prosecutions.736Moreover, such training ensures reinforcement of appropriate737procedures designed to protect the rights, expression, privacy,738and other civil liberties. There are no magic bullet739technological solutions to this problem. Each type of740technology has its own inherent capabilities and limitations.741    Finally, I would like to highlight the vital importance of742continued research and development. Research consortiums, like743the Alliance for System Safety of UAS Through Research744Excellence, ASSURE, and its accompanying and training arm745ASSURED Safe are qualified, equipped, and ready to address746these challenges that are affecting the National Airspace747System.748    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallace follows:]749   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]750751    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Dr. Wallace. Now, the Chair752recognizes Dr. Cahill for her five minute opening statement.753754              STATEMENT OF DR. CATHERINE F. CAHILL755756    Dr. Cahill. Thank you. Chair Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin,757and Ranking Member McBath, and the esteemed Members of the758Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance. My759name is Cathy Cahill, and I'm the Director of ACUASI, the760Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration.761    The ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA test sites where we762are a key player in many other FAA, DOJ, and DOD programs. We763also partner with a variety of commercial and governmental764entities on cutting edge UAS and counter-UAS technologies,765required to safely integrate UAS us into the National Airspace766System. These facts uniquely position me to discuss the topic767of malicious UAS. This written testimony is provided to you768through my personal capacity as a private citizen based on my769professional experience. It does not necessarily represent the770views of the University of Alaska.771    The ACUASI uses UAS for good, such as conducting medical772supply delivery, cargo delivery to isolated communities, and773emergency response. However, our team is very aware of how they774can be used maliciously.775    I live in Alaska, but even in this remote location our team776has seen the malicious use of UAS. We have seen flights of777unauthorized UAS in the flight path of Ted Stevens778International Airport, one of the top five cargo airports in779the world.780    Simultaneously, we have seen multiple UAS entering781restricted airspace of our military bases. We have observed the782flight tracks of UAS dropping contraband into correctional783facilities. I personally have seen UAS crossing the Southern784border, bringing drugs from Mexico. All these examples show the785malicious UAS activities are widespread, and we need policies,786procedures, training, and technologies to allow law enforcement787to stop these activities without creating a hazard to people788and property.789    The first question I always get asked when I talk to the790public about the issue of malicious UASs, why can't we shoot791them? The United States Code, Section 49, defines UAS as792aircraft and all the laws codified for traditional manned793aircraft apply to them. Therefore, shooting an UAS is a Federal794offense with applicable jail time and fines. Only five795agencies, DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ and, to a limited extent, FAA have796relief from the United States code sections applicable to797shooting down, hacking, or jamming UAS. Most law enforcement798operators dealing with unauthorized UAS do not have the legal799authority to do so. Also, it is unsafe to mitigate a UAS800without knowing what is under it and one might get hit when the801UAS falls.802    Additionally, the operator of a counter-UAS system needs to803know that UAS under operation is authorized to be flying in804that location. These facts point to why we need highly trained805professionals with appropriate statutory relief and good806information, making the risk benefit calculations about whether807and how a UAS should be mitigated.808    As the malicious use of UAS spreads, State, local law809enforcement, and officers will be on the front lines for810combating the threat from the rogue UAS, because Federal agents811with counter-drone capacities cannot be everywhere. The ACUASI812team has been studying the willingness of local law enforcement813officers to engage with systems designed to detect, track, and814identify malicious UAS.815    In Alaska, we have had trouble getting State and local law816enforcement officers to address rogue UAS because they are817overworked, understaffed, dealing with more urgent situations,818and feel it is not their responsibility to do so. Additionally,819many of the law enforcement participants in our study aren't820sure as to what laws are applicable to malicious UAS, and do821not know what they can legally do to build a case for the822misuse of UAS.823    We need to provide our law enforcement officers with clear824guidance on how to address rogue UAS. As the risk from825malicious UAS increases, the potential to mitigate the UAS is826certain circumstances.827    We cannot afford to allow criminals to use UAS maliciously,828or our adversaries to use UAS to endanger our military bases or829personnel and conduct espionage. In my opinion, H.R. 5061, the830Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act831is a good first step toward safely implementing counter-drone832technology in the U.S. However, more needs to be done.833    To accelerate our testing and implementation of these834technologies and the required risk benefit decision835calculations needed before UAS is mitigated. These investments836will not only help our law enforcement organizations here at837home, but also our military overseas, as they deal with the838malicious UAS threat.839    The U.S. should be a world leader in the development and840deployment of these technologies. If we do not move fast841enough, the criminals and our adversaries will win the UAS war.842    This ends my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any843questions you have.844    [The prepared statement of Dr. Cahill follows:]845    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]846847    Mr. Biggs. Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member of848the Subcommittee, Ms. McBath, for her opening statement.849    Ms. McBath. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to our850witnesses. I have read your testimonies, and I apologize that I851am just getting here. Thank you for convening today's hearing852to provide us with an opportunity to learn more about how853drones can be used to commit crimes; how law enforcement can854respond to those crimes; and what we might do here in Congress855to adapt our laws to meet the challenges that drones pose to856our society and the challenges that you have expressed today.857    As with the internet, artificial intelligence, and so many858other technologies, drones can really be a valuable tool. They859can help first responders that survive or survey a disaster860area to search for survivors, or they can give law enforcement861another vantage point from which to monitor a special event or862a very sensitive location. They can keep officers safe by863allowing them to remotely investigate a dangerous situation or864location. The rapid proliferation of drone technology has865ushered in a new frontier of crime, and many, many public866safety challenges.867    In the wrong hands, drones can be used to invade privacy,868smuggle contraband, as you just mentioned, or provide bad869actors with information that can help them avoid detection.870I've heard firsthand about these harms from many law871enforcement officers, in particular, in my district in the872State of Georgia, as they are working to keep us all safe. For873example, Georgia prison officials have informed me that they874are increasingly battling the use of drones to smuggle875contraband into our prison facilities. Drones have been used to876deliver illegal drugs, weapons and cell phones, which can each877pose a threat to the safety of our inmates and also the staff.878    Just last year, the Georgia Department of Corrections see879drones, dozens of them, that could be used to smuggle in880contraband. Recently, officials at Washington State Prison in881Davisboro, Georgia, they worked with the Washington County882sheriff to track drones that were being used in an attempt to883smuggle methamphetamine and heroin into prison. By tracking the884drones and using a K-9 unit, they were able to locate the drone885operators, arrest them, and prevent the drugs from reaching the886prison.887    While law enforcement succeeded in this effort, using888traditional tools, additional law enforcement tools may be889needed to respond to the rising challenges that are presented890by the drones.891    As with any new technology, we must exercise caution and892proceed thoughtfully to avoid unintended consequences of893detecting and mitigating drone activities. Disabling or894intercepting drones presents very unique challenges. For895example, an intercepted or disabled drone could fall as was896stated, and injure innocent bystanders on the ground, damage897objects, or property in its path. Similarly, many of the898technologies used to combat drones rely on disrupting their899communications systems of planes or emergency--these900communication systems could disrupt aircrafts or emergency901responders.902    The testing, planning, training, and targeted deployment903can all help ensure that counter-drone technologies are used in904a way that promotes public safety, but also strengthens our905national security.906    I'm so thankful to each of our experts today for your907expert testimony. Thank you for coming here today to discuss908how we can work together to respond to these challenges and909opportunities that have been presented by drones and counter-910drone technology and our ever-changing technological landscape.911Thank each of you for sharing your expertise.912    Mr. Biggs. The gentlelady yields back. Now, we'll go to913questions from Members of the Subcommittee, we'll start first914with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls.915    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Chair. You spoke so well about the916issues that we see down at our Southern border related to917drones coming across with all the drugs, killing our people918from the bad hombres we have on the Southern border. We have to919stop it.920    I'd like to talk a little bit about drones in the airspace,921specifically airports, concerned about the airports, right? A922bad actor with bad intentions, entering restricted airspace923over one of our airports. As I do, I am looking at you, I am924thinking about Florida. You have about 400 airports as your925responsibility. What does a medium-size airport do? You detect926at the airport, a drone comes in restricted airspace, what's927your response?928    Sgt. Dooley. Normally, I'll give you an example. We've done929some really different things in South Florida, especially Miami930International Airport, as an example, has a drone problem and931we have partnered with our FAA partners, DHS, et cetera,932entities that are allowed without question to detect or933mitigate because we recognized it was an issue. We incorporate934a lot of our public safety in the area of Miami-Dade, et935cetera, and we were involved as well. We are able to go out936there and start intercepting, but from the perspective of an937airport that simply has the ability to detect and there is938really nothing they can do other than watch it, honestly.939    Mr. Nehls. Did you see how stupid that sounds?940    Sgt. Dooley. It does.941    Mr. Nehls. It's stupid.942    Sgt. Dooley. Yes.943    Mr. Nehls. I like the idea we can detect; we can detect.944All these airports we can detect a drone. Well, if it's being945operated by an individual with some bad intentions, you'll just946catch it on video. The destruction of--you are going to detect947it, but there's nothing to mitigate that drone? This is948airports, correct me if I am wrong, sir, but this is airports949across the entire country.950    Sgt. Dooley. Yes, that's correct. There may be some that951have specialized, but--952    Mr. Nehls. Well, Ms. Cahill brought up a few of the953agencies that have the ability to mitigate a drone.954    Dr. Wallace, I hear these arguments, I'm on the955Transportation Committee, I hear all these arguments about you956can't mitigate the drone because it could interfere, it could957interfere with commercial aviation and all this. Is there958technology available out there that could mitigate a drone959without interfering with our commercial air?960    Dr. Wallace. There are certainly several technologies that961are available for mitigation.962    Mr. Nehls. Sure.963    Dr. Wallace. Each of those technologies have their own964benefits and limitations.965    Mr. Nehls. Sure, sure. That's an excuse that I hear over966and over again, it's going to interfere with the aircraft that967are coming in, I said, interfere with the aircraft coming in.968The damn drone could take down one of our aircraft. You talked969a little bit about what we've seen in Ukraine with the complex970missions that some of these drones are taking. I am appalled by971the fact that I was in Milwaukee and I went to visit the972airport, we were talking about the drones, and I was inside973there. I said well, ``what happens if a drone gets into this974red air--this restricted airspace?'' ``Well, we know it's975there.'' I said, ``what would you do?'' ``We try to call976somebody. Yes, we try to find the guy, he could be a couple977blocks, a couple miles away in the backyard and we will knock978on the door.'' I said, ``What if that guy has bad intentions?''979``Then, when we have a significant event, we'll bring in the980Coast Guard. The Coast Guard would have the ability to mitigate981the drone and send it out to Lake Michigan or set it down.''982    The idea to say that, we have to be careful here that the983drone doesn't fall down and hit somebody in the head. The984technology is there to take control of the damn drone and get985it out of the restricted airspace. The idea that we have to be986worried about not offending somebody; it's in restricted987airspace. At some point in time, Mr. Feddersen, we're going988have a drone operated by some bad hombres over here interfering989with some commercial airliners, running into the engines and990causing problems but then, maybe then, is when we will actually991get serious about mitigating the risks of these drones, because992there's going to be millions of them out there. The bad guys993are understanding these are pretty--you can put some pretty994good payload on some of these drones, they are relatively995inexpensive, right? So, I am deeply concerned, Sergeant Dooley,996about the U.S. Government's position on this, whether it is997Section 49, it is a Federal offence, that just makes me sick to998think that this is a Federal offense for State individuals,999State officials to protect their own airports in their own1000State. We must change; we must change.1001    I yield back.1002    Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields. We appreciate that. The1003Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McBath.1004    Ms. McBath. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.1005    We know that drones, as I've stated and many have stated in1006this hearing, drones have been used to smuggle drugs, weapons,1007and phones into prisons and across our borders. As I mentioned1008in my opening remarks, this is already happening in Georgia.1009Drones present a significant risk to the safety of inmates and1010staff.1011    Dr. Cahill, your written testimony notes that your team has1012worked with Alaskan correction facilities to detect and to1013track and to identify the drones that are being used to smuggle1014contraband into the prisons. You also said this is a widespread1015problem, but can you talk about--you said that you had1016difficulty in getting law enforcement to address the rogue UAS,1017and so including at correctional facilities. Could you explain1018the source of the hesitancy?1019    Dr. Cahill. Ranking Member, the reality is when we have1020dealt with our law enforcement, they are skeptical of a new1021technology until it is proven because they have so many things1022on their plate that it is a challenge for them to learn1023something new and be able to work with it. We had hesitancy in1024our correctional facilities for installing one of these1025systems. The moment we did and were able to confirm some of1026their intelligence that there was a contraband drop occurring1027and we were able to track the drone, identify where the hand1028controller for the operator was. We changed their opinion. As1029soon as we gave them that briefing the answer was: Could you1030please train us this afternoon? We did.1031    They've spread that story to additional correctional1032facilities and they've accepted it. They have a very targeted,1033very limited area that they need to protect.1034    The police and the Alaska State troopers who have much1035wider ranges for them. We are severely understaffed. So, a1036malicious drone doesn't mean anything compared to wife beating1037or major traffic accidents in the middle of nowhere. The1038priority is not there to be able do these additional duties1039associated with monitoring the technologies and determining how1040to interact with them.1041    Ms. McBath. Could you kind of explain to me when the drones1042are seized in these crimes, what type of digital forensics can1043be performed on them? What data can be extracted or recovered1044from a seized drone?1045    Dr. Cahill. The Ranking Member, we don't actually do the1046forensics on the drones. People do, for example, the Pacific1047Palisades case where the drone hit the Super Scooper, a fire-1048fighting aircraft. They were able to do a forensic analysis1049because the drone was stuck in the wing of aircraft. In a lot1050of these cases, all we see are the tracks and we may know it is1051group one or group two, which is the size category, but we1052don't know a whole lot about that aircraft because we have to1053obey Title 18 and Title 49, which means we cannot break into1054the communications link for that aircraft without permission,1055the 124 and authority, for example. We as a State university do1056not have that, but the partners we have who do, they are able1057to get more information in terms of what the serial number is1058what type of aircraft it is. They can say it is a DJI Mavic,1059for example. It really is a function of what you have.1060    What we are doing when we are using passive RF is for1061trying authorization, is we are looking for basically somebody1062yelling. We have a network of censors, and we determine the1063direction from which the yelling is coming. That lets us find1064the drone and the operator. We will be able to track where the1065drone is and where the operator is. In the recent case with the1066Juneau glacial outburst flooding, we said at the system we were1067able to determine where the controller was, where the drone1068went and landed, local law enforcement went to that location1069and knocked on doors and found the perpetrator.1070    Ms. McBath. Then, would you say that local law enforcement1071is able then to build a criminal case from the data that they1072are to extract that you can't do it but they can?1073    Dr. Cahill. Yes.1074    Ms. McBath. OK, thank you. Sergeant Dooley, what are the1075greatest legal and technical hurdles in actively encountering a1076drone in real time?1077    Sgt. Dooley. Just to the doctor's point again, we do have1078legal constraints, we would violate about 15 different U.S.1079codes by simply frequency jamming or mitigating all kinds of1080FAA rules, regulations, FCC, et cetera. Most of those carry1081jail time and significant fines as well. A lot of colleagues1082would say, ``Like, oh, well, we're public safety, if we have to1083do what we have to do.'' The problem is, to your point earlier,1084mitigating a drone and they may have had a legal right to be1085there, and they made an honest mistake, there is still a1086tremendous amount of consequence that comes with that.1087    Our biggest hurdles are all the existing codes, our laws1088simply do not keep up with the rate the technology progresses,1089and the way that it can be manipulated for bad. Those are some1090of the biggest hurdles we have is Title 18 pen trap, wire-1091tapping laws, et cetera, that are of huge concern when we do1092want to not only detect that a drone is there, but be able to1093mitigate it away, we would be violating about 15 different1094title codes, and also Title 18 and 49 as well.1095    Ms. McBath. Thank you. I appreciate it.1096    Mr. Biggs. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from1097Wisconsin for five minutes, Mr. Tiffany.1098    Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1099    As we heard over the last few years, every State became a1100border State, with the previous administration and cartel1101members openly stated that they used our Northern border to1102smuggle in narcotics. Mr. Feddersen, do you think it is equally1103important to implement these drone enforcement programs at both1104the Southern border and the Northern border?1105    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I do. They are being implemented1106at the Federal level, particularly CBP on both the North and1107the South sides. However, the lack of authorities for detection1108track identifying, or even the mitigation piece does extend to1109those local departments that are shoulder to shoulder with CBP1110taking action to address these issues. We are severely1111overmatched by the criminal element when it comes to it.1112    Mr. Tiffany. How should that change in your opinion?1113    Mr. Feddersen. It is actually quite easy, sir. Detect,1114track, and identify authority is our Title 18. They are very1115vague, they are antiquated, and they honestly add a lot of1116confusion to law enforcement, commercial sectors, and critical1117infrastructure that want to be able to see what's flying in1118their airspace. The information that goes from there into the1119counter-drone systems like ours are nothing more than remote ID1120data. It's just data that comes directly from the drone. The1121most personal information you may get from it is the serial1122number which is akin to license plate on a vehicle. Law1123enforcement still has to call the FAA to get the registry1124information from the FAA and then from there, be able to take1125leaps.1126    The DTI should be a blanket open authority for critical1127infrastructure, security, law enforcement and honestly, all1128Federal agencies because they don't all have the authority1129right now.1130    Mr. Tiffany. With that authority they could accomplish the1131mission that you were referring to that they are not able to1132fulfill at this point. Is that correct?1133    Mr. Feddersen. Correct, most of it, because at this point,1134you can figure out where the drone is, where it took off, and1135where the pilot is in real time.1136    Mr. Tiffany. The cartels and others are light years ahead1137of the law enforcement at this point in part because of that?1138    Mr. Feddersen. Honestly, the rest of the world, sir. We are1139a global country in 33 countries. We do airports and law1140enforcement and military everywhere else, and they use our1141system quite a bit to mitigate.1142    Mr. Tiffany. Mitigation looks much different in other1143places around the world than it does here in the United States?1144    Mr. Feddersen. It is only the policies and legislative1145piece. They have given authorities to their law enforcement and1146security entities.1147    Mr. Tiffany. You think China may have had a hand in the1148drone activity around some of our military sites?1149    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, absolutely. I believe that drones1150are a tool, they are a tool by criminal networks, and they are1151a tool for foreign adversaries. Absolutely, they are being1152used.1153    Mr. Tiffany. Sergeant Dooley, are you familiar with the1154Guang Pan Cape Canaveral incident that happened earlier this1155year in Florida?1156    Sgt. Dooley. Vaguely, yes.1157    Mr. Tiffany. In the case of Chinese-born Canadian citizen1158Guang Pan was found to be using a drone to take unauthorized1159photographs at Patrick Air Force Base, a submarine morph in1160Cape Canaveral. Have you seen increased activity of drones1161around U.S. military bases in Florida?1162    Sgt. Dooley. Military bases not so much. We don't support1163them as often, it is normally during large scale events, but we1164went from literally detecting a few hundred per month in those1165general areas where they are restricted airspace like a DOD1166site or a military base to thousands. In particular, when DGI,1167in particular, drones, turned off their geofencing for the most1168part. Our principal workhorse years ago in the State of1169Florida, what we used was DGI drones. That is how we got1170started. Now, we are not allowed to use them anymore. Back1171then, you had to have special permission, the drone told you,1172you're not allowed to fly here or take off from here. Now, that1173is not the case. It is simply a check box where you turn on1174your drone and it can be right next to an airport runway, and1175before it would say, ``You can't fly here.'' It says, you're1176taking responsibility, you touch a check box and it takes off1177and flies wherever I want it to fly now. We've seen dramatic1178increase over the past, I would say, 8-9 months of going from a1179handful of detections to in the thousands of detections in1180these areas or within range of our detection equipment because1181there is no more geofencing. Yes, it has increased dramatically1182in a lot of these areas, not just for infrastructure, but our1183military sites and other places.1184    Mr. Tiffany. Is it correct that we do not produce a lot of1185drones in the United States principally produced in China. Is1186that accurate?1187    Sgt. Dooley. That's correct. The principal ones that are1188produced here are normally purchased by DOD or law enforcement1189or areas like Florida where we restrict the type of drones1190we're allowed to purchase.1191    Mr. Tiffany. For national security purposes, do you think1192that we should make that a priority to be able to produce them1193in the United States?1194    Sgt. Dooley. I am a proud American for sure; I would love1195to be prideful of us producing those types of things here, yes.1196I also don't want to stifle some of the things where people1197need to buy a certain product because it is the correct tool1198for the correct job if that makes sense, but buying American1199should be preferred, yes.1200    Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield.1201    Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Before we go to the1202next one, I want to submit for the record documentation called,1203``Cartels Drop Bombs From Drones Near Southern Border.'' So1204ordered.1205    I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell,1206for five minutes.1207    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. There's no doubt that drones1208particularly for law enforcement have changed the game for1209surveillance, for search and rescue, to assist in active SWAT1210operations, they can save not only civilian lives, but also1211protect our men and women in law enforcement. The Sergeant just1212alluded to a problem that we have run into is that cheaper1213Chinese components have made it much more affordable for law1214enforcement agencies to have these capabilities. We all know1215the risk that comes along with having Chinese components in our1216drones, which is that they could be pinging back to mainland1217China and affecting our own national security in the way that1218they could be gathering intelligence on behalf of the Chinese1219Government. Certainly, no law enforcement agency wants that.1220    Sergeant Dooley, I imagine you would tell me that when1221you're making decisions to protect the people who work with you1222and to protect the public, you have to think about what can1223bring public safety and how you can stretch your dollars the1224best. Is that right? Is that some of the tension you have to1225deal with in making a decision like that?1226    Sgt. Dooley. Not anymore. The State of Florida legislated1227that, so we don't have to worry about it, we just take what we1228need. They also supply funding now to help us reach those goals1229of transitioning everything away.1230    Mr. Swalwell. My goal, just as you stated earlier, is that1231we would have entirely an affordable American-made supply1232chain. In fact, in California, there's a company, it's made up1233of former Navy SEALS, called Inspired Flight which is American1234made components. It sounds like you're familiar with Inspired1235Flight.1236    Sgt. Dooley. Oh, yes. They are good people. I like them.1237    Mr. Swalwell. Yes, same. My question for Dr. Wallace is1238knowing that 86 percent of the drones--I'm sorry. Knowing that1239a high percentage of drones are made in China, in that the over1240concentration can affect our national security. What can we do1241in the near term to make sure that law enforcement has1242affordable drones, but on the manufacturing side that we're1243able to expedite our ability to produce American made1244components?1245    Dr. Wallace. That's an excellent question. I can tell you,1246I'm not a manufacturing expert. I can tell you that from a1247capabilities' perspective, currently Chinese made drones have a1248capability that can't be matched with the same dollar value. I1249do think that given that limitation the choice that ultimately1250has to be made with regard to especially public safety is one1251of lives, because at the end of the day, if public safety1252agency doesn't have access to the tool they need to protect1253that public and the capability they need to accomplish what1254they need to do, the ultimate price will be either law1255enforcement member's life or potentially a member--a citizen's1256life. That is a metric that should be taken?1257    Mr. Swalwell. Agreed. Sergeant Dooley, are there any1258examples you have not given the Committee as to how a drone1259facilitated saving life or protecting the officers who worked1260with you that you think could animate the need for giving law1261enforcement more resources in this area?1262    Sgt. Dooley. For the counter site or just a success story1263from having drones in public safety?1264    Mr. Swalwell. Both.1265    Sgt. Dooley. OK, from the success side, I will give you an1266example and I give it all the time, I work very closely with1267the Palm Beach County sheriff's office in South Florida. There1268was a deputy and I were eating lunch and we get this call of a1269stabbing inside a home and everybody fled. Unfortunately, the1270person that was the criminal in this particular case was off1271his medication, recognizing that we may have had some type of1272mental episode and we approach it differently. As soon as we1273arrive there, the deputy get permission to put his drone and I1274supported him by making sure everything was squared aware. He1275put his drone under the house and within three minutes he1276located the suspect, we recovered the suspect, they are in1277custody, no one got shot, not one got dog bit. Everybody went1278on about their day and the person who had been stabbed was1279getting medical attention. This was solved in minutes, versus1280like an hour standoff with a SWAT team without this type of1281technology.1282    From the other side of not having detection or counter UAS1283that has been hindering is a bulk of what we get is like1284careless and clueless individuals where they just as dangerous1285at times as someone with bad intent. For example, the person in1286California gave an example of hitting the sea plane that was--I1287forget the name of it. That person didn't do it on purpose;1288they were just careless and clueless. Same thing in Texas1289during the flooding, we had someone strike a helicopter. They1290didn't do it on purpose, sometimes careless and clueless1291individuals, dangerous as those that have those negative1292intentions. Having this technology both for public safety1293provides a tremendous value of being able to save lives, to1294protect lives. More importantly, having the ability to detect1295and potentially mitigate if needed could provide those values1296where we can keep mandate aviation safe. We harp on the1297terrorist side, and OK, careless and clueless can be just as1298dangerous as those individuals that intended and planned1299something versus someone just popping up trying to make a1300YouTube video and actually hit an airplane or violate airspace.1301    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you for your service, Sergeant. To the1302men and women that you serve with, I'll say what we say in our1303law enforcement family: Be safe. Thank you.1304    Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.1305    I have two more documents that I'm introducing into the1306record: ``Drones in the Wrong Hands: How Criminals Use UAVs to1307Threaten Prisons and Jails,'' and another one titled, ``New1308State Drone Law Sets Strict Operational Boundaries.''1309    Without objection, so ordered. I now recognize the1310gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott.1311    Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To the witnesses, thank1312you for being here.1313    I'll piggyback on one of those submissions. When I was1314working in law enforcement, the problem had already arrived in1315many respects. We would send some of the most dangerous people1316in the country away to jail for sometimes 20-40 years, but1317there would be no interruption in the criminal enterprises that1318these folks led, in large part, because of devices and1319capabilities that made it into the Bureau of Prisons because of1320the drones. It seemed like just a lumbering bureaucracy and1321inefficiency that it could not keep up with the technology.1322    I am curious. Mr. Feddersen, you mentioned that the United1323States seems to be overwhelmed at this particular juncture. Is1324the posture of being overwhelmed--is that from just a volume1325standpoint of all the drones that are in circulation? Is it a1326technology standpoint, or is it just the layers of bureaucracy1327that prohibit effective deterrence?1328    Mr. Feddersen. Thank you for the question. It is a policy,1329legislative, and bureaucracy issue. Technology is out there1330today from many companies that have been tested by the FAA,1331tested by TSA, deemed safe to use at airports, but the1332confusion over detection, track, and identify has hesitancy1333across the land, and the fact that the mitigation authorities1334haven't been expanded in a quick enough manner is--1335    Mr. Knott. What makes sense to remedy this? Because a drone1336is not an airplane. The fact that they are being regulated as1337such, in many respects, does not make much sense in terms of1338placing the same value on a drone as it does an airplane.1339Should we have a facility-specific code for unmanned aircraft?1340    Mr. Feddersen. I don't think so, sir. I disagree that1341labeling it an aircraft hinders anything. It actually gives1342both operators and those that are working around the drones1343more protection and coverage into what they're doing. It gives1344better regulatory understanding of what these drones can and1345cannot do when they're flying because, honestly, as it has been1346said before there are drones that are as small as a coffee cup1347but some that are as big as a car.1348    Mr. Knott. Yes, yes.1349    Mr. Feddersen. You would have to be able to safely manage1350that, and aircraft is the right designation for that.1351    Mr. Knott. In terms of fixing the issues that we see,1352though, how can we fix the bureaucracy and I would say the1353ineffective legislative posture we have with drones?1354    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir, I'm going to have to point the1355finger back to all of you on the panel.1356    Mr. Knott. Well, you're the expert. I'm just asking.1357    Mr. Feddersen. No, because that's exactly what it is. We1358had a five-year pilot program for a very small sect of Federal1359law enforcement that started in 2018. We're now in the eighth1360year of that five-year program. No authorities have been1361expanded. We have seen that that technology can be used safely1362and without issue. We've had those departments and agencies ask1363for an expansion of authorities to get them some relief off1364their responsibility.1365    Honestly, especially from being a former State trooper, to1366say that an FBI agent is smarter and more apt at using this1367equipment than a State trooper or local law enforcement isn't1368the right way. The delay is simply understanding the technology1369and giving trust back to the process and the system.1370    Mr. Knott. What does the technology do specifically?1371    Mr. Feddersen. It gives you the basic remote--for remote ID1372information, it tells you where the drone is, what the drone's1373serial number is, where it's flying, which way it's heading,1374and where the pilot is in real time. That information can be1375used for a ground interdiction without even having to worry1376about the airspace, to talk to the pilot, and have him bring it1377down.1378    There are technologies like ours, which is cyber takeover,1379which takes control of the drone and lands it safely where it1380needs to be, which then allows for the officer to either give1381it back to the child and parent with a warning undamaged, no1382collateral damage, or go ahead and submit for a search warrant1383to get the information out of the drone.1384    Mr. Knott. Do you think there is a space in the legal1385construct to have emergency authorization to remove a drone,1386whether it's shooting it down, taking control of it, or some1387other means?1388    Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. These drones are flying at 30-601389miles per hour. The decision cycle for law enforcement or a1390security individual is literally seconds and minutes. It's not1391weeks or hours. If it is to be that type of system, then I1392think it has to be preemptively done to say that a search1393warrant is going to cover a large area for a large period of1394time.1395    Mr. Knott. The emphasis of my question is--let's say a1396drone is flying over an airport, or over a Bureau of Prisons1397facility. Should there not be the authorization to remove that1398drone immediately?1399    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, absolutely.1400    Mr. Knott. Do we lack that currently? Is that correct?1401    Mr. Feddersen. We do.1402    Mr. Knott. OK. The technology is there to remove that1403drone?1404    Mr. Feddersen. The technology is available to remove the1405drone and remove it safely, and the technology has been tested1406by the FAA and TSA. A prime example, though, is Federal Air1407Marshals--1408    Mr. Knott. Yes.1409    Mr. Feddersen. --who are using the Chinese equipment at our1410major airports to assess what the situation is, but they don't1411have authority to use other equipment or use mitigation.1412    Mr. Knott. Mr. Chair, I have more room, but that's--I'll1413yield back the--1414    Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.1415    Mr. Knott. Yes.1416    Mr. Biggs. I now recognize--thank you. We've got lots of1417questions, don't we?1418    Mr. Knott. Yes.1419    Mr. Biggs. The gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, is1420recognized for five minutes.1421    Mr. Kiley. Thanks, Mr. Chair.1422    Clearly, the problems being discussed at this hearing are1423extremely serious when it comes to the malicious and1424unauthorized uses of drones. Of course, there are a lot of good1425and authorized uses of drones as well for agriculture, for1426hobbyists, for security, and so forth, and increasingly,1427actually, for delivery. If you look at companies like Walmart1428and Amazon, they have actually been expanding their use of1429drones to make almost instantaneous or very quick deliveries at1430least of smaller parallels at this point, and that many believe1431this will become quite widespread in the coming years.1432    This sort of problem of the unauthorized uses of drones1433threatens the ability to have that process go smoothly, both1434from the perspective of having the regulatory process--or1435framework, more correctly--and in terms of public perception1436and support for these sorts of things.1437    Maybe I'll ask Dr. Wallace, and if any of the other1438panelists want to add to this, how do we sort of address the1439malicious uses of drones in a way that does not threaten the1440productive and valuable uses of them?1441    Dr. Wallace. It's an excellent question. The initial1442challenge is there is a misperception that it's easy to1443identify the misuse of a drone, at least initially. If you're1444looking at a radar screen, for example, you're going to see a1445dot and an altitude. That doesn't really give you the ability1446to immediately distinguish that someone is doing something1447improperly.1448    Typically, we leverage information contextually with other1449kinds of information to try to make some assertions about what1450is actually happening. Is the drone operating above the1451altitude that the FAA would permit? Are they operating at an1452unusual time? Are they operating near a facility that would be1453questionable? You never really know definitively if this drone1454is a threat or not. You only have indications.1455    Mr. Kiley. Thank you. Did any of the other panelists want1456to weigh in?1457    Mr. Feddersen. Yes. That the question is a very good1458question, but it comes back into the fact that when we look at1459our Nation's airspace, we look at it through two lenses: Safety1460and security. Air Domain Awareness, which would allow you to1461see all the drones, is an essential part of the safety aspect1462of things. It's akin to telling police officers they can't look1463at certain vehicles that are flying around--or driving around1464in areas that are off-limits and not being able to react to it.1465It's the same--you either drive the car legally or you drive1466the car illegally. It's the same with a drone.1467    Sgt. Dooley. When we do large-scale events, we do have to1468do a lot of deconfliction. To your point, like, how do you know1469which one is good and which one is bad? We have briefings prior1470to large-scale events of our public safety professionals--1471Amazon, Walmart, if they're doing deliveries in those areas,1472and make sure that we understand that those are already1473authorized and we can get a list because, again, it's all about1474communication and reaching out. We reach out to our FAA1475partners and say who has been authorized to fly in this area,1476because we're going to be their eyes and ears.1477    If we do have something that is authorized to be there or--1478to their point, we're not accidentally intercepting or1479mitigating with our Federal partners. We know that they're1480supposed to be there, or we already have those clearances ahead1481of time. Communication is key, and getting out of your silo and1482talking to the other entities that can do that is key.1483    Mr. Kiley. Yes. That's very important. If this is going to1484become more common, deliveries being done in this way, we want1485folks to have the assurance that these drones are supposed to1486be there and that they are safe and that they're doing just a1487routine delivery as opposed to some of the other encounters1488that people might have in other contexts with drones. I1489appreciate the work you're doing.1490    I appreciate the Chair for bringing attention to this1491issue. I yield back. I would be happy to yield to my colleague,1492Mr. Knott.1493    Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Kiley.1494    Sergeant, I noticed that you waved me down when I was1495talking about the ability to shoot down drones in emergency1496situations that's not currently within the legal construct. Do1497you have any insight into how we can best achieve that across,1498I would say, the sensitive areas, whether they're airports,1499bases, Bureau of Prisons, what have you?1500    Sgt. Dooley. Well, the ideal means would be nonkinetic. You1501don't want to, accidentally, a projectile goes up and comes1502down. There are some scenarios which we've seen overseas where1503people don't care that you're mitigating, jamming, or GPS1504denying. They're using fiber-optic and other things to cross1505these barriers and be very successful, and that may be1506something that we have to deal with at some point.1507    We don't want to box our public safety in to just1508nonkinetic issues, which is basically radio frequency jamming,1509et cetera. We want to be able to give them a full spectrum of1510what they feel is necessary to do--or based on their personal1511experience of what they've encountered, or maybe the intel that1512they're getting--to be able to handle the situation1513accordingly. That's my biggest fear, is that we're going to1514authorize this, but box them in so much that they--1515    Mr. Knott. Yes. They can't respond.1516    Sgt. Dooley. They can't--they are like, I wish I could do1517something. It would be like me standing on the side of the road1518with a radar gun and I clock someone going 100 miles an hour,1519but they didn't give me a car to go chase them down and stop1520them from that dangerous speed. This is the same thing. We want1521to have multiple options available to us without being boxed1522in, but be doing it responsibly with a high level of1523accountability.1524    I do think that if we do make a mistake, we should be held1525accountable. If we mitigate a drone that wasn't supposed to be1526mitigated, we figure out what went wrong and how we can fix it,1527but more importantly, document and justify to our Federal1528partners if we mitigated a drone why we made that decision and1529what was going on at the time, not just I hit the button, he's1530not supposed to be there, have a nice day. We have to have some1531level of that, too.1532    That will help with the trust part as well in allowing1533committees like this to approve those type of authorities1534because we're going to be able to explain when, where, and why1535we actually did some form of mitigation versus just hitting a1536button and trusting that everybody is doing what they're1537supposed to be doing.1538    Mr. Knott. Sergeant, thank you. I yield back.1539    Mr. Biggs. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.1540    This was going to be the last question if I had time, but1541you touched on this here, and that is has a framework--and I1542know the answer has a framework been established that clarifies1543indemnification and liability provisions for law enforcement1544interacting with drones? Then, my guess is no, other than just1545general qualified immunity.1546    Sgt. Dooley. From the FAA perspective, there is a law1547enforcement toolkit that--it gives you things that you're1548allowed to do if you have to interact with a drone pilot. That1549you can ask for their registration, you can ask for their trust1550certificate or part--1551    Mr. Biggs. It doesn't deal with--1552    Sgt. Dooley. As far as the mitigation and the detection1553side, no.1554    Mr. Biggs. Right. I guess that's really my question1555regarding mitigation and detection, that there really is1556nothing right now--1557    Sgt. Dooley. Other than you can't do it unless you're one1558of the four Federal entities.1559    Mr. Biggs. Right. This leads to the next question.1560    You kind of addressed it, Mr. Feddersen, and so I may ask1561all of you.1562    What is the current framework under the pilot program? What1563agencies are given authority, what kind of authority are they1564given, and how do we effectively expand that nationwide?1565    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. In DHS, there's only a small1566number of them, small components. There're components out there1567like his and ICE, the FAMs, and TSA that don't have any1568authorities that probably should. There on the DOJ side, U.S.1569Marshals, BOP, you've got DEA and FBI. All Federal components1570that have authorities are using our system because of the1571methodology that it has.1572    The DOD also has it, and you've got--on DOE, falling short1573of how they're going to go ahead and use things because it's1574private contractors that particularly take care of power plants1575and nuclear plants.1576    The authorities in 124n are fine, because they actually go1577ahead and do the notwithstanding aspect and waive Title 18 and1578the Title 49 piece. The issue is training. As long as we have a1579good solid training program, those authorities in 124n should1580be broadly spread across the rest of the Federal agency, State,1581local law enforcement, and critical infrastructure security1582officers.1583    Mr. Biggs. We have--for instance, in immigration law, we1584provide status for training for departments--sheriffs'1585departments, et cetera--so they can then enforce certain1586aspects of immigration law. Is that the kind of thing that1587might be helpful?1588    I'm just going to go down--be very quick--and start with1589Dr. Cahill and go all the way down and finish with Sergeant1590Dooley.1591    Dr. Cahill. That would be very useful, Mr. Chair, in terms1592of getting it to the people who need it.1593    Mr. Biggs. By the way, when I read your statement, I got a1594kick out of the people that are operating these things while1595they're drunk. I shouldn't get a kick out of that, but that you1596reported it kind of made me smile.1597    Dr. Wallace?1598    Dr. Wallace. I would generally agree.1599    Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?1600    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir. Very helpful.1601    Mr. Biggs. Sergeant?1602    Sgt. Dooley. Yes. In fact, a lot of our Federal partners1603have asked, but, unfortunately, that's not an authority they1604can delegate under those programs like a TFO program. That1605would have to change to allow us to receive those authorities.1606    Mr. Biggs. Right. That would be new legislation we would1607have to pass to get those authorities in place.1608    Right now, I want to make sure everyone knows. If I1609understand correctly, if there is a drone, whether it's a1610malevolent actor or benign, and it's operating in a restricted1611airspace, you as local law enforcement--you can't do anything1612effectively to mitigate?1613    Sgt. Dooley. Mitigating, no. That's it.1614    Mr. Biggs. You can make a phone call and say, Hey--1615    Sgt. Dooley. Yes. We can go try to find the operator or try1616to deal with it, but if we're unsuccessful, that person gets1617away and we have no record of being able to go back and track1618it down of where it took off from, who was flying, et cetera.1619    Mr. Biggs. We've got major events coming up. We've got1620Olympics. We've got World Cup. I guess the question is, are we1621prepared? Are we prepared? We'll just go down this way now.1622    Sergeant Dooley?1623    Sgt. Dooley. No. I would say public safety could1624significantly fill those gaps within a--I'm not talking about1625moving fast and breaking things but moving with a purpose and1626start filling those gaps pretty quickly.1627    Mr. Biggs. Mr. Feddersen?1628    Mr. Feddersen. No, sir. We're not prepared. The crux of the1629issue is that, to get systems and people trained and in place1630before the World Cup and the 250th Anniversary, you have to be1631able to do an evaluation, determine what you want to buy,1632secure the funding, and then manufacturers have to get the1633equipment out and on time for the training.1634    At that point, we are honestly--Christmas is the deadline1635for us to be able to do that. If we don't put the authorities1636in place and expand that to State and local law enforcement,1637then Federal entities are going to have to do the job, but1638they're going to have to let something else go.1639    Mr. Biggs. Yes. Gosh, I'm out of time. Because I wanted to1640get to the next point, which is--and you kind of touched on1641it--what is the time lag to get equipment and train enough1642personnel to actually be effective for some of these big events1643coming up?1644    Go ahead. My time is up, but you can answer Dr. Wallace and1645Dr. Cahill, really quickly.1646    Dr. Wallace. I would agree with my colleagues. We're not1647prepared, and part of that critical need is the ability to1648detect, track, and identify.1649    Dr. Cahill. I agree we're not prepared, and one of the1650challenges, of course, is some of these events are very, very1651spread out. The number of people and assets you need is going1652to be significant.1653    Mr. Biggs. Thank you.1654    Well, it sounds to me like we need to get on our horse and1655get a piece of legislation passed very quickly, as quickly as1656we possibly can. Maybe Representative McBath and I can work1657together on maybe designating that just, I would say,1658correlative to the immigration authorities that we give.1659    With that, I thank all of you for coming today. I1660appreciate your testimony, again, bearing with us as we started1661late. Thank you very much.1662    With that, we are adjourned.1663    [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]16641665    All materials submitted for the record by Members of the1666Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance can1667be found at: https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent1668.aspx?EventID=118608.16691670                                 [all]