“Smarter Borders, Safer Nation: Expanding the Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                 SMARTER BORDERS, SAFER NATION: EXPANDING5                  THE USE OF NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION TECH-6                  NOLOGY7=======================================================================89                                HEARING1011                               BEFORE THE1213                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON14                            BORDER SECURITY15                            AND ENFORCEMENT1617                                 OF THE1819                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY20                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2122                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2324                             SECOND SESSION2526                               __________2728                            JANUARY 22, 20262930                               __________3132                           Serial No. 119-363334                               __________3536       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3738[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3940        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4142                               __________4344                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4563-556 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 202646=======================================================================4748                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY4950                Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman51Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,52    Chair                                Ranking Member53Michael Guest, Mississippi           Eric Swalwell, California54Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           J. Luis Correa, California55August Pfluger, Texas                Shri Thanedar, Michigan56Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island57Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Daniel S. Goldman, New York58Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois59Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York60Elijah Crane, Arizona                LaMonica McIver, New Jersey61Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking62Sheri Biggs, South Carolina              Member63Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico64Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Nellie Pou, New Jersey65Brad Knott, North Carolina           James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia66Vince Fong, California               Troy A. Carter, Louisiana67Matt Van Epps, Tennessee             Al Green, Texas68Vacant69                     Keighle Joyce, Staff Director70                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director71                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk72                                 ------7374            SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT7576                  Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman77Tony Gonzales, Texas                 J. Luis Correa, California,78Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member79Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois80Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Julie Johnson, Texas81Brad Knott, North Carolina           James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia82Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex    Al Green, Texas83    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi84                                         (ex officio)85                Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director86       Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8788                           C O N T E N T S8990                              ----------91                                                                   Page9293                               Statements9495The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From96  the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border97  Security and Enforcement:98  Oral Statement.................................................     199  Prepared Statement.............................................     2100The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From101  the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on102  Border Security and Enforcement................................     3103The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress104  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on105  Homeland Security:106  Oral Statement.................................................     5107  Prepared Statement.............................................     6108109                               Witnesses110111Ms. Diane J. Sabatino, Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner,112  Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:113  Oral Statement.................................................     8114  Prepared Statement.............................................     9115Ms. Hilary M. Benedict, Director, Science, Technology116  Assessments, and Analytics, U.S. Government Accountability117  Office:118  Oral Statement.................................................    12119  Prepared Statement.............................................    13120121                                Appendix122123Questions From Chairman Michael Guest for Diane J. Sabatino......    33124Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Diane J.125  Sabatino.......................................................    34126Questions From Ranking Member J. Luis Correa for Diane J.127  Sabatino.......................................................    35128Questions from Chairman Michael Guest for Hilary M. Benedict.....    42129130   SMARTER BORDERS, SAFER NATION: EXPANDING THE USE OF NON-INTRUSIVE131                         INSPECTION TECHNOLOGY132133                              ----------134135                       Thursday, January 22, 2026136137             U.S. House of Representatives,138                    Committee on Homeland Security,139           Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,140                                                    Washington, DC.141    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in142room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael Guest143[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.144    Present: Representatives Guest, Crane, Biggs, Correa,145Johnson, Walkinshaw, and Green.146    Also present: Representatives Thompson and Magaziner.147    Mr. Guest. Good morning. Welcome to the Subcommittee on148Border Security and Enforcement's hearing on U.S. Customs and149Border Protection's use of non-intrusive technology, or NII, at150our borders. The committee will come to order. Without151objection, the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any152point.153    Without objection, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.154Magaziner, will be permitted to sit on the dais and ask155questions today.156    The purpose of this hearing is to examine U.S. Customs and157Border Protection's Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Program,158including its crucial role in detecting and preventing the159entry of contraband into the country. Additionally, we will160discuss the challenges and roadblocks in the deployment of NII161equipment as evidenced in the fall of 2025 Government162Accountability Office report that concluded the program must be163strengthened to achieve Congressional-mandated scan rates.164    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.165    CBP's non-intrusive inspection equipment uses technology to166locate concealed items such as drugs, weapons, or people in167vehicles and cargo. As cartels and other smuggling168organizations develop more sophisticated means of concealing169drugs and contraband, the Government must adapt to stay ahead170of these evolving threats, and the expansion of the NII program171will play a critical role in that effort. CBP managed the front172lines in our efforts to keep threats out of our country, and173NII has been an integral tool for CBP's mission. NII enables174CBP to detect and interdict contraband while minimizing the175impact to the flow of lawful trade and travel at our borders.176    Pursuant to the Securing America's Port Act of 2021, CBP177was tasked to develop a plan to reach a 100 percent high178through NII scan rate at land ports of entry by 2027. As of179fiscal year 2024, CBP fell short of that goal, using NII to180examine approximately only 8 percent of passenger vehicles and18127 percent of commercial vehicles. These low scan rates can be182attributed partially to poor planning and mismanagement, from183acquisition to installation and the deployment of the NII184equipment. Reports from both the Department of Homeland185Security Office of Inspector General and the Government186Accountability Office have raised concerns with, No. 1, program187management and, No. 2, future outlook. NII program leaders have188assured oversight bodies that they have made changes to their189structure, staffing, management, and standards to ensure scan190rates reflect the amount of taxpayer dollars that the program191has received.192    Ultimately, regardless of the prior shortcomings in the NII193program, the capabilities NII affords to our front-line194officers keeping our ports secure are invaluable. We must195continue to invest responsibly in this technology as we see196that this technology has a proven track record in facilitating197CBP's ability to protect and prevent smuggling into our198country.199    Additionally, having just entered a year with record-low200illegal border crossings, CBP has the opportunity to invest201resources in developing and the deployment of security measures202along our border. Those measures include NII, which will203further strengthen our national security.204    To aid in this effort, Congress provided a historic205investment in the budget reconciliation bill to enhance and206improve NII at our borders. With the appropriations of these207additional funds, Congress must provide additional oversight to208ensure this investment in the NII program is wisely and209efficiently allocated. I am cautiously optimistic that prudent210decisions from NII leadership within CBP, oversight from211Congress, and technological advances in industry will allow CBP212to achieve 100 percent scanning rates.213    I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation214and for briefing Ranking Member Correa and myself prior to this215hearing. I look forward to working with my colleagues to216enhance and prioritize CBP's Non-Intrusive Inspection Program.217    [The statement of Chairman Guest follows:]218                  Statement of Chairman Michael Guest219                            January 22, 2026220    Good morning! Welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security and221Enforcement hearing on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's use of non-222intrusive inspection technology--or NII--at our borders.223    CBP's non-intrusive inspection equipment uses technology to locate224concealed items such as drugs, weapons, or people in vehicles and225cargo. As cartels and other smuggling operations develop more226sophisticated means of concealing drugs and contraband, the Government227must adapt to stay ahead of these evolving threats, and the expansion228of the NII program will play a crucial role in this effort.229    CBP mans the front line in our efforts to keep threats out of our230country, and NII has been an integral tool for CBP's mission. NII231enables CBP to detect and interdict contraband while minimizing the232impact to the flow of lawful trade and travel at our borders.233    Pursuant to the ``Securing America's Ports Act of 2021,'' CBP was234tasked to develop a plan to reach a 100 percent high throughput NII235scanning rate at land ports of entry by 2027. As of fiscal year 2024,236CBP fell short of that goal, using NII to examine approximately only 8237percent of passenger vehicles and 27 percent of commercial vehicles.238    These low scan rates can be partially attributed to poor planning239and mismanagement, from acquisition, to installation and deployment of240the NII equipment. Reports from both the Department of Homeland241Security's Office of Inspector General and the Government242Accountability Office have raised concerns with both (1) program243management and (2) outlook.244    NII program leaders have assured oversight bodies that they have245made changes to their structure, staffing, management, and standards to246ensure scan rates reflect the amount of taxpayer dollars the program247has received.248    Ultimately, regardless of the prior shortcomings in the NII249program, the capabilities NII affords to our front-line CBP officers250keeping our ports secure are invaluable. We must continue to invest251responsibly in NII technology. This technology has a proven track252record in facilitating CBP's ability to detect and prevent smuggling253into our country.254    Additionally, having just ended a year with record-low illegal255border crossings, CBP has the opportunity to invest resources in256developing/deploying of security measures along our borders, including257NII, to further strengthen our national security.258    To aid in this effort, Congress provided a historic investment in259the ``Budget Reconciliation Bill'' to enhance and improve NII at our260borders. With the appropriation of these additional funds Congress must261provide additional oversight to ensure this investment in the NII262program is wisely and efficiently allocated.263    I am cautiously optimistic that prudent decisions from NII264leadership within CBP, oversight from Congress, and technological265advancements in industry, will allow CBP to achieve 100 percent266scanning.267    I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation today,268and for briefing Ranking Member Correa and myself prior to this269hearing. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enhance and270prioritize CBP's non-intrusive inspection program.271272    Mr. Guest. I now recognize the Ranking Member, my friend,273the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for his opening274statement.275    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, my good276friend. Ms. Sabatino, Ms. Benedict, thank you for being here277today.278    As a Member of this committee, I have had the opportunity279to visit all the ports of entry South border of the U.S. of New280Mexico. In those visits, I have had the opportunity to begin to281understand the job, the task that you have, the challenges. So282I have sat there, stood there with your agents in blue uniforms283and asked them about their challenges on an everyday basis.284    One thing stood out clear to me, which is when you have a285car, when you have a vehicle coming across the border, the286challenge is you don't know who is in that car. You don't know287if it is a friendly, you don't know what that individual may288have in mind, which poses a lot of challenges for the289individuals in blue uniform. I think it is important that we290appreciate that it is not only your blue uniforms at the291border, but rather it is the result of working with other292agencies to make sure that you have the intel to know who is293coming to the border at that moment. That is the challenge that294we have today.295    Ms. Sabatino, I want to talk to you about non-intrusive296inspection technology. I think I can speak for both the297Chairman and myself, but Democrats and Republicans support this298technology implemented at our border. But I think we have to299address a bigger picture issue, which is DHS, CBP, and ICE are300being deployed to the interior of our country and not doing the301job that they are supposed to do, which is protect our country302from things that are coming across the border and from foreign303terrorists, foreign elements that may pose a threat to our304Nation.305    We recently had Renee Nicole Good shot and killed by an ICE306agent in Minnesota. I have had many stories from my district307about American citizens, some being blinded because of the308behavior of some of these agents. Today, Ms. Sabatino, the309administration is focused on mass deportations, in my opinion,310at the expense of our national security. So much focus on311deportations. I have spoken to many folks that work with you,312other departments within the U.S. Government that tell me right313now the focus is deportations and not what DHS was supposed to314focus on.315    As you know, DHS was created after 9/11. The goal was to316protect Americans from future terrorist attacks. Thousands of317Americans died 9/11. I remember that day. I couldn't believe it318was happening in front of my eyes. DHS was created to stop one319of those attacks from happening.320    Back home I check with my local law enforcement. One of the321individuals I check with is my local sheriff, Don Barnes, who322runs a local Orange County Fusion Center. He has told me many,323many times that his concern is the focus on deportations has324left a lot of empty doors--a lot of open doors in our national325security that could be exploited by those that want to do our326Nation harm.327    Not only are we leaving doors open, so to speak, in our328national security picture, a lot of those agents are now329terrorizing our communities, immigration agents going after not330only immigrants, but American citizens now. Last night, I got331another phone call from the district, another challenge. This332administration has essentially redirected thousands of agents333from Homeland Security, from the mission of protecting our334country, to deportations. Not only Homeland, but FBI, DEA, CBP,335all are now converging on deportations.336    As you know, the President of the United States promised337that he would be going after the worst of the worst. That is338not the case today. He is going after immigrants, hardworking339immigrants, nannies, construction workers, anybody they can get340their hands on, people that essentially are providing valuable341services and work to this great country. The administration is342no longer arresting criminals. They are sadly arresting U.S.343citizens. I see this on a daily basis.344    I have young people in my district asking me, should we345carry a passport? I think the fact that they even have to ask346me that question is a sad testament to the situation in our347country. Some of those that actually carry the passport makes348no difference. They have been apprehended, taken in to double-,349triple-check their citizenship status.350    It pains me to see what is going on in my district. Every351night I get phone calls. Not only undocumented, but American352citizens now being arrested, held, charges, alleged charges353dropped, but nonetheless, American citizens being held for a354number of days in custody.355    Ms. Sabatino, I support what you do at the border. I have356worked with you for a number of years. I think you have a357tremendously hard job keeping drugs from coming into the358country, making sure that trade and commerce, good stuff,359continues to flow. We support non-intrusive technology. But360when I think of all the resources that should be focused on361helping you do your job, and instead they are focused on362American citizens, on undocumented immigrants that don't even363have a traffic ticket to their name, this is bothersome. As364people back home who voted for President Trump tell me this is365not what we thought we were going to get. We voted for an366individual that was supposed to deport criminals, not our367neighbors that have lived among us for so many years.368    I am hoping that as we move forward, this committee, my369colleagues on the other side of the aisle, as well as we do an370investigation of what is really going on. Ms. Sabatino, you371have been in uniform for 30 years-plus. I trust that you have372essentially put into place good practices at the border, how to373manage the border, how to treat American citizens. But I am sad374to report that today in the United States, American citizens375are being terrorized. I look forward to hearing your testimony376today, ma'am.377    Ms. Benedict, I look forward to hearing from you as well.378But as we focus on a certain technology, we got to pull back379and look at the big picture. As General Kelly, former Homeland380Security Secretary, used to say, border security does not end381or begin at the border. It is a holistic approach to protecting382this great country.383    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield.384    Mr. Guest. Thank you.385    I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee386from the great State of Mississippi, Congressman Thompson, to387give an opening statement.388    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me389welcome our panel of witnesses here this morning. I look390forward to your testimony.391    I am particularly pleased to see CBP here to answer392questions. With the violent immigration enforcement activities393occurring in communities, I expect Members will have plenty of394questions for you, Ms. Sabatino, today. I understand you395oversee some of the officers participating in these activities.396In fact, we have a photo of your officers participating in a397raid in Massachusetts.398    The notice topic today is about non-intrusive inspection399equipment. I want to be clear, I have long pushed for the full400deployment of these scanners at our ports of entry to prevent401dangerous drugs and other illicit goods from entering the402country. There are real concerns with the acquisition and403rollout of that equipment and I will continue to engage with404CBP on that. We need to make sure taxpayers dollars are405invested effectively.406    However, right now, the American people are demanding407answers about what is happening in our cities. They want to408know what immigration agents are being instructed to do. We409have all seen the horrific videos from Minnesota, Chicago, Los410Angeles, New Orleans, and other areas. The Trump administration411is occupying and terrorizing American communities in the name412of immigration enforcement. That is what needs to be our focus413today. I do not understand how my Republican colleagues can sit414here and pretend it isn't happening.415    It has been 1 year since President Trump was sworn into416office. It is clear that he, along with his corrupt crew, don't417care about public safety or national security. President Trump418and his administration have not made us safer or stronger as a419Nation. In fact, he has done the opposite. Just look at420Minneapolis. I can't believe anyone could claim those violent421actions are making the city safe. Most citizens there will422probably tell you they have never felt more unsafe.423    Masked Federal agents are roaming the streets asking people424of color for their papers to prove their citizenship, including425young children in Minneapolis who are walking home alone just426yesterday. If they don't have them or don't respond quickly,427they are violently arrested and whisked away to unknown428locations.429    That same thing is happening to those who dare to film430them, even though that is a protected activity. This is an431assault on everyone's civil rights and civil liberties. I still432can't quite believe that my Republican colleagues, who were433appalled about wearing a mask during COVID, are just fine being434told that their constituents must carry their passports on them435at all times. Because if an immigration officer can detain a436citizen in Minneapolis who doesn't have their passport on them,437they can just as easily detain any one of us in this room or438any one of the people we are here representing. This is not OK.439None of us should think of it as acceptable.440    Citizens and non-citizens alike are being harmed by this441administration. We saw an ICE agent shoot and kill a mother of4423 in broad daylight. An immigration agent, including CBP, have443shot at least 11 other people since the start of this Trump444administration.445    In addition to the shootings, we have seen aggressive and446violent tactics by ICE and CBP depicted in over-the-top action447movies. A military-style raid in Chicago targeted residents in448an apartment building in the middle of the night. Beyond the449flashbang grenades and agents rappelling from helicopters,450witnesses saw children in their underwear zip-tied together in451vans. Other residents, including U.S. citizens and military452veterans, were also zip-tied for hours. This is not what our453country stands for. The American people are taking notice. They454see the Trump administration and DHS is more focused on an455anti-immigrant agenda than improving the lives of our citizens.456    I heard the Ranking Member, Mr. Correa, and his passionate457comments. You know, as a person of color, I had to go through458some things in Mississippi as a young Black boy and I thought459those kinds of activities were past. But what I see occurring460with people of color, Black, Brown, whatever, is not who we are461as a country.462    I want law enforcement to follow the law. I now find out463that you can just break into somebody's house now without a464warrant. We are a better country than this. I was brought up to465respect law enforcement and I want law enforcement to do their466job, but respect civil rights and civil liberties of anyone in467this country.468    So I think we are at a juncture in this country that is469concerning to a lot of us. I hope as we pursue some remedy for470this endeavor, we can all get back on the same page.471    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.472    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]473             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson474                            January 22, 2026475    I'm particularly pleased to see CBP here to answer questions. With476the violent immigration enforcement activities regularly occurring in477communities, I expect Members will have plenty of questions for you,478Ms. Sabatino, today. I understand you oversee some of the officers479participating in these activities.480    The noticed topic today is about non-intrusive inspection481equipment. I want to be clear--I have long pushed for the full482deployment of these scanners at our ports of entry to prevent dangerous483drugs and other illicit goods from entering the country. There are real484concerns with the acquisition and rollout of that equipment. And I will485continue to engage with CBP on that--we need to make sure taxpayer486dollars are invested effectively. However, right now the American487people are demanding answers about what is happening in our cities.488They want to know what immigration agents are being instructed to do.489    We've all seen the horrific videos from Minnesota, Chicago, Los490Angeles, New Orleans, and other cities. The Trump administration is491occupying and terrorizing American communities in the name of492immigration enforcement. That is what needs to be our focus today. I do493not understand how my Republican colleagues can sit here and pretend it494isn't happening.495    It's been 1 year since President Trump was sworn into office. It's496clear that he, along with his corrupt crew, don't care about public497safety or national security. President Trump and his administration498have not made us safer or stronger as a Nation. In fact, he's done the499opposite.500    Just look at Minneapolis. I can't believe anyone could claim those501violent actions are making the city safe. Most citizens there will502probably tell you they've never felt more unsafe. Masked Federal agents503are roaming the streets asking people of color for their papers to504prove their citizenship. And if they don't have them or don't respond505quickly, they are violently arrested and whisked away to unknown506locations.507    The same thing is happening to those who dare to film them. Even508though that is a protected activity. This is an assault on everyone's509civil rights and civil liberties. And I still can't quite believe that510my Republican colleagues who were appalled about wearing a mask are511just fine being told that their constituents must now carry their512passports on them at all times.513    Because if an immigration officer can detain a citizen in514Minneapolis who doesn't have their passport on them, they can just as515easily detain any one of us in this room. Or any one of the people we516are here representing. This is not ok. None of us should think it is517acceptable.518    Citizens and non-citizens alike are being harmed by this519administration. We saw an ICE agent shoot and kill a mother of 3 in520broad daylight. And immigration agents--including CBP--have shot at521least 11 other people since the start of this Trump administration. In522addition to the shootings, we've seen aggressive and violent tactics by523ICE and CBP usually depicted in over-the-top action movies.524    A military-style raid in Chicago targeted residents in an apartment525building in the middle of the night. Beyond the flashbang grenades and526agents rappelling from helicopters, witnesses saw children in their527underwear zip-tied together in vans. Other residents, including U.S.528citizens and military veterans, were also zip-tied for hours.529    This is not what our country stands for. The American people are530taking notice. They see the Trump administration and DHS is more531focused on an anti-immigrant agenda than improving the lives of our532citizens.533534    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson.535    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening536statements may be submitted for the record.537    I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses538before us today on this important topic. Pursuant to committee539rule VIII(C), I would ask that our witnesses please rise and540raise their right hand.541    [Witnesses sworn.]542    Mr. Guest. Thank you. Let the record reflect that the543witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated.544    I would now like to take a moment to formally introduce our545witnesses. First, Ms. Diane Sabatino serves as the acting546executive assistant commissioner within the Field Office547operations at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. We also548have with us Ms. Hilary Benedict, who serves as the director of549the science technology assessments and analytics director550within the Government Accountability Office. I would like to551thank each of our witnesses for being here today.552    Ms. Sabatino, I recognize you for 5 minutes to make an553opening statement.554555  STATEMENT OF DIANE J. SABATINO, ACTING EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT556  COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND557                       BORDER PROTECTION558559    Ms. Sabatino. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa,560Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee, thank561you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss562how U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses non-intrusive563inspection technology, or NII, to secure our Nation's ports of564entry while enforcing lawful trade and travel. I'm honored to565represent the more than 35,000 men and women of CBP's Office of566Field Operations stationed at 328 ports of entry across the567Nation, with more than 800 men and women serving in 48568countries overseas.569    Our front-line personnel work tirelessly to protect the570homeland. On a typical day they process more than 1 million571travelers and enable $10 billion in imported goods. At the same572time, they prevent the entry of inadmissible individuals, seize573illicit drugs, intercept contraband, illuminate and deliver574consequences to bad actors in the supply chain, prevent575biological threats from harming our communities and natural576resources, all while ensuring the efficient flow of lawful577trade and travel.578    The Office of Field Operations plays a critical role in579national security. Our Nation's ports of entry are not only580gateways for lawful commerce and travel, they are also prime581targets for transnational criminal organizations and other bad582actors seeking to exploit the immense volume of cross-border583activity. In fiscal year 2025, for example, 75 percent of584illicit drugs seized by Customs and Border Protection at the585Southwest Border were intercepted at ports of entry.586    NII is one of many tools that we use to secure our borders.587It's complementary to intelligence, K-9 teams, and targeting588systems, among many others in support of our most valuable589resource, which is our front-line personnel. All of these tools590relieve administrative burdens from our personnel, enabling591them to do what they do best, which is to determine intent and592increase situational awareness.593    In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP officers used NII systems to594scan more than 17 million sea containers, rail cars, and595vehicles. These inspections led to the interdiction of 110,000596pounds of narcotics, the seizure of 2.2 million in unreported597U.S. currency, and the apprehension of 66 undeclared598passengers.599    While NII technology is a proven and powerful tool,600deploying these systems is not without challenges. Constraints601related to port infrastructure, real estate availability, and602the need to avoid interference with other detection systems can603be limiting as to where and how the systems are placed. To604address these challenges, we're continually reevaluating port605facilities, exploring opportunities for alternative placement606of the systems, and prioritizing deployments in areas with the607greatest operational impact.608    From the beginning of our NII deployments, we have609deliberately gathered lessons learned and incorporated them610into a long-term comprehensive resource strategy. This strategy611strengthens acquisition planning, improves contract support,612and ensures systems are deployed where they will deliver the613greatest benefit to border security and trade enforcement.614    With the support of Congress, we've made significant615progress in deploying our and enhancing our NII capabilities.616As of December 2, we had deployed 405 large-scale NII systems617at air, sea, and land ports of entry, including 67 new systems618added over the past 2 fiscal years. We're also enhancing our619NII operations through the integration of artificial620intelligence, which helps automate the analysis of the scanned621images, reduces the time needed for manual image review, and622allows us to focus our resources on the greatest risks.623    Looking ahead, we remain committed to expanding our NII624capabilities and with funding provided by Congress, we plan to625deploy 38 additional systems by the end of this fiscal year.626These drive-through systems will allow United States to scan 40627percent of privately-owned vehicles and up to 70 percent of628commercial vehicles at Southwest Border land ports of entry,629significantly enhancing our ability to detect and interdict630threats.631    As I mentioned earlier, NII is one of the critical632components of CBP's broader multilayered border security633strategy. With investments authorized through the Big Beautiful634Bill Act, we will enhance scanning capabilities and635recapitalize many of the existing mobile and fixed technologies636in the field today.637    Our continued approach prioritizes the indispensable638expertise of our front-line personnel, including officers,639skilled trade specialists, and agriculture specialists, and640integrates all of the specialized tools and capabilities641available to us. Through the combined use of advanced642technology, canine teams, skilled personnel, as well as strong643partnerships with Federal, State, and international644stakeholders, CBP maintains a comprehensive and agile security645posture. This integrated approach not only enhances our ability646to address evolving and emerging security threats, but also647supports the efficient movement of lawful trade and travel648across our borders.649    Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission and I650look forward to your questions.651    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sabatino follows:]652                Prepared Statement of Diane J. Sabatino653                            January 22, 2026654                              introduction655    Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of656the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about657U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) use of non-intrusive658inspection technology. This critical capability strengthens our ability659to continue securing our Nation's borders while facilitating the flow660of lawful trade and travel.661    Under President Trump and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)662Secretary Noem's leadership, the CBP Office of Field Operations plays a663central, critical role in securing our Nation's borders. With nearly66434,000 highly-trained personnel, the Office of Field Operations is665CBP's largest component and oversees 328 ports of entry and 15666preclearance locations domestically and abroad, performing complex667customs, immigration, agriculture, and trade activities. Every day,\1\668the Office of Field Operations processes more than 1 million passengers669and pedestrians, facilitates the importation of nearly $10 billion in670goods, and collects nearly $600 million in duties and taxes. At the671same time, on average, we prevent the entry of nearly 1,200672inadmissible persons, seize more than 1,300 pounds of drugs, confiscate673$165,000 in illicit currency, and intercept 3 counterfeit documents.674---------------------------------------------------------------------------675    \1\ Average daily enforcement actions based on preliminary fiscal676year (FY) 2025 data.677---------------------------------------------------------------------------678    CBP's Office of Field Operations employs a dynamic, intelligence-679driven, law enforcement strategy that integrates advanced data680analysis, information sharing, and coordination with Federal, State,681and international partners to identify and disrupt threats. By682leveraging cutting-edge technologies such as non-intrusive inspection683systems, artificial intelligence, and facial biometrics, the Office of684Field Operations enhances its ability to detect contraband, verify685identities, and streamline inspections, all while maintaining the flow686of lawful trade and travel.687    Today, I will provide an overview of CBP's non-intrusive inspection688technology, its role within CBP's broader security strategy, and the689progress made in deploying these critical assets. I will also discuss690the deployment and operational challenges we face and outline our plans691to address them as we continue to enhance our border security692capabilities and protect our communities from transnational threats.693             border security threats at u.s. ports of entry694    As CBP reasserts control of our borders in accordance with695President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and696foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle697people, contraband, and other potentially harmful materials into the698United States. These organizations possess immense resources and699sophisticated capabilities and can adjust their concealment tactics to700evade detection by law enforcement.701    Most illicit drugs seized by CBP, including fentanyl, are seized702during smuggling attempts at Southwest Border land ports of entry. In703fact, last fiscal year, approximately 75 percent of the total weight of704illicit drugs seized by CBP at the Southwest Border were seized at705ports of entry.\2\ Drug cartels and other transnational criminal706organizations conceal these drugs in passenger vehicles, commercial707vehicles, mail, and even on pedestrians.708---------------------------------------------------------------------------709    \2\ Of the 255,243 pounds of drugs CBP seized at the Southwest710Border in fiscal year 2025, 192,701 pounds were seized at land ports of711entry. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.712---------------------------------------------------------------------------713    To counter these threats, CBP's Office of Field Operations714continues to integrate law enforcement intelligence, data analysis, and715advanced detection technologies to enhance its ability to intercept716contraband and other potential threats. Among these capabilities, CBP's717non-intrusive inspection technology remains one of CBP's most effective718tools for detecting radiological materials as well as anomalies that719may indicate concealed contraband.720  non-intrusive inspection technology as part of cbp's multi-layered721                                strategy722    CBP employs a diverse range of non-intrusive inspection systems723tailored to the unique needs of our operational environments. Large-724scale systems are used at sea and land ports of entry to scan passenger725vehicles, commercial trucks, rail cars, and cargo containers. Small-726scale systems are used to scan baggage, mail, and parcels. Together,727these technologies provide a versatile and effective detection728capability across all operational environments.729    Simply put, non-intrusive inspection allows CBP to ``see'' inside730vehicles, packages, cargo containers, and other conveyances without731physically opening or unloading them. Using advanced imaging732technologies, such as X-ray and gamma-ray, these systems detect733anomalies that may indicate the presence of illicit drugs, contraband,734or other threats.735    The key advantage of non-intrusive inspection technology is its736ability to conduct thorough inspections quickly, efficiently, and737safely. This enables CBP to detect and interdict suspected dangerous738materials without causing unnecessary delays to lawful trade and travel739that physical inspections would cause.740    Most of CBP's large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems are741deployed in secondary inspection operations at ports of entry, where742they are used to examine targeted or referred vehicles or shipments.743CBP leverages advance electronic shipping information, actionable law744enforcement intelligence, and CBP's Automated Targeting System to745identify high-risk shipments for inspection before they arrive at ports746of entry. This proactive approach allows CBP to allocate resources747efficiently and focus on the highest-priority threats, while748facilitating the critical flow of lawful goods into the United States.749    To further advance the efficiency of our operations, CBP750prioritizes the implementation of drive-through operational concepts.751New non-intrusive inspection systems are positioned in pre-primary752inspection areas, allowing for a greater capacity of vehicles to be753scanned without interrupting traffic flows. The scans are transmitted754to remote command centers, where officers review the images in real755time for anomalies and flag those requiring secondary inspection. This756approach streamlines the vehicle inspection process and allows more757vehicles to be scanned.758    The effectiveness of CBP's non-intrusive inspection systems is759clear. In fiscal year 2025, CBP officers used large-scale non-intrusive760inspection systems to scan over 17 million sea containers, rail cars,761and vehicles, resulting in the interdiction of 110,000 pounds of762narcotics, approximately $2.2 million in unreported U.S. currency, and763the apprehension of 66 undeclared passengers. Just this past November,764CBP officers at the Laredo-Colombia Solidarity International Bridge in765Laredo, Texas intercepted nearly 2,000 pounds of methamphetamine with a766street value of $16 million concealed in a commercial truck hauling767decorative items.\3\ These enforcement results underscore the critical768role of non-intrusive inspection technology in combating the smuggling769of illicit drugs.770---------------------------------------------------------------------------771    \3\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-772seize-more-16-million-methamphetamine-colombia-solidarity.773---------------------------------------------------------------------------774    While non-intrusive inspection technology is a powerful tool, it is775just one component of CBP's broader multi-layered enforcement strategy.776This strategy provides our skilled personnel with advanced technology,777law enforcement intelligence, and partnerships to create a778comprehensive approach to border security.779    A key example of this integrated approach is the work of CBP's780National Targeting Center, which integrates law enforcement781intelligence and data analysis to identify potential high-risk782shipments for inspection. Skilled trade specialists and CBP officers,783trained to operate and interpret non-intrusive inspection systems, play784a critical role in identifying suspect shipments. In addition, CBP785canine teams further enhance our detection capabilities and often work786alongside officers conducting inspection activities. These specially-787trained dogs can detect undeclared passengers, narcotics, unreported788currency, prohibited agricultural items, and other contraband.789    Together, these resources form a multi-layered approach that790ensures that no single tool or capability is relied upon exclusively.791By combining technology, intelligence, and specialized personnel, CBP792adapts to emerging threats while maintaining the balance between793security and the facilitation of lawful trade and travel.794  non-intrusive inspection technology investments and deployment plans795    Congressional funding is instrumental in advancing CBP's non-796intrusive inspection system program. As of December 2, 2025, CBP has797deployed 405 large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems at air, sea,798and land ports of entry, including 67 fixed systems added during fiscal799year 2024, fiscal year 2025, and fiscal year 2026 to date. By the end800of fiscal year 2026, CBP plans to deploy 38 additional systems801currently under construction or in an active construction planning802phase. These drive-through non-intrusive inspection system deployments803are part of a multi-year effort to close the vehicle scanning capacity804gap and address high-priority threats.805    Looking ahead, CBP has allocated more than $1 billion from the One806Big Beautiful Bill Act for the procurement and integration of new non-807intrusive inspection systems, artificial intelligence, and other808mission support capabilities.\4\ The President's fiscal year 2026809budget also requests $137 million to procure more systems and to810enhance non-intrusive inspection capabilities. These investments will811enable CBP to expand pre-primary non-intrusive inspection operations,812integrate systems, and implement artificial intelligence to reduce813manual image analysis to further increase security and enhance the flow814of legitimate trade and travel through ports of entry.815---------------------------------------------------------------------------816    \4\ Public Law 119-21.817---------------------------------------------------------------------------818    CBP's non-intrusive inspection system program represents a819tremendous investment in our border security capabilities, and we are820committed to maximizing the impact of these systems. CBP has ambitious821plans to expand the use of non-intrusive inspection technology and822increase scanning rates at our ports of entry. With current deployment823plans, CBP aims to scan 40 percent of passenger vehicles and 70 percent824of commercial vehicles at Southwest Border land ports of entry by the825end of fiscal year 2026.826    CBP also has a recapitalization plan to replace aging non-intrusive827inspection systems, ensuring the continued functionality and828availability of this critical technology to support port of entry829operations. Replacing this equipment with the latest cutting-edge830technology is expected to increase our scanning capacity and improve831our ability to detect anomalies.832    Despite its benefits, non-intrusive inspection technology faces833deployment challenges, including limited real estate at some ports of834entry and placement constraints to avoid interference with radiation835detection systems. CBP addresses these challenges by evaluating836facilities and infrastructure at ports of entry and exploring837innovative solutions to increase and improve scanning at these838locations.839                               conclusion840    Non-intrusive inspection technology is an essential component of841CBP's layered enforcement strategy. It enables our front-line personnel842to focus on their critical border security mission, facilitate lawful843trade and travel, and protect American communities by disrupting844transnational criminal organizations that attempt to smuggle contraband845through ports of entry.846    CBP will continue to implement President Trump's policies to847enforce the law, prevent criminals from entering our country, and848strengthen border security.849    I want to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its850unwavering support of CBP's mission. Specifically, your commitment to851funding advanced technologies, such as non-intrusive inspection852systems, is instrumental in addressing the complex challenges we face853at our Nation's ports of entry. With your support, CBP will further854expand its non-intrusive inspection capabilities, enhance and modernize855data systems, and address infrastructure and technology challenges.856These advancements will enhance our ability to detect and interdict857threats, disrupt criminal and terrorist networks, and safeguard the858American people.859    Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your860questions.861862    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Sabatino.863    I now recognize Ms. Benedict for 5 minutes to summarize her864opening statement.865866STATEMENT OF HILARY M. BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY867  ASSESSMENTS, AND ANALYTICS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY868                             OFFICE869870    Ms. Benedict. Thank you. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member871Correa, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the872subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to talk about873CBP's non-intrusive inspection systems. My statement is based874on GAO's report on the topic issued in September 2025.875    CBP has received more than $2 billion to deploy non-876intrusive inspection systems at land ports of entry. These877systems generally use X-rays to scan vehicles. Officers review878the images from these scans to identify anomalies and indicate879the presence of contraband. In 2021, the Securing America's880Ports Act directed CBP to develop a plan to scan 100 percent of881commercial and passenger vehicles and rail containers by 2027882using these systems.883    CBP has made progress in deploying systems in pre-primary884inspection areas. For example, CBP determined it needed a total885of 434 systems and procured 153 systems for these areas; 52886were operational at the time of our review.887    CBP's deployment of these systems has increased its rate of888scanning passenger and commercial vehicles at the Southwest889Border. Specifically, scanning rates for passenger vehicles890have increased from 2 percent in 2020 to 8 percent in 2024 for891passenger vehicles. For commercial vehicles, scanning increased892from 16 percent to 27 percent during this time.893    However, 3 issues have prevented CBP from meeting the894requirement to scan 100 percent of commercial and passenger895vehicles and rail containers by 2027. The first issue is896planning. CBP's scanning plan does not include all land ports897of entry. Specifically, the plan does not include 9 Southwest898Border crossings. These 9 crossings together account for 40899percent of passenger vehicle crossings at the Southwest Border900and include 3 of the biggest border crossings: San Ysidro, Otay901Mesa, and Nogales. CBP officials said these sites are not902included in the current plans because they are still903determining how to overcome space issues at these sites.904    In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP905determine how to include systems at all border crossings in its906deployment plans. CBP agreed with our recommendation and plans907to implement it by the end of fiscal year 2028.908    The second issue that has prevented CBP from meeting the909scanning requirement is cost. CBP developed cost estimates for910deploying systems, but costs have exceeded those estimates.911These cost increases are due to a variety of factors such as912not accounting for all deployment costs in the original913estimates and unique construction challenges at each site. CBP914officials said they have received the funding they needed to915deploy the systems they have procured to date. However, CBP916will need additional funding to meet the 100 percent scanning917requirement because CBP needs to procure additional systems to918achieve its current plans and the estimate does not include919systems at the 9 border crossings that are not included in920CBP's plans.921    The third issue that has prevented CBP from meeting the922scanning requirement is the schedule. Deployment of non-923intrusive inspection systems has taken longer than expected. At924the time of our review, CBP planned to complete deployment of925the systems it had procured for passenger and commercial926vehicles by the end of 2026 and for rail containers by the end927of 2029. However, it will take longer to achieve the 100928percent scanning requirement because the schedule does not929include the system CBP has not yet procured or the systems930needed for the 9 biggest crossings that are not included in931CBP's plan.932    CBP officials told us that various factors have caused933schedule delays. For example, major upgrades were needed at934some sites, vendors have been slow to resolve deployment935issues, and site conditions such as interference with scanning936systems have required additional time to resolve. During our937review, CBP officials told us they were aware of these issues938and were working to resolve them. It will be important for CBP939to continue to address these issues as it deploys and operates940additional systems.941    Moving forward, GAO will monitor CBP's implementation of942the recommendations we made in our September 2025 report. We943believe that addressing our recommendations would strengthen944CBP's management of its non-intrusive inspection systems and945its interdiction efforts to help achieve its mission.946    This concludes my statement. I'm happy to answer any947questions.948    [The prepared statement of Ms. Benedict follows:]949                Prepared Statement of Hilary M. Benedict950                       Thursday, January 22, 2026951 border security.--improvements needed to increase vehicle scanning at952                          land ports of entry953                             gao-26-108767954    Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the955Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S.956Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) non-intrusive inspection (NII)957systems. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP is the958lead Federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating the959flow of legitimate travel and trade at U.S. borders while also keeping960terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and961inadmissible people out of the country. As part of its962responsibilities, CBP coordinates the inspection and processing of963pedestrians, passengers, and cargo at land, air, and sea ports of entry964(POE).\1\965---------------------------------------------------------------------------966    \1\ POEs are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into967or departure from the United States. Specifically, a POE is any968officially-designated location (seaport, airport, or land border969location) where CBP officers or employees are assigned to clear970passengers, merchandise, and other items, collect duties, and enforce971customs laws; and where CBP officers inspect persons seeking to enter972or depart, or apply for admission into the United States, pursuant to973U.S. immigration and travel controls. A single land POE may be composed974of one or more crossings.975---------------------------------------------------------------------------976    Land POEs are a key drug smuggling route for transnational criminal977organizations. According to CBP, most illicit drugs, including978fentanyl, enter the United States through Southwest Border POEs hidden979in passenger vehicles or belongings, concealed in commercial vehicles,980and carried by pedestrians.\2\ To help detect illegal drugs and other981contraband, CBP uses large- and small-scale NII systems, like X-ray982machines, at land POEs to enable officers to inspect travelers and983their belongings, and vehicles and their contents, without the need for984unloading or disassembly.\3\985---------------------------------------------------------------------------986    \2\ James Mandryck, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of987Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of988Homeland Security, Protecting the U.S. Homeland: Fighting the Flow of989Fentanyl from the Southwest Border, testimony before the U.S. House of990Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border991Security and Enforcement (Washington, DC: July 12, 2023).992    \3\ CBP officers use large-scale NII systems to scan entire993vehicles. The process produces an image that CBP officers review to994identify anomalies that may be an indication of contraband or hidden995people. CBP officers use small-scale NII systems to localize those996anomalies, among other things.997---------------------------------------------------------------------------998    Since 2019, CBP's NII program has received over $2 billion for NII999systems, which it has used to enhance inspections of commercial and1000passenger vehicles and trains, and to increase the number of vehicles1001that are scanned using large-scale NII systems as they enter the United1002States. In 2021, the Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to1003develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and1004passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land1005POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems.\4\1006---------------------------------------------------------------------------1007    \4\ Securing America's Ports Act, Pub. L. 116-299, 134 Stat. 49061008(2021), codified at 6 U.S.C.  211 note.1009---------------------------------------------------------------------------1010    My statement today discusses: (1) how CBP assesses large-scale NII1011system performance, (2) the status of large-scale NII system1012deployment, and (3) CBP's plans for future large-scale NII system1013deployments. This statement is based primarily on a report we published1014in September 2025 in response to a request to review the implementation1015and effectiveness of CBP's NII program.\5\1016---------------------------------------------------------------------------1017    \5\ GAO, Land Port Inspections: CBP Should Improve Performance Data1018and Deployment Plans for Scanning Systems, GAO-25-107379 (Washington,1019DC: Sep. 15, 2025).1020---------------------------------------------------------------------------1021    To inform that report, GAO analyzed NII program documentation,1022including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment1023plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and1024observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs where large-1025scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas.1026More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for1027that work can be found in the report. Our work was performed in1028accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards.1029                               background1030    CBP began using large-scale NII systems to scan vehicles in 19961031and has generally deployed them in secondary inspection areas at land1032POEs. When deployed in secondary inspection areas, they are only used1033to scan vehicles that were referred by CBP officers in primary1034inspection. In 2020, CBP began deploying new large-scale NII systems in1035preprimary inspection areas--before a traveler is interviewed by a CBP1036officer, where vehicles are scanned before they reach the primary1037inspection booth (see fig. 1). Previously, NII systems were generally1038used only when an officer determined that further inspection was1039required after the interview. Placing NII systems in preprimary1040inspection areas significantly increases the number of vehicles scanned1041because all vehicles approaching a primary inspection booth that do not1042choose to go through an opt-out lane are scanned, rather than only1043those referred for secondary inspection.\6\1044---------------------------------------------------------------------------1045    \6\ According to CBP officials, travelers may opt out of undergoing1046a scan by an NII system in preprimary inspection by using an opt-out1047lane to drive to the primary inspection booth, and officials at the1048POEs have discretion as to how vehicle inspections are handled when1049drivers choose to opt out.10501051    As part of its overall inspection process, CBP uses large-scale NII1052systems to scan vehicles. These scans produce images that are reviewed1053by officers to identify any anomalies that might be contraband or1054hidden people. If officers identify any anomalies, the vehicles undergo1055further inspection, which can include the use of detection canines;1056small-scale NII systems such as videoscopes to look into hard-to-reach1057areas of vehicles or baggage scanners to scan vehicle contents to1058localize the anomalies; and manual inspection procedures.1059 cbp assesses large-scale nii performance, but has not clearly defined1060                     all key performance parameters1061    CBP collects and uses performance data to help ensure that its1062large-scale NII systems are operational and available for use to scan1063vehicles. For example, these data include a daily list of system1064outages, and operational availability, which is the percentage of time1065systems are available for use.1066    CBP uses performance data to inform actions it takes to improve NII1067system performance. For example, CBP's fiscal year 2024 target for1068system performance was for individual large-scale NII systems, and for1069the average across all large-scale NII systems, to have an operational1070availability of 95 percent or greater. However, in fiscal year 20241071just over half of individual large-scale systems met this target, while1072the average across all large-scale NII systems was 90 percent. CBP1073officials told us that CBP included penalty clauses in its new1074maintenance contracts in September 2024, which are intended to improve1075contractors' accountability for maintaining the targeted level of1076operational availability.1077    In 2015, CBP established 3 key performance parameters for NII1078systems. These include (1) meeting an average NII imaging system1079operational availability of 95 percent, (2) inspecting 100 percent of1080all designated high-risk commercial vehicles and containerized cargo,1081and (3) maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted containers,1082cargo, and international mail. According to DHS guidance, key1083performance parameters reflect the most important and non-negotiable1084requirements that NII systems must meet to fulfill their purpose.1085    CBP collects data for operational availability and reports the1086results in its annual operational analysis reports. However, as we1087found in our September 2025 report, CBP has not clearly defined its1088other two key performance parameters or reported their results in1089operational analysis reports. Specifically, CBP has not clearly defined1090what ``high-risk'' means for the inspection rate key performance1091parameter or what maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted1092containers, cargo, and international mail means for the examination key1093performance parameter. CBP officials said that because they are unclear1094how CBP intended to define or measure these key performance parameters,1095they have not reported data related to them.1096    Clearly defining its key performance parameters and using them for1097reporting would enable CBP to determine whether large-scale NII systems1098are working as intended. Doing so would also help CBP identify any1099system deficiencies or possible cost savings, achieve its objectives1100more efficiently and effectively, and help inform future procurement1101decisions. In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP should1102clearly define all NII key performance parameters and report1103performance using them. The agency concurred with the recommendation1104and said that its NII program will capture and clearly define system-1105level key performance indicators and reporting requirements for NII1106systems within new contract statements of work.1107   cbp has made progress deploying large-scale nii systems, but has1108            encountered increased costs and schedule delays1109    As part of its efforts to increase vehicle scanning at land POEs,1110CBP is deploying additional large-scale NII systems in preprimary1111inspection areas. Specifically, CBP is deploying low-energy portals1112(LEP) in passenger vehicle preprimary inspection areas and multi-energy1113portals (MEP) in commercial vehicle preprimary inspection areas. These1114systems will allow CBP to scan vehicles prior to primary inspection to1115identify potential anomalies and assist in determining whether to refer1116vehicles for secondary inspection, rather than only scanning vehicles1117referred for secondary inspection.1118    Beginning in fiscal year 2020, CBP awarded contracts to procure and1119deploy 153 large-scale NII systems to land POEs. As of February 2025,112052 of these 153 systems CBP planned to deploy were fully operational,1121nearly all located at preprimary inspection areas. An additional 1011122systems were in preplanning, design, or construction phases (see table11231). These systems include 12 high-energy NII rail systems that CBP1124plans to deploy to replace existing gamma-ray systems that they are1125retiring.11261127    As a result of the deployment and use of LEPs and MEPs, CBP has1128increased its scanning of passenger vehicles from 2 percent in fiscal1129year 2020 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2024, and scanning of commercial1130vehicles from 16 percent to 27 percent during this same time frame.1131Some factors have limited the use of the systems, such as limited staff1132and system outages. For example, when these systems are deployed in1133preprimary inspection areas at land POEs, they require additional staff1134to operate them and to review the images from the vehicle scans. CBP1135officials we met with at all 4 field offices with land POEs where1136large-scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection1137areas told us they did not always have sufficient staff to fully use1138the systems. CBP headquarters officials said they are discussing ways1139to mitigate staffing challenges, such as reviewing images at regional1140command centers rather than at the POEs, which could improve1141efficiency. Additionally, CBP officials at these POEs said that system1142outages, which were sometimes frequent or lengthy, have affected their1143operations.1144    In our September 2025 report we found that, although CBP has made1145progress deploying large-scale NII systems, it has encountered1146significant challenges that have led to deployments costing more and1147taking longer than expected.1148    CBP has developed and updated cost estimates for deploying MEP,1149LEP, and high-energy NII rail systems, but costs have exceeded those1150estimates. One reason for higher costs than anticipated are substantial1151increases in the costs for civil works and construction. For example,1152the estimated costs to install each MEP increased from $1.3 million in1153fiscal year 2020 to $4.1 million in fiscal year 2023. Further, in1154October 2024 CBP estimated the cost to complete installation of each1155remaining planned MEP system would range from $4.2 million to $9.71156million.1157    As a result, CBP has requested and received additional funding to1158deploy its large-scale NII systems and to meet its initial goals to1159increase vehicle scanning rates. According to CBP officials, in fiscal1160years 2019 through 2024, CBP received over $2.1 billion for the NII1161program (see table 2).\7\ Most of these funds were intended for the1162deployment of large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas.1163In October 2024, CBP reported that it had sufficient funds to finish1164deploying most of the large-scale NII systems but needed an additional1165approximately $173 million to complete deployment for 31 of the1166systems.1167---------------------------------------------------------------------------1168    \7\ In July 2025, Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act,1169which included an appropriation of funds available to CBP for, among1170other things, NII. See Pub. L. 119-21 Title IV, Subtitle A,  90004,1171139 Stat. 72, 359.11721173    Large-scale NII system deployments have also taken longer than1174originally planned. The Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to1175develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and1176passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land1177POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems. As of February 2025, CBP1178did not expect to complete all of its planned large-scale NII1179deployments until December 2029. CBP's original time lines to complete1180system deployments ranged from 12 to 24 months. However, some1181installations have taken longer than expected.1182    CBP officials identified various factors that have contributed to1183system deployments taking longer than expected. For example, some POEs1184require major site upgrades to enable NII systems to be installed in1185preprimary inspection, including the construction of command centers or1186installation of power and data connections to the new systems. In other1187instances, vendors have taken longer than expected to resolve issues1188encountered during system deployment, such as during site acceptance1189testing. CBP said they are aware of these issues and are taking actions1190to address them, such as considering future NII system installation1191needs when making infrastructure improvements at POEs along the1192Northern Border.1193  cbp's deployment plans do not include all ports of entry along the1194   southwest border, including three of its highest-traffic locations1195    In response to the Securing America's Ports Act, in January 20221196CBP submitted its plan to Congress to increase vehicle scanning with1197these large-scale NII systems at land POEs.\8\ In its January 20221198scanning plan, CBP estimated that it would need 434 large-scale NII1199systems to achieve 100 percent scanning of vehicles and rail containers1200along the Southwest and Northern Borders (see table 3). While the plan1201described how CBP intended to deploy large-scale NII systems to both1202the Southwest and Northern Borders, CBP has focused its initial efforts1203on the Southwest Border because most CBP contraband seizures have1204occurred there.1205---------------------------------------------------------------------------1206    \8\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border1207Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan Fiscal1208Year 2021 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: January 18, 2022).12091210    CBP submitted its fiscal year 2022 update in March 2023 including1211the steps it had taken to increase scanning.\9\ Specifically, in its1212March 2023 scanning plan update, CBP reported procuring 129 large-scale1213NII systems for scanning passenger and commercial vehicles to be1214deployed at POEs along the Southwest Border, which, once fully1215deployed, would give CBP the capacity to scan up to 40 percent of1216passenger vehicles and 70 percent of commercial vehicles.1217---------------------------------------------------------------------------1218    \9\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border1219Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan--Annual1220Update Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress (Washington, DC: March 31,12212023). In November 2025, CBP issued its fiscal year 2024 update to its1222scanning plan.1223---------------------------------------------------------------------------1224    As we stated in our September 2025 report, however, the CBP1225scanning plan does not include NII system deployments needed to scan1226passenger vehicles at 9 POEs along the Southwest Border. This includes12273 of its highest-traffic locations that together accounted for almost122824 percent of passenger vehicle crossings at all land border POEs in1229fiscal year 2024 (see table 4). Combined, these 9 POEs comprised about123030 percent of total passenger vehicle traffic entering the United1231States and almost 40 percent of passenger vehicle traffic entering the1232United States at the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2024.12331234    CBP officials told us they have not included the 3 high-traffic1235crossings because there is not enough space to install the large-scale1236NII systems in preprimary inspection areas (see fig. 2). While CBP has1237not determined how it will overcome the lack of space at these POEs,1238they are considering some possible solutions, including working with1239the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop LEPs that could1240be installed where space constraints and interference with radiation1241detectors make deployment of large-scale NII systems difficult. Other1242solutions they are considering include deploying the systems after the1243primary inspection booth, which they have done at other POEs;1244redeveloping the border crossings so there is enough space in1245preprimary; or installing the equipment across the international1246border, as they have done on the Northern Border, although this may not1247be possible on the Southwest Border.12481249    While CBP's scanning plan states its intent to scan 100 percent of1250passenger and commercial vehicles and rail containers entering the1251United States at land POEs, the plan does not include the deployment of1252large-scale NII systems to some of CBP's highest passenger traffic POEs1253along the Southwest Border. Without these crossings in its plan, CBP1254risks entry of many unscanned passenger vehicles, hampering its ability1255to prevent illegal drugs and other contraband from entering the United1256States.1257    In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP determine how1258to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to all Southwest1259Border land POEs in updates to its deployment plans. CBP concurred with1260GAO's recommendation and said it is collaborating with the DHS Science1261and Technology Directorate to address the radiation interference1262between the large-scale NII systems and the radiation detection1263equipment, which could allow for placement of NII large-scale systems1264within limited real estate constraints.1265    We will continue to monitor CBP's efforts to address our1266recommendations. Addressing our recommendations would strengthen CBP's1267management of the NII program and its interdiction efforts to help it1268achieve its mission.1269    Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the1270subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased1271to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.12721273    Mr. Guest. Thank you.1274    I would now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask1275questions. Questions will be asked by order of seniority. As I1276mentioned earlier to each of our witnesses, we will have to1277break shortly as votes have been called, but I do believe that1278we have an opportunity.1279    Would you like to go ahead and break now, Mr. Ranking1280Member?1281    Mr. Correa. Let's keep it going, Mr. Chairman.1282    Mr. Guest. All right. We are going to get through maybe the1283first questions by myself and the Ranking Member and then we1284will break for us to vote and return quickly. So I will begin.1285    Ms. Sabatino, I know we had a chance to meet and visit, and1286you do a great job of setting forth in your written testimony1287the importance of what we are here for today. You talk about 551288tons of narcotics being seized, that 75 percent of all1289narcotics that are seized are seized at ports of entry. So you1290make a very compelling case for the importance of this1291technology.1292    I will tell you that as a former prosecutor, I have seen1293first-hand the impact that this type of technology has on us1294being able to stop the flow of illegal drugs. I know that this1295makes our borders more secure and our agents more effective.1296    We have heard statistics put out by GAO talking about where1297we are on scan rates. We know that in 2021, the Securing1298America's Ports Act said that by next year, by 2027, that we1299wanted to have 100 percent scan rates of all passenger,1300commercial, and rail. We started off in 2020 with 2 percent1301passenger, 16 percent commercial. By 2024, that rate had1302increased to 8 percent passenger, 27 percent commercial. Ms.1303Sabatino, I think you say the goal for fiscal year 2026 is 401304percent passenger, 70 percent commercial.1305    Then we heard just in the opening statement of Ms. Benedict1306that there are 9 Southwest Border crossings that have not been1307included in the planning phase. So clearly it does not appear1308to me that we are going to be able to meet that 2027 deadline.1309We are getting closer and we are getting better and we are1310moving in the right direction, but we are not getting there1311quick enough. We are not getting there fast enough. Americans1312are dying because fentanyl and methamphetamine and cocaine and1313other drugs continue to float into our country, because we are1314not doing an adequate job of screening that.1315    So I understand, Ms. Sabatino, when we have met, that there1316are, at certain border crossings, there are infrastructure1317issues that we are having to deal with. There are interference1318issues where we have got different types of scanners looking1319for different things and sometimes those scanners interfere1320with one another. But I also know that there is different types1321of non-intrusive inspection technology. There is the fixed1322permanent sites, which do have to have infrastructure. There is1323mobile scanning technology, there is handheld scanning1324technology. So I want to make sure that we are including, when1325we talk about this inspection technology, that we are not just1326focused on the fixed technology, which is great and which we1327want to have in every port, but we know that some of the ports1328weren't designed for this type of equipment. I do believe that1329the mobile and handheld will at least provide us some sort of1330scanning capabilities as we are working toward that 100 percent1331scan rate that Congress instructed DHS to get to.1332    So my question to both of you, and I have got about a1333minute and a half, is how do we get there and how quickly can1334we get there? What do you need from Congress other than money?1335    We have funded this technology. I think we will continue to1336fund this technology. This is a bipartisan issue. We can argue1337about other things in the DHS arena. But I don't think there is1338anybody that is going to question either of you here today that1339are going to say that we don't need to continue to make this1340investment. So what do you need from us to make sure that we1341can get to the 100 percent scan rate as quickly as possible?1342    Ms. Sabatino, I will start with you and if there is any1343time left, Ms. Benedict, I will let you have the remainder of1344that time.1345    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I1346certainly would say that continued accountability and holding1347us accountable for meeting those goals is critical for us to1348get there with the deployments; I think continuing to support1349our work with the vendors to identify additional or enhanced or1350emerging technology. We have--we're very optimistic about some1351tests that are going on now, working with the Department of1352Homeland Security Science and Technology Office, to address the1353radiation portal monitor interference at a place like San1354Ysidro. That would significantly increase the scan rates, being1355the largest border crossing for vehicles on the Southwest1356Border. Certainly continuing to engage with us, you know, with1357our needs with respect to addressing the civil works and1358funding and very much appreciate the funding that was available1359to us in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.1360    Mr. Guest. Ms. Benedict, I know I am almost over time, but1361I want to give you a real brief opportunity to answer as well.1362Then I will turn the questioning over to Mr. Correa.1363    Ms. Benedict. Absolutely. I think a first good step--a good1364first step will be CBP including those 9 border crossings that1365are not currently in the plans, in their plans and how they1366plan to address the non-intrusive inspection systems of those1367sites. Ms. Sabatino and I have talked and it sounds like that's1368in progress and we look forward to seeing their progress on1369that as we follow up on our recommendations. I look forward to1370working with you and your committee staff on the updates to our1371recommendations.1372    Mr. Guest. Again, thank you all both for being here. Thank1373you for what you do. We want you to be successful.1374    At this time I recognize the Ranking Member for his 51375minutes of questioning.1376    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up the1377witnesses on the Chairman's line of thought, questioning. The1378thought that San Ysidro, 1 of the 9 ports is not even being1379looked at in the plan, biggest probably border crossing in the1380world, massive. We have got fentanyl coming into this country.1381Lives being lost. You can't get this technology out there.1382    Ms. Benedict, you talked about cost. The Big Beautiful Bill1383has $170 billion, massive investment in this part of our1384Government. Want to work with you to make sure that these non-1385intrusive technology, these marvels of technology are put into1386place as quickly as possible.1387    Ms. Sabatino, I am concerned because the technology is1388still not implemented, yet it is my understanding that1389currently you have essentially reassigned or been asked to1390reassign some of your personnel from the border for ICE1391deportation enforcement in the interior of the United States.1392Is that correct?1393    Ms. Sabatino. We have assigned personnel to surge1394operations. That's not new or unique for us.1395    Mr. Correa. Yet we continue to have this issue at the1396border. OK. It is not unique to you, but I believe every agency1397at the Federal level is reassigning the personnel for1398deportations away from their stated purpose. Is this correct?1399    Ms. Sabatino. I can say I'm familiar with the personnel1400that we have deployed. I don't know that I could speak for the1401other Federal agencies.1402    Mr. Correa. OK. Fair enough. If I can, your officers that1403you essentially deploy to immigration enforcement, is this job1404different from stopping or apprehending people at ports of1405entry?1406    Ms. Sabatino. Again, when it comes to surging law1407enforcement support to our Federal, State, or local partners,1408that is something that we plan for for periods of time.1409    Mr. Correa. It was reported that Border Patrol recently1410sent out a legal refresher on the use of force. Have you sent1411out something similar to your officers?1412    Ms. Sabatino. We do quarterly training with respect to use1413of force. We have done refresher training in First Amendment1414and Fourth Amendment rights. Again, that is not unique to any1415single deployment. That is----1416    Mr. Correa. I might have 2 minutes. But, you know, just1417hours after Jonathan Ross, ICE officer, shot Renee Nicole Good,1418Secretary of Homeland Security Ms. Noem stood at a podium and1419said the officer did exactly what he was taught to do. So let1420me ask you, if I can and if you have the answers, do you1421instruct officers to approach a vehicle from the front to1422prevent them from fleeing?1423    Ms. Sabatino. While I am familiar with the incident itself,1424I'm not familiar with exactly what happened and didn't really1425assess videos of that.1426    Mr. Correa. But in general, would you instruct your1427officers to approach a vehicle from the front to prevent it1428from fleeing?1429    Ms. Sabatino. The direction that officers are trained in is1430to approach in as safe a manner as possible.1431    Mr. Correa. Do you authorize officers to use--to shoot at1432fleeing vehicles if they are not immediately in harm's way?1433    Ms. Sabatino. In our use-of-force training, it is related1434to the threat that the individual themselves face or to the1435public.1436    Mr. Correa. Ms. Sabatino, within the refresher, it states1437that passive resistance alone is not conduct under 18 U.S.C.1438Section 111 to constitute Federal crime as long as there is no1439assault, resisting arrest, or impeding Federal officers from1440doing the job. The Border Patrol in the refresher course stated1441that it is not a violation of Section 18-111, noncompliance,1442refusal to cooperate with an officer's commands, disobeying1443commands without fighting back, and taking photographs or1444videotapes of an officer operating in public, again, does not1445constitute a crime. Have you sent out a similar refresher1446instructions to your officers?1447    Ms. Sabatino. Again, with respect to the use of force, it1448is something we do recurring training on.1449    Mr. Correa. But would you agree then that taking a photo,1450videotaping, a person standing on the sidelines as situations1451are developing is not a violation of the law?1452    Ms. Sabatino. Again, our officers are trained to identify1453threats and take in the totality of circumstances, you know,1454when it comes to threats to themselves or the public.1455    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Ms. Sabatino. I am out of time, but1456I will ask you these questions again in writing and I hope we1457can get clearer answers.1458    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.1459    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1460    At this time, pursuant to committee rules, the Chair will1461call a recess. We will reconvene as soon as votes occur. So the1462committee stands in recess at this time.1463    [Recess.]1464    Mr. Guest. The hearing is reconvened.1465    At this time I call on the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.1466Crane, for 5 minutes for his questioning.1467    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the1468panelists for showing up today to give us your thoughts on non-1469intrusive inspection technology at the border.1470    For those Americans that might be watching this hearing,1471would it make sense to compare this type of technology to, you1472know, the machine at the airport that scans our bags to look1473inside in using X-ray technology, Ms. Sabatino?1474    Ms. Sabatino. Yes, it identifies anomalies in the images.1475    Mr. Crane. We recently went down to the border as a part of1476this committee and I got to see some of the technology in1477action. It is pretty amazing that this technology is being1478deployed. Obviously, it is not going nearly as quick as we want1479it to. I believe you said you had over 400 units deployed1480around the country, is that correct?1481    Ms. Sabatino. Four hundred and five units deployed, both1482mobile and fixed.1483    Mr. Crane. Ms. Benedict from GAO said that a part of your1484plan, there were 9 major ports of entry that this technology is1485not in your plans to deploy this technology to, is that1486correct?1487    Ms. Sabatino. The technology that's been procured. But we1488are actively working on plans to identify technology with1489vendors for beating kind-of the physical constraints and the1490RPM interference in locations where we don't currently have1491technology deployed.1492    Mr. Crane. One thing that I found a little disturbing when1493looking through the committee prep for this hearing today was1494that the DHS IG put out a report saying that a lot of the1495equipment, I think $96 million worth of equipment, was sitting1496in storage containers. Can you unpack that for us, Ms.1497Sabatino, and what the issue there is?1498    Ms. Sabatino. Well, as of today, we currently have 891499systems that are operational of the technology that was1500procured. We have 24 systems under construction and 44 in1501active planning. With respect to the systems that are in1502storage, 11 of them are high-energy rail systems. We currently1503have NII technology at the sites. Currently these would be1504replacing with new technology.1505    For the 29 other pieces of technology, there are MEPs and1506LEPs, 2 sites specifically make up 15 of those that are in1507storage. They've been in storage about a year. In March and May1508of this year, it's 9, I believe, to Calexico and 6 to San Luis.1509Following the construction, they'll be deployed, which will1510shrink the number that's currently in storage.1511    Mr. Crane. So it is not that those units that were1512delivered aren't working. You are just working at implementing1513the deployment of them, is that correct?1514    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1515    Mr. Crane. For these sites that don't have the capacity at1516this time to accommodate these units, are you guys using1517portable and handheld technology at those entry points?1518    Ms. Sabatino. We do have some type of NII system available1519at all our land ports of entry, and that ranges from mobile1520technology to handheld technology.1521    Mr. Crane. How many vendors are you working with to1522accomplish the goal of 100 percent of all vehicles coming1523through ports of entry being scanned?1524    Ms. Sabatino. We deal with different vendors all the time.1525I would say there's between 4 and 5 that we're regularly in1526communication with for the specific types of technology that1527we're looking at.1528    Mr. Crane. Have you found any of the vendors to be superior1529in the product they deliver?1530    Ms. Sabatino. I think all have benefits, the types of1531technology, and it really is unique to the type of deployment1532that we're doing and the distinctions between mobile or fixed1533or the handheld.1534    Mr. Crane. Which systems are more susceptible to have1535malfunction and breakdown?1536    Ms. Sabatino. A number of reasons for outages, but the1537primary one is the age of the equipment and the availability of1538parts. That's where the funding for the recapitalization from1539the One Big Beautiful Bill Act is going to be prioritized.1540    Mr. Crane. We have obviously talked today in this hearing1541about, you know, what the percentage is that we are currently1542hitting on pedestrian and commercial vehicles that are actually1543being scanned at the port of entry. Do you believe you will be1544able to hit the goals that you guys have laid out?1545    Ms. Sabatino. So we have increased the scan rates already1546to 13 percent for passenger vehicles and 37 percent for1547commercial vehicles. The goal in 2026 is to have it at 401548percent for POVs and 70 percent for commercial vehicles. But we1549are very, you know, welcome to continue keeping you updated as1550these deployments roll out and certainly let you know of any1551road blocks or challenges that we hit that would prevent us1552from achieving that goal.1553    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.1554    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1555    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green,1556for 5 minutes.1557    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking1558Member as well. Thank the witnesses for appearing today.1559    Ms. Sabatino, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I1560may, please. You are currently hiring persons who are working1561in the interior of the country, is that correct, ma'am?1562    Ms. Sabatino. Well, we do have people stationed at ports of1563entry, airports, land border ports, maritime. But we do have1564people surged to support Immigration and Customs Enforcement1565and other partners, yes.1566    Mr. Green. Would that include--other partners include ICE?1567    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1568    Mr. Green. So you have persons who are actually in the1569field and they are with ICE when they are raiding. Well, let's1570not use that term, excuse me, when they are making arrests?1571    Ms. Sabatino. We support in a number of ways, we do----1572    Mr. Green. Excuse me. Is making arrests one of the ways?1573    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1574    Mr. Green. OK, thank you. These persons who are doing this,1575have they been trained to the same extent that the ICE officers1576have been trained?1577    Ms. Sabatino. I'm not personally familiar with the ICE1578training. I imagine it's comparable, but we do recurring use of1579force training for all of our armed law enforcement officers.1580    Mr. Green. If I told you that someone associated with1581antifa is working with these ICE officers who happens to be1582someone associated with your area, would that concern you?1583    Ms. Sabatino. If I had more context. Like ``working with,''1584like employed by?1585    Mr. Green. Well, let's take the example of a prosecutor in1586Dallas, Texas, who has some affiliation with persons who are1587known to be dastards. This person was a prosecutor and seems to1588have a white supremacist account, makes or posts statements1589about Adolf Hitler, indicated we should make America white1590again, that sort of thing does that. That sort of thing would1591offend you, wouldn't it, if you knew that some of your officers1592were doing something like that?1593    Ms. Sabatino. Well, we would certainly investigate any1594allegations.1595    Mr. Green. Good. The best way to deal with this kind of1596circumstance is to prevent it from ever happening. You wouldn't1597want a person who is doing these kinds of things within your1598ranks, right? If the person is actually doing it.1599    Ms. Sabatino. It's important to ensure----1600    Mr. Green. I believe your answer would be yes or no.1601Anything less than a yes, I would assume is no. So you would1602not want a person in your ranks, right?1603    Ms. Sabatino. No.1604    Mr. Green. OK, good. So if you want to avoid it, the best1605way to prevent it from happening is to avoid it by good vetting1606from the outset. So what are you doing to vet people who are1607new to this work with ICE or new to you? What are you doing to1608vet them? How do you vet?1609    Ms. Sabatino. Speaking specifically to Customs and Border1610Protection, we do background investigations. They're subject to1611polygraph examinations and interviews.1612    Mr. Green. What does it take to trigger a Professional1613Responsibilities investigation?1614    Ms. Sabatino. I would have to defer you to our Office of1615Professional Responsibilities on how they triage allegations1616that are made, but investigations could be conducted by the1617Inspector General, by OPR, or by local management. But again,1618the nature of the allegation would determine that.1619    Mr. Green. But you do agree that you would not want someone1620who is affiliated with some sort of white supremacist movement1621to be associated with your officers or in your core of1622officers, would you?1623    Ms. Sabatino. I would agree in theory.1624    Mr. Green. In theory? Well, that is fair enough. I am going1625to just ask you if you would do this. Please give some1626additional thought to how persons are being vetted, and I may1627have more to say about it at a later time. Thank you.1628    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.1629    Mr. Guest. Thank you.1630    I would now like to recognize Mrs. Biggs from South1631Carolina for 5 minutes of questioning.1632    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Trump1633administration has made great strides to secure our borders and1634to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. Encounters at the1635Southwest Border are down from a high of over 300,000 under1636President--I am sorry. Encounters at the Southwest Border are1637down from a high of over 300,000 under President Biden to under16388,000 in July 2025. This is a historic achievement, but now is1639not the time to let our guard down or to rest on our laurels.1640    We ensure that our ports of entry are equipped with the1641proper technology and personnel needed to ensure the1642accomplishment of their mission. Smugglers often go through1643ports of entry. Commercial containers and personal vehicles1644alike are modified to have spaces to hide illicit cargo such as1645cocaine and fentanyl. Contraband cargo is often in locations1646that are not immediately obvious to the naked eye or even older1647detection technology. This is where modern NII technology is1648important. Vehicles and containers can be thoroughly examined1649without having to be torn apart. Full implementation of the1650newest and best non-intrusive inspection technology across all1651ports of entry will save time and lives by catching more1652illicit drugs and staying one step ahead of criminal elements.1653    So my question is to Ms. Sabatino. What new and novel1654technologies is the CBP innovation team investigating and1655fielding at ports of entry through initial research and pilot1656programs? How will these new technologies complement the1657existing fleet of NII machines?1658    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question. There's a number1659of emerging technologies that we are looking at. I think1660certainly in complement to the image scans, the artificial1661intelligence, machine learning, that's going to help identify1662anomalies. We have a number of algorithms deployed along the1663Southwest Border today that are in training that we hope will1664be able to actually peel back resources as the NII--the1665algorithms will help officers streamline identifying those1666anomalies.1667    I think in terms of other technology, in our mail and1668express consignment facilities, leveraging CT scanners1669complemented by artificial intelligence machine learning to1670help our officers, again, increase the efficiency in the work1671that they do. Looking at millimeter and ThruWave technology and1672working with vendors to help kind-of build their repository1673because, frankly, we have the types of substances to help them1674identify and build the information kind of database.1675    Mrs. Biggs. OK, great. Thank you. How can current and1676future implementations of NII technology be improved and1677streamlined to ensure that our borders remain secure in an1678evolving threat environment?1679    Ms. Sabatino. Certainly with the deployment of the pre-1680primary technology, which is the technology that has1681experienced delays and challenges in moving out because of the1682interference, we have a number of lessons learned, including1683contracting and engineering firm to assist with those initial1684site surveys that, frankly, when they were first done were not1685substantive enough and didn't address some really critical1686engineering issues, including like ground penetration with1687radar. But happy to provide, you know, a more fulsome briefing1688on all of the different lessons learned, how we've incorporated1689them into our resource strategy moving forward, and what the1690outcomes of those lessons learned in implementing have been.1691    Mrs. Biggs. OK, great. Thank you so much.1692    I yield back.1693    Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back.1694    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman for Virginia for his16955 minutes of questioning.1696    Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you1697and Ranking Member Correa for convening today's hearing and our1698witnesses for joining us.1699    Last week, I and 27 other Members of the House visited1700Minnesota and we saw first-hand the negative impacts of the1701mass deportation, the mass destruction machine that the Trump1702administration has assembled. American citizens and our law-1703abiding immigrant neighbors are terrified. Businesses and1704schools in Minnesota are closed. American citizens again are1705staying home because they don't want to be the next person1706pulled through the streets, put in a chokehold, or, God forbid,1707fatally shot by a Federal agent, maybe ICE, maybe CBP, dressed1708and armed as if they are in a war zone.1709    Reported this week that local law enforcement leaders in1710Saint Paul and Minnesota have shared that their officers, off-1711duty officers, have been stopped and detained and harassed by1712ICE. The masked and, in many cases, minimally-trained officers1713have dragged pregnant mothers, pepper-sprayed children, placed1714their knees on the necks of American citizens, and recently1715they detained a 5-year-old, a 5-year-old, and then used that 5-1716year-old, you might not be able to see it, this is him, this is1717Liam Ramos, 5 years old, detained him, used him as bait to lure1718his family members out of their home. Then they shipped him to1719a detention facility a thousand miles away, 5 years old.1720    In city after city, CBP Commander Greg Bovino has strutted1721around spreading terror: L.A., Chicago, Charlotte, New Orleans,1722Minneapolis. This Congress must take immediate action to rein1723in the outrageous abuses we are seeing by ICE and CBP officers.1724We need to end the masking, end the secret police, require use1725of force standards and enforce them, and withdraw the thousands1726of Federal agents from Minnesota. Secretary Noem and the1727leadership of these agencies must be held accountable for the1728egregious abuses that we have seen.1729    Ms. Sabatino, I have a 5-year-old. I dropped him off at1730preschool this morning. I won't ask you if you have children.1731It is not my business, not the committee's business. You have1732had an honorable career in law enforcement. You are highly1733trained. You have been a leader in your field. I just want to1734ask you a simple question. Were you ever trained to use a 5-1735year-old in a law enforcement operation in the way that Liam1736Ramos was used? Were you ever trained to use a 5-year-old as1737bait to get his family members to open the door? Were you1738trained to do that? Would you countenance one of your officers1739doing that?1740    Ms. Sabatino. I'm not familiar with that case.1741    Mr. Walkinshaw. I am not asking you about this situation. I1742am saying were you trained and would you allow a child to be1743used in a law enforcement operation? Would you allow your1744officers to do it?1745    Ms. Sabatino. I'm not familiar with that case. It's not1746part of our training.1747    Mr. Walkinshaw. What would you do if one of your officers1748at a port of entry perhaps did that, used a 5-year-old to get1749their parents or a family member to open their car door? What1750would you do to one of those officers if they used a child in a1751law enforcement operation like that?1752    Ms. Sabatino. Any allegation of unprofessional behavior or1753use of force would be investigated by the appropriate third1754party.1755    Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.1756    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1757    At this point, we would like to do a second round of1758questioning, but after consulting with Mr. Correa, we would1759like to do a lightning round, so not 5 minutes of questioning,1760but 3. So we would like for all Members to have an additional 31761minutes to ask questions. If there are other Members who have1762not come in, they will also be included in the queue, but would1763like to explore this just a little bit further. So if we could1764set the clock at 3 minutes.1765    So, Ms. Sabatino, my question will just be, you know, we1766have heard testimony that there will be, at least at certain1767ports of entry, there will be some period of time before we are1768able to get fixed permanent scanners there at those locations.1769We know that there is infrastructure issues, there is1770interference issues. We have talked about some of the1771challenges that CBP faces. So I guess my question is, in the1772interim, what is the plan? What is the possibility, again, to1773use mobile scanners, handheld scanners, so that we will have1774coverage at those ports of entry?1775    Again, the coverage may not be to the same level. We may1776not be able to screen as many vehicles as we would like. But is1777there a plan within CBP to use those handheld scanners, those1778mobile scanners, to supplement some of the deficiencies that we1779may see, particularly at the 9 ports of entry that Ms. Benedict1780has made us aware of?1781    Ms. Sabatino. Yes, we're going to continue to use all of1782the technology that's available to us, as well as additional1783technology that we'll be procuring with funding from the One1784Big Beautiful Bill Act. That's in complement to also our canine1785assets, our targeting models, and the intelligence available to1786us.1787    Mr. Guest. I do want to say, look, you have got some1788incredible men and women who work at the ports of entry. They1789do a great job of identifying individuals for secondary1790screening. You all do an amazing job of stopping a large number1791of narcotics that come across. But we want to make sure through1792the use of artificial intelligence, through the use of1793technology, that we are making those agents more efficient,1794more effective, and that we are doing everything that we can on1795behalf of the American public to stop the flow of drugs coming1796into the country. So please, when you return, please tell the1797men and women that you serve with, that we have great respect1798for the work that they do and we thank them for their1799commitment and dedication to serving this great Nation.1800    With that, I would yield 3 minutes to the Ranking Member,1801Mr. Correa.1802    Mr. Correa. Thank you again, Ms. Sabatino and Ms. Benedict.1803Thank you for being here today.1804    Let me say that I know San Ysidro quite well. I have1805traveled that place. I have been with you with your officers.1806Sixty to 70 percent, 60 to 70 percent, of all the fentanyl1807coming into the United States goes through San Ysidro. Yet we1808are not scheduled to put any of these high-tech scanners there,1809not scheduled to even begin to plan to put them there. So it1810becomes extra critical to have the personnel there.1811    Ms. Sabatino, I kind-of asked you, are you fully staffed? I1812will ask it again. Are you fully staffed?1813    Ms. Sabatino. I can provide you what our target on-board1814number is as a follow-up specifically for San Ysidro, but we're1815actively hiring 5,000 officers.1816    Mr. Correa. We have been trying to hire thousands of1817officers for years. As you know, the background checks are very1818tough. Polygraph tests are almost impossible to pass. They are1819tougher than for the folks applying for the FBI. It is very1820hard to hire people. This is my concern. When you have officers1821at the border stopping fentanyl deployed into the interior of1822the country, it concerns me we are not doing the job of1823protecting Americans from fentanyl. These officers are now1824deployed into my district.1825    Southern California is the manufacturing capital of the1826United States, do a lot of economic activity. A lot of these1827immigrants are the workers there. So I look at this as a lose-1828lose policy. We are not doing the best we can to stop the1829fentanyl and we are missing out on common-sense economic1830activity, economic growth that we have in Southern California1831that is done by these immigrants.1832    I am not going to belabor this issue. But what I would like1833to do, I am going to submit some questions to you in writing.1834But essentially I want to know how many folks are you down, how1835many open slots do you have? Is this something that just1836happened?1837    You use the words to describe that this is something that1838you do on a regular basis, which is redeploy officers off the1839border to the interior of the country. I would like to have the1840data from the last 5 years. Have you really deployed them, how1841many numbers over the last 5 years? Because I believe my1842citizens, American citizens, want to make sure that fentanyl is1843not getting into this country.1844    Again, I have been to San Ysidro. I have spoken to your1845folks over there. Wonderful individuals that have these skills.1846I don't know how they do it, sixth sense. But they can figure1847out where this fentanyl is at. When you transfer them to1848somewhere in the United States, they are not doing their job1849that we hired them to do.1850    Thank you very much. I look forward to getting your data1851from you. Thank you.1852    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1853    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.1854    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously my colleagues1855on the other side of the aisle continue to attack Homeland1856Security ICE agents. Their newest attack is ICE just detained a18575-year-old child. Right? We keep hearing that on the panel1858today. It is all over social media. That would be atrocious if1859true, but it is not.1860    This is exactly what Homeland Security put out officially:1861ICE did not target a child. The child was abandoned. On January186220, ICE conducted a targeted operation to arrest Adrian1863Alexander Conejo Arias, an illegal alien from Ecuador, who was1864released into the United States by the Biden administration. As1865agents approached the driver, Adrian Alexander Conejo Arias1866fled on foot, abandoning his child. For the child's safety, one1867of our ICE officers remained with the child while the other1868officers apprehended Conejo Arias.1869    Parents are asked if they want to be removed with their1870children or ICE will place them--place the children with a safe1871person that the parent designates. This is consistent with past1872administrations' immigration enforcement. Parents can take1873control of their departure and receive a free flight and $2,6001874with the CBP Home app. By using the CBP Home app, illegal1875aliens reserve the chance to come back the right and legal way.1876I just wanted to clarify that with all the outrage on the left1877and, you know, trying to generate, you know, hysteria in these1878chambers right now. That is not the truth of what happened. I1879am glad that officials at ICE made sure that the real story was1880made public----1881    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields?1882    Mr. Crane [continuing]. To the American people.1883    Thank you and I yield back.1884    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1885    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.1886    Mr. Walkinshaw. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. I am OK.1887Actually, I will yield to the Ranking Member.1888    Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. To my colleague from1889Arizona, you make an interesting point, which is what are1890exactly the facts? Because it is not only one 5-year-old. I1891have heard a number of stories about young individuals being1892left when their parents are apprehended, some with orders of1893deportation, others essentially picked up randomly off the1894streets and children left to their own. I would welcome the1895opportunity with my colleague to do an investigation to study1896what exactly is the truth.1897    As you have said, sir, this has been an issue for a number1898of administrations, not just one. I say to do a study because1899we want to have the truth. Somewhere the truth is there. It is1900probably in the middle somewhere. But we all have an interest1901in making sure children are taken care of. So I would like to1902look under the hood, so to speak, and look at the facts and see1903what the policy is when a child's parents are apprehended,1904because that child is an American citizen most likely. So I1905think we do need to look at this issue a lot closer.1906    Thank you very much.1907    Mr. Walkinshaw. Reclaiming my time. I appreciate the1908gentleman's comments. What he didn't address and what the DHS1909statement didn't address is a question I posed to Ms. Sabatino,1910and that is the use of a 5-year-old child in a law enforcement,1911immigration enforcement operation. That doesn't seem to be in1912dispute whether the agents on the ground used that child to1913ring the doorbell to lure his family members who were inside1914the home out.1915    There should be an impartial investigation of that and the1916hundreds of other allegations of abuses, violations of policy1917from ICE, and, as Ms. Sabatino is here today, CBP officers. The1918American people don't trust that this administration and this1919Secretary of Homeland Security will conduct that kind of fair1920and impartial investigation in the case of Liam Ramos or1921others.1922    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1923    Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.1924    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 31925minutes.1926    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I thank you and1927the Ranking Member and the witnesses.1928    Ms. Sabatino, you and I were talking earlier about1929unacceptable character information being reported. I think we1930concluded that it can be reported to your Office of1931Professional Responsibility. Is that correct?1932    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1933    Mr. Green. Can anyone report to this office, Ms. Sabatino?1934    Ms. Sabatino. I believe there's a publicly-available number1935and email.1936    Mr. Green. Does anyone include you, ma'am?1937    Ms. Sabatino. If I could report allegations?1938    Mr. Green. Does anyone include you when I say anyone?1939    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1940    Mr. Green. OK. Now let's talk about criminal activity. Is a1941similar circumstance available for persons who are aware of1942something that may be criminal in nature?1943    Ms. Sabatino. If we had allegations of criminal behavior,1944yes, that would be called in.1945    Mr. Green. Do you recall that Ms. Renee Nicole Good was1946shot by an officer?1947    Ms. Sabatino. I did see the media attention to it, yes.1948    Mr. Green. Has that been reported to the Office of1949Professional Responsibility?1950    Ms. Sabatino. I think, because the agent that was involved1951would be--was with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, I'm not1952aware of any specific call into either our or ICE's Office of1953Professional Responsibility.1954    Mr. Green. But there is an Office of Professional1955Responsibility for these kinds of things. It is sort-of1956internal affairs, is that correct?1957    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1958    Mr. Green. You have the ability to report these things, do1959you not?1960    Ms. Sabatino. Everyone in the public can report.1961    Mr. Green. Does everyone include you?1962    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1963    Mr. Green. So you have the ability to report, do you not?1964    Ms. Sabatino. If I believe that there was criminal activity1965or misconduct.1966    Mr. Green. Did you--you said you saw the video. There was1967statements made that--by the wife of Ms. Good that we had1968whistles, they had guns. You saw what happened. You can report1969this as something that should be investigated by the Office of1970Professional Responsibility, can't you?1971    Ms. Sabatino. I don't think it would be appropriate for me1972as I was not there and I saw clips of videos on the news.1973    Mr. Green. Excuse me. Excuse me. The question is, if you1974wanted to, you could, couldn't you?1975    Ms. Sabatino. Anyone who believes that there's criminal----1976    Mr. Green. Are you a part of the anyone?1977    Ms. Sabatino. Yes.1978    Mr. Green. So you can report it. How can you, ma'am, see1979what happened on that video and not report it to the Office of1980Professional Responsibility, just ask them to look into it?1981This woman lost her life and no investigation is said to be1982taking place and you won't report it to the Office of1983Professional Responsibility.1984    Mr. Guest. The gentleman's time has expired.1985    Mr. Green. I yield back. Thank you.1986    Mr. Guest. I would like to thank the witnesses for being1987here today. I would like to thank the Members for their1988participation in this hearing. Members of the subcommittee may1989have additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask1990the witnesses to respond in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule1991VII(E), this hearing and the record for the hearing will--the1992record for this hearing will be held open for 10 days.1993    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank1994you.1995    [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]19961997                           A P P E N D I X  I19981999                              ----------20002001      Questions From Chairman Michael Guest for Diane J. Sabatino2002    Question 1. Ms. Sabatino, historically, CBP has submitted project2003funding requests that are considerably lower than the actual costs of2004project installation. For example, when DHS Office of Inspector General2005(OIG) assembled their 2025 OIG-25-27 report, 3 high-energy rail units2006were in storage because CBP underestimated installation costs by about2007$43 million.2008    How is CBP working to create accurate cost estimations across their2009installation plans?2010    Answer. Cost estimations across installations are difficult2011particularly regarding the scope of required site preparation and civil2012works, largely due to the unique characteristics of each port including2013geography and infrastructure variations and the range of environmental2014impacts along the Southwest and Northern Borders. To assist U.S.2015Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with mitigating these challenges,2016CBP has secured the services of an engineering firm to perform a2017reasonableness check on vendor construction cost estimates and2018installation plans before and during the contract modification process.2019CBP solicits quarterly vendor Estimate to Complete (ETC) numbers for2020active installation projects. ETC are used to identify cost variances2021early during the construction process. CBP obtains justifications of2022potential cost increases early in the planning and construction cycle2023of each project. CBP regularly performs an analysis of cost at contract2024award, funding required for the completion of projects, and ultimately2025the final cost upon system acceptance. This data, in addition to2026collaboration with the CBP Office of Acquisition's Cost and Schedule2027Management Branch, has led to significant improvements in the program's2028cost estimations.2029    Question 2a. Ms. Sabatino, given the issues where large-scale NII2030systems are interfering with existing Radiation Portal Monitors when2031placed near each other, what innovative solutions have CBP explored to2032mitigate this issue?2033    Question 2b. Have any contracts been awarded to mitigate2034interference?2035    Answer. CBP has been actively pursuing solutions to the radiation2036interference issues to effectively deploy the fixed pre-primary2037scanners funded by Congress in 2020. In calendar year 2023, CBP2038convened a working group comprised of its operations and scientific2039subject-matter experts along with subject-matter experts from the U.S.2040Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass2041Destruction Office (CWMD) to develop potential solutions to the2042interference issue. As a result of the working group, some solutions2043were approved that mitigated a portion of the radiation interference2044issue. Additionally, the working group convened a session later in2045calendar year 2023 with the contracted vendors and allowed them to2046present potential solutions to the radiation interference issue. One of2047the solutions was accepted for development by the DHS Science and2048Technology Directorate (S&T). S&T has been working collaboratively with2049CBP and with the vendor to develop the solution, with a successful2050factory test completed in December 2025. S&T and CBP will conduct an2051operational test at the Port of San Ysidro in mid-calendar year 20262052for further evaluation and assessment.2053    Question 3. Ms. Sabatino, the 2025 OIG-25-27 report, states that2054several years of staffing challenges led to decisions within the NII2055program being made on ``immediate needs rather than developing a2056structured, long-term plan.''2057    What steps besides offering hiring and retention bonuses have been2058taken to hire and retain qualified and committed individuals?2059    Answer. Through assistance from CBP's National Recruitment2060Division, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) has expanded targeted2061recruitment campaigns, leveraged partnerships, expanded engagement with2062military transition programs, utilized social media and digital2063platforms, and participated in career fairs and webinars nationwide to2064increase visibility and engagement. Additionally, OFO utilizes targeted2065recruiting efforts to attract candidates for specific hard-to-fill2066locations as well as individuals that are involved in specific clubs or2067organizations that have a nexus to areas and activities that correlate2068with law enforcement or physical fitness. For retention, OFO invests in2069employee engagement and formal recognition through awards and programs2070for employee achievements. In addition, OFO focuses on mentoring and2071leadership development opportunities while also providing career-2072enhancing trainings that include resume and interview training to2073provide employees opportunities for career advancement and career2074mapping. Furthermore, for the non-intrusive inspection (NII) program in2075particular, CBP has strategically aligned personnel resources with the2076specialized skills needed to improve CBP's ability to assess2077operations, identify the right technology, equip the ports of entry,2078and quickly deploy NII equipment. In concert with OFO's recruitment and2079retention efforts, this alignment of resources has supported the growth2080of the NII program team from approximately 15 full-time employees to 392081full-time employees.2082 Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Diane J. Sabatino2083    Question 1a. Ms. Sabatino, on January 14, CBP sent out a directive2084requiring all CBP officers to complete Mandatory Mobile Field Force2085Certification. According to the directive, MFF-trained teams will2086provide CBP with a flexible and scalable response for incidents such as2087civil disturbances, protests, natural disasters, or any event requiring2088an enhanced law enforcement presence. These CBP officer teams can be2089deployed quickly at both the local and national levels to assist field2090offices, ports of entry, or to support other law enforcement agencies2091as needed.2092    As you know, CBP officers' mission is to facilitate lawful trade2093and travel while protecting the national security at the ports of2094entry. The Nation's ports are already facing severe staffing shortages,2095stretching officers thin at the ports. Reassigning CBP Office of Field2096Operations personnel for non-port missions exacerbates these shortages2097and undermines the security and efficiency of our Nation's ports.2098    It is critical that the Homeland Security Committee ensure CBP2099officers are not used in ways that Congress never intended and that2100place both officers and the public at unnecessary risk.2101    How specifically does CBP intend to use mandatory MFF-trained CBP2102officers?2103    Answer. CBP intends to use Mobile Field Force (MFF)-trained CBP2104officers as a standardized, rapidly-deployable capability to manage2105large groups, protect CBP personnel and facilities, and support partner2106agencies when directed, consistent with existing law and CBP policy.2107Officers who receive MFF training continue to perform their primary2108duties at ports of entry and are assigned to MFF operations only as2109needed.2110    More specifically, CBP intends to use MFF-trained officers to:2111   Manage crowds and civil disturbances at CBP locations.2112   Deploy to respond to large groups, demonstrations, or2113        disturbances at ports of entry and other CBP-controlled2114        facilities, to maintain safety and security and preserve the2115        orderly flow of lawful travel and trade.2116   Provide rapid, organized responses to emergent incidents.2117        Serve as a quickly-mobilized, organized force package that can2118        be deployed on short notice to address incidents that exceed2119        the capabilities of routine staffing, such as unrest or other2120        public-order situations at or near CBP facilities.2121   Augment CBP during contingency or surge operations. Support2122        CBP operations during periods of unusually high operational2123        demands such as mass migration events or other significant2124        surges--where additional, specially-trained personnel are2125        needed to manage large groups safely and effectively.2126   Protect CBP facilities and personnel. Reinforce security at2127        CBP facilities and related infrastructure during elevated2128        threat conditions or active incidents, to help ensure2129        continuity of operations and the safety of officers, other2130        Federal personnel, and the public.2131   Support the Federal Protective Service (FPS). Support FPS2132        under established authorities, provide force protection and2133        crowd-management support to FPS for the protection of2134        designated Federal buildings, personnel, and property.2135   Participate in interagency operations, when authorized and2136        directed. Operate alongside other Federal, State, or local law2137        enforcement agencies during joint operations or nationally2138        significant events, when such support is formally requested and2139        approved through DHS and CBP operational channels.2140    These uses are intended to ensure that CBP maintains a disciplined,2141properly-trained capability for public-order and facility-protection2142missions, rather than relying on ad hoc responses by untrained2143personnel.2144    Question 1b. What legal authority is CBP using to deploy CBP2145Officers outside of the port of entry environment?2146    Answer. CBP's deployment of officers outside ports of entry is2147legally supported by Federal statutes granting enforcement authority2148within the border region and customs territory, as well as broader DHS2149and Executive authorities for national security and emergency response.2150These authorities allow CBP to conduct enforcement, respond to2151emergencies, and assist other agencies as required to keep the American2152people safe. CBP's legal authority to deploy CBP officers outside of2153the port of entry environment is primarily derived from several2154statutes and regulations, most notably:2155   Title 6 U.S.C.  211 establishes CBP and outlines its2156        mission, including border security and enforcement of customs2157        and immigration laws.2158   Title 8 U.S.C.  1103 grants authority to direct employees2159        to perform or exercise any of the power, privileges, or duties2160        conferred or imposed, or regulations issued upon any other2161        employee of the service.2162   Title 8 U.S.C.  1357 grants immigration officers (including2163        CBP officers) authority to interrogate, arrest, and enforce2164        immigration laws from any external boundary of the United2165        States.2166   Title 19 U.S.C.  1401(i) and authorizes CBP officers to2167        perform their duties not only at ports of entry but also within2168        the ``customs territory'' and in areas where customs laws are2169        enforced.2170   Title 19 U.S.C  1589a authorizes CBP officers to make an2171        arrest without a warrant for any offense against the United2172        States committed in the officer's presence or for a felony.2173   Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) provides2174        broad authority for DHS components, including CBP, to protect2175        the Nation's borders and respond to threats.2176   Title 31 U.S.C.  1535 authorizes agencies to enter into2177        agreements to obtain supplies or services from another agency.2178    Additionally, CBP officers may be deployed outside ports of entry2179to assist other Federal, State, or local agencies to provide assistance2180where there is legal authority to do so.2181    CBP may act under Executive Orders or DHS directives that outline2182operational scope for national security, emergency response, or public2183safety.2184    Question 1c. What legal authority is CBP using to deploy CBP2185officers more than 100 miles from the border?2186    Answer. As outlined above, CBP's deployment of officers outside2187ports of entry is legally supported by Federal statutes granting2188enforcement authority within the border region and customs territory,2189as well as broader DHS and Executive authorities for national security2190and emergency response. CBP has facilities that they work at, and2191inherently protect, which are more than 100 miles from the border. CBP2192officers have the authority to deploy to conduct interior enforcement2193operations to enforce immigration law pursuant to the authority2194accorded to the CBP Commissioner under Title 6 U.S.C  211(c)(8).2195   Questions From Ranking Member J. Luis Correa for Diane J. Sabatino2196    Question 1a. Ms. Sabatino, under the Trump administration, DHS2197shifted thousands of officers and agents away from their regular duties2198to focus on immigration enforcement operations in the interior of the2199United States. My understanding is that you currently have personnel2200detailed to or supporting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and2201the Federal Protective Service (FPS) in our cities.2202    How many personnel from CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) have2203been detailed to support immigration enforcement actions in the2204interior of the United States since January 20, 2025? Please further2205break this out by the agency they are supporting, the city to which2206officers are deployed, the ports of entry they are deployed from, and2207the lengths of their deployments.2208    Answer. Since January 20, 2025, OFO has supported interior2209immigration enforcement actions across the United States alongside2210Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). OFO personnel have been2211deployed to a range of locations to assist in these operations. As of2212January 22, 2026, a total of 610 CBP officers (CBPOs) from 15 Field2213Offices have been assigned to support efforts in 61 ICE offices located2214throughout the United States, for an average period between 60 to 1802215days.2216    The following OFO locations provided support: Anchorage; Ashtabula;2217Atlanta; Baltimore; Baltimore Field Office; Birmingham; Blaine;2218Brownsville; Buffalo; Calexico; CBP Headquarters; Charleston;2219Charlotte; Chicago; Cincinnati; Cleveland; Columbus; Dallas; Del Rio;2220Denver; Detroit; Detroit Airport; Dulles International Airport; Durham;2221Eagle Pass; El Paso; Erie; Ft. Lauderdale; Gramercy Park; Gulfport;2222Hidalgo; Honolulu; Houston Airport; Houston Seaport; San Luis; San2223Ysidro; Santa Teresa; Savannah; SeaTac Airport; Seattle Seaport; St.2224Croix; St. Louis; St. Thomas; Sweetgrass; Tampa; Toledo; West Palm2225Beach; Huntsville; Indianapolis; Jacksonville; John F. Kennedy Airport;2226Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport; Laredo; Los Angeles International2227Airport; Logan Airport; Louisville; Memphis; Miami Field Office; Miami2228International Airport; Miami Seaport; Milwaukee; Minneapolis; Mobile;2229Morgan City; Nashville; National Targeting Center; New Orleans; New2230York Field Office; New York/Newark; Nogales; Norfolk; Oakland; Oakland2231Seaport; Orlando; Otay Mesa; Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; Port Canaveral;2232Portland; Raleigh; San Diego; and San Francisco Airport.2233    OFO support was provided to the following ICE locations: Alamosa,2234CO; Louisville, KY; Indianapolis, IN; Atlanta, GA; Charlotte, NC;2235Charleston, SC; Roanoke, VA; Harrisonburg, VA; Baltimore, MD;2236Birmingham, AL; Honolulu, HI; Bakersfield, CA; Milwaukee, WI; Houston,2237TX; Buffalo, NY; Nashville, TN; Memphis, TN; Cary, NC; Chicago, IL;2238Columbus, OH; Cincinnati, OH; Dallas, TX; Fresno, CA; Richmond, VA;2239Centennial, CO; Glenwood Springs, CO; Craig, CO; Casper, WY; Grand2240Junction, CO; Cheyenne, WY; Sacramento, CA; Detroit, MI; Pittsburgh,2241PA; Miami Broward, FL; Salt Lake City, UT; New Orleans, LA; Yuma, AZ;2242St. Paul, MN; Norfolk, VA; Savannah, GA; Seattle, WA; St. Louis, MO;2243St. Thomas, USVI; Tampa, FL; Stuart, FL; Jacksonville, FL; Stockton,2244CA; Central Islip, NY; New York City, NY; Santa Ana, CA; San2245Bernardino, CA; Burlington, MA; Newark, NJ; Tucson, AZ; Morgan Hill,2246CA; Orlando, FL; Philadelphia, PA; Mount Laurel, NJ; Portland, OR; San2247Diego, CA; and San Francisco, CA.2248    During this period, OFO has periodically provided limited temporary2249duty and detail support to interior operations led by other DHS2250components, primarily ICE, based on operational need and subject to2251resource availability at ports of entry. Furthermore, OFO also2252periodically provided support to U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), Federal2253Protective Service (FPS), and to fellow OFO field offices.2254    Question 1b. For each of the last 5 years, how many of your2255officers have supported surge immigration enforcement operations in the2256interior of the United States? How many of these details or support2257have been to ICE?2258    Answer. The number of OFO officers who supported these operations2259in each of the last 5 calendar years, and how many of those assignments2260were to ICE is as follows:22612262------------------------------------------------------------------------2263                                  Total OFO officers2264                                      supporting2265                                    interior surge    Total OFO officers2266               CY                     immigration          detailed/2267                                      enforcement       supporting ICE2268                                      operations2269------------------------------------------------------------------------22702021............................               3,582                   222712022............................               3,410                   222722023............................               4,232                   222732024............................               1,190                   222742025............................               4,573               2,9052275------------------------------------------------------------------------22762277    Question 2a. Ms. Sabatino, there are countless instances of Federal2278officers using aggressive tactics against people peacefully refusing to2279cooperate with unlawful commands or are simply videotaping officers'2280interactions.2281    Are CBP officers trained to tackle and restrain individuals who2282videotape them?2283    Answer. No.2284    Question 2b. Does every use of force instance get investigated?2285    Answer. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)2286Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) personnel respond to,2287investigate, coordinate, report, review, and resolve use of force (UoF)2288incidents. As part of the process, a Use of Force Review Board (UFRB)2289shall review all use of force incidents to determine compliance with2290policy and best law enforcement practices for training, tactics, and2291equipment.2292    Use of force incident reviews are an administrative inquiry,2293conducted by IOD personnel under standard investigative protocols, to2294gather facts and prepare an investigative package for the appropriate2295UFRB. The UFRBs, comprised of CBP, DHS and other representatives,2296independently reviews CBP UoF incidents to determine whether the UoF2297was reasonable and in accordance with the DHS Use of Deadly Force2298Policy, CBP Use of Force Policy, Guidelines and Procedures Handbook,2299and the relevant legal authorities. The UFRBs also serve to provide2300information to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division to2301assist in their determination as to whether the pursuit of criminal2302prosecution is warranted in relation to the UoF. Finally, the UFRB2303process is designed to inform the affected CBP component senior2304management, and other appropriate CBP personnel of any findings or2305recommendations from an operational, administrative, tactical, and2306training perspective. Please reference below links.2307Links:2308    Use of Force Policy and Administrative Guidelines and Procedures2309Handbook/U.S. Customs and Border Protection2310    U.S. Customs and Border Protection Update on the CBP National Use2311of Force Review Board/U.S. Customs and Border Protection2312    Question 2c. Have you received any direction or guidance indicating2313that officers can engage in use of force without fear?2314    Answer. No.2315    Question 2d. Are all CBP OFO officers up-to-date with use-of-force2316training? If not, when will they be?2317    Answer. OFO officers are required to complete use of force training2318on a quarterly basis in accordance with CBP policy and Federal2319standards. CBP actively monitors compliance and works to ensure any2320outstanding training requirements are addressed promptly.2321    Question 3a. Ms. Sabatino, in Massachusetts, CBP officers and ICE2322agents used an undocumented mother's child and grandchild as bait to2323get her to come outside--where they promptly arrested the mother in2324front of her kids. The CBP officers at the scene were filmed wearing2325OFO jackets.2326    Who in the Trump administration authorized using children as bait?2327How was this communicated to CBP?2328    Answer. Under this administration DHS has never used children as2329``bait'' when conducting immigration enforcement operations. ICE is2330committed to conducting immigration enforcement operations in a manner2331that prioritizes the safety and well-being of all individuals,2332including aliens, officers, and agents. ICE personnel follow strict2333guidelines, receive on-going training, and adhere to established2334policies and procedures to minimize risk and prevent harm during2335operations. ICE regularly reviews its practices to ensure compliance2336with legal and ethical standards. To frame this case in any other way2337is a fabrication of the truth.2338    Question 3b. Do you support this tactic of using children and2339babies to lure immigrants out of their homes?2340    Answer. Please see response above.2341    Question 4a. Ms. Sabatino, over the past year, CBP officers have2342been detailed to or otherwise supported ICE, Border Patrol, and FPS2343during interior enforcement operations.2344    What training, if any, do your officers receive before these2345deployments. Does it include use of force training specific to2346interacting with individuals engaged in protected First Amendment2347activities?2348    Answer. All OFO officers receive use of force training each quarter2349along with receiving refresher training on 1st and 4th Amendment2350Rights.2351                 non-intrusive inspection (nii) program2352    Question 5a. Ms. Sabatino, CBP has received billions of dollars for2353its Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) program, going back to 2019. It has2354been reported that NII equipment is still sitting in warehouses despite2355receiving this money. CBP must better manage taxpayer dollars to secure2356our Nation.2357    What steps are you taking to improve the management of this2358program?2359    Answer. CBP has taken tangible steps to strengthen the NII program2360and ensure that it delivers results as evidenced by increasing scan2361rates along the Southwest Border (SWB). Changes to equipment2362requirements including the strengthening of software and2363interoperability features were made as a result of critical analysis.2364Initial pre-primary projects were tested in locations where2365infrastructure costs were determined prior to an overall assessment of2366what was needed to upgrade infrastructure. Each location has unique2367geography, infrastructure, traffic demographics (both passenger and2368cargo), and threats that impact how the technology will be most useful2369at individual crossings. Most CBP ports were not designed to handle the2370current traffic flows or for this cutting-edge technology.2371    CBP has refined vendor requirements to include more detailed2372construction designs including the planning for land agreements,2373shoring requirements, and environmental impacts. The implementation of2374tailored site design reviews also further mitigates challenges and2375delays.2376    In addition, CBP has strategically aligned personnel resources with2377the specialized skills needed to support the program, improve CBP's2378ability to assess operations, identify the right technology, equip the2379ports of entry, and quickly deploy. For example, the NII program team2380has grown from approximately 15 full-time employees to 39 full-time2381employees. CBP has also worked to ensure that the new scanning2382equipment is integrated into our CBP holdings to best leverage the2383tools that are currently in place. As a result of the changes that CBP2384has made, as of February 13, 2026, 94 NII deployed systems were2385operational at 30 sites, including 66 Low-Energy Portals (LEPs), 272386Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs), and 1 High-Energy (HE) Rail.2387   In fiscal year 2024, 29 systems at 11 locations became2388        operational.2389     In fiscal year 2025, 36 systems at 15 locations became2390            operational.2391     As of February 13, 2026, construction is under way for 192392            systems at 9 locations (9 LEPs, 7 MEPs, and 3 HE Rail).2393    Additionally, scan rates have improved, and as of March 30, 2026,2394the SWB scan rates for commercial vehicles is 38 percent and passenger2395vehicles is 14 percent.23962397----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2398                                                                                                        FY 20262399                                                            FY 2022    FY 2023    FY 2024    FY 2025   (as of 3/2400                           Type                            Scan Rate  Scan Rate  Scan Rate  Scan Rate    30/26)2401                                                                                                       Scan Rate2402----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2403SWB Passenger Vehicles...................................         3%         3%         8%        13%        14%2404SWB Commercial  Vehicles.................................        15%        19%        21%        35%         382405----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------24062407    Through all of these actions, CBP has advanced the NII program to2408improve management and ensure that operations are more successful.2409    Question 5b. When can we expect to see all of that equipment moved2410out of warehouses?2411    Answer. CBP has successfully deployed 94 fixed, large-scale systems2412as of February 11, 2026. There are an additional 19 systems currently2413under construction. Past delays in deployments were primarily due to2414shortfalls in civil works funding. Projects were moved as far as2415feasible pending appropriation of civil works funding; however, final2416design and construction kick-off required application of civil works2417funds. Funding needs to finalize deployments were assessed in fiscal2418year 2023. A portion was received in fiscal year 2024 (April 2024),2419with final funding received in fiscal year 2025 (September 2025).2420    Long-term storage of equipment primarily impacted the HE Rail2421projects, where initial contracting required equipment manufacturing2422and sites and civil works costs were assessed after the fact. This was2423done because funding was expiring and needed to be applied quickly to2424the procurement of equipment. With MEP and LEP systems, equipment2425manufacturing is generally concurrent with site preparation and2426construction. Individual vendors can request that funding be applied to2427manufacturing, in some cases, to ensure that systems are ready for2428delivery when construction is completed. Delays in the deployment of2429some systems were also impacted by radiation interference testing and2430the need to build shield walls as well as unanticipated facility2431issues.2432    CBP projects deployments of all LEPs and MEPs by the end of fiscal2433year 2026. Additionally, due to significant challenges and complexities2434in the rail environment, CBP is estimating the full deployment of the2435HE Rail systems by the end of calendar year 2028.2436    Question 6. Ms. Sabatino, some of the issues with deploying NII2437systems are longstanding, such as interference with secondary screening2438systems and space concerns. How is CBP planning to address these2439issues? Why were they not resolved before?2440    Answer. To mitigate the challenges that CBP encounters when2441deploying NII scanning capabilities at ports of entry due to limited2442physical real estate, CBP deploys fixed scanning systems in post-2443primary areas where there is sometimes more operationally available2444space or deploys NII mobile systems. In the pre-primary environment at2445some ports of entry, CBP will encounter radiation interference when2446deploying NII scanning systems near Radiation Portal Monitors because2447of the lack of proper distancing between the two systems. This is2448primarily due to the real estate footprint in that area not allowing2449for enough necessary space to properly deploy these two systems2450together. CBP has been actively pursuing solutions to the radiation2451interference issues to effectively deploy the fixed pre-primary2452scanners. In calendar year 2023, CBP convened a working group comprised2453of its operations and scientific subject-matter experts along with2454subject-matter experts from the CWMD to develop potential solutions to2455the interference issue. As a result of the working group, some2456solutions were approved that allowed for a portion of the radiation2457interference issue to be mitigated. Additionally, the working group2458convened a session later in calendar year 2023 with the contracted2459vendors and allowed them to present potential solutions to the2460radiation interference issue. One of the solutions was accepted for2461development by S&T. S&T has been working collaboratively with CBP and2462with the vendor to develop the solution, with a successful factory test2463completed in December 2025. S&T and CBP will conduct an operational2464test at the Port of San Ysidro, California, in mid-calendar year 20262465for further evaluation and assessment.2466    Question 7. Ms. Sabatino, based on the data in the Government2467Accountability Office's (GAO) report, GAO-25-107379, CBP has procured2468about one-third of the systems it needs. What is CBP's schedule for2469procuring and deploying these remaining systems?2470    Answer. As of February 11, 2026, CBP deployed 94 NII systems, 192471are under construction, and 44 NII systems are in the planning phase.2472CBP has made steady progress on developing a solution to mitigate2473radiation interference which will offer CBP the opportunity to deploy2474scanning equipment at some locations, most significantly the San Ysidro2475Port of Entry which accounts for a significant percentage of traffic.2476Once implemented, this solution will allow for placement of equipment2477within a certain distance from the radiation portal monitors and will2478allow plans for pre-primary deployment to be developed. Some sites--for2479example, most ports of entry in Arizona--do not have the requisite2480footprint, distance, etc. to allow placement of pre-primary systems.2481For remaining sites, where pre-primary is not an option, an evaluation2482will be conducted to determine post-primary placement and types of2483systems that will increase scan rates and deployment schedules will be2484updated accordingly.2485    Question 8a. In September 2025, GAO reported that CBP has not2486included some of the largest ports of entry in its scanning plans,2487including San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales.2488    Why were these ports of entry excluded?2489    Answer. While the ports of San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales do2490have fixed scanning technology in the post-primary environment that2491allows for the scanning of passenger vehicles that have been referred2492by primary officers for further inspection, CBP recognizes that the2493ports of San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Nogales represent a significant2494portion of passenger vehicle traffic volume along the SWB. The primary2495reason for the lack of the deployment of fixed pre-primary scanners at2496this time has been due to the lack of real estate in the pre-primary2497areas at these ports of entry that would allow for the scanning of the2498passenger vehicles and to passively scan for radiation simultaneously2499creating a radiation interference issue.2500    Question 8b. How effective is CBP's program if it excludes about2501one-third of the traffic at Southwest Border crossings?2502    Answer. NII is valuable tool used by front-line personnel to screen2503cargo, baggage, and conveyances for potential threats. NII is part of2504CBP's layered enforcement strategy which also includes advanced vetting2505through trusted traveler and trader programs that offer prioritized2506processing for trusted entities, intelligence-driven targeting to2507identify high-risk shipments and crossing behaviors, enforcement and2508canine teams observing for suspicious indicators throughout operations,2509and our front-line personnel using their knowledge, skills, and2510experience to conduct primary and secondary inspections. Where fixed2511systems are not available, front-line personnel have mobile and2512handheld NII technology to support them in primary and secondary2513inspections.2514    CBP will obligate $1.038 billion from the Working Families Tax Cut2515Act (WFTC) to replace outdated technology, procure new technology for2516locations where technology does not exist, integrate data from vendor2517systems into CBP holdings, and develop algorithms. CBP actively works2518with industry and S&T to evaluate new technologies to determine the2519best technology for CBP operations. The legacy systems are being2520replaced with newer technology that can scan at higher capacity and2521with increased image quality. While CBP has evaluated new technologies2522that would provide scanning of specific signatures and allow for a2523better capability, this technology is not currently able to scale to2524the size, speed, and footprint of CBP operations. WFTC funding is being2525applied to the best equipment to meet operational needs.2526    While fixed, large-scale scanning systems are an important part of2527the CBP enforcement strategy, CBP relies on a layered approach to2528security that includes advanced targeting and intelligence; canine2529assets; trade partner initiatives, such as Customs Trade Partnership2530Against Terrorism and Free and Secure Trade programs; officer primary2531and secondary inspections; and utilization of secondary scanning2532systems and hand-held technology. CBP's vast targeting and law2533enforcement intelligence holdings provide the front line with2534indications of high-risk individuals and/or shipments as they interact2535with them. The screening provided through NII is another layer of2536information that is provided and while useful, only our front-line2537personnel can determine whether a shipment, conveyance, or individual2538can be allowed to proceed into the United States.2539    Additional considerations include the following:2540   Due to existing requirements in U.S. law and radiation2541        standards, the public must be given the opportunity to ``opt-2542        out'' of NII scanning which requires CBP to have at least one2543        primary lane without equipment. With natural traffic flow, a2544        percentage of vehicles will always go through that lane, even2545        if they are not concerned about the radiation.2546   Fixed NII systems have set dimensions. For both passenger2547        and commercial vehicles, oversized cargo vehicles and vehicles2548        that are pulling a trailer are too large to pass through the2549        scanners and must instead be inspected in the ``opt-out''2550        lanes.2551   Not all ports of entry have enough real estate to2552        accommodate a fixed system in pre-primary areas. Where there is2553        not enough space, scanning takes place in secondary areas.2554    Question 9. How could advanced 3D X-ray and computed tomography2555systems improve CBP's ability to discriminate between legitimate cargo2556and concealed threats--especially when dealing with complex or2557cluttered freight?2558    Answer. A computed tomography (CT) scan produces a series of X-ray2559images taken at different angles, processed into a 3-D image. The2560images can be rotated as 3-D images, sliced and layers removed, each2561process theoretically providing an opportunity for the operator to view2562and identify an anomalous concealed threat. CT scanners can also aid in2563the quantification of object densities, through measurements of the2564attenuation of X-rays as they pass through the material. A 3-D image2565eliminates the overlap between the layers, which is one of the issues2566that obscures contraband with the traditional two-dimensional X-ray2567image.2568    CBP has begun to deploy CT scanners in the mail/express consignment2569vectors and has collected data with vendors utilizing real interdicted2570threats to support the development of automated threat detection2571algorithms for fentanyl and other dangerous materials.2572    Question 10. What progress has CBP made developing anomaly2573detection algorithms to improve the detection of contraband? How would2574the use of such technology shift CBP's resource needs, such as staffing2575levels and officer training?2576    Answer. CBP is actively developing, training, and implementing2577anomaly detection algorithms as a tool for CBP officer use to enhance2578the identification of contraband. These advancements leverage2579Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning to analyze non-2580intrusive inspection images.2581    The agency is developing specific algorithms to detect anomalies2582within commercial vehicles and passenger vehicles, alongside comparison2583models designed to reduce human workload.2584    The three use cases that CBP is focused on are described below:2585   Empty Truck Low-Risk Historical Comparison.--This algorithm2586        validates an empty truck by comparing its current X-ray image2587        with previously cleared X-ray images from prior entries.2588   Passenger Vehicle Model.--This model assists CBP officers in2589        detecting anomalies within the structure of passenger vehicles.2590   Commercial Vehicle Model.--This model helps CBP officers2591        detect anomalies in the cab and parts of the trailer structure.2592    To date the ``Empty Truck Low-Risk Historical Comparison'' model2593developed is the only model that has been successfully tested at a high2594enough level of confidence to expand beyond the initial deployment2595location.2596    Following successful model development, field deployment of each2597use case is dependent on appropriate technical infrastructure,2598including appropriate X-ray machine technology, unified file format2599conversion by the vendors, and a common integrated platform deployment.2600Technical infrastructure projects are currently under way at 122601different CBP facilities and are scheduled for completion by end of2602fiscal year 2026.2603    The integration of anomaly detection technology may one day allow2604CBP to shift its resource needs, particularly for staffing and officer2605training.2606   Staffing Levels.--While these technologies assist officers,2607        their full implementation could lead to personnel reallocation.2608        The goal is to increase throughput and efficiency, potentially2609        allowing officers to focus on higher-risk situations rather2610        than routine inspections.2611   Officer Training.--The widespread introduction of AI-powered2612        anomaly detection tools would necessitate updated training for2613        CBP officers. Officers would need training to interpret2614        algorithm outputs, understand limitations, and make informed2615        decisions based on AI recommendations.2616                                staffing2617    Question 11a. Ms. Sabatino, regarding staffing at the San Ysidro2618Port of Entry: How many OFO staff are needed to fully staff the San2619Ysidro port of entry per the Workforce Staffing Model?2620    Answer. The Workload Staffing Model (WSM) is a decision support2621tool and is the initial, data-driven, step in the process of2622quantifying workload at ports of entry (POEs). The WSM considers all2623business processes required of CBPOs, the workload associated with2624those business processes, and the true level of effort required to2625carry out daily missions effectively. The fiscal year 2025 WSM, which2626uses fiscal year 2024 data and projects staffing needs through fiscal2627year 2026, shows the need for a total of 2,961 CBPOs in the San Diego2628Field Office.2629    Question 11b. How will the money given to CBP from reconciliation2630address the staffing needs at San Ysidro?2631    Answer. OFO has identified 500 positions from the reconciliation2632funding that will be allocated to the San Diego Field Office. Of those,2633around 100 were identified by the Field Office to be utilized in San2634Ysidro.2635    Question 11c. How many open vacancies are there right now at the2636San Ysidro Port of Entry?2637    Answer. As of pay period 01 ending January 24, 2026, San Ysidro had2638105 vacant CBPO positions (approximately 10 percent of allocated).2639    Question 11d. How many individuals have you hired for the San2640Ysidro Port of Entry in the last year?2641    Answer. One hundred thirty-nine (77 in fiscal year 2026)2642individuals have been hired for the San Ysidro Port of Entry in the2643last year with an additional 47 pending their enter on duty date within2644the next month.2645    Question 11e. What is the average length of time it takes to hire2646an individual for the San Ysidro Port of Entry?2647    Answer. The average time to hire a CBPO across all POEs is2648approximately 399 days; however, OFO has continued to maintain a2649healthy pipeline and ``ready to hire'' list. San Ysidro is considered a2650hard-to-fill location and candidates are offered incentives for San2651Ysidro and several other ``hard-to-fill'' locations.2652    Question 12a. Ms. Sabatino, regarding CBP OFO staffing overall: How2653many additional officers does OFO require per its Workforce Staffing2654Model? How will the money given to CBP from reconciliation address2655these staffing needs?2656    Answer. The WSM is a decision support tool and is the initial,2657data-driven, step in the process of quantifying workload at POEs. The2658WSM considers all business processes required of CBPOs, the workload2659associated with those business processes, and the true level of effort2660required to carry out daily missions effectively. The fiscal year 20252661WSM, which uses fiscal year 2024 data and projects staffing needs2662through fiscal year 2026, shows the need for an additional 6,193 CBPOs2663across the POEs nationwide. OFO was provided 5,000 new CBPO billets in2664WFTC, for distribution throughout its ports of entry based on2665operational demands and facility expansions.2666    Question 12b. A significant portion of OFO's workforce plans to2667retire over the next few years. What are your plans to address this2668wave of retirements?2669    Answer. OFO has implemented a hiring strategy based on operational2670needs, anticipated attrition, and mission-critical priorities to ensure2671sustainable staffing alignment. This strategy includes:2672   Staffing for increased operational demands, projected2673        traffic surges, and planned facility expansions to maximize2674        efficiency and readiness.2675     An aggressive recruitment strategy that resulted in a 35.52676            percent increase in applicant volume when comparing fiscal2677            year 2025 to fiscal year 2024.2678     Leveraging technology to automate pre-employment2679            processing to reduce time to hire and meet hiring targets.2680     Fiscal year 2026-2029 hiring goals include annual2681            attrition hiring and additional appropriated CBP officer2682            positions through the WFTC.2683     OFO was provided 5,000 new CBPO billets in the 2025 WFTC2684            for distribution throughout its ports of entry based on2685            operational demands and facility expansions.2686     Increased training seats at the Field Operations Academy2687            to meet future hiring demands (fiscal year 2026-fiscal year2688            2029).2689     Remaining flexible with filling additional allocations2690            based on a strong CBPO pipeline and ability to pulse and2691            surge quickly.2692     Utilization of recruitment and retention incentives for2693            locations that are typically hard to fill and/or hard to2694            retain based on the remote nature of the facility or a high2695            cost of living in the location.2696      Questions from Chairman Michael Guest for Hilary M. Benedict2697    Question 1. Ms. Benedict, based on the observations your team has2698made in reviewing this program, is CBP assigning appropriate resources2699to addressing the issue of ``sufficient space'' at San Ysidro, Otay2700Mesa, and all other ports of entry along the Southwest Border that are2701not in their plan?2702    Answer. Based on information obtained during our review, CBP is2703investigating solutions for deploying large-scale non-intrusive2704inspection (NII) systems to the ports of entry along the Southwest2705Border with limited space, including working with the Department of2706Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate to develop and2707deploy low-energy portals that could be installed where space2708constraints and interference with radiation detectors make deployment2709of these systems difficult. According to CBP, factory testing of this2710technical solution will be completed by June 30, 2026, followed by2711conducting operational testing, selecting a solution, and beginning2712deployment in fiscal year 2028. We will continue to monitor CBP's2713progress toward deploying NII systems to all ports of entry along the2714Southwest Border and expect CBP to provide an update of its progress in2715March 2026.2716    Question 2a. Ms. Benedict, in the GAO-25-107379 report on the NII2717program, your team suggested that CBP: Should clearly (1) define all2718NII key performance parameters and report performance using them and2719(2) determine how to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to2720all Southwest Border land ports of entry in updates to its deployment2721plans.2722    Can you elaborate on the recommendations and how GAO identified2723them as the most pressing issues with CBP's NII program?2724    Question 2b. Were there any other areas of concern that GAO2725identified, which did not rise to the level of a recommendation that2726Congress should be aware of?2727    Question 2c. Have you had any meetings with CBP post release of the2728report? If so, have you seen progress within CBP to execute on the2729recommendations?2730    Answer. CBP collects and uses performance data to help ensure that2731its large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems are available2732for use to scan vehicles and inform actions it takes to improve NII2733system performance. We made our first recommendation because we2734determined that clearly defining the performance parameters used to2735collect and report on NII system performance would help CBP identify2736deficiencies and potential cost savings, achieve its objectives more2737efficiently and effectively, and inform future procurement decisions.2738To address our recommendation, CBP planned to define system-level key2739performance parameters for NII systems in the statement of work for its2740new contract statements of work, to include maintenance and2741availability requirements and reporting.2742    Additionally, in our review, we found that CBP did not have plans2743to deploy large-scale NII systems at 9 ports of entry, which accounted2744for 30 percent of passenger vehicle crossings at all land ports of2745entry in fiscal year 2024. We made our second recommendation because2746only vehicles selected for secondary inspection are scanned at these2747ports of entry so CBP risks entry of many unscanned vehicles entering2748the United States, hampering its ability to prevent entry of illegal2749drugs and other contraband.2750    In our review, we identified and discussed in our report several2751challenges CBP's NII program is facing. Some of these challenges have2752limited CBP's ability to use the systems, such as staff shortages and2753system outages. Some challenges have led to deployments costing more2754due to factors such as substantial increases in costs for civil works2755and construction. Other challenges have led to system deployments2756taking longer such as the need for major site upgrades to enable system2757installation and vendors taking longer than expected to resolve issues2758encountered during deployment.2759    We have not formally met with CBP to discuss its progress on our2760recommendations since the release of our report in September 2025.2761However, we expect CBP to provide an update on its progress in March27622026.27632764                             [all]