“Frontline Defenders: How the Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces Combat Narcoterrorists and other Maritime Threats on the High Seas”
Hearing•House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security•Feb 3, 2026 · 10:00 AM
Summary
House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security held a hearing on Feb 3, 2026 at 10:00 AM in Cannon House Office Building, Room 310. 2 witnesses appeared.
Record
The meeting has its video, its transcript, witnesses and documents on the record.
Video
The proceedings, as the committee streamed them.
Transcript
The transcript runs to 1,960 lines and 111,967 characters, as the Government Publishing Office printed it.
1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34 FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S5 DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND6 OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS78=======================================================================910 HEARING1112 before the1314 SUBCOMMITTEE ON15 TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY1617 of the1819 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY20 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2122 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2324 SECOND SESSION2526 __________2728 FEBRUARY 3, 20262930 __________3132 Serial No. 119-373334 __________3536 Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3738 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3940 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4142 ______4344 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE454663-776 PDF WASHINGTON : 20264748 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY4950 Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman5152Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,53 Chair Ranking Member54Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California55Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California56August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan57Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island58Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York59Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois60Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York61Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey62Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking63Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member64Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico65Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey66Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia67Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana68Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas69Vacant70 Keighle Joyce, Staff Director71 Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director72 Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk7374 ------7576 SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY7778 Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman7980Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,81Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Ranking Member82Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Timothy M. Kennedy, New York83Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana84 officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi85 (ex officio)8687 Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director88 Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8990 C O N T E N T S9192 ----------93 Page9495 Statements9697The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress98 From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on99 Transportation and Maritime Security:100 Oral Statement................................................. 1101 Prepared Statement............................................. 3102The Honorable Troy A. Carter, a Representative in Congress From103 the State of Louisiana:104 Oral Statement................................................. 3105 Prepared Statement............................................. 5106The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress107 From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on108 Homeland Security:109 Prepared Statement............................................. 5110111 Witnesses112113Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations114 Policy and Commander, United States Coast Guard:115 Oral Statement................................................. 7116 Prepared Statement............................................. 8117Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice118 Team, Government Accountability Office:119 Oral Statement................................................. 11120 Prepared Statement............................................. 12121122 For the Record123124The Honorable Elijah Crane, a Representative in Congress From the125 State of Arizona:126 Article, CNN................................................... 27127128 FRONTLINE DEFENDERS: HOW THE COAST GUARD'S129 DEPLOYABLE SPECIALIZED FORCES COMBAT NARCOTERRORISTS AND130 OTHER MARITIME THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS131132 ----------133134 Tuesday, February 3, 2026135136 U.S. House of Representatives,137 Committee on Homeland Security,138 Subcommittee on Transportation and139 Maritime Security,140 Washington, DC.141 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in142room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez143(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.144 Present: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs, Van Epps,145and Carter.146 Mr. Gimenez. Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee147on Transportation and Maritime Security will come to order.148Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee in149recess at any point.150 The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the151capabilities, readiness and operational demands of the Coast152Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces as they confront153increasingly complex maritime, narcotrafficking, smuggling, and154other homeland security threats on the high seas.155 I now recognize myself for an opening statement.156 Good morning everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for157joining us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a158partial shutdown, including Department of Homeland Security. I159am hopeful that we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so160they can return to their important work protecting and serving161the American people.162 Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable163Specialized Forces, and particularly, their role in halting164maritime narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and165related threats from communist dictatorships.166 For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and167drug cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, arming168both the Venezuelan people and the security of the United169States. On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a170turning point in dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift171capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife.172 This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for the173people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend174President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their175coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This176decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide.177The United States must not be trifled with.178 This operation is personally significant to me, as my179family fled to America from the Cuban communist regime over 70180years ago--actually, 65 years ago. The United States is the181shining light of democracy, and through its operation, can182support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a leader183in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats184around the world.185 Cuba must be considered next. Just the other day, I echo186President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on187all countries that--and--or send oil to Cuba's dictatorships to188end the Castro's regime once and for all. I have called for the189immediate end of oil shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt190communist regime and crush the Cuban people.191 It's why I'm eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast192Guard's role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's193actions which helped pave the way for the success of Operation194Absolute Resolve. Securing our maritime front by halting and195disrupting these sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela is key196to unlocking security and freedom in our corner of the Western197Hemisphere.198 We are grateful for the Coast Guard's bravery and199exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these wide200visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of201U.S. and international law.202 This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized203Forces historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly204510,000 pounds of cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We have also the205opportunity to hear how the Deployable Specialized Forces have206become one of the most tactically capable maritime forces of207the United States and what their future holds amid an ever-208increasing maritime threat landscape.209 We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review210of the Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for211improvement. Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and212provide further direction with a future of the Coast Guard.213 We should also consider the initiatives laid out in the214Coast Guard's recently released Force Design 2028 which calls215for a Deployable Specialized Forces command. We are grateful to216have witnesses here today to discuss this important topic and217also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to work with us218in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting in the219near future so Members can learn more about the specifics of220these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela.221 Hearing directly from operational leaders from the Joint222Interagency Task Force South would be beneficial for Members to223receive further details on operational impacts, emerging224threats, and any on-going challenges.225 Thank you.226 [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]227 Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez228 February 3, 2026229 Good morning, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses for joining230us today. I appreciate you both being here despite a partial shutdown,231including for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am hopeful232we can reach a deal this week to reopen DHS so they can return to their233important work protecting and serving the American people.234 Today's hearing will focus on the Coast Guard's Deployable235Specialized Forces, and particularly their role in halting maritime236narcotrafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and related threats from237Communist dictatorships.238 For far too long, Venezuela's export of sanctioned oil and drug239cartels has prolonged the regime of Nicolas Maduro, harming both the240Venezuelan people and the security of the United States.241 On January 3, Operation Absolute Resolve marked a turning point in242dismantling Venezuela's regime with the swift capture of Nicolas Maduro243and his wife. This powerful operation begins to restore democracy for244the people of Venezuela and upholds the rule of law. I commend245President Trump, our military, and diplomatic leaders for their246coordinated efforts to complete this successful operation. This247decisive action sent a clear message to adversaries worldwide: The248United States must not be trifled with.249 This operation is personally significant to me, as my family fled250to America from the Cuban Communist regime over 70 years ago. The251United States is the shining light of democracy, and through this252operation, can support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a253leader in peace through strength and must continue to confront threats254around the world.255 Cuba must be considered next: Just the other day, I echoed256President Trump's Executive Order to impose strict tariffs on all257countries that send oil to Cuba's dictatorship, to end the Castro258regime once and for all. I have called for the immediate end of oil259shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt communist regime and crush the260Cuban people.261 It's why I am eager to hold today's hearing on the Coast Guard's262role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's actions, which helped263pave the way for the success of Operation Absolute Resolve. Securing264our maritime front by halting and disrupting these sanctioned oil265tankers from Venezuela is key to unlocking security and freedom in our266corner of the Western Hemisphere. We are grateful for the Coast Guard's267bravery and exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these268right-of-visitation boardings and seize vessels found in violation of269U.S. and international law.270 This hearing will highlight the Deployable Specialized Force's271historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly 510,000 pounds of272cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We also have the opportunity to hear how273the Deployable Specialized Forces have become one of the most274tactically capable maritime forces of the United States, and what their275future holds amid an ever-increasing maritime threat landscape.276 We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review of the277Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces and areas for improvement.278Congress should consider GAO's recommendations and provide further279direction for the future of the Coast Guard. We should also consider280the initiatives laid out in the Coast Guard's recently released Force281Design 2028, which calls for a Deployable Specialized Forces Command.282 We are grateful to have the witnesses here today to discuss this283important topic, and also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to284work with us in order to continue this dialog in a Classified setting285in the near future, so Members can learn more about the specifics of286these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela. Hearing directly287from operational leaders from the Joint Interagency Task Force South288would be beneficial for Members to receive further details on289operational impacts, emerging threats, and any on-going challenges.290 Thank you, and now I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.291Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his 5 minutes292for an opening statement.293294 Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana,295Mr. Carter, sitting in for Ranking Member McIver today, for his2965 minutes for an opening statement.297 Mr. Carter. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for298convening this hearing. Thank you for also recognizing me to299provide opening remarks as Ranking Member McIver, regrettably,300could not be here today.301 I also would like to thank our witnesses for joining us302today. Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid303a shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the304Armed Forces. Thank you for your incredible service.305 To state the obvious, our military service members deserve306to be paid for their service, and I hope you can come--we can307come together quickly to pass funding for the Coast Guard,308along with reforms desperately needed at the Department of309Homeland Security.310 Today we are here to discuss Coast Guard's Deployable311Specialized Forces. These specialized forces compromise--312comprise some of the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained313units. Their activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range314of critical missions as they deploy to conduct some of the most315important services at high-risk operation across a variety of316challenging environments.317 Specialized forces missions vary from advanced interdiction318and boarding against hostile targets to responding to oil319spills and hazardous material releases. These specialized320forces dive underwater to repair ships in harsh environments of321remote polar regions, chase down narcotic traffickers on the322high seas, and help protect national security events, like323United Nations General Assembly.324 Last year maritime safety and security terms were among the325most--the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of326New Orleans to help protect Super Bowl LIX. I want to thank you327and the hard-working Coast Guard personnel who helped make that328event safe and successful, along with all of the work you do329for Louisiana to ensure the community of maritime commerce and330the safety of my constituents are always held at its highest.331 Most recently, the Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized332Forces have conducted a series of high-profile, high-risk333boardings of sanctioned oil tankers near the coast of334Venezuela. While I strongly disagree with the Trump335administration's operation last month to deploy forces on land336in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as337his bombing of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal338but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage339international maritime cooperation, in contrast, these oil340tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce341sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.342influence.343 The Coast Guard should be commended for conducting these344high-risk boardings without incident, demonstrating the skill345and training of the service's specialized forces.346 The Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast347Guard's success as a service. We must ensure that the Coast348Guard has the resources, personnel, training, and strategies,349and authorities to utilize these units effectively.350 The Government Accountability Office has done vital351research to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more352effective across its many missions. I look forward to hearing353from both of our witnesses about the capabilities of the Coast354Guard's specialized forces and how our committee can help the355services come to grow to fruition and give you the absolute356most state-of-the-art tools to do your jobs.357 I thank the witnesses for joining us. Mr. Chairman, I358yield.359 [The statement of Honorable Carter follows:]360361 Statement of Honorable Troy A. Carter362363 February 3, 2026364365 Rear Admiral Barata, I recognize you are joining us amid a366shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the367armed forces. To state the obvious, our military service368members deserve to be paid for their service, and I hope we369will be able to come together quickly to pass the reforms and370funding our country desperately needs.371 Today, we are here to discuss the Coast Guard's Deployable372Specialized Forces. These specialized forces comprise some of373the Coast Guard's most elite, highly-trained units. Their374activities exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range of critical375missions, as they deploy to carry out some of the service's376highest-risk operations within a variety of challenging377environments.378 Specialized forces' missions vary from advanced379interdictions and boardings against hostile targets, to380responding to oil spills and hazardous material releases.381Specialized forces dive underwater to repair ships in the harsh382environment of remote polar regions, chase down narcotics383traffickers on the high seas, and help protect National Special384Security Events like the United Nations General Assembly.385 Last year, Maritime Safety and Security Teams were among386the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of New387Orleans to help protect Super Bowl 59. I expect some of these388teams will deploy again this weekend to help ensure another389safe and successful Super Bowl. Most recently, the Coast390Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces have conducted a series391of high-profile, high-risk boardings of sanctioned oil tankers392near the coast of Venezuela. I strongly disagree with the Trump393administration's operations last month to deploy forces on land394in Venezuela without Congressional authorization, as well as395its bombings of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal396but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts to encourage397international maritime cooperation. In contrast, these oil398tanker boardings represent a legal and effective way to enforce399sanctions, enforce international maritime laws, and exert U.S.400influence.401 The Coast Guard should be commended for carrying out these402high-risk boardings without incident, displaying the skill and403training of the service's specialized forces. The Deployable404Specialized Forces are critical to the Coast Guard's success as405a service. We must ensure the Coast Guard has the resources,406personnel, training, strategies, and authorities to utilize407these units effectively.408 The Government Accountability Office has done important409work to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more410effective across its many missions.411412 Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Carter.413 Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening414statements may be submitted for the record.415 [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]416 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson417 February 3, 2026418 Coast Guard service members carry out a broad range of critical419missions every day, from search-and-rescue activities to drug420interdictions and maritime security. The Coast Guard helps respond to421disasters, protect maritime commerce, defend seaports and other422critical infrastructure, and secure National Special Security Events.423In each of these missions, the Coast Guard's efforts are enhanced by424its Deployable Specialized Forces.425 These elite teams represent some of the service's most skilled and426highly-trained units. With 11 statutory missions and a global427footprint, the Coast Guard relies on the readiness and expertise of its428specialized forces to deploy quickly and respond to crises effectively.429 If a cutter is stuck in ice in the Arctic or Antarctic and requires430repair, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces. If an431oil spill threatens environmental disaster, the Coast Guard will call432upon its specialized forces. If an advanced tactical team is needed to433conduct a high-risk interdiction of a suspected drug trafficking434vessel, the Coast Guard will call upon its specialized forces--at435least, that is, if it is allowed to do so. Under the Trump436administration, the Coast Guard is not getting enough calls.437 The Trump administration has chosen to illegally and immorally bomb438alleged drug boats instead of allowing the Coast Guard's specialized439forces to safely interdict narcotics traffickers and turn them over for440prosecution. These attacks fly in the face of international law, and441though they may deter drug trafficking in the short term, they442undermine the Coast Guard's long-term efforts to advance international443maritime cooperation and law enforcement.444 How can the Coast Guard convince international partners and allies445to assist with maritime law enforcement and information sharing when446other branches of the U.S. military are illegally blowing boats out of447the water? The administration must cease these war crimes immediately.448Accountability is coming.449 The administration has shown that at least some of its lawyers do450in fact understand maritime law, as the Coast Guard's specialized451forces have been deployed to conduct a series of successful boardings452of sanctioned oil tankers off the Venezuelan coast. These operations453stand in contrast to the illegal drug boat attacks--as well as the454illegal deployment of U.S. armed forces into Venezuela to depose its455president--as the boardings are at least rooted in internationally456recognized rules and practices.457 The Coast Guard's specialized forces deserve significant credit for458carrying out these difficult and dangerous operations without incident.459As the Coast Guard works to build upon the successes of its specialized460forces, Congress must ensure the service supports its personnel and461mission needs with capable vessels and aircraft.462 Recently, through their One Big Ugly Bill, Republicans gifted the463Coast Guard with $25 billion--a much-needed investment that464unfortunately was paid for by gutting Medicaid. This money was provided465with few strings attached, and the Coast Guard has not yet shared its466spend plan with Congress.467 In the past, the Coast Guard has struggled to manage large468acquisitions programs efficiently and effectively. As the Coast Guard469works to support its specialized forces and other units with this large470investment, the service must act as responsible stewards of taxpayer471dollars and ensure money is not wasted.472 I look forward to working with GAO and my colleagues in Congress to473hold the Coast Guard accountable as it invests in its Deployable474Specialized Forces and other units.475476 Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of477witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that478our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.479 [Witnesses sworn.]480 Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have481answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.482 I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Rear483Admiral David Barata serves at deputy commandant for operations484policy and as commander, 8th Coast Guard District overseeing485Coast Guard operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of486Mexico, adjacent offshore waters, and major inland waterways,487such as the Mississippi and Ohio River systems. Previously, he488served as commander, Coast Guard Personnel Services Center,489where he led human resource policy and work force management490for nearly 45,000 active-duty and reserve members.491 A 1993 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Rear492Admiral Barata holds a Master of Arts in national security and493strategic studies from the Naval War College and served as494senior military fellow at the Center for a New American495Security.496 I also misstated something. You are overseeing Coast Guard497operations across 26 States, including the Gulf of America.498Right? OK.499 Heather MacLeod is the director in the Homeland Security500and Justice team for the U.S. Government Accountability Office.501 Ms. MacLeod joined GAO in 2002. During the last 22 years,502Ms. MacLeod has worked on a range of public policy issues at503GAO. She currently leads the Coast Guard in maritime security504issues portfolio in conducting a variety of reviews addressing505issues such as Coast Guard work force and strategic planning506efforts and maritime port and supply chain cargo security.507 Prior to joining the Homeland Security and Justice team,508Ms. MacLeod led reviews covering a broad range of topics in509transportation policy, including aviation safety, airline510competition, transit programs, and highway bridge management.511 Ms. MacLeod has a master's degree in public administration512from the University of Washington and a bachelor's degree in513international relations from American University.514 I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here515today. I now recognize Rear Admiral Barata for 5 minutes to516summarize his opening statement.517518 STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT519 FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD520521 Admiral Barata. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Member, and522distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the523opportunity to testify today.524 I request that my written testimony be submitted for the525record.526 Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.527 Admiral Barata. Thank you.528 The United States is a maritime nation, and the Coast Guard529stands as a vital instrument of national power, a military530service, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the531intelligence community, tasked with controlling, securing, and532defending our maritime borders and their approaches,533facilitating commerce vital to economic prosperity, and534responding to crises and contingencies that often arise with535little or no warning.536 Our Nation faces significant and evolving threats,537including narcoterrorists and transnational criminal538organizations that smuggle deadly drugs, traffic people, bring539violence to our communities, and use illicit cash through540sanctioned oil to buy influence throughout the hemisphere.541 The Coast Guard is on the front line of these fights,542pushing our borders out and targeting these networks where they543are most vulnerable. The dedicated men and women of the Coast544Guard are at the forefront of our efforts to defend our545homeland. At the tip of the spear are the service's Deployable546Specialized Forces. These highly-skilled teams provide547operational commanders with a versatile and rapidly-deployable548toolkit to address ever-changing and asymmetric threats.549 For instance, our maritime security response teams provide550the Nation's only Federal maritime counterterrorism capability,551and our tactical law enforcement teams embed with naval552partners to execute dangerous drug interdictions. Our553Deployable Specialized Forces are prepared for the most554demanding missions.555 Their rigorous training, often with the Department of War556colleagues, ensures that they can deploy globally at a moment's557notice, bringing unparalleled skills to bear against terrorism,558weapons proliferation, piracy, transnational crime, and other559domestic contingencies.560 Most recently, our operators conducted several law561enforcement boardings aboard dark fleet tankers to enforce562sanctions at sea and uphold international law. These highly563capable units are a crucial and adaptable force, ensuring the564Coast Guard cannot only patrol our waters but dominate the565maritime environment where the Nation needs them most.566 Employing well-organized force packages in fiscal year5672025, the Coast Guard achieved the largest annual maritime drug568interdiction results in service history, seizing over 511,000569pounds of narcotics valued at more than $3.8 billion. This570stopped over 193 million potentially lethal doses from reaching571American communities.572 Over the past year, the Coast Guard has hardened and573sustained our border to control and secure and defend that574border and our maritime approaches starting with the Southern575Border where the President declared a national emergency. For576example, along the Rio Grande Valley, Operation River Wall has577already supported the apprehension or deterrence of over 300578individuals illegally trying to cross since it began in October579of 2025, and Operation Border tried--increased interdictions of580aliens along the Southwest Border by 44 percent over the581previous year.582 Our enhanced enforcement presence at our borders and583maritime approaches protects the country against transnational584criminal organizations and illegal aliens attempting to585unlawfully enter the country, upholding our national586sovereignty. To effectively meet these dynamic threats, the587Coast Guard is pursuing a bold modernization of its people,588assets, and capabilities through Force Design 2028.589 Coupled with the historic investments made through the One590Big Beautiful Bill Act and the support of this subcommittee, we591are transforming our service into a more agile, capable, and592responsive fighting force to protect the American people and593advance our national security.594 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and allowing595me to speak on behalf of the Coast Guard's men and women who596have volunteered to serve the Nation. I look forward to your597questions.598 [The prepared statement of Admiral Barata follows:]599 Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David C. Barata600 February 3, 2026601 introduction602 Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and603distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here604today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to deliver peace605through strength to control, secure, and defend America's borders.606 The United States is a maritime nation. With more than 95,000 miles607of shoreline, 361 commercial ports, and 25,000 miles of navigable608waterways, the maritime domain fortifies our national security and609economic prosperity. Over 90 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves610the United States by sea, facilitating more than $5.4 trillion in611maritime commerce annually. The security of this domain is not612optional--it is foundational to our national and economic security. The613Coast Guard is the Nation's leading agency in this domain.614 In the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard serves as615the Nation's finest maritime fighting force. We are one of the six616Armed Services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the617intelligence community. The Coast Guard controls, secures, and defends618the U.S. border and maritime approaches; ensures the safe and secure619flow of commerce vital to economic prosperity; and responds to crises620and contingencies that often come with little or no warning.621 Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, the622Coast Guard is changing and growing to meet the needs of Americans.623This effort is Force Design 2028, a bold blueprint to build a stronger,624more agile, and responsive fighting force. Under the leadership and625vision of Secretary Noem, this effort directly enhances our ability to626enforce the law, secure maritime approaches, protect commerce, and627respond to crises. By expanding our workforce and deploying advanced628assets and technologies, the Coast Guard is better postured to secure629our Nation's maritime borders and sovereign interests against these630persistent threats.631 deployable specialized forces632 Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces are elite teams capable633of rapid worldwide deployment and a wide array of missions. These teams634are trained for high-risk scenarios such as direct action; counter-635narcotics; operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear636environments; and disaster response--providing specialized capabilities637to the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, Department of War,638and other interagency partners.639 Maritime Security Response Teams are the Coast Guard's premier640units for counterterrorism and high-risk law enforcement. Trained in641conducting direct action and advanced interdiction missions, they642specialize in opposed boardings against hostile targets, including in643chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments. They also644possess canine explosives-detection teams and can conduct counter-645unmanned aircraft systems operations.646 Tactical Law Enforcement Teams are the Coast Guard's law647enforcement experts specializing in counter-trafficking operations at648sea. They provide highly-skilled, deployable teams for counter-649narcotics and maritime interdiction from U.S. and allied vessels. Their650mission set also includes alien migration interdiction. These teams can651conduct both compliant and non-compliant vessel boardings.652 Maritime Safety and Security Teams are anti-terrorism and force653protection units responsible for safeguarding strategic shipping, high-654interest vessels, and critical port infrastructure. Their capabilities655are focused on waterborne security, non-compliant vessel pursuits, and656the use of canine teams for explosive detection. As a rapid response657force, these teams can be deployed globally to meet evolving maritime658security threats.659 Port Security Units are expeditionary security units, primarily660comprised of reservists, that provide sustained force protection for661seaports of disembarkation and critical infrastructure. They can deploy662within 96 hours of a crisis and establish full operations within 24663hours of arrival, offering both waterside and shoreside security.664 The National Strike Force is a highly specialized rapid response665unit equipped to handle major oil discharges, hazardous material666releases, and Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents. The National667Strike Force provides technical expertise, specialized equipment, and668incident management support for complex environmental and security669crises. The force is a critical national asset, capable of worldwide670deployment to mitigate threats, manage containment and clean-up671efforts, and provide crucial technical support to Federal on-scene672coordinators.673 Regional Dive Lockers provide full-time diving capabilities for a674variety of missions, including the security of ports and waterways,675maintaining aids to navigation, and conducting ship husbandry and676repair, often in extreme environments like remote polar regions.677 In a complex and evolving maritime environment, Coast Guard678Deployable Specialized Forces are critical to America's national and679economic security. Most recently, these forces, supported by the680Department of War, are combatting the threat of ``dark fleet tankers,''681used to illegally transport sanctioned oil. In these high-stakes, at-682sea operations, these forces are prepared to execute complex opposed683boardings.684 In the Western Hemisphere, these teams are also leaders in drug685interdiction, a mission that accounts for a significant portion of686their operational focus. Teams frequently deploy on U.S. and allied687naval vessels to intercept a variety of drug-smuggling conveyances.688These range from high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to sophisticated, hard-689to-detect, self-propelled semi-submersibles. The interdiction of these690vessels is a core component of the effort to dismantle the powerful691transnational criminal organizations and foreign terrorist692organizations that threaten American communities.693 maritime drug interdiction694 Maritime drug trafficking remains one of the most direct threats to695U.S. homeland security and public safety. As directed by the President,696the Coast Guard is on the front lines securing the global supply chain697against drug trafficking and reducing the availability of illicit drugs698that devastate American communities. Narco-terrorists exploit maritime699routes to move drugs, generate enormous profits, and fuel violence,700instability, and crime. These revenues are increasingly leveraged by701hostile actors and transnational networks to fund human trafficking,702weapons smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other malign activities that703destabilize regions and drive illegal migration. The Coast Guard is704often the only agency with the authority, capability, and presence to705act at sea. The Coast Guard interdicts more illicit drugs than all706other Federal law enforcement agencies combined.707 Since January 2025, the Coast Guard seized over 511,000 pounds of708cocaine from the maritime domain--representing over 189 million709potentially lethal doses. This all-time historic high more than doubles710the amount of cocaine removed in fiscal year 2024 and nearly triples711the removals from fiscal year 2023. These seizures save American712taxpayers over $10 billion in social programs, including over $2.3713billion in health care costs from cocaine interdictions alone.714 Combating fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals remains one715of the administration's top priorities, and the Coast Guard has taken716significant action in this effort. Fentanyl is the leading cause of717U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70718percent of drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican narco-terrorists are719the primary source of the synthetic opioid flow into the United States.720Accordingly, the Coast Guard leverages its broad authorities to seek721out and interdict both fentanyl and its precursor chemicals. On January72231, 2025, Commandant Admiral Lunday directed immediate action to723bolster these operations, focusing on interdicting precursor chemicals724and disrupting the revenue streams that fund fentanyl trafficking.725 illegal migration726 The Coast Guard also secures 220 river miles along the Rio Grande,727from the Gulf of America to West Texas, part of the U.S. Southern728Border, and the maritime approaches to San Diego. These areas continue729to experience a sustained and above-average rate of illegal maritime730migration. This vector presents a persistent threat characterized by731continuous smuggling attempts and is targeted through the Coast Guard's732Operation Border Trident, on the southwest maritime border, and733Operation River Wall, along the Rio Grande in Texas, both of which seek734to achieve 100 percent control of the southern maritime border.735Trafficking organizations in this region primarily utilize high-speed736boats, jet skis and other personal watercraft, and additional makeshift737watercraft. Although a variety of nationalities are encountered, the738overwhelming majority of those interdicted are Mexican nationals.739 The maritime approaches to the southeastern United States are also740a leading vector for illegal maritime migration. Most of the migrants741encountered originate in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or the Dominican742Republic, utilizing established transit corridors. Cuban and Haitian743migrants typically journey toward Florida, either directly or through744the Bahamas. Meanwhile, Dominican and some Haitian groups often cross745the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. They746attempt these journeys on a wide array of vessels, from coastal747freighters and high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to dangerously crude,748homemade rafts.749 The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy have a750parallel focus to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen751stability and security on land and sea in the Western Hemisphere. Under752the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard753maintains a robust and forward-leaning posture to combat illegal754immigration. In 2025 we interdicted, deterred, or transported 11,713755aliens illegally attempting entry. This was 120 percent more than in7562024. Our persistent presence both serves to deter departures from757countries of origin and enables a rapid response to suspicious vessels,758in close coordination with our international, Federal, State, and local759partners. To enhance this posture, we utilize advanced unmanned760systems, such as long-range unmanned aerial systems, surface drones,761and small aerial drones launched from our over-the-horizon boats, to762provide persistent surveillance and support shore patrols.763 conclusion764 Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and dark fleet765tankers are distinct challenges, but they share a common feature: each766exploits the maritime domain to evade law enforcement and767accountability. Through its unique and enduring law enforcement768authorities, the Coast Guard directly confronts these threats--securing769and defending the Nation's borders and maritime approaches every day.770 These threats are evolving, and the demands placed on the Coast771Guard continue to increase. The Coast Guard's layered security model--772leveraging forward presence, elite capabilities, an exceptional773workforce, and unmatched legal authorities--allows us to address risks774far from U.S. shores before they reach our homeland.775 The changes under way through Force Design 2028 are already776accelerating enduring change and showing measurable results. By777empowering our workforce and enhancing the ways we conduct our patrols778and inspections, recent operations resulted in the seizure of more than779511,000 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $3.8 billion. These780outcomes demonstrate both the effectiveness of our authorities and the781return on investment they provide.782 Since 1790, in peace and in war, a ready Coast Guard has been an783indispensable element of national security. With continued784Congressional support, the Coast Guard will remain prepared to meet785today's challenges and build a more resilient and capable Service for786decades to come.787 I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to788your questions. Semper Paratus.789790 Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Admiral Barata.791 I now recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her792opening statement.793794STATEMENT OF HEATHER MAC LEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND795 JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE796797 Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Carter, and798Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to799be here today to discuss GAO's work, examining Coast Guard800maritime security operations.801 These operations may be carried out by specialized forces802units which have the training and capabilities needed to handle803drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats. My testimony804today focuses on persistent challenges Coast Guard faces in805carrying out missions, including those involving specialized806forces units and actions that GAO's work has identified to help807Coast Guard address them.808 We have made dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard809to help address key challenges, like staffing shortfalls,810declining availability of vessels and aircraft, and acquisition811issues.812 Regarding Coast Guard staffing shortfalls, in recent years813the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission workload814has outpaced its work force levels. Staffing gaps, particularly815in specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can816hinder drug interdiction efforts, counterterrorism operations,817and missions.818 While the service recruited more enlisted service members819than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in years820prior. In April 2025, we reported that, even with the increase821in recruiting, the service remained short of its enlisted work822force target. As a result, the Coast Guard was operating below823the work force level it deemed necessary.824 We made three recommendations to help address these825challenges, including that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan826to support its retention initiatives. Specific to specialized827forces, in 2019 we reported that the Coast Guard has taken828steps to create a maritime law enforcement career path which829helped them retain qualified personnel.830 We also reported that the Coast Guard might not have the831right mix and number of specialized forces to meet mission832demands. For example, we reported that officials from some833specialized forces units were underused, while others were so834busy that they had to turn down operations.835 In November 2024, the Coast Guard acknowledged that836significant overlap in mission and mission capabilities related837to specialized forces exist. Continued analysis remains838important, as the Coast Guard needs to establish a Deployable839Specialized Forces command as part of Force Design 2028.840 Another challenge I would like to highlight is vessel and841aircraft availability, assets that specialized forces are often842deployed from. The condition of Coast Guard assets has been in843a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown a concerning844trend that the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing845at the same time that their availability is decreasing.846 For example, in June we reported that operation847availability of cutters that the Coast Guard relies on for its848maritime security operations declined. We also reported that849increasing maintenance challenges have led to cutters missing850patrol obligations. These readiness challenges are not limited851to cutters.852 In a separate report, we found that Coast Guard aircraft853were not available for missions as often as the service deemed854necessary. We made 10 recommendations in these reports to855address cutter and aircraft challenges.856 Finally, our work has noted that acquisition program delays857have been a long-standing challenge for the service and858continue to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets.859 For example, the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the offshore860patrol cutter and the polar security cutter, are intended to861support maritime security operations. But we found that862combined these two programs are years behind schedule and863billions of dollars over their initiative cost estimates. We864have made dozens of recommendations on how Coast Guard can865better manage acquisition programs.866 In conclusion, the Coast Guard specialized forces units867include a range of capabilities that are vital to the service's868ability to fulfill its missions. However, the Coast Guard faces869significant challenges that can hinder its maritime security870operations.871 Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help to872ensure the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently using873available resources to carry out these operations and support874national interests.875 This completes my prepared statement, and I would be876pleased to answer any questions you may have.877 [The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]878 Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod879 Tuesday, February 3, 2026880coast guard.--actions needed to address challenges that hinder maritime881 security operations882 gao-26-108901883 Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the884Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work885examining Coast Guard maritime security operations and challenges. The886U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic criminal887organizations as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement,888and national security. The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime889military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is890the Nation's lead Federal maritime law enforcement agency. To help891carry out certain maritime security missions, the Coast Guard maintains892Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) units with the893capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other894threats to the U.S. maritime environment.\1\ These units deploy from895their home locations, such as major U.S. port areas, to conduct896operations in U.S. coastal waters and internationally. Certain units897can carry out operations from vessels, such as Coast Guard cutters and898Navy ships, or air assets, such as Coast Guard helicopters.899---------------------------------------------------------------------------900 \1\ See 6 U.S.C. 468(a) (Coast Guard missions).901---------------------------------------------------------------------------902 According to the Coast Guard, its presence--vessels, aircraft, and903Specialized Forces--serves as an enforcement mechanism and deterrent to904illicit activity that contributes to instability throughout the Western905Hemisphere. Figure 1 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting a drug906interdiction operation that included a Specialized Forces member907boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which resulted in seizing90817,000 pounds of cocaine.909910[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]911912 My statement today discusses challenges the Coast Guard faces913related to its maritime security operations and actions that could help914address those challenges. This statement is based primarily on seven915GAO reports published from November 2019 to January 2026.916 For the reports we cite in this statement, among other917methodologies, we analyzed Coast Guard policies, documentation, and918data, and interviewed officials from agency headquarters and selected919field units. More detailed information on our scope and methodology,920including analyzing data and determining a sufficient level of921reliability for our reporting, can be found in the reports we cite in922this statement. For this statement, we also reviewed information on the923status of agency implementation of selected recommendations through924January 2026. (See appendix I for related open recommendations as of925January 2026.)926 We conducted the work on which this statement is based in927accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those928standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain929sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our930findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that931the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and932conclusions based on our audit objectives.933 several challenges hinder coast guard efforts to conduct its maritime934 security operations, which the service has yet to fully address935 Our prior work has identified several longstanding challenges that936have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission demands,937including those conducted by Specialized Forces. These include: (1)938staffing shortfalls and workforce planning, (2) availability of vessels939and aircraft, and (3) acquisition of new assets.\2\ The Coast Guard940received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025941for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize942operations and capabilities and faces the difficult decision of943determining how best to invest these resources.\3\ We have made944recommendations to help the Coast Guard address these challenges and945effectively and efficiently use its resources.946---------------------------------------------------------------------------947 \2\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent948Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug949Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024). GAO,950Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before951Buying More Ships, GAO-26-107583 (Washington, DC: Nov. 25, 2025).952 \3\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127 (2025).953These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year 2029.954---------------------------------------------------------------------------955Staffing Shortfalls and Workforce Planning956 Our prior work has shown that staffing shortfalls and poor957workforce planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its958mission needs, including for maritime security missions that959Specialized Forces support. While the service recruited more enlisted960service members than it lost in fiscal year 2024, it experienced net961enlisted staffing losses from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year9622023. In April 2025, we reported that even with the increase in963recruiting, the service remained approximately 2,600 service members,964or 8.5 percent of its total enlisted workforce, short of its enlisted965workforce target at the end of fiscal year 2024.\4\ As a result, the966Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary967to meet its operational demands. We made 3 recommendations, including968that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its retention969initiatives. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendations, and we970continue to monitor their implementation.971---------------------------------------------------------------------------972 \4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address973Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.97423, 2025).975---------------------------------------------------------------------------976 Specific to Specialized Forces, in November 2019 we reported that977the Coast Guard had taken steps to improve retention of these978personnel.\5\ Prior to a 2007 reorganization, active-duty Coast Guard979personnel working in Specialized Forces units could not remain in those980units and be competitive for promotions, according to Coast Guard981officials we interviewed for that review. Officials told us that this982was because the Coast Guard has certain requirements for career983progression, including personnel working in various assignments within984a given career path. After the reorganization, the Coast Guard created985a maritime law enforcement career path within Specialized Forces in986response to challenges the service faced in retaining law enforcement987personnel. Coast Guard officials we spoke with told us that the career988path has helped them retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel.989According to the Coast Guard's Force Design 2028 plan, retention of990Specialized Forces remains a priority.\6\991---------------------------------------------------------------------------992 \5\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'993Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap994or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2019).995 \6\ U.S. Coast Guard, Force Design 2028 Execution Plan Summary996(July 2025). Force Design 2028 is a U.S. Coast Guard strategic997initiative aimed at modernizing the service into a more agile, capable,998and responsive maritime force to meet evolving operational demands by9992028. It focuses on 4 key areas--People, Organization, Technology, and1000Contracting/Acquisition.1001---------------------------------------------------------------------------1002 Further, we have previously reported that the Coast Guard might not1003have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and1004number of operations where Specialized Forces are needed to meet1005mission demands. For example, in November 2019 we reported that1006officials from some Specialized Forces units we interviewed indicated1007that they experienced periods of underutilization.\7\ An official at1008one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations the1009unit conducted by asking other Coast Guard units to request them for1010specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar1011outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces1012capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units1013need assistance. In contrast, similar units turned down operations1014because of a lack of available personnel. For example, officials from a1015different Specialized Forces unit described instances where they had to1016decline operations because they did not have enough personnel to meet1017the demand.1018---------------------------------------------------------------------------1019 \7\ GAO-20-33.1020---------------------------------------------------------------------------1021 As a result, we made two recommendations. We recommended that the1022Coast Guard conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces'1023workforce needs and that it assess the extent to which unnecessary1024overlap or duplication exist. We reported that without an analysis of1025the Specialized Forces units as a whole, the Coast Guard did not have1026reasonable assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in1027the right units to conduct the required missions. While the Coast Guard1028agreed with the recommendation to conduct a comprehensive analysis of1029its workforce, it did not agree to assess the extent to which1030unnecessary overlap or duplication exists. Nevertheless, the Coast1031Guard contracted a study in 2022 to conduct an analysis of Specialized1032Forces' ports, waterways, and coastal security mission. This addressed1033both of our recommendations by providing the service with better1034information for that mission priority.\8\ However, in November 2024 the1035Coast Guard acknowledged that its study did not address all missions or1036Specialized Forces units, and that significant overlap in mission and1037mission capabilities exist. Such continued analysis remains important,1038particularly as the Coast Guard moves to establish a Deployable1039Specialized Forces Command to optimize Specialized Forces' unique1040capabilities as part of Force Design 2028.1041---------------------------------------------------------------------------1042 \8\ RAND Corporation, Mission Analysis of U.S. Coast Guard1043Deployable Specialized Forces (Dec. 2022).1044---------------------------------------------------------------------------1045 Regarding Specialized Forces' deployment with Coast Guard cutters1046and helicopters, we have also identified gaps in cutter and aircraft1047workforce planning. Figure 2 shows Specialized Forces conducting1048vertical deployment training from a Coast Guard helicopter.10491050[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10511052 In June 2025, we reported that cutters often deploy without a full1053crew due to personnel shortages.\9\ We recommended that the Coast Guard1054collect and assess data on staff availability for the cutter workforce.1055DHS did not agree with this recommendation, but we maintain that it1056remains valid and could help ensure the Coast Guard is fully1057considering the workload faced by cutter crews and support personnel1058when making decisions on personnel assignments. We also previously1059reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce1060planning for its aviation workforce. As a result, we recommended that1061the Coast Guard assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it1062requires to meet its mission needs. DHS concurred with this1063recommendation and stated that the Coast Guard would conduct workforce1064analyses for its air stations by June 2026.\10\ Until such analysis is1065completed, the Coast Guard will not fully understand the resources it1066requires for its aviation units.1067---------------------------------------------------------------------------1068 \9\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter and1069Maintenance Workforce Challenges, GAO-25-107222 (Washington, DC: Jun.107025, 2025). Specifically, our analysis showed that 1,104 cutter crew and1071support positions were vacant (about 13 percent) in fiscal year 2024.1072This is an increase from fiscal year 2017, in which 401 cutter crew and1073support positions were vacant (about 5 percent).1074 \10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce1075Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024). The1076Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation. We also made four other1077recommendations in the report and the Coast Guard concurred with all1078four. As of August 2025, four of the five recommendations remain open.1079We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these1080recommendations.1081---------------------------------------------------------------------------1082Vessel and Aircraft Availability1083 The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability1084challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades, which can1085limit the ability of Specialized Forces to conduct their missions.\11\1086Overall, the total number of operational hours generally decreased, and1087the total estimated operating expenses generally increased from fiscal1088year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 3.1089---------------------------------------------------------------------------1090 \11\ Vessel and aircraft availability challenges hinder the Coast1091Guard's ability to meet mission demands. For example, in January 2026,1092we reported that during fiscal years 2015 through 2024, the Coast Guard1093generally did not meet its drug or migrant interdiction goals. We also1094found that the service did not fully share information about lessons1095learned from maritime migrant interdiction with Federal partners. We1096made two recommendations to DHS to address these issues and will1097monitor Coast Guard actions to fully address them. See, GAO, Coast1098Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions, GAO-26-107440.1099(Washington, DC: Jan. 13, 2026).11001101[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]11021103 In June 2025, we reported that the operational availability of the1104Coast Guard's Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Coast Guard relies on1105for its law enforcement missions, declined from fiscal year 20201106through fiscal year 2024.\12\ We also reported that the Coast Guard was1107experiencing increasing cutter maintenance challenges, and that those1108increasing challenges, such as equipment failure and resulting1109unplanned maintenance, have led to cutters missing patrol obligations.1110For example, Coast Guard operational reporting documents indicated that1111unplanned maintenance, among other things, had significantly reduced1112the capacity of Medium Endurance Cutters to conduct missions. Further,1113due to delays in receiving critical parts needed for repairs, the Coast1114Guard cannibalized cutters by moving working parts between cutters.1115According to Coast Guard data, there were 194 cannibalizations1116completed across the cutter fleet from February 2022 to September 2024;1117145 of these involved National Security Cutters--which mostly support1118the drug interdiction mission. As a result, in June 2025 we made five1119recommendations to address cutter maintenance and workforce challenges.1120For example, we recommended that the Coast Guard systematically collect1121and assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may1122have caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies1123as appropriate. DHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps1124the Coast Guard plans to take to improve its processes to document,1125develop, and validate the efficacy of a new cutter maintenance metric,1126which it plans to use to develop the recommended assessment. DHS1127estimates completing these efforts by June 2027. We will continue to1128monitor the status of this and the other recommendations.1129---------------------------------------------------------------------------1130 \12\ GAO-25-107222.1131---------------------------------------------------------------------------1132 The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its1133cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft1134generally did not meet its 71 percent availability target during fiscal1135year 2018 through fiscal year 2022.\13\ Coast Guard officials1136attributed the aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability1137targets to maintenance and repair challenges. As a result, we made five1138recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and1139number of helicopters, and aviation workforce size, needed to meet its1140mission demands. In response, in August 2025, the Coast Guard told us1141an analysis of alternatives and a fleet mix analysis are being ordered.1142It anticipates completing these steps by December 2027. We will1143continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these1144recommendations, as well as the other recommendation that remains1145unaddressed.\14\ See appendix 1 for more information on open GAO1146recommendations to DHS pertaining to Coast Guard personnel and assets,1147as of January 2026.1148---------------------------------------------------------------------------1149 \13\ GAO-24-106374. We further reported that the Coast Guard was1150embarking on a significant operational change from a largely short-1151range helicopter fleet to a medium-range fleet. However, we reported1152that its related planning efforts raised serious questions, including1153how the medium-range helicopters will interact with cutters for its1154drug interdiction operations.1155 \14\ The Coast Guard has addressed one of the five recommendations.1156In April 2024, we found that the Coast Guard's air stations do not have1157complete data for the Coast Guard to assess service-wide readiness. We1158recommended that the Coast Guard should establish procedures to1159uniformly collect and maintain air station readiness data. The Coast1160Guard concurred with this recommendation and in April 2025 updated its1161operational reporting manual to, among other things, help standardize1162the collection of air station readiness data. The manual requires air1163stations to report periods when they cannot meet readiness requirements1164and provides examples on how to do so. By issuing updated guidance1165requiring air stations to uniformly collect and maintain aircraft1166readiness data, the Coast Guard can help ensure it has complete and1167accurate information on Coast Guard-wide air station readiness.1168---------------------------------------------------------------------------1169Acquisition Programs1170 We have previously reported that the Coast Guard's declining asset1171availability is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing1172its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels1173and aircraft. For example, in September 2024 we reported on the1174declining availability of the Coast Guard aircraft fleet and found that1175the Coast Guard's cutter program faces persistent challenges including1176capability gaps from schedule delays.\15\ Furthermore, officials told1177us that they would not be able to increase mission activity without1178acquiring more assets, but acquisition delays have been a long-standing1179challenge for the service. Furthermore, according to officials, the1180acquisition process is lengthy, as it can take several years from1181initial request to final delivery of an asset.\16\1182---------------------------------------------------------------------------1183 \15\ GAO-24-107785.1184 \16\ GAO-26-107440.1185---------------------------------------------------------------------------1186 One of the Coast Guard's highest-priority programs--the Offshore1187Patrol Cutter--has experienced delays that will exacerbate maritime1188capability gaps.\17\ According to the Coast Guard, it urgently needs1189Offshore Patrol Cutters to replace aging cutters that conduct law1190enforcement and search-and-rescue operations.\18\ However, in November11912025, we reported that the Coast Guard's plan to acquire 25 Offshore1192Patrol Cutters was delayed by more than 5 years.\19\ Notwithstanding1193delays, ship design remains incomplete, and continued delays and cost1194overruns are likely.\20\1195---------------------------------------------------------------------------1196 \17\ In June 2023, we found that the Coast Guard's management of1197its Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisitions continued to face challenges we1198had previously identified. We made five recommendations to the Coast1199Guard, including that it develop a technology maturation plan and1200update its acquisition policy to require programs to complete routing1201of distributive systems as part of functional design prior to lead ship1202construction. Two of the recommendations have not yet been fully1203addressed. See, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter1204Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-1058051205(Washington, DC: Jun. 20, 2023).1206 \18\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,1207testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland1208Security, 118th Cong., 2d sess., July 24, 2024.1209 \19\ GAO-26-107583. We also reported that the program is at risk of1210not meeting its cost goals, in part, because the program used outdated1211cost information to establish them.1212 \20\ The Coast Guard plans to acquire the 25 Offshore Patrol1213Cutters in four phases. In July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated two of1214four ships from the first phase contract for default.1215---------------------------------------------------------------------------1216 As a result, we made four recommendations in November 2025,1217including that the program stabilizes design before starting1218construction of additional ships. Incorporating the knowledge gained1219from testing--as well as other shipbuilding leading practices--into the1220procurement process could help the Coast Guard make better investment1221decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future ship1222deliveries. While the agency agreed with two of the four1223recommendations, we maintain that all four recommendations are1224warranted and will continue to monitor their implementation.1225 In summary, the Coast Guard's Specialized Forces units include a1226range of specialized capabilities that are vital to the service's1227ability to fulfill its missions, including those pertaining to maritime1228security operations. The Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion in1229supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and1230in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities and1231faces the difficult decision of determining how best to invest these1232resources.\21\ We have identified long-standing challenges with the1233Coast Guard's management of its programs and tradeoff decisions among1234its mission priorities and have made recommendations to help address1235these challenges. Addressing our 20 open recommendations pertaining to1236the Coast Guard's workforce and assets would help ensure that the1237service efficiently uses its resources to carry out its maritime1238security operations--including those carried out by Specialized1239Forces--and support national interests.\22\1240---------------------------------------------------------------------------1241 \21\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 1271242(2025). These funds are available for obligation through fiscal year12432029.1244 \22\ We made 26 recommendations in the reports covered by this1245statement. The Coast Guard implemented four of these recommendations,124620 remain open, and two were closed as no longer valid.1247---------------------------------------------------------------------------1248 Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the1249subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased1250to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.1251 Appendix I.--Related Open Recommendations1252Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-26-1253 107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.1254 Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should1255 ensure the Commandant of the Coast Guard implements performance1256 measures for the migrant interdiction mission that effectively1257 measure the service's efforts.1258 Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should1259 ensure the Operation Vigilant Sentry task force implements a1260 process to identify and address lessons learned following real-1261 world events and exercises with all relevant Federal partner1262 agencies, and shares relevant information with those partners.1263Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before1264 Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,1265 2025.1266 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1267 ensure that the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program1268 demonstrates that the stage 2 design is stable prior to1269 authorizing construction of additional stage 2 OPCs by (1)1270 completing basic and functional design, including routing of1271 major distributive systems that affect multiple zones of the1272 ship, in a 3D model with reliable vendor-furnished information1273 and (2) successfully testing an integrated prototype of the1274 davit in a realistic environment, consistent with shipbuilding1275 leading practices.1276 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in1277 collaboration with the Navy, should develop a memorandum of1278 agreement to clarify and document agreement on how the1279 evaluation of deficiencies and on-going surveillance of1280 Austal's EVM system will be coordinated between the Coast Guard1281 and SUPSHIP throughout the duration of the OPC program.1282 Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the1283 DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to1284 revise the OPC acquisition program baseline to include cost1285 goals for each stage.1286 Recommendation.--The DHS Secretary should ensure that the1287 DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to1288 document a plan for acquiring stage 3 OPCs that identifies (1)1289 how results from operational testing of OPC stages 1 and 2 will1290 be incorporated into stage 3 procurement activities, such as1291 developing the request for proposals, and contingency plans if1292 this testing is delayed; and (2) how leading practices for ship1293 design will be incorporated into stage 3.1294Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and Workforce1295 Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.1296 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1297 systematically collect and assess data on instances where1298 previously-deferred maintenance may have caused cutter1299 equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as1300 appropriate.1301 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1302 complete Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Boards for all1303 cutter types at the intervals prescribed by policy.1304 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1305 systematically collect and assess data on which parts and1306 systems across the cutter fleet are or will become obsolete and1307 develop mitigation strategies as appropriate.1308 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1309 systematically collect and assess data on cutter days lost due1310 to unplanned maintenance issues.1311 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1312 regularly collect and analyze data on staff availability for1313 cutter crew and support personnel positions, including which1314 cutter workforce positions are temporarily empty across the1315 cutter fleet, and use this information to inform personnel1316 assignments.1317Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service1318 Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC.: April1319 23, 2025.1320 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1321 ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and1322 Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response1323 rates for its Career Intention Survey.1324 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1325 ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and1326 Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its1327 Career Intention Survey results.1328 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1329 ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program1330 Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how1331 retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and time1332 frames and milestones for implementation, to track progress and1333 gauge program performance.1334Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed.1335 GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.1336 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1337 establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air1338 station readiness data.1339 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1340 assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet1341 its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.1342 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1343 assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to1344 meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.1345 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1346 assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires1347 to meet its mission needs.1348Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to1349 Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC:1350 June 20, 2023.1351 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1352 ensure that OPC program officials develop a technology1353 maturation plan for the davit prior to builder's trials. This1354 plan should identify potential courses of action to address1355 davit technical immaturity, including assessing technology1356 alternatives should the current davit continue to face1357 development challenges, and a date by which the Coast Guard1358 will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a technology1359 alternative.1360 Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should1361 ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype1362 of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 11363 builder's trials.1364 Related GAO Products1365 Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-136626-107440. Washington, DC: January 13, 2026.1367 Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge1368Before Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, DC: November 25,13692025.1370 Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and1371Workforce Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, DC: June 25, 2025.1372 Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service1373Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, DC: April 23, 2025.1374 Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges1375Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling. GAO-24-1376107785. Washington, DC: September 19, 2024.1377 Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments1378Needed. GAO-24-106374. Washington, DC: April 9, 2024.1379 Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to1380Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, DC: June 20,13812023.1382 Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce1383Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in1384Capabilities. GAO-20-33. Washington, DC: November 21, 2019.13851386 Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.1387 Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their13885 minutes of questioning. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes1389of questioning.1390 Ms. MacLeod, your report is quite troubling, and so I would1391like to get to the root causes of this on staffing. Are you1392saying that the Coast Guard--the Coast Guard has a number of1393authorized positions, right? I mean, this is the number of1394people you should have, and are we short on the authorized1395positions, or do we need more authorized positions or both?1396 I mean, what is your estimate of what we need in order to1397get the Coast Guard up to its strength, the strength that is1398needed in order to carry out its mission? More authorized1399positions or we just need to fill the ones that we have?1400 Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, the Coast Guard was1401short of its authorized positions. Since then, in Force Design14022028, the Coast Guard has plans to increase authorized1403positions, which we envision would have--they would have the1404same challenges in recruiting and retention with even more1405positions to fill.1406 Mr. Gimenez. Are they short right now recruiting up to1407their authorized positions?1408 Ms. MacLeod. At the time of our review, yes.1409 Mr. Gimenez. Do you know that is still the case?1410 Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard reported its highest1411recruiting numbers last year, and then it's on track to meet1412its targets.1413 Mr. Gimenez. Which means filling every authorized position?1414 Ms. MacLeod. Correct.1415 Mr. Gimenez. OK. So now if we have the number of people1416that we need, the problem then becomes to the assets that they1417need in order to carry out their mission, which are the ships1418and the aircraft of the Coast Guard, correct?1419 Ms. MacLeod. Yes.1420 Mr. Gimenez. Right. So you're talking about ships and1421aircraft. Is it due to age? Is it due to the ships and the1422construction of them themselves? Is it due to the fact that we1423don't have enough maintenance personnel?1424 What is causing the deficiency in the readiness of these1425assets?1426 Ms. MacLeod. Our work has shown more recently the1427maintenance challenges facing these older cutters and aircraft1428are increasing.1429 Mr. Gimenez. Because we don't have enough people or it's1430just a matter they're old and they're just breaking down more1431often?1432 Ms. MacLeod. The age of the cutters. Some of the parts are1433unavailable, obsolete parts and things like that.1434 Mr. Gimenez. And the--you're saying that the plan to1435replace these assets is way behind schedule and billions of1436dollars over?1437 Ms. MacLeod. Yes.1438 Mr. Gimenez. OK. That calls for another hearing, I guess.1439 All right. So, Admiral--I got a couple of minutes left--1440what percentage of the sanctioned oil vessels that are out1441there, what percentage of them do you think that you actually,1442you know, interdict?1443 Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. A very small1444percentage, frankly. We estimate that there is probably about14456- or 800 sanctioned dark fleet vessels in and about--between1446Iran and Venezuela, China and Russia. We have interdicted about14477, 8 over the last 2 months.1448 Some other countries are starting to chip in. I think over1449in the Mediterranean, we've seen the British and the French do1450some things, but it's a very small percentage. They operate out1451of the rule of law and on a consistent basis.1452 Mr. Gimenez. Six-to-eight hundred of these ghost ships?1453 Admiral Barata. That's what we estimate operating around1454the world.1455 Mr. Gimenez. Wow. OK. What makes it so difficult to spot,1456interdict, et cetera? Just assets or can you spot them or are1457they just completely off the radar?1458 Admiral Barata. It's a combination of things, Chairman.1459They are--they obfuscate their position a lot of times. You1460know, all of our large commercial foreign vessels are required1461to use an automatic identification system. Many of these1462vessels have the means to easily have two or three sets of AIS1463aboard and kind-of project their position somewhere else.1464 They use false documents, they use false ownership. They1465claim the numbers of vessels that have already been destroyed1466and taken apart in other places so that they look like they're1467another vessel. So even when we contract them, though, they are1468very hard to interdict.1469 For instance, some of these vessels that we've seen in1470Venezuela, if they're coming from the Middle East or the Far1471East, they'll go around the south--the southern tip of Africa1472and go right into Venezuela.1473 So without the right assets and the reasoning to board them1474on the high seas, it's very hard to get aboard. I think you've1475seen us do a lot of counter drug interdictions on smaller1476vessels and even in dhows over in the Middle East.1477 You know, some of the vessels we're going on right now are14781,100 feet long, very large crude carriers, very hard to1479interdict at sea without some support from the Department of1480War or other assets.1481 Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you. I yield now.1482 I now recognize Mr. Carter from Louisiana for his 51483minutes.1484 Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1485 Admiral Barata, let's discuss the recent boardings of oil1486tankers. First, I want to note that this committee has1487requested a Classified briefing on these operations, and we1488haven't received one yet. I hope we can work to make that1489happen in the near future.1490 My question concerns the video that administration has1491posted on some of these operations. I understand it may be good1492PR, but I want to make sure that we're not broadcasting1493sensitive tactics or the identities of our special operators to1494our enemies, putting them in harm's way.1495 Is the Coast Guard being given the opportunity to review,1496and, if necessary, redact or block any of these videos before1497they share it with the world?1498 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, good morning. We see a lot1499of this footage before it goes out, not all of it. It depends.1500Some of it is Department of War footage, some of it is1501Department of Homeland Security, but it's all being processed1502through the White House.1503 I think they are taking a close look at protecting the1504identity and the tactics that our teams use.1505 Mr. Carter. I think the best way to do that, obviously, is1506to have you guys involved. I won't put you in the middle of1507that, but, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we, where possible,1508request that the administration has heightened sensitivity of1509the protection of our men and women who are carrying out these1510highly-sensitive operations, just to be sure that in our haste1511to bring public awareness that we don't put our service men and1512women in harm's way.1513 As you know, one of the oil tankers the Coast Guard1514recently targeted, the Bella 1, later renamed the Marinera, was1515able to bypass U.S. forces and escape into the Atlantic. While1516the Coast Guard--while the Coast Guard pursued it, Russian1517military reportedly began repositioning naval assets as a1518submarine to protect the ship from seizure.1519 Thankfully, U.S. forces eventually intercepted the tanker1520without incident, but the episode raises some questions about1521the potential impacts of these boardings. While enforcing1522sanctions is important--and we all can agree we do not want to1523inadvertently escalate into direct hostilities with nations,1524including Russia--what contingency plans are in place when the1525Coast Guard is pursuing these vessels and might encounter1526foreign military vessels?1527 What are the rules of engagement your forces are operating1528under, and would you please, if you run out of time, if we can1529back this up with some written documentations on the actual1530policies that we have for the rules of engagement?1531 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, thanks for the question1532there.1533 I--as far as the risks and the protocols and the1534contingencies in place, we put stringent security measures,1535stringent contingency measures in place. In the case of the1536Bella 1, we worked closely with our Department of War partners1537over at EUCOM. You know, as far as Russian assets--Russian1538military assets, deployers, we ensured that we weren't at risk1539of anything happening there. We were never, you know, concerned1540at the risk level with Russian deployers impacting our ability1541to conduct those law enforcement activities.1542 We can give you a little bit more--you mentioned a1543Classified briefing, sir. We'd be happy to do that, and we've1544prepared that, and we can set up a time; we'd like to come over1545and talk to you a little bit more about it.1546 Mr. Carter. That would be great.1547 So without going into anything that might be confidential1548or might be--that we should do in a more secure setting, the1549contingency plan of what happens in the case of meeting some1550other resurgence that may have bigger power or anticipated--1551maybe even an ambush, we should always, obviously--and I'm1552preaching to the choir, but talking from a Member of Congress'1553standpoint. We want to make sure that we're giving you all the1554tools that you need in our quest to capture these illegal1555vessels, that we never put at risk our men and women in uniform1556who are out doing an incredible job.1557 I can't thank you enough for the incredible work that you1558do, not just when the cameras are rolling, as they've been1559doing most recently, but when no one is watching. Rather, it is1560search and rescue or capturing these tankers, we know that the1561work of the Coast Guard is vast. You guys have been phenomenal1562partners for us in Louisiana, particularly in the aftermath of1563these horrific storms that we continue to have facing our1564communities.1565 You're sitting before Congress. Tell us, what can we do--1566and my time is already up. But if you could just finish, tell1567us what we can do to arm you better. If you had a magic wand1568that you could wave today, recognizing that this committee,1569particularly this one in a bipartisan vein, wants to give you1570the tools that you need to carry out your functions safely.1571 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, I think the No. 1 thing1572that you can give us is resources. I think under the1573Reconciliation Act, we have tried to get after some of the1574things that Ms. MacLeod highlighted, assets.1575 What we need on an annual basis is the O-E money, the1576operating funds to hire more personnel to operate these ships1577to do our Deployable Specialized Forces missions and also1578sustain those assets as we move forward. We really appreciate1579your support.1580 Mr. Carter. Thank you, Rear Admiral.1581 Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.1582 I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.1583 Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1584 I want to thank the witnesses for showing up to this1585subcommittee on front-line defenders, how the Coast Guard's1586Deployable Special Forces combat narcoterrorists and other1587maritime threats on high seas.1588 Admiral, when we talk about Deployable Specialized Forces,1589are we primarily talking about VBSS?1590 Admiral Barata. We're talking about a group of teams, which1591includes our Maritime Security Response Team, our--both forces1592team that deploy domestically and internationally, our Port1593Security Units that do expeditionary. There's a number of units1594that fall under that category for us.1595 Mr. Crane. OK. Thank you, Admiral. I have a little bit of1596experience with VBSS myself. I was on a VBSS team on the USS1597Gettysburg a couple decades ago. My last job in the Navy was in1598the SEAL teams. My job was to train and coach SEALs on the West1599Coast on how to do VBSS. So a little bit of experience with1600what you guys are doing, and I appreciate--I know that's a very1601complicated mission set, and I appreciate all the hard work1602that you guys do.1603 Admiral, I want to ask you if you believe that the1604President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, under1605Article II of the Constitution has broad Executive powers for1606maritime security? Do you recognize that, sir?1607 Admiral Barata. Yes. Yes, I recognize that.1608 Mr. Crane. Do you recognize that the President made direct1609maritime interdictions when enforcing sanctions or national1610security measures, Admiral?1611 Admiral Barata. Yes, I do. We follow that.1612 Mr. Crane. OK. So one of the things that's concerned me as1613a former service member myself is a video that was made by1614Senator Mark Kelly and several other Senators who just a couple1615months ago, they made a video to tell service members that they1616don't need to follow unlawful orders.1617 Admiral, are you familiar with this video?1618 Admiral Barata. I have not seen the video itself. I was1619following the news story, obviously, and the escalation of the1620dissension.1621 Mr. Crane. It made national news, did it not, Admiral?1622 Admiral Barata. It did, indeed.1623 Mr. Crane. Did you or any of the other high-ranking Coast1624Guard officers that you work with fear that a video like that1625might undermine your chain of command?1626 Admiral Barata. From my standpoint, I have found that our1627service members will follow lawful orders if they--you know, as1628given.1629 Mr. Crane. You know, I find it interesting, Admiral, that I1630didn't see any videos made like that from Members of Congress1631during the Biden administration.1632 I want to submit an article for the record. This is from1633CNN. ``Biden finalizes new rules for U.S. drone strikes.''1634President Joe Biden assigned a long-awaited Classified policy1635tightening the rules for the CIA and Pentagon to carry out1636deadly drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of1637traditional war zones, U.S. officials said on Friday. This was1638October 7, 2022.1639 Did you notice that no Members of Congress, including1640Senator Kelly, made any videos during this time, Admiral?1641 Admiral Barata. I was--I'm not familiar with that article.1642 Mr. Crane. But you didn't see any videos, did you? I1643didn't.1644 Admiral Barata. Not that I recall, no.1645 Mr. Crane. As service members, we tend to follow these1646types of things, right?1647 Admiral Barata. Yes.1648 Mr. Crane. I found that very interesting, that they weren't1649making videos during that time frame about whether or not1650service members follow lawful orders or not.1651 I think we all know that, right, Admiral? Don't we get that1652training in basic training, that we are not supposed to follow1653unlawful orders?1654 Admiral Barata. Absolutely. At all the session sources,1655that is what we train our personnel.1656 Mr. Crane. So did you find that video a little bit odd,1657knowing that we all know that?1658 Admiral Barata. I find that it's--you know, for me, as I1659reflect on it, I think it's unnecessary. I think our personnel1660will know to follow lawful orders and to question unlawful1661orders.1662 Mr. Crane. Yes. That's what I thought, too.1663 Admiral, you guys--Congress delivered for you guys in a1664pretty big way during the reconciliation package. Is that1665correct?1666 Admiral Barata. That is absolutely correct.1667 Mr. Crane. We gave you about $25 billion. Is that correct?1668 Admiral Barata. Yes. Generational change for the Coast1669Guard, Congressman.1670 Mr. Crane. You guys had about $7 billion in maintenance1671backlog for infrastructure. Is that correct?1672 Admiral Barata. Yes, that's correct.1673 Mr. Crane. How do you see the Coast Guard deploying that1674money to make sure that the Coast Guard is ready to carry out1675the Nation's national security and homeland security needs in1676the next couple years?1677 Admiral Barata. We--under Force Design 2028, Congressman,1678we have reorganized to ensure that the Coast Guard can obligate1679all of those funds quickly. We're not waiting for the 5 years1680that they are available to us. We want to spend those right1681away on maintenance, on shore infrastructure to get after the1682problems that we have.1683 Mr. Crane. Thank you. My last question for you, Admiral, is1684do you feel in the last couple months with the boat strikes and1685everything else going on, do you feel like you have given1686orders to your men to carry out any of these--any of these1687strikes, any of these interdictions that have been deemed1688unlawful?1689 Admiral Barata. The Department of War has had to lead for1690these kinetic strikes. The Coast Guard has not been involved1691with them. So I can answer that we have not. I have not felt1692that way at all.1693 Mr. Crane. Thank you, Admiral.1694 I yield back.1695 Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Are you1696submitting that report for the record?1697 Mr. Crane. Yes.1698 Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.1699 [The information follows:]1700 Biden Finalizes New Rules for US Drone Strikes1701Oct 7, 20221702By Katie Bo Lillis1703 President Joe Biden has signed a long-awaited classified policy1704tightening the rules for the CIA and the Pentagon to carry out deadly1705drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of traditional war1706zones, US officials said on Friday.1707 With only Iraq and Syria still considered by the US to be so-called1708areas of active hostilities--or conventional war zones--the new policy1709is geared toward countries like Somalia, Yemen and now, Afghanistan,1710where the US continues to carry out counterterrorism strikes from afar.1711 In practice, the new policy signals that the US is limiting its1712reliance on drone strikes, once a ubiquitous counterterrorism tool that1713has drawn increased criticism in recent years in the wake of a series1714of high-profile revelations about civilian casualties.1715 The new policy requires the president's approval before a lethal1716drone strike or commando raid can be launched on a particular1717counterterrorism target, according to a senior administration1718official--and that individual must be named, although the policy does1719allow the president to waive that and other requirements at his1720discretion. The president must also approve which groups in which1721countries are considered to have potential targets as members.1722 The New York Times first reported on the new rules.1723 It also institutionalizes a series of standards for taking action1724against a target, including that counterterrorism operators must1725establish with ``near certainty'' that there will be no civilian1726casualties in the strike, and that the target poses a continuing,1727imminent threat to the United States.1728 The policy also requires operators to obtain permission from the1729State Department's chief of mission in the country in question, the1730senior administration official said.1731 White House Homeland Security adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall, who1732spearheaded the nearly 2-year review which led to the new policy, said1733in a statement that the guidance ``directs [the Biden] Administration1734to be discerning and agile in protecting Americans against evolving1735global terrorist challenges'' and ``requires that U.S. counterterrorism1736operations meet the highest standards of precision and rigor, including1737for identifying appropriate targets and minimizing civilian1738casualties.''1739 In Syria and Iraq, where the US maintains a military presence,1740commanders in the field will continue to have more discretion on1741operational decisions.1742 Biden had quietly put in place many of the limitations that the new1743policy now formalizes when he took office. The policy now officially1744reverses a loosening of Obama-era rules under then-President Donald1745Trump, which had pushed authority for approving lethal strikes down the1746chain of command.1747 ``I think this is overwhelmingly a return to a rigorous process, to1748an intel-heavy consideration of targets and [an] intense role for the1749president himself in approving the use of this particular tool,'' the1750senior administration official told CNN.1751 Some counterterrorism operators and analysts have likely chafed at1752the tightened restrictions, sources familiar with the deliberations1753over the new rules say. But the broader shift in US priorities away1754from counterterrorism and toward competition with China and Russia--and1755the increased political scrutiny on civilian casualties--to a certain1756degree makes the changes inevitable, these people said.1757 The new policy follows a separate Pentagon initiative announced in1758August designed to help reduce the number of civilians killed and1759injured by US military operations, particular drone strikes.1760 The US military has been criticized for years for killing civilians1761in drone strikes but came under increased scrutiny after the military1762conducted a botched strike during the chaotic withdrawal from1763Afghanistan last August that killed 10 civilians, seven of them1764children.1765 The department also faced criticism over a 2019 airstrike in Syria1766that killed multiple civilians. The military acknowledged the deaths in1767that strike in November 2021, after The New York Times reported them.1768The department ultimately held no one accountable for the 2019 strike.1769 The Pentagon action plan is tasked with building a framework that1770will put people who are trained to consider civilian harm issues1771throughout the military, both in combatant commands and at more senior1772levels of the Defense Department.1773 US military drone strikes have dramatically decreased in recent1774years in many of the countries that the new policy impacts. According1775to data maintained by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,1776there have been no US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen since 20181777and 2019, respectively. In Somalia, US drone strikes in Somalia have1778dropped precipitously since Biden took office.1779 But although the military is required by Congress to disclose data1780about its counterterrorism strikes, including civilian casualties, the1781CIA is not--making it much more difficult to judge how its operations1782have shifted over time.1783 Some former intelligence officials take it a step further, claiming1784that CIA drone strikes kill far fewer civilians that the military's--1785but because the agency's figures aren't public, and outside groups that1786track drone strike casualties say the US military routinely undercounts1787its collateral deaths, an accurate comparison is difficult to draw.17881789 Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South1790Carolina, Mrs. Biggs, for her 5 minutes.1791 Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much. Thank you to our witnesses1792for being here today.1793 I'll direct my first question to Admiral Barata. So Force1794Design--and I may overlap a little bit with Congressman Crane,1795but hopefully it will kind-of go in a different direction.1796 So the Force Design 2028 outlines a plan to modernize the1797Coast Guard and to expand deployable capabilities. So how does1798Force Design 2028 aim to expand the recruitment of DSF1799personnel and set up training centers to equip the future of1800the DSF work force? For instance, some--does the Special1801Mission Training Center have the capacity to support that1802growth?1803 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning. So under Force1804Design 2028, we do intend to expand our work force by 15,0001805personnel. That will include personnel to man the ships that1806you've helped us acquire, the aircraft, but it will also be1807operators for our unmanned systems and also our Deployable1808Specialized Forces.1809 So we intend to grow, and we envision a very agile,1810adaptable work force that includes a lot of Deployable1811Specialized Forces. The Special Missions Training Center is a1812real valuable part of that. Our MLEA Academy in Charleston is1813also a big part of that for our baseline law enforcement, and1814then the FMTC is more of our advanced tactics.1815 You know, we'll--we plan to make some investments there. We1816need some assistance with the infrastructure there, the number1817of personnel who are training, the type of training that we do,1818some of these vertical insertion tactics that we use for VBSS.1819 So those type of things are the ones that we need,1820Congresswoman.1821 Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. My second question, what are the1822details on the Coast Guard's standup of a DSF command, and why1823is it necessary and what value does it add?1824 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, I appreciate that question.1825 For us--and in response to Ms. MacLeod's work at GAO and1826her colleagues, we have taken a look at DSF, and we think we1827need to unify the command structure for all of our forces1828there. We have seen functional commands work over in Department1829of War, like SOCOM and JSOC and some of these other functional1830commands. We have seen it work for us as well for our Coast1831Guard Cyber Command.1832 So we think that unifying these elements will help us man,1833train, equip, deploy our specialized forces in a better way,1834equip them in a better way, you know, whether that's, you know,1835travel money, whether that's funding for weapons, specialized1836tactics, all of those things.1837 We think that putting that under one header will help us be1838a lot more efficient.1839 Mrs. Biggs. Great. I'll go a little bit further. What is1840the anticipated size of the command, and where might it be1841located?1842 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, we're still early in that.1843We are hoping by October to have a location.1844 We do have a team put together that's making some1845proposals, and we're going to base some of the factors on, you1846know, can we deploy out of there, can we command out of there,1847can we support the operational commander, but we have not1848narrowed that down.1849 The exact size still is to be determined. We don't plan to1850move any of our current units, any of our Deployable1851Specialized Forces, the units themselves. What we do expect is1852a command element that can focus on the training, that can1853focus on the funding and the equipping, and how we deploy them.1854 Mrs. Biggs. Well, I'll just end since my time is about to1855expire. But I thank you for your service and for what you do. I1856have a huge respect for you and am very grateful. So thank you.1857 Admiral Barata. Thank you, Congresswoman.1858 Mrs. Biggs. I'll yield back.1859 Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields back.1860 I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps.1861 Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral1862Barata and Director MacLeod, for being here today.1863 The United States has the best Armed Forces in the world,1864and as we've heard already, the Coast Guard's Deployable1865Specialized Forces are one of the most agile. Seeing their work1866in the public eye recently has been gratifying, and I want to1867thank you, Admiral Barata, for the part the Coast Guard has1868played in making our country and the waters around us safer.1869 The DSF is often the tip of the spear in actions that can1870quickly become interagency operations. When a DSF unit boards a1871vessel, for example, the service members may need to quickly1872loop in interagency partners as they find illegal cargo.1873 Admiral, can you walk us through the maritime operational1874threat response process used to manage the moving pieces of1875interagency coordination between the Coast Guard, Department of1876Justice, State, and the Department of War and others?1877 Admiral Barata. Congressman, good morning. Yes. So the--our1878process there for counter drug for these dark shadow fleets are1879very similar.1880 Once we get aboard, the first thing we do is we want to1881establish the nationality of the vessel, and we then have to1882call back to the motor process. The motor process, what that1883involves is the entirety of the interagency, Department of1884State, Department of Justice, other elements, maybe even in the1885case of the tankers, Department of Energy, up to the White1886House. So that we ensure that we are following international1887law and that we are able to exercise U.S. law and authorities1888aboard the vessel.1889 So, for instance, when we board a drug vessel, we'll call1890back to the motor process, and we'll either engage one of our1891bilateral agreements that we have or we will go back to the1892Department of State to call that individual country and assess1893whether or not they agree, concur with the vessel's claim, or1894they're allowing us to operate on a vessel that's under their--1895subject to their authority.1896 So on the tankers we're doing something similar. Once we do1897that, we know we're in a good position to follow the law.1898 Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. Are there gaps that exist1899between the Coast Guard and these interagency partners when1900conducting operations, and is there anything we can do in1901Congress to help close any of those gaps?1902 Admiral Barata. We've found that it's been very successful1903in practice. As I've said, we had our largest counter drug year1904last year in fiscal year 2025, 511,000 pounds over 3 times some1905of our previous years. Our tanker operations, I will tell you1906the motor process has been vital for us--for our success here.1907 But there's no gaps that I can see right now, Congressman.1908 Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thanks. Thanks, Admiral. Pivoting1909here, the Trump administration has prioritized Western1910Hemisphere security and law enforcement, such as enforcing1911sanctioned Venezuelan oil, and the Coast Guard has been a1912crucial part of the overall approach. In the past year, it has1913seized huge amounts of illicit substances and disrupted1914criminal networks.1915 Admiral, can you talk about how criminal organizations are1916adapting to increased law enforcement operations in the1917Caribbean and East Pacific?1918 Admiral Barata. Congressman, I can give you a couple1919examples. We've talked about the dark fleet tanker operations.1920You know, the use of those--of those that have--the funds and1921revenue that come from the oil that's being sold overseas is1922then replicated back in and put into the organizations. So we1923have seen that.1924 We've seen that revenues from illegal fishing, from illegal1925arms sales, human smuggling. Those are all being used to feed1926drug networks. They're being used to then come back and rearm1927and re-resource some of the traffickers for semi-submersibles1928and those type of assets that are--that they know are really1929hard to find at sea. So we've had to adjust our tactics as we1930go.1931 Mr. Van Epps. One follow-up to that. How are the Coast1932Guard's maritime on your--to that note, how are your maritime1933drug interdiction operations changing, and what do you need to1934continue adapting to new trends?1935 Admiral Barata. I think what we need is exactly what1936Congress has given us, and we need to obligate those funds. We1937need more cutters, we need more unmanned systems, we need more1938intelligence programs.1939 You know, I think what last year showed us, you know, for1940Operation Pacific Viper over in the Eastern Pacific, that when1941we have a cutter like a national security cutter that has a1942hitch arm, a helicopter on the back with precision marksmen and1943the right small bullets over the horizon, the right1944intelligence, and the right tactical teams aboard to gather the1945evidence that we need, we are very effective in stopping the1946drug traffickers.1947 Mr. Van Epps. Admiral, thank you so much. Thank you for1948what you do.1949 Mr. Chairman, I yield back.1950 Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.1951 I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony. The1952Members having no further questions, the Members of the1953subcommittee may have some additional questions for the1954witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these1955in writing pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E). The hearing1956record will be held open for 10 days without objection.1957 The subcommittee stands adjourned.1958 [Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]19591960 [all]Witnesses
2 witnesses appeared, with 5 papers on file.
- Witness Truth in Testimony — HHRG-119-HM07-TTF-BarataD-20260203.pdf
- Witness Biography — HHRG-119-HM07-Bio-BarataD-20260203.pdf
- Witness Statement — HHRG-119-HM07-Wstate-BarataD-20260203.pdf
Documents
The committee filed 2 documents for the meeting.