Hearings to examine the nominations of Bradley Hansell, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security, Earl Matthews, of Virginia, to be General Counsel, and Dale Marks, of Florida, to be an Assistant Secretary, all of the Department of Defense, and Brandon Williams, of New York, to be Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security.

1[Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 5]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                 S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 556                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION7 REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS8                            DEFENSE PROGRAM910=======================================================================1112                                HEARING1314                               before the1516                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES17                          UNITED STATES SENATE1819                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021                             FIRST SESSION2223                                   ON2425                                S. 22962627     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY28ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND29   FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE30   MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER31                                PURPOSES3233                               ----------3435                                 PART 53637                   EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES3839                               ----------4041                             APRIL 8, 20254243    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4445         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services4647                                                  S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 54849                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION50 REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS51                            DEFENSE PROGRAM5253=======================================================================5455                                HEARING5657                               before the5859                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES60                          UNITED STATES SENATE6162                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS6364                             FIRST SESSION6566                                   ON6768                                S. 22966970     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY71ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND72   FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE73   MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER74                                PURPOSES7576                               __________7778                                 PART 57980                   EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES8182                               __________8384                             APRIL 8, 20258586                               __________8788         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services8990    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]9192                 Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov9394                                   _______9596                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE979861-983 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 202599100                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES101102                ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman103104DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JACK REED, Rhode Island105TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire106MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York107JONI K. ERNST, Iowa                  RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut108DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii109KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota           TIM KAINE, Virginia110RICK SCOTT, Florida                  ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine111TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama            ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts112MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma           GARY C. PETERS, Michigan113TED BUDD, North Carolina             TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois114ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada115JIM BANKS, Indiana                   MARK KELLY, Arizona116TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan117118                        John P. Keast, Staff Director119                     Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director120121                                   _______122123           Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities124125                       JONI K. ERNST, Iowa, Chairman126TOM COTTON, Arkansas                   ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan127MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota              JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire128KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota             KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York129MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma             TIM KAINE, Virginia130TED BUDD, North Carolina               GARY C. PETERS, Michigan131ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri                 JACKY ROSEN, Nevada132TIM SHEEHY, Montana                    MARK KELLY, Arizona133134                                  (ii)135136                            C O N T E N T S137138                                 _______139140                             April 8, 2025141142                                                                   Page143144United States Special Operations Command.........................     1145146                           Members Statements147148Statement of Senator Joni K. Ernst...............................     1149150Statement of Senator Elissa Slotkin..............................     2151152                           Witness Statements153154Jenkins, Colby C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,             3155  Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for156  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.157158Fenton, General Bryan P., USA Commander, United States Special        4159  Operations Command.160161Questions for the Record.........................................    38162163                                 (iii)164165                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION166 REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS167                            DEFENSE PROGRAM168169                              ----------170171                         TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2025172173                          United States Senate,174                   Subcommittee on Emerging175                          Threats and Capabilities,176                               Committee on Armed Services,177                                                    Washington, DC.178179                UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND180181    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room182SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Joni Ernst183(Chairwoman of the Committee) presiding.184    Committee Members present: Senators Ernst, Wicker, Budd,185Sheehy, Reed, Slotkin, Shaheen, Rosen, and Kelly.186187           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI K. ERNST188189    Senator Ernst. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities190Subcommittee meets today to review the posture of our Special191Operations Enterprise. Thank you to our witnesses for appearing192before the subcommittee today. I want to take a moment to193welcome Senator Slotkin as the Subcommittee's new Ranking194Member. I look forward to working closely together.195    For the Members' information, today's hearing will begin in196open session, and then transition to a closed session in SVC-197217 in the Office of Senate Security, no later than 3:45 p.m.198For years, I have worked closely with our Special Operations199Forces (SOF) community to ensure they have the resources to200counter evolving threats. SOF is more than a counter-terrorism201force. They are indispensable in countering the malign202activities of the Chinese Communist Party, Russia, and their203authoritarian allies.204    Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is operated under205stagnant budgets. The limitation of SOF and strength was a very206shortsighted decision at a time when SOF capabilities are207needed, more than ever. We must change course now. That is why208I intend to work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to209rebuild SOCOMs budget. Given SOF's critical role in national210security, this is a wise and cost-effective investment.211    Additionally, we must update DOD policies and authorities212to leverage SOF capabilities fully. Irregular warfare has been213a core SOF mission since World War II, yet unnecessary214restrictions have hampered their flexibility. We need to215empower our combatant commanders to unleash SOF's full216potential. President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and our217witnesses today recognize the urgency of these threats and the218vital role SOF plays.219    As Chair of this Subcommittee, I will prioritize these key220forces, which are essential for this era of great power221competition and for ensuring the security of the American222people. This is not just about defense and deterrence. It's223about ensuring the U.S. remains the preeminent global force. We224have no time to waste.225    Now, I would like to recognize Senator Slotkin for her226opening comments.227228              STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELISSA SLOTKIN229230    Senator Slotkin. Thank you, Chairwoman Ernst. Important231hearing on readiness, but importantly, happy to be here with232you in our first official hearing on Emerging Threats and233Capabilities Subcommittee of the 119th, my first time Ranking234Member in the Senate, so, I'm happy to be here and I look235forward to maintaining a really strong, robust bipartisan236approach.237    I think we want the same things, which is to make sure that238our Special Operations Forces have the resources, the239potential, the acquisition, everything you need to deal with a240world of really changing fast changing threats and challenges.241Welcome to our guests. We're happy to have you here. I think we242want to express our appreciation for everything you do every243day particularly in guiding the Special Operations Forces,244given that, as you were describing to us earlier, the245precipitous increase in the missions you are being asked to do.246I think that we are keenly aware of that.247    Obviously, the gray zone challenges in places like China,248Russia, Iran, North Korea, and enabling the joint force, but I249think in particular, I think it's hard to have this250conversation without thinking about Taiwan and sort of the251scenarios we have going forward with Taiwan and the important252role you all will play. Space, cyber, information operations,253you all are at the forefront of a very changing world on254conflict. Conflict is just going to look different and continue255to look different than it was when many of us were starting256out.257    We want you to have those resources and therefore I will258just flag, I'm very interested in what's going on right now and259the cuts that are potentially on the table at the Defense260Department. We've heard rumors of 80,000, 90,000 forces, for261instance, from the Army being cut. I don't think anyone is262against cutting actual fat on the bone, but being surgical and263smart about it and not cutting the very operators that we need264to perform this ever-expanding group of missions, you're being265asked to do.266    So, with that Madam Chairman, I yield back.267    Senator Ernst. Thank you. I'd like to thank Senate Armed268Services Committee (SASC) Ranking Member, Senator Reed for269being here today. Senator Reed, do you have any opening270comments or thoughts?271    Senator Reed. I just want to commend you Madam Chairman and272the Ranking Member. I have great confidence.273    Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. We will go ahead and274proceed to your opening statements, and Mr. Jenkins, we will275start with you and then we will proceed to General Fenton. So,276gentlemen, you each have 5 minutes for your opening statements.277278 STATEMENT OF COLBY C. JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF279 DEFENSE, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF280   DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT281282    Mr. Jenkins. Thank you. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member283Slotkin, Chairman Wicker when he comes, Ranking Member Reed,284and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you285for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our286Nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I'm honored to287testify alongside General Fenton. We are joined here today by288two extraordinary Americans, who I would like to take a moment289to recognize.290    Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)291and Director of the Special Operations Secretariat, Dr. Sandra292Hobson, seated behind me, as well as Secretary of Defense for293Special Operations and Low-Intense Conflict (SO/LIC) Senior294Enlisted Advisor, Command Master Chief Brad Rhinelander, also295seated behind me. These dedicated servant leaders bring296expertise and insights that have been invaluable as we advocate297within the Department of Defense, on behalf of our SOF298servicemembers and their families. As a combat veteran Green299Beret myself, the opportunity to work with these incredible300teammates and represent our SOF enterprise is profoundly301humbling and special.302    Today's global security environment has become increasingly303complex, as artificial intelligence (AI) and other304technological advancements rapidly transform the character of305warfare, threats from State and non-State actors continue to306converge. Our global competitors actively seek to undermine the307United States and our allies. Terrorists and transnational308criminal networks continue to pose a serious threat to the309Homeland.310    In these turbulent times, my office, the Office of Special311Operations, Low Intensity Conflict or SO/LIC, and the U.S.312Special Operations Command remain at the forefront of our313Nation's strategic priorities, representing less than 2 percent314of the defense budget. Our Special Operations Forces provide315unique and outsized effects, adding exceptional value to the316Nation. Tasked with the most challenging and dangerous317missions, SOF remain the world's most lethal, adaptable, and318capable force.319    Our priorities for the SOF enterprise are squarely nested320within Secretary Hegseth's priorities for the joint force,321defend the Homeland, strengthen deterrence, and increase burden322sharing with U.S. allies and partners. Our elite warriors deter323our adversaries by creating strategic asymmetric advantages and324maintaining irregular warfare superiority.325    Leveraging our close relationships with our foreign326partners in critical regions, SOF are uniquely positioned to327identify and counter our adversary's malign and coercive328activities. Whether in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle329East, Africa, Western Hemisphere, or near our own southern330border, these low-cost, small-footprint efforts promote331stability, empower partners and allies, and lead efforts332against China, terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats.333    Even with the global increase in demand, our Special334Operations Forces face personnel cuts and resource constraints.335In fact, armed conflict and regional instability have driven a336200 percent increase in our crisis response mission over the337past 3 years. While at the same time, operational and logistics338costs for crisis response have increased 260 percent.339    We must ensure SOFs readiness while balancing operational340demands and optimizing available resources. We must also341promote accountability through rigorous analytics and data-342driven decisionmaking. Congress wisely established civilian343oversight of Special Operations to ensure that SOF remains344strategically aligned, ethically grounded, and accountable. My345office provides policy direction, resource advocacy, and346oversight needed to ensure that SOFs initiatives and efforts347stay focused on war fighter needs and national objectives,348without mission creep or undue strain on the force.349    This oversight is not bureaucratic. In fact, it is350essential to effective war fighting. Our Nation's security351depends on a strong, agile, modernized, and accountable SOF352enterprise. With your support, we will continue ensuring that353SOF is ready to deter, fight, and win anytime, anywhere. Thank354you again for the opportunity to testify. I invite you to visit355our SOF community around the globe, to meet our servicemembers356and their families, and to see firsthand the capabilities that357we bring in defense of the Nation. Your continued support is358critical. I look forward to answering your questions.359    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. General Fenton, you360are now recognized for 5 minutes.361362  STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA COMMANDER, UNITED363               STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND364365    General Fenton. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin,366distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, Chairman Wicker367when he comes, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for the368opportunity to testify before you today.369    This month marks 38 years since the creation of Special370Operations Command. We are thankful for Congress's incredible371foresight in creating us and steadfast support ever since. I'm372joined today by Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter. Shane373exemplifies the unmatched caliber of our non-commissioned374officer corps. If you look at the hardest problems facing our375Nation in the darkest corners of this earth, you will find our376Special Operations non-commissioned officers solving them.377    Our Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) exemplify the378precision, lethality of your Special Operations teams and379demonstrate our competitive and comparative advantage. They are380the reason we are envied by militaries around the globe. It's381the honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to represent the382uniform and civilian members of your Special Operations383Command, as well as our U.S. Interagency Partners and the384Global SOF Warriors from 28 nations who are stationed at our385SOCOM headquarters in Tampa.386    I'm also honored today to testify alongside Secretary387Jenkins from Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) SO/LIC. We388rely on SO/LIC 's partnership, support, and advocacy to ensure389your Special Operations warriors and their families who serve390alongside them continue to thrive and win. We are in an era of391serious national security challenges. The border, communist392China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist organizations393all pose significant threats in isolation.394    However, we're increasingly seeing these threats converge395across the globe. Meanwhile, the changing character of war is396changing at a rate faster than we've ever seen. The innovation397cycle now turns in days and weeks, not months and years. Our398adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones that we shoot down with399$2 million missiles. That cost benefit curve is upside down.400    To summarize, this is the most complex, asymmetric, and401hybrid threat security environment I've seen in 38 years of402service. Contending with these challenges demands more from403your Special Operations Forces that requires tough choices,404forcing tradeoffs as we strike to balance an increase in405operations readiness and the need for modernization.406    Your elite SOCOM team provides an outsized return on any407investment. However, with only 3 percent of DODs forces and408less than 2 percent of DODs budget, we are now playing a zero-409sum game. Yet I'd submit your Special Operations Forces were410tailor made for this era, rapidly responding to crisis,411disrupting terrorist organizations, and asymmetrically412deterring our adversaries.413    Employed expressly at the direction of the President and414Secretary of Defense, SOCOM's Crisis Response Mission is the415Nation's most lethal and surgical tool to eliminate threats to416the Homeland, rescue American citizens, protect our diplomats,417all at a moment's notice. In the past 3\1/2\ years, the418frequency of these Presidentially directed missions419significantly increased by 200 percent. Yet for this sacred420obligation, we'll accept no risk in today's crisis response421mission.422    Some may think we're done fighting terror. I'd submit423terror is not done with us. SOCOM's mission to degrade424terrorist groups starts at our border, spans the globe. In425recent months, your Special Operations team eliminated over 500426terrorists who had the intent and capability to strike the427Homeland. Alongside our global Special Operations partners,428we've captured over 600. Aligned with the Department's429priorities, deterrence has long been a part of SOCOM's DNA.430    We are America's irregular warfare experts. We deter war by431altering our adversaries' decision below the threshold of432conflict in the gray zone. We stand ready to prevail if433deterrence fails, as combatant commands seek to strengthen,434deterrence requests for SOCOM capabilities have increased by435more than 35 percent in the last 2 years alone. Against that436backdrop, we continue to grapple with years of flat budgets, a43714 percent decrease in buying power, significant personnel438reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and439authorities.440    All this forces tradeoffs, tough choices that challenge441current missions and puts modernization at risk. Yet SOCOM442remains the world's premier Special Operations Force. I pledge443to always provide the Nation with the best Special Operations444capability for the fiscal and personnel resources we receive.445We will never compromise on standards and lethality. We are446grateful for this Subcommittee's work on novel approaches to447SOF funding and authorities.448    I look forward to taking your questions. Thank you.449    [The joint prepared statement Mr. Colby C. Jenkins and450General Bryan P. Fenton follows:]451452    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]453454    Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton, and we will start455now with the senators' questions. I'll start with 5 minutes of456questions and go on to the Ranking Member. If we have other457Members join, we will have them ask questions as well. If we458don't have other Members join, we will recess briefly and move459to the closed hearing. So, this may be a very speedy round but460I will go ahead and start.461    General Fenton, so you mentioned the personnel reductions462in force, and since the announcement of SOF personnel cuts463under the previous Administration, I have been very firmly and464vocally opposed to that. The return on investment our Nation465gets from our Special Operations Forces is not only measurable,466it is absolutely unmatched. Despite those reductions, SOF467continues to do what it does best, it's adapting, innovating,468and overcoming.469    General Fenton, can you speak to how SOF is adapting its470training pipelines to enable future operators to integrate high471tech capabilities like AI, cyber, and electronic warfare more472effectively?473    General Fenton. Senator, I can. I would start by saying I474think you know you're your SOF very well, in terms of that we475innovate and I like to think we innovate for today and we476modernize for tomorrow. As we think about tomorrow, that's477certainly through the lens of the lessons learned that we're478watching vis-a-vis the events in Ukraine. I think it's more479important to not just observe those lessons, but as you laid480out, institutionalize them.481    I think in the instance of institutionalization of those482lessons I would offer U.S. Army Special Operations, ARSOF, has483undergone two, what I think are pretty significant efforts484against this change of character of war. First, is they've485created a brand-new course, the remote Uncrewed Systems486Integration Course down at Fort Bragg, a course that is about a4876-week program of instruction, bringing together everything488from learning how to build the drone, fly drones, and then489certainly adapt them as we have seen on the battlefield.490    The second thing they've done, I would characterize in491terms of institutionalizing, is they've created a brand-new492Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or job title. That job493title is remote systems integrator, and they've created that494around the backdrop of a Special Forces warrant officer, a495Green Beret warrant officer, and after their training is496complete a multi-month program of instruction, they'll go back497to the Special Forces groups and start to really take that as a498master trainer and weave it into all group training.499    You would see that across many of our components. But I500think, Senator, those are a couple of examples I'd want to give501you.502    Senator Ernst. No, that's great, and I think many of us503recognize there's nothing more dangerous than a warrant504officer. So, appreciate that new MOS. So, let's talk a little505bit more about those cuts. A critical strength of SOF is their506ability to lead on emerging technologies and developing those507capabilities that kind of ripple across the broader force, and508it speaks directly to the indispensable role that they play in509today's complex threat environment.510    So, any additional reductions that we might see in SOF511wouldn't just impact our SOF, they would degrade our ability to512project power around the globe. So, General Fenton, from an513operational perspective, how would further force reductions514impact SOF's ability to respond to emerging threats in regions515like Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Europe, and of course516the Middle East?517    General Fenton. Well, Senator, I would offer right out the518gate that that would absolutely hurt. It would hurt fairly519significantly, especially against the backdrop of, I think over520the last 3, 3\1/2\ years, we've seen a 5,000-person teammate521reduction inside of SOCOM already. That's against the backdrop522of communications, logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, and523sci-ops, and of course operators. I think all those are the524type of capabilities that you see combatant commanders, as I525mentioned in my opening statement, asking for more and more to526the tune of about 35 percent. I think that would absolutely527impact that. We're already forced to make tough choices and528tradeoffs. Those would certainly make those would amplify those529tough choices and tradeoffs and really put us in a place where530I've mentioned earlier in the statement, we're already at a531zero-sum game.532    Senator Ernst. Thank you, and just in the time that I have533remaining, can you please characterize the situation that534unfolds when we have SOF teams that are out on the ground as535force multipliers? One example that I'm thinking about this is536many years ago in Africa when we had Special Forces Operational537Detachment Alphas (ODAs) there, we were able to bring together538many different nations. Those nations had teams on the ground539as well, but they could not get along with the populations that540exist in some of those regions.541    It took Americans and the leadership that these teams542brought into Africa to bring all of these nationalities543together into a collaborative force. Can you speak to how SOF544really can provide that leadership in small teams, small545numbers without a huge footprint and be able to bring different546nations together?547    General Fenton. I can, Senator. Small teams, small548footprints, big impact, is the way I like to think about it. I549think that starts with the fact that in our DNA is partnering,550and SOF is known as a premier partner force. That's what we do551across the globe and maybe even today to the tune of about5527,000 folks in about 80 different countries. It's all about553beginning partnerships, and those partnerships then evolve into554trust.555    Once you get trust, then we're able to do everything, build556partner capacity, develop some level of competency and557capability. I think it just goes on from there, and even do558exactly as you just described, bring folks together who559otherwise may not be together. I think at the end of the day,560amplify capability and capacity for any combatant commander or561for the Secretary of Defense.562    Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Ranking Member563Slotkin.564    Senator Slotkin. Thank you. The Senator had very similar565questions to the ones I had about what are the tradeoffs of566these cuts, right? For me, it's hard to miss that Space Force567got excluded from having to take cuts. I'm happy for them,568that's a mission that's extremely important, but just would569hope that if there's someone who's picking and choosing570missions that are going to be cut versus protected, that I know571you're advocating, but that sort of, we realize that the units572that are in highest demand should not be taking the same573haircut as everybody else across the force. So, hope that574that's happening. Thank you for illustrating some of those575tradeoffs that you would have.576    I do want to, you know, understand what missions you have577been tasked to do in recent months. I am, as someone who was a578Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and a Middle East579specialist and did three tours in Iraq, I am 100 percent with580you that just because you don't hear about threats in the news581every day doesn't mean that they're not still out there582plotting to kill Americans, attack the Homeland and do really583devastating things. We of course have nation states that are584causing all kinds of problems.585    But I did see that the President designated Mexican586cartels, a number of named cartels, as foreign terrorist587organizations restricting in a positive way American citizens588from providing support, materiel, leadership in any way to589those organizations. Can you describe what, if any, guidance590you've been getting and giving on lethal force against cartels591on the southern border, given the buildup of about 10,000 U.S.592Forces down there?593    General Fenton. Thank you. I can begin with that and then594we can talk the details. The designation of foreign terrorist595organization does not grant us any new authorities as a DOD596entity is. What it really does is it helps us unlock the doors597to whole-of-government approach. Our threat finance analysts598can now better provide their target packets to our counterparts599in the whole-of-government approach. But what we are doing now600is making sure that we provide options that we can be ready,601lethal, and prepared should the President need us to continue602to seal and protect the border.603    To answer your question directly, it does not grant us any604new authorities to take direct action or so forth.605    Senator Slotkin. So, you would need commander-in-chief606authority to go, for instance, and pursue drone attacks inside607Mexico against cartels? I'm just asking, Mr. Musk said publicly608that that foreign terrorist designation authorizes drone609strikes against Mexican cartels inside Mexico. I'm just trying610to understand fact from fiction here.611    Do you believe you have that authority today? Understanding612the designation alone may not give it to you, do you believe613you have the authority today to cross over the Mexican border614and use drone strikes to go after cartels?615    General Fenton. No, ma'am. The designation of Foreign616Terrorist Organizations (FTO) does not grant us any new617authorities.618    Senator Slotkin. But separate from the FTO designation, do619you, as the service secretary believe you have that? I'm just620trying to understand. I'm not----621    General Fenton. Yes, ma'am.622    Senator Slotkin. I have no problem with them being623designated. I have no problem going against them and their624financing, right, their materiel. But I think certainly as part625of this Committee, we want to understand use of lethal force in626a neighboring State.627    So, is there in any way separate from FTO designation, do628you currently have the authority to shoot down, shoot at629Mexican cartels over the border right now?630    General Fenton. No, ma'am. I do not.631    Senator Slotkin. Okay. Thank you for clarifying, and then632you know, I think a lot of us on the Committee are very worried633about Taiwan and a potential problem with China over the next634few years. I'm the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus, so we think635about this a lot.636    Can you give me your best assessment of, you know, what our637security assistance activities there, our training, maybe we638have to go into classified session, but would appreciate you639know, your role and deterrence understanding the role you're640playing in that issue.641    General Fenton. Senator, we'll absolutely have to go into a642closed session to provide details. What I would offer is that,643in support of INDOPACOM, you would see your Special Operations644Forces doing many of the missions you described earlier.645Certainly, always being prepared for crisis response inside646that area of responsibility (AOR) through our theater, Special647Operations Command, Special Ops Command Pacific, that is a648sacred obligation.649    I think you would also see us in a counter-terrorism way650making sure that any counter-terrorism (CT) threats, in this651case, ISIS East Asia, we're doing in a partnered way with652teammates in that region. Then I think you would see us653certainly in deterrence. The way we present ourselves is654placement and access. It builds relationships and partnerships655and capability and all that I think is very valuable to Sam656Paparo, and any Combatant Command (COCOM) commander because it657provides options and opportunities they wouldn't otherwise658have, and dilemmas and challenges to the adversary.659    Senator Slotkin. Thank you. I yield back.660    Senator Ernst. Thank you, and next we will go to Senator661Budd. Thank you.662    Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you all for663being here. General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins, thank you both for664testifying before the committee on SOF. I was grateful for the665opportunity to travel with Chairman Wicker last year to Joint666Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg and to talk667about the important work that SOF is doing not only in North668Carolina, but around the world.669    General Fenton, how would you characterize the demand and670requirements for Special Operations Forces particularly in671crisis response, General Fenton?672    General Fenton. Senator first, thanks for visiting our673forces and thanks for allowing us to be in the great State of674North Carolina.675    Senator Budd. Our honor.676    General Fenton. Appreciate all the hospitality there. I677know all our forces do. I would offer in my opening statement;678I laid out a couple.679    I think in terms of crisis response, we have seen a pace680and a scale and duration that I frankly have not seen in my 20681to 30 years in the Special Operations community. It is called682on more. So, there's a requirement that's gone up by 200683percent in the last 3\1/2\ years. That's on or about 15684missions where we've been asked to get out very quickly and do685the type of missions that I mentioned, either recover686diplomats, protect an embassy at some point, maybe even recover687a U.S. citizen. I think I don't anticipate the world to get any688less volatile, and that looks like a pattern to me, and so, I689think that demand has certainly gone up.690    In deterrence, the combatant commanders have asked for691Special Operations in the last 2 years at an increase of about69235 percent to do the type of missions that they're looking for693us to do. That could involve anything from partner-based694training to unilateral operations that would give them695additional opportunities and advantages, maybe an unfair696outsize advantage and give the adversaries a bunch of dilemmas697and challenges. So, I think I anticipate that going up.698    Then I just mentioned earlier, terrorism is not done with699us, and I think we absolutely have to stay focused on the700threat that ISIS, al Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab pose and all three701of those missions are absolutely in SOF wheelhouse.702    Senator Budd. General, talk a little bit about, you gave703some numbers, 35 percent increase in area, 200 percent in704another area. When you're called upon, how often do you have to705say no because of that increased demand and perhaps the lack of706readiness or rest or requirements that are needed?707    General Fenton. Senator, I think that that question is at708the heart of something the Command Sergeant Major and I think709about every day, that's risk. I think in this case that risk is710a combination of operational risk: do we have the capability711and the capacity? Then for the first time, certainly in my712memory, fiscal constraint risk: can we actually do it?713    I think that drives to the heart of I've had to say no in714some instances in deterrence, where I feel like I am taking715risk almost 41 times in the last year, to combatant commanders716that would want Special Forces operational detachments, so 12717Green Berets, folks who may want command and control nodes. I718could go on and on.719    I can give you additional examples in closed session, but I720think it's certainly way too often, and my sense is that,721first, that is risk. We're not meeting the combatant command,722DURs demands in a special ops peculiar way. I'm also taking723risk in modernization, and in a sense, I feel like I'm saying724no to the SOCOM enterprise when we don't have the top line725increase and the budget needed to modernize not only726technology, but certainly our humans.727    So, we think about education for an uncertain world, that's728modernization, and on top of that, certainly even our729authorities. So, I think I say no way too much. Then those two730categories to combatant commanders in deterrence, and frankly,731to where we need to be as a SOCOM enterprise to win tomorrow,732just like we've been winning today and in the past years.733    Senator Budd. Thank you for that, and lots of other734questions, either for the record or the closed session.735    Senator Budd. Mr. Jenkins, again, thank you for being here.736See if you're tracking this provision in the Senate Fiscal Year7372026 NDAA includes a provision requiring the Assistant738Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and the Commander of Special739Operations to ensure the annual defense planning guidance740includes specific guidance for requirements and employments741Special Operation Forces across the spectrum of conflict. Are742you tracking that, sir, and care to elaborate?743    Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir. Yes, and thank you for that very744much. So, with our Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,745we have three lines of effort, defend the Homeland, deter746China, and increased burden sharing. The only force that can747fill in or blend across all three lines of effort there is the748Special Operations Force.749    In my service like capacity, I've been able to advocate and750make sure that as the defense planning guidance goes forward751and now gets underway in earnest, that my peers, my752counterparts, ensure that SOF is adequately and thoroughly753accounted for in all three lines of effort there, and not just754as an asterisk, that we play a major part.755    Senator Budd. [Presiding.] Thank you both again. It appears756I'm out of time. Chairman Reed, you're recognized.757    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Gentlemen,758thank you for your service and your sacrifice and that of your759family. I endorse your tribute to the non-commissioned760officers, General Fenton.761    General Fenton. Yes.762    Senator Reed. I would be in Fort Leavenworth not the763military side, the other side without my NCO, so thank you.764    General Fenton. I think we all would, Senator.765    Senator Reed. Yes, sir. Mr. Jenkins, SO/LIC is a work in766progress, and I think we're making great progress. We want, as767we envision a service secretary like civilian overlooking those768Special Operations. I would note in the prepared partial769statement for today, it says, ``SO/LIC requires the requisite770tools, workforce, and resources to accelerate the771implementation of these priorities and enable Special772Operations to be the most effective disciplined and773strategically relevant force it can be.''774    Could you tell us what additional tool, workforce, and775resources you need?776    Mr. Jenkins. First, thank you and thank you to Congress for777having the vision and foresight to make sure that SO/LIC778exists, that we do have the tools that we do have right now.779I'd just like to point out, thanks to section 922 and780Congress's vision, you can see the physical manifestation back781here with Dr. Sandra Hobson, who's the first to sit in that782position, that 922 facilitated. So, we are underway in783establishing the service secretary side of Special Operations,784and that's thanks to Congress. So, we welcome your continued785engagement and reinforcement.786    In terms of additional authorities or funding that we would787need, we certainly welcome that, your continued engagement. One788area that comes to mind, is in the realm of talent management.789We want to make sure that SOF officers and enlisted leaders,790that we have the ability as SOF enterprise leaders to advocate791for their advancement, just like our service counterparts would792for theirs as well. As a Green Beret, I come from the Army, but793I'm also a SOF officer, and so, we want to make sure that we794have that.795    Then in terms of acquisition authorities we welcome796additional discussion on how we can have more agile, more797abundant acquisition authorities so that we can answer the need798of those quick problems that we encounter out on the799battlefield and be able to innovate and modernize and fund800those accordingly.801    Senator Reed. Thank you very much. General Fenton, from802your perspective, have you seen the benefits of this empowered803senior civilian like secretary?804    General Fenton. Senator, absolutely. I think this will be805my third time at this table saying how critical it is, how much806we appreciate the work this Congress has done in that arena. I807think the first thing I offered you before, and maybe even808yesterday, and thank you for the office call, was that having809Secretary Jenkins at the Service Secretary table, along with810the Secretary of Defense representing Special Operations and811SOCOM issues, is critical.812    I think about that on the service side of the SOCOM813organization. Also advocating for issues that support our814servicemembers, our civilians, and our family members, and815those run the gamut. Certainly, the human performance program,816preservation of the force and family, and many other items that817we have inside of our enterprise. I would also offer in terms818of thinking through modernization and certainly transformation.819So, I think there's a great deal that we've been able to820achieve together as a team of teams in the SOF enterprise.821    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, and after some822notable civilian casualty several years ago, the Department of823Defense set up the Civilian Harm Center of Excellence. In the824last year's prepared statement submitted, it pointed out that825these policies and procedures outlined by the Department826through the center assist with counter violent extremist827organizations efforts as they prevent the underlying dynamics828from creating more extremism.829    I think in layman terms, it means if you're out there and830you're hurting a lot of civilians, the reaction is the enemy831gets more recruits, essentially. But I've heard public832indications that the Department is considering to rescind the833policy guidance and to eliminate the center of excellence. Mr.834Jenkins, what's your understanding of that?835    Mr. Jenkins. Well, first, Senator, thank you for pointing836that out. We agree that the ability and requirement to mitigate837and limit civilian harm on the battlefield is paramount838responsibility for us. Second, it's the law. It's the law, and839so, we have to be respondent to that.840    I can also say there have been no decisions made on what841the program may be called or the form that it will take. But842the requirement and the need to report back and make sure that843we are always mitigating civilian harm will always be present844no matter what it's called or how it looks, Senator.845    Senator Reed. Again, let me add to the point. It's not only846the law and the sense of humanity, it's also a very practical847situation because by antagonizing the population, you'll lose848ground.849    Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.850    Senator Reed. Once you lose it, you don't gain it. Just851General, final question. Can you say if SOCOM has received852adequate support from the center and that it's been an asset to853your operations?854    General Fenton. Senator, I'm not--from the center?855    Senator Reed. From the center.856    General Fenton. Senator, I think certainly. As we've857thought through it, I go back to Secretary Jenkins piece, we858absolutely, as your SOCOM team always aim to do the mission,859especially in the kinetic ops that you're referring to, and860then protect non-combatants and civilians as part of who we are861and what we stand for. I think to your point, that sends a very862powerful message across the globe that we're there to eliminate863or disrupt a bad actor, yet at the same time protect innocence864and vulnerable and non-combatants. That's a very different865signal from a nation. That's what your SOCOM team works to do866everyday.867    Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, thank868you.869    Senator Ernst. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ranking Member.870We'll recognize now Senator Kelly for 5 minutes of questions.871    Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Fenton, in872your opening statement, you highlighted your flat budget since8732019, which appears to be a 14 percent decrease in purchasing874power, and SOCOM has also faced some significant personnel cuts875over the past years. Is it fair to say right now that the876demand for Special Operations Forces continues to increase? Is877that a fair observation?878    General Fenton. Senator, that's absolutely a fair879characterization, as I've laid out in the opening statement.880    Senator Kelly. With this flat budget then, where have you881assumed any additional risk because of budgetary and personnel882constraints?883    General Fenton. Senator, I'd actually offer two places. In884the operational arena, we've assumed risk in deterrence, as I885mentioned in the opening statement, I'll assume no risk in886crisis response today. That is a sacred obligation, and as we887go across the spectrum in deterrence, as I've laid out, there888have been instances where I've had to say no to combatant889commander requirements because of operational risk and fiscal890constraints in a way I haven't seen before.891    So, first in operations deterrence. Second is in892modernization. Working to have the SOCOM team and at times893tying it to the joint force, for sure. Be able to win in the894future environment like we have won for years and years and895years in an increasingly contested and congested environment.896We're taking risks there. The inability to get after the things897I think that are asymmetric, that are part of the changing898character of war, do it at speed.899    You could add anything, uncrewed artificial intelligence,900additive manufacturing, autonomy, all that. I think we're901accruing high risk because we at SOCOM are not able to get902after that based on a flat top line on 5 years, $1 billion in903lost buying power that is reflective of that 14 percent lost904buying power.905    Senator Kelly. Would it be fair for me to say then that a906risk in deterrence because if you're not deterring our907adversaries, there's a higher chance you're going to have to908put some of your troops in harm's way that the risk to your909forces, personally risk to them being injured or killed in910combat, that that has gone up.911    I think it's probably fair to say the same thing on the912modernization side of this. If you don't have the equipment you913need and you're facing a more challenging adversary, that914that's possibly putting folks at risk as well?915    General Fenton. Senator, I'll take it from the916modernization piece first. I think first and foremost, the risk917is not winning, not being able to complete the mission in the918future environment. Again, against the backdrop of what we're919seeing in Ukraine with the changing character of war that has,920I call it a version of symmetry and asymmetry.921    Symmetry, being all the things--and certainly the Russian922Federation had, that any nation needs to go to war tanks, and923missiles, and airplanes, and helicopters. Then asymmetry, where924Ukraine did not have that, and has imposed costs on the Russian925Federation through all things that we're observing,926institutionalizing, and operationalizing. I think we're taking927risks there and that risk is about winning.928    It certainly has a force protection component to it,929because if you're unable to get through the contested and930congested battle space of integrated air missile defense, radio931frequency spectrums, knocking your things down, electronic932warfare, there is a force protection component for sure to933that. I look at both, but I think it's both of those and934modernization.935    In deterrence, I think it's more about aggregated risk, us936not being able to fulfill the parts of a campaign plan or a no937plan that the combatant commanders absolutely would rely on.938That probably at some point has aggregated risk for his end939states and certainly their operations.940    Senator Kelly. Right. Thank you, General, and Mr. Jenkins,941on China Gray Zone operations, they execute this all the time942as an instrument of national power and in their effort to943supplant us as the world's preeminent superpower. So, what944adjustments, just quickly in statute or fiscal authorities,945would you need to better compete and deter the People's946Republic of China (PRC)?947    Mr. Jenkins. In terms of authorities, we are working948sufficiently and efficiently with what we have right now. It949comes down to what, what the general outlined in terms of950resources. We clearly recognize that deterring China is not951just in the South China Sea of the first island chain. It's952everywhere, and in the closed session, we'll be able to give953you some good vignettes on where we are going head-to-head to954deter in the irregular warfare arena to make sure that we not955only meet China where they are, but where they want to be,956where they, where they're trying to be.957    So, in terms of authorities, we're moving out and executing958on what we have, but we're always looking to evolve with them959as well.960    Senator Kelly. If you identify something----961    Mr. Jenkins. We will.962    Senator Kelly.--please, come to us with that. Thank you.963    Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.964    Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.965    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Kelly, and now I966recognize SASC Chairman, Senator Wicker.967    Chairman Wicker. Well, thank you Madam Chair, and thank you968Senator Kelly as you leave because I'm going to followup on the969very important lines of questioning that you pursued. I was970planning on asking about what extra things your command has971been required to do for less buying power.972    But let's talk about the gray zone and followup if we can973on that. Do you find that there's not enough coordination in974the irregular warfare field and would you recommend any changes975in the way our defense department is organized with regard to976no one having a particular domain over that particular issue977and coordinating it across the various commands?978    Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you for pointing that out.979Certainly, over the last 20 years plus, we've seen our counter-980terrorism muscle be exercised tremendously and our irregular981warfare muscle, not so much. But nowadays, we are certainly982exercising that muscle and meeting and deterring, as the983Senator alluded, China, where they are and where they're trying984to be. SO/LIC itself----985    Chairman Wicker. Tell us and those listening what sort of986things, specifically some examples of what the Chinese are987doing?988    Mr. Jenkins. Well, Senator, certainly we can get into more989details in the closed session, but it's safe to say, areas990where you would not think China is, they are. They're trying to991be there, not only in the South China Sea, the first Island992chain, but in the Southern Hemisphere.993    We have specific examples that we can point to, to show994where we have met, deterred, and even ejected their influence995from certain areas, and so, it's incumbent upon us to not only996just be counter-terrorist experts, but also irregular warfare997specialists.998    Chairman Wicker. You can talk about the economic warfare in999this hearing, can you not?1000    Mr. Jenkins. For sure, yes, sir, and that's as you alluded1001to. In China, it's a whole-of-government approach when it comes1002to economic warfare. General Fenton's actually starting a new1003program to bring that together to harness not only attention1004amongst our economic machines here in the United States, but to1005show them where they could draw their power to help our Nation1006as well.1007    Chairman Wicker. So, are we organized sufficiently in this1008area, or should one office, one person be in charge of1009coordinating this for either of you?1010    Mr. Jenkins. In the irregular warfare arena?1011    Chairman Wicker. Yes.1012    Mr. Jenkins. We are sufficiently organized within SO/LIC.1013We have a department, we have a team, an actual DASD (Deputy1014Assistant Secretary of Defense), that has irregular warfare1015within, its charter that it's responsible for and leads through1016the Department in terms of helping combatant commands draw1017campaign plans that involve irregular warfare and educating1018throughout the joint force in terms of its irregular warfare is1019not just a SOF opportunity. It's a whole of Department of1020Defense opportunity.1021    General Fenton. Senator, I would add.1022    Chairman Wicker. Sure, General Fenton.1023    General Fenton. I think for now, sufficiently organized,1024you know, as we talk and work through this, it's through1025Secretary Jenkins on their policy side. I think for SOCOM, it's1026unequivocal that we do irregular warfare and our components in1027our operational elements know it. They go back to the SOCOM1028headquarters or geographic combatant commanders.1029    What I would offer is, I think it's always worth relooking1030because of the pace of the world and the way the world's1031changing and all type of levels. I talk about modernizing1032authorities, and I think it's always good to keep an eye on1033things so we're not complacent, or even as we think about1034technology, how fast it's moved. My sense is there's certainly1035a need to re-look authorities to make sure that they have not1036stayed stagnant or they have moved as fast as we need them.1037    Chairman Wicker. Okay, well, I might want to have a1038conversation, an ongoing conversation with you General and for1039as long as I can, Mr. Jenkins, about how we could perhaps make1040the coordination better in this area. We're intruding on the1041time, Madam Chair, but let me just say.1042    There's been a 35 percent increase from the COCOMs for your1043capabilities in the last 3 years. Is that right, General?1044    General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.1045    Chairman Wicker. One hundred and seventy percent increase1046in SOCOM crisis response missions. Including, but not limited1047to hostage rescues?1048    General Fenton. Yes, sir. In fact, we just updated the1049numbers after we got chance to see you. I think today I1050reported 200 percent in 3\1/2\ years.1051    Chairman Wicker. So, instead of 170 percent. Then manpower1052cuts of nearly 5,000 personnel in recent years. How did those1053come about?1054    General Fenton. Well, Senator a couple things. I think1055through the lens of the defense planning scenario and the work1056that the service has to do along with the Department, against1057any potential scenario, and I'll leave at that because we could1058talk more in a classified session. My sense is that services1059took a look at the lens that they were given through those1060scenarios and came away with, we don't need X number of SOF.1061    Over time, my sense is that that continued surely to gain1062traction in the Department. As a result, I think you're very1063aware of a point last year where Secretary of Defense Austin1064made a decision to reduce SOF by 3,000 people.1065    Chairman Wicker. Well, have these crisis response requests1066gone unanswered?1067    General Fenton. Senator, that----1068    Chairman Wicker. With everything you're facing with the1069lack of funding and the lack of purchasing power and cuts of10705,000?1071    General Fenton. As I said in my opening statement, crisis1072response is the one place that I'm taking no risk. So, we put1073everything we have against the crisis response today because1074our sense is that is a sacred obligation. Presidentially1075directed, SECDEF directed, we cannot fail.1076    Chairman Wicker. So, the other things that you might put1077behind those crisis response things might be, for example?1078    General Fenton. Senator, I feel like we're absolutely1079taking risks in two places, modernization, and deterrence.1080Deterrence would be that mission that we are taking risk in and1081we're taking risk because in my sense, we are unable to answer1082the combatant commander's requirements to the level that they1083have requested and certainly need. When I look at that, that is1084risk to them and certainly risk to your SOF forces and that1085we're bringing the value that we could be bringing to the1086combatant commands, in preventing great power conflict and1087certainly preparing for it.1088    Chairman Wicker. One other thing, Madam Chair. I just hope1089the General understands the Committee's position on both sides1090of the dais, that we need to hear fully from you on your1091unfunded requirements. Tell us what you need, be honest about1092it, and we'll try to get it for you. But we have found that1093some places within our defense establishment, they're reluctant1094to actually be honest with us about all the requirements that1095remain unfunded.1096    Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.1097    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Chairman.1098    General Fenton. You got my commitment to that Senator.1099    Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Next, I will1100recognize Senator Shaheen 5 minutes. Thank you.1101    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair. So, Mr. Jenkins,1102you talked about feeling confident about our irregular warfare1103capacity. Where do you put information operations that1104irregular warfare?1105    Mr. Jenkins. Thank you for pointing that out, because1106irregular warfare is just like, when you think about a kinetic1107strike, there are regular warfare strikes that are just as1108potent or valuable or important and need to be timed1109accordingly. So, the coordination for information operations1110actually resides within SO/LIC, within my organization.1111    So, we have the unique opportunity to coordinate across the1112combatant commands, not only within DOD, but also with our1113sister agencies, with the Agency, with Department of State, and1114so those information operation plans are coordinated. So, that1115messages are comprehensive and complimentary was the word I was1116trying to think of instead of getting each other off track and1117timed accordingly. So, it's very important.1118    Senator Shaheen. Well, I understand that you have the1119ability to coordinate. I'm concerned. General Fenton, you1120talked about the 3000 person cuts to SOF, and my understanding1121is that many of those were enablers for the military1122information support operations (MISO). Is that correct?1123    General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.1124    Senator Shaheen. I am concerned about our ability to1125compete in those information operations. We had a hearing in1126the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of the year1127where our China experts said that China is spending $1.11128billion a year on information operations, disinformation1129misinformation. Right now, we've completely dismantled our1130humanitarian and foreign aid presence in the regions where1131China has a foothold. We don't have anybody in charge of1132information operations across as far as I can tell--now, maybe1133we do, and I just don't know about it--across defense, State,1134and the Administration and the President just fired General1135Haugh, the head of Cyber Command.1136    So, help me understand how we're able to compete in the1137information arena when we don't have anybody in charge, and1138when we've lost a lot of our people who are doing that work.1139    General Fenton. Yes, ma'am. In terms of that, who's1140actually in charge and in coordination for the Department of1141Defense, that would fall by default to my organization, because1142I support the Under Secretary of Defense for policy, who is the1143principal information operation advisor to the SECDEF.1144    So, we do have a coordination body and ability to do that.1145I have a full-time team that that's organizing and actively1146engaging with the combatant commands in terms of funding, also1147in messaging. Then they work outwardly with our State and1148agency partners so that if one agency is going to employ a1149message or an information operation, it's adequately1150coordinated with the other so that we don't have fracture side.1151    Senator Shaheen. So, if China's spending over a billion1152dollars a year on their messaging strategy, how much are we1153spending in the Department of Defense on our messaging1154strategy?1155    General Fenton. Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you with1156that specific number. But what we are doing is we're trying to1157make sure that we are good stewards----1158    Senator Shaheen. Is it fair to say we're not spending a1159billion dollars a year?1160    General Fenton. Correct. Yes, ma'am. That is fair.1161    Senator Shaheen. Significantly less?1162    General Fenton. Significantly less. We are trying to be1163smart with every penny for sure, ma'am.1164    Senator Shaheen. But it's not likely that we're able to1165match the operations that China's doing, despite our intention1166and the fact that we think we can do it better, because we1167don't have the infrastructure to do that. We've dismantled our1168global engagement center at the Department of State. We're1169dismantling Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, all of the media1170that we've relied on really since the cold war to get messaging1171across to accurately reflect the position of the United States1172against our adversaries.1173    So, again, I would ask you, General Fenton, do you think1174you have--should we be doing more to resource those information1175operations?1176    General Fenton. Well, Senator, you and I have talked about1177this for----1178    Senator Shaheen. We have.1179    General Fenton.--quite some time. My sense, I'll start with1180information operations are absolutely critical. You know,1181there's a sense of you may not win a war with information1182operations like you could with artillery. You can certainly1183lose it if you're not a key part of that and putting out the1184messages. I would offer, I think as a United States of America,1185we've got a great message to tell. My sense is that there is a1186void. You mentioned misinformation, disinformation by any1187adversary. There's a void out there that's not being filled by1188our message.1189    I think we take it certainly in Special Operations Command1190with our information officer professionals to really work at1191that in concert with our more often not our country teams, our1192embassy country teams, to put those messages out that assure1193populations or reassure and also at points in time, deter1194adversaries. That is also part of the information operations1195space. So, thank you for the opportunity to comment.1196    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.1197    Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Senator Shaheen. We'll move1198to Senator Rosen.1199    Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking1200Member Slotkin for holding this hearing. It's very important.1201I'd also like to thank General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins for1202testifying today and for your service--excuse me, I'm going to1203scoot in a little bit here--service to our Nation.1204    I want to talk about Special Operations Forces in Syria1205because the United States and Syrian Democratic Forces, the1206SDF, they share an interest in preventing an Islamic State of1207Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence in northeastern Syria. Any1208escalation in the region, which is Turkish backed Syrian1209National Army and the central government in Damascus engaged1210military with the SDF would lead to instability that we know1211ISIS could exploit.1212    That is extremely concerning, as is the possibility that1213such instability combined with destabilizing efforts from Iran1214and its proxies could cause SDF personnel guarding ISIS prisons1215and displaced persons camps to leave their posts in order to1216defend their territory. This would open the door to the1217possible escape of captured ISIS fighters and their families,1218as we saw that just play out in 2019.1219    So, General Fenton, given our SOF partnership with the SDF1220and the Defeat ISIS campaign, including security training and1221assistance, what are SOF and the SDF doing to prevent breakouts1222from SDF run prisons and displaced persons camps to ensure that1223captured ISIS fighters and their families do not return to the1224battle space?1225    I know this is a question that geographically pertains to1226CENTCOM, but our troops performing these counter-terrorism1227mission missions are Special Operation Forces.1228    General Fenton. Senator, I think the very first thing we do1229is partner with our SDF partners, it's almost a decade now. I1230can get back and certainly provide written on the record how1231long we've done it, but I think it's about a decade, is1232disrupt, degrade and work to defeat ISIS in Syria. It's a1233threat certainly in the United States as we've laid out before.1234Many of the committees have come before you have talked about1235it.1236    But I think the first thing we do is disrupt and degrade1237ISIS along with SDF counterparts, that certainly vectors into1238protecting the prisons and the camps. I think that, you know,1239if you look at it that's keeping improvised explosive ISIS1240bombers from attacking those, creating a level of or1241opportunities for breakout, that is taking action in places1242that may not be close to the camps, but we know have planning1243going on in the camp.1244    So, I think there's many things your ARSOF team is doing1245along with our SDF partners to first and foremost, and that is1246the mission, disrupt and degrade and diminish ISIS, spur the1247CENTCOM and SECDEF direction, and also protect those camps from1248a breakout and a prison as well.1249    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'm going to direct this question1250to both of you staying on the same topic, because how does a1251continued elimination of ISIS leadership and which SOF you have1252accomplished time and time again, impact ISIS's ability to plan1253and carry out attacks on United States Forces and SDF front1254prisons and displaced persons camps? What are we doing more1255specifically to degrade Iranian aligned militias from attacking1256or attempting to attack United States and coalition forces?1257    Mr. Jenkins, we can start with you and go on to the General1258please.1259    Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, ma'am. We see all those problems1260clear-eyed for sure, and thank you for sharing that concern1261with us. As General Fenton alluded to, looking at what SOF can1262control what we can do in this space. We take that very1263seriously. We are at the leading edge to make sure that our SDF1264partners can maintain control of those prisons, that they can1265repatriate where appropriate and when possible, so that we can1266decrease the population of potential breakout and under1267difficult situations.1268    Then in terms of decreasing malign influence, we have to1269make sure that, similar to China, that we are deterring1270wherever possible, whether it's at the level of armed conflict1271or below with irregular warfare. We have the ability and lots1272of tools across the spectrum to make sure that we are deterring1273them from being in the battle space where they want to be, and1274where they're trying to be.1275    Senator Rosen. Thank you. General Fenton, anything to add?1276    General Fenton. Senator, I would offer on the ISIS piece I1277think is very important, as you've alluded to, to keep the1278pressure on ISIS by degrading their leadership the operational1279experience, personnel, the communicators, financiers, all of1280these things come together for attacks, not only in the Middle1281East against our forces, and that is force protection as we1282take it, but also in Europe and against our Homeland.1283    ISIS is an ex-op's threat. So, I think that is the multiple1284responsibility for your Special Operations teammates, not only1285ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda, but getting after these layers1286is really important to keep any of those terrorist groups from1287being able to plan and execute an attack on the Homeland.1288    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'll yield back, but I'm going to1289actually ask a question for the record about the Houthis1290relations with Al-Shabaab. So, I'm glad you brought that up1291because it's critically important we discuss that as well.1292Thank you.1293    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Rosen, and at this time,1294we will recess for about 7 minutes, which will give us time to1295move over to the SVC-217, and we will go into a closed hearing1296at that point. So, I call a recess.1297    [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]12981299    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]13001301               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton1302               special operations command and supplements1303    1. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, it also surprised me that the1304Special Operations Community does not currently provide supplements1305that average Americans are allowed to utilize for optimal athletic1306performance such as creatine. Do you support special operators having1307access to these supplements, not on their own dime, to optimize1308performance?1309    General Fenton. USSOCOM supports the use of appropriated funds for1310the provision of third-party certified dietary supplements, in1311accordance with Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6130.06, Use1312of Dietary Supplements in the DOD, such as creatine to enhance optimal1313performance and operational readiness of special operators, while also1314ensuring the safe use of any dietary supplement. We look forward to1315Congress' support in this effort.13161317    2. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, can you commit to working with1318Congress to address this issue and get our special operators the1319supplements and hormone therapies they deserve after sending them into1320some of the most demanding and dangerous environments in the world?1321    General Fenton. Yes, USSOCOM is committed to collaborating with1322Congress, the Department of Defense, academia, and industry to address1323the need for evidence-based dietary supplementation and FDA-approved1324hormone therapy solutions that support the unique physical and1325psychological demands placed on our special operators.13261327                           operator syndrome1328    3. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, there are widespread impacts of1329``operator syndrome''--the syndrome associated with low testosterone1330and other imbalances resulting from years of operating under chronic1331stress. Do you believe the Special Operations community should call for1332regular blood testing to identify hormonal imbalances associated with1333``operator syndrome''?1334    General Fenton. USSOCOM medical providers adhere to current1335clinical guidelines on hormonal imbalances and ensure that Special1336Operators who are experiencing symptoms, which may be related to low1337testosterone or other hormonal imbalances, receive a comprehensive1338work-up, including blood testing of hormone levels and appropriate1339treatment. USSOCOM partners with medical specialists at military1340medical treatment facilities and within the provider networks,1341including endocrinologists, urologists, and sports medicine physicians1342to ensure optimal care.1343    USSOCOM would support a longitudinal study of hormone levels in1344Special Operators, which could inform future guidelines on testing and1345supplementation. Normal testosterone levels vary widely, and current1346medical literature provides a broad reference range. Research that1347specifically targets the SOF population would be extremely helpful to1348determine if and how their ``normal'' hormone levels differ from the1349general population, and how those differences correlate with1350performance optimization and health improvement.13511352    4. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, do you believe our policies1353should reflect a desire to get as many operators access to hormone1354treatment as possible--acknowledging that their needs may be more1355aggressive than the average citizen?1356    General Fenton. Our policies are currently designed to ensure that1357every operator who is experiencing symptoms due to hormonal imbalances1358receives a comprehensive evaluation with the appropriate specialists,1359and when indicated, treatment to correct irregularities. USSOCOM's1360medical and Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) human1361performance teams--which include medical providers and SOF medics,1362licensed nutritionists, physical therapists, strength and conditioning1363specialists, athletic trainers, mental health providers, and cognitive1364performance specialists--are trained to recognize potential symptoms of1365hormone imbalance and communicate their concerns to SOF patients and1366clients.1367    While Special Operations personnel face unique operational demands1368and potentially higher stress levels contributing to hormonal1369imbalances, treatment decisions prioritize individual medical needs and1370established clinical guidelines for hormone replacement therapy. In1371addition to hormone replacement therapy when appropriate, our medical1372providers rely on non-pharmacological interventions including stress1373management, sleep optimization, exercise, and nutritional counseling.13741375                  preservation of the force and family1376    5. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations1377Command] has a program called Preservation of the Force and Family1378[POTFF] that is specifically designed to enhance human performance. Yet1379out of the approximately $80 million allocated for that program, none1380is allocated to address these hormone or supplement performance and1381optimization issues. Will you commit to seeing if any of that money can1382be re-allocated to address this appropriately?1383    General Fenton. USSOCOM lacks the statutory authority to procure1384quality dietary supplements and sports foods using Major Force Program138511 funding. If granted new authorities to procure dietary supplements1386and sports food items for SOF servicemembers, USSOCOM will work with1387ASD SO/LIC and DHA on policy and budgetary requirements associated with1388any changes to authorities to ensure the health and mission1389effectiveness of SOF, without degrading the other key POTFF services1390for SOF warfighters. Currently, the POTFF program budget does include1391contracted service support of Performance Dietitians to advise SOF1392Commands on hormone and supplements issues.13931394                               __________1395                           Senator Joni Ernst1396                   ubiquitous technical surveillance1397    6. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, as you are aware of the threat of1398Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance [UTS], from your standpoint, are we1399executing a coordinated strategy to deal with such a threat? In your1400opinion, who owns or should own that strategy? What measures will you1401implement to conduct thorough digital risk assessments aimed at1402identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities exploited through UTS?1403    General Fenton. Yes. In the 2024 National Counterintelligence1404Strategy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence through1405the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) identified1406the growing threat of cutting-edge technologies, such as technical1407surveillance equipment being employed by foreign intelligence entities,1408and goals for the intelligence community to mitigate.1409    The NCSC's charter as the Nation's premier source for1410counterintelligence and security expertise leads the development of a1411whole of government strategy to address the challenges of UTS.1412    The USSOCOM Director of Intelligence (J2), in accordance with the14132024 National Counterintelligence Strategy guidance, as the office of1414primary responsibility for the UTS problem set in close collaboration1415with the Director of Operations (J3), and intelligence community1416partners to effectuate the NCSC strategy, has developed procedures to1417assess the counterintelligence risks to include UTS of on-going1418operational activities, specifically leveraging sensitive intelligence1419reporting to identify adversary capabilities to exploit UTS threat1420vectors, and develop mitigation techniques to secure those operations,1421activities, and investments. USSOCOM has identified an enterprise gap1422in countering the long-term threats posed by UTS and the J2 is1423sponsoring a capability development requirement to centralize and1424synchronize counter UTS efforts across the enterprise to gain1425efficiencies within the current fiscal constraints.14261427    7. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, the recently published SOF1428[Special Operations Forces] Imperatives 2025 document highlighted the1429threat the digital surveillance economy or UTS poses to SOF. The1430digital surveillance economy collects, resells, and resolves our1431commercial transactions and digital habits is an unavoidable part of1432today's operating environment. The digital signatures and patterns of1433life of our SOF operators, their communities, and partners risk being1434exploited by our adversaries. What requirements, policies and programs1435does SOCOM and its subordinate commands have in place to manage this1436UTS risk?1437    General Fenton. USSOCOM established an Identity Management Program1438of Record in 2014 with the Director of Operations, J3, as the Office of1439Primary Responsibility. This program provides identity assessment and1440threat mitigation capabilities by incorporating people, technology, and1441tools to: assist with the protection of SOF members, their families,1442and our organizations; coordinate identity management standards and1443procedures; and provide training to enable and empower USSOCOM1444personnel to protect their identities. In doing so, USSOCOM strengthens1445its resilience against UTS threat vectors and ensures viable options--1446especially in the case of sensitive activities. The USSOCOM Identity1447Management Program adheres to three key tenets: (1) Train: Train and1448Educate the force to protect identity data; (2) Govern: Provide policy1449and governance to the SOF Enterprise, and (3) Employ: Deliberate and1450judicious application of capability to execute the program's vision.1451USSOCOM incorporates these key tenets of Identity Management into a1452larger strategy that supports, enables, and protects SOF before,1453during, and after the conduct of global special operations and1454activities. Additionally, USSOCOM disaggregates its Identity Management1455Program by providing trained Identity Management Technicians to1456subordinate Commands. Identity Management Technicians are then able to1457conduct tailored identity management activities for individual1458personnel, organizations, and assets that are unique to assigned1459missions and acceptable risk. Furthermore, the J3 coordinates closely1460with the J2, Director of Intelligence to deconflict and share training1461opportunities on protecting identities against the threat of UTS.1462Looking to the future, USSOCOM is seeking opportunities to partner1463closer with the Services. Identity management programs at the Service1464level will be mutually beneficial to educate and protect the General1465Purpose Force and potentially mitigate digital dust prior to a1466servicemembers ascension into the SOF community.14671468                               __________1469                        Senator Elizabeth Warren1470                             civilian harm1471    8. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you agree1472that one difference between the United States and its potential1473adversaries is the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on1474protecting human life and liberty at home and abroad?1475    Mr. Jenkins. The Department of Defense has a strong history of1476compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our commanders strive to1477minimize harm to civilians1478    General Fenton. USSOCOM, like the Department of Defense, values all1479human life, be it a combatant or non-combatant, and is committed to1480mitigating and responding to civilian harm for legal, moral,1481operational, and strategic reasons, including to improve the1482capabilities and effectiveness of our SOF, while recognizing the1483protection of civilians during military operations. This is not only a1484top priority for USSOCOM, but a moral obligation for all our SOF1485members currently operating around the globe.14861487    9. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what is your1488understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian1489Protection Center of Excellence?1490    Mr. Jenkins. I am aware of the statute, which requires DOD to1491operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence as a focal point1492for matters relating to civilian harm, spells out its purpose and use,1493and requires the issuance of an annual report.1494    General Fenton. Title 10 U.S.C. Sec.  184 mandated the Secretary of1495Defense to operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP1496CoE) with the purpose of institutionalizing and advancing knowledge,1497practices, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to1498civilian harm. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.17 designated the1499Army as the joint proponent for Civilian Harm Mitigation Response1500(CHMR) and directs the Army to establish the CP CoE.15011502    10. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, the U.S.1503military has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent1504and mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including1505through the development of the DOD [Department of Defense] Instruction1506on Civilian Harm under the first Trump administration. These efforts1507received bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition1508from the U.S. military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,1509warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent1510civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and1511psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. What do1512you understand to be the importance of preventing and responding to1513civilian harm for successful special operations, including in areas1514outside of active hostilities or in support of allies and partners?1515    Mr. Jenkins. I believe it is both morally right and in the U.S.1516national interest to reduce civilian harm caused by military1517operations. The Department will continue to address the challenges of1518civilian presence on the battlefield in a way that enhances our1519effectiveness and does not constrain our commanders or diminish our1520lethality.1521    General Fenton. USSOCOM values demand the safeguarding of non-1522combatants during SOF operations. Failure to prioritize this undermines1523our legitimacy, erodes public trust, and fuels adversary propaganda.1524Civilian Harm Mitigation is vital for maintaining local support,1525strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries opportunities to1526exploit civilian casualties. Mitigating and appropriately responding to1527civilian harm underscores both our values and the precision of our1528capabilities. Furthermore, it sets a critical example for our partners1529and allies to emulate.15301531    11. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what value can1532advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response1533provide to commanders?1534    Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation1535and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,1536identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to1537tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.1538    General Fenton. In the past, CHMR advisors assisted Commanders and1539their staffs in mitigating civilian harm without compromising1540lethality. Their expertise enhanced precision, preserving legitimacy1541and enabling mission success. They proactively shaped strategies,1542providing foresight into the civilian environment and potential second1543and third-order effects of operations. This strengthens partnerships,1544safeguards our forces, and informs decisionmaking. Early staff1545integration during Shape and Deter planning is key to mitigating harm1546and preparing appropriate responses to potential incidents.15471548    12. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special1549Operations benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence?1550    Mr. Jenkins. The Civilian Protection Center of Excellence has1551provided support to Special Operations in preparation for, during, and1552following military operations by enhancing operational effectiveness,1553increasing battlefield awareness, and minimizing harm caused to1554civilians.1555    General Fenton. The CP CoE served as hub and facilitator of1556Department-wide analysis and expertise related to civilian harm1557mitigation and response, aiding the operationalization of CHMR concepts1558through guidance, force development, training and education.15591560    13. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special1561Operations supported and implemented the Civilian Harm Mitigation1562Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?1563    Mr. Jenkins. SO/LIC and numerous other DOD components, including1564the Combatant Commands, contributed to the design of the CHMR-AP and1565worked with others across the force to implement it. We continue to1566support CHMR efforts being applied in a way that enhances our military1567effectiveness and does not constrain commanders or diminish our1568lethality.1569    General Fenton. USSOCOM has made significant progress on its1570assigned CHMR actions, reaching an estimated 52 percent completion1571rate. However, further progress is contingent upon the CP CoE and1572higher echelons completing their tasks. USSOCOM and its Subordinate1573Components are actively working with supported Geographic Combatant1574Commands to ensure the effective integration of SOF capabilities and1575protection of civilians and non-combatants during operations and1576exercises involving SOF.15771578    14. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what have been1579the benefits for Special Operations in supporting and implementing the1580Civilian Harm Mitigation Response and Action Plan?1581    Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation1582and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,1583identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to1584tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.1585    General Fenton. This increased transparency fosters trust with1586local populations and strengthens the legitimacy of our operations.1587Proactive mitigation is enhanced through a collaborative effort across1588the DOD, Combat Supported Agencies (CSA), and NGO's to accurately1589depict the civilian environment through rigorous data analysis, and1590adherence to policies that mitigate civilian harm.15911592    15. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you believe1593that our troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of1594civilian deaths from U.S. military operations or U.S.-led military1595operations increases?1596    Mr. Jenkins. American security rests on the ability and will to use1597lawful and appropriate military power. This is a simple fact in a1598dangerous world. At the same time the Department of Defense has a1599strong history of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our1600commanders strive to minimize harm to civilians1601    General Fenton. Civilian harm can fuel resentment and potentially1602motivate retaliatory actions against U.S. forces, impacting both their1603physical security and the overall operational environment. SOF1604recognizes that minimizing civilian harm is crucial for maintaining1605local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries1606exploitable propaganda.16071608    16. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how does1609preventing and mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. national1610security?1611    Mr. Jenkins. Actions taken to mitigate civilian harm--such as1612increasing our battlefield awareness and our precision--also enhance1613our military effectiveness. In addition, mitigating civilian harm1614supports U.S. strategic goals and limits strategic advantages for our1615adversaries.1616    General Fenton. Preventing and mitigating civilian harm1617significantly contributes to U.S. national security. Respect for1618civilian lives and property enhances U.S. legitimacy on the global1619stage, bolstering international partnerships and facilitating foreign1620policy objectives. Conversely, causing civilian harm undermines U.S.1621credibility, alienating allies, and empowering adversaries. Protecting1622civilians improves stability and security in conflict zones, reducing1623the likelihood of protracted conflicts, terrorism, and the need for1624costly U.S. military interventions. Furthermore, it protects U.S.1625servicemembers by mitigating the risk of retaliatory violence and1626hostility. Finally, protecting civilians upholds core American values1627of human life and dignity, reinforcing the Nation's moral standing and1628maintaining public support for military operations both domestically1629and internationally.16301631    17. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, does having1632civilian-harm prevention personnel build trust and relationships with1633local civil society groups help commanders to collect useful1634intelligence information?1635    Mr. Jenkins. Yes. By demonstrating a commitment to mitigating1636civilian harm, commanders can build trust and cooperation with local1637communities. This improves intelligence gathering, facilitates access1638to key areas, and reduces resistance to military operations.1639    General Fenton. USSOCOM recognizes the importance of building trust1640and relationships, critical actions to develop a robust civilian1641environment picture and gather critical intelligence to inform1642Commanders and their staffs.16431644    18. Senator Warren. General Fenton, in what ways do you see1645civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM's1646mission and the effectiveness of its operations?1647    General Fenton. Protecting civilians and non-combatants1648significantly enhances USSOCOM's mission effectiveness. Minimizing1649civilian harm reduces blowback, fostering a permissive operating1650environment for SOF and improving mission success. This effort1651strengthens operational legitimacy, increasing cooperation with1652partners and bolstering information operations by countering negative1653narratives. It also builds trust with partner forces, improving1654interoperability; furthermore, it fosters greater access and freedom of1655movement by building rapport with local populations. Finally, it1656mitigates legal and political risks, while contributing to long-term1657stability and security, reducing the need for future interventions.1658                           blast overpressure1659    19. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators1660benefited from working with community partners, such as Home Base, to1661treat servicemembers who have been exposed to blast overpressure or1662have suffered brain injuries?1663    General Fenton. USSOCOM has benefited greatly from Community1664partners who address traumatic brain injury (TBI) or blast overpressure1665injuries. Our Special Operators deserve to have the best care that they1666can possibly get from the military healthcare system and in our1667communities. Our partnership with Home Base and other institutions1668remains strong as we have a commitment to taking care of our1669servicemembers. Community organizations have become an integral part of1670ensuring that we take care of Special Operators while in uniform and1671afterwards.16721673    20. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators1674benefited from the Comprehensive Brain Health and Trauma [ComBHaT]1675Program at Home Base?1676    General Fenton. Over 1,150 USSOCOM servicemembers have attended1677ComBHaT since the 2019 pilot program and 93 percent have returned to1678duty after attending. This high return-to-duty rate demonstrates the1679effectiveness of ComBHaT, and the value of partnership with community1680organizations like Home Base in supporting the health and readiness of1681our operators.16821683    21. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to mitigate1684the risks of blast overpressure for Special Operators?1685    General Fenton. It is important for us to understand and mitigate1686the risk of blast overpressure because of our inherent commitment to1687our people. People are our No. 1 priority. We have an obligation to1688protect the brain health and cognitive functioning of our USSOCOM1689servicemembers, while preserving the required lethality. USSOCOM is1690leveraging next-generation technologies to mitigate blast overpressure1691risks, while effectively monitoring and tracking operator exposures.16921693    22. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to ensure1694Special Operators have access to quality care after exposure to blast1695overpressure?1696    General Fenton. While much remains unknown about the long-term1697effects of blast overpressure on the brain, USSOCOM is taking decisive1698action to protect our personnel today. USSOCOM is committed to early1699identification of operators with brain injuries and symptoms from blast1700overpressure to treat and mitigate possible long-term consequences. We1701invest heavily in our people, and we want them to operate at their1702best.17031704    23. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how do you work with the1705Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that servicemembers,1706veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of blast1707overpressure and traumatic brain injury?1708    General Fenton. USSOCOM has a strong partnership with the1709Department of Veterans Affairs. USSOCOM utilizes the VA's Polytrauma1710System of Care and network of specialized rehabilitation programs to1711treat SOF servicemembers with TBI and polytrauma. An integral part of1712these rehabilitation program is interdisciplinary evaluation and1713treatment, case management and family education and training. USSOCOM1714families provide a source of strength for our servicemembers, and it is1715critical that they remain involved in medical treatment and1716rehabilitation.17171718    24. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators1719benefit from logs detailing their exposure to blast overpressure and1720traumatic brain injury, including the number, date, and intensity of1721exposures?1722    General Fenton. Special Operators would benefit from being able to1723objectively measure their individual blast overpressure exposure. This1724would allow individuals, Commanders, medical personnel, and researchers1725to integrate risk management, correlate blast overpressure exposure to1726blast related injuries. USSOCOM is at the forefront of developing tools1727to help SOF operators monitor their exposure, to include coordinating1728with Program Managers for the Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record1729and Electronic Health Record to capture and present exposure data to1730our Healthcare Providers. A key focus is the investment in and1731deployment of advanced blast sensors that provide the most accurate1732measurement capabilities available. These sensors are being developed1733and fielded to deliver precise data on blast exposure in real-time,1734empowering operators and medical teams to better assess risks and take1735timely action.17361737    25. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators1738benefit from annual neurocognitive assessments, including one before1739they begin training to establish a baseline, and one before they leave1740the military to determine changes in cognitive health over time?1741    General Fenton. In 2019, USSOCOM instituted requirements for more1742frequent neurocognitive assessments than the Department of Defense1743required at the time as we needed closer monitoring of our operators'1744cognitive functioning throughout their careers. The benefit of more1745frequent assessments is that it allows for earlier identification and1746treatment of cognitive changes over the course of a servicemember's1747career. USSOCOM is attempting to validate and leverage tools like rapid1748cognitive and balance assessment apps to establish baselines before1749training events, and to enhance our medical screening processes. The1750August 2024 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum on DOD Requirements1751for Management of Brain Health Risks from Blast Overpressure directed1752baseline cognitive testing for all new Active and Reserve members1753during initial military training. This baseline data will greatly1754benefit all servicemembers to include those who become Special1755Operators for monitoring and documentation.17561757    26. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to1758address concerns about increased risks of suicide after exposure to1759blast overpressure?1760    General Fenton. To address concerns about increased risks of1761suicide after exposure to blast overpressure, the USSOCOM POTFF program1762continues to take a multipronged approach. In the prevention space, we1763have modernized suicide prevention training, integrating virtual1764reality (VR) training to assist with these efforts. The training1765modules highlight the symptoms often seen in those who have experienced1766repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and memory1767difficulties. In addition to highlighting these various concerns, the1768goal of the VR training is to encourage early identification of1769teammates in distress, have uncomfortable yet necessary conversations,1770and have the servicemember connected to care. Leveraging interactive,1771innovative training technology, we hope to decrease stigma in1772addressing these concerns, and getting necessary assistance before1773turning into a crisis.1774    Additionally, the Command Senior Enlisted Leaders and I host1775quarterly ``1st SOF Truth Events'' with the leaders of our O-5 and1776above Command teams to discuss key people topics, such as suicide1777prevention, brain health, and mental health to ensure that Command1778leadership teams across the SOCOM enterprise are adopting best1779practices and are taking proactive actions. Our next event will focus1780exclusively on Blast Overpressure education and mitigation strategies.17811782    27. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to1783ensure that servicemembers and their families are aware of potential1784increased risks of suicide after exposure to blast overpressure?1785    General Fenton. As mentioned earlier, USSOCOM has modernized1786suicide prevention training, integrating VR suicide prevention training1787that also includes a module specifically designed for spouses. The1788training module highlights the symptoms often seen in those who have1789experienced repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and1790memory difficulties. It is our hope that the VR suicide prevention1791training module for spouses will provide them the opportunity to1792practice addressing concern, asking hard questions, and ultimately1793getting their SOF members help if necessary. Following each VR suicide1794prevention training experience is a guided discussion that allows1795participants to conduct a targeted discussion on elevated suicide risks1796after a blast overpressure exposure.1797    Our quarterly 1st SOF Truth Events, focused on suicide prevention,1798brain health, and mental health enable Command leadership teams to1799implement proactive actions and promulgate best practices throughout1800their units and down to the servicemembers themselves.18011802    28. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what resources and support do1803you provide for the families of Special Operators so that they can1804understand the risks of blast overpressure and recognize if their loved1805one may be experiencing symptoms as a result of this exposure?1806    General Fenton. USSOCOM wants to increase awareness, identify the1807need for further evaluation, and foster a culture of early reporting1808and intervention. We know that spouses are often the first to recognize1809any change in their partner's well-being.1810    It is our hope the VR suicide prevention training module for1811spouses will provide them a tool to help identify the symptoms of blast1812overpressure and the opportunity to support their loved ones in getting1813help they need.1814    Additionally, there is an optional survey for spouses as part of1815the USSOCOM's brain health monitoring program. USSOCOM requires every1816SOF Warfighter to complete a Comprehensive Assessment and Symptom1817History (CASH) within 12 months of completing initial SOF training and1818every 5 years afterward. Spouses can take an optional CASH survey1819designed for them. The CASH documents SOF Warfighters' experiences in1820combat and training that may not have been reported previously. Our1821CASH assessors spend a significant amount of time educating Operators1822on TBI and blast overpressure symptoms to enhance treatment.1823    In alignment with DOD BOP Implementation Guidance, ASD SO/LIC and1824USSOCOM are committed to educating our servicemembers potentially1825exposed to BOP hazards on the potential adverse health and performance1826effects and actions they can take to protect themselves. We have1827broadened the audience of our quarterly 1st SOF Truth events to include1828the spouses of our O5 and above Command teams. By educating informing1829the spouses of our SOF leaders, they will in turn, help mentor and1830support the spouses of our servicemembers.18311832    29. Senator Warren. General Fenton, do you support addressing the1833risks of blast overpressure to servicemembers through the swift1834implementation of Sections 721 through Section 725 of the fiscal year18352025 NDAA [Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act]?1836    General Fenton. Yes, I support these DOD-wide efforts to address1837the risk of BOP on servicemembers' brain health.1838                               __________1839                          Senator Jackie Rosen1840    30. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, the Iranian-backed Houthis are1841diversifying their military capabilities and leveraging regional1842conflicts to expand their influence. In recent months, there have been1843reports that the Houthis are working to provide weapons to the Somali1844terrorist group, al-Shabab. This development is incredibly concerning,1845as al-Shabab could utilize more sophisticated Houthi weapons--including1846drones--to target U.S. equities and personnel in the Horn of Africa,1847such as our base in Djibouti. To the extent that you are able in this1848open setting, can you share more about the growing partnership between1849the Houthis and al-Shabab and the risk this poses not only to US1850equities in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa1851Command], but also to global shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden?1852    General Fenton. Since at least June 2024, the Houthis have provided1853small weapons, ammunition, explosives, and training to al-Shabaab, one1854of al-Qa'ida's wealthiest affiliates. A pragmatic strategic interest1855drives the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, with1856reported heightened tactical collaboration in transporting equipment1857and weapons, training, and intelligence sharing. The Houthis may be1858facilitating the transfer of advanced weaponry, such as UAVs and1859surface-to-air missiles in exchange for access to al-Shabaab networks1860and new locations from which to attack commercial ships, further1861disrupting freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.1862Iranian encouragement may also drive some of the willingness of the1863Houthis to engage with an ideological adversary, such as al-Shabaab.1864While a formal alliance remains unconfirmed, the growing evidence of1865tactical cooperation, particularly in maritime activities, arms1866trafficking, and potential training exchanges suggests a growing and1867more diverse threat to U.S. equities and global shipping in the region.1868Al-Shabaab has used Houthi-supplied weapons in attacks on the African1869Union presence in Somalia and the group could use Houthi-supplied1870weapons in the current offensive in Lower and Middle Shabelle, Somalia.18711872    31. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, since our withdrawal from our1873two air bases in Niger last year--at the behest of the host nation--our1874ability to conduct ISR within the Sahel and throughout the African1875continent has been severely degraded. Can you share more about the1876challenges this poses to countering violent extremism in the region?1877    General Fenton. The withdrawal of U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance,1878and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and U.S. SOF from Niger impacted1879USAFRICOM's ability to maintain indications and warnings of terrorist1880activity, and support and enable African partner-led counterterrorism1881in the Sahel, respectively. Terrorist groups in the Sahel, including1882ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates, present a regional threat as they expand1883their activities and attacks from the Sahel into northern Cote1884d'Ivoire, Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Continued and increasing control over1885territory and resources may enable these groups to fund, plan, and1886execute attacks on the U.S. Homeland, and U.S. persons and interests1887abroad. To mitigate this impact, the Department of Defense works with1888and through our West African partners to disrupt, degrade, and deny the1889terrorist activities by strengthening their northern borders with1890Sahelian states, bolstering their military capabilities, and improving1891their own intelligence capabilities. The Department also is working1892with non-African allies and partners to maintain situational awareness1893of terrorist groups in the Sahel.18941895                                 [all]