Hearings to examine combatting the People's Republic of China's behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

1[Senate Hearing 119-258]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                        S. Hrg. 119-25856                    COMBATING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC7                     OF CHINA'S ILLEGAL, COERCIVE,8                   AGGRESSIVE, AND DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR9                          IN THE INDO-PACIFIC1011=======================================================================1213                                HEARING1415                               BEFORE THE1617                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,18                     THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL19                          CYBERSECURITY POLICY2021                                 OF THE2223                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS24                          UNITED STATES SENATE2526                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2728                             FIRST SESSION2930                               __________3132                            OCTOBER 7, 20253334                               __________3536       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations3738[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3940                                __________4142                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4362-398 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20264445-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4647                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS4849                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman50PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire51DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware52STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut53BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia54JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon55RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey56TED CRUZ, Texas                        BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii57MIKE LEE, Utah                         CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland58RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois59JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada60JOHN CORNYN, Texas61             Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director62           Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director63                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk6465                              (ii)6667                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S6869                              ----------70                                                                   Page7172                               Statements7374Ricketts, Hon. Pete, Chairman of the subcommittee, U.S. Senator75  from Nebraska..................................................     17677Coons, Hon. Christopher A., Ranking Member of the subcommittee,78  U.S. Senator from Delaware.....................................     17980                               Witnesses8182Singleton, Craig, China Program Director and Senior Fellow,83  Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, DC..........     68485    Prepared statement...........................................    298687Powell, Raymond, Executive Director, Sealight Foundation,88  Stanford, CA...................................................     88990    Prepared statement...........................................    419192Ratner, Dr. Ely, Principal, The Marathon Initiative, Washington,93  DC.............................................................     99495    Prepared statement...........................................    549697                                 (iii)9899     COMBATING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S ILLEGAL, COERCIVE,100         AGGRESSIVE, AND DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE INDO-PACIFIC101102                              ----------103104                        TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2025105106                               U.S. Senate,107                    Committee on Foreign Relations,108                Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and109                        International Cybersecurity Policy,110                                                    Washington, DC.111112    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in113room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete Ricketts114presiding.115    Present: Senators Ricketts [presiding], Cornyn, Coons,116Shaheen, Van Hollen, and Duckworth.117118            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETE RICKETTS,119                   U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA120121    Senator Ricketts. This hearing of the Senate Foreign122Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific will come123to order.124    Before we begin I want to go over a few ground rules. There125will be zero tolerance for protests or any efforts to126communicate with witnesses or anybody up here on the dais.127    If you so choose to disrupt this hearing you will be128arrested immediately and banned from this committee for 1 year.129We invite the public to attend but we also have important130business to attend to.131    With that said, we welcome everyone here today and thank132our witnesses for agreeing to testify. We will begin with an133opening statement from Senator Coons and then myself, and then134we will hear from our witnesses.135    Following the testimoney, we will move to a 5-minute round136of questions. I would like to start by recognizing the ranking137member for his comments.138139            STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,140                   U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE141142    Senator Coons. Thank you so much, Senator Ricketts. I am143grateful for the chance to serve with you on the subcommittee144and to partner on this hearing, and thanks to our three145talented witnesses for being here to share your expertise.146    The most significant area of enduring bipartisan consensus147in U.S. foreign policy is the growing threat that the PRC poses148to American security and our economy.149    That is why Senator Ricketts and I came together to lead150this subcommittee on our trip to Taiwan and the Philippines, as151chair and ranking. It was one of the very first bipartisan152CODELs of this Congress, led by Senator Ricketts.153    For years, the national security establishment has154correctly identified China as our central national security155challenge.156    Today's hearing will explore China's gray zone activities157which are increasingly offering Beijing an asymmetric advantage158and that several administrations have struggled to respond to159since they fall below the threshold of armed conflict.160    Our witnesses will spell out this wide range of activities161used to coerce and bully and assert control over the Pacific.162Let me give you just a few striking examples from this year of163Beijing's brazen activities.164    In Australia, a U.S. treaty ally, for the first time we saw165a large Chinese naval task group conduct a full166circumnavigation of the continent and live fire exercises with167no warning, an enormous show of force intended to intimidate168Australia and send a signal to other regional States.169    Against Taiwan, record levels of incursion by the PLA into170Taiwanese airspace and its economic zones, brazen election171interference, cutting undersea cables, and much more.172    This spring, China conducted its largest ever military173exercise around Taiwan, including simulated blockades and174participation from the Chinese navy and coast guard.175    In 2023, the PLA conducted more than 1,700 sorties into176Taiwan's airspace. That number jumped 80 percent in 2024 to177more than 3,000, and this year it has already surpassed that178number with 3 months left in the year.179    In the Philippines we saw firsthand how the PRC claims180islands, reefs, and other features despite international legal181rulings against it, and harasses Filipino vessels as a result,182and the PLA is actively harassing our own pilots and vessels183operating lawfully in international waters and airspace.184    What does this all mean and why does it matter? China is185trying to change the facts on the ground in the Indo-Pacific186just as Putin did with Crimea in 2014. They are hoping they can187salami slice their way into asserting control of the region and188forcing the United States out.189    Perhaps most ominously, they are intending to create so190much noise in the area with their steadily increasing191operational tempo creating a new normal that we will not be192able to tell the difference between an invasion and an actual--193between an exercise and an actual invasion of Taiwan.194    As INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo has said, China's195military exercises are no longer drills--they are rehearsals.196The United States is an Indo-Pacific power and we cannot and197should not back down.198    But how do we tackle this challenge? That we will hear from199our witnesses and Chairman Ricketts and I will discuss with you200today.201    The good news is our allies are stepping up in ways we have202not seen before. They are clear-eyed about the threat and203determined to serve on the front lines of defense.204    They are spending significantly more on defense and205security and providing troops, training, access, and materiel206critical as we shore up deterrence.207    The bad news, as China has ramped up, the Trump208administration has also taken steps that erode key sources of209our strength.210    The Trump administration has been willing to do several211things with regards to Taiwan that I view as strengthening--212excuse me--weakening our partnership: withholding prescheduled213weapons sales and deliveries, canceling high-level defense214dialogs, and denying the President of Taiwan transit through215the United States.216    The administration has defunded Radio Free Asia, Voice of217America, dismantled the Global Engagement Center, which risk218leaving PRC disinformation unresponded to and uncontested.219    The administration has slapped our regional partners with220significant tariffs from 10 to 50 percent, making them221prioritize economic interests over contributions to their222defense and our security partnerships.223    They have also withheld critical foreign assistance. One224project, for example, is building a communications225infrastructure in Asia that is secure and that China does not226own.227    The administration has now embarked on a dangerous campaign228of taking strikes against vessels in international waters off229Venezuela, striking with impunity and creating a dubious legal230precedent that I view as risking our own sailors in the Indo-231Pacific as they do freedom of navigation operations.232    If we do not change course, if we continue to dole out233concessions to China and look the other way as they change234facts on the ground, we may well lose the fight for this235century.236    So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how237we should meet the challenge of this moment, how we can238leverage the bipartisan consensus and cooperation we have on239this key issue, and how we can strengthen our position in the240Indo-Pacific.241    Thank you, and thank you, Chairman Ricketts.242    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Ranking Member Coons.243    Today's hearing is on an egregious and continuing problem244of Communist China's illegal, coercive, aggressive, and245deceptive actions, also known as ICAD, in the Indo-Pacific.246    You will first notice the deliberate use of ICAD, coined by247our Filipino friends, rather than gray zone. This is not just248semantics. Gray zone allows Communist China to muddy the waters249with regard to its intention and its involvement.250    It is perfectly trying to hide what it is trying to do, and251gray zone allows them to be able to do that. ICAD dispels this252ambiguity and allows for more appropriate responses.253    It is time to call out Beijing's behavior for what it254actually is. It is illegal, coercive, aggressive, and255deceptive.256    In April, as Senator Coons mentioned, he and I and Senator257Budd saw Beijing's firsthand ICAD conduct on full display on a258CODEL that we took to the Philippines and Taiwan.259    On a P-8 over-flight of the West Philippine Sea, we260witnessed firsthand the sheer scope of Chinese illegal261violation of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.262    Communist China uses the full spectrum of ICAD measures to263try to turn the West Philippine Sea into a Chinese lake with264Beijing's illegitimate and illegal nine-dash line and265undermining Philippine people's will to resist.266    Xi Jinping has referred to this as the smokeless267battlefield that will allow Communist China to win without268fighting. Thanks to the tireless work of the Philippines, this269hostility has been publicly documented, making it impossible270for Communist China to deny or for the world to ignore.271    However, despite the reputational cost, Communist China's272dangerous aggression continues. In August we saw two Chinese273vessels collide as they belligerently tried to ram a Filipino274coast guard ship near the Scarborough Shoal.275    While this was a reckless and embarrassing event for Xi276Jinping, it could have been much worse, particularly if there277was a fatal collision with a Filipino vessel. This could have278triggered our mutual defense treaty with the Philippines and279started a war. Rather than appreciating the severe risks of its280aggression, Communist China has instead doubled down.281    In addition to continuing to ram ships and shoot water282cannons, Communist China has resorted to political lawfare,283recently declaring Scarborough Reef as a nature reserve.284    Let us be clear, this is within the Philippines' EEZ, not285Communist China's.286    In Taiwan, the story is not any better, as my colleague287just highlighted. Taiwan continues to endure disinformation288campaigns, cyber attacks, bans on Taiwanese food exports,289undersea cable cutting, violations of airspace and exclusive290economic zone, and increasingly larger military exercises291simulating quarantines, blockades, and evasion.292    Under President Lai, Taiwan is taking critical steps to293strengthen its resilience to Communist China's ICAD behavior294including increasing national level planning and conducting295civil defense exercises.296    But Taiwan still remains particularly vulnerable to297coercion. This was evident in a tabletop exercise that Senator298Coons and I held with Mr. Singleton earlier this year299simulating a Chinese pressure campaign targeting Taiwan's300energy.301    While Taiwanese and U.S. defense planners are right to302prepare for a PLA invasion, a more immediate risk might be that303Communist China will use its ICAD tactics to destroy Taiwan's304ability to push back.305    If we are to successfully neutralize Chinese ICAD tactics306targeting Taiwan it is clear that more needs to be done to307bolster Taiwan's whole society resilience, military308preparedness, and level of international support.309    Concerningly, Beijing's ICAD playbook is not confined to310the West Philippine Sea or the Taiwan Strait but is now being311used throughout the region. In February, Chinese warships312sailed through the Tasman Sea and circumnavigated Australia's--313sorry, circumvented Australia's coastline for more than 3314weeks.315    They staged unprecedented live fire drills in a show of316force meant to intimidate and stress Australia's ability to317respond. Communist China is also increasingly militarizing the318Yellow Sea, installing dual-purpose platforms in disputed319territory with South Korea.320    Similarly, Beijing has stepped up construction of drilling321rigs and other platforms along the median line with Japan in322the East China Sea while it conducts a record number of coast323guard patrols around the Senkaku Islands.324    So why does all this matter? To steal from Mr. Powell, as325Sun Tzu said, the supreme excellence consists of breaking the326enemy's resistance without fighting.327    This is right out of Sun Tzu's playbook. To be able to win,328the greatest general never fights a battle--he defeats his329enemy beforehand.330    Ultimately, Communist China would rather act as a python,331slowly squeezing countries to resist rather than acting as a332cobra and striking quickly.333    Communist China's ICAD tactics are central to this effort334or, at the very least, they can provoke a kinetic response and335give Beijing a pretext for self-defensive military action.336    The good news is we have allies and partners who are337bravely confronting Beijing's ICAD behavior but they are338currently overmatched. The United States must do more to even339the scales and strengthen their resilience.340    Ranking Member Coons and I are working together to do just341that. We introduced the Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo342Act, which would facilitate increased American LNG exports to343Taiwan, encourage cooperation with Taiwan on nuclear energy344use, and ensure commerce with Taiwan continues in a345contingency.346    We also introduced the Porcupine Act, which make it easier347to quickly send arms that are critical to Taiwan to respond to348and deter some of Communist China's ICAD activities.349    And finally, we recently introduced a resolution honoring350the 75th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense351Treaty to ensure Communist China knows that the United States352will continue to stand by our ally.353    But more needs to be done and I look forward to hearing354from our witnesses to understand the evolution of Communist355China's use of ICAD tactics and what the U.S. and specifically356the Congress can do to combat them.357    And so we will now turn to our witnesses. We will ask our358witnesses to keep your oral testimony to 5 minutes, please, and359as a reminder, your written testimony will be submitted to the360official record.361    Our first witness today is Craig Singleton. Mr. Singleton362is a senior director for China and a senior fellow at the363nonpartisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies where he364focuses on great power competition with Beijing.365    A former U.S. diplomat with nearly two decades of service,366he has worked extensively on China, North Korea, and the Indo-367Pacific security. He also lectures at Stanford University on368Chinese grand strategy.369    With that, Mr. Singleton, the floor is yours.370371STATEMENT OF CRAIG SINGLETON, CHINA PROGRAM DIRECTOR AND SENIOR372 FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC373374    Mr. Singleton. Chairman Ricketts, Ranking Member Coons, and375distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for376inviting me to testify.377    I am pleased to offer policy insights from the Foundation378for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute379where I serve as a senior fellow.380    Today, China is preparing for a conflict it hopes never to381fight by slowly engineering the conditions for Taiwan's382subjugation. This is not a distant or hypothetical problem. It383is happening now.384    Beijing's ICAD playbook is calibrated to be incremental and385ambiguous, carefully designed to avoid tripping U.S. red lines386while steadily degrading Taiwan's confidence in its future.387    In China's calculus, Taiwan must eventually conclude that388resistance is futile, that capitulation, not confrontation, is389the only rational choice.390    Beijing interprets vulnerabilities not only in Taiwan's391defenses but also in U.S. and allied responses as validation of392its approach.393    To date, sustained coercion below the threshold of war has394not triggered decisive action. Instead, it has generated395debate, delay, and uneven responses rather than unified396pushback.397    This perception emboldens Beijing which views ambiguity and398hesitation among democracies as exploitable gaps in deterrence,399gaps that reinforce Beijing's conviction that time favors its400strategy.401    One challenge is that deterrence as traditionally402understood does not map cleanly on the problem China has403created.404    Deterrence by denial, building enough military power to405block an invasion, and deterrence by punishment, threatening406retaliatory costs, both falter when the contest unfolds in the407gray zone.408    Equally critical is resilience, Taiwan's ability to409withstand and bounce back from sustained pressure without410losing confidence in its future or faith in U.S. support.411    Our job is to flip China's logic, proving that Taiwan's412society, economy, and partners can outlast coercion, that413Taipei can get back up after each shove, and that Beijing gains414nothing from dragging out the contest.415    But increasingly gray zone coercion is no longer a low-risk416strategy. The more ships and planes Beijing surges around417Taiwan the higher likelihood there is for an accident,418collision, or exchange of fire.419    What looks like slow-motion strangulation could just as420easily become a sudden shock, a crisis that neither side421intended but both must confront.422    While Beijing has many avenues of coercion, one423vulnerability stands out above all others--energy. Taiwan424imports nearly all of its primary energy and about half of its425electricity now comes from liquefied natural gas.426    Its storage depth is thin, barely 10 days for LNG, meaning427even temporary disruptions could cascade quickly into political428and social pressure.429    To stress test these risks, the Foundation for Defense of430Democracies conducted a series of energy quarantine tabletop431exercises in Taipei with Taiwanese officials and experts and in432Europe and in the U.S. with public and private stakeholders.433    The findings were sobering. The exercises revealed how434Beijing could exploit Taiwan's dependence by combining limited435interdictions at sea, cyber-enabled disruption of energy436infrastructure, and political disinformation, squeezing437confidence without firing a shot.438    The lesson is clear. Energy is not just a technical439vulnerability, it is Taiwan's Achilles' heel. So what should we440do?441    Congress has a critical role in closing the deterrence gap.442Three priorities stand out.443    First, help harden Taiwan's resilience. That means444supporting efforts to diversify energy imports, strengthen445cyber defenses around critical infrastructure, and build446redundancy into Taiwan's power grid, ports, and defense supply447chains.448    These are practical steps that make it harder for Beijing449to exploit choke points and they buy time in a crisis.450    Second, strengthen allied and private sector signaling.451Beijing counts on insurers, shippers, and markets to walk away452at the first hint of risk, cutting off Taiwan's lifelines453through commercial caution rather than open confrontation.454    Congress can press the administration to coordinate with455allies on maritime insurance backstops and reflagging options456so trade with Taiwan continues even under pressure.457    Third, make clear that coercion will carry costs. Congress458can advance sanctions tools that target Chinese entities459complicit in quarantine operations or cyber-enabled disruption.460    This does not mean threatening war. It means ensuring461Beijing understands that coercion against Taiwan will trigger462coordinated countermeasures.463    The goal is simple--to ensure Beijing concludes that464coercion, whether slow motion strangulation or sudden shock,465will fail.466    That is how we keep the peace, and that is why this467committee's leadership is so essential. On behalf of the468Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you again for469inviting me to testify today.470471    [The prepared statement of Mr. Singleton is located at the472end of this transcript begining of page 29.]473474    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Singleton.475    Our second witness is Ray Powell. Mr. Powell is the founder476and executive director of SeaLight, a nonprofit maritime477transparency initiative launched with the help of the Gordian478Knot Center for National Security Innovation at Stanford479University, California.480    He is also the co-host of the ``Why Should We Care About481the Indo-Pacific'' podcast. Ray has served 35 years in the U.S.482Air Force including posts in the Philippines, Japan, Germany,483and Qatar, as well as combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.484    He has also served as the U.S. air attache to Vietnam and485the U.S. defense attache to Australia.486    Mr. Powell, the floor is yours.487488   STATEMENT OF RAYMOND POWELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SEALIGHT489                    FOUNDATION, STANFORD, CA490491    Mr. Powell. Well, Chairman Ricketts, Ranking Member Coons,492members, distinguished members, thank you so much on behalf of493the SeaLight Foundation for the opportunity to testify today.494    The People's Republic of China is this century's most495successful expansionist power, one that directly threatens U.S.496interests in East Asia.497    While Russia's territorial aggressions capture headlines498and trigger responses, it is actually China that has quietly499achieved far greater imperial successes in the maritime domain500through its mastery of gray zone tactics or what we now call501illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive, or ICAD, tactics.502    Yet, the United States has still not even articulated an503effective counter-ICAD strategy. We are decades into losing a504gray zone war we, largely, do not recognize we are supposed to505be fighting.506    For over 50 years China has systematically seized effective507control of vast ocean areas through patient, incremental508expansion.509    Its campaign began with direct military action with its5101974 Paracel Islands battle with South Vietnam but has since511evolved into sophisticated civil-military tactics that have512multiplied its gains across maritime East Asia.513    In blockading, occupying, and militarizing key maritime514features across the South China Sea, Beijing has demonstrated515strategic patience that has consistently outmaneuvered our516outdated and inefficient response mechanisms.517    China's tactics extend beyond conquering reefs to include518intrusive coast guard patrolling that establishes its claims of519jurisdiction throughout its neighbors' waters in the South520China Sea, around Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, and in the521Yellow Sea.522    Beijing also deploys oil platforms and aquaculture rigs to523normalize administrative control over new areas through524economic activities that also complicate countermeasures.525    Beijing expands its maritime empire with astonishing526impunity. China's model represents a more successful527expansionist threat than Russia's because it has mastered the528art of winning without fighting.529    To do so, China has not relied solely on gray zone tactics530at sea. It combines these tools with a highly sophisticated531political warfare machinery that targets democratic weaknesses.532    Beijing enlists local adversaries to carry its message of533China's inevitability, American retreat, and the futility of534resistance so that governments will eventually make business535decisions to accommodate Beijing's demands.536    The goals are complementary--steady erosion of the will to537contest China's ambitions and gradual acceptance of a new538normal, one of Chinese regional supremacy.539    In the Philippines we can see this clearly. Even as the540world's bravest coast guard routinely faces extreme danger at541sea from China's paramilitary ships, CCP acolytes organize542lavish events ashore through united front-linked organizations543assembling business and civic leaders to normalize CCP544positions.545    It recruits and trains influencers through scholarships and546other programs who then provide local voices for Chinese547interests for broadcast on international media platforms.548    China's gray zone success exploits gaps in our national549security bureaucracy designed as it was--designed as that550bureaucracy was against historical conventional threats.551    Beijing identifies strategic features, establishes presence552through ostensibly civilian means, then escalates through its553maritime militia and coast guard and backed by military force,554all while maintaining the fiction of a peacefully rising China555persecuted by local provocations.556    Our window to act is not just closing, it is vanishing.557Beijing is even now consolidating recent gains and turning558toward new objectives.559    We urgently need a comprehensive national counter-ICAD560strategy that coordinates diplomatic, informational, economic,561legal, cyber, and security instruments to meet this challenge.562    This strategy must also learn from the Philippines example563and creatively integrate assertive transparency as a core tool,564proactively collecting and rapidly releasing evidence that565systematically exposes China's gray zone aggressions to deny it566the cover of opacity and deniability upon which it has built567its campaign.568    We must repurpose agencies like the U.S. Agency for Global569Media to counter political warfare, establish a development570assistance program explicitly focused on building resilience571against gray zone tactics, and mobilize our defense innovation572ecosystem against this threat.573    Only a unified and well resourced national effort can574prevent China's gray zone successes from becoming irreversible575precedents. But to win we must first get our team on the field576and organize for this campaign, the one we are already in.577    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.578579    [The prepared statement of Mr. Powell is located at the end580of this transcript begining of page 41.]581582    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Powell.583    Our third witness today is Dr. Ely Ratner. Dr. Ratner is584currently a principal at The Marathon Initiative. He served as585Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security586Affairs from 2021 to 2025, and as Deputy National Security587Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden from 2015 to 2017.588    He has also worked at the State Department and in the U.S.589Senate as a professional staff member on the Senate Foreign590Relations Committee.591    Outside of government, Dr. Ratner has worked for a number592of leading think tanks including the Council on Foreign593Relations and the RAND Corporation.594    Dr. Ratner?595596     STATEMENT OF DR. ELY RATNER, PRINCIPAL, THE MARATHON597                   INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC598599    Dr. Ratner. Chairman Ricketts, Ranking Member Coons,600distinguished members of the subcommittee and committee, thank601you for the opportunity to appear before you today.602    Let me begin by commending your strong bipartisan603leadership to advance U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific. This is604desperately needed and more important than ever.605    As I have testified before, our stakes in the competition606with China are enormous and, yet, despite significant progress607the United States is still not addressing the challenge with608the level of urgency, attention, or resources it demands.609    This is also true in the gray zone where U.S. policy is too610often risk averse, reactive, and inconsistent. My fellow611witnesses today have done a great job describing and assessing612China's ICAD behavior so, Mr. Chairman, I will spend the613balance of my time on the question of what we should do about614it, highlighting a few recommendations from my written615testimony for how Congress can help shape a new approach to616this critical challenge.617    First, we can and should do more to strengthen our allies.618It is profoundly in America's interest to have partners who can619provide frontline defenses against China's coercion.620    When our allies are more capable they can do more on their621own, they can contribute more to our collective defense, and in622doing so they can help to strengthen deterrence and reduce the623costs and risks shouldered by U.S. forces.624    This is why the Trump administration, tactics aside, is625doing the right thing by urging our partners to spend more on626defense.627    But many of them cannot do it entirely on their own,628whether in the case of the Philippines or the Pacific Islands,629and even though we acknowledge that China is our primary630challenge, U.S. security assistance still does not reflect that631reality including major programs such as U.S. foreign military632financing.633    Going forward, Congress can lead in correcting this634imbalance by ensuring that U.S. support both in scale and focus635reflects this prioritization of the China challenge.636    Second, this is especially true when it comes to Taiwan637where China's gray zone activities are growing more intense by638the day. To be frank, I am concerned that the current direction639of U.S. policy is reducing U.S. support for Taiwan and640undermining America's commitment to peace and stability in the641Taiwan Strait.642    Congress can lead by advancing an all-of-the-above strategy643for Taiwan's defense and resilience that uses the full set of644tools available consistent with and reaffirming our commitments645under the Taiwan Relations Act.646    That should include timely foreign military sales, foreign647military financing, Presidential drawdown authority, and648support for Taiwan's defense industrial base.649    Mr. Chairman, we also have work to do here in Washington to650compete more effectively in the gray zone and that starts with651crisis preparedness.652    The administration needs to be ready with concrete options653for specific contingencies such as a blockade of Second Thomas654Shoal, a military over flight of Taiwan, or a maritime655incursion close to Taiwan's shores.656    These could include rapid U.S. military deployments,657coordinated responses with our allies, or preauthorized658sanctions packages. Congress should use its full authorities,659including briefings, hearings, and legislation to ensure that660preparation is real and ongoing.661    Finally, as you heard from my colleagues today, we have662more to do to compete in the information domain. Information663operations are central to China's gray zone strategy, used to664amplify its strengths, obscure its predatory activities, and665shape global narratives to its advantage.666    Each year China's Government spends billions of dollars on667State propaganda and overseas influence operations and, yet, to668our own disadvantage U.S. policy in this space is nearly669nonexistent.670    Instead, we should be proactively exposing, documenting,671and publicizing China's illegal and coercive activities. Doing672so can deter malign behavior, dilute the effectiveness of673China's actions, and strengthen the resolve of partner674governments to resist.675    To that end, Congress should lead an effort to build new676U.S. institutions equipped and resourced to compete with China677in the information domain.678    Otherwise, this prevailing gap will remain one of the most679significant shortcomings in America's ability to meet the China680challenge both in the gray zone and more broadly.681    Mr. Chairman, those are just a few of the recommendations682from my written testimony. Thank you again for your leadership683and I look forward to your questions.684685    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner is located at the end686of this transcript begining of page 54.]687688    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.689    Now we will go into a round of 5-minute questions.690    And, Senator Cornyn, I believe you have an intel briefing691so I am going to take my first question and offer it to you.692    Senator Cornyn. Thank you.693    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. I would694like to ask, maybe starting with Mr. Singleton and go down the695row here, a few years ago when I visited Australia with Senator696Warner, who was chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and697Angus King and also another member of the Intelligence698Committee, I was struck by the fact that talking to Australian699parliamentarians that the assumption that I had made that700Australia would join in any collective defense of Taiwan that701the United States was involved in just as a matter of course.702    But because of the politics in their own country, the703diaspora of Chinese in Australia, it caused me to question who704might join us in that effort.705    Mr. Singleton, who can we rely on besides ourselves?706    Mr. Singleton. It is a great question, and I think what the707PRC is doing is actively exploiting all the cleavages amongst708the democracies to sow doubt on this question.709    I personally believe that in the event of a Taiwan710contingency Canberra would step up, but it will, largely,711depend on the political calculus in Canberra at the time, the712makeup of its government and, of course, the Chinese get a vote713and the leverage that they can employ over the Australians and714all of our partners, frankly.715    I would put the most bang for my buck on the Japanese. I716think we have seen real shifts in strategy, rhetoric, and717resource allocation in Japan. The election of a new, very718hawkish Japanese prime minister is an excellent sign.719    But ultimately, at the end of the day, I suspect this will720come down to U.S. power and U.S. pressure in the region.721    Senator Cornyn. Mr. Powell, do you have a different view?722    Dr. Ratner?723    Mr. Powell. I do not. I completely agree with Mr.724Singleton.725    I was the U.S. attach for Australia to 2020. I used to--726when I would brief our incoming delegations I would often727remind them that Australia is, despite all of our experience on728the military side, is not the 51st State and does not729necessarily sign up to everything that we decide to do even730though they have been extraordinarily consistent in supporting731U.S. operations throughout the decades.732    I think that one of the things we often forget is that when733we are engaged in our own internal public discourse that the734world watches and that they are also, in many cases,735democracies and so it is very important that we sort of736calibrate our rhetoric so that we bring them in rather than737sort of find reasons to sort of cleave them off.738    So it is very important, I think, that we sometimes when we739are talking out loud remember that the Australian people are740listening.741    Senator Cornyn. Dr. Ratner, let me withhold that answer742from you because the time is limited and I want to get back to743all of you on another important topic.744    A few years ago as a result of COVID we realized how745dependent we are on extended supply chains of critical746technology, for example, advanced semiconductors, and it747occurred to me and not just me alone but many of us that748another pandemic, another war, another natural disaster would749be disastrous to the United States in terms of our access to750advanced semiconductors that we need for virtually everything,751including our weapons.752    So I wanted to ask about our dependency on China for753processing of critical minerals. Ninety percent of the world's754critical minerals are processed in China.755    They use that as enormous leverage, and while we did plus756up the Office of Strategic Capital and the Development Finance757Corporation and the Working Families Tax Cut Act, otherwise758known as the One Big Beautiful Bill, how should we use that759leverage, leverage those authorities and that funding to760counter PRC's dominance when it comes to critical mineral761processing?762    We will start with you, Mr. Singleton.763    Mr. Singleton. Sure. I would just add that the late Chinese764leader Deng Xiaoping said that the Middle East has oil but765China has rare earths and they have shown a willingness to766weaponize it in the last year.767    I think this gets back to your last question, where are our768partners? The Australians are a natural partner here. They are769a mining superpower.770    The Japanese have capital and they have connections in771countries like Malaysia where President Trump is getting ready772to go in a few weeks.773    We should be signing deals in this space aggressively,774thinking about capital pooling but also offload agreements, and775I think it just represents a tremendous opportunity for776enhancing alliance cohesion in the region.777    Senator Cornyn. Let me ask Dr. Ratner, do you have a view?778    Dr. Ratner. I would agree with Mr. Singleton and just say779that, look, we need to build secure supply chains with our780allies and partners, not closing ourselves off from the rest of781the world.782    Senator Cornyn. My time is up. Thank you, sir.783    Senator Ricketts. Ranking Member Coons?784    Oh, do you want to----785    Senator Coons. I am inclined to defer to Senator Duckworth786if she is prepared to question because we are going to do a787number of rounds.788    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,789Ranking Member Coons.790    On my frequent travels to the Indo-Pacific, the PRC's791coercive and aggressive tactics are never far from the792forefront.793    Two years ago, I met with the Philippine coast guard just794as we were delivering the first Black Hawk helicopter to them795that was eagerly anticipated and had been put to use. They had796endless examples of videos of the wildly aggressive actions797coming from the PRC and those actions have only continued to798escalate.799    We have seen the PRC weaponize the tourism industry and sow800disinformation to try to destabilize their neighbors. This is801all part of their playbook and we all recognize it.802    Illinois soybean farmers are feeling it today, too, as they803are being screwed over amid the Trump tariffs, bearing the804brunt of some very real pain right now.805    So having co-led repeated bipartisan delegations to the806Shangri-La Dialogue in recent years, I know that there is807strong appetite for continued United States commitment to the808region, particularly as a Pacific power ourselves, and we all809know that in our absence the PRC will fill that vacuum and810exploit every loophole that they can find with energy811dependencies being another obvious target.812    And we can project our power militarily and we must813continue to show up for our allies and partners to keep proving814that capability. But I feel very strongly that we have to show815up on other fronts, too, and I believe there is a bipartisan816interest in doing so, especially on the energy front.817    Mr. Singleton, you have discussed this already, how818Taiwan's energy dependency is an acute and severe819vulnerability.820    Can you elaborate on your recommendations and specific821steps that the United States should take to ensure LNG supply822flows remain stable and accessible? And, no, Senator Sullivan823did not pay me to say that.824    [Laughter.]825    Senator Duckworth. What about other sources of energy?826Because I have had this conversation with the Taiwans827themselves. Thank you.828    Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely, it is wonderful to see you829again, ma'am.830    Energy is Taiwan's soft underbelly. There is no doubt about831it. They are--Taiwan has one of the most taxed grids of any832OECD country.833    In the recent TTXs--and this is a fair warning for any834think tanker that wants to go against the senator in a think835tank or a war game. She had my number as the PRC in move one so836that was pretty frightening.837    But we realized pretty quickly that the Chinese were going838to leverage low-level administrative and lawfare tactics to839start to require permission for LNG tankers to cross the840strait.841    You keyed in immediately on the disinformation component842with the cyber element as well, and it was designed to create843societal panic, to force hard choices in Taiwan between844powering households or powering industry and it cost me as845China very, very little.846    I think, obviously, we need to be pressuring Taiwan's key847suppliers, including Qatar, that if they do try to cutoff848Taiwan that they face some pretty serious consequences from the849U.S.850    Taiwan has to do its part. They need to be thinking about851restarting mothballed nuclear facilities. They need to be852thinking about purchasing their own LNG tanker fleet. That is853something we can help them with.854    But we also can help them fast track the purchase of U.S.855LNG, which is something they would like to do, as well as856invest in infrastructure projects, expanded terminals,857emergency storage.858    That will all encourage resilience measures that I think859would enjoy broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill.860    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So the United States military861presence is not only an essential tool for regional defense but862also a fundamental element for proactive engagement and power863projection, deterring the PRC from increasingly trying out864their luck.865    We have a number of critical alliances and partnerships in866the region. That we do not have to go it alone has always been867one of our distinct advantages over the PRC in the Indo-868Pacific.869    That commitment has to be a two-way street and our allies870have to trust that we will actually show up and be there when871the time comes. But that trust has been shaken this year.872    Mr. Powell, given your expertise on gray zone tactics, what873strategies did the United States adopt to facilitate a874coordinated approach with our Indo-Pacific partners in875addressing the PRC's territorial claims and broader regional876influences?877    Mr. Powell. Senator Duckworth, thank you for the question.878One particular one that I have already mentioned in my opening879comment and which we have spent a lot of time on is studying880very hard what the Philippines has done with assertive881transparency.882    Now, ``assertive transparency'' is a term that we developed883at SeaLight; the Philippines itself does not use that exact884term.885    But the systematic exposure, documentation, and release of886information about gray zone tactics pulls back the curtain of887China's opacity and deniability that they use to conduct their888gray zone activities.889    In short, I think we should light up the gray zone.890    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And can we replicate these891strategies around the world? What can you say about specific892regional concerns that we should bear in mind here?893    Mr. Powell. Well, do that is, I think, one reason why it is894important to also bring in outside actors. Now, I recognize as895an outside actor involved in the transparency space there is a896little self-interest here.897    But I think one of the reasons that SeaLight exists is898because we recognize it is actually very hard for governments899to release information due to security, political, diplomatic,900all kinds of different--just bureaucratic reasons.901    So I think there needs to be a combination of aggressively902doing things like declassifying information, releasing903information from government sources, which have the best904information, but also bringing in private actors that actually905bypass the government bureaucracies so that you can kind of906have all hands on deck.907    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.908    I have a final question. May I--thank you, Mr. Chairman,909for indulging me.910    I think, looking forward, there are many steps that the911United States should take to mitigate the PRC's illegal and912coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific but we also have to ensure913that we keep open both diplomatic and financial channels with914our partners to help them close their deficiencies.915    For instance, again, we talked about enhancing Taiwan's916base load energy options. Previous administrations' efforts to917mitigate the immediate PRC threat to Taiwan have worked.918    Yet, the Trump administration is withdrawing U.S. influence919at a time when we actually need to show the PRC we remain with920our friends.921    Dr. Ratner, what specific steps should the United States922take to demonstrate its long-term commitment to the Indo-923Pacific and its allies, and what are immediate and key924components that need to be addressed and how can we reconcile925those needs with this administration's retreat from our926longstanding commitments?927    Dr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Senator Duckworth.928    I mean, clearly, I think we have heard from the chairman929and ranking member as well as the witnesses today that we do930need what we call a whole-of-government strategy that includes931military operations and military support and assistance and932being with our allies, as you suggest.933    But it is much more than that. We need our State Department934rallying the international community in support of our allies.935    During the previous administration when the PRC would936engage in these kind of activities against the Philippines937there would be a chorus of over a dozen countries around the938world speaking out about the dangers and the unacceptability of939that behavior.940    So that is quite important. We need development assistance941to be strengthening the resilience of our partners, helping942with their economic development.943    We need the information part of this equation more clear to944get the message out to the region and we need to think about945legal tactics to be pushing back on China as well.946    I will add one other thing, Senator Duckworth, in the947context of your original question to Mr. Singleton about948energy, which is that the PRC has its own energy949vulnerabilities and they have been doing a lot to try to patch950those up, but they are not there yet.951    Their energy consumption is only increasing and they have952major vulnerabilities in that regard just like they have major953vulnerabilities politically, diplomatically, in the information954space, with trade, finance, and economics.955    And we need to be much more strategic about how we are not956just playing defense and trying to put band-aids on our own957allies and partners but, rather, thinking about how do we layer958our strengths with our allies and partners against China's959weaknesses and vulnerabilities to create opportunities of960advantage to start pushing back on this.961    There are a number of places to do that. I do not think we962have done that effectively yet and we need to be willing to ask963hard questions.964    It does not mean regime change. It does not mean we are965going to take actions that undermine the livelihood of the966Chinese people.967    But there are very much clear things we can do to push back968on the regime in Beijing that we have not done yet and we ought969to change that.970    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Mr.971Chairman.972    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.973    Communist China's ICAD activities are expanding in scope,974sophistication, and coordination across the Indo-Pacific. These975are not isolated provocations. They are pillars of a systematic976strategy to reshape the regional order in Beijing's favor.977    We are witnessing a pattern. Maritime intimidation in the978East and South China Seas, cyber attacks and disinformation979campaigns undermine democratic resilience, economic coercion980used to silence criticism, and lawfare employed to legitimize981illegal territorial claims.982    Each tactic reinforces the next. Together, they create a983playbook of political warfare designed to erode sovereignty,984fracture alliances, and normalize Chinese control through985pressure--short of the pressure of war.986    So, Mr. Singleton, given the range of tactics, you987mentioned, obviously, energy being Taiwan's, in particular,988soft underbelly. But what tactic do you think or what has the989Chinese ICAD activities that has been the most effective?990    Mr. Singleton. I think that what is fascinating about what991they are sort of executing is that all of it is very self-992reinforcing and I think Mr. Powell hit on this in his993testimony.994    Enhanced and expanded military operations around Taiwan in995particular feed into a political warfare messaging that you see996that is intended to sort of wear them down and I think there is997a psychological effect to this that over time it becomes clear998that time is on China's side, that there is no other choice. It999is a fait accompli.1000    I think it is the use of psychological warfare that is1001unique and distinct from our model of soft power that we have1002not actually sort of contextualized and we have not built the1003tools and resources today to wage war with it.1004    We did in the past, though. There is muscle memory from the1005Soviet Union when we went against Soviet active measures. I1006think we need to sort of dust off that playbook and start to1007think about how we can play in the sandbox here as well.1008    I think Ray's point about sunlight is the best disinfectant1009is a cliche but I think it is particularly important as we talk1010about Chinese political warfare.1011    Senator Ricketts. Mr. Powell, you talked about the need for1012strategy. Can you explain just broadly, like, what would a1013strategy look like? When you say strategy, help us understand1014specifically what you mean we should be doing.1015    Mr. Powell. Chairman Ricketts, thank you.1016    You know, I think it begins with having somebody whose1017responsibility it is to organize the campaign, right? So part1018of our problem is that we have--I mean, I have spent 35 years1019in the world's greatest military. It is also the world's1020biggest bureaucracy and it is--but it is primarily built around1021a hard power problem.1022    As a 35-year military veteran I can tell you that in many1023ways this is not a military problem. It is a whole-of-1024government problem, a whole-of-society problem, and whose job1025is that?1026    I mean, is there somebody on the National Security Council1027who is taking this on and saying, how do we wage a successful1028campaign against an ICAD enemy?1029    And one of the things I think the--you know, I know,1030Chairman, that you have chosen the term ICAD over gray zone. I1031actually sort of use both interchangeably in part because I1032think that both are helpful for different reasons.1033    In the gray zone case, I use it because China knows how to1034fill in all of those gaps in our bureaucracy. So however it is1035that we are organized, they will organize a counter campaign1036utilizing their sort of fusion--their civil-military fusion1037organization to sort of push into the gaps.1038    And so we need somebody whose job it is to build the1039counter ICAD strategy and then to get everybody together.1040Unfortunately, I do not--I cannot tell you what all the1041elements of the strategy is.1042    Obviously, I am very much a fan of the tactic of assertive1043transparency, but I think it is going to take some extremely1044deep thinking to figure that out.1045    Senator Ricketts. Right.1046    Dr. Ratner, obviously, you have spent a lot of time in1047government.1048    Can you tell us a little bit about when you were in1049government what did those strategic options to respond to ICAD1050look like and what are some concrete things that we ought to be1051thinking about?1052    Dr. Ratner. Well, Senator Ricketts, it relates to the point1053in my opening statement about preparedness because one of the1054things that we did do when I was at the Defense Department with1055the interagency was in fact to do a huge number of scenario1056planning, a lot of which was organized by the National Security1057Council so included economic measures and development measures1058as well and actually built a whole set of options around1059potential contingencies and then associated with them U.S.1060policy options up against escalatory ladders of actions the PRC1061could take.1062    So I think that is really important work and that ought to1063continue, but that was not addressing what we were seeing on a1064day-to-day basis and I would again reflect back on the comment1065in my opening Statement that I think, frankly, as a government1066we have been too risk averse.1067    We ought not be, you know, pigheaded in terms of our--or1068overly aggressive in terms of our reactions to get into some1069escalatory spiral to the PRC.1070    But I do not think we are in danger of that and what we1071have been in danger of is self-deterrence and not at all1072testing what I would describe as the elasticity of1073decisionmaking in Beijing because they themselves are also1074quite risk averse against getting into a conflict with the1075United States.1076    And as I look back on the last couple of decades that I1077have had the opportunity to work in the State Department, at1078the Defense Department, in the White House, up here on the1079Hill, there are very few instances where when the United States1080asserted itself with American power with our allies and with1081conviction and commitment that Beijing then becomes and tries1082to escalate against that.1083    That has not happened very much. So what we need to do,1084whether it is in the Taiwan Strait, whether it is in the South1085China Sea, is to start pushing back in a way with our power and1086conviction and allies that, again, test that risk aversion in1087Beijing as well and I do not think we have done that1088sufficiently yet.1089    Senator Ricketts. Would you agree with Mr. Powell that it1090maybe starts by putting one person in charge of designing the1091strategy to combat it?1092    Dr. Ratner. I think that would help. In the previous1093administration there certainly were single individuals in the1094National Security Council that were in charge of doing that1095around particular issues, whether it was the Taiwan issue set1096or the South China Sea issue set.1097    Whether we need someone regionally I think that is a good1098question. But I think I have seen the process working pretty1099well when there is a single individual around an issue set,1100yes.1101    Senator Ricketts. Great, thank you.1102    Senator Coons?1103    Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Ricketts, and thank you1104to all of our witnesses.1105    So if I could, a part of the challenge of where we are1106right now is that the National Security Council has been1107significantly downgraded in terms of its staffing, its scope,1108its reach.1109    We are reinvesting significantly in our military, which I1110think is a positive. We have had some fundamental restructuring1111in terms of our development program. USAID is gone and a number1112of its key programs like the Global Media Enterprise are either1113gone or being restructured.1114    I will just posit that I think our greatest strength in1115terms of pushing back on China's illegal and coercive,1116aggressive, and deceptive behavior is our full spectrum all-of-1117government all-of-society approach, our economic power, and our1118alliances.1119    And you had a conversation earlier with Senator Cornyn1120about Australia. I led a bipartisan CODEL to the U.S.-Australia1121Leadership Dialogue in Adelaide in the summer and was really1122struck at how uniformly the Australians are seized with the1123challenge of China, have significant reach in the region, in1124Papua New Guinea, in the Pacific Island nations, in terms of1125development, defense, diplomacy, and are a great partner.1126    I would be interested in two things.1127    Dr. Ratner, I was intrigued by your proposal in a recent1128Foreign Affairs article about a defense collective pact or a1129deterrence pact between the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the1130Philippines, and I would love it if you would expound on that a1131little bit more.1132    And if you would, Mr. Powell and Mr. Singleton, how would1133you rebuild the capacity for a coordinated, focused engagement1134around resiliency for Taiwan and alliance coordination around1135ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific?1136    We have got a scattered range of capabilities: the1137Development Finance Corporation, whose authorization has1138expired and cannot do new deals. We have got USTR, which is1139engaged in trade.1140    We have got USTDA. These are all independent agencies. We1141have got the Foreign Commercial Service. We used to have in1142USAID development entities focusing on economic strength. In1143the State Department there is an economic bureau.1144    How would you pull all of this together? Would you create a1145new agency? Would you come up with a coordinated approach, and1146if so, led by whom?1147    How do we get the strategy, the focus, and the leadership1148to deliver on leaning in to our alliances, economic1149development, and our soft and hard power capabilities which in1150coordination should be enough to deter China but when1151disaggregated and discoordinated and discombobulated and1152defunded, I think are issuing an open invitation to increase1153coercion by China.1154    Dr. Ratner, if you would, first, on the collective pact and1155then the other two. Forgive me for the very long question.1156    Dr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Senator Coons.1157    The proposal that I had put forward was for a Pacific1158defense pact, a collective defense pact between the United1159States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines.1160    The rationale for it is, look, the defining national1161security question of our time is how we prevent PRC aggression1162in the Western Pacific in their ambitions to revise the Indo-1163Pacific order and the international order.1164    The consequences of that, as you well know, would be1165terrible for the United States and terrible for the world. If1166we do that as a team sport with our allies and partners it1167will, No. 1, be more effective, and, No. 2, come at lower cost1168and lower risk to U.S. forces.1169    It is a win-win for the United States. We have great1170alliances with those three countries. We have good partnerships1171around the region but those alliances are not connected with1172each other and the question before us then is how do we make1173the whole greater than the sum of the parts as it relates to1174our alliances and how do we create structures so that we can1175actually operate together, deter together, fight together as1176necessary?1177    And the fact of the matter is, whether we like it or not1178today we are not prepared to fight as a collective with our1179allies and partners. We do not have the command and control we1180need.1181    We do not have the plans we need. We do not have the force1182posture we need. We are not operating together in the way that1183we need to.1184    So we need institutions that bring together these countries1185to get prepared in that fashion and what I put forward was a1186proposal to do exactly that.1187    Senator Coons. Well, thank you.1188    I was struck at INDOPACOM at the senior level at which1189Australian military flag officers are integrated into the1190INDOPACOM, both planning and command and control, and I do1191think the Japanese have stepped up dramatically in terms of1192their defense investment and defense posture.1193    And Korea over the last decade has steadily increased its1194posture, but I could not agree more it is not coordinated and1195it does not have interlocking security.1196    Mr. Powell--if I might, Mr. Chairman.1197    Mr. Powell. Senator Coons, thank you.1198    On your question of coordination, how to build the--1199essentially, the institution I think we have to start1200domestically in part because, I mean, right now, the way that1201we are putting out policy geopolitics is just--it seems to be1202kind of a minor part of the overall understanding.1203    So we have things coming out of Treasury and Commerce and1204all kinds of different parts of the government that seem to be1205disaggregated from the larger strategic problems.1206    And so I do think that there needs to be somebody at a very1207senior level whose job it is to think about these things and1208how they are working toward victory or at least, you know,1209competing in this space.1210    Second, on the question of whether we should build new1211agencies or repurpose the ones that we have, I think, you know,1212right now as many things have been defunded or even dismantled1213the question being, you know, whether we are talking about1214USAID or USAGM or any of these things, recognizing that there1215actually was an intent behind those things, however well it was1216being carried out, and maybe taking this moment to say, well,1217how do we either build something new or repurpose this thing so1218that it is fighting this fight that we are in right now.1219    Because, you know, the idea of, OK, we do not like this1220tool in the toolbox so we are just going to remove it, well,1221yes, but what are we going to put back in the toolbox?1222    Because, you know, maybe the new problem--the old tool did1223not fit very well so let us make a new tool or even if we can1224just cleanup the old tool and make it work better.1225    And then, finally, I hate to be a one-note Nancy on this1226but, you know, I really do think that transparency has--and,1227again, this idea of assertive transparency has a lot to be said1228for because it is the thing that helps build democratic1229resilience.1230    If you look at the Philippines, where were they before they1231began their assertive transparency program in early 2023? They1232were--their primary strategy was built around the problem of1233counterterrorism. They were basically asleep to what was1234happening in the West Philippine Sea.1235    Where are they today? Their people are motivated. They are1236holding their lawmakers accountable. They have completely1237remade their strategy so it is focused on archipelagic defense.1238    They are investing in their coast guard and their navy and1239their air force, and they are reaching out to a lot of allies1240and making their own allies and partners.1241    They are extremely aggressively putting together, and they1242are doing this because in a democracy you need the support of1243the people and in order to get the support of the people you1244have to show them why, and that is what they have done.1245    Mr. Singleton. Thank you, Senator, for the question.1246    I think the first step is we have to articulate our desired1247end States in the region, which we have not done, and then you1248have to catalog the players who are involved.1249    I think when we think both domestically and internationally1250it is clear that not every partner is going to do the same1251thing but every partner has to do something.1252    The first step, of course, is we need to talk more openly1253with our partners and our allies about the Taiwan challenge in1254particular but I would also add what is happening in the South1255China Sea.1256    Too often these conversations are happening in private. We1257need to start to talk about them in public and that forces, I1258think, hard political decisions both here and abroad about what1259we are actually willing to do to push back on Chinese ICAD1260behavior.1261    It is vital that we have at least some centralized1262decisionmaking in our government about this. In the cold war we1263had individuals at the National Security Council specifically1264tasked with combating these sorts of activities. Those people1265do not exist anymore and have not for some time.1266    The other thing we have to do, obviously, is resource it1267where Congress comes into play and then hold the1268administration, regardless of who is in power, accountable for1269those decisions and allocations.1270    But all of that starts with identifying what is our desired1271end State in the region and, frankly, multiple administrations1272have not really done that very well.1273    Senator Coons. Thank you. If I could just briefly.1274    As the senior Democrat on defense appropriations, we are1275investing a massive amount in shipbuilding, in networks, in1276long-range fires, in next-generation fighters, all with an eye1277toward Indo-Pacific engagement and with China as our pacing1278threat.1279    If the new National Security Strategy significantly1280deprioritizes the Indo-Pacific and the PRC threat, I am1281concerned about whether or not our allies will take that as a1282signal that we are significantly disengaging or under1283investing.1284    I recognize that border security and ending the scourge of1285fentanyl and drug trafficking in our country is a priority for1286national security but I think the fight of this century, the1287definitional fight for free societies, is with the PRC and the1288CCP and I hope that we will be able to work together to find1289bipartisan ways to engage, to invest in Taiwan's resilience,1290and to buildup the alliances that will make us successful.1291    Thank you, Senator.1292    Senator Ricketts. All right.1293    So, Mr. Singleton, you were talking about energy a little1294bit earlier about being the soft underbelly of Taiwan. The1295island imports 98 percent of its energy. I think it is 42 days1296of coal it has on hand. I think you said 10--maybe it is 111297days of natural gas.1298    You mentioned that they should dust off some of their1299mothballed nuclear facilities. Senator Coons and I had a1300tabletop exercise that we led with several of our colleagues to1301go through this with you.1302    The scenario underscored how quickly an embargo or a1303blockade could escalate into a crisis and highlight some of1304these things and that is why we introduced the Taiwan Energy1305Security and Anti-Embargo Act to help strengthen Taiwan's1306energy resilience.1307    Based upon that tabletop exercise that you facilitated in1308May and then, as you have said, you have done in other places1309as well, what are some of the key lessons that stand out and1310some of the concrete steps that we ought to be taking to be1311able to strengthen Taiwan's energy resilience?1312    Mr. Singleton. No, thank you for the question.1313    I think my key takeaway was just how easy it was for the1314PRC to exert a little bit of pressure and achieve the desired1315end state that it was hoping for, which was societal panic.1316    Obviously, I think some of the key provisions we need to be1317thinking about are helping Taiwan with energy diversification.1318We have lots of LNG here.1319    You are right, it is 10 days of storage there. We need to1320be thinking about how we can fast track and sign long-term1321deals, offload agreements with the Taiwanese. They want to buy1322our LNG. They want to diversify away from countries like Qatar.1323    What can we do to sort of fast track that, and then1324encourage greater integration I think with some of the trusted1325suppliers including countries like Australia on the coal side.1326    We can help them with things like strategic stockpiling. We1327can help them buildup emergency energy reserves, particularly1328in the coal space. We want to expand and I think Dr. Ratner1329used a great term, sort of elongate and expand the sort of1330deterrence rubber band, if you will, here to think beyond 101331days.1332    How many more days can we build in to build redundancy?1333Critical infrastructure resilience in Taiwan is a massive1334problem. We need to think about hardening their energy1335infrastructure.1336    That includes LNG terminals and pipelines and power grids1337and ports, making them sort of--to inoculate them against some1338of the cyber operations and disruptions that the PRC is1339orchestrating, and we have to do this with the private sector.1340    I think one of the key takeaways from both the exercise we1341did with the committee but also in foreign capitals was how1342much the insurance risk market plays in here and whether it is1343thinking about reflagging operations or potential convoy1344operations to break a quarantine or a blockade, but also to1345think about war-backed insurance that could be provided in the1346event of a contingency through U.S. and allied partners to1347ensure that transit of commercial goods and LNG continues to1348flow.1349    Again, there are historical precedents for all of these1350things, particularly in the 1980's under Ronald Reagan and the1351Iran-Iraq war. We just have to dust off the history and get1352that muscle memory back.1353    Senator Ricketts. Now, you also mentioned that China has1354its own vulnerabilities. What are some specific steps that we1355could do that would remind Communist China that they have got1356vulnerabilities as well?1357    Mr. Singleton. Let us not forget that the Chinese are1358almost wholly dependent on their food needs from other1359countries. These are countries where the United States has1360tremendous diplomatic leverage.1361    Dr. Ratner mentioned energy vulnerabilities. These are1362pretty severe and intense for the Chinese. But also we have to1363remember that the Chinese economy is currently in a State of1364disarray.1365    We have exceptionally low growth. We have an economic model1366that is running on fumes and an economic model that is highly1367vulnerable to sanctions. I think sanction signaling is so1368important.1369    I saw that Chairman Risch introduced a bill I think today1370on that very topic. We need to make clear to the Chinese that1371specific Chinese State-owned entities and banks could become1372targets of U.S. financial sanctions in the event that they1373pursue a quarantine operation and I think that that would1374seriously challenge China's calculus.1375    Senator Ricketts. Senator Sullivan has a bill that would1376spell out the sanctions that would happen in a Taiwan1377contingency.1378    Do you think that putting those down in writing, passing a1379bill, is something that is helpful in deterring Communist China1380or is that giving away our playbook?1381    Mr. Singleton. I do not think it gives away our playbook. I1382think consistency in messaging is essential. It forms one of1383those--part of the three-legged stool, right?1384    Consistent messaging, credible capacity, which is, I think,1385an area where the Biden administration really excelled, and we1386also have to be thinking about these coordinated1387countermeasures.1388    That three-legged stool, I would say, there are1389opportunities to really harden it and do so through legislation1390but also very clear signaling to the PRC that this is not1391costless, and I think today the challenge, of course, is that1392the Chinese are increasingly becoming overconfident and that1393could lead to miscalculation.1394    Senator Ricketts. If we were able to pass a sanctions bill1395such as Senator Sullivan has, what about getting our allies on1396board? You have all stressed the importance of our allies and I1397agree it is the strategic competitive advantage we have that1398the PRC will never have.1399    So how do we work with our allies on something that would1400be involved in sanctions?1401    Mr. Singleton. I think it takes work. It takes engagement,1402of course. I am reminded of the excellent work that the Biden1403administration actually did on unifying export controls on the1404PRC.1405    Tarun Chhabra in particular at the NSC was flying around1406the world convincing all of our friends and allies to exert1407tool controls on the Chinese to slow down semiconductor1408manufacturing and tool design and chip design.1409    We can mirror that same--piggyback on that same model, I1410think, by convincing partners and allies that we are all going1411to do this together, that it is a unified sanctions framework,1412and that there will probably have to be some select carve-outs1413in certain cases.1414    Senator Ricketts. And then encouraging our allies like1415Japan and Australia to pass similar bills?1416    Mr. Singleton. Whether they pass certain bills or there is1417just a commitment in kind to follow what we do, I think that1418signaling alone really seeds doubt into China's decisionmaking1419calculus and then they are forced to contend with whether they1420can continue to sustain a war against Taiwan or continue to1421fund certain parts of its military modernization.1422    Senator Ricketts. Great.1423    Senator Coons?1424    Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Ricketts.1425    Let me just follow along in that line, Mr. Singleton. I do1426think that one of the things we need to keep thinking and1427working and legislating around is how do we make Xi Jinping's1428morning ritual not today, not this week, not this month, and1429having a common approach to presignaling about the price that1430will be imposed on China--China's leadership, China's economy--1431in exchange for their activities against Taiwan, helps deter.1432    Senator Risch in particular but a number of other1433colleagues felt that if we had been more active and clear and1434aggressive in signaling to Putin the price he would pay for1435invading Ukraine we might have deterred Putin's invasion of1436Ukraine or full spectrum large-scale invasion since he1437initially invaded in 2014.1438    What is your assessment of what scale and coordination of1439signaling around price would actually be most effective?1440    Mr. Singleton. It is a great question. I actually think1441that some of the research that Bonny Lin has done at CSIS on1442gray zone responses is super helpful here.1443    The longer that you delay a response to gray zone1444aggression you have to have a more outsized response to1445reestablish sort of a deterrent baseline. I think, as I sort of1446think about the PRC, I agree with Dr. Ratner.1447    We are talking about a particularly risk-averse regime that1448is usually inward focused and I think very cognizant in their1449own discourse about their own limitations and weaknesses.1450    I think us very cleanly mapping all of their dependencies1451and all of their vulnerabilities and starting to signal where1452we have leverage, whether it is in the tech space. I certainly1453think the economic space is one that has not been sort of1454addressed cohesively.1455    Again, it just forces the Chinese to start to account for1456all of these potential complications that will make something1457that is already probably the most consequential and difficult1458invasion known to mankind even less likely.1459    But then you cannot discount what we are seeing in the gray1460zone space and the silent subjugation and I think sort of the1461ramping up of activity there such that they are going--we want1462to buy time and slow them down.1463    I think it is probably what we need to internalize as our1464strategy. Anything that does and accomplish that objective I1465think should be--get a fair shake.1466    Senator Coons. Mr. Powell, last month the PRC announced a1467new national nature preserve at the Scarborough Shoal that1468would create a protected area around a whole coral reef1469ecosystem. Philippine officials have called this another PRC1470land grab.1471    Could you just briefly walk through the impact of this1472designation and how it relates to a broader pattern of lawfare1473tactics designed, again, below the threshold of military1474aggression to expand PRC control in the South China Sea?1475    Mr. Powell. Yes, Senator Coons. That is a great question,1476and I think as most of us know the PRC campaign for Scarborough1477Shoal really began in 2012 when it basically took effective1478control of access to Scarborough Shoal.1479    And then last year--actually early in the year, what we saw1480was kind of a remarkable sequence of events. There was an1481expansion of Chinese paramilitary activity and I classify China1482coast guard and maritime militia as a paramilitary force in1483part because I think it is very important for us to realize1484that we do not have a paramilitary force, which is part of why1485we do not have a good response to these assets.1486    So they began to deny Philippine access in a much more1487aggressive way early last year. They also sent in a scientific1488expedition to take a look at the condition of the shoal and two1489things happened.1490    One is that they immediately banned their giant clam1491harvesting fleet, which all disappeared around June of last1492year, indicating that they probably found out that giant clam1493harvesting, which is extraordinarily destructive, had done1494great damage to the shoal, and second, they issued a report1495that said the condition of the shoal is great.1496    So we then saw they also established straight baselines1497around the shoal, essentially marking it out as territory, and1498so this establishment of a nature preserve is sort of an1499environmental overlay onto that, you know, essentially land1500grab at this point.1501    So we can see all of these things working together--the1502establishment of effective control, the lawfare, the1503administrative control, all of these things, and the denial of1504Philippine access.1505    And in fact, Senator, I will also say that the collision1506that we observed in August was in part a result of this1507establishment of effective control because the Philippine ship1508that got in close to the shoal I think got in a lot closer than1509China expected, which was what drew in the destroyer which1510almost caused that mutual defense treaty triggering event that1511we all fear.1512    So it is part of a larger campaign, and one last thing, on1513top of what Mr. Singleton has said about Taiwan and what we1514have all been talking about.1515    I am one, because I have been looking at this in the South1516China Sea so long, I do not actually expect to see a large-1517scale quarantine or blockade or anything like that.1518    I would be more afraid of what would start happening if all1519of a sudden China announced that it was going to enact a new1520safety regime for LNG ships inbound to Taiwan and begin to,1521say, turn around one and then maybe another one.1522    And, again, that would be much more in line with the ICAD1523kind of campaign that they have been waging.1524    Senator Coons. I agree with you that, look, we need to plan1525for and prepare for the possibility of a full-scale invasion of1526Taiwan.1527    But doctrine, history, preparedness, risk aversion strongly1528suggests that they are much more likely to engage in the1529creeping, steady, aggressive behavior that you were just1530describing and that allows them to assert sovereignty over a1531greater and greater area of the region.1532    Let me--a last question, if I might.1533    Dr. Ratner, you have talked about how past U.S. policy has1534been overly reactive to PRC actions. What would a more1535proactive U.S. Government approach ideally look like, given1536where we are today and looking forward, given your experience?1537    Dr. Ratner. Well, I guess I would--as I mentioned in my1538written testimony, I think there are a couple ways to think1539about this.1540    One is at the tactical and operational level and then1541another is at the strategic level. I think at the tactical1542level, as we have talked about there are things we can be doing1543operationally to be doing our own salami slicing back.1544    There are new emerging defense technologies, autonomy, low-1545cost, attritable systems that we can be using ourselves and1546providing to our partners for them to get out on the water and1547start asserting their claims instead of just defending against1548PRC incursions.1549    There are things we can be doing on the development and1550assistance front to try to get ahead of the very likely forms1551of political influence operations, cyber intrusions that we1552know the PRC is conducting.1553    Again, we talked about the information domain so there are1554ways to get after this. But I guess what I would say at the--1555one thing I think we have to remember as we think about this1556issue set is when we see the PRC doing something out at Second1557Thomas Shoal or out at Scarborough Shoal, those very specific1558tactical features and locations are important but they are part1559of a bigger story, which is China's ambitions to control the1560South China Sea, to control the East Asian littoral.1561    What we need to be doing in response and in parallel to1562China's ICAD activities is not just playing whack-a-mole,1563though we should be out there defending their tactical moves,1564but rather thinking about what are the strategic actions we1565need to be taking to ensure that they cannot, in the end, have1566that kind of effective control that they want.1567    So with the Philippines, for instance, yes, we need to be1568supporting them out at Scarborough Shoal, but we ought to be1569working on our force posture in the Philippines.1570    We ought to be expanding the number of locations we are1571investing in. We ought to be investing a lot more in those1572locations to develop them. We should be bringing more advanced1573capabilities into those locations.1574    We should be operating more and more with our allies and1575partners, the Australians and the Japanese, who both have1576reciprocal access agreements now with the Philippines. They can1577be operating and supporting these EDCA sites as well. They can1578be contributing development assistance that are connecting1579roads to our military sites.1580    So when we pick up our heads a few years from now, yes,1581maybe China has more coast guard vessels around Second Thomas1582Shoal or Scarborough Reef but, hey, look, the United States has1583a collective defense pact with our partners.1584    It has got a robust rotational military presence in the1585Philippines. It has got advanced counter ship capabilities now1586in the Philippines and we are operating with our allies and1587partners like never before.1588    I think that is a strategic victory for the United States.1589That is what we ought to be aiming for.1590    Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you to all the witnesses1591and, thank you, Senator Ricketts, for our trip.1592    We literally got to see Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas1593Shoal, that whole West Philippine Sea region on our trip1594together earlier this year.1595    It was enormously illuminating, and thank you for this1596hearing.1597    Senator Ricketts. I am now going to exercise my privilege1598as chair to ask one last question.1599    Just briefly, I want to followup with Mr. Powell. Based on1600that same topic with regard to the Philippines, Senator Coons1601and I introduced the resolution celebrating the 74th1602anniversary of our defense treaty with the Philippines.1603    But what are some--I will give you an opportunity to just1604talk about some--what are some of the concrete steps we can do1605to be able to help shore up that relationship with the1606Philippines and help build their confidence and resilience1607against these--you know, these behaviors from China that are1608aggressive, coercive, illegal, and deceptive?1609    Mr. Powell. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for that1610question.1611    The Philippines, of course, is extremely dear to my heart.1612Not only have I been married to the Philippines for 35 years, I1613also have, you know, spent a lot of time in the Philippines1614working with the Philippine Government and others there.1615    So I think one of the things--you know, back to the fact1616that the Philippines is a democracy and remembering that1617letting not just the Philippine Government but the Philippine1618people know that America is behind them is really important.1619    So I commend you for the resolution. I think those kinds of1620Statements are extraordinarily important in the overall1621campaign to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the Philippines.1622    I cannot tell you how many times I was asked about the1623mutual defense treaty since early 2023 every time there was a1624ramming or a water cannoning or all kinds of things.1625    So there is a lot of concern there that they might be1626abandoned, and as a democracy it is important to note that1627there is a great deal of political warfare in the Philippines,1628that there are groups and--I mean, there was recently a large,1629lavish reception at a swanky hotel in Manila in which basically1630a Philippine council for the reunification of Taiwan assembled1631the Chinese Ambassador and a host of Philippine groups to1632promote Philippine-Chinese friendship, some of which receive1633money directly from China, some of which are supported by1634united front organizations, many very powerful business and1635other kinds of civic leaders.1636    So they are in the game very much. So anything that helps1637strengthen the U.S. message that the U.S. has committed1638because, you know, China knows about elections.1639    It knows that prior to this administration in the1640Philippines there was an administration that was much1641friendlier to it and there could be in the future, and they1642want to pave the way for that future because they believe that1643a lot more of the fruit will fall from the tree if they have a1644friendly administration.1645    So one specific recommendation that might even make Dr.1646Ratner, who used to be in the Pentagon and would have received1647briefings from his people on this idea, squirm a little bit,1648but I have actually recommended that people should go and visit1649the civilian population at Thitu Island in the Spratly1650archipelago.1651    I have studied the South China Sea for decades and I can1652tell you that we have as the United States avoided that because1653we have not wanted to sort of throw in our lot with any one1654claim on the fear that we would have to sort of try to then be1655forced to adjudicate all claims.1656    But there is a civilian population at Thitu Island. There1657is a runway. You can easily get there by aircraft, and it would1658be a tremendous show of support for a population that wakes up1659every morning and sees dozens of coast guard and maritime1660militia ships not just on the horizon but right there just a1661couple nautical miles away from their shores reminding them1662that China believes they own that island and is coming for it1663eventually.1664    So because China is pressing that claim I believe it would1665be very helpful for the United States not only to conduct1666medical civic action programs out there, bring out some1667military doctors and engineers, work alongside our Philippine1668friends and, frankly, U.S. senators should go out there and1669visit and remind them that we stand shoulder to shoulder in a1670very, very real way.1671    So thank you again, sir.1672    Dr. Ratner. Senator, could I respond to that very quickly?1673    Senator Ricketts. Yes, absolutely.1674    Dr. Ratner. Mr. Powell invoked my name. He will be happy to1675see in my written testimony that the last concrete1676recommendation that I have is that the United States actually1677revisit its position of not taking a position on the1678sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea because our1679neutrality has been existing in the context of complete PRC1680violation of international law.1681    We ought to do it carefully but I think there are models1682like the way that we approach the Senkaku Islands where we1683recognize Japanese administration without taking a position on1684sovereignty.1685    We could do something similar in the South China Sea that1686would open up exactly the kind of cooperation that Mr. Powell1687is talking about.1688    So we ought to think about how can we support our allies1689and partners in the defense of their own contested features and1690we would need a change in our overall position on the1691sovereignty disputes to do that. So that is something we ought1692to take a careful look at.1693    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.1694    Well, I want to thank all of our witnesses today for a1695really great conversation we had about what further we need to1696do to oppose the Communist China's ICAD activities in the Indo-1697Pacific. Really, really valuable.1698    I appreciate everybody's contribution and all your service1699to our great nation.1700    And with that, the hearing is over.17011702    [Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]17031704             Prepared Statements Submitted by the Witnesses17051706                 Prepared Statement of Craig Singleton17071708               China Program Director and Senior Fellow,1709                 Foundation for Defense of Democracies17101711[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]17121713                Prepared Statement of Raymond M. Powell17141715                Executive Director, Sealight Foundation17161717[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]17181719                    Prepared Statement of Ely Ratner17201721                Principal at The Marathon Initiative and1722                   Senior Advisor Clarion Strategies17231724[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]17251726                            [all]