S.Hrg.119-269

1[Senate Hearing 119-269]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                        S. Hrg. 119-26956                   THE STATE OF NUCLEAR SHIPBUILDING78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               before the1314                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER1516                                 of the1718                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES19                          UNITED STATES SENATE2021                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2223                             FIRST SESSION2425                               __________2627                             APRIL 8, 20252829                               __________3031         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services3233                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3435                 Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov3637                               ______3839                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE404162-647 PDF                WASHINGTON : 20264243                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES4445                 ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman4647DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		     JACK REED, Rhode Island48TOM COTTON, Arkansas		     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire49MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York50JONI ERNST, Iowa		     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut51DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii52KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota	     TIM KAINE, Virginia53RICK SCOTT, Florida		     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine54TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama	     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts55MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan56TED BUDD, North Carolina	     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois57ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri		     JACKY ROSEN, Nevada58JIM BANKS, Indiana		     MARK KELLY, Arizona59TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan6061                  John P. Keast, Staff Director62             Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director6364                               ______6566                        Subcommittee on Seapower6768                    RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman6970DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska		     TIM KAINE, Virginia71TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama	     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire72MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut73JIM BANKS, Indiana		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii74TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine7576                                  (ii)7778                            C O N T E N T S7980                              ----------8182                             april 8, 20258384                                                                   Page8586The State of Nuclear Shipbuilding................................     18788                           Member Statements8990Statement of Senator Rick Scott..................................     19192Statement of Senator Tim Kaine...................................     29394                           Witness Statements9596Sermon, Mr. Matthew D., Program Manager Maritime Industrial Base.     29798Weeks, Rear Admiral Todd S., USN, Program Executive Officer           499  Strategic Submarines.100101Rucker, Rear Admiral Jonathan E., USN, Program Executive Officer      5102  Attack Submarines.103104Moton, Rear Admiral Casey J., USN, Program Executive Officer          6105  Aircraft Carriers.106107Questions for the Record.........................................    42108109                                 (iii)110111                   THE STATE OF NUCLEAR SHIPBUILDING112113                              ----------114115                         TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2025116117                      United States Senate,118                          Subcommittee on Seapower,119                               Committee on Armed Services,120                                                    Washington, DC.121    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room122SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Rick Scott123(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.124    Committee Members present: Senators Scott, Sullivan,125Tuberville, Sheehy, Kaine, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, and126Kelly.127128            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT129130    Senator Scott. The hearing will come to order. In today's131Subcommittee on Seapower hearing, we're going to have an132important discussion about the state of our Navy's nuclear133shipbuilding effort.134    With us today is Rear Admiral Todd Weeks for strategic135submarines, Rear Admiral Casey Moton for aircraft carriers,136Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker for attack submarines, and Matt137Sermon, who serves as the program manager for the Navy's new138maritime industrial base office, which seeks to coordinate and139execute investments to strengthen naval shipbuilding and140maintenance. First off, thank you each of you for being here141today.142    As many as you know, I was in the Navy where I served as an143operation specialist, was a radar man, really swabbed the deck144a lot, cleaned the chains on the USS Glover. It's alarming to145me when I see some of our ships and hear about the countless146delays in production to replace them, especially when these147ships and submarines are often a crucial tool in projecting148power in our seas and around the world.149    Today, the Navy's nuclear shipbuilding efforts are riddled150with delays, workforce shortages, and industrial based strength151stretched too thin, and we're at great risk of losing ground152and falling behind adversaries like communist China. We can153look no further than our Virginia-class submarines, which are154critical America's undersea dominance or the Columbia-class155ballistic missile submarine, which was intended to replace our156aging Ohio-class submarines and is crucial to our nuclear157triad.158    This is just the start of our challenges. It's clear cause159for concern. I'm very optimistic that with a focused industrial160base President Trump's leadership in the newly announced office161of shipbuilding, we're going to get back on track and ensure162our naval forces are prepared to project power and maintain163peace through strength.164    But like any business organization in need of a turnaround,165we're going to need a plan to ensure our shipyards step up,166improve retention, invest in new technologies, and work with167industry partners to speed up production because our national168security depends on it.169    Today, the Subcommittee is seeking clear answers on how our170witnesses will deal with these challenges and deliver for the171American people. I look forward to our discussion and now I'd172like to recognize Ranking Member Kaine for his remarks.173174                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM KAINE175176    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the177witnesses. I enjoyed our talk last week and I'm looking forward178to the hearing today, and I welcome you and thank you for your179service to the Nation.180    Two weeks ago, we had a hearing in the Subcommittee on the181state of conventional shipbuilding. While today we'll focus on182nuclear shipbuilding, submarine programs and the aircraft183carrier program. Many of the same challenges apply that we184discussed at the earlier hearing. We don't yet know what the185fiscal year 2026 budget request will be for these programs, but186we do know that Secretary Hegseth has decided to try to protect187Virginia-class submarines and executive surface ships from the1888 percent budget cut drill that he directed last month, at189least in the initial phase.190    So, while we wait for budget clarity today, we can discuss191the state of the industrial base that supports our nuclear192shipbuilding program and what the Navy is doing to support that193industrial base. We also need to discuss the important194question, the big, big question of how to get Virginia-class,195Columbia-class, and Ford-class delivered on time. This is196particularly important for our submarines given the197construction schedule, operational demands, and the commitments198that we've made pursuant to the Australia, United Kingdom,199United States (AUKUS) agreement.200    We have to be open to new approaches and admit that what we201have been doing needs to change if we want better outcomes. I202want to thank the Chairman and I look forward to our witnesses'203testimony.204    Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member Kaine.205Why don't we just start? Mr. Sermon, you want to start first?206    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. Thank you.207208 STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW D. SERMON, PROGRAM MANAGER MARITIME209                        INDUSTRIAL BASE210211    Mr. Sermon. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Kaine, and212distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the213opportunity to appear before you today. As we commemorate the214250th anniversary of the Navy, we reflect on our unmatched215legacy of guaranteed freedom of the seas, a legacy enabled by216our sailors, which is not possible without the American217industrial base, its workforce, and their ability to leverage218modern manufacturing methods to build and maintain the Navy the219Nation needs.220    Today, we must confront and overcome persistent challenges221including workforce shortages and supply chain disruptions that222are causing delays in ship deliveries. In order to do this, we223must embrace a number of vital opportunities, including224adopting advanced manufacturing for our entire maritime225ecosystem, expanding and strengthening the network of226shipbuilding suppliers, leveraging the power of capital markets227for National defense at this time, and removing statutory,228regulatory, or policy driven bureaucratic barriers that stand229in the way of maximizing maritime capacity.230    The maritime industrial base program is leading efforts to231reinvigorate the industrial base in order to expand232shipbuilding capacity. In this effort, our priorities are: one,233systematically expanding and reinforcing supply chain capacity234to ensure timely delivery of critical components. Two,235addressing workforce challenges through partnering with236government and private organizations across key regions in an237all-hands-on deck effort that will attract, train, and retain238American manufacturing and engineering workers.239    The nuclear and conventional shipbuilding and repair240industrial base must hire approximately 250,000 skilled and241well compensated workers over the next decade. Three, bold and242urgent adoption of advanced manufacturing in all aspects of the243ship lifecycle. This can be done by integrating additive244manufacturing, robotics, automation, and artificial245intelligence into how we build and maintain our Navy.246    To do all of this, the Navy is working closely with our247industrial based partners and has launched nearly 1,200248supplier development, workforce, and advanced manufacturing249projects in 40 states. All of them focused on supporting250businesses, improving throughput, and updating antiquated251tooling and production processes. Foundational investments like252these take time to mature. We are planting trees, not growing253house plants.254    Since 2018, we have expanded parts delivery for submarines255by more than 250 percent. This production must more than double256again, in order to deliver the nuclear Navy that the Nation257needs. We can get this done. In parallel, we have supported258industry efforts to recruit, train, and retain over 12,600 new259employees in 2024, helping to address critical labor shortages260in skilled trades and naval engineering fields.261    We're also seeing momentum in advanced manufacturing where262the adoption of cutting-edge technologies is driving innovation263and improving productivity across the industrial base. The264Navy's Additive Manufacturing Center of Excellence in Danville,265Virginia has already printed more than 270 parts, and this year266we'll partner with the advanced manufacturing industry to267mitigate over 1,000 days of delay in parts availability.268    These efforts are on track to revolutionize critical parts269procurement with the ability to print thousands of parts270quickly and with unprecedented quality. In conclusion, our271shipbuilding industrial base stands at a pivotal moment, thanks272to strong congressional support and by investing in our273workforce, infrastructure, and manufacturing technology, we can274ensure that the United States Navy remains the world's premier275maritime force, not just today, but for the next 250 years and276beyond.277    Thank you for your dedicated support for our sailors, our278crucial industrial base workforce, and their collective279mission. I look forward to your questions.280    Senator Scott. Thank you. Admiral?281282STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL TODD S. WEEKS, USN, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE283                  OFFICER STRATEGIC SUBMARINES284285    Rear Admiral Weeks. Thank you, sir. Chairman Scott, Ranking286Member Kaine, it is my honor to be here today to address the287state of nuclear shipbuilding.288    As a program executive officer for strategic submarines, I289have cradle to grave responsibility for the sea-based leg of290the American nuclear triad, the largest and most survivable291leg. I provide proactive and focused acquisition,292modernization, and lifecycle management for both the new293Columbia-class strategic submarine and the existing Ohio-class294strategic and guided missile submarines.295    The Columbia-class is the Navy's number one acquisition296priority and a critical once in a generation recapitalization297effort for this foundational leg of the Nation's nuclear triad.298The current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force299is reaching the end of its operational life and must be300replaced to meet US strategic command operational requirements.301    In General Cotton's recent statement to this Committee, he302noted that the United States, its allies, and partners are303confronted with a deteriorating security environment. The304Chinese Communist Party's investment in the expansion of its305land, sea, and air based nuclear delivery platforms, along with306Russia maintaining the largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal307in the world, only reinforces the assertion that no portfolio308needs recapitalization more than the nuclear portfolio.309    Simply stated, building and sustaining a modernized U.S.310naval force that can stand the test of time adapt to the ever-311changing maritime threat landscape is more important now than312ever. It is a mission that we live each day. The delivery of313the lead ship in the Columbia-class, the future District of314Columbia, is projected to be 12 to 18 months late to contract.315While this delay is due to a variety of factors, it is316unacceptable.317    I have directed the shipyards to execute a bold, paradigm318shifting approach to recovered lead ship schedule. The program319is also pursuing every opportunity to drive and improve320velocity, ensuring Columbia is appropriately resourced in the321shipyards, and prioritize in the industrial base.322    The second ship, the future Wisconsin is on schedule. We323have seen positive continued performance and productivity324improvements over the lead ship. Wisconsin is approximately 5325percent ahead of where the lead ship was at the same point in326time during her construction. Early procurement and327construction activities are underway for the next five ships,328building on the learning demonstrated on Wisconsin. I would329like to thank the Committee for your steadfast support of330nuclear shipbuilding.331    Together with my counterparts, I am committed to rebuilding332our shipbuilding industrial base building and sustaining the333Navy the Nation needs. I hold myself personally accountable334for, and remain committed to providing SSBNs on time and in335budget with the ability to operate anywhere and everywhere, to336deter aggression, responding to crises whenever and wherever337they happen and to keep our seas open and free.338    Thank you for the opportunity to be to appear before you339today. I look forward to your questions.340    Senator Kaine. [Presiding] There's a vote ongoing now, so341you'll see some folks coming in and out. But Admiral Rucker,342you're up next.343344  STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JONATHAN E. RUCKER, USN, PROGRAM345              EXECUTIVE OFFICER ATTACK SUBMARINES346347    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thank you, sir. Ranking Member Kaine348and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, coming and349going, thank you for your opportunity to be here for you today.350Your continued support remains instrumental in helping the Navy351and industry build and maintain our submarine force and uplift352the industrial base to increase production and improve353operational availability.354    As the program executive officer for attack submarines, I'm355both privileged and honored to be responsible for sustainment356of the Navy's attack submarines and for the design and357acquisition of the most capable attack submarines in the world.358The Virginia-class, our Navy's unmatched undersea capability is359a key component of the United States ability to deliver peace360through strength.361    The United States force structure requirement is 66 attack362submarines. Virginia-class submarines are also a vital363component of The AUKUS partnership, which is a generational364opportunity to deepen diplomatic, security, and defense365cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including the sale of366Virginia-class submarines to Australia.367    To meet U.S. fleet requirements, the Navy must first368achieve a production cadence of one Columbia-class plus two369Virginia-class submarines per year. This is what we call 1+2.370To then meet AUKUS commitments, we'll, this will subsequently371ramp to 1+2.33. To accomplish this, the U.S. submarine372industrial base is undergoing its largest recapitalization373effort in nearly 50 years.374    Over the last decade, we have more than doubled our annual375submarine tonnage production, and we must double again this376decade. As of March, 2025, the Navy has taken delivery of 24377Virginia-class attack submarines with 14 additional submarines378under construction. In 2024, the Navy and industry team379delivered two Virginia-class submarines to the fleet, New380Jersey and Iowa. We are tracking to deliver two more submarines381in 2025, Massachusetts and Idaho.382    However, our 2024 annual production rate of Virginia-class383submarines per year was 1.13 compared to our need of 2.0. The384main causes for this are workforce challenges, material and385supplier delays, and shipbuilder facilities and infrastructure386issues, all of which are driving cost increases and scheduled387delays. Together, the Navy and industry are aggressively388addressing these challenges. In fiscal year 2018, Congress389began appropriating funding to help lift the submarine390industrial base to increase capability and capacity.391    This funding started to grow significantly in fiscal year3922023. We are executing a holistic strategy across the393shipbuilders and industrial base. Increasing production takes394time. Our dividends are not fully matured, but we are seeing395initial benefits of the investments and we expect much more to396come.397    Submarine shipbuilding and sustainment is my life, and I am398fully committed to improving things. Continued strong399collaboration between Navy, industry, and Congress is crucial400to executing these important efforts. I want to thank the401Subcommittee for your steadfast bipartisan support of the U.S.402Navy and our industrial base, and I look forward to your403questions. Thank you.404    Senator Kaine. Thanks, Admiral Rucker. Admiral Moton,405you're up.406407    STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL CASEY J. MOTON, USN, PROGRAM408              EXECUTIVE OFFICER AIRCRAFT CARRIERS409410    Admiral Moton. Ranking Member Kaine and all distinguished411Members of the Subcommittee, good afternoon and thank you for412the opportunity to discuss our Navy's vital shipbuilding413mission.414    I am honored to lead the team of sailors and Navy civilians415of the program executive office aircraft carriers. My team is416proud to both deliver and sustain these mighty instruments of417national power. We consider our mission a solemn obligation to418our Navy and our Nation. The results of our work are visible419daily from USS Harry S. Truman, operating in the Middle East,420with Carl Vincent on route to join her, to the George421Washington maintaining steady presence in the Pacific.422    We see it in our oldest aircraft carrier, USS Nimitz423beginning her final deployment after 50 years of service, and424our newest carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, continuing to bring425next generation capability to the fight as she prepares for her426upcoming second deployment.427    Our future Ford-class aircraft carriers are under428construction at Newport News Shipbuilding, where we continue429working closely with the shipbuilder to address challenges and430improve performance. CVN 79, the future USS John F. Kennedy is43195 percent complete, but delivery is pressurized by remaining432critical path work. Supply chain issues have impacted CVN 80,433the future USS Enterprise with sequence critical material434delaying the ship. We are rigorously incorporating all lessons435learned into production.436    CVN 81, the future USS Doris Miller is early in437construction but has benefited from earlier material buys and438an innovative dry dock modification that will allow439simultaneous carrier construction. The Navy and industry are440responsible and accountable to improve this performance. With441my partners here at this table, we are attacking shipbuilding442challenges with investment and improvements in our industrial443workforce, supply chain resiliency, and shipbuilding444infrastructure.445    Specific to carriers, we have transitioned new construction446to digital products, implemented projects to expand and447distribute production capacity, made focused improvements in448critical system production techniques, and worker training and449efficiency, and accelerated the adoption of advanced450manufacturing.451    Our guidepost remains our statutory force structure452requirement of 11 aircraft carriers, the most survivable,453lethal, and adaptable airfields in the world. As an enterprise,454we will deliver John F. Kennedy to the fleet on the fastest455possible path to combat readiness. We will continue to456stabilize and improve class shipbuilding production. In457service, we will continue to improve overhaul and maintenance,458and we stand ready to extend the service lives of these 50-year459platforms as appropriate, as we have already done on Nimitz and460Eisenhower.461    We will do all of this working collaboratively with462industry, knowing that we are accountable to every citizen for463providing the protection they deserve. I want to thank Congress464and specifically this Subcommittee for your steadfast support465of our Navy, our sailors, our shipbuilding mission, and our466industry that enables it. I look forward to your questions.467    [The joint prepared statement of Rear Admiral Casey J.468Moton, Rear Admiral Jonathan E. Rucker. Rear Admiral Todd S.469Weeks, and Mr. Matthew D. Sermon follows:]470 Joint Prepared Statement by Rear Admiral Casey J. Moton, Rear Admiral471  Jonathan E. Rucker. Rear Admiral Todd S. Weeks, and Mr. Matthew D.472                                 Sermon473                              introduction474    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of475the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you476today to provide an update on the Navy's nuclear shipbuilding477programs--programs that are foundational to America's military478strength, global leadership, and national security.479    This year marks the 250th anniversary of the United States Navy--a480moment to reflect on two and a half centuries of unwavering commitment481to defending American interests at sea. Since Congress authorized the482Navy's first six frigates in 1794, the United States has built and483sustained the most powerful and capable naval force the world has ever484known. That success was not inevitable--it was earned through485foresight, sustained investment, and an enduring partnership between486industry, Congress and the Navy.487    Today, that legacy is under pressure. Our adversaries are investing488heavily to challenge our maritime dominance and assert themselves as489the world's preeminent naval power. They are building fleets, expanding490shipyards, modernizing capabilities, and positioning forces to491undermine the international order and threaten regional stability. We492cannot afford to cede the advantage we have built. Maintaining our493position as the world's foremost maritime power requires bold action,494clear resolve, and continued National support.495    A superior naval force has long been a pillar of American496deterrence and global influence. At the core of that force is our497nuclear powered fleet--a critical asset that ensures global presence,498credible deterrence, and sustained combat power. Ballistic missile499submarines provide the most survivable leg of the Nation's nuclear500triad. Attack submarines deliver unmatched lethality and stealth in501undersea environments. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their502strike groups enable rapid, sustained operations across the globe--503reassuring allies, deterring adversaries, and responding decisively in504times of crisis.505    But this fleet's effectiveness depends on the strength of the506industrial base behind it. America's shipyards, suppliers, engineers,507and tradespeople are the engine of maritime readiness--and they must be508modern, resilient, and resourced to meet both today's operational509demands and tomorrow's challenges. Together with our industry partners,510we must focus on growing capacity, driving innovation, accelerating511deliveries, and modernizing production and sustainment to ensure we512stay ahead of those who seek to surpass us. We are executing a513generational shipbuilding increase as we ramp to the one Columbia-class514and two Virginia-class serial production per year, often referred to as515``1+2''. Subsequent to this, we will further ramp to 1+2.33 to support516delivery of a conventionally armed, nuclear powered attack submarine517capability to Australia under Pillar 1 Optimal Pathway of the tri-518lateral AUKUS Security Pact.519    As the current security environment becomes more complex, the U.S.520Navy is aggressively implementing new, agile ways of operating,521integrating, and maintaining our forces. We are harnessing innovation,522strengthening partnerships, and investing in the people and523infrastructure that make our maritime dominance possible. The future of524American sea power depends on the decisions we make now.525                   state of maritime industrial base526    The U.S. maritime industrial base is a critical enabler of the527Navy's ability to deliver and maintain combat capability necessary to528execute its missions around the world. The industrial base consists of529public and private shipyards, private industry partners, highly skilled530workforces, original equipment manufacturers, complex supply chains,531and organic resources. While U.S. shipbuilders continue to produce the532highest quality, safest, and most advanced warships in the world, our533maritime industrial base faces significant challenges and, as a result,534cost and schedule performance remain poor. These challenges are common535across nuclear and conventional shipbuilding with both Navy and536industry sharing responsibility. Identified challenges in nuclear537shipbuilding include atrophy of our manufacturing industrial base,538workforce shortages related to macroeconomic and demographic trends,539diminished workforce and supervisor proficiency, supply chain540disruptions, slow adaptation of advanced manufacturing technology, and541limited overall investment across the industrial base.542    Historic underinvestment and industry consolidation following the543end of the cold war have led to inadequate capacity at our nuclear544shipbuilders and in their supply chains, leading to workforce-545constrained build schedules that do not meet the needs of the Navy and546the Nation today. The remaining prime shipbuilders and subcontractors547face shortages of available skilled workers in both the trades548(welders, pipefitters, electricians, etc.) and design/engineering549workforce leading to schedule disruptions, delayed delivery of critical550components, and associated cost and schedule challenges. The Navy faces551its own challenges, as well, with burdensome acquisition processes and552overly cumbersome technical and logistics requirement and processes,553along with historically inconsistent demand signals--factors that554discourage innovation and participation from non-traditional industry555partners.556               columbia-class submarine program overview557    The Columbia-class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) is the Navy's558top acquisition priority and is a critical once-in-a-generation nuclear559recapitalization effort for the Navy and the Nation's nuclear triad.560The current Ohio-class SSBN force is reaching the end of its561operational life and must be replaced to meet U.S. Strategic Command562(USSTRATCOM) strategic deterrence requirements.563    The first Columbia-class submarine, the future USS District of564Columbia, must be ready for patrol by fiscal year 2031 to meet565USSTRATCOM requirements. The Columbia-class is the largest, most566powerful, and most advanced submarine this Nation has ever designed or567built--approximately 2.5 times the size of a current Virginia-class568submarine, and 10 percent larger than the existing Ohio-class569submarines. It is designed for a longer service life, better570operational availability, and better survivability than the Ohio-571class--designed to be effective and relevant through at least the5722080's. Columbia, with the TRIDENT D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) missile,573will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the Nation's sea574based strategic deterrent through the rest of this century.575    The lead ship of the class started full construction in fiscal year5762021 and is more than 50 percent complete. This ship is the first SSBN577built in 30 years, and the first lead ship of an SSBN class built in578almost 50 years. Based on shipbuilder performance, supply chain579challenges, and the complexity of first-of-class construction and580testing of this new submarine, delivery is projected to be 12 to 18581months late to contract delivery date. The Navy is working with both582General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) and Huntington Ingalls Newport583News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) to implement an aggressive, alternative584build strategy to recover up to 12 months of schedule, improve overall585performance, and deliver the lead ship as rapidly as possible.586    The second ship of the class, the future USS Wisconsin, commenced587full construction in October 2023. Relative to the lead ship,588performance is improving through learning, updated build plans, and589increased proficiency. This ship is on schedule to deliver within590contractual schedules.591    Through the Polaris Sales Agreement, the Navy is supporting the592United Kingdom's four-ship Dreadnought-class SSBN, a generational593recapitalization of the UK's Continuous At-Sea Deterrent. With the594Common Missile Compartment, the shipbuilders provide missile tubes and595associated components for both Columbia and Dreadnought.596    Continued adequate and on-time funding for advance procurement,597advance construction, and continuous production for the class, as598reflected in our budget requests, is critical to improved supply chain599performance, reducing construction schedule risk, enabling cost600savings, and meeting USSTRATCOM requirements throughout the Ohio to601Columbia transition. The Navy appreciates Congress's continued support602of the Columbia-class as a national priority.603               virginia-class submarine program overview604    Virginia-class fast attack submarines (SSN) provide critical multi-605mission undersea warfighting capabilities. As of February 2025, the606Navy has taken delivery of 24 Virginia-class submarines with 14607additional under contract. USS New Jersey (SSN 796) delivered in April6082024 and USS Iowa (SSN 797) delivered in December 2024. The Navy and609industry team is tracking to deliver two more submarines in 2025, the610future USS Massachusetts (SSN 798) and the future USS Idaho (SSN 799).611The second ship of the Block V contract (future USS Arizona (SSN 803))612will introduce the Virginia Payload Module, which incorporates four613additional large diameter payload tubes to help mitigate the loss of614undersea strike capability with the retirement of Ohio-class guided615missile submarines (SSGN). All Block V ships will incorporate acoustic616superiority improvements.617    Beginning in 2011, the Virginia-class program began a ramp to618achieve a production rate of two SSNs per year in support of Navy force619structure requirements. Construction performance achieved a build rate620close to 1.9 per year for approximately 3 years, but post-COVID [Corona621Virus Disease] performance has dropped to a production rate of 1.13 at622the end of CY 2024. Key drivers of the drop in production include623workforce challenges, first time quality, material and supplier delays,624and lead ship issues associated with the Virginia Payload Module625variant. The Navy is working closely with the shipbuilders to drive626improvement throughout the Virginia enterprise.627    The Navy appreciates the support of Congress in providing an628additional $5.7 billion of fiscal year 2025 supplemental funding to629fully fund cost increases in the two fiscal year 2024 boats and the630single fiscal year 2025 boat, as well as providing wage increases and631funding shipyard productivity enhancements across the nuclear632shipbuilding portfolio. These investments are critical to address633issues associated with workforce development and retention along with634recapitalization of shipyard industrial facilities and equipment.635             state of submarine construction & path forward636    In February 2023, the submarine Program Executive Officers (PEOs)637and shipbuilders (GDEB and HII-NNS) established a production execution638plan to ramp to serial production of 1+2 by the end of CY2028 ''),639which would then serve as the foundation to ramp to 1+2.33 in the early6402030's to support AUKUS.641    With the Navy's additional investments to strengthen the submarine642industrial base as well as ongoing Navy and industry actions, we've643seen performance improvements in the following areas: hiring at644shipbuilders increased by 41 percent in 2023 and exceeded hiring645targets in 2024; capacity of vendors in key market spaces has646increased, shoring up single source suppliers and developing new647suppliers to ensure material is available; and strategic outsourcing648and manufacturing technology are on track to support increased649production and material availability.650    Despite these improvements, we have not observed the needed and651expected ramp-up in Columbia-class and Virginia-class submarine652production rates necessary to keep pace with the 1+2 strategy. The653Navy, submarine shipbuilders, and supply chain enterprise654underestimated the effort required to transition from the peace-655dividend era, low-rate submarine production and sustainment to the656increased 1+2 production needed for an era of near-peer competition.657While both submarine programs have experienced delays, there are unique658challenges in each program that we are aggressively working to correct.659    To help address this, both Columbia-class and Virginia-class660Submarine Programs, in coordination with Supervisor of Shipbuilding,661GDEB, and HII-NNS, have instituted intrusive program office deck plate662presence to help inform and drive improvement. In addition, the Navy663and the shipbuilders conducted in-depth reviews into the underlying664drivers of performance issues to execute lines of effort to drive665increased production and inform new production rate projections.666Looking ahead, increased improvement efforts will continue, and--667coupled with ongoing investments--are expected to produce improvements668in calendar year 2025 with additional gains projected across the FYDP.669                  ford-class aircraft carrier program670    Ford-class aircraft carriers (CVN) are the next generation of671aircraft carriers designed to improve survivability, increase672lethality, and significantly drive down total ownership cost over their673expected 50-year service life. The replacement of legacy systems and674multiple improved design features are meant to reduce maintenance and675manning needs and allow service for decades with reduced periods of676downtime. Despite enduring their own higher first-in-class and677subsequent platform cost and schedule challenges, Ford-class carriers678are beginning to make an impact on the Fleet.679    The USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) completed a highly successful680deployment in January 2024 in support of Combatant Commander681objectives, including the initial response to the Hamas attack on682Israel, with critical new systems performing well. CVN 78 spent 239683days underway, sailed over 83,476 nautical miles, and worked with 17684nations throughout its deployment during critical strategic exercises.685Her crew and embarked air wing logged over 17,826 flight hours and68610,396 sorties, conducted 33,444 flight deck moves, 3,124 hangar bay687aircraft moves, 2,883 aircraft elevator moves, 16,351 aircraft fueling688evolutions, and transferred 8,850 pallets of cargo and mail. CVN 78 is689currently completing workups for her next deployment, upcoming shortly.690    John F Kennedy (CVN 79) is nearly 95 percent construction complete691and has a contract delivery date of July 2025, however, we assess692significant pressure to that date. The pressure meet the contractual693delivery date is driven by critical path challenges, primarily in the694Advanced Weapons Elevators and Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment.695Initial class design challenges are resolved, as evidenced by Ford's696successful operations, however, early class production-focused697challenges and associated learning continue on CVN 79. All lessons698learned and improvements by both the Navy and industry teams are being699implemented in-construction on CVN 80 and 81. The Navy and shipbuilder700HII-NNS are hyper-focused on a CVN 79 delivery plan that results in the701fastest path to a combat ready CVN, crew, and air wing.702    Enterprise (CVN 80) construction is 44 percent complete, and Doris703Miller (CVN 81) 20 percent complete, with Doris Miller's material704procurements pacing significantly ahead of previous Ford-class carriers705thanks to the two-ship buy. CVN 80 continues to experience schedule706challenges driven by late sequence critical material that will707significantly delay delivery past the contractual date. The Navy708continues to work with our shipbuilding partners and critical path709vendors to identify levers for schedule risk reductions. CVN 81 risk is710also reduced by earlier material procurement and the completion of the711shipbuilder's new construction dry dock for simultaneous CVN712construction.713    Despite the construction challenges on CVN 80, the Navy remains714committed to reducing and controlling the cost of Ford-class aircraft715carriers and continues to benefit from the $4 billion acquisition716savings achieved through the two-ship block buy contract award for CVN71780 and CVN 81. Cost growth to date has not eroded the two-ship savings718assessment. Additionally, the aircraft carrier industrial base has719significant overlap with the submarine industrial base, both at the720shipyard and at major suppliers. The Navy's investments in the721submarine and maritime industrial bases have in many cases benefited722aircraft carrier programs by improving performance, efficiency, and723capacity at critical suppliers, which will help to realize the designed724Ford-class life cycle cost savings of $5 billion per ship when compared725to Nimitz-class carriers.726                    maritime industrial base program727    With the help of Congress, the U.S. Navy is addressing these728challenges through a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation effort to729develop and nurture the shipbuilding industry with significant730investment in the industrial base that is required to meet a731generational increase in demand for shipbuilding. Since 2018, over $10732billion has been appropriated for SIB efforts. The Navy's strategy to733improve the health of our MIB is focused on six key lines of effort:734growing capability and capacity in the supply chain, modernizing735shipbuilder infrastructure, expanding capacity of key suppliers to take736on work traditionally executed by shipbuilders, developing the critical737maritime manufacturing workforce, operationalizing advanced738manufacturing technology, and improving government oversight.739    In September 2024, the Navy established the MIB Program Office to740lead enterprise efforts to help restore America's shipbuilding capacity741and to ensure the Navy can build and sustain the fleet required to742support the National Defense Strategy. This strategic reorganization743integrates the submarine industrial base (SIB) and surface combatant744industrial base programs into a cohesive entity focused on the overall745health of the maritime enterprise. The transition to the MIB Program746represents a comprehensive approach to revitalizing America's747shipbuilding and ship sustainment ecosystems, enabling the Navy to748holistically address challenges and opportunities, respond to a749comprehensive Navy demand signal, while also opening the aperture on750efforts and investments to meet future defense demands more751efficiently.752    The Navy has implemented a data-driven and data-informed process to753ensure our investments and initiatives are targeting the primary754needle-movers and enablers of shipbuilding and ship sustainment755schedules. As part of this process, we assess and track impacts of Navy756investment at multiple levels. At the individual project level, the757Navy implements discrete, measurable return on investment metrics for758each project with a mandated feedback loop to measure progress. At the759aggregate level, we assess multiple individual projects with shared760objectives; and at the portfolio level, we assess projects and761aggregate-level impacts relative to production schedule drivers. The762Navy's data-based assessment and decisionmaking process for industrial763base investment enables a standard approach to assessing impact and764identifying challenges and opportunities, improving coordination, and765integrating perspectives among a range of stakeholders. Collectively,766these efforts support flexible decisionmaking to meet a dynamic supply767chain environment.768    The Navy is seeing early indications that investments appropriated769to date are helping to stabilize targeted sectors of the industrial770base that provide critical materials for new construction programs and771in-service ships. Since fiscal year 2018, we have launched more than772725 supplier development projects with more than 300 suppliers across77333 states to add capability, capacity, and resiliency to the supply774chain, including developing alternate suppliers for critical775components. The Navy has invested more than $1 billion over the past776few years to improve the on-time delivery of components that are build777sequence-critical for nuclear shipbuilding programs--material that must778be delivered on time to maintain production schedules. The Navy is also779executing strategic outsourcing efforts to smartly shift some workload780to other shipbuilders and key suppliers to enable long-term sustainable781growth in capacity to deliver the submarines that we must have. This782includes the innovative partnership with private capital and industry783to create the United Submarine Alliance Fund and the subsequent784purchase of prime shipbuilding industry land in Mobile, Alabama.785    The Navy's six regional Talent Pipeline Programs have placed more786than 6,700 trades workers in the maritime sector and, through our787partnership with the Southeastern New England Defense Industry788Alliance, more than 6,750 workers have been trained and placed in the789shipbuilding industrial base. The Accelerated Training in Defense790Manufacturing rapid trades training program in Danville, Virginia has791trained more than 875 students in key maritime trades, and in January7922025, opened the National Training Center which will scale the program793to 1,000 graduates per year by the end of 2025.794    The Navy is working with shipbuilders, suppliers, and a consortium795of non-traditional companies and academic partners to move shipbuilding796into the era of advanced manufacturing and automation, leveraging797commercially proven technologies like additive manufacturing (AM) and798robotics at scale across the industrial base while working to integrate799next generation capabilities like artificial intelligence to improve800efficiency and productivity. The Navy's Additive Manufacturing Center801of Excellence (AM CoE) in Danville made significant progress in802maturing and operationalizing additive manufacturing, printing more803than 350 parts and leading efforts to scale AM by producing production-804ready technical data packages, responding to emergent material needs,805centralizing non-recurring engineering, and qualifying AM suppliers to806enable parts production at scale. The AM CoE is already helping get our807ships back to sea, where the AM CoE has printed numerous parts for808ships and submarines in response to emergent needs, saving over 900809days of delay to date relative to traditional procurement paths. The810CoE is on path to print an additional 50 parts in 2025. The combined811efforts of the Navy's MIB Program are focused on improving elements812that impact nuclear shipbuilding schedules.813                               conclusion814    As we commemorate the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy this year,815we reflect on a legacy built on strength, sacrifice, and an enduring816commitment to protect our Nation's interests at sea. That legacy817endures today through the unmatched strategic power of our nuclear818fleet.819    Ballistic missile submarines form the bedrock of our Nation's820strategic deterrent, providing an enduring and survivable capability821that ensures any adversary must think twice before threatening the822United States or its allies. Fast attack submarines deliver asymmetric823advantage--capable of operating undetected across the world's oceans to824gather intelligence, hunt enemy submarines, and deliver precision825strike. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers serve as unmatched826instruments of national power, enabling sustained air operations,827supporting joint force integration, and reassuring allies through828persistent presence in areas of strategic importance.829    Together, these platforms form the backbone of the Navy's ability830to deter aggression, defend the homeland, and uphold the international831rules-based order. But their strength depends on the health and832resilience of the industrial base that builds and sustains them.833Maintaining and enhancing this base is not just a strategic necessity,834it is a generational obligation.835    The Department of the Navy remains committed to working alongside836Congress, industry, and our partners to accelerate production,837strengthen our supply chains, and develop the skilled workforce we need838to, deliver these vital assets on time and on budget. We owe it to our839warfighters, our allies, and the American people.840    As we look to the future, our responsibility is clear: to ensure841the U.S. Navy remains the world's premier maritime force--ready,842resilient, and capable--for the next 250 years and beyond.843    Thank you for your continued support.844845    Senator Kaine. Great. We will jump in. I'll begin with a 5-846minute round of questions. I know then the Chairman should847return promptly and I'll go vote. Let me ask a question general848before I get into the particular platforms, which is the849adjudication of resources and workforce to these three very850important platforms: Columbia-class, very important, Virginia-851class, very important carrier, very important.852    You cite some of the reasons for delays or not being able853to do the work we need to do in a timely fashion. The reasons854you cite are similar supply chain issues, workforce issues. As855you work together with the two primary shipyards, from a Navy856standpoint, how are you sort of prioritizing and adjudicating857the, you know, progress on Virginia-class vis-a-vis Columbia858vis-a-vis carrier? If you could talk about that please?859    Admiral Moton. Sir, I'll just briefly open up by, obviously860all of the platforms are important. It has to be in all of the861above strategy. Columbia is clearly our highest program862priority, but the carriers bring in a central mission, and863Virginia is critically important to the fight. We work864together, we have to do what makes our programs most efficient,865but we work together every day ensuring that our plans for both866shipyards support construction to meet our objectives for both.867    We work with Navy leadership to ensure that we do that.868Trade-offs have to be made at some point and there is a balance869process. Our going in position is that we have to accomplish it870all and that's what our plan is designed to do.871    Senator Kaine. I completely agree, but your point about the872Columbia being the primary acquisition priority, that is873because it's the one place where we cannot have a gap. We874cannot have a gap in the triad. You have been able, I think875Admiral Weeks, you've been able to manage the gap a little bit876through the extension of the useful life of the Ohio-class. So877that's helpful. Columbia has to kind of take lead as we're878trying to adjudicate because this is an area where no gap is879really allowable. Is that correct?880    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. So I 100 percent agree with881Admiral. We work very hard to make sure that the programs don't882come into competition with each other, because the only thing883that loses when we do that is the American people. Absolutely,884Columbia is the Navy's number one acquisition priority. As you885state, we are doing select service life extensions for our886Ohio-class submarines to make sure that we have sufficient887margin to make sure that we continuously meet the United States888Strategic Command (STRATCOM) requirement for 10 operational889SSBNs. Yes, sir.890    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. Admiral Rucker, please891give us an update on the status of the contract for the two892fiscal year 2024 Virginia-class option votes and the 5.7893million in emergency funding Congress provided in the894Continuing Resolution (CR) for fiscal year 2025.895    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thank you for the question, sir. I896would also echo the importance of all the programs. Where we897stand right now is we on the fiscal year 2024 ships, which is898two boats as well as the 5.7 billion. We have finished up899primary negotiations. We're finishing up documentation as well900as getting final approvals, answering questions for the various901stakeholders to be able to support awarding the contract in the902near term.903    Senator Kaine. When you say near term, give me a sum904estimate of what near term means.905    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. Right now, as we finish up906answering questions making sure that the documentation is907correct depending as we finish those, we're kind of in the908final throws. So I don't want to give you a time because it's a909little bit contract sensitive, but I would commit to you that910it's not too far in the distant.911    Senator Kaine. Great. Well, you know, this Committee and912the full Committee is going to be deeply involved between now913and the end of June on the National Defense Authorization Act914(NDAA). So I hope that we can have a solid answer on that one915as we get into the finalization of the committee's work916product.917    Last year we had some significant discussion about the918Surface Advanced Warfighting School (SAWS) proposal that was919made by industry with respect to this particular platform. Now920that's not in your control. That is probably Secretary of921Defense (Sec Def) and White House and Office of Management and922Budget. But ever since the proposal came to light last year,923I've had two basic questions. If we don't do SAWS, what do we924do instead?925    What can we do to make sure that we don't end up in a926position where we need a proposal like SAWS in the future?927Could you share your thoughts on those two questions?928    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, thanks for that question, sir.929What I would say is the most important thing, whichever path we930choose, whether it to your term SAWS or a different path, the931main thing we're focused on is outcomes. What we were able to932do through the analysis that we did over the last year or two,933is clearly identify across both shipbuilders and the Navy what934investments would be required, what's required with wages.935    So in the end, we're looking and really do appreciate all936the congressional support for the money we need for the 24937ships and the anomaly funding because that has investments and938wages in there to get after what we need. So right now, we're939focused on working with senior leadership to achieve those940outcomes, which is increase submarine production to deliver the941submarines the Nation needs.942    Senator Kaine. I'm assuming the second half of my question,943what do we do to avoid getting in a position like this in the944future? The outcome strategy has to be one that's sustainable945and not just episodic?946    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. I would agree. The goal is947the ramp to that 1+2 in the most efficient and a quick process948that we can.949    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield to you.950    Senator Scott [Presiding] Senator Hirono.951    Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.952Chairman several reports highlight significant workforce953shortages across the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base,954particularly in skilled labor necessary for new ship955construction. Without addressing this issue, we risk continued956delays and increased costs in delivering much needed vessels.957    So, my questions, what specific actions is the Navy taking958to recruit, train, and retain a skilled workforce to support959shipbuilding efforts? By the way, and what is causing the labor960shortage issues that I just referred to?961    Mr. Sermon. Thank you, ma'am. I'll actually hit the second962question first because I think it frames out the overall963answer. Over the last if I go back 40 years to 1985 when we964were producing submarines specifically and aircraft carriers at965the rate that we need to now, we were about 30 percent966manufacturing as a Nation, our percentage of our workforce.967Today we're about 12.968    So, in a more service-based economy, it makes competition969for people, for resources really challenging. What we are doing970is really a three-pronged approach, right? It is actually, you971know attracting workforce. We've established972buildsubmarines.com campaign that has resulted in 2.7 million973job applications with thousands and thousands of jobs on a974website that we work with a nonprofit partner and gotten975attention kind of across the industrial base. That's an976attraction example.977    In training, we've worked both with the shipbuilders now978working with the public shipyards as well starting relatively979recently with the formation of the Maritime Industrial Base980(MIB) program and working with the supply chains across six of981our most intense regions to support partnerships between982community colleges and those supply chain partners to do that.983    Finally you know, retention. We have additional work to do984here, but our critical team that's building and maintaining our985nuclear ships should be paid more than the service industry986wage. Over time, that wage gap that we had for many years has987gone away. So, you know, we're interested in addressing that,988but also very critically we have to train supervisors.989    Another thing that causes retention issues is inexperienced990or poorly trained supervisors, and we have the least991experienced supervisors that we've had at any point in our992history that we can mine data for, and so we have to address993that issue as well.994    Senator Hirono. Clearly, without an adequate workforce, and995you have retirements, you have people, all of that, that you996have to be very focused. Are you focused on the areas that I997talked about? It doesn't, you know, it doesn't happen. The998workforce doesn't happen because it's a good thing. You have to999be very intentional about getting the people you need and to1000retain them. So, I conclude that that's what you're doing.1001    Mr. Sermon. Yes. Yes, ma'am.1002    Senator Hirono. So, one of the other issues is that there1003are always massive cost overruns. The estimates that we get for1004how much a ship will cost usually is way off. Is there a way1005that you can better tell us what the costs are so that we're1006not facing massive overruns due to basically an inability to1007estimate what the cost will be over time? Have you thought1008about using an independent entity to estimate the cost that1009might be involved?1010    Admiral Moton. Yes, ma'am.1011    Senator Hirono. Who wants to respond to that?1012    Admiral Moton. I will do that, ma'am.1013    Senator Hirono. Go ahead.1014    Admiral Moton. In general, in shipbuilding, you know, good1015cost estimates are key to informing the process. They're key to1016understanding the business case. I know that's recognized as1017the best case in shipbuilding. I know that Government1018Accountability Office (GAO) has recognized that and the1019business case itself as best practices for shipbuilding. So, I1020completely agree. Our process is set up so that when we are1021getting ready to procure a new class or new ships, we actually1022have independent cost estimates.1023    There's a team that we work closely with, but does their1024own cost estimates depending on the buy, we often have other1025sources of cost. We talk to Congressional Budget Office (CBO)1026and others. So we do take several inputs all designed to1027increase the fidelity of those estimates and improve our1028budgets.1029    We then obviously have to perform. The other half of your1030question is cost efficiency. Clearly that's part of the1031National efforts that Mr. Sermon talks about and that we're1032working at each of our shipbuilders to improve their cost1033performance.1034    Senator Hirono. I can't tell if my time is up, I think it1035is. So I will submit other questions for the record, Mr.1036Chairman. Thank you.1037    Senator Scott. When you contract with the private sector,1038do you mandate that they contract or do they voluntarily bid1039and not do what they said they're going to do? Voluntarily, you1040don't have a mandate that they have to sign a contract with1041you, right?1042    Admiral Moton. Sir, it depends in which area of1043shipbuilding. I know certainly in aircraft carriers and nuclear1044shipbuilding, our shipbuilders, you know, we have our two1045primary builders. For aircraft carriers, Newport News1046Shipbuilding is our only supplier. It doesn't mean that we1047don't hold them accountable. It doesn't mean that we don't1048aggressively look at their bids. But we do have to partner with1049them and collaborate as we do that. I do believe that we can do1050both.1051    Senator Scott. Senator, are you ready to go or are you,1052okay, Senator Shaheen.1053    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all1054for being here today. I'm sorry I missed your testimony. So, if1055you've addressed the questions that I'm going to ask, please1056forgive me.1057    I know we're here to have a conversation about building the1058Navy's nuclear fleet, but we also need to maintain those ships1059once they're built. That maintenance and sustainment mission is1060one that I'm very focused on because the Portsmouth Naval1061Shipyard is half in New Hampshire and half in Maine. So, we1062claim it. So, Mr. Sermon, how is the Navy prioritizing those1063Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) investments to ensure1064that we have the public shipyards that are going to be1065necessary to maintain the fleet?1066    Mr. Sermon. Thank you for the question, ma'am. My1067organization actually works closely with the SIOP office on the1068intersection between those fundamental infrastructure1069investments and things like dry docks and buildings at our1070public shipyards and how my organization is pressing to use1071additional advanced manufacturing. So how do we put together1072the new facilities the additional people needed with advanced1073manufacturing?1074    So, working very closely with them on that, and, you know,1075understand, there's you know, particularly at Portsmouth, as I1076happen to know, a very mature SIOP program ongoing and tracking1077with them as the new dry docks come in, as the new buildings1078come in, how do we best leverage technology and the workforce1079efforts that we're doing across New England frankly from1080Electric Boat to Bath Iron Works (BIW) and with Portsmouth. How1081do we put all those things in battery together and the1082organizations really focused around putting all the things the1083workforce to manufacturing technology and the infrastructure1084with these partners together for better results.1085    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, and as I'm sure you know1086since you sound like you've been up to Portsmouth, the work1087that's going on there is going to make them much more efficient1088in terms of the job that they're doing, which will integrate1089better with the shipbuilding that's happening at BIW and1090Electric Boat.1091    Mr. Sermon. Yes, ma'am.1092    Senator Shaheen. I want to followup on Senator Hirono's1093question about workforce. I appreciated the comments that folks1094made about the effort to hire, recruit, and retain skilled1095workers. It's been an ongoing challenge at the shipyard. I know1096as people have retired because one of the challenges is just1097our unemployment rate is so low, there are a lot of options for1098people. The uncertainty right now around what's happening in1099the Department of Defense has created a lot of anxiety and1100concern that it's going to make the situation worse.1101    So, I know that the Department of Defense (DOD) has1102indicated that our public shipyards should be exempt from1103policies like the Deferred Resignation program, the mass1104firings, but my understanding is also that the actual policy1105guidance has been very slow to arrive. So, what can you say1106that will reassure folks that that policy guidance is actually1107going to come and they don't need to worry about their current1108jobs and look for something else because we do value the job1109that they're performing. I guess that's for you, Mr. Sermon.1110    Mr. Sermon. Thank you, ma'am. What I can say is that I am1111confident in the demand signal for submarines. I'm confident in1112the demand signal for repairing submarines and quite frankly,1113because you talked about BIW and that work too, as my1114organization reaches to support across shipbuilding and ship1115repair very confident in our need for surface ships and that1116continued work ongoing. Honestly, that's what I would say is1117I'm confident in that demand signal for the Navy.1118    Senator Shaheen. Well, I agree with that, but I guess it1119doesn't address the policy guidance question and the slowness1120with which the Secretary's office, I guess, has come down to1121reassure people that they're not going to be fired. I don't1122know if somebody else would like to address that.1123    Admiral Moton. Ma'am, I would just offer at the general, I1124think all of us would agree that we need a strong professional1125workforce in shipbuilding and ship sustainment, including at1126Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and all of our naval shipyards. You1127mentioned the exemptions that have been announced for the1128public shipyard workers. I think all of us also earnestly have1129to agree though that we need to perform as efficiently as we1130can.1131    Senator Shaheen. I would just point out that in Portsmouth,1132they have been on time and on budget.1133    Admiral Moton. Yes, ma'am. I would just close by saying1134that it's our job to do both. To have that professional1135workforce and to be efficient.1136    Senator Shaheen. Well, I would hope that when possible, you1137would urge that the policy guidance reflect that intent.1138    Admiral Moton. Yes, ma'am.1139    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1140    Senator Scott. Senator Tuberville.1141    Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for this1142hearing. I hadn't been in this business long, but I've noticed1143shortcomings of shipbuilding since I've been on this Committee1144and Armed Service Committee. We build components for1145submarines, the Columbia-class and the Virginia-class at Austal1146in Mobile, probably most of you know that. It's pretty new to1147us, but I've noticed a recruiting as Senator was alluding to1148workforce.1149    I know Austal has gone out and going through fast food1150joints and everything else, trying to find welders and people1151that can actually work and understand it. So it's an ongoing1152process. Admiral Weeks, how does this module production support1153your goal of increasing summary and construction rates?1154    Rear Admiral Weeks. Sir, thank you. Thank you for that1155question. So, as we look at the constrained capacity in our1156primary building yards, it's really important that we recognize1157that broadening that shipbuilding industrial base, the1158shipbuilding base beyond those two yards is really the1159opportunity we need to be able to, again, bring more folks to1160bear, bring, you know different geographical regions to bear,1161and alleviate the strain on our primary yards, right?1162    That will then allow them to do most efficiently what only1163they can do, which is things like outfitting, final assembly,1164and testing. So both----1165    Senator Tuberville. Are we seeing an increase in production1166by doing this?1167    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. Sir, it has been, you know,1168anytime you put something new in a new facility that's not done1169that kind of work before, you expect that it's going to take a1170little bit of time to come up to speed. That's exactly what's1171happening. We are now, you know, especially with Austal, we've1172been on the path long enough now that we're starting to see the1173improvement that we expected.1174    Both Admiral Rucker and I have been down to Austal multiple1175times partnering with both Electric Boat and the company there1176to make sure that they're on track to get where they need to be1177and, you know, they're doing well. Yes, sir.1178    Senator Tuberville. Yes. You think it'll help us catch up1179with the Chinese and their expansion of their submarines?1180They're really, they're flying past us. You think it's going to1181be possible for this type of procedure to really help catch the1182Chinese?1183    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. I think it's absolutely1184critical that we expand our industrial base. That is the only1185way we're going to be able to compete. Yes, sir.1186    Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Admiral Rucker, what can the1187Navy and Congress do to accelerate outsourcing of module1188production?1189    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thank you for the question, sir. I1190agree with everything Admiral Weeks said and the importance of1191outsourcing. Where we stand today, we have a goal by 2026 to1192get up to about 7 million man-hours annually. That's equivalent1193of a surface ship destroyer from our submarine yards out to the1194industrial base. As of end of 2024, we were at about 3 million1195hours, so we're about halfway there.1196    As Admiral Weeks said, we've been down to Austal. They've1197already delivered the first two large submodules for Virginia-1198class. They've got three more they're working right now. The1199next one's going to be delivering this summer, and then they1200keep on going. We need that strategic outsourcing to increase1201the overall capability and capacity for large structural1202fabrication, machining, electrical. So we're going to continue1203to work with the shipbuilders to ensure that we can execute1204that efficiently and effectively.1205    Senator Tuberville. Admiral Moton, any thoughts on1206strategic outsourcing as a method to increase our shipyard1207output?1208    Admiral Moton. Yes, Senator. I completely agree with my1209colleagues on the importance. I think it's a critical part of1210our strategy, as you say, to improve our pace of shipbuilding.1211I would note in the example of Austal, the aircraft elevators1212for CVN 80 and 81 are both being built there as well. So we've1213done that.1214    Closer to Hampton Roads, outsourcing has been an important1215part of Newport News Shipbuilding strategy to improve on1216aircraft carrier production. They've gone to several suppliers1217to help with construction of modules, including a site just1218across the river in the Hampton Roads area that's focused on1219adding real estate and the ability to do panels more quickly to1220support our carrier shipbuilding. So I agree, it's critical.1221    Senator Tuberville. Now, visiting Austal, I noticed that1222especially in submarines, Nickel is a huge part of very1223important parts of the submarine and our supply chain there.1224Any three of you can you give update on, do we have a, a better1225supply of nickel now? Is it getting worse? Because we don't1226have a lot of nickel in our country. Anybody want to answer it?1227Mr. Sermon?1228    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Nickel is1229as you point out, sir, is among the fundamental metals and1230alloys that we're continuing to work with OSD, Office of1231Secretary of Defense, to take a very careful look at and1232address. As you pointed out, we do continue to have both price1233fluctuations, which are of course related to supply but1234committed to addressing those, sir.1235    Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Just one other question if I1236could. Mr. Sermon, the Navy and Capstone Investments put $1501237million each to buy land from Alabama shipyard just recently1238which is just next to Austal. Can you describe how this1239partnership came about and what's your plans for growing the1240industrial base using, you know, this land? Do you know1241anything about this?1242    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. I'm familiar, and thank you for the1243question. So, when we talked about outsourcing and we1244understand as Admiral Rucker and Admiral Weeks pointed out1245we're about 3 million hours into that outsourcing that we have1246to do annually, we have to get to seven. We need as an1247enterprise, we need additional space, we need additional1248workforce, we need additional production.1249    We've got a very promising work started at Austal. We've1250got work started at BAE Systems in Jacksonville. We've got work1251started at Rhodes in Philadelphia as well, that are really1252going to bring us into battery. More land is needed, more you1253know, waterfront land. That facility that is Alabama shipyard,1254actually 60 acres of that 355 acres there will remain as in1255battery maintaining our military sealift command.1256    Much of the rest of that, our intention in an opportunity1257zone public private partnership is to work to bring that land1258into battery, much like it was that exact same land was in1259battery building liberty ships and tankers during World War II,1260is to bring that in battery for supply chain activities, for1261submarine modules, and most importantly from my perspective,1262advanced manufacturing that will fundamentally teach us across1263the entire industrial base, the entire nation, how to build1264ships, unmanned vehicles, and other kinds of naval activities1265better and more efficiently.1266    Senator Tuberville. Yes, I'd love to get into the cell1267drone discussion, but thank you, Mr. Chairman.1268    Senator Scott. Thank you, Senator. So first off, thanks1269each of you for your answers. Mr. Sermon, so you run the1270maritime industrial based program. Since 2018, you've received1271funding above normal funding. So how much is it and what's the1272return that we can tell our taxpayers?1273    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Since12742018, we've received about $6.7 billion that's focused on the12751+2 mission. Then I believe around $3.16 billion that's focused1276on submarine sustainment mission. Those have been focused in a1277handful of areas, as we mentioned, supply chain uplift, what1278we've seen there, and that's where we started. Fiscal year 20181279to 2022 is focused on supply chain uplift.1280    The statistics we have from the projects that took place1281between, or were funded between 2018 and 2022 and together with1282that and the rising demand signal, we've actually increased the1283parts output from 16 percent of what is required in order to1284execute 1+2 to just over 40 percent. We have to continue to1285advance that, and you know, the plan for the money that's in1286battery now, we haven't seen the results yet because it takes1287between 24 and 48 months, depending on the type of project to1288really bring those things into battery.1289    But 1,200 projects across workforce, across supply chain1290and across advanced manufacturing are in battery working to get1291our production rates better, sir.1292    Senator Scott. You know what I don't get is, I never1293understand how with government, private companies can bid, not1294do their contract, and then somehow government's responsible1295for somehow putting up more money to get something done. It1296seems like if they bid up for something, they know what1297employees cost, it's their responsibility to go get these1298employees, not government's responsibility.1299    So, it's never made sense to me. So, let's talk about1300contracts. So, you all, every one of you have dealt with1301companies that have not performed on their contract. Do they1302have any negative, did anything bad happen to them? Do they,1303like, do they have penalties? What's the repercussions of not1304doing what they said, they're the ones that committed to it.1305You're not the one committed to it. I guess all of you have1306dealt with this, right?1307    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.1308    Senator Scott. So, if you could just say what's the1309accountability part of this?1310    Admiral Moton. Sir, I will just say in, you know, when we1311choose a contract type, it is different for each type of ship1312that we're procuring in the circumstances. All of them come1313with various tools. You obviously cost plus is a different1314strategy. Fixed price puts more accountability on the1315shipbuilder. We have fixed price for share lines, which1316strongly incentivize them to have positive cost performance.1317Every contract has often a typical set of incentives that go1318along with that incentivize the shipbuilder to perform in1319schedule or other key program aspects.1320    We hold the contractor accountable by first of all, the1321profit that's associated with those, and sometimes with other1322measures, but it differs for each contract depending on what1323we're executing.1324    Senator Scott. Admiral Rucker?1325    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I1326agree with my colleague, Admiral Moton. What I would also say1327is, in addition to holding them accountable via their profit1328and how much money they make or lose, we have had cases where1329vendors have not performed. One of our strategic outsourcing1330vendors, in which case we move the work from them to other1331vendors. So we do take action when we do see something that is1332affecting our production.1333    Senator Scott. Are they responsible for any increased cost1334if you have to move it?1335    Rear Admiral Rucker. Depending. It goes back to what1336Admiral Weeks said, sir. It depends on the contract structure.1337So, my answer is it depends. In some cases, they are fixed1338price contracts, which they're fully responsible. In other1339cases, it might be a cost contract depending on if it's a1340development one or not. It depends on the amount of risk and1341how we share that risk.1342    Senator Scott. Admiral Weeks?1343    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. I would add that, you know,1344in extreme cases, we can also withhold payments. So we will1345retain some of the payments if the companies are not performing1346to the contract. So that is another tool that's in our1347inventory if we need to use it.1348    Senator Scott. Mr. Sermon?1349    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. As Admiral Rucker said, we've had 171350suppliers where we've stood up additional suppliers where we1351were single source previously with the submarine industrial1352base investments. To fully address your question, sir, I would1353say that the direction that we are headed with these maritime1354industrial base efforts with partnering across the submarine1355aircraft carrier community is particularly in submarines, is to1356get to leverage competitive forces to get the best results.1357Both in terms of schedule and cost out of our industrial base.1358As we buildup the maritime industrial base we are positioning1359ourselves to better leverage those forces.1360    Senator Scott. Thank you. Senator Sheehy.1361    Senator Sheehy. Thanks for your time today, gentlemen. How1362do we boost our forward submarine tender capability? My1363understanding is we're pretty low on those right now.1364    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thanks for the question, sir. Right1365now, we have two. Right now, they're helping us if you're1366probably familiar with the maintenance that was done over in1367Australia. We actually positioned our tender there to help the1368USS Hawii was over there doing maintenance. USS Minnesota as1369well. Right now, those two tenders are what we are using. As1370part of the budget process, the evaluations ongoing on what's1371going to take to replace them,1372    Senator Sheehy. How many do you think we need to be fully1373operationally capable for the whole fleet?1374    Rear Admiral Rucker. So, the answer depends. It depends on1375where we end up with the fleet, sir. I'd have to take that for1376the record. I'm not the expert on how many we need right now,1377so I'd have to take that for the record.1378    Senator Sheehy. Do you have enough?1379    Rear Admiral Rucker. The two that we have today, they're1380fully utilized, sir.1381    Senator Sheehy. Then you know, as we explore a near peer1382environment, is the Virginia-class and another Columbia-class1383as well, is that where we need to be operational wise, do you1384think as far as capabilities for a near peer engagement? Or do1385we think there's a next gen investment we need to make for our1386undersea dominance?1387    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. As1388the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for attack submarines, I1389own not only the Virginia-class construction and sustainment,1390but also the development of the Next Generation Attack1391Submarine (SSNX). The Virginia is an extremely capable1392platform. There's no peer like it in the world, so it is1393executing missions today for national security.1394    However, as we look out in the future and where the rest of1395the world is going, we are realizing what we need to add in1396terms of payload, speed, stealth, and survivability. So that's1397what we're looking for the next generation attack submarine.1398But our intent is to continue for the 2025 shipbuilding plan,1399continuing to build Virginia-class in parallel as well.1400    Senator Sheehy. Our replacement capability for that, you1401know, which ties back to our maritime industrial base you know,1402if we enter into a sustained conflict, our ability to replace1403vessels, should they be attrited. Do you feel confident we have1404the ability to have replacement both undersea and for our1405surface vessels?1406    Rear Admiral Rucker. Great question, sir. For our1407submarines, our four public shipyards or what have the primary1408capacity to repair our submarines as well as our two private1409shipbuilders, we've been undergoing material strategy to ensure1410that we can uplift and provide, working with Matt Sermon's team1411and the rest of the industrial base to provide the necessary1412spare parts that we have on the shelf so that as we need to do1413those repairs, they're more available.1414    We've obviously, as we went down to low-rate production had1415less on the shelf. So now we're in the process of not only1416improving summary construction, but our sustainment efforts as1417well.1418    Admiral Moton. Sorry, I would just briefly add as well on1419the sustainment side, you know, that the ability of our naval1420shipyards and our private shipyards to do a quick repair is a1421big focus. I know for Naval Sea Systems Command and other1422organizations they basically--the ability to respond to battle1423damage is something that we have significantly increased focus1424on in recent years. It's a key part of how we would respond to1425any conflict.1426    Senator Sheehy. Yes, and I think my concern is, you know,1427we've become very comfortable, you know, in the not near peer1428environment where, you know, we may have damage, but my biggest1429concern is when it's a near peer conflict and we're losing1430ships, i.e. they're destroyed and sunk, and our ability to1431replace those at a rate higher than the adversary. Right now,1432our adversary builds vessels 230 times faster than we do.1433    So, the advantage we had last time we had a big naval war1434in Westpac was our ability to replace those vessels rapidly.1435Now that advantage lies with our adversary. So two things1436either have to happen, one or both. We have to be eminently1437survivable under any combat conditions or we have to be able to1438replace, and right now we can't replace, so.1439    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. We do need to do both.1440    Senator Sheehy. Yep. Then one final question. I think as we1441see relatively low intensity conflict, you know with our Naval1442Combat and the Red Sea what have you learned as far as our--I1443don't think we've had any major vessel damage from that, but of1444course we've had magazine replacement, you know, and we've had1445to keep those ships combat operational. Are there many lessons1446that you've gleaned from the fleet now that we've actually seen1447for the first time in decades, some pretty steady naval combat1448that we can adopt quickly?1449    Admiral Moton. Sir, I will just say, obviously you know,1450that's not day to day, you know, as an aircraft shipbuilder,1451but as a naval officer, I've been extremely proud to watch1452what's happened in the Red Sea. Our fleet has responded1453magnificently. You know, getting our assets on station,1454supporting them in theater has been significant. I know that,1455you know, Admiral Cooper and others have talked explicitly1456about the incredible performance of the crews, of our carrier1457strike groups.1458    We are learning on the fly. We are outpacing anyone's1459ability to keep up with us as we adapt to the tactics and1460techniques that have been used, and made improvements on the1461fly to ensure that our entire Navy force out there is able to1462respond. Obviously so far it's been successful, and so we have1463learned a lot but we have a lot to be proud of as well.1464    Senator Sheehy. Thank you.1465    Senator Scott. Senator Blumenthal.1466    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for1467being here today. Thank you for your testimony and your service1468to our Nation. I want to begin on submarines. I was at the1469commissioning of the Iowa on Saturday. As always with all the1470commissionings and christenings, a stirring and moving event,1471and a tribute to the great workforce at Electric Boat (EB). I1472was talking to Mark Rayha, I'm sure you're familiar with him.1473He seemed pretty optimistic about the progress on hiring enough1474of the skilled workforce that are necessary in the thousands.1475Is that your assessment as well, Rear Admiral Rucker?1476    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thanks for the question sir, and good1477to see you again. Good seeing you at the Iowa on Saturday. I1478will applaud you for being able to make it up there, given your1479schedule I know.1480    Yes, sir. I would agree. From 2022 to 2023 we saw across1481both ship loaders about a 41 percent increase in their hiring.1482In 2024 they pretty much met their goals. Our challenge now is1483to continue to work with them on their attrition. Those rates1484have come down since 2022. However, they're still higher than1485they need to be, especially in the one to 2-year workforce1486range. So that's an effort that we are working together with1487them to address.1488    Senator Blumenthal. Is there anything you would recommend1489our doing in the NDAA to make possible or make more likely1490meeting that workforce challenge?1491    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. There are multiple things1492that we're doing, so appreciate the question. I would say the1493workforce is one of the number one things that is needed to be1494able to build the submarines and aircraft carriers. Wages is1495one of the top things, and so appreciate Congress's continued1496support and the funding that came in the emergency1497supplemental, the 5.7 billion of that, about 520 million of1498that is specifically to go after wages on current contracts1499across all three of our programs. That's something as we move1500forward, we can hopefully be able to continue to do that so we1501can pay the people that do the work what they should earn and1502deserve to earn.1503    Senator Blumenthal. They're in the midst or they're1504beginning contract negotiations with a number of their unions,1505I believe, and I think that's very important to meet the goals1506and challenges of their workers in an era of rising prices and1507possibly even higher prices in the future.1508    Let me ask you if I may on the subject of cost, both the1509Columbia-class and the Virginia-class programs depend on1510nuclear grade steel, high yield steel, steel alloys, other1511kinds of extremely specialized materials coming from a supply1512base that has shrunk over the last few years. I think in the15131980's there were 17,000 suppliers. Today, they're around15145,000. Will tariffs impact the costs of producing our nuclear1515submarines?1516    Rear Admiral Weeks. Senator, thank you for that question.1517As I'm sure you're aware, you know, the vast majority of the1518components that go, you know, certainly into the Columbia-1519class, but also the Virginia-class are American made1520components. You know, the Navy anticipates that there may be1521some cost increases associated with tariffs, however, it's1522really too early to be able to assess what those might be.1523    Senator Blumenthal. I'm sorry. Maybe it's going to be up to1524the suppliers to determine what the----1525    Rear Admiral Weeks. No, sir. I mean, the Navy, you know, as1526we have, you know, work together with industry to evaluate what1527the, you know, as costs change and go up or go down depending1528on what market you're talking about, again, it's all sort of1529rides, you know, all the things we procure for the, you know,1530certainly in the commodity space like steel and things like1531that, really do ride on kind of what the market is, right?1532    As the things sort of ebb and flow, our ability to work1533together with industry to be able to evaluate what the impact1534would be to our program specifically.1535    Senator Blumenthal. So, we really don't know at this point.1536    Rear Admiral Weeks. We do not know. Yes, sir.1537    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, what is the timetable1538for the Columbia currently being constructed and the next two,1539if you can tell us?1540    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. So, lead ship District of1541Columbia, right now, we are projecting it to be 12 to 18 months1542late, the contract. However, we're taking action right now to1543accelerate and recover as much schedule as we possibly can. The1544second ship, Wisconsin, is currently on schedule. So, we are on1545schedule to deliver that ship at the 80-month contract.1546    The next five ships we're really in the early construction1547phase of those. So, we're not in a position yet to be able to1548evaluate where they are relative to the delivery schedule.1549However, all the activities that we have going on right now are1550all on track.1551    Senator Blumenthal. So just to be more precise, the1552Columbia will be ready in about 2027?1553    Rear Admiral Weeks. Sir, it'll be closer to 2029.1554    Senator Blumenthal. In 2029?1555    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir.1556    Senator Blumenthal. The next, the Wisconsin, what year?1557    Rear Admiral Weeks. Sir, Wisconsin will deliver in 2032,1558but I----1559    Senator Blumenthal. In 2032?1560    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir.1561    Senator Blumenthal. The one after that, the Groton?1562    Rear Admiral Weeks. So that sir, would be in 2034.1563    Senator Blumenthal. In 2034? I recognize I'm out of time,1564Mr. Chairman, maybe if we have a second round and I can stay,1565I'll come back with more questions. Thank you.1566    Senator Scott. Senator Sullivan.1567    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,1568thank you for your testimony. By the way, as a senator, I've1569gotten to kind of dig deep into the whole history of the1570nuclear Navy and it's really remarkable organization. You guys1571are all part of something that's very special. It started out1572under some really unique leadership with Admiral Rickover, and1573then the systems in which we continue today have a long-term1574billet assignment for the admiral in charge of the nuclear1575navy, an 8-year assignment.1576    So one of the things I tried to do last year, and I raised1577this in the hearing 2 weeks ago on conventional surface1578shipbuilding, is saying, ``Hey, why wouldn't we want to do1579something similar on shipbuilding?'' I asked Vice Admiral1580Downey from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), should we make1581the NAVSEA billet like the head of Navy nuclear reactors 81582years. That way you can actually oversee shipbuilding.1583    It was interesting, I didn't know this, but Admiral Downey1584said, ``Well, NAVSEA is a 3-year billet, but it often gets1585extended.'' Which actually kind of makes my point. So last year1586I had a provision that this Committee passed and voted on1587pretty strongly bipartisan vote that got in the Senate, NDAA1588bill for having Nav Sea to have an 8-year billet, just like the1589head of Navy nuclear reactor.1590    So that individual and then be done retired, can actually1591seriously oversee shipbuilding, not have to look at your next1592billet assignment. What do you gentlemen think about that? I1593think Admiral Downey kind of liked the idea. I like the idea. I1594think we're going to re-attack it again. Think Navy stripped it1595out last year in the conference with the house. I have no idea1596what the hell the house was doing, but the Navy didn't like it1597for some reason.1598    Why? Why wouldn't we want to do that? It works for you1599guys. Why wouldn't it work for shipbuilding writ large? Anyone1600have a view on that?1601    Admiral Moton. Sir, I'll just start. I probably have a1602little bit of a unique perspective on my panel here in PEO1603carriers. I'm actually not a nuclear trained officer. I have1604immensely enjoyed working with Naval Reactors over the last 21605years in the job and have been incredibly impressed with----1606    Senator Sullivan. Do you think part of their impressiveness1607is the fact that the head of Navy nuclear reactors has an 8-1608year billet, and retires pretty much?1609    Admiral Moton. I do. I'm certain that steady capable1610leadership is part of their success. Absolutely.1611    Senator Sullivan. Would that help in shipbuilding?1612    Admiral Moton. You know, longevity, the ability to see1613programs through a long period of time, I think is always1614helpful. People often bring up other factors such as the, you1615know, being change agents and bringing fresh sets of eyes. From1616my perspective----1617    Senator Sullivan. If your fresh set of eyes are leaving1618every 3 years, you're----1619    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. It has to be looked at from, you1620know, for every job from a PEO's perspective, you know, I1621certainly trust Navy leadership to balance that properly, and1622that they'll do----1623    Senator Sullivan. Yes. Not always. Sometimes we know what1624we're talking about here.1625    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.1626    Senator Sullivan. Sometimes we don't, but sometimes we do.1627Let me move on to another question. I just literally walked out1628of a meeting with Admiral Caudle and we were talking about the1629same issue. He mentioned to me from 1960 to 1964, the United1630States produced 41 Boomer strategic submarines. 41 in 4 years.1631So we can do this. We all know we can do this, but we had a lot1632more shipyards back then.1633    In the last 30 years, the number of public shipyards has1634been halved leaving four, and only seven private new1635construction yards still in existence. What's more concerning1636is that we have only two private nuclear shipyards and both of1637those are on the East Coast. The good news is there's very1638strong bipartisan support right now in the Senate and the House1639to help the Navy fix its shipbuilding crisis. Now you have the1640support of the President of the United States. In the State of1641the Union has said he's making this a priority.1642    Do we need more shipyards? Do we need West Coast shipyards?1643If we did, I think this Congress would say, ``How many? We'll1644pay for them.'' What do you guys think? Open any and all.1645    Rear Admiral Rucker. I appreciate the question, sir. I1646think with our two nuclear shipbuilders today we've been1647talking so far to the Committee about all the work we're doing1648to move work outside of the two shipbuilders to what we call1649strategic outsourcing. The number we were talking about, it's1650about 7 million hours per year. So the equivalent of a surface1651ship, a destroyer that we're pushing out to the industrial base1652to other locations from a public----1653    Senator Sullivan. Do we need more shipyards?1654    Rear Admiral Rucker. So, the shipyards, we're actually1655evaluating that right now, sir. We have a joint study going on1656with the Secretary of Defense's office, the Cape as well as the1657Navy that will be finishing up. We're in evaluation right now1658of what will be required.1659    Senator Sullivan. What do you think, Admiral?1660    Rear Admiral Rucker. I actually am and have the team that's1661running that study, and I'm waiting to see the final results,1662so I'll be able to get back to you later this year, sir.1663    Senator Sullivan. Admiral Weeks?1664    Rear Admiral Weeks. Sir, I agree with Admiral Rucker that1665we absolutely need more shipbuilding capacity in this Nation.1666So, whether that is you know, discrete shipyards or as our1667current strategy is, which is to shift work out across the1668Nation, right? Not necessarily be constrained by coastal areas.1669I think, you know, again, my perspective, the right answer is1670we've got to grow our capacity. I think that comes in lots of1671different ways. I'm looking forward to seeing the results of1672the study that Admiral Rucker referred to, to make sure we're1673being smart about how we pursue it.1674    Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Admiral Moton, any of you1675guys have a view on this?1676    Mr. Sermon. Sir, I think it's critically important that we1677get the shipyards that are both public in the maintenance1678world, and as you mentioned, our two nuclear yards to full1679capacity at three shifts and humming there as we assess this,1680which is part of what the study that Admiral Rucker is1681participating in is doing.1682    The workforce efforts that we're undertaking to do that, to1683be able to really take advantage of three shifts at the public1684shipyards and take advantage of manning there, as well as how1685we use advanced manufacturing. We've both got uplift1686possibilities.1687    Admiral Moton. Sir, I, you know, completely agree with my1688partners up here. You know, aircraft carriers are a little bit1689different, obviously the size of the platform, there's only two1690naval shipyards that are able to work on them, and one shipyard1691that's able to build. But collectively, I think it's an1692important part of the discussion. We are actually part of the1693study that Admiral Rucker mentions, I can assure you that it is1694data-based. It is, you know, looking hard at the future1695capacity and the future workload, and it's going to inform the1696right decision, I'm sure.1697    Senator Sullivan. Sorry, Mr. Chairman, there was one final1698question on aircraft carriers. We have one company in America1699that can build aircraft carriers. Is that right?1700    Admiral Moton. That's correct, sir. Newport News1701Shipbuilding from Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) is our1702carrier shipbuilder.1703    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.1704    Senator Scott. Senator King.1705    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to followup1706on this line of questioning. Everybody around here for the past1707three or 4 years has been talking about rebuilding the defense1708industrial base, expanding the defense industrial base. How do1709we do it? Is that a matter of more contracts for the big prime1710contractors? Is it bringing new people into the business? Is it1711encouraging smaller companies?1712    I mean, this is one of these things everybody talks about,1713but I never hear much in the way of specifics about how to go1714about it. Mr. Sermon, what are your thoughts?1715    Mr. Sermon. Thank you, Senator. My three primary focus1716areas that are absolutely aimed at capacity, are getting the1717workforce that we need.1718    Senator King. That's going to be my next question.1719    Mr. Sermon. That's not just at the shipbuilders, but in the1720supply chain across the Nation, right? Not just on where the1721shipyards are on the coast.1722    Senator King. Isn't one of the big issues supply chain,1723second and third order suppliers?1724    Mr. Sermon. Yes. Yes, sir. It absolutely is. My second item1725is foundational investment in our supply chain. What we have in1726the submarine community in particular, about 70 percent of our1727critical suppliers are single or sole source, meaning we don't1728have a backup method. Getting a backup supplier, or getting1729that supplier to where they're very competitive, both in terms1730of schedule and cost, is crucially important.1731    Senator King. One of the problems, we've had testimony1732before, the full Committee, that smaller companies have given1733up trying to contract with the Pentagon. It's so burdensome,1734slow, so much paperwork, and we're losing the opportunity to1735develop this capacity in anything but larger entities.1736    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir. I think it's absolutely necessary for1737us to lower some of those barriers to entry to get more1738suppliers in. One of the ways we're pursuing that is through1739advanced manufacturing. We see that, you know, we know, to get1740to the full 100 percent capacity required for the 1+2 number1741that we use, that we're going to require many, many additional1742components across the industrial base. When we look at capacity1743and look at workforce and look at what our foundational1744infrastructure is, we know we'll need advanced manufacturing1745for that.1746    Senator King. What are the bottlenecks in the Columbia1747program? Is it suppliers? Is it Electric Boat? Where could we1748poke to improve the throughput?1749    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. I'll address that as the PEO1750for Columbia. So it is all the things that Matt Sermon said, is1751absolutely supply chain challenges. I would offer that because1752of the unique authorities that we have with the Columbia1753program, so the, you know, advanced construction, advanced1754procurement authorities, we've been able to minimize some of1755those impacts. We do still feel them.1756    We also have this, you know, the challenges in the1757shipyards themselves, right? The workforce you know, the green1758workforce we have in those shipyards, their ability to not be1759as efficient as they need to be. Those are also pacing us. Then1760unique to Columbia, at least on the first ship is we have the1761first of class sort of learning that you always have with a1762first of class. We're working through those as well.1763    Senator King. Let's talk about workforce. You fellows have1764mentioned it two or three times. I believe we're headed into a1765time when workforce--well, workforce is a huge barrier now. I1766was with the building supply companies in Maine today. They1767have workforce problems. Everybody's facing workforce problems,1768and we always talk about wages. I think, Admiral, you mentioned1769wages, but I believe we're going to have to start talking about1770things like childcare and parking because those are the things1771that are necessary in order to enable people to get to work.1772    I hope the Navy is, and I know they are in some cases,1773thinking about those kinds of, that's a legitimate part of the1774workforce proposition is these kinds of ancillary benefits, if1775you will to attract workers that we need.1776    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. I would 100 percent agree1777with you. Congress did a great job in the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA1778about talking about workforce incentives and matching with the1779shipbuilders and our industry partners. When we established1780contracts, we've been putting those into some of the near, you1781know, most recent shipbuilding contracts. Many of those are1782looking at things such as childcare, parking, quality of1783supporting the workforce to then allow them to be able to be1784the most effective and efficient at their jobs.1785    Senator King. That has to be part of it. Mr. Chairman, I'm1786going to associate myself with Senator Sullivan's comments1787about tenure tour. I think of myself after 3 years, I barely1788was learning how his place worked and to learn all you learn in17893 years and then move on, I think that's a discussion that1790should be had more generally.1791    I'll never forget interviewing General Dunford when he left1792Afghanistan and all the knowledge that he had that was walking1793out the door. So, I think that's something that we ought to be1794talking about generally, not only in nuclear shipbuilding or1795shipbuilding generally, but across the board, particularly at1796these high expertise positions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I1797yield.1798    Senator Scott. Thank you. Senator Kaine.1799    Senator Kaine. I don't want to ask about the content of1800these communications, but I just want to ask sort of the fact1801of communications. Have any of you been consulted about how the1802proposed shipbuilding office at the White House should be1803composed and what mission that they should take?1804    Admiral Moton. Sir, I'll say that, you know, that all of us1805had the opportunity to actually review the draft executive1806order for the White House Office shipbuilding and the other1807measures that are in there. We were able to provide feedback.1808So it was very positive that we had the ability to do that and1809continue to have feedback. I know at kind of the higher1810secretariat level, there's active discussion going on, on that1811process and how that's going to work. We're supporting that1812process from our level as PEOs.1813    Senator Kaine. Great. Yes, I don't want to ask about the1814content of communications because that's really for the1815executive, but the fact that you've been consulted, that's a1816positive and been offered the opportunity for feedback. Admiral1817Rucker talk a little bit about the collaboration going on with1818the Australian shipbuilding industry around the Virginia-class1819program.1820    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. As you mentioned earlier,1821the importance, and I kind of talked about the importance of1822the AUKUS partnership both of our ally partners to be1823successful, Indo-Pacific AUKUS is a key tenet of that. I've1824been fortunate we have our AUKUS Integration and Acquisition1825office currently led by Ms. Atkins. But just in the last 21826weeks, I got to sit down with the entire UK leadership at the1827one to two, three-star level to have a update with them on what1828we're doing with our capabilities jointly.1829    Then as part of AUKUS, the Australian, both the Australian1830Submarine Agency and the Australian Submarine Corporation was1831just over 2 weeks ago, meeting with them. So far, we're seeing1832great efforts that they're leaning forward with the workers1833that are at Pearl Harbor Shipyard, about 154 of them. Part of1834our discussions, one of the lessons learned that we learned1835about is that's a lot of trades. So we're talking about what we1836need to do to also uplift their engineering and planning1837personnel as well. That's kind of a takeaway we learned is1838something we need to get after as well.1839    Senator Kaine. Thank you. Admiral Moton, I want to give you1840a chance to brag on the Ford a little bit. You know, this1841Committee's been very focused over the years on the delays and1842cost issues with the Ford-class, with the arresting gear, with1843the weapons elevator, with the launch system. Those systems1844continue to pose challenges in future ships.1845    However, the Ford is now under deployment. Talk to us about1846how the Ford is performing, and particularly in those three1847areas that had been trouble spots. Give us a report.1848    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. Senator, thank you for the1849opportunity to do that. So our entire organization, the PEO, I1850know Newport News, we're all very proud of the performance of1851Ford so far. Ford had a highly successful initial deployment.1852Ford was there. Ford was the initial response from the United1853States following the Hamas attack on Israel. One of the best1854pictures that I have is actually the, the Eisenhower and Ford1855sailing together. The ship did extremely well. The crew did1856well.1857    I can tell you that during that deployment service the1858ship, including the crew, including the catapults, including1859the resting gear and the elevators, did over 10,000 aircraft1860sorties during that deployment. Weapons onto aircraft and1861conducting those sorties. The elevators themselves, lots of1862discussion there. Obviously, the elevators have done on Ford1863over 43,000 cycles. I'm----1864    Senator Kaine. This is all the elevators. So you're not1865operating with like 7 of the 11. You got all of them going?1866    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. I will tell you, as a program1867executive officer, my job is not only construction and1868sustainment. So there are absolutely early class sustainment1869issues. Things like changing, you know, where and how many1870spares and those kinds of things. We are every day taking the1871lessons learned from Ford to improve that. But overall, the1872systems are doing well and the ship is underway right now,1873preparing for her next deployment and doing exceptionally. So1874we're very proud.1875    Senator Kaine. My understanding is that CVN 79 is probably1876not going to deliver till March 2026. Is that correct?1877    Admiral Moton. So, CVN 79 at John F. Kennedy is 95 percent1878complete. So the progress is good there, but we are having1879critical path challenges. Right now, in principally two areas1880in the aircraft in the advanced weapons elevators, and also the1881advanced arresting gear. The shipbuilder is very focused. I1882will be quick to point out that the challenges that the1883shipbuilder is having are not design related. The elevators and1884the catapults and the aircraft launch recovery gear are1885performing exceptionally, as I just mentioned.1886    The ship, this is the second class. We're still learning a1887lot of lessons on production. These are complex machines and1888that's what we're seeing. We're executing a variety of1889improvements, both on 79 as much as we can, but particularly on189080 and 81. I do anticipate that that's going to delay the1891delivery of John F. Kennedy. We are focused very much on1892mitigating that and getting to combat readiness as quickly as1893possible, and we're assessing that and we'll have more details.1894    We are looking at all avenues to improve the timeline that1895I can get John F. Kennedy to the fleet1896    Senator Kaine. On 80, the contract delivery date was1897September 2029, but Secretary Del Toro's 45-day review1898suggested it would be more like January, 2032. Is that still1899how it's tracking?1900    Admiral Moton. I think that was January 30, sir. But I take1901your point. So CVN 80, as I mentioned earlier, has been delayed1902by sequence critical material major items of, material that are1903late to the ship and are causing delays to the critical path1904and forcing the shipbuilder to change our build cycle. We are1905doing everything we can to get that equipment intense oversight1906from both the Navy and Newport News Shipbuilding.1907    I do actually anticipate that that performance has1908continued to degrade from what we reported a year ago. I'm1909estimating about--a year ago, we reported up to 26 months late.1910I'm estimating now 28 months. We are doing everything we can1911with the shipbuilder to improve that prognosis.1912    Senator Kaine. I said January, 2032, and you're right, I1913meant January, 2030, because It's the Doris Miller where the1914contract delivery date is 2032.1915    Admiral Moton. Doris Miller, yes, sir. You're correct.1916Doris Miller is on track for 1932. So the other thing that is1917helping with Doris Miller's schedule is, number one, we bought1918the material for Doris Miller much earlier than we did for1919Enterprise. That in and of itself is preventing those critical1920path challenges to 81. The other thing we did very innovatively1921was with the shipbuilder, do a modification to the dry dock1922that's going to actually allow Enterprise and Doris Miller to1923construct at the same time that's going to mitigate the impacts1924to Doris Miller.1925    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. Yield back, Mr. Chair.1926    Senator Scott. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Mr. Sermon, I1927guess, I don't know if it was you did this or somebody else,1928but you shifted from executing industrial based funding through1929shipyards to a new not-for-profit Blue Forge Alliance. Can you1930talk about how much money we've given to Blue Forge Alliance1931and if we've gotten a return?1932    Mr. Sermon. Yes, sir, I can. So, since 2023 we have done1933approximately 200 supply chain projects as well as numerous1934workforce efforts, as well as coordination of our advanced1935manufacturing, bringing together colleges and our technical1936community efforts via nonprofit company called Blue Forge1937Alliance.1938    That company has about right around $2 billion that has,1939has flowed through it to the industrial base, on the efforts I1940talked about, primarily on supply chain projects, right? The1941company is a nonprofit. The company has a overhead rate and an1942execution rate that is actually less expensive for executing1943these projects than we had as we were executing them with the1944shipbuilders.1945    Just as importantly the projects that they are executing it1946has, and I believe that the shipbuilders would share this1947perspective takes pressure off of the shipbuilders supply chain1948team who is buying this 5x, really 6x by components increase1949across the industrial base.1950    We bring the Blue Forge Alliance team into battery to go1951and execute the actual investment projects that raise1952capability and capacity. By no means stuck on like, ``Hey, we1953got to use Blue Forge Alliance for this either.''1954    My plan going forward is to maximize bringing in partners1955from across the defense industrial base from other parts of the1956United States from other industrial base places of excellence1957where we've seen these kind of uplifts and learning and having1958more partnerships to ultimately get us to 1+2 to get us to19591+2.33. Thank you.1960    Senator Scott. Thank you. Admiral Weeks when you talk about1961the different ballistic missile submarines, when they're going1962to be ready, is that actually ready to go to combat or is that1963that just delivered and there's still going to be a lot of work1964to do afterwards?1965    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes, sir. The dates I was quoting1966earlier were delivery dates out of the shipbuilder. There is1967another, you know, approximately 18 months of time it takes1968from when the ship is delivered till it's ready for first1969patrol. Lead ship is a little bit longer, but we are partnering1970with the fleet to shrink that to as small of a period of time1971as we possibly can.1972    Senator Scott. Is that still way later than what they1973thought?1974    Rear Admiral Weeks. Yes sir. We're still looking at, you1975know, it basically carries forward into that on patrol date,1976although we're looking to shrink some of that as well as the,1977as I mentioned earlier, the work we're doing with the1978shipbuilders to try accelerate delivery schedules to get the1979ship delivered as soon as possible. So that's the fastest right1980now, that's the thing we can do.1981    We're also, again, working with the fleet to optimize that1982post-delivery to first patrol timeframe to make sure we're1983cutting out all the extra stuff in there and make sure it's1984really just the things we have to do.1985    Senator Scott. Admiral Moton, so how many shipyards can we1986build at nuclear aircraft carrier and how many do we have?1987    Admiral Moton. Sir, you know, given the size of the1988aircraft carrier and the specialized facilities we only have1989one shipyard in the United States that's capable of building1990them, and that's Newport News Shipbuilding under HII.1991    Senator Scott. Could they be built overseas? Are there1992shipyards overseas?1993    Admiral Moton. Not that immediately could build a carrier.1994I'd have to, you know, check and see if there were one that1995were big enough potentially. But obviously with the nuclear1996power aspects of the carrier, the complex machinery, which is1997part of what makes Ford capability so special you know, I would1998say it would probably be unlikely in my opinion that we could1999do that overseas. But, you know, I'm always willing to look at2000any alternative to improved performance.2001    Senator Scott. If they don't perform, then what do we do?2002We don't have any options?2003    Admiral Moton. Sir, Newport News Shipbuilding is our2004partner in building aircraft carriers, but we also hold them2005accountable under the contract. All of the provisions that are2006in there are designed to incentivize their performance. If they2007don't do that properly, they don't get those incentives. We do2008that and we hold them accountable in many other ways day to day2009on their performance. But at the end of the day, we do have to2010partner with them. I do believe that we can do both and both2011are PEO Navy organizations such as the supervisor shipbuilding2012exercise, accountability of the builder at all possible levels,2013at the same time as we work with them to produce the ships.2014    Senator Scott. Wouldn't it be beneficial to have2015competition?2016    Admiral Moton. Sir, it's always beneficial to have2017competition. Prior in my career as a captain, I was the2018destroyer program manager for the Arleigh Burke-class. I very2019much enjoyed having two shipbuilders that were in competition2020with each other as we built that class. It has to be a class-2021by-class basis and obviously the carrier brings special2022constraints.2023    Senator Scott. So Admiral Rucker, so we're continuing to be2024way behind on the Virginia-class program. I mean, is it really2025anything that's happening now? Because didn't they tell us2026before we were going to be on time and it still hasn't2027happened. I mean, what's realistic? Same question I asked2028Admiral Weeks. When you say you're going to deliver something,2029it doesn't mean it's ready to go to war, right? There's2030significant delays after that.2031    Rear Admiral Rucker. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.2032I'll kind of work my way from your second question here first.2033When we deliver Virginia-class today, they're the highest2034quality platforms in the Navy. Independently assessed by our,2035what's called our inserve team. They have the highest quality2036score of any ship in the Navy. From the time we've delivered2037them, we've worked with the fleet based on the fleet's needs to2038actually deploy multiple submarines.2039    So, both New Jersey and Rickover both deployed before their2040post shakedown availability and Iowa's on track to do that this2041year as well. So, my answer is on that, we do support the fleet2042and let them use them and adjust our schedules when world2043events require that. Where we stand today on production, sir,2044we need to continue to improve. It's both an issue with the2045supply base and at the shipbuilders.2046    We've got actions ongoing, both with congressional help to2047support the uplift of the supplier base. We've already seen2048some bottlenecks removed. We have more to go and then at the2049shipbuilders we need to get after their production capacity as2050well.2051    Senator Scott. So, we're producing a little over one a2052year, right? What are we funding? Are we funding more than2053that?2054    Rear Admiral Rucker. We have funded two. The Congress has2055appropriated two and authorized two in the past. The 20252056budget has one that's in there. The advantage of that one,2057which I've talked on the record before about, is right now the2058production system is, what I would say is out of balance across2059manufacturing, kind of the steel production outfitting and2060final assembly and tests. We need to get that back rebalanced.2061    We actually slowed down portions of the production system2062that we're at a two per year rate to make sure the whole system2063could then be uplifted together. That one boat in 2025 allows2064us to resynchronize and rebalance the production system. Then2065going forward, the two per year rate that we anticipate doing2066allows us to do a more efficient ramp up to get to the two per2067year that we need to achieve.2068    Senator Scott. So, does it make sense to keep funding at a2069rate way in excess of what we're producing?2070    Rear Admiral Rucker. Great question, sir. I understand that2071perspective. Part of the continuing to look going forward as we2072go into the 2026 budget, obviously that's still being looked2073at, but the advantage of the two per year is if you look across2074the production system, we need all phases of it to get to that2075two per year.2076    If we go back down to one per year looking out in the2077future, the ability to ramp back up the two would cause us to2078have those same challenges of ramp, which we're going through2079now. We have a clear plan working with Matt Sermon's team and2080the industrial base and then with our shipbuilders on a path to2081get there. So going back down, we would still have to get back2082up again to support what we need for our four structure of 662083submarines, and then also our AUKUS partners.2084    Senator Scott. Just didn't seem to make much sense when2085we're funding two, we're not getting two, but if we don't keep2086funding two, we'll never get to two. It seems completely out of2087whack of what we're spending.2088    Rear Admiral Rucker. Understand, sir, which is why in 20252089we put one forward to kind of allow the system to catch back up2090and ensure we get rebalanced.2091    Senator Scott. All right. Anybody have any questions?2092    Senator Blumenthal. Yes, I have a couple. Thanks Mr.2093Chairman. If I understand correctly, we funded one for 2025,2094but we're funding two for the successive years when we hope to2095be back on two subs a year?2096    Rear Admiral Rucker. The current PB 2025 shipbuilding plan2097has two per year in it right now. Yes, sir.2098    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you Admiral Moton, and I2099apologize if I'm being repetitive or just plain dumb. How far2100behind was the Ford on schedule? In other words, how far behind2101its scheduled completion date was it?2102    Admiral Moton. Sir, actually I will have to take that for2103the record. I do not, you know, having been the PEO only for--2104--2105    Senator Blumenthal. For 3 years.2106    Admiral Moton. Actually, I do not know the original2107scheduled date for Ford, right? It was certainly behind. It2108delivered in 2017, but then also it delivered in an incomplete2109state and required the Navy several years through our Make Ford2110Ready program to get it ready, right? We have to do better than2111that. Understanding the challenges that we're still having, we2112have to continue to improve. It was unacceptable. I don't have2113the original delay number and I'd have to get that for you,2114sir.2115    Senator Blumenthal. Is the John F. Kennedy behind schedule?2116    Admiral Moton. Sir, the John F. Kennedy is largely complete2117except for critical path work primarily in the weapons2118elevators.2119    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I know. I heard you say that. But2120when was it supposed to be delivered?2121    Admiral Moton. Sir, it's current contract date is this2122summer. It's supposed to deliver this summer. There have been2123some changes in John F. Kennedy schedule over time. The Navy2124shifted the plan on how we were going to take delivery of the2125ship. We also made a decision to pull a lot of the work that we2126had done on Ford after delivery into earlier on John F. Kennedy2127All of that being said, that caused a date shift. The current2128date that the shipbuilder is accountable for is this summer,2129and that's the date with the challenge.2130    Senator Blumenthal. This summer. But that's later than what2131was the date, the projected date. When was it supposed to be2132done?2133    Admiral Moton. It's later than the original contract date,2134but the Navy made a decision to pull capability into the ship2135so that it's combat readiness, like when it was ready to go2136with the fleet would be on time. That was what was done with2137John F. Kennedy. I know that is slightly confusing, but it was2138done to ensure that we had a fully combat ready carrier on the2139schedule to meet fleet needs.2140    Senator Blumenthal. I have to confess, I don't understand2141that answer.2142    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2143    Senator Blumenthal. If I'm a home buyer, I go to a2144contractor, he says I'll have the home ready for you to move2145in----2146    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2147    Senator Blumenthal.--in Christmas of 2025. If it's ready 22148years later, I can say it's 2 years behind.2149    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. In this case in your analogy, we2150would have the original schedule for the home. The home buyer2151may want to put a pool and we decided that we're going to go2152ahead and put the pool in before we take the custody of the----2153    Senator Blumenthal. I understand that point that maybe its2154capabilities were increased.2155    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2156    Senator Blumenthal. But my question is, the original John2157F. Kennedy, when was it supposed to be ready?2158    Admiral Moton. I do not have the original delivery date in2159front of me, sir.2160    Senator Blumenthal. Can you get these answers for us?2161    Admiral Moton. Absolutely.2162    [The information referred to follows:]21632164    Admiral Moton. The Detail Design and Construction (DD&C)2165contract awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News2166Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) on June 5, 2015, initially envisioned a2167two-phased delivery approach for USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79):2168    Phase I (Hull, Mechanical & Electrical--HM&E): Completion2169targeted for September 2022, providing full propulsion, safe2170navigation, and limited aircraft launch and recovery2171capability.2172    Phase II (Combat & Warfare Systems): Completion targeted2173for September 2024, installing remaining combat and warfare2174systems, including Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR),2175delivering CVN 78-like capability.2176    Subsequently, Section 124 of the fiscal year 2020 National2177Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 116-92, mandated a shift2178to a single-phase delivery to ensure CVN 79's operational2179readiness with the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter before Post2180Shakedown Availability (PSA). While this required integrating2181additional work during construction, this new single-phase2182delivery targeted completion for 2024, achieving the most2183efficient path to fleet operational status.2184    However, in 2023, to optimize work scope placement to2185achieve the mandated F-35C capability at ship delivery and to2186mitigate risks, the single-phase delivery date was revised to2187July 2025, while shifting work originally planned for PSA into2188the construction period.2189    Finally, compliance with 10 USC 8671 (Determination of2190Vessel Delivery Dates) required the Navy to deliver vessels2191that are ``assembled and complete.'' Accordingly, the Navy's2192current estimated delivery date for CVN 79 is March 2027, with2193preliminary acceptance expected in 2026.21942195    Senator Blumenthal. The reason I'm asking is you've got two2196more?2197    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2198    Senator Blumenthal. The Enterprise and the Doris Miller.2199    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2200    Senator Blumenthal. They're supposed to be ready in 20302201and 2032.2202    Admiral Moton. Correct.2203    Senator Blumenthal. Are they going to be ready in 2030 and22042032?2205    Admiral Moton. Well actually Enterprise was supposed to be2206ready in 2028, sir.2207    Senator Blumenthal. Twenty twenty-eight.2208    Admiral Moton. We are now projecting it's going to deliver2209in 2030 based on the----2210    Senator Blumenthal. That's 2 years behind.2211    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2212    Senator Blumenthal. The Doris Miller 2032, was that2213supposed to be ready in 2030?2214    Admiral Moton. 2032 is the date for the Doris Miller. We2215assessed that Doris Miller is still tracking to that partly by2216the earlier material buys and the dry dock updates that I2217talked about earlier. I'll just say, Senator, you know, my2218apologies as a lot of those dates were long before I was with2219the program. I will get you a crisp answer on the dates for2220both 78 and 79.2221    [The information referred to follows:]22222223    Admiral Moton. The Detail Design and Construction (DD&C)2224contract awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News2225Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) in September 2008, established a2226contractual ship delivery date of September 2015 for USS Gerald2227R. Ford (CVN 78). The actual ship delivery occurred in May22282017.2229    This delay can be primarily attributed to challenges2230inherent in the first-of-class nature of the CVN 78 program,2231which incorporated numerous advanced technologies. Key factors2232contributing to the delay included:2233     First-of-Class System Integration Challenges:2234Initial systems installation faced developmental, production,2235and testing challenges associated with a lead ship.2236     Advanced Technologies: Complex manufacturing of2237new technologies led to certification delays and delayed system2238turnover to the Navy.22392240    Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate that, and again, I hate to2241ask questions that maybe I should know the answer to. The Ford2242costs how much?2243    Admiral Moton. Sir, that's another one that unfortunately I2244do not have the final Ford cost in front of me.2245    Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate knowing what it2246costs.2247    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2248    Senator Blumenthal. What it was projected to cost.2249    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. I will get that for you.2250    [The information referred to follows:]22512252    Admiral Moton. The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) projected2253cost at the time of the 2008 Detailed Design and Construction2254contract award was $10.5 billion. The final cost for CVN 78 was2255$13.224 billion.22562257    Senator Blumenthal. What is John F. Kennedy going to cost?2258    Admiral Moton. John F. Kennedy is projected to cost $12.92259billion.2260    Senator Blumenthal. Twelve point nine.2261    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2262    Senator Blumenthal. In other words, $13 billion?2263    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2264    Senator Blumenthal. The Enterprise?2265    Admiral Moton. Thirteen point five billion dollars, sir.2266    Senator Blumenthal. How about the Doris Miller?2267    Admiral Moton. Fourteen billion dollars, sir.2268    Senator Blumenthal. Fourteen?2269    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2270    Senator Blumenthal. Is the John F. Kennedy actually--that2271figure $13 billion, is that what it was projected to cost or is2272that higher?2273    Admiral Moton. That is our current estimate. It is higher2274than the original cost. I will have to get you the original2275cost in anticipation of your question.2276    Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate that as well.2277    [The information referred to follows:]22782279    Admiral Moton. The USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) projected2280cost at time of the 2015 Detailed Design and Construction2281contract award was $11.498 billion. The cost for CVN 79 in2282President's Budget 2026 is $13.196 billion. Key factors2283contributing to the increased cost included:2284      Transition from a dual-phase to single-phase2285delivery approach2286      F-35C Joint Strike Fighter capability prior to2287Post Shakedown Availability (PSA)2288      Shifting PSA work into the main construction2289period2290      Shipbuilder production inefficiencies leading to2291increased costs22922293    Admiral Moton. There have been that's the total cost of the2294carrier, not just the shipbuilders, but also all the equipment.2295There has been growth on both. It's unacceptable. I will say2296that all three of these ships were awarded pre Corona Virus2297Disease (COVID) so that they were affected by COVID performance2298and also the continuing escalation that we're seeing. None of2299that's an excuse. It's just a fact. The bottom line is we2300should have been able to deliver on the original cost, and2301that's our commitment.2302    Senator Blumenthal. Okay.2303    Senator Scott. Have you done analysis of if you could give2304us this, what was the starting date? What was the original2305cost? What's it now? All right. Then what the reasons, and then2306the last one could be is, okay, so they didn't do it. The2307people that were responsible, I mean, do they suffer anything?2308    Senator Blumenthal. Yes, that was actually--Mr. Chairman,2309thank you for anticipating my next question. Were there any2310penalties for the cost overruns or delays? Again, going to my2311analogy on the house, somebody said, I'm going to get the house2312ready for you in Christmas of 2025. It turns out it costs twice2313as much and it's delayed by 2 years.2314    I would say, ``Hey guys, I'm not going to pay you what I2315promised to. You're going to have to pay, you're going to2316suffer some penalty.'' To go to the Chairman's question, I2317think that's one of the questions I had. Were there any2318penalties and will there be penalties for the cost overruns on2319the JFK, the Doris Miller, and the Enterprise?2320    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. So, first, Senator, I will2321absolutely get you the question that you asked for. In terms of2322penalties, the way that the contracts are set up, Ford was a2323little bit of a different--as the leadership Ford was a cost-2324plus contract. You know, and that's a, that's kind of a2325separate discussion.2326    For 79, for 80, for 81, those ships are fixed price2327contracts with what we call an incentive share line, or2328basically the shipbuilder's profit is degraded as their cost of2329building the ship goes up. So they are absolutely paying a cost2330penalty for the shipbuilder cost growth on those ships.2331    Senator Blumenthal. How much does their return or their2332profit go down? Do they absorb all of the costs overrun or?2333    Admiral Moton. So, the way that the--you know, to2334immediately absorb all of it would be what we call firm fixed2335price. For shipbuilding, what we often do, including on Ford-2336class, is what we call a fixed price incentive fee. There's a2337target that they are supposed to hit with a target profit2338associated with that. Then we share either the overruns or2339underruns.2340    So, if there's an overrun you know, for every dollar on the2341overrun, the shipbuilder has to basically eat a certain amount2342of that out of their profit. Then the Navy pays. It's part of2343how we balance risk with the shipbuilders. It changes from2344contract to contract, but the contract is basically the same.2345    Senator Blumenthal. So, the Chairman is a business person,2346so he can ask this question a lot better than I.2347    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2348    Senator Blumenthal. But my question is, what is the2349percentage of profit on these ships?2350    Admiral Moton. It differs from ship to ship, sir. Again,2351depending on kind of where you are in the class, it's a2352different construct, right? I could certainly give you an2353example. You know, I think typically a typical ship percentage2354for profit may start out as perhaps 14 percent profit, right?2355Then that profit would degrade as cost, as cost performance2356degrades.2357    Senator Blumenthal. If the shipbuilder of an aircraft2358carrier hits the target cost, for example, on the John F.2359Kennedy----2360    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir.2361    Senator Blumenthal. Which is not going to happen, it2362would've been 14 percent. Do you know what it will be now that2363there have been some increase in cost beyond what it was2364supposed to be, cost overrun?2365    Admiral Moton. Sir, I do know exactly where the Navy2366anticipates that the shipbuilder will end up in terms of cost2367and profit on that ship. That is a number that we typically do2368not say publicly in terms of reporting their returns.2369    I would be completely willing to get specifics of those2370numbers to the Committee outside of the hearing. But we do know2371precisely where we think their performance is and what the2372impact of that will be on their profitability on that contract.2373    Senator Blumenthal. I would appreciate--I don't know how2374the--I don't want to be presumptuous here, but I would2375appreciate----2376    Senator Scott. You know what we should do is we can pull2377up--I'll get my office to do it and I'll just send around to2378everybody. Let's get everybody's profitability of--they're2379public. Most of them are publicly traded companies. We can just2380look at those numbers, and so you don't have to look at it--you2381know, it's not going to be perfect because they'll have all2382these different programs as Senator Kaine said. But that's one2383way to look at it.2384    Admiral Moton. Yes, sir. Sir, we can absolutely get it to2385the Committee. We can get the specific information. Certainly,2386to your point, sir, there's public information. I know that2387Newport News Shipbuilding has publicly talked about, you know,2388declining cost performance and declining margins including on2389their carrier work. They've said that in their own statements.2390We certainly assess that that's true. It's just that for the2391specific numbers we would get that to you separately.2392    Senator Scott. What I'll do is I'll get my team to just get2393all the--I get a pool of them. There's a lot of public--you2394know, we can get from all these analyst reports too, so I'll2395just get around to everybody. So all the ones that deal with,2396you know, Seapower.2397    Senator Blumenthal. Great.2398    Senator Scott. That might be helpful.2399    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.2400    Senator Scott. Okay, anything else?2401    Senator Kaine. Just two quick things. So one, this is a2402good kind of conversation back and forth about accountability2403and contracting mechanisms. So let me put one other contracting2404question into the mix, and I'm going to shift to something2405else. Block buys. So, you know, I've been a block buy fan. You2406make a block buy that should enable you to achieve cost savings2407by pre-ordering, you know, supplies, etc, etc.2408    I wonder whether you have to factor in a downside to block2409buy, which is the block buys that were done, say in Virginia-2410class were done at a time when we didn't know we were going to2411hit COVID and have big inflation. So, you lock in a contract2412and you lock in a price. Then we had this significant inflation2413event that nobody was projecting.2414    I kind of wonder if you rolled it backward, would the2415shipyard or would we have wanted to do a block buy, if we had2416the crystal ball, we might've said maybe it's not a good time2417to do a block buy.2418    So now we hope we don't have COVID type emergencies that2419put all kinds of inflationary pressure on things. But the block2420buy has a lot of positives, but they may not be all positives.2421So, for purposes of thinking about the best way to contract, to2422deliver a result and to have an accurate assessment of the cost2423and the timing, I'm not asking for an answer, but it's made me2424rethink a little bit about whether block buy is 100 percent the2425virtuous solution. Do you want to say something on that Dick,2426but then I'll move to an unrelated issue? Go ahead.2427    Senator Blumenthal. Yes, I guess I'd be interested. I think2428that's a really important point. I guess my question is, both2429of you Admiral Rucker and Admiral Moton have emphasized the2430importance of advanced buying of materials, which I think is2431critical.2432    When you advance buy the materials, is it at a certain2433price so that even if you know their tariffs and inflation, and2434obviously steel and aluminum maybe subject to tariffs, the2435aluminum goes into these ships, but do you get the raw2436materials that you advance by at a fixed price or does it rise2437with inflation?2438    Rear Admiral Rucker. Thanks for the question, Senator. The2439answer is, it depends on the contract. But back to your2440question on block buys, we do block buys. We get an advantage2441of what's called economic order quantity funding in addition to2442the advanced procurement. By doing that, we actually, the2443shipbuilders, when we negotiate with them and they go do it,2444they lock in forward pricing rates so they actually can get a2445reasonable bulk buy, kind of like a Walmart. So that is a2446benefit.2447    The downside to your point Senator, is if there is some2448type of catastrophic change just like they can benefit from it2449and they did in early blocks, that unpredictable thing can2450result in a downside. Then we have to work with them on what2451makes the most sense on how we adjudicate it.2452    Senator Kaine. Please go ahead, Admiral Moton.2453    Admiral Moton. Sorry. I would just add another tool that we2454have for the scenario you're talking about is something we call2455economic price adjustment that we put in many of our contracts2456often contracts have an economic price adjustment for material.2457We do that so that if there's general market increase in2458particular types of material some of that we are able to adjust2459the cost of the contract to account for that.2460    We quite frankly, do that because we found if we don't do2461that, the shipbuilder's perception of risk is oftentimes going2462to cause them to increase their prices, possibly even more2463dramatically. So, we consider it a risk balancing tool.2464    Senator Kaine. The unrelated question I wanted to ask Mr.2465Sermon, you mentioned in your opening testimony, the additive2466manufacturing program in Danville, which is really designed to2467do two things. One, it's to train workers that Danville cluster2468to train the workforce, but also with additive manufacturing,2469it's also to come up with new strategies for dealing with2470supply chain issues.2471    Is the Navy looking--I had heard that the Navy was thinking2472about doing another one in the upper Midwest, either Wisconsin2473or Michigan. Is that model something that the Navy is looking2474at dispersing more generally to try to help us deal both with2475workforce issues, but also to develop new technologies around2476innovative production through additive manufacturing of supply2477chain items and parts?2478    Mr. Sermon. Thank you, sir. Specifically, we are looking to2479leverage on the training side and as you said the accelerated2480training and defense manufacturing efforts in Danville that2481will provide 1,000 workers to the industrial base across the2482whole Nation in steady state with which they'll be in next2483year.2484    We'll do that going forward, we have had it critiqued and2485reviewed by the supply chain folks who've gotten those workers2486and have had outstanding feedback on you know, saving 300 days2487in terms of brokers getting to full capability and capacity.2488    We absolutely are looking to and we have in a much smaller2489version as we were doing the Michigan Maritime Manufacturing2490program that we stood up, we used some of the lessons learned2491to partner with the folks in Michigan. It's a smaller scale,2492but we will continue to look for opportunities to apply that.2493    On the advanced manufacturing, particularly metallic2494additive side of that, what the effort in Danville has been2495primarily focused on is we have struggled as--I would frankly2496say as certainly as the navy more broadly in the entire nation,2497I've studied our economy--to get additive manufacturing demand2498into that industrial base, right?2499    We have, because of cost concerns, because of schedule2500concerns, because of is that material really better than how we2501were doing castings and forgings? We struggled to establish the2502additive manufacturing community. What we're doing in Danville2503is focusing on a set of materials that are six materials that2504are really impactful to the submarine, aircraft carrier, and2505shipbuilding industrial base, and maturing those materials.2506    Then working with the Navy and working with the2507shipbuilders and working with suppliers to then get a demand2508signal out to the additive manufacturing community for those2509materials. With a formula that's like, here's exactly how you2510do it. So that as we bring additive manufacturing partners in,2511we would actually have an established demand signal for them,2512be able to put, you know, those kind of incentives toward2513building that capacity. But pressing that out further I think2514is absolutely important sir.2515    Senator Kaine. Let me just say this just for my two2516colleagues who are here. On this demand signal side, I have2517some tremendously innovative additive manufacturers in Virginia2518who say I keep getting like, awards from the DOD for being an2519innovator, but then getting no orders. Like I'm tired of2520getting the blue ribbon, but not getting any orders.2521    I think you're right. Finding the area where you don't just2522have the innovators, but you're actually putting a demand2523signal in so that they can get work through their innovation,2524that's going to be helpful.2525    On the workforce side, this thing in Danville is2526fascinating. They usually have, you know, 50 to 100 going2527through a cohort at a time, and it's about an 8-week full-time.2528They come from around the country and around the world.2529    So, the last time I was there, you know, kids from rural2530Virginia, kids from the Pacific Northwest, Aussies, a lot of2531Afghans who are here, you know, they already work to defend the2532Nation and they're here on a special immigrant visa and they've2533decided, ``I don't want to drive an Uber. I've worked with the2534U.S. military, why don't I be a shipbuilder?''2535    You walk into this class and you see them all learning2536together and then they fan back out among the industrial base2537all over the country and some back to Australia to work. But2538they've had a common set of experiences to train. Then you do2539find that it reduces the training needed once they get back. It2540probably increases the retention too, if they've been into this2541program. So, it is really a program worth seeing, and it is2542bearing some fruit, but thank you for giving that report and I2543yield back.2544    Senator Scott. Anything else? Well, first of all, thanks2545for coming. I can't imagine how frustrating it has to be for2546you to come and, you know, have to respond on how late things2547are. Because none of you seem like you're the type that don't2548want to get things done on time and on budget and all these2549things. So thank you for all your hard work. We do have to make2550a--we have to figure this out.2551    We are falling behind communist China. We don't really have2552a choice. You know, we've got to figure this out and we might2553have to figure it out pretty fast depending on what they do.2554So, I was talking to Senator Kaine, hopefully with the2555secretaries that we're getting, hopefully with President2556Trump's leadership, this new Office of shipbuilding, that we're2557going to be able to make a dramatic change to get something2558accomplished.2559    Because my concern is, we don't know when communist China2560is going to take action. If we're not ready it's going to be2561horrible for our country and we're going to put a lot of men2562and women at risk. So, thank you. This adjourns the meeting,2563but I guess we'll leave the record open for two or 3 days--two2564days, I guess, if anybody wants to add anything. Thanks.2565    [Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]25662567    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]25682569              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan2570                      shipbuilding and maintenance2571    1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2572Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, President Trump has2573expressed a vision where we work with our allies to make use of their2574existing shipbuilding capacity, leverage lessons learned from their2575shipyards and encourage their investment in our own Maritime Industrial2576Base (MIB). What is the role that you see our allies playing in2577expanding our navy shipbuilding infrastructure and growing the Navy?2578    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2579and Rear Admiral Weeks. As a maritime nation, the United States must2580have a strong and resilient maritime industrial base capable of2581securing our national and economic security. The Navy is closely2582engaged with our allies to understand their approaches to shipbuilding2583and how we can leverage best practices to improve efficiency and2584productivity. The Navy is working closely with partners from across the2585Federal Government to carry out the President's Executive Order2586``Restoring America's Maritime Dominance,'' including identifying2587opportunities to work our allies in executing the President's vision.25882589    2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2590Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, what is your view on2591expanding the authorities for overseas preventive maintenance on U.S.-2592based ships?2593    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2594and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Navy appreciates the authority provided by2595title 10 U.S. Code Sec.  8680, which was recently expanded to allow2596preventive maintenance on surface ships, which may not exceed 21 days2597in duration nor affect any homeport by more than 2 percent of its2598workload.25992600    3. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2601Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, what, in your mind, are the2602biggest barriers facing our Naval shipbuilding industry and how do you2603plan to approach them if confirmed?2604    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2605and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Naval shipbuilding industry faces several2606significant barriers that are jeopardizing performance and efficiency.2607Key challenges include workforce recruitment, training, and retention;2608workforce proficiency and efficiency; supply chain delays and2609associated material lead times; and slow integration and adoption of2610manufacturing technology.2611    The Navy's Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and Direct Reporting2612Program Manager for the Maritime Industrial Base (DRPM MIB) are focused2613on removing these barriers through targeted initiatives and investments2614with the support of industry partners. Navy investments are increasing2615nuclear shipyard worker wages, helping to improve workforce attraction,2616recruitment, training, retention, and execution; growing capability and2617capacity in the supply chain; and operationalizing advanced2618manufacturing technology.26192620    4. Senator Sullivan. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker and Rear2621Admiral Weeks, I am very concerned about both our ship and submarine2622readiness. I know the Navy has established an 80 percent surge2623readiness goal, but we are nowhere near there today. Xi is deathly2624afraid of our submarines. What will you do to get submarines in and out2625of maintenance on time?2626    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Navy2627is executing major initiatives to increase readiness of attack2628submarines by increasing material availability at the start of a2629maintenance period, outsourcing discrete work, addressing obsolescence2630aimed at reducing submarine maintenance durations, and addressing2631public shipyard execution and efficiency.2632    The Navy continues efforts to enhance collaboration between the2633public and private sectors, aiming to sustain a robust industrial base2634and enhance cost-effectiveness and schedule adherence for both2635submarine maintenance and new construction initiatives.2636    U.S. Strategic Command sets requirements for the Navy's strategic2637submarines. The Navy is meeting those requirements.26382639    5. Senator Sullivan. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker and Rear2640Admiral Weeks, what will you do to simultaneously increase sub2641maintenance capacity?2642    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, and Rear Admiral Weeks. Increases2643in throughput and on-time delivery of submarines from maintenance2644availabilities will ultimately lead to an increase in submarine2645maintenance capacity. The Navy is focused on the development of the2646workforce, enabling nonstop execution of work on the deck-plate, and2647improving the availability of new and refurbished parts and components2648to ensure projects have the material needed before the maintenance2649availability begins. Enabling non-stop work and improving overall2650throughput are key to ensuring the readiness of our fighting submarine2651fleet.2652    While additional work is in progress to improve schedule adherence2653and minimize delays, current efforts are having a positive impact. With2654this focus, submarine throughput has increased by 22 percent from2655fiscal year (FY) 2024 quarter 2, and work stoppage durations have been2656reduced by 33 percent over the same period.2657    Navy will continue to focus on increasing throughput and on time2658delivery of submarines from maintenance availabilities, driving2659increases in submarine maintenance capacity.26602661    6. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2662Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, will you commit to working2663with the Senate Armed Services Committee to review military2664specification requirements for naval vessels created and executed by2665Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and to proactively recommend the2666removal of those deemed most burdensome?2667    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2668and Rear Admiral Weeks. It is important to ensure we are not2669overengineering our vessels and not overburdening our industry partners2670in the design and production of our fleet. In support of these notions,2671it is prudent and necessary to review the specifications placed on our2672ship classes to determine whether they are current, necessary, and2673reasonable. The Navy is working closely with partners from across the2674Federal Government to carry out the President's Executive Order2675``Restoring America's Maritime Dominance,'' identifying proposals to2676accelerate procurement timelines and strengthen the U.S. maritime2677industrial base by following commercial approaches to shipbuilding2678where ever possible, and we are committed to working with this2679Committee on this important issue as well.26802681    7. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2682Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, the delays identified by2683the previous Secretary of the Navy's (SECNAV) 45-day shipbuilding2684review paint a damning picture whereby five major ship classes are2685delayed by 12 to 36 months. Do you believe the regular congressional2686authorization and appropriation cycle and Department of Defense (DOD)2687planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process can2688deliver ships on time and on budget?2689    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2690and Rear Admiral Weeks. The shipbuilding timeline can be influenced by2691a complex set of factors including requirements stability, availability2692of materials, workforce capacity and capability, technical challenges,2693and external global supply chain disruptions. The PPBE process and2694congressional cycles, while critical for ensuring appropriate funding2695and oversight, sometimes present challenges in responding at the speed2696of relevance to these issues. A particular challenge is the consistent2697cycle of Continuing Resolutions (CR) which result in negative2698consequences far beyond the timeframe of the CR if certain2699flexibilities aren't also provided.2700    Ultimately, while the current processes provide a solid foundation,2701the ability to dynamically and responsively manage programs will be2702necessary to meet the growing demands of our Navy and ensure we stay2703ahead of emerging threats.27042705    8. Senator Sullivan. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, recognizing2706that attack submarines are one of our biggest advantages compared to2707the People's Republic of China (PRC). Do you agree that our inability2708to produce at least two submarines per year, and deliver them on time,2709increases risk in the Indo-Pacific during this decade?2710    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. Yes, I do agree. Our fast attack2711submarines (SSNs)--particularly the Virginia-class--remain one of the2712United States' most significant asymmetric advantages in the Indo-2713Pacific region, where undersea superiority is essential to deterring2714adversaries and preserving freedom of maneuver for joint and coalition2715forces. China is expanding its submarine fleet at a rapid pace, and2716Russia continues to modernize its undersea forces in the Pacific. In2717this context, any delay in restoring and sustaining a minimum two-boat-2718per-year production cadence directly increases operational and2719strategic risk in this decisive theater.2720    As Admiral Paparo recently testified, the U.S. submarine force2721provides a ``generational advantage''--an advantage that cannot be2722assumed to persist without deliberate investment. Returning to a stable2723two-per-year build rate for Virginia-class submarines is critical to2724the Navy's global posture.2725    Sustained undersea dominance requires predictable procurement,2726strong industrial base support, and timely delivery. Failing to produce2727at least two attack submarines per year--and to deliver them on2728schedule--exacerbates risk in the Indo-Pacific, erodes combatant2729commander flexibility, undermines strategic deterrence and places2730alliance agreements at risk.27312732    9. Senator Sullivan. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, I have been2733a strong supporter of AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, and United2734States] since its launch, and believe it is a potential game changer2735for U.S. and allied posture in the Indo-Pacific as well as the weapons2736capabilities at allied disposal. The nominee for Secretary of State,2737Senator Marco Rubio, was enthusiastically supportive of AUKUS in his2738confirmation hearing and I agree with him that AUKUS is a ``blueprint''2739for future consortium partnerships with allied nations facing global2740threats. Do you agree?2741    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. We must increase submarine2742availability and production if we are going to meet U.S. requirements2743in the Indo-Pacific and realize AUKUS Pillar I. The United States2744cannot afford to weaken its own submarine forces during this critical2745period, which is why President Trump is leading a whole-of-government2746approach to revitalize American shipbuilding. Significant investments2747are needed by industry in the U.S. Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) to2748increase production rates.2749    On Submarine Rotational Force-West, I remain concerned that2750Australia has fallen behind on timelines necessary to support2751infrastructure requirements for our sailors at HMAS Stirling. We are2752working with Australia to determine whether timelines can be2753recaptured, however, analysis still needs to be done. We will continue2754to work to ensure appropriate cost-sharing arrangements with our allies2755and partners, and to address worrying trends in our submarine2756industrial base.27572758    10. Senator Sullivan. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, our2759inability to produce at least two submarines per year obviously creates2760doubt in Australia that we can deliver three to five Virginia-class2761submarines as part of the optimal pathway for Pillar I. What would you2762tell your Australian counterparts to assure them of our commitment to2763increasing Virginia production and executing the optimal pathway?2764    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. I would tell our Australian2765partners that I am laser focused on getting Virginia-class production2766to what we need in the United States; that thanks to Congress we are2767investing billions of dollars through the Submarine and Maritime2768Industry Base Programs to uplift our submarine production and2769sustainment. We are also encouraging our Submarine Industrial Base2770partners to make concurrent investments in their own enterprises as2771well.2772    We must expeditiously increase submarine availability and2773production, however, if we are going to meet U.S. requirements in the2774Indo-Pacific and realize AUKUS Pillar I. The United States cannot2775afford to weaken its own submarine forces, which is why President Trump2776is leading a whole-of-government approach to revitalize the American2777shipbuilding industry.2778              2025 government accountability office report2779    11. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2780Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, in a 2025 Government2781Accountability Office (GAO) report on shipbuilding, one of the2782recommendations was for the Secretary of the Navy to develop2783performance metrics to assess the programmatic and aggregate effect of2784investment in the Navy's ship industrial base. This echoes a similar2785recommendation from a 2024 GAO report on Amphibious Ship readiness.2786What is the importance of these metrics, and which metrics should the2787Congress be tracking to ensure that the intent of these investments is2788being reached?2789    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2790and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Navy has implemented a process to ensure2791our investments strengthen and grow the maritime industrial base are2792targeting the primary needle-movers and enablers of shipbuilding and2793ship sustainment schedules. As part of this process, we assess and2794track the impact of Navy industrial base assessments at multiple2795levels, including individual project level, aggregate level across2796multiple projects with shared objectives, and portfolio level assessing2797impacts to shipbuilding production drivers.2798    This approach enables us to assess performance against current2799shipbuilding demand in addition to projected future demand as the2800industrial base scales to meet growing demand to ensure we are working2801to achieve gains that are sustainable. Collectively, these efforts2802support flexible decisionmaking to meet a dynamic supply chain2803environment.28042805    12. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, one of the things we certainly2806need to be tracking is the retention of workforce. In my opinion, we2807are expending a lot of effort and treasure to get people in the door of2808these shipyard, we need to ensure we are keeping them. What are you2809doing to increase retention through the Maritime Industrial Base?2810    Mr. Sermon. Encouraging young Americans to seek careers in the2811skilled trades will require the collective efforts of Federal, State,2812and local governments, as well as our industry partners. Next-2813generation workforce members must see a viable career path that is2814adequately compensated, has clear purpose, and provides opportunities2815to advance. We must fundamentally change how we view skilled trades--2816they must be seen as a critical component of our national security, and2817the Navy team is actively working to elevate those conversations at a2818national level through messaging and partnership.2819    The Navy has made significant investment to attract, recruit,2820train, and retain the maritime industrial base workforce. The fiscal2821year 2025 Continuing Resolution (Public Law 118-158) funded wage2822increases and infrastructure productivity enhancements for nuclear2823shipbuilding programs, to help improve worker retention. In addition,2824our six regional talent pipeline programs provide dedicated coaching2825for small and medium suppliers to implement attraction and retention2826best practices. Navy funding is also supporting quality-of-life2827improvements at the shipyards, such as a new childcare facility at Bath2828Iron Works. To maintain improvement of recruiting and retention, we2829must continue to urge industry to provide competitive wages in order to2830attract and retain its workforce, continue to address K-12 education,2831career and technical education/university education, incumbent2832workforce matters, and the ecosystem improvements to ensure people want2833to stay.2834              dual buy of cohen veterans network's 82 & 832835    13. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon and Rear Admiral Moton, in your2836provided testimony you cited an acquisition savings of $4 billion2837dollars by doing a dual buy of CVN 80 and 81. In last year's National2838Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the House version of the bill2839included language ``encouraging'' the Navy to review and revise the2840future Ford-class acquisition strategy starting with CVN 82 and2841included funding for a dual buy of CVN's 82 and 83. The Senate included2842funding for CVN 82. Neither of these provisions made it into the final2843bill. Can you explain the benefits to the taxpayer and our maritime2844industrial base of doing a dual buy of these ships?2845    Mr. Sermon, and Rear Admiral Moton. The Navy is assessing the2846procurement of CVNs 82 and 83 as part of the fiscal year 2027 budget2847review. A block buy has the potential for significant savings and would2848send the industrial base a clear demand signal.28492850    14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon and Rear Admiral Moton, can you2851articulate the risks to our maritime industrial base of not doing a2852dual buy of CVN 82 and CVN 83?2853    Mr. Sermon, and Admiral Moton. Both the Navy and our Nation's2854shipbuilding industrial base face many challenging demands for time and2855resources, but we must balance our construction plans for nuclear-2856powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) with other national conventional and2857nuclear shipbuilding priorities. Reduction in steady State demand2858signal for equipment and components for construction will negatively2859affect the overall health and future growth of the shipbuilding2860industrial base.28612862    15. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon and Rear Admiral Moton, included2863in the NDAA was a request for procurement of CVN-82 to take place not2864later than fiscal year 2028. Can you address the risks to our maritime2865industrial base of procuring any later than fiscal year 2028?2866    Mr. Sermon, and Rear Admiral Moton. The timing and method of2867procuring future aircraft carriers (CVNs) will be reviewed by the2868Administration as we determine budgets and shipbuilding plans. Our job2869is to inform that process regarding both the industrial-base2870implications and the most efficient shipbuilding approach. Not2871procuring CVN 82 by FY28 could result in the narrowing of the2872industrial base and reduction in number of suppliers.2873                        shipyards and automation2874    16. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2875Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, the number of public and2876private shipyards in the U.S. has been halved over the last 30 years,2877leaving only two private nuclear shipyards on the East Coast. Do we2878need more shipbuilding infrastructure on the West Coast?2879    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2880and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Navy is working to grow the capability and2881capacity of our shipbuilding industrial base across the country, with2882investments to strength our supply chain, modernize shipbuilder2883infrastructure, generate capacity for key partners to take on work2884traditionally executed by shipbuilders, develop the critical maritime2885manufacturing workforce, and drive shipbuilding into the era of2886advanced manufacturing and automation.2887    We are making targeted investments to address chokepoints in the2888supply chain, with more than $1 billion invested to date to improve on-2889time delivery of components that are build-sequence-critical for2890nuclear shipbuilding programs. Navy investments are also helping2891improve capacity and modernize infrastructure of new-construction2892private shipyards, as well as address supply chain capacity constraints2893by leveraging advanced manufacturing technology.28942895    17. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker,2896Rear Admiral Moton, and Rear Admiral Weeks, would building new2897shipyards help the Navy use automation to better leverage advanced2898manufacturing techniques, thereby reducing the number of hours needed2899for fabrication and inspection?2900    Mr. Sermon, Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, Rear Admiral Moton,2901and Rear Admiral Weeks. The Navy is focused on improving maritime2902industrial base health by leveraging commercially mature advanced2903manufacturing technologies, such as metallic additive manufacturing,2904robotics and automation, artificial intelligence, and non-destructive2905test to improve shipbuilding schedules and reduce maintenance delays,2906alleviate chokepoints in key supplier marketspaces, and help mitigate2907the demand for maritime manufacturing workforce.2908    It is vital we infuse advanced manufacturing technology into new2909shipbuilding infrastructure, whether new shipyards or new facilities2910with existing industry partners, while we modernize existing2911shipbuilding infrastructure at the same time. For example, Austal is2912building a dedicated modular submarine manufacturing facility designed2913to incorporate advanced technology, such as autonomous welding and2914inspection, digital shipyard architecture, and advanced training.2915Similarly, the Navy is funding pilot programs to incorporate robotics2916and automation technologies at our public shipyards, to improve2917efficiency and alleviate workforce constraints.2918                               __________2919                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine2920                         australian investments2921    18. Senator Kaine. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, who is2922responsible for ensuring the funds received from the Australian2923Government are invested to support Virginia-class submarine production?2924    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. The Navy is focused on improving2925maritime industrial base health by leveraging commercially mature2926advanced manufacturing technologies, such as metallic additive2927manufacturing, robotics and automation, artificial intelligence, and2928non-destructive test to improve shipbuilding schedules and reduce2929maintenance delays, alleviate chokepoints in key supplier marketspaces,2930and help mitigate the demand for maritime manufacturing workforce.2931    It is vital we infuse advanced manufacturing technology into new2932shipbuilding infrastructure, whether new shipyards or new facilities2933with existing industry partners, while we modernize existing2934shipbuilding infrastructure at the same time. For example, Austal is2935building a dedicated modular submarine manufacturing facility designed2936to incorporate advanced technology, such as autonomous welding and2937inspection, digital shipyard architecture, and advanced training.2938Similarly, the Navy is funding pilot programs to incorporate robotics2939and automation technologies at our public shipyards, to improve2940efficiency and alleviate workforce constraints.29412942    19. Senator Kaine. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, how will the2943funds received from the Australian Government be executed and who2944defines the priorities for investment?2945    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. Per the Fiscal Year 2024 National2946Defense Authorization Act, the President must specify to Congress how2947the Australian contribution will be used, including specific amounts2948and purposes. That requirement has been delegated to the Secretary of2949Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Office of Management2950and Budget for execution. The draft plan is under review within the2951Department of Defense to ensure it aligns with Department of Defense2952priorities.29532954    20. Senator Kaine. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, who is2955responsible for ensuring these investments produce the desired2956improvements in submarine production?2957    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. The Maritime Industrial Base,2958along with PEO SSN and the AUKUS Integration and Acquisition Office,2959are responsible for ensuring the investments meet the desired outcomes.29602961    21. Senator Kaine. Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker, who is2962responsible for messaging the results of these investments to the2963Australian Government?2964    Rear Admiral (lower half) Rucker. In coordination with U.S. Navy2965Policy, the Office of Secretary of Defense Policy, Indo-Pacific2966Security Affairs, is responsible for sharing information related to the2967use of Australia's submarine industrial base contributions to the2968Government of Australia.2969                               __________29702971             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen2972            maritime industrial workforce training programs2973    22. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Sermon, New Hampshire manufacturers and2974suppliers along with Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are proud to be key2975members of the Maritime Industrial Base. Workforce development remains2976critical to their continued success and the health and readiness of the2977MIB supplier network. Navy-funded machinist and welder training2978programs at Nashua Community College and Manchester Community College2979in my State are delivering well-trained workers and are an example of2980partnerships that create employment opportunities and provide low-cost,2981high-return solutions. Does the Navy intend to continue support for2982these training programs? The Navy's long-term commitment to these2983programs is critical to industrial base capacity and meeting production2984objectives.2985    Mr. Sermon. The Navy has made significant investments to attract,2986recruit, train and retain the maritime industrial base workforce, which2987is the foundation of our shipbuilding and repair industrial base. These2988efforts are making a real impact; the submarine industrial base hired298912,600 new workers in 2024, a nearly 200-percent increase since 20212990and close to our goal of hiring 14,500 workers annually, to meet the2991demand for submarine construction.2992    This progress is only possible by working with a wide range of2993partners, including shipbuilders, industry, academic and training2994organizations, community groups, and State and local governments.2995Initiatives like the Machinist Training Pipeline Program with Nashua2996Community College and the Manchester Community College Workforce2997Development Welding Program, both launched in partnership with Granite2998State Manufacturing and the Southeastern New England Defense Industry2999Alliance), are great examples of focused trades training programs that3000will help to meet the demand for skilled workers across our maritime3001industrial base.3002    We are focused on the full continuum of workforce development,3003including attracting and recruiting today's workforce, providing world-3004class training opportunities across the country, connecting trained3005workers with career opportunities in the maritime industrial base,3006upskilling the existing workforce, improving retention, and inspiring3007the next generation of skilled maritime workers.3008                               __________30093010             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono3011                     adopting advanced technologies3012    23. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, I have concerns that the Navy lacks3013an enterprise-wide, holistic process to identify, test, transition, and3014incorporate commercially available advanced manufacturing techniques3015that are capable of reducing construction and sustainment costs. I'm3016introducing a provision in this year's NDAA that would establish a3017program specifically focused on advanced technology transition and3018adoption across the naval ship enterprise. What are your thoughts?3019    Mr. Sermon. To remain competitive and ensure our Nation has the3020capacity to build ships at scale, our industrial base must quickly3021adopt advanced manufacturing technologies such as automation, robotics,3022additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and generative3023scheduling to maximize productivity and efficiency.3024    The Department of the Navy (DON) is executing an enterprise-wide3025approach to identify, test, and implement Advanced Manufacturing (AdvM)3026technologies to address its most critical operational challenges. This3027effort was initiated with the release of the DON Advanced Manufacturing3028Strategy in December 2024 by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for3029Research, Development & Acquisition. The strategy outlines three key3030lines of effort: leveraging cutting-edge commercial technologies for3031strategic advancement; expanding organic manufacturing capabilities,3032including depot modernization; and enhancing warfighter self-3033sufficiency. AdvM encompasses a range of technologies such as additive3034manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing, cold spray), subtractive3035manufacturing (e.g., CNC machining), robotics, automation, and AI-3036enabled inspection and process control.3037    To implement this strategy, the DON has launched a coordinated3038transition process across the enterprise. This involves identifying3039components and processes that can most benefit from AdvM, assessing3040their suitability, and progressing qualifying candidates through3041engineering certification, standards development, and design generation3042to enable commercial and organic production. This effort is supported3043by the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps,3044systems commands, the Office of Naval Research, and program executive3045offices.3046    The Direct Reporting Program Manager for the Maritime Industrial3047Base (DRPM MIB) also plays a key role, integrating AdvM into3048shipbuilding and ship repair to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and3049modernize maintenance operations. For needs not immediately met through3050existing technology, the DON continues to pursue research and3051innovation with industry and academia.3052    The Navy appreciates Congress's support on this very important3053issue. We are committed to continuing to work with this Committee as3054well as our industrial base partners to increase adoption of new3055technologies across the maritime industrial base.3056            supply chain disruptions and material shortages3057    24. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, the prior SECNAV's review and3058congressional Research Service (CRS) report on shipbuilding highlight3059supply chain vulnerabilities, particularly in securing key components3060like propulsion and combat systems. These disruptions are further3061exacerbating shipbuilding delays and increasing costs. What actions are3062the Navy taking to stabilize the shipbuilding supply chain and ensure3063timely access to critical materials?3064    Mr. Sermon. The Navy is focused on improving the capability,3065capacity, and resiliency of our supply chain. Since fiscal year 2018,3066the Navy has funded over 725 supplier development projects to add3067capability, capacity, and resiliency to the supply chain, including3068development of alternate suppliers for critical submarine components.3069This includes investments with more than 50 single/sole-source3070suppliers to address supply chain fragility, including establishing and3071qualifying alternate sources of supply in key areas like castings, raw3072materials, valves and fittings, and mechanical components. In addition,3073the Navy has invested $1 billion to date to improve on-time delivery of3074components that are build-sequence-critical for nuclear shipbuilding3075programs.3076    The Navy is also addressing supply chain vulnerability by3077leveraging advanced manufacturing technology such as automation,3078robotics, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and3079generative scheduling. Driving advanced manufacturing at scale into the3080supply base and operationalizing technologies like additive3081manufacturing as an interchangeable manufacturing process is a critical3082focus area for the Navy. This will help us reduce maintenance delays3083and new construction schedules, alleviate chokepoints in key market3084spaces such as castings and forgings, and mitigate the demand for3085growing the manufacturing workforce.30863087    25. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, what can be done to help mitigate3088supply chain risks and improve resiliency in ship component production?3089    Mr. Sermon. The Navy is focused on improving the capability,3090capacity, and resiliency of our supply chain. Since fiscal year 2018,3091the Navy has funded over 725 supplier development projects to add3092capability, capacity, and resiliency to the supply chain, including3093development of alternate suppliers for critical submarine components.3094This includes investments with more than 50 single/sole-source3095suppliers to address supply chain fragility, as well as $1 billion3096invested to date to improve on-time delivery of components that are3097build-sequence-critical for nuclear shipbuilding programs.3098    The Navy is also addressing supply chain vulnerability by3099leveraging advanced manufacturing technology such as automation,3100robotics, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and3101generative scheduling. Driving advanced manufacturing at scale into the3102supply base and operationalizing technologies like additive3103manufacturing as an interchangeable manufacturing process is a critical3104focus area for the Navy. This will help us reduce maintenance delays3105and new construction schedules, alleviate chokepoints in key market3106spaces such as castings and forgings, and help mitigate the demand for3107growing the manufacturing workforce.3108             strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base3109    26. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, the shipbuilding industrial base is3110struggling with capacity constraints, particularly in submarine3111construction, where delays in Virginia-class and Columbia-class3112production threaten both the attack submarine force and our strategic3113deterrent. Strengthening the industrial base is essential to meeting3114national security objectives. What targeted investments does the Navy3115plan to make to expand the capacity of private shipyards?3116    Mr. Sermon. Since 2018, more than $10 billion has been appropriated3117to address submarine industrial base capability, capacity, and3118workforce with an additional $1.3 billion appropriated to support3119surface ship industrial base efforts. The Navy DRPM MIB is leading3120enterprise-wide efforts to help restore America's shipbuilding capacity3121in a strategy focused on six key lines of effort: growing capability3122and capacity in the supply chain; modernizing shipbuilder3123infrastructure; expanding capacity of key suppliers to take on work3124traditionally executed by shipbuilders; developing the critical3125maritime manufacturing workforce; operationalizing advanced3126manufacturing technology; and improving government oversight.3127    We are making targeted investments to address chokepoints in the3128supply chain, with more than $1 billion invested to date to improve on-3129time delivery of components that are build-sequence-critical for3130nuclear shipbuilding programs. Navy investments are also helping3131improve capacity and modernize infrastructure of new-construction3132private shipyards, as well as address supply chain capacity constraints3133by leveraging advanced manufacturing technology.31343135    27. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, how is the Navy leveraging3136partnerships with allied shipbuilders and best practices from foreign3137shipbuilding industries to improve efficiency and productivity in U.S.3138shipyards?3139    Mr. Sermon. The Navy is closely engaged with our allies to3140understand their approaches to shipbuilding and how we can leverage3141best practices to improve efficiency and productivity. For example, the3142Navy is working to identify opportunities to leverage some of the3143approaches that Japan and South Korea use in their shipbuilding sector,3144such as standardized ship design, modular production techniques,3145advanced manufacturing technology, and strong public-private3146partnerships.3147                  addressing navy cost estimation gaps3148    28. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, persistent underestimation of3149shipbuilding costs often leads to major budget overruns once3150construction begins. These miscalculations have impacted multiple3151programs over the past decade. How is the Navy working to improve its3152cost estimation process to provide more accurate projections for3153Congress?3154    Mr. Sermon. We recognize good cost estimates across the3155shipbuilding enterprise are key to informing the budget. The Navy3156develops or obtains independent cost estimates for major defense3157acquisition programs, consistent with statute and DOD policy. The3158independent cost estimates ensure we leverage Government Accountability3159Office (GAO) cost-estimating best practices.31603161    29. Senator Hirono. Mr. Sermon, is the Navy considering independent3162cost assessments for major programs to ensure greater transparency and3163accountability?3164    Mr. Sermon. The Navy develops or obtains independent cost estimates3165for major defense acquisition programs, consistent with statute and DOD3166policy. The independent cost estimates ensure we leverage GAO cost-3167estimating best practices.31683169                               [all]