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Hearings to examine interdicting illicit drug trafficking, focusing on a view from the front lines.
Meeting•Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation•Feb 26, 2025 · 11:00 AM
Summary
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a meeting on Feb 26, 2025 at 11:00 AM in Russell Senate Office Building, Room 253.
Record
The meeting has its transcript on the record.
Transcript
The transcript runs to 4,327 lines and 241,299 characters, as the Government Publishing Office printed it.
senate-hearing-61202.txt1[Senate Hearing 119-117]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34 S. Hrg. 119-11756 INTERDICTING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING:7 A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES89=======================================================================1011 HEARING1213 BEFORE THE1415 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,16 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION17 UNITED STATES SENATE1819 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021 FIRST SESSION2223 __________2425 FEBRUARY 26, 20252627 __________2829 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and30 Transportation3132[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3334 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov3536 __________3738 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3961-202 PDF WASHINGTON : 20254041-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4243 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION4445 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS4647 FIRST SESSION4849 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman50JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,51ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking52DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota53JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii54DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts55MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan56TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin57TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois58ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada59JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico60BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado61TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania62SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey63CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware64 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director65 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director66 Liam McKenna, General Counsel67 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director68 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director69 Jonathan Hale, General Counsel7071 C O N T E N T S7273 ----------74 Page75Hearing held on February 26, 2025................................ 176Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 177 DHS Office of Inspector General report....................... 1478Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 379Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 3980Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 4081Statement of Senator Moreno...................................... 4282Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 4483Statement of Senator Sheehy...................................... 4684Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 4785Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 6486Statement of Senator Kim......................................... 6987Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 7188Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 7389Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 7590Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 769192 Witnesses9394Jena Ehlinger, Mother of Jake Ehlinger of Texas, A Victim of95 Fentanyl Poisoning............................................. 596 Prepared statement........................................... 797Kevin Hall, Chief of Spokane Police Department................... 998 Prepared statement........................................... 1099Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of National Drug100 Control Policy, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; and Director,101 National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program.. 49102 Prepared statement........................................... 51103Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, Assistant Commandant for Response104 Policy, U.S. Coast Guard....................................... 55105 Prepared statement........................................... 57106Jonathan Miller, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and Marine107 Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)........... 60108 Prepared statement........................................... 62109110 Appendix111112Response to written questions submitted to Shannon Kelly by:113 Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 81114 Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 83115 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 84116Response to written questions submitted to Rear Adm. Adam Chamie117 by:............................................................118 Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 85119 Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 86120 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 87121Response to written questions submitted to Jonathan Miller by:122 Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 87123 Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 88124 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 89125126 INTERDICTING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES127128 ----------129130 WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2025131132 U.S. Senate,133 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,134 Washington, DC.135 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:09 a.m., in136room SR-253, Russell Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz, Chairman137of the Committee, presiding.138 Present: Senators Cruz [presiding] Fischer, Blackburn,139Budd, Moreno, Sullivan, Sheehy, Cantwell, Klobuchar, Markey,140Baldwin, Kim, and Lujan.141142 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,143 U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS144145 The Chairman. Good morning. The Senate Committee on146Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order.147 Today we are here to talk about stopping deadly drugs from148crossing our maritime borders. But you cannot stop illegal149drugs from crossing a border if you do not believe in having150them.151 The Biden administration and former DHS Secretary Mayorkas152deliberately ignored the painful connection between their open153border policies and the devastation wrought by illegally154trafficked drugs on families and communities in our country.155 Trying to have a country without borders led to an influx156of illegal aliens, drug smuggling, sex trafficking, and,157tragically, far too many American lives lost.158 That dereliction of basic sovereignty left the Coast Guard159in an impossible position. The Coast Guard has admitted it160missed opportunities to intercept drugs because it was161overwhelmed chasing and catching illegal immigrants.162 Despite the Biden administration's lack of interest in163border security, Republicans were able to make some progress.164In the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022 I secured funding165for a blimp-based radar system at South Padre Island to combat166drug runners, poachers, and human traffickers. Today, it is167still protecting south Texas.168 Similarly, my provision requiring data sharing between CBP169and the Coast Guard is streamlining interdiction in the170southern maritime border, halting illegal incursions into the171United States.172 In contrast to Democrat ambivalence about the border173crisis, President Trump and congressional Republicans are174making real gains in border security through the Coast Guard.175 In the last month the Coast Guard interdicted an historic176amount of illegal drugs. Just last week it offloaded 37,000177pounds of seized cocaine worth $279 million. That is going to178make a real difference in keeping communities safe from179criminals and addiction.180 But protecting Americans from deadly illicit narcotics181extends beyond our borders. We also need to reverse the Biden182administration's dangerous policies in the Middle East where183maritime drug running bankrolls Iran's malign activities.184 Coast Guard cutters recently caught advanced weapons185originating in Iran and bound for the Houthis in Yemen, as well186as hundreds of kilograms of methamphetamines, heroin, and other187illegal drugs from dhows in the Arabian Sea.188 The Coast Guard and other Federal agencies have been189catching and releasing Iranian drug runners, meaning there was190no consequence beyond losing cargo for financing terrorism.191 Let me be clear. Catch and release is a disgrace and an192insult to those who have lost their lives to Iranian terrorism.193 That is why I have included language in the Coast Guard194Reauthorization Act of 2025 to empower the Coast Guard and the195Navy to respond forcefully to dhows running drugs and weapons196when they have helped finance Iranian terror.197 Under President Trump's leadership we need to pass the198Coast Guard Reauthorization Act and end the catch and release199approach to Middle East drug enforcement.200 That legislation, which has broad bipartisan and bicameral201support, would also close a loophole in the ability to202prosecute cartels for drug smuggling on remotely operated drone203ships like the one in the hearing room today.204 We also need to enact the Pay Our Coast Guard Act, which I205will reintroduce this week along with Senator Cantwell,206Sullivan, Baldwin, Wicker, and Blunt Rochester, to ensure that207the Coast Guard is no longer the only armed service that goes208unpaid during a government shutdown.209 As I have said before, the Coast Guard deserves to be paid210without question and without delay.211 Finally, today we will hear powerful testimony from the212unthinkable damage caused by illicit drugs like fentanyl to213American families.214 Texan Jena Ehlinger will testify about the effects this215crisis had on her own family. I am grateful she is here today216as she works to turn tragedy into progress, and I look forward217to hearing from Ms. Ehlinger and the rest of our witnesses218about what law enforcement needs to protect our communities.219 Another American lost to fentanyl is one too many. I know220that Ranking Member Cantwell agrees with me on this point and221that is why we are working together on legislation to stop222illicit fentanyl smuggling in the United States.223 I am grateful for a partnership in this endeavor and now224turn to her for her opening statement.225226 STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,227 U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON228229 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you230for having this very important hearing on fentanyl and what our231committee and committee jurisdiction can do to stop the scourge232of fentanyl.233 I very much appreciate the witnesses being here: police234chief of Spokane, Chief Hall, and Ms. Ehlinger. So sorry for235your loss of your son Jake. You are such a brave advocate and236thank you.237 There are many brave advocates, like Laura Lynch who talks238in Seattle about the loss of her daughter Brillion, and you are239making a difference so thank you for being here today.240 And I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, as we241fight this scourge and work within our committee jurisdiction.242Of the 10 states with the highest number of drug-related243overdoses they all host major intermodal hubs. That is to say,244states like mine, Washington, and yours, Texas, are clear245nexuses to transportation networks.246 I think we are going to hear from Chief Hall about how247those networks allow for the distribution of fentanyl once they248are across the border.249 And overdose deaths continue to rise in most western250states, up 14 percent in Washington just last year. The supply251chain is clear. The Chinese triad sells precursor chemicals to252Mexican drug cartels, hidden on ships and in air cargos, and253cartels make fentanyl and smuggle it through the United States.254 They hide fentanyl in personal vehicles, commercial trucks,255busses, trains, planes, and even on unmanned aerial vehicles.256So this is a danger to our national security and our257transportation security. It is very highly toxic.258 So it is, Mr. Chairman, the jurisdiction of our committee259to have oversight over transportation security. Last year, I260fought for more nonintrusive inspection technologies at U.S.261Customs and Border--CBP--who I know we will hear from as well262about how a 370--it now has 370 large nonintrusive inspection263systems and more than 4,000 small systems across various ports264of entry.265 I have seen firsthand how this helps us detect better the266next generation of technology, vapor technology, could be267developed by our Pacific Northwest Lab and the University of268Washington to increase even the speed and accuracy of this269analysis.270 Our national labs' Vapor ID accurately detects and271identifies the vapors from illicit drugs and explosives in real272time and in extremely small amounts. Rather than using surface273swipes or the pulse of air for analysis the system sniffs the274vapors, much the way a trained canine can detect explosives.275 So our borders are not our only problem but this fentanyl276detection at our borders is working. We need to do more.277 Fentanyl smuggling happens every day within the borders of278our country on our interstates, on our Amtrak, at our bus279terminals, at our airports, and concealed U.S. mail and we must280track the activities of these transportation networks.281 Recent interdiction efforts in the state of Washington282illustrates the importance of joint law enforcement efforts at283our transportation hubs and networks.284 Just last October we had the largest coordinated drug285trafficking bust in Seattle--600 officers from 10 different286states, local law enforcement agencies, and they disrupted a287violent drug trafficking gang.288 It resulted from a wiretap investigation of a shipment of289fentanyl into the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. A year-290long investigation was led by Homeland Security, the Seattle291police, involving a U.S. attorney, FBI, DEA, ATF, CBP,292Washington State Patrol, the King County Sheriff's Office, and293Bellevue, Everett, Renton police departments and Yakima294narcotics and gang task force members.295 And in January 2023 law enforcement also conducted a bust296at Sea-Tac discovering more than 400,000 fentanyl pills in a297checked baggage of drug couriers. Traffickers were smuggling298millions of pills into Puget Sound.299 The Port of Seattle Police Department, working with DEA and300canines, seized that fentanyl and the Phoenix Police Department301then arrested the suspects in Arizona.302 In 2024 the Burien Police Department, King County Sheriff's303Office, and DEA seized more than 1 million fentanyl pills and304meth and heroin, and traffickers transported hundreds of pounds305of drugs in a semi truck on a regular trip from southern306California into Washington.307 So we must give law enforcement more tools--more tools to308attack these transportation networks and stop the flow of these309drugs into our states.310 Chief Kevin Hall of the Spokane Police Department with us311today has worked closely with Federal, state, and local law312enforcement for more than 30 years. He will be speaking to this313experience in eastern Washington and what he calls the super314highways for fentanyl distribution.315 As an enrolled member of the Colville tribe he also knows316that tribal communities have been hard hit by fentanyl crisis317because it is another place to hide these drugs and these318rings, and that is why last year I introduced with Senators319Baldwin, Lujan, and Rosen the Stop Fentanyl Smuggling Act,320largely supported by law enforcement, transportation, and321forensic science groups including the National High-Intensity322Drug Area.323 And so witness Shannon Kelly is a director of the National324High-Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area Program. She is also a325member of the interdiction coordinator at the Office of the326National Drug Control Policy.327 So I look forward to asking her about this and the ways in328which we can all work together to stop the flow of fentanyl,329accelerate the development of next-generation nonintrusive330inspection technology and build state and local forensic331science capabilities.332 So I hope that we all can work together collaboratively. I333think it shows that we can disrupt this trafficking.334 So I am very pleased to work with you, Mr. Chairman, on335these issues and I appreciate your focus on the Coast Guard's336critical role in this area.337 I know that the Coast Guard has been working but we need to338do more. I want to acknowledge that the crew of the Coast Guard339Waesche who interdicted more than 37,000 pounds of cocaine340worth $275 million earlier this month. I am also, though,341saddened to hear that a crew member was lost at sea. So our342thoughts and prayers are with their family and friends.343 I think, Senator Cruz, you and I have introduced this344bipartisan Coast Guard Reauthorization Act which would increase345authorization levels and I hope that the Coast Guard's critical346counternarcotics mission and other missions will be bolstered347in our efforts.348 We need to do everything. As you have displayed here, if349you leave a territory unaddressed that is where the drug will350flow.351 So attacking this at all levels is the right idea and so I352look forward to working with you as we in this committee tackle353the transportation networks that are threatening the lives of354young individuals and many more Americans.355 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.356 The Chairman. Thank you very much.357 I will now introduce the first panel. Joining us on the358first panel today is Ms. Jena Ehlinger who was the mother of359Jake Ehlinger of Texas. Ms. Ehlinger is a mom who turned360unimaginable grief, the nightmare of every parent, into action361after losing her son Jake to fentanyl poisoning in 2021.362 Since then she has fought tirelessly to raise awareness363about the dangers of fentanyl, to advocate for stronger drug364policies, and to work to ensure that no other family has to365endure the same devastating loss.366 Our second witness is Mr. Kevin Hall, Chief of Police for367the City of Spokane, and he has been on the front lines of the368fight against the fentanyl crisis. Thank you, Chief, for your369service.370 Thank you both for being here. Ms. Ehlinger, you are371recognized for five minutes, and I understand that you will be372starting your testimony with a brief video.373374STATEMENT OF JENA EHLINGER, MOTHER OF JAKE EHLINGER OF TEXAS, A375 VICTIM OF FENTANYL POISONING376377 [Video played.]378 Ms. Ehlinger. Jake was just a bundle of love and joy and379happy from the day he was born. He loved sports. He loved being380outdoors.381 He loved his friends. He had a very creative side. We all382say he gave the best hugs, like, in the entire world, just big383old bear hugs. He played football at the University of Texas.384 Jake just had--he had a fire about him and it was a good385way to, like, release that fire. He was a finance major in the386school of McCombs when he passed away. His anxiety was pretty387high the last probably year of his life and I think it was just388the pressure of school and football.389 We were in Mexico at a friend's daughter's wedding when I390got the news that Jake had died. I was just in complete, utter391shock. I mean, it is like an out of body experience because you392just are, like, no, not my child. That cannot be right.393 The problem is the medical examiners are coming in and they394are finding someone dead. They know it is not suicide because395it is obviously not suicide and so the only other box they have396to check is accidental overdose.397 And it is not an accidental overdose. It is poisoning.398These young adults are buying these pills thinking they are399getting one thing and they are getting something else.400 I wish I could tell you that we found the person that sold401it to Jake but we did not. Basically, the DEA and the police402were, like, sorry, there is nothing we can do. We cannot help403you.404 We were so confused. Like, how in the world are people405getting away with this, and, of course, my horror is if we do406not do anything more and more kids are going to be dying every407day.408 And so what House Bill 6 does is anybody who is lacing409drugs with fentanyl can now be charged and prosecuted including410for murder. The facts that I wish the average parent knew about411the dangers of fentanyl is do not think it will not be your412kid.413 I would have never in a million years dreamed that Jake414would die of fentanyl poisoning. Like, this is happening every415day to so many teenagers and young adults. Do not put your head416in the sand and think there is no way this will happen in my417family because it could.418 [Video ends.]419 Ms. Ehlinger. Good morning. My name is Jena Ehlinger. I420never imagined that I would be on the front lines of a war I421knew nothing about, and then I received the live-shattering422call that my 20-year-old son Jake had been poisoned with423fentanyl. This photo of Jake was taken 10 days before that424call.425 Jake grew up in Austin, Texas. He was a gifted athlete who426also excelled in academics. With a score of 35 out of 36 on the427ACT exam combined with his stellar high school grades and428athleticism, Jake was recruited to play linebacker by a number429of top tier universities including Stanford, Yale, Brown, Penn,430and Dartmouth.431 Jake passed on those incredible offers so that he could432play football at his dream school, the University of Texas. His433dad and I went to UT. His brother Sam was then UT's434quarterback.435 Jake wanted to play football with his brother on the team436he had been an avid fan of his entire life. Jake was admitted437into the McCombs School of Business as a finance major, became438a member of the Texas Silver Spurs, and was a UT football439player and a straight A student.440 In the spring of 2021 as a sophomore he was looking forward441to his upcoming summer internship at Dell, and his little442sister Morgan joining him at UT in the fall.443 On May 6, 2021, I received that horrific call. Jake had444taken a counterfeit Xanax that had been laced with fentanyl. As445with many things, until you have lived it the reality of such446devastation is difficult to fully understand.447 To our family's further devastation, when the death448certificate was issued the DEA and the Austin police informed449us that they were closing their investigation because the450manner of death on the death certificate was classified as an451accident.452 Jake's death was not an accident. He was killed, literally453poisoned to death. Labeling the poisoning and murder of my son454as an accident resulted in the premature closing of Federal and455local law enforcement investigations, ensured that no one will456ever be arrested for poisoning and killing Jake, prevented the457case from ever reaching a prosecutor's desk.458 I hope no other families have to live through the459additional nightmare that their child's killer will never be460arrested or prosecuted because a medical examiner labeled their461child's poisoning as an accident for statistical purposes.462 Through my experience I learned that there were few to no463consequences for murdering someone by poisoning them with a464fentanyl-laced pill. Most laws address larger quantities of465drugs, not the mere two milligrams of fentanyl that is466considered a lethal dose.467 As a result, those illegally manufacturing and distributing468fentanyl remained on the streets and continued killing our469children one pill at a time with little fear of prosecution.470 Thankfully, with the help of friends we were able to pass a471law in Texas addressing this vacuum in the law. Our legislation472requires medical examiners to classify death from a fentanyl-473laced substance as what it is, poisoning, and created a murder474offense for the unlawful manufacture or distribution of475fentanyl resulting in death including from just one pill.476 Now in the state of Texas on the death certificate it is477described as fentanyl poisoning, thereby keeping law478enforcement investigations from prematurely closing, and479illegally manufacturing or distributing a fentanyl-laced480substance that results in death, even from one pill, may be481prosecuted as murder and those poisoning Texans can no longer482kill one pill at a time without fear of arrest and prosecution483and are being taken off the streets. And other families may not484have to live with the fact that no one will ever be prosecuted485for killing their child or their loved one.486 The law has been effective. Before this law there were no487Texas state murder charges for deaths from one fentanyl-laced488pill. In the first 8 months there were approximately 25 murder489charges. To date, there have been nearly 60 murder charges.490 But we are just one state. We need Federal laws to491accomplish these goals and more nationwide including stopping492the distribution of fentanyl in our country.493 Senators, our country is at war and we are losing the war494as evidenced by fentanyl becoming the number-one killer in the495United States for ages 18 to 45. It impacts all races,496religions, socioeconomic statuses, and political affiliations.497 This lethal epidemic is killing young Americans and498destroying families. I am just one mom who lost her precious499son.500 You are among the most powerful people in this country and501there is no higher use of that power than to save someone's502child and perhaps even your own.503 Thank you for listening. God bless you all.504 [The prepared statement of Ms. Ehlinger follows:]505506 Prepared Statement of Jena Ehlinger507 My name is Jena Ehlinger.508 I never imagined that I would be on the front lines of a war I knew509nothing about. And then I received the life-shattering call that my 20-510year-old son Jake had been poisoned with fentanyl. This photo of Jake511was taken 10 days before that call.512 Jake grew up in Austin, Texas. He was a gifted athlete who also513excelled in academics. With a score of 35 out of 36 on the ACT exam514combined with his stellar high school grades and athleticism, Jake was515recruited to play linebacker by a number of top-tier universities,516including Stanford, Yale, Brown, Penn, and Dartmouth.517 Jake passed on these incredible offers so he could play football at518his dream school, The University of Texas. His dad and I went to UT and519his brother, Sam, was then UT's quarterback. Jake wanted to play520football with his brother on the team he had been an avid fan of his521entire life.522 Jake was admitted into the McCombs School of Business as a finance523major, became a member of the Texas Silver Spurs, was a UT football524player, and a straight A student. In the spring of 2021, as a525sophomore, he was looking forward to his upcoming summer internship at526Dell and his little sister Morgan joining him at UT in the fall.527 On May 6, 2021, I received that horrific call. Jake had taken a528counterfeit Xanax that had been laced with fentanyl. As with many529things, until you have lived it, the reality of such devastation is530difficult to fully understand.531 To our family's further devastation, when the death certificate was532issued, the DEA and the Austin Police informed us that they were533closing their investigations because the ``manner of death'' on the534death certificate was classified as an ``Accident''. Jake's death was535not an accident. He was killed--literally poisoned to death.536 Labeling the poisoning and murder of my son as an ``Accident'':537538 (1) resulted in the premature closing of Federal and local law539 enforcement investigations;540541 (2) ensured that no one will ever be arrested for poisoning and542 killing Jake; and543544 (3) prevented the case from ever reaching a prosecutor's desk.545546 I hope no other families have to live through the additional547nightmare that their child's killers will never be arrested or548prosecuted because a medical examiner labeled their child's poisoning549an ``Accident'' for statistical purposes.550 Through my experience, I learned that there were few to no551consequences for murdering someone by poisoning them with a fentanyl-552laced pill. Most laws address larger quantities of drugs, not the mere5532 milligrams of fentanyl that is considered a lethal dose. As a result,554those illegally manufacturing and distributing fentanyl remained on the555streets and continued killing our children--one pill at a time--with556little fear of prosecution.557 Thankfully, with the help of friends, we were able to pass a law in558Texas addressing this vacuum in the law. Our legislation requires559medical examiners to classify death from a fentanyl-laced substance as560what it is--poisoning--and created a murder offense for the unlawful561manufacture or distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, including562from just one pill. Now, in Texas:563564 on the death certificate, it is described as ``fentanyl565 poisoning'' thereby keeping law enforcement investigations from566 prematurely closing;567568 illegally manufacturing or distributing a fentanyl-laced569 substance that results in death--even from one pill--may be570 prosecuted as murder;571572 those poisoning Texans can no longer kill one pill at a time573 without fear of arrest and prosecution and are being taken off574 the streets; and575576 other families may not have to live with the fact that no577 one will ever be prosecuted for killing their child or loved578 one.579580 The law has been effective. Before this law, there were no Texas581state murder charges for deaths from one fentanyl-laced pill. In the582first eight months, there were approximately 25 murder charges. To583date, there have been nearly 60 murder charges.584 But we are just one state. We need Federal laws to accomplish these585goals and more nationwide, including stopping the distribution of586fentanyl in our country.587 Senators, our country is at war and are losing the war, as588evidenced by fentanyl becoming the number one killer in the U.S. for589ages 18-45. It impacts all races, religions, socioeconomic statuses,590and political affiliations. This lethal epidemic is killing young591Americans and destroying families. I am just one mom who lost her592precious son. You are among the most powerful people in this country.593There is no higher use of that power than to save someone's child and594perhaps even your own.595 Thank you for listening.596597 The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you for the598difference you are making in our home state of Texas and thank599you for speaking to the American people today, and I hope that600Congress hears your words today.601 Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.602 The Chairman. Chief Hall.603604 STATEMENT OF KEVIN HALL,605 CHIEF OF SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT606607 Mr. Hall. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and608members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to609testify on the fentanyl crisis, an issue of national urgency610that devastates communities across the country including my own611in Spokane, Washington.612 My name is Kevin Hall. I am honored to serve as Police613Chief for the City of Spokane, the second largest city in the614state of Washington.615 I was appointed to the position in August 2024 after616previously serving more than 32 years in the Tucson Police617Department in Tucson, Arizona, the last nearly 8 years as618assistant chief.619 My 33-year career in policing has focused on violent crime,620addressing the impacts of drugs and drug trafficking on public621safety at both local and national levels.622 Since 2019 the annual number of opioid drug overdoses has623doubled in Washington State, and Spokane's opioid deaths have624surpassed the state's average.625 Recent reports by the CDC and DEA illustrating national626declines in fatal drug overdoses are not the reality in627Washington State. The Spokane Fire Department's calls for628overdoses have increased 30 percent in 2024 over the previous629year.630 Like every other urban police agency in the country, the631Spokane Police Department continues to allocate more and more632resources to address open-air drug use, fatal drug overdoses,633and the overall harm caused to the community by fentanyl.634 The Spokane County medical examiner reported at least 346635opioid related deaths last year, over 75 percent involving636fentanyl. The economic toll is staggering. The Senate's Joint637Economic Committee estimated the opioid crisis cost the U.S.638$1.5 trillion in 2020 alone.639 Fentanyl's impact stems from its potency--40 to 50 times640more lethal than heroin--and its alarming accessibility. From641my experience in southern Arizona I know that most fentanyl642enters the U.S. through legal ports of entry, concealed in643commercial cargo trucks, passenger vehicles, trailers, and RVs.644 Recent seizures highlight the scale of trafficking along645transportation routes. In Tucson law enforcement intercepted6461.7 million fentanyl pills in just two stops in late 2024.647 Spokane's supply chain follows similar patterns, moving648drugs from Mexico along interstates I-19, I-10, and I-5 before649reaching eastern Washington via I-90. Spokane officers have650recently encountered bulk powder fentanyl, an emerging and651highly dangerous trend.652 Fentanyl trafficking has direct and violent consequences. A653harrowing example of this occurred in Spokane when an654investigation where traffickers using I-90 transported bulk655fentanyl pill loads to Spokane from the Tri-Cities area.656 Spokane PD and Federal partners, after an intensive657investigation, interdicted the trafficker, resulting in a658violent midday shootout with Spokane police officers that659endangered innocents including small children who were in the660area. Two thousand fentanyl pills were seized from the car that661the suspect was traveling in.662 Elsewhere in Washington drug traffickers have used663commercial trucks, passenger rail and even commercial airlines,664as seen in a 2023 investigation at Seattle-Tacoma International665Airport where 400,000 fentanyl pills were found in checked666baggage.667 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimated that668drug traffickers were bringing millions of pills a month into669the Seattle region via drug couriers' checked luggage.670 Another separate investigation in Seattle in the fall 2024671culminated in the arrest of 12 violent fentanyl traffickers,672the seizure of significant amounts of fentanyl, dozens of673weapons, and highlighted what effective Federal and local law674enforcement partnerships look like with the Department of675Homeland Security, Seattle Police Department, U.S. Attorney676General's Office, among the agencies involved.677 This investigation directly stemmed from the previously678mentioned checked baggage investigation at Sea-Tac Airport.679Interdicting fentanyl requires strong partnerships between680local, state, Federal, and tribal agencies.681 We must enhance these collaborations with improved682technology and resources. That is why I respectfully urge683Congress to pass the Stop Smuggling Illicit Synthetic Drugs on684U.S. Transportation Networks Act.685 This legislation would expand nonintrusive inspection686technologies such as drive-through and mobile X-ray sensors,687specialized canine resources, vapor technology to strengthen688our ability to detect and disrupt fentanyl trafficking before689it reaches our streets.690 The fight against fentanyl is urgent. It is real.691Strengthening our enforcement capabilities will save lives.692 Thank you for your time and I welcome any questions.693 [The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]694695 Prepared Statement of Kevin Hall, Chief of Police, City of Spokane696 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the697Committee thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing698and for your attention to a topic that has impacted countless families699across the country and in the communities I serve. The fentanyl crisis700is one of national importance and national urgency.701 My name is Kevin Hall, and I am honored to serve as Police Chief702for the City of Spokane, the second largest City in the State of703Washington. I was appointed to the position in August of 2024 after704previously serving more than 32 years in the Tucson Police Department705in patrol, investigations, SWAT, and nearly 8 years as Assistant Chief.706I also serve as Co-chair of the Research Advisory Committee for the707International Chiefs of Police; I'm a graduate of the Major Cities708Chief's Association Police Executive Leadership Institute, the Police709Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Police, the710Harvard Kennedy School of Government Senior Executives in State & Local711Government and I am proud to be an inductee in the Evidence-Based712Policing Hall of Fame.713 Since 2019, the annual number of opioid drug overdoses has doubled714in Washington State, and Spokane's opioid deaths have surpassed the715state's average.\1\ Recent reports by the CDC and DEA illustrating716national declines in fatal drug overdoses are not the reality in717Washington state. The Spokane Fire Department's calls for overdoses718have increased 30 percent in 2024 over the previous year.\2\ Like every719other police agency in the country, the Spokane Police Department720continues to allocate more and more resources to address open-air drug721use, fatal drug overdoses, and the overall harm caused to the community722by fentanyl. A recent Spokane County Medical Examiner Report concluded723that at least 346 individuals died of an opioid-related overdose last724year, with fentanyl accounting for over 75 percent of those deaths.\3\725The cost of fentanyl is devastating both individually and collectively.726The Senate's Joint Economic Committee previously estimated that in 2020727alone, the opioid epidemic cost the country roughly 1.5 trillion728dollars.\4\729---------------------------------------------------------------------------730 \1\ See Opioid and Drug Overdose Data | Washington State Department731of Health.732 \2\ 'Anecdotally, we're seeing more dead people.'--RANGE Media.733 \3\ Most overdose deaths in Spokane County among housed, employed734adults, according to new report | News | kxly.com.735 \4\ JEC Analysis Finds Opioid Epidemic Cost U.S. Nearly $1.5736Trillion in 2020--JEC Analysis Finds Opioid Epidemic Cost U.S. Nearly737$1.5 Trillion in 2020--United States Joint Economic Committee738(senate.gov).739---------------------------------------------------------------------------740 The scale of fentanyl's impact is in part due to the potency of the741drug--40 to 50 times more lethal and addictive than heroin--as well as742its accessibility and street price.\5\ From my 32 years of policing in743southern Arizona, in a city 60 miles north of the international border744with Mexico, I know that the vast majority of fentanyl enters this745country through legal ports of entry, often concealed in commercial746cargo trucks, RVs, trailers, and cars. Let me be clear: this traffic747represents a mere fraction of the vehicles coming into the United748States from Mexico for legal purposes every day.749---------------------------------------------------------------------------750 \5\ See Fentanyl Facts | Stop Overdose | CDC.751---------------------------------------------------------------------------752 Nevertheless, the Tucson Police Department, in partnership with753their Federal partners, frequently seizes hundreds of pounds of754fentanyl. In November of 2024, Tucson PD, in conjunction with the755Southern Arizona HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area) group,756seized 1.1 million illicit fentanyl pills that were hidden in a Dodge757Charger.\6\ This car crossed the international border and traveled758north on I-19 and then I-10, where it was intercepted in Tucson. In a759similar example, in October of 2024, a stop on a vehicle that took the760same route resulted in a seizure of 600,000 fentanyl pills. 1.7 million761pills in two non-descript sedans traveling on America's highways,762nearly unimpeded.763---------------------------------------------------------------------------764 \6\ Tucson Police help recover over 1.1 million fentanyl pills in765traffic stop766---------------------------------------------------------------------------767 The fentanyl not seized by law enforcement at or near the border768travels along transportation networks using passenger buses and rail,769but most commonly cars and trucks on major interstates throughout the770country, routes commonly policed by state, county, and local law771enforcement.772 For instance, we know from collaborative investigations with state773and Federal partners that fentanyl in Spokane enters the U.S. from774Mexico, travels up along interstates I-10 and I-5, and makes its way to775Eastern Washington via the Tri-Cities. The major transportation artery776into eastern Washington and northern Idaho is I-90, which represents777the most significant pathway for fentanyl into Spokane and northern778Idaho.779 Spokane area law enforcement have recently seized pounds of powder780fentanyl, a new phenomenon where pills are being replaced by bulk781powder fentanyl. A harrowing example of fentanyl trafficking in Spokane782involved an investigation where traffickers, utilizing I-90,783transported bulk fentanyl pill loads to Spokane from the Tri-Cities784area. Spokane PD, after an intensive investigation, interdicted the785trafficker, resulting in a violent, mid-day shootout with Spokane786Police officers that endangered innocents, including small children in787the area.\7\ Two thousand fentanyl pills were seized from the car the788suspect was traveling in. The spin-off investigation from this shooting789resulted in a seizure of over 60 pounds of methamphetamine and over790500,000 fentanyl pills.791---------------------------------------------------------------------------792 \7\ Spokane drug agents seize press capable of making 17,000793fentanyl pills an hour.794---------------------------------------------------------------------------795 In 2024, the Burien Police Department and King County Sheriff's796Office on the west side of Washington state seized more than 1 million797dollars in fentanyl, meth, and heroin that were smuggled in a798commercial truck.\8\ According to charging documents, the drug799traffickers transported hundreds of pounds of drugs in a semi-truck on800regular trips from southern California to Washington State.801---------------------------------------------------------------------------802 \8\ Drugs worth $2.49 million, $46K in cash and gun recovered in803Burien bust.804---------------------------------------------------------------------------805 We also know that drugs are smuggled in through commercial806airlines, requiring sophisticated collaboration between local, state,807and Federal law enforcement partners to track and intercept them808successfully. One such example occurred in January 2023, when federal,809state, and local law enforcement conducted a bust at Seattle-Tacoma810International Airport SEATAC airport and found more than 400,000811fentanyl pills in checked luggage of drug couriers.\9\ The U.S.812Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that drug traffickers813were bringing millions of pills a month into the Seattle region via814drug couriers' checked luggage. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (SEA),815the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Port of Seattle police, and816other local law enforcement agencies worked together to interdict these817drugs.818---------------------------------------------------------------------------819 \9\ See VIDEO: KIRO 7 Investigates packing drugs in checked820luggage--KIRO 7 News Seattle.821---------------------------------------------------------------------------822 I appreciate this Committee's support for the partnerships that are823critical to the work we do on the ground. Without the cooperation of824federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, and private sector825partners, the problem would be even worse. But I also know that we can826work together to strengthen these key partnerships and produce better827outcomes for the people we all serve.828 To that end, I urge Congress to pass the Stop Smuggling Illicit829Synthetic Drugs on U.S. Transportation Networks Act. This legislation830would leverage precious Federal resources to develop and provide non-831intrusive technologies and canines to conduct inspections of cargo832transported via civil aircraft, passenger and freight rail, commercial833motor vehicles, and maritime vessels. By improving the detection and834interception of fentanyl at the border and along routes of interstate835commerce, this legislation will help choke supply and mitigate the836devastating downstream consumption of fentanyl. This is exactly the837kind of initiative that we need to strengthen the partnership between838local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement in the fight against839fentanyl and the smuggling of illicit drugs into our communities.840 Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to841answer any questions you may have.842843 The Chairman. Thank you, Chief.844 Ms. Ehlinger, I am going to start with you. Thank you for845coming and telling us about your son Jake. As a father my heart846breaks for you.847 You have gone through a nightmare that every parent, every848grandparent, is terrified of experiencing. You have done an849enormous amount in Texas to help prevent more tragic deaths.850 What advice can you give to parents who might want to make851a difference preventing future fentanyl poisonings?852 Ms. Ehlinger. The first thing I would say is that--talk to853your kids about drugs. Use the word fentanyl. Do not be afraid854to talk about it. Share statistics. Explain how dangerous it is855compared to when we were growing up, and also I would say for856kids that, you know, may have a lot of pressure on them.857 Kids in our society have a higher rate of anxiety than ever858before and to take the stigma away of it is OK if you need859help.860 Like, if you feel like you need some counseling or whatever861that is that it is OK to ask for some help and do not turn to a862counterfeit, you know, drug to try to make you feel better.863 The Chairman. An illustration that a DEA agent told me in864Texas of just the potency of fentanyl is he took a Sweet & Low865packet. He said, tear it open and empty the contents out so866that there is nothing in it. And then he said, stick your867finger inside the packet and remove your finger, and you have a868couple of little tiny specks of Sweet & Low.869 Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly.870 The Chairman. That is enough fentanyl to kill you. I can871tell you I have done that with our girls and tried to convey872the point but you are terrified that a teenager, a young adult873at one party, somebody gives them some stupid pill and that is874their last moment on Earth.875 Through your hard work the Texas penal code now876criminalizes the delivery or manufacture of fentanyl that877results in death, and the code requires medical examiners to878properly classify fentanyl poisoning deaths.879 As you noted, over 60 drug peddlers have already been880charged in Texas with murder since the law went into effect.881 Have you spoken with others in Texas about what these882changes have meant to them when the tragedy of fentanyl883poisoning occurs and what have they told you?884 Ms. Ehlinger. Yes. I mean, unfortunately, I have made a lot885of new friends because of this tragedy. Pain is a really strong886motivator and there is--any time there is a fentanyl death, you887know, whatever the seven degrees of separation--I mean,888somebody will ask me, can you talk to this person--they just889lost their child to fentanyl and I am, like, absolutely.890 Send me their phone number and I can literally pull up my891phone and just type in fentanyl and 30 names of people I never892knew before come up in my phone.893 They are extremely thankful. It is a very motivated group894of people, as you can imagine--parents that have lost their895children, probably one of the most motivated group of people.896 And there is also--just in Austin alone there is a group897called Angel Moms and there is probably 60 of these mothers who898have lost their children to fentanyl and that is in Austin,899Texas, only.900 The Chairman. Wow. In the video you played you said that901you were unable to determine who sold the drugs to your son902Jake. In the last Congress I passed legislation called the903TRANQ Act to help improve the technology for detecting and904identifying fentanyl and other related drugs, and Senator905Cantwell and I are now working on new legislation in this906space.907 How important is it for families to have the technology in908place to track the origins and pathways that these drugs travel909into the country?910 Ms. Ehlinger. I think it is extremely important. I mean,911yes, shockingly, the DEA could not open Jake's phone to912retrieve any information to find anyone responsible. My913understanding is that these young adults are buying these914counterfeit pills, thinking they are getting one thing, and915getting killed through social media platforms like Snapchat and916things like that.917 So I know that is how they are coming through, and then I918also know that they are also being delivered through rideshare919apps. So there is definitely a problem between all of the920different social media and technology applications that these921young adults use and have their hands on not understanding the922dangers of them.923 The Chairman. The record illegal immigration flows during924the Biden administration have clearly taken a toll on the Coast925Guard's counterdrug mission and so I am going to submit to the926hearing record a DHS Office of Inspector General report927entitled ``The Coast Guard faces challenges interdicting928noncommercial vessels smuggling drugs into the United States.''929 This report notes that the Coast Guard did not meet its930cocaine interdiction goals because it did not have enough931cutters available to perform the counterdrug mission. Those932cutters had been diverted to interdict illegal immigrants.933 The DHS OIG estimated that the Coast Guard could have934interdicted up to an additional 89 metric tons of cocaine had935those cutters been performing the counterdrug mission.936 And without objection, so ordered entered into the record.937 [The information referred to follows:]938939 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]940941 The Chairman. And with that, I recognize Senator Cantwell.942 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for943mentioning the TRANQ Act. I, too, supported that important944legislation, which is one of the tools, and I just want to say,945Ms. Ehlinger, again, you know, we have had I think 11 regional946meetings in my state and it is just--the story is the same. The947story is the same and the call is the same. We need more to948alert.949 I will never forget a high school student in Yakima,950Washington telling me that, you know, having an assembly once a951year is not enough. You should be telling high schoolers every952day do not take anything given to you by anyone other than a953health care provider. Just do not.954 And I think that we have to amplify on many different955fronts. We have to fight this scourge on many different fronts.956So, again, thank you for your willingness to continue to push957on this.958 And, you know, the jurisdiction of this committee is a959little more on the transportation network and but your960illumination of the problem just shows you what distribution961does to destroy families.962 I want to ask Chief Hall about those distribution networks963because we hear a lot about the border and we want more964security and detection at the border but it is clear that these965rings are so elaborate that by attacking the transportation966network we can discover and illuminate and catch these rings.967 And what have we learned about these networks and968transportation system and why is interdiction like you have969experienced in Spokane or Tucson--why do we need to expand the970tools given to law enforcement to help with this?971 Mr. Hall. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell, for the972question.973 There are a number of different reasons on why we need to974do this, but primarily when I talk to my DEA-DHS partners it is975that we are catching a fraction of the illegal narcotics that976are entering the country.977 Such a small amount it looks huge on the newspaper on the978front page when we--you know, when we post shots of it for the979media but that is just a fraction of what is actually entering980the country and we are missing so much more and we know we are981missing so much more.982 The investigations, particularly the collaborative983investigations with our Federal partners are where we are the984most functional and we see the most success.985 Bringing local, state, tribal, and Federal partners986together just enhances or scales up all of the skill sets and987brings in the--quite frankly, the resources of the Federal988Government that most of us do not have. Collaborating allows us989to locate more, to utilize the intelligence base from the990Federal Government on international--national transportation991routes and through, like we said, rail, sea, air, and the992interstates, which is where we are seeing most of this.993 The investment by the cartels--and make no mistake, this is994all cartel driven--is such that they will completely995disassemble a vehicle--a brand new vehicle--put as much996narcotics into every single void inside that vehicle, and then997assemble it again.998 They will go through that amount of energy, put the vehicle999back together, and put it on the road, and it is off on the1000freeways. The 1.7 million pills that I referenced in my opening1001statement that was in two vehicles--two sedans--two nondescript1002sedans that were that had to be completely disassembled in1003order to recover all of those narcotics.1004 Senator Cantwell. And how did you discover to check those?1005 Mr. Hall. Investigations.1006 Senator Cantwell. Something told you?1007 Mr. Hall. Yes, ma'am.1008 Senator Cantwell. Yes. This is why I want us to have a more1009collaborative effort here because when you look at the1010technology that we have at the border that is doing some of1011this detection but like you said they are tearing cars apart.1012 So what do you think a new vapor technology could help us1013do?1014 Mr. Hall. Any tool will help us down this road whether it1015is X-ray technology, vapor technology, even going to like I1016call old school canine technology. They are all very effective1017in different ways and having a layered approach and a cross-1018sector approach, multifaceted, this is a very complex problem.1019 It requires complex solutions, and having all of those1020technologies and all of those different approaches is just1021going to enhance law enforcement's ability to detect and seize1022these narcotics.1023 Senator Cantwell. Well, I am just going to be a little more1024clear about--the challenges of getting a warrant on search and1025seizure are complex but when you are at one of our ports or1026transportation systems and you have a nondetected--you can1027basically--a noninvasive way to detect the movement of1028fentanyl.1029 That is what I want at every transportation hub and because1030that will stop this flow. I mean, it is not going to stop all1031but it will give us the tools that you are talking about.1032 And then how can we best help too on the labs and the1033information? What is the gap there that we are seeing?1034 Mr. Hall. I am sorry. The labs?1035 Senator Cantwell. Locally how you have to do the work to1036try to detect and figure out what you have acquired.1037 Mr. Hall. A lot of it is just the sheer number, the1038backlog. So, say, we are working with the state lab in order to1039process the narcotics that we seize and we have to wait for1040that processing in order to charge for the most part.1041 So it is that kind of resource that is limited and I know1042from my time in Arizona it was the same issue there. It is just1043there is--it is a capacity issue. There is so much illegal1044narcotics coming into the country and so few people doing this1045work including lab personnel, law enforcement, even harm1046reduction agencies that we work with.1047 You know, going to an earlier point is we inform them1048everything that you see out on the street from marijuana to1049what you think is cocaine to what you think is a prescribed1050pill is going to have fentanyl in it.1051 What we are finding out is everything we test has fentanyl1052in it. So we just tell everybody know what you are taking. It1053is fentanyl.1054 Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.10551056 STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,1057 U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA10581059 Senator Budd [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.1060 You know, there is, roughly, a thousand miles between my1061home in North Carolina and the southern border but on average1062nine North Carolinians lose their lives every day due to1063fentanyl.1064 I just want to thank you personally both for being here.1065When I talk to law enforcement officers in all 100 counties in1066North Carolina I repeatedly hear that every single county in1067North Carolina is a border county, largely, because of the1068prior administration's policies. But I think that we are on1069track to do much better.1070 The county next to where I live, the sheriff there he said,1071we just had a traffic stop--it looked like some of the pictures1072that were shown earlier--and there was enough in that trunk to1073kill 250,000 people. Unbelievable.1074 Chief, while you are here, is there anything else Congress1075can do to give local law enforcement the additional tools to go1076after drug and human traffickers?1077 Mr. Hall. Resources are always scarce. Always scarce. You1078know, I know currently the Department of Justice is holding up1079grants.1080 I know that they will come out sooner or later, but those1081types of grant funding helps us at the local level, helps us at1082the state level, and it helps our collaborations with HIDTA and1083different task forces that we have created with the DEA,1084Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland1085Security investigations.1086 All those different agencies we are all facing the same1087scarcity of resources.1088 Senator Budd. Thank you.1089 Ms. Ehlinger, thank you for sharing your story of Jake as1090well. I would imagine that our children are about the same age,1091and we do not sit up here, whether it is in this body or across1092the hall or in the House of Representatives, as theorists.1093 We are all personally affected by this. So it means a lot.1094I remember when I first ran in 2016 and right before the1095election I was given the devastating news that the young1096volunteer staffer that was driving me that day had just lost1097his younger brother about the same age as Jake and it was from1098something he thought was something innocent but it was not.1099 And that brother that survived and was volunteering for me1100that day gave a speech 2 weeks ago regarding fentanyl except it1101was not at--on that side of the dais. It was on this side1102because he is now a Member of Congress in the U.S. House of1103Representatives and he is in the fight in the other chamber.1104 So, again, we are not theorists. We are all personally1105affected by this and, again, I thank you both for what you do.1106 Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.1107 Senator Budd. Senator Baldwin.11081109 STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,1110 U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN11111112 Senator Baldwin. Thank you.1113 Ms. Ehlinger, thank you so much for being here to bravely1114share your story about your family and your son, and I thank1115you for your tireless work to bring attention to this tragedy.1116 I believe to my core that your efforts are saving lives and1117I am heartbroken for your family's tremendous loss.1118 I have heard from and sat with mothers in Wisconsin who1119have shared with me stories just like yours. Fentanyl is1120devastating families and communities in my state and, we know,1121throughout our country and I am committed to fighting this1122deadly epidemic on all fronts.1123 And I know my colleagues, as you have already heard, are1124hearing similar demands from their constituents. Congress has1125taken a few important bipartisan steps in the right direction1126but clearly there is so much more work for us to do.1127 So, Ms. Ehlinger, it is thanks to the brave advocacy of1128people like you that this important issue remains really1129forefront in our work and I thank you for that.1130 Chief Hall, I want to thank you for your work, both in1131Tucson and now Spokane, in the front lines to protect Americans1132and we have to make sure that we are putting every resource1133possible toward protecting Americans and stopping the movement1134of deadly fentanyl and illicit substances across our borders1135but also throughout our communities.1136 For that reason I worked with Senator Cantwell to introduce1137a bill that would stop smuggling of drugs through our domestic1138transportation networks. We have already heard that bill1139elevated during this hearing, and I am eager to collaborate1140with both Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz again this Congress1141to continue that work.1142 I would love to hear your recommendations, Chief Hall,1143about actions the Federal Government can take to improve the1144coordination between local law enforcement and other levels of1145law enforcement but also additional resources that would help1146you and your colleagues detect and seize the illegal drugs1147right on our own streets.1148 Like my colleagues I have held many first responder1149roundtables throughout the state of Wisconsin, and sometimes1150there are challenges in the various levels that are looking at1151these distribution networks--these domestic cartels, if you1152will--and tracking high-level cases versus the work you are1153doing to find the individual perpetrator in a particular case.1154 Can you please share a little bit more about that?1155 Mr. Hall. Sure. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. I appreciate1156the question, and I will try not to get myself in trouble here.1157 Senator Baldwin. It is a tough----1158 Mr. Hall. There is--there are so many different things the1159Federal Government can do and have done in the past, quite1160frankly. We have always had a good partnership with our Federal1161law enforcement partners.1162 But I think sometimes--I would submit one of the first1163things we could do is draw back a little and look at a wider1164perspective of what we are dealing with here and define it is1165transportation networks and disrupting those networks in any1166way, shape, or form will disrupt the marketplace--the business1167model that these cartels operate under--and in that same1168fashion I think we can spend a little bit more time providing1169the training and resources for state and local and, quite1170frankly, even Federal law enforcement to look at how they are1171funneling money.1172 This is a for-profit business in this model and it is not1173giant loads of cash anymore. It is Bitcoin and it is electronic1174wallets, and local and state and a lot of Federal agencies do1175not have the sophistication to track that money and seize that1176money and, quite frankly, in a lot of cases it is completely1177untrackable.1178 But those--while we are just now starting to dip our toe in1179how to go after those funds--those illegal funds gained1180through, quite frankly, the killing of our children--that would1181be enormously helpful if we took a look at that as well as the1182transportation networks.1183 And as I said before this is a very complex problem. It is1184going to need a very complex solution that crosses sectors, is1185multi-dimensional, and that is one of the ways I can think of.1186 We just had this discussion back where I am from is how do1187we go after those wallets and those Bitcoins that are being1188utilized to hide these illegal funds from the government.1189 Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Chief.1190 Senator Budd. Senator Moreno.11911192 STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,1193 U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO11941195 Senator Moreno. So, first of all, Ms. Ehlinger, thank you1196for being here. My youngest son is 26 which would be about, I1197would guess, Jake's age today. I cannot imagine, honestly, how1198you have been able to do that. So God bless you. God bless you1199for your strength.1200 Because, quite frankly, there is probably a part of you1201that is just really pissed off, and so pushing that and1202suppressing that down has got to be really hard.1203 And I am really pissed off too because I have seen the1204Federal Government do so little to attack this. I mean, you1205said something in your testimony that really stuck with me1206which is we are at war and we are losing that war. Would you1207agree? Do you feel that way?1208 Ms. Ehlinger. One hundred percent and I am so thankful for1209this administration and for being here today because it is--as1210you said, it is so painful just to live with not having Jake1211every day and then to just know that our amazing country is1212just--it felt like to me was doing absolutely nothing, and more1213and more and more and more children were dying every single day1214and it just does not make sense.1215 Senator Moreno. Yes. In Ohio we probably lose about 4,0001216people a month to fentanyl poisoning, and you look back and you1217go, OK, like, if we are losing 4,000 American kids every year1218just in Ohio--110,000 around the country--you would think that1219would be, like, a 12-alarm fire in Washington, D.C., over the1220last 4 years. Yet, what did we do?1221 Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly.1222 Senator Moreno. We did not do anything at the border, like,1223nothing. In fact, sat here on their hands while they knew this1224was going on.1225 And so I get the sentiment today from the other side but,1226honestly, you know, to me it falls so short. Number one, what1227did President Trump do? Declared the Mexican cartels a foreign1228terrorist organizations.1229 We should wipe those animals off the face of the Earth and,1230yet, the administration in the last 4 years did nothing about1231that.1232 We should make anybody who distributes fentanyl an1233accessory to first degree murder and if you are the ultimate1234supplier of that then you are a first degree murder Federal1235charge recipient.1236 Anybody who is involved in the banking of that, the1237transportation of that, if you are a tech company and you are1238allowing the sale of these products then you, the executives of1239these companies, are an accessory to first degree murder.1240 We have to--we cannot have half measures. If it was my son1241I would not be able to sit through this, honestly. How you do1242it--like I said, I will repeat it again, God bless you for1243doing what you are doing.1244 And to my Democrat colleagues, I hope this is not just1245words about more government spending but, rather, actual1246attacks on what we are seeing at our southern border that we1247treat this as an existential threat to our country.1248 You know, you said, Chief--I will turn to you--you said1249this is a for-profit business. This is not just a for-profit1250business. This is a multi-billion dollar a year operation that1251this country is enabling--this country and this administration1252and the majority that had control of Congress over the last 41253years they made these drug cartel members so insanely wealthy.1254Those are the billionaires that they should be talking about1255when they rant on the Senate floor that they are going after.1256 And, Chief, you said something--and God bless you too for1257the work that you do and all law enforcement does but I would1258just push back a little bit on something you said.1259 You said that most fentanyl comes across legal ports of1260entry. We do not know that. We have absolutely no idea how much1261fentanyl comes across through nondesignated ports of entry1262because by definition we have no idea, and when I have been on1263the border you look at what the Border Patrol agents are doing1264where you have this surge of human trafficking on one side,1265these fake asylum claims that my colleagues will not even vote1266on a bill to say, hey, you cannot claim asylum through a1267nondesignated port of entry, they will not even agree to that1268and say, hey, if you are going to claim asylum you got to do it1269at a legal port of entry and you got to wait. No, they want to1270parole these people into the country, which is insane.1271 So the Border Patrol agents have to go to those1272nondesignated ports of entry. I was in Del Rio when the Haitian1273surge happened. There were ports of entries that were wide1274open.1275 These were streets that were available. So we have no idea1276what comes across there, and we have to go right at the root1277cause and make the punishment so severe.1278 So I am all for investing more money in the Coast Guard. We1279have a big lake in Ohio. But I hope that what comes out of this1280testimony from both of you and, hopefully, there is colleagues1281on the other side of the aisle that have kids that are your1282kids' age and realize what is really going on and that we take1283this moment to say we are not going to allow a 9/11 plane to1284crash every single day in America and do something about it.1285Pass legislation to make this happen.1286 So I urge my colleagues on the other side of the aisle you1287abdicated your duties for the last 4 years. Step up and work1288with us to pass meaningful legislation to attack the1289billionaires that you enabled on the other side of our border1290to kill our kids.1291 Thank you. Thank you.1292 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Moreno.1293 Senator Sullivan, you are recognized.12941295 STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,1296 U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA12971298 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate1299the witnesses very much.1300 Ms. Ehlinger, I want to extend my condolences, too. I just1301read your testimony. Sounds like Jake was an incredible,1302amazing, gifted young man. I am very sorry, really sorry for1303your loss.1304 Ms. Ehlinger. Thank you.1305 Senator Sullivan. Is that his UT uniform on right there?1306 Ms. Ehlinger. Yes, sir.1307 Senator Sullivan. My mom went to UT so----1308 Ms. Ehlinger. Awesome.1309 Senator Sullivan.--I have been a Longhorns fan for a long1310time.1311 Let me ask a question. We have a--maybe you have met her.1312If you have not it would be really great because you are very1313similar to her. We have a very courageous woman in Alaska named1314Sandy Snodgrass. She has kind of had the same experience that1315you have.1316 Her son Bruce was killed by a fentanyl overdose like Jake.1317It was laced with something. So she has done what you have1318done, which has kind of taken this horrible grief that most1319people cannot even imagine and used it in a way to push for1320public policy changes in state law. She has done that in1321Alaska.1322 And then she and I and our Governor we have teamed up on1323this big campaign we launched about eight or 9 months ago in1324Alaska called One Pill Can Kill, and I do not know if you are1325familiar with that but what we are trying to do on that is to1326get to prevention, to let the young people in Alaska know that,1327hey, if you are taking a pill or smoking a joint you might have1328no idea that this is laced with fentanyl.1329 Believe it or not, my state in the last few years has had1330the highest overdose rates of fentanyl of any state in the1331country--Alaska, 4,000 miles from the border.1332 So when people say, what do you guys care up in Alaska--you1333are far away from the southern border, we care because it is1334killing our kids just like it is killing kids in Texas.1335 So are you familiar with the One Pill Can Kill campaign and1336have you guys done it in Texas? And I would really like to get1337your sense of prevention.1338 We are trying to put--we put this big campaign together,1339gotten all the high school kids and even junior high kids1340involved to do PSA announcements so they can learn from each1341other. I think it is most effective when it comes from peer to1342peer, not senators and Governors telling them.1343 So what is your sense on that, and I would really--again, I1344really appreciate your courage for being here. I know probably1345every single day you are missing your really wonderful son.1346 Ms. Ehlinger. Yes. Thank you so much.1347 Actually, Governor Abbott and the state of Texas had a One1348Pill Kills campaign.1349 Senator Sullivan. Oh, good.1350 Ms. Ehlinger. And if you drive in the state of Texas on any1351highway you will see signs that say one pill kills, and many1352people have also put up billboards with their children's1353pictures on them saying fentanyl kills.1354 I think all of those things help. I 100 percent agree with1355you that coming from the younger generation is more impactful.1356 Senator Sullivan. Yes. You know, part of the frustration1357for me has been is anybody thinking about the fact that this is1358our future. These young people that are dying, that are getting1359wiped out in large numbers, that is the future of our country.1360 So what is going to happen in 10 years when we have this1361horrific gap because we have lost so many of them? My son is in1362the NFL and they do the Cause for Cleats.1363 Senator Sullivan. Yes.1364 Ms. Ehlinger. Cleats for a Cause--I am sorry--and he--and1365then one of his friends also who he played with at UT wore1366their One Pill Kills fentanyl awareness cleats and got a great1367response from that. I think, like Senator Cantwell said1368earlier, we have to come at this from every angle.1369 Senator Sullivan. Yes.1370 Ms. Ehlinger. It cannot be, you know, here, let us just go1371here and let us look at this. It is a--like we were saying, it1372is a war and we are losing. We are losing bad.1373 Senator Sullivan. Well, if you have ideas in--from what you1374learned in Texas on the One Pill Can Kill campaign, prevention,1375right? So young people are aware.1376 A lot of young people are not aware at all that this is a--1377you know, taking a pill like that that is not a prescribed pill1378that they got from a pharmacist can be a Russian roulette death1379sentence.1380 Ms. Ehlinger. Exactly what I call it is Russian roulette. I1381mean, it is in cocaine. It is in pot. It is in all of the1382things that in our generation people could experiment with and1383they had no fear of dying. They just were making a really1384stupid mistake----1385 Senator Sullivan. Yes.1386 Ms. Ehlinger.--and a bad choice.1387 Senator Sullivan. Well, look, we might look at kind of1388nationalizing some of these ideas of prevention.1389 Real quick--so thank you again--Chief, I just had a quick1390question too for you. You know, you served up in kind of the1391Pacific Northwest area and then down along the border.1392 Any major differences? And then this is probably for the1393next panel but what always really frustrates me on this is that1394Xi Jinping is a dictator, right?1395 I mean, nobody does anything in China without his1396permission, and the flow that continues from China, you know,1397he did a deal with President Trump. He did a deal with1398President Biden to stop this flow and, you know, it is more1399what we call promise fatigue with the Chinese. They make big1400announcements and they never keep their promises even to our1401leaders.1402 So what is your sense on kind of differences at the Pacific1403Northwest level that you have seen--that is Alaska, of course--1404and then any sense on the Chinese just ignoring it and wanting1405to kill young Americans?1406 Mr. Hall. I will take the difference between Arizona and1407Washington first. The biggest difference I see is we would1408interdict massive loads in Tucson, Arizona.1409 Tucson is 60 miles north of the international port of1410entry, and it was nonstop and it was not unusual to get1411hundreds of thousands of pills or bulk powder form in the1412pounds in Arizona.1413 That is much less likely up in Washington. It does happen,1414as we have seen and as I have testified. It does happen but not1415nearly as often and that is because, you know, when it comes1416from the border then it gets distributed throughout the Nation.1417So we are getting smaller amounts up there.1418 But the smaller amounts are just as deadly and we have just1419as many fatal overdoses and we have just as many social1420problems that come from fentanyl as every other city.1421 So when I look at downtown Tucson and I look at downtown1422Spokane, if I did not know where I was at they would look very1423similar and that is the impact that fentanyl has.1424 Senator Sullivan. OK. Maybe for the record--I know I am out1425of time--if you could answer the China question. I know it is a1426tough question but, you know, I just think they are flooding1427the zone on purpose.1428 Mr. Hall. Respectfully, Senator, I am going to stay out of1429the geopolitics. I know the precursor chemicals for the most1430part are coming from China and how we stop those I am not sure1431because they are not coming to the United States. They are1432going to Mexico, so that would be the realm of you fine folks.1433 Senator Budd. Thank you, Chief. Yes, thank you.1434 Senator Sullivan. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.1435 Senator Budd. Senator Sheehy, you are recognized.14361437 STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SHEEHY,1438 U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA14391440 Senator Sheehy. Thank you for coming today. Jena, thank you1441for taking on this cause. I know you have survived a terrible1442tragedy in your family so thank you for turning that into1443productive advocacy because it is going to take, you know, a1444whole country to come together to fix this.1445 Chief, a question for you on Montana so not too far from1446you. I spend a lot of time up in your neck of the woods1447fighting wildfires so familiar with Spokane and the surrounding1448area.1449 You know, what is your feeling on the northern border as1450far as impacting your communities with regard to fentanyl and1451drug trafficking?1452 Mr. Hall. As far as the northern border what we are seeing1453is very little coming south from Canada. Almost everything we1454have seen that we have been able to track, once again, with our1455Federal partners it is all coming up from Mexico along the1456interstates--like I said, I-19 to I-5, our I-10 to I-5 and then1457I-90 into Spokane and northern Idaho. We are the urban hub of1458eastern Washington and it all spreads out from there.1459 Senator Sheehy. Yes, we see the same in Montana, coming up1460I-15 to Butte and then over. So and, you know, what interface1461are you seeing at all with the tribal communities in the region1462as far as how they are being impacted by the fentanyl crisis?1463 Mr. Hall. In the tribal communities it is a little bit more1464of an invisible epidemic because, quite frankly, the tribes for1465historical reasons are far more isolated and have far less1466trust in the government, and so it is harder to get inroads1467into the tribes.1468 And I am speaking from my personal experience as a tribal1469member, not--I do not enforce the law on the tribes. I have no1470jurisdiction. But it is probably far more tragic because it is1471far more isolated and it is not as well known on the tribes1472just because of that.1473 Senator Sheehy. And what do you feel the way ahead is1474there? Obviously, we feel those same issues in Montana. You1475know, we have reservation land and travel communities all1476across the state and they are dealing, you know, with this1477crisis first and--I mean, the first thing I hear from our1478tribal leaders is the fentanyl crisis is tearing apart their1479communities and, you know, they fall into, as you well know, a1480very unique law enforcement construct with their sovereignty.1481But they still want their streets cleaned up. They still want1482their kids to be healthy.1483 So given your experience in the region what do you think1484are some ways ahead where we can start to thread that needle,1485where we can still respect the sovereignty of our tribal1486communities but help them battle this epidemic and win?1487 Mr. Hall. I think much stronger and closer relationships1488with tribal authorities local and state and Federal1489authorities. I think we are getting there, at least in my1490region and the Spokane region with the Spokane tribe Kalispell,1491Colville, all of those tribes.1492 We are getting to a point where our relationships are1493getting stronger, where we understand this is a common issue1494that is killing all of us.1495 It does not matter if you are Native or indigenous, if you1496are from Spokane or if you are from Omak. It is still going to1497kill you, and so we all need to come together and I am starting1498to see that collaboration and that cooperation amongst the1499tribal folks--state, local and Federal as well.1500 Senator Sheehy. Great. Thank you for making the trip out. I1501yield back.1502 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Sheehy.1503 Senator Markey.15041505 STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,1506 U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS15071508 Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1509 I would like to begin just by expressing my deepest1510condolences to Ms. Ehlinger for your great loss--tragic loss. I1511am just so sorry.1512 And we want to do everything we can in order to in the1513future do a better job. Because you are right, we are in a war1514against fentanyl and that means we need every resource1515possible.1516 We need to be tracking every overdose death. We need1517everyone to have access to naloxone to reverse overdoses. We1518need enough providers and access to medications like methadone1519and Suboxone for people struggling with addiction.1520 We need communities and law enforcement to have funding to1521prevent fentanyl from coming into their communities and respond1522once it is there.1523 President Trump and I had lunch in September 2017 as he was1524on a--heading for a trip to China. I was the Ranking Member on1525that Committee on Foreign Relations, and I talked to him about1526how important it was to tell President Xi to just stop those1527precursor chemicals from coming from China because we were1528losing 80,000 to 100,000 people a year.1529 And I also recommended to him that we work together on a1530bill to have detection devices along the southern border and1531that there were actually devices in place that could detect1532that fentanyl from coming across the border.1533 And in February 2018 I stood with him and he gave me the1534pen as he signed the bill to provide those tens of millions of1535dollars for the devices along the border to detect fentanyl.1536 So I know it is just such a very important issue that we1537have to deal with.1538 So, Chief Hall, does your police department have to balance1539both stopping fentanyl smuggling and responding to the1540overdoses from fentanyl? How do you handle that?1541 Mr. Hall. It is a balance, Senator, and thank you for the1542question. Once again, it is how we prioritize the workload and,1543as you know, we are understaffed. Washington State is severely1544understaffed.1545 I think it is number 50 out of the 50 states on a ratio of1546officers to population. So we struggle with that in allocating1547the appropriate amount of resources to addressing this issue.1548 However, it is an issue of life or death so we take that on1549seriously. We take that on----1550 Senator Markey. So how important is it for you, Chief, for1551Spokane to continue to receive sustained and reliable funding1552for all of the work that you are doing to take on the fentanyl1553crisis?1554 Mr. Hall. It is incredibly important. It is incredibly1555important. Funding is what we live on. It is how we pay my1556officers. That is how we pay for the technology that we use.1557 It is how we pay for the programs that we use, some of1558which that you just mentioned including naloxone, the1559administration of buprenorphine, and our work in the harm1560reduction area trying to keep people alive.1561 Senator Markey. And I am just so concerned this Trump1562administration is too busy making drastic, unfocused cuts and1563engaging in political stunts rather than actually focusing its1564energy in addressing the fentanyl crisis because the reality is1565that cuts to Federal research will slow down finding better1566ways to test for fentanyl, to improve upon that.1567 And as you know a border wall is not going to stop all of1568it no matter what. You are still going to need these additional1569resources that you have in the community because it is going to1570come through legal ports of entry still to some degree, no1571matter what happens, and disrupting funding to organizations1572dedicated to responding to the overdose crisis will just slow1573down the lifesaving efforts that you engage in every single1574day.1575 When we are talking about overdose and fentanyl epidemic1576playing politics is just not going to solve the problem. You1577need the resources to do it so and that is why I worked with1578President Trump to have INTERDICT Act be signed. That was a1579pragmatic, bipartisan--I did it with Senator Rubio in order to1580put that in place.1581 But we need more equipment. We need more high-tech1582equipment even at the local level. We just need more resources1583in your hands, which is why I introduced the Stop Fentanyl1584Overdoses Act to enhance information sharing between health1585care providers and law enforcement and to educate communities.1586 So I thank you, Chief. I thank you, Ms. Ehlinger. You have1587come here with serious efforts that you are recommending to us1588and you deserve a serious response and that is what I am1589committed to having Congress provide for you, not just chainsaw1590the solutions to the problem. We have to focus in on where your1591needs are the greatest.1592 I thank you.1593 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Markey. I appreciate that.1594 I want to thank you both for being here. This has been very1595important, very insightful, very helpful, and whether it is law1596enforcement or personal experience it matters a lot to us.1597 We want to conclude this panel and we want to welcome our1598next panel. If they would please come forward to the witness1599table now.1600 Thank you both so much.1601 [Pause.]1602 Senator Budd. Our second panel of witnesses today include1603Ms. Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of National Drug1604Control Policy, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and Director,1605National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program.1606 Ms. Kelly has more than two decades of counterdrug1607experience and worked previously for the U.S. Department of1608Justice and the National Drug Intelligence Center. Thank you1609for being here.1610 Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, U.S. Coast Guard Assistant1611Commandant for Response Policy. In this capacity he is1612responsible for developing strategic response doctrine and1613policy guidance for all Coast Guard forces, including covering1614law enforcement activities and border maritime security.1615 And last, Mr. Jonathan Miller, Executive Assistant1616Commissioner, Air and Marine Operations with U.S. Customs and1617Border Protection. His mission is to safeguard our Nation by1618anticipating and confronting security threats through aviation1619and maritime law enforcement.1620 Ms. Kelly, you are recognized for your opening statement.16211622 STATEMENT OF SHANNON KELLY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,16231624 OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,16251626 U.S. INTERDICTION COORDINATOR, AND DIRECTOR,16271628 NATIONAL HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA16291630 (HIDTA) PROGRAM16311632 Ms. Kelly. Good afternoon.1633 First, I want to thank Ms. Ehlinger for sharing Jake's1634story with us. She is an eloquent and courageous spokesperson1635for the many Americans suffering from the illicit fentanyl1636crisis.1637 Senator Budd and distinguished members of the Committee, I1638am honored to speak with you today about the challenges and1639opportunities facing our law enforcement partners as they1640combat illicit drug trafficking.1641 I am here today representing the White House Office of1642National Drug Control Policy where it is my privilege to serve1643as both the U.S. interdiction coordinator and the director of1644the National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program.1645 As the U.S. interdiction coordinator I advise the ONDCP1646director as we create policy and coordinate activities to1647reduce the flow of illicit drugs across our borders and into1648our communities.1649 Through its coordination function the USIC ensures a1650comprehensive and cogent approach to securing the Nation's1651borders, supporting the President's executive orders on1652ensuring the territorial integrity of the United States and1653addressing the national emergency at the southern and northern1654borders.1655 To make this direction efficient and effective I draft the1656applicable portions of the National Drug Control Strategy, the1657National Interdiction Command and Control Plan, and border1658interdiction strategies for the southern, northern and1659Caribbean borders of the United States.1660 The centerpiece of my team's work is the HIDTA program1661which provides Federal grant funds to areas determined to be1662critical drug trafficking regions of the United States. HIDTA1663allocates nearly $300 million in Federal funding to support the1664strategies developed and implemented by coalitions of Federal,1665state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.1666 I deeply appreciate Congress' strong bipartisan support of1667the HIDTA program and want to personally thank you for your1668support for the HIDTA program. This support is critical because1669as we speak America is facing the deadliest drug threat in its1670history.1671 Over the past 25 years the number of fatal overdoses1672involving synthetic drugs including fentanyl have increased1673nearly 100 times and the illicit drug threat continues to1674transform.1675 We must dismantle the supply chains for illicit drugs and1676the raw materials and attack the global criminal networks1677fueling these American deaths. This includes the drug cartels1678that have inundated the United States with deadly drugs,1679violent criminals, and vicious gangs.1680 Our Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners1681work tirelessly to interdict illicit drugs, weapons, and1682proceeds and to dismantle criminal networks wherever they1683reside. I look forward to telling you more about the1684outstanding work of these tireless patriots.1685 As a result of the recent executive order designating1686cartels and other organizations as foreign terrorist1687organizations and specially designated global terrorists, we1688expect to see additional authorities for law enforcement to1689investigate and dismantle these networks and place new pressure1690and threat of prosecution on entities that support and enable1691the cartels.1692 Law enforcement working to disrupt drug trafficking1693networks need access to telecommunications, automated license1694plate readers, financial transactions and illicit firearms1695data.1696 Developing and deploying these technologies is critical to1697investigative success. It is equally important these tools are1698used to maximize investigative efficacy while minimizing any1699risks to the privacy of innocent Americans.1700 Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and1701to share the perspective from the Office of National Drug1702Control Policy.1703 Protecting Americans from illicit drugs and the traffickers1704who harm them is our mission. Our strong interagency partners,1705as represented by my fellow panelists from the Coast Guard and1706Customs and Border Protection today, are key to disrupting and1707dismantling criminal networking organizations.1708 Collectively, our work is leading to real progress under1709President Trump's leadership and with your support I am1710confident we will continue to stop traffickers and save lives.1711 I am happy to respond to any questions.1712 [The prepared statement of Ms. Kelly follows:]17131714 Prepared Statement of Shannon Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of1715 Homeland Interdiction and Supply Disruption, Office of National Drug1716 Control Policy1717 Good morning, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members1718of this committee.1719 I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you about the challenges1720and opportunities facing our law enforcement partners with respect to1721illicit drug trafficking.1722 I'm here today representing the White House Office of National Drug1723Control Policy.1724 ONDCP leads and coordinates the national drug control policy to1725address drug trafficking, save lives, and improve the health and safety1726of the American people.1727 We oversee the National Drug Control Program Budget, which1728encompasses 19 Federal agencies and coordinates the Federal1729government's efforts to address the illicit drug threat, which is1730significant and growing.1731 I am here today as both the United States Interdiction Coordinator1732and the Director of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, or1733HIDTA, Program. It is a privilege to serve in both roles.1734USIC1735 As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, or USIC, I provide the ONDCP1736Director advice regarding policy and coordination of interdiction1737activities to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States,1738and integration with domestic efforts to prevent illicit drugs from1739crossing our borders and entering our communities. With coordination1740among the 28 senior leaders from across the government who are members1741of The Interdiction Committee, I am responsible for overseeing the1742interdiction activities of the National Drug Control Program agencies1743to ensure consistency with Presidential policy priorities.1744 The USIC's coordination function is vital to ensuring a1745comprehensive, cogent approach to securing the Nation's borders, in1746direct support of President Trump's Executive Orders on ensuring the1747territorial integrity of the United States and addressing the national1748emergency at the Southern and Northern Borders. To ensure this1749direction is efficient and effective, I draft and issue the applicable1750portions of the National Drug Control Strategy; the National1751Interdiction Command and Control Plan; and border interdiction1752strategies for the southern, northern, and Caribbean borders each year.1753 These documents focus on coordinated interdiction efforts by1754federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement1755agencies, and promote strengthened collaboration with our international1756partners to maximize the impact of each interdiction event. Drug1757interdictions are vital not only for removing dangerous drugs1758immediately from the illicit supply chain, but also for providing1759cooperating witnesses, physical and digital evidence, and intelligence.1760These contributions are the foundation that the interagency community1761builds on to dismantle transnational criminal networks (TCNs). This1762coordination is becoming even more vital as we implement a strong1763response to President Trump's executive order designating of1764international cartels and other transnational criminal organizations,1765as foreign terrorist organizations, and organize the interdiction1766community to fully support national efforts to totally eliminate these1767organizations.1768HIDTA1769 The centerpiece of my team's work is the HIDTA Program, which1770provides Federal grant funds to areas determined to be critical drug1771trafficking regions of the United States.1772 HIDTA allocates nearly $300 million in Federal funding to support1773the strategies developed and implemented by coalitions of federal,1774state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners.1775 I greatly appreciate Congress's strong bipartisan support of the1776HIDTA Program, and I want to personally thank you, Chairman Cruz and1777Ranking Member Cantwell, for your support to the HIDTA program over the1778years.1779 Through its 33 regional programs, HIDTA brings together more than1780twenty thousand individual participants from 500 law enforcement1781agencies, focusing and integrating their efforts against the drug1782trafficking organizations that pose the greatest threat to our Nation.1783Through HIDTA collaboration, we are able to fully engage partners from1784across all levels of government to prioritize their investigations to1785fully align with the President's designated list of the most dangerous1786cartels.1787 To these ends, HIDTA-supported task forces annually disrupt or1788dismantle more than three thousand drug trafficking or money laundering1789organizations, and seize billions of dollars of illicit drugs.1790Illicit Drug Threats1791 As we speak, America is facing the deadliest drug threat in its1792history.1793 Over the past 25 years, the number of drug overdose deaths in the1794United States involving synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have1795increased nearly 100 times.1796 During the same timeframe, the rate of fatal overdoses involving1797other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, also rose. Since17981999, the number of drug overdose deaths involving cocaine and1799methamphetamine have increased nearly eight and 64 times, respectively.1800 While far too many lives are currently being lost due to drug1801overdose, we are starting to see signs that progress is being made to1802combat this crisis. The latest CDC provisional data predicts a 23.71803percent decrease i in drug overdose deaths for the 12-month1804period ending in September 2024, compared to the same time period a1805year prior. This is the largest recorded reduction in drug overdose1806deaths, and these reductions are being observed across all major drug1807classes.1808---------------------------------------------------------------------------1809 \i\ Per CDC data, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-1810data.htm. Accessed 21 Feb 2025.1811---------------------------------------------------------------------------1812 While this is important progress, we must recognize that the1813illicit drug threat will continue to transform. This is not a challenge1814for the United States alone. Illicit drugs are a global problem, and1815the criminals who produce and traffic these drugs are determined and1816resilient, driven by increased profits and an increased global customer1817base. Illicit drugs produced outside the United States make their way1818across our borders and into our communities by a variety of means.1819Illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine often enter the United States1820through ports of entry. On occasion, cocaine is loaded onto1821semisubmersibles and go-fast boats that traverse the maritime1822approaches to the United States.1823 We recognize that the illicit drug supply chain is a multinational,1824complex network that spans public and private entities, utilizes1825legitimate commerce pipelines to move raw materials and finished drugs,1826and exploits our financial and banking systems to obtain profits and1827fund illicit activity.1828 Addressing this crisis calls for decisive, coordinated action.1829 We must dismantle the supply chains for illicit drugs and their raw1830materials, and attack the global criminal networks fueling American1831deaths, including the drug cartels that have inundated the United1832States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and vicious gangs.1833Seizing Drugs1834 While we face substantial challenges in keeping these drugs from1835entering the United States, our Federal interdiction and law1836enforcement have achieved some noteworthy success.1837 In Fiscal Year 2024, HIDTA-supported task forces seized more than183820,000 pounds of illicit fentanyl, more than 277,000 pounds of1839methamphetamine, nearly 317,000 pounds of cocaine, and over 4,1001840pounds of heroin.1841 My colleague from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will provide1842more details on its work, but I want to highlight that in FY 2024, CBP1843seized almost 575,000 pounds of illicit drugs, approximately half of1844which was seized at Southwest Land Border ports of entry. That number1845includes nearly 22,000 pounds of fentanyl. There was also a nearly 251846percent increase in methamphetamine seizures in FY 2024 from the1847previous Fiscal Year, with nearly 175,000 pounds seized, primarily at1848the Southwest Border.1849 As we'll hear from the Coast Guard, maritime cocaine interdictions1850are vital inroads to dismantling criminal networks, particularly those1851in Mexico that both receive multi-ton loads of cocaine from South1852America, and at the same time produce fentanyl for distribution in U.S.1853markets. The Coast Guard has re-oriented its focus to lean in on drug1854interdiction, and those efforts continue to be a vital tool for1855removing drugs and illuminating high-level criminal networks.1856 It's impossible to overstate the impact of seizing drugs before1857they slip across international borders, are broken down into smaller1858loads, and make their way along our highways and through our mail and1859package systems, and into our communities and homes.1860 Seized drugs represent lives saved--they are fatal overdoses that1861never happened, and profits that drug traffickers never received.1862Seizing dangerous and addictive substances, like fentanyl, cocaine,1863methamphetamine, and heroin, also is a critical component of preventing1864illicit drug use and substance use disorder in American citizens.1865Disrupting Criminal Networks1866 The integration of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial1867efforts through task forces is critical to disrupting and dismantling1868criminal networks. To meet this need, HIDTA and the Organized Crime1869Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) play complementary roles. This1870partnership enhances intelligence sharing, investigative capabilities,1871and operational effectiveness, enabling task forces to dismantle entire1872trafficking networks rather than just interdict individual shipments,1873creating a sustained impact.1874 Additionally, our partners at the Drug Enforcement Administration1875(DEA) have led government-wide efforts to map the cartels responsible1876for distributing deadly drugs like fentanyl. This entails combining DEA1877data with external data, and employing innovative analytic techniques1878to map and strategically target priority threat networks throughout the1879cartels' supply chain. The network illumination will provide the1880knowledge to develop cohesive and coordinated operations within DEA and1881across government agencies to most effectively dismantle, degrade, and1882defeat transnational drug cartels. These operations will target every1883stage of the cartels' business cycle, support structure, and1884facilitators.1885 Those teams are composed of special agents, intelligence analysts,1886targeters, program analysts, data scientists, and digital specialists.1887 DEA's Special Operation Division (SOD), is home to over 30 Federal1888and international partners, including Internal Revenue Service-Criminal1889Investigations (IRS-CI), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), FBI,1890Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Australian Federal Police, and members1891of the Intelligence Community. SOD allows for the sharing, support, and1892coordination of work across the government and the globe, to identify1893and target drug trafficking networks. This includes the networks1894responsible for the chemicals and pre-cursor chemicals shipped to1895Mexico, the cartels who use those chemicals to produce fentanyl and1896other deadly synthetic drugs, the networks who smuggle the drugs into1897the United States, the local street distributors, and the global money1898laundering networks who repatriate the illicit proceeds back to the1899cartels.1900 Similarly, the HSI Innovation Lab is constantly developing new ways1901to combat transnational criminal networks more effectively. The HSI1902Innovation Lab brings together HSI investigators with data engineers1903and scientists to develop and utilize new technology for cross-1904referencing, analyzing, and triaging information to support some of the1905most complex cases. This team provides technical solutions, rapidly1906advanced analytical support, and priority access to HSI specialized1907resources.1908 The HSI-led DHS Cyber Crimes Center (C3) supports HSI's mission by1909providing investigative and operational support for complex1910transnational cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent investigations that1911have the highest potential impact against TCNs. C3's advanced support1912to combat TCNs includes applying the necessary technical solutions,1913advanced data and cryptocurrency analytical support, and priority1914access to HSI specialized resources.1915 C3 is also at the forefront of interagency collaboration and is a1916longstanding member of the FBI's Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet1917Enforcement (JCODE) Team, which is a DOJ-sponsored initiative1918established in 2018, to combat the proliferation and distribution of1919fentanyl and other opioids via illicit darknet marketplaces. C31920actively collaborates with JCODE members to develop and distribute1921high-impact target packages to HSI and other JCODE member agency field1922offices. C3's expertise and efforts significantly contribute to HSI's1923seizure of $190 million in cryptocurrency from transnational criminal1924organizations, many of which were associated with narcotics1925investigations.1926 Also, HSI's Cross-Border Financial Crime Center (CBFCC) has been1927designed to identify, target, and dismantle the financial networks that1928are utilized by transnational criminal networks that seek to launder1929their illicit proceeds from inside and outside of the United States.1930The CBFCC employs a strategy of utilizing the expertise of federal,1931state and local law enforcement agencies and their analytical1932capabilities to infiltrate and dismantle these financial networks. The1933CBFCC includes elements of HSI, U.S. Customs and Border Protection1934(CBP), and the Internal Revenue Service--Criminal Investigations (IRS-1935CI). Also included is the support from the HSI-led El Dorado Task1936Forces around the country which include HSI, DEA, United States Secret1937Service, IRS-CI, and state/local law enforcement.1938 This effort is a concerted, HSI-wide response to combat the1939transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threats to the1940security of the United States, particularly those engaged in the1941production and distribution of illicit drugs like fentanyl.1942 Although DOD does not interdict or arrest drug traffickers, I would1943be remiss to not mention the valuable enabling role DOD plays in this1944area. In addition to leading the air and maritime detection and1945monitoring of drug trafficking, the DoD Counterdrug program provides1946the bulk of the U.S. government's intelligence collection and analysis1947on foreign transnational criminal networks.1948Protecting Mail and Package Systems1949 Drug traffickers exploit the mail and express consignment service1950industry to obtain precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment, and1951ship illicit drugs to their customers.1952 To combat this activity, CBP officers and HSI Special Agents1953assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) have1954increased their presence, coordination, and inspections at1955international express consignment carrier (ECC) processing centers1956operated by United Parcel Service (UPS), Federal Express (FedEx),1957Dalsey, Hillblom, and Lynn (DHL), and others.1958 From 2021-2023, domestic task forces at ECC hubs seized nearly195959,000 pounds of illicit drugs from small parcels, including nearly 8401960pounds of illicit fentanyl.1961 Also, the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) seized1962over 3,800 pounds of fentanyl and 7,700 pounds of methamphetamine from1963the domestic mail system in FY 2024, mostly originating from states1964surrounding the Southwest Border. The Postal Inspection Service1965continues to see a significant increase from FY 2023 in cocaine1966seizures, with over 6,000 pounds in FY 2024.1967Targeting Illicit Proceeds1968 Narcotics traffickers operating on a global scale require an1969extensive support network, including procurement, logistics,1970transportation, communications, security, money laundering, and other1971facilitation.1972 Major drug operations create, corrupt, and misuse supposedly1973legitimate enterprises to conduct criminal activity and launder vast1974profits on an international scale.1975 These illicitly-funded ``corporate empires'' can be extensive,1976complex, and can undermine the integrity of financial systems.1977 They are also one of transnational criminal organizations' greatest1978vulnerabilities.1979 As a result, disrupting this illicit financial network is a1980national priority to help disrupt the flow of illicit fentanyl, its1981precursors, and related production equipment, such as pill presses.1982 In recent years, the Department of the Treasury received a new1983sanctions authority for combating the illicit drug trade.1984 Specifically, it received authorization to target any foreign1985person engaged in drug trafficking activities, regardless of whether1986they are linked to a specific kingpin or cartel, which further enables1987Treasury to sanction foreign persons who knowingly receive property1988that constitutes, or is derived from, proceeds of illicit drug1989trafficking activities.1990 Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has since1991designated 233 individuals and 167 entities under this new authority.1992 When OFAC designates an individual or entity, any assets within the1993United States or the possession or control of a United States person1994anywhere in the world must be frozen. Additionally, any money being1995transferred through the United States financial system may be seized,1996even if neither the sending nor receiving accounts are within the1997system. Since the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial1998Telecommunication (or SWIFT) network is based in the United States,1999this limits any transfers within that network.2000 An OFAC designation also means trade with or through the United2001States is cut off. Often, businesses and banks not based in the United2002States voluntarily sever ties with individuals and entities that OFAC2003has listed.2004 As a result, designated persons may lose access to their bank2005accounts outside the United States, disrupting their operations and2006freedom of access.2007 In addition, in many cases, partner nation authorities have taken2008law enforcement actions against designated companies or properties2009after OFAC has listed them.2010 In addition to sanctions, since 2021, the Department of State's2011Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has made2012public up to $410 million in reward offers for information leading to2013the arrest or conviction of 80 different wanted individuals. Some of2014these, from both China and Mexico, are involved in the fentanyl supply2015chain and have been captured through the Narcotics and Transnational2016Organized Crime Rewards Programs.2017 As a result of the recent Executive Order Designating Cartels and2018other organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and specially2019designated Global Terrorists, we expect to see additional tools and2020authorities for our law enforcement officers to investigate and2021dismantle these organizations, placing new pressure and threat of2022prosecution on entities that support and enable the cartels.2023Protecting Investigative Tools2024 Directly or indirectly, a number of the approaches I've noted so2025far depend upon the widespread availability of key investigative tools.2026 Law enforcement working to disrupt drug trafficking networks need2027access to telecommunications, automated license plate readers,2028financial transactions, and crime gun tracking data.2029 Developing and deploying these technologies is critical to2030investigative success, but it is equally important that these tools are2031used to maximize investigative efficacy while minimizing any risks to2032the privacy of innocent Americans.2033 This is increasingly important as we contemplate the use of2034groundbreaking technologies, such as artificial intelligence.2035 Trust is a pillar of law enforcement. It's integral to the multi-2036agency, multi-jurisdictional efforts that have yielded great successes.2037 It's also critical to the relationships that all law enforcement2038agencies maintain with the citizens they protect.2039 I'm grateful to all our law enforcement partners for their forward-2040looking approach to the use of new technologies, and their commitment2041to use these tools effectively and responsibly.2042Conclusion2043 Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning and to2044share the perspective from the Office of National Drug Control Policy.2045 Protecting Americans from illicit drugs and the traffickers who2046harm them is a key mission for the Federal government. Our strong2047interagency partnerships are working tirelessly to disrupt and2048dismantle criminal trafficking organizations and it's leading to real2049progress under President Trump's leadership. With your support, I am2050confident we will continue to stop traffickers and save lives.2051 I am happy to respond to any questions you have.20522053 Senator Budd. Thank you, Ms. Kelly.2054 Admiral Chamie, you are recognized for your opening2055statement.20562057STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ADAM CHAMIE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR2058 RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD20592060 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator Budd and2061distinguished members of the Committee. I request that my2062written testimony be submitted for the record.2063 Senator Budd. Without objection.2064 Rear Admiral Chamie. Thank you, sir.2065 Thank you for your continued support of the United States2066Coast Guard and the young men and women who selflessly2067volunteer to serve our Nation.2068 Throughout our 234-year career our workforce has always2069been our greatest strength and I am incredibly proud to serve2070alongside them.2071 I very much appreciate the title of this hearing, ``A View2072From the Front Lines.'' It is a good reminder for me of why I2073am here today to share with you the successes and challenges of2074our crews who do the mission every day.2075 Throughout my time in uniform the best part of my job has2076always been bragging about my crews, and now sitting before you2077I am honored to share just two of their success stories over2078the past month.2079 On February 2, Coast Guard Cutter Joseph Doyle and a Coast2080Guard aircraft were patrolling south of the U.S. Virgin2081Islands. The cutter stopped and boarded a go-fast vessel,2082seizing 2,000 pounds of cocaine and detaining three Venezuelan2083smugglers.2084 Thanks to the crew of that cutter and aircraft they kept2085over $16 million of drugs off American streets.2086 On January 23, the crew of Coast Guard Cutter Waesche was2087patrolling far off the coast of Mexico when the crew spotted a2088go-fast vessel with three outboard engines.2089 The Coast Guard helicopter employed their precision2090marksmen to shoot the outboards and the boarding team seized2091six tons of cocaine valued at almost $100 million and they2092detained 10 smugglers from Mexico and Ecuador.2093 In all of Fiscal Year 2024 the Coast Guard interdicted 1062094tons of cocaine with a street value of $3.2 billion and2095detained 213 smugglers. That sounds good, but I would call it2096an average year.2097 This year our crews have interdicted 108 tons of cocaine2098and they have already surpassed last year's total only 5 months2099into the Fiscal Year.2100 This pace, however, is not sustainable. For every drug2101interdiction each crew has countless stories of engine2102casualties, electronics failures, and just last week one cutter2103discovered a hole in the side of the ship with seawater pouring2104in.2105 Making our crews' lives even tougher, when they order the2106parts to make repairs sometimes we do not have them on the2107shelf or they are not even available, and sometimes we take the2108parts off a ship returning to port so another ship can go out2109to sea. Our crews know we are the world's best Coast Guard but2110we need to do a better job to make them feel that way.2111 I have talked a lot about cocaine because bulk cocaine is2112smuggled at sea. The interdiction of cocaine matters because2113the same cartels who smuggle cocaine produce and smuggle2114fentanyl.2115 When we interdict the smugglers at sea we work with our2116interagency partners in the intelligence community to determine2117who these criminals are, which cartels employ them, and how and2118where these cartels operate.2119 Cocaine is the cash crop for transnational criminal2120organizations, the cartels. Their huge profits from cocaine2121fund other nefarious activities like human smuggling, weapons2122trafficking, and production of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.2123 Fentanyl is the leading cause of drug-related deaths in our2124country but cocaine still kills upwards of 25,000 Americans2125every year.2126 Although we rarely encounter fentanyl at sea the Coast2127Guard is actively finding new ways to get after this problem.2128We are working alongside Federal, state, local, tribal, and2129international partners to protect the American people and2130ensure our national security remains strong.2131 The Coast Guard does a lot of things but we do not do it2132alone. Whether in the field, in a skiff, or in a courtroom we2133count on each other every day to achieve mission success.2134 We proudly serve alongside the Department of Defense, our2135many homeland components like Customs and Border Protection and2136Homeland Security investigations, and with the Department of2137State and Department of Justice, just to name a few.2138 On behalf of our acting commandant and our entire work2139force--active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliary--thank you2140for your enduring support of the United States Coast Guard.2141 I look forward to your questions.2142 [The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Chamie follows:]21432144 Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie,2145 Assistant Commandant for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard,2146 U.S. Department of Homeland Security2147Introduction2148 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished Members2149of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify and for your2150continued support of the United States Coast Guard and the Department2151of Homeland Security generally. I look forward to discussing the Coast2152Guard's maritime drug interdiction operations. We have a proud history2153of protecting and defending our Nation by ensuring our economic2154prosperity and national security in the maritime domain since the2155founding of the Revenue Marine in 1790. Today, our efforts remain2156focused on guarding our Nation against maritime border threats and2157conducting all of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions.2158 As our Acting Commandant highlighted in recent Service-wide2159guidance, controlling our maritime borders and approaches, including2160conducting maritime drug interdiction, is a priority for the Trump2161Administration and a critical function of the Coast Guard. We are2162particularly qualified to answer the call to safeguard the homeland. In2163Fiscal Year 2024, the Coast Guard removed over 106 metric tons of2164cocaine, bringing our six-year total to 873.5 metric tons removed.2165While a substantial amount, it would be much higher if we had more2166available interdiction and detection assets--Coast Guard cutters and2167aircraft, and Navy ships--to conduct these critical operations.2168 The multitude of Coast Guard missions necessarily create competing2169demands for these limited assets, specifically on interdicting drugs in2170the maritime transit zone. Assets that could otherwise be targeting2171drug traffickers are also needed to maintain elevated cutter presence2172in support of Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to counter illegal2173maritime migration, provide support to Administration priorities in the2174Indo-Pacific, assure presence in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska to2175deter Russia and People's Republic of China, and advance the global2176effort to counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.2177The Coast Guard continuously assesses demands and strategically employs2178assets to maximize effectiveness and mitigate risk to the Nation--we do2179a lot, but we strive to do much more. The trafficking of illegal drugs2180poses an exigent threat to the American people, and the men and women2181of the Coast Guard continue to do everything in their power to remove2182cocaine and other contraband before they reach our shores and our2183citizens.2184 Of equal importance as cocaine removals in 2024 are the 288 drug2185smugglers detained for U.S. or foreign prosecution as a result of Coast2186Guard interdictions. Those individuals and associated evidence provided2187critical information to advance Department of Homeland Security (DHS)2188and Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into smuggling networks2189that present a larger threat to U.S. border security. The same2190transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) engaging in cocaine2191smuggling are also responsible for trafficking people and other drugs,2192including fentanyl and its precursors, into the U.S. while creating2193instability in the source and transit zones in Latin America and the2194Caribbean, at the Southern Border, and throughout our hemisphere. Coast2195Guard interdictions of bulk quantity cocaine decrease TCO profit2196margins, while also providing valuable information to aid our2197investigative partners. The Coast Guard is postured to disrupt illegal2198trafficking in the maritime environment to advance the broader United2199States goals to secure the Nation's borders and help dismantle TCOs.2200Drug Trafficking--Overview2201 Mexico-based TCOs transship much of the cocaine consumed in the2202U.S. through Central America and the Caribbean using licit commercial2203shipping companies and illicit drug trafficking shipping networks. The2204Coast Guard's cutter fleet and versatile Tactical Law Enforcement Teams2205(TACLETs) operating from U.S. Navy and allied warships target bulk2206cocaine movements typically originating from Colombia, Ecuador, and2207Venezuela, pushing the U.S. borders out hundreds of miles from land.2208Two major drug transit corridors exist in the Western Hemisphere: the2209Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. In the Eastern Pacific, there are2210multiple vectors used to move bulk cocaine; however, traffickers2211generally land contraband between Costa Rica and Mexico for further2212shipment to the U.S. In the western Caribbean Sea, bulk cocaine is2213typically trafficked through Honduras or Nicaragua through Mexico and2214moved across the Southwest Border into the U.S. In the central and2215eastern Caribbean, the bulk smuggling destinations are typically the2216Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico. Approximately 60 to 65 percent of2217the cocaine destined for the U.S. flows through the Eastern Pacific2218corridor, while 35 to 40 percent moves through the Caribbean Sea.2219National Drug Control Strategy & the Coast Guard's Role2220 Since 1989, the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) has2221emphasized the global reach of U.S. enforcement and interdiction2222efforts to address both illicit drug supply and demand. The Trump2223Administration's deliberate focus on combatting TCOs and securing our2224borders reinforces the value of the Coast Guard's capabilities.2225Historically, drug interdiction missions sought to reduce supply, and2226were supported by our cutters, boarding teams, and aircraft. However,2227our role has advanced beyond mere presence and operations on and over2228the water. As a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard2229works across the government to collect, analyze and share critical2230information to target TCOs and drug trafficking terrorists.2231 The Commandant of the Coast Guard serves as the Chair of The2232Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is the Office of National Drug2233Control Policy's (ONDCP) senior interagency forum attended by drug2234interdiction officials from 26 departments and agencies. Last year, TIC2235principals convened in San Juan, Puerto Rico to review issues related2236to the coordination, oversight, and integration of international,2237border, and domestic drug interdiction efforts. It highlighted the2238unique counter-drug challenges from Panama north into the U.S. waters2239and territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which are2240on the front lines of our southeast U.S. border, and the broader drug2241interdiction concerns we face as Nation.2242 In addition to our role within TIC, Coast Guard Flag Officers lead2243the U.S. Southern Command's Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-2244S) and Indo-Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-2245W). These task forces are charged with executing the Department of2246Defense's (DoD) Title 10 responsibility for the detection and2247monitoring of illicit aerial and maritime drug trafficking, while2248efficiently coordinating interdiction operations conducted by Coast2249Guard, the interagency, allies, and partner nations.2250Drug Interdiction Operations2251 The Coast Guard works closely with JIATF-S and JIATF-W to target2252illicit narcotics and fentanyl precursor flows. While we strive for2253U.S. interdictions to support investigations by our DHS and DOJ2254partners, we look to coordinate a partner nation response when a U.S.2255interdiction is not possible. In Fiscal Year 2024, partner nations2256contributed to approximately 80 percent of documented JIATF-S cocaine2257disruptions, while the Coast Guard provided actionable intelligence to2258European law enforcement partners on trans-Atlantic cocaine movement,2259accounting for an additional 76.6 metric tons disrupted. This was the2260largest percentage of partner nation contributions on record; a2261promising trend indicating the increased capability and willingness of2262our partners to collaborate on this important mission. In a recent six-2263week period from December 20, 2024, to January 31, 2025, the Coast2264Guard positioned multiple assets in the Eastern Pacific to successfully2265conduct 32 interdictions, seize over 43 metric tons of cocaine and2266detain 85 smugglers for transfer to Department of Justice Organized2267Crime Task Forces for prosecution and further investigation. On2268February 13, 2025, in California, a Coast Guard cutter off-loaded over226916.9 metric tons of cocaine with an estimated street value of over2270$275.7 million that will never be sold to poison the American people.2271 While a multitude of Coast Guard assets engage in counterdrug2272operations, our National Security Cutters have proven to be our most2273effective platform for this mission, especially when combined with a2274force package consisting of an embarked helicopter and a small-unmanned2275aircraft. Just last month, Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) James responded to2276three suspected smuggling vessels in their operating area. The cutter2277simultaneously launched three small boats and their airborne use-of-2278force capable helicopter, successfully stopping all three suspect2279vessels. With these suspected smuggling vessels being subject to U.S.2280jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the cutter's2281crew conducted lawful boardings and seized over six metric tons of2282cocaine and detained nine Ecuadorian smugglers. This successful2283operation was part of an even more impressive week, with CGC James2284interdicting a total of six cocaine-laden smuggling vessels.2285Fentanyl2286 Fentanyl is a major U.S. counterdrug priority and has been the2287leading cause of U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for2288approximately 70 percent of U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican2289TCOs are the primary source of synthetic opioid flow into the U.S.,2290predominantly across our Southwest Border. While bulk fentanyl has yet2291to be encountered in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard is leveraging2292all of our authorities, capabilities, and policies to seek out and2293interdict both fentanyl and precursor chemicals. On January 31, 2025,2294the Acting Commandant directed immediate action to bolster operations2295to combat illegal fentanyl and the Service is seeking new ways to2296leverage our broad authorities and partnerships with other agencies.2297 Coast Guard drug interdictions, while historically focused on2298cocaine and marijuana, are critical to the whole-of-government effort2299to combat TCOs. Cocaine interdictions at sea cut off a critical source2300of funding for the same Mexican TCOs that produce and smuggle fentanyl,2301impairing their efforts to produce and smuggle fentanyl into the United2302States. Beyond our efforts on the water and in the ports, Coast Guard2303intelligence personnel work closely with our Intelligence Community2304partners to combat TCOs that threaten the U.S. by providing valuable2305and actionable information targeting suspected smuggling terrorists.2306Partnerships2307 As the United States' lead maritime law enforcement agency, the2308Coast Guard has a broad range of authorities and a network of2309interagency and international partnerships that enable us to conduct2310law enforcement operations on the high seas to combat threats far from2311U.S. borders. The Coast Guard conducts drug interdiction operations2312over a six-million square mile transit zone, and the Service depends on2313robust partnerships for mission success. Drug interdiction is a large-2314scale operation, and a Service of our size relies on like-minded2315partners to drive our whole-of-government effort to target TCOs that2316threaten our Nation.2317 The Coast Guard relies on over 40 counterdrug bilateral and2318multilateral international agreements and arrangements with stakeholder2319nations to enable seamless, coordinated law enforcement efforts against2320TCOs. These agreements and arrangements are critical to Coast Guard2321drug interdiction successes, as they allow our law enforcement teams to2322conduct boardings of foreign-flagged vessels and promote time-critical2323partner nation coordination during high-seas drug interdiction2324operations. The Coast Guard works closely with the Department of State2325(DOS) to improve the effectiveness of partner nations' counterdrug2326efforts by negotiating, securing, and managing those agreements.2327 In addition to exercising international agreements and2328arrangements, the Coast Guard relies on allies and international2329partners to provide assets, collaborate on operations, and share2330intelligence to eradicate maritime trafficking. We coordinate2331operations with, and regularly deploy Coast Guard law enforcement teams2332aboard allied vessels (e.g., United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and2333Canada), and work closely with partner nations throughout South and2334Central America and the Caribbean to dismantle regional maritime2335trafficking networks.2336 Force packages consisting of allied partner assets, augmented with2337small Coast Guard TACLETs provide tremendously high operational return2338on investment. In late January 2025, we deployed a team of 10 Coast2339Guard law enforcement personnel aboard a Royal Netherlands Navy ship,2340and, within 48 hours of operational certification, they interdicted a2341boat 30 miles off the coast of Venezuela, seizing nearly three metric2342tons of cocaine and detaining five Venezuelan and Colombian suspected2343traffickers.2344 The DoD-Coast Guard partnership is also critical to the Nation's2345drug interdiction mission and our collective ability to succeed. While2346DoD is the lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of2347aerial and maritime transits of illegal drugs into the United States,2348the Coast Guard leverages unique law enforcement authorities to serve2349as the lead agency for the interdiction and apprehension of vessels2350suspected of engaging in maritime drug trafficking. The Coast Guard's2351role as a law enforcement agency, an armed force, and a member of the2352Intelligence Community allows us to leverage our vital suite of2353authorities and capabilities in various ways throughout the2354interdiction process, unique among cooperating agencies.2355 Similarly, the Coast Guard maintains close connections with DOJ to2356prosecute cases and investigate TCO networks. In addition to engagement2357on various DOJ-led interagency task forces, the Coast Guard assigns2358judge advocates who serve as Special Assistant United States Attorneys2359to work side-by-side with DOJ attorneys in the U.S. Attorney's Offices2360who prosecute the majority of significant maritime drug cases. This2361model is highly successful and allows the Coast Guard to bring its2362maritime counterdrug expertise into the courtroom.2363 Within DHS, a Coast Guard flag officer leads Joint Task Force East2364(JTF-EAST), which is responsible for coordinating activities and2365operations across DHS components (i.e., Customs and Border Protection,2366Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United States Citizenship and2367Immigration Services) to protect the U.S. Southeast Border and maritime2368approaches. In 2024, Caribbean coalition efforts across synchronized,2369enduring operations resulted in the interdiction of 538 illegal Aliens,237071.4 metric tons of cocaine, 339 illegal firearms, and over 26,0002371rounds of ammunition. Working with JIATF-S, allies, and international2372partners, we have improved unified efforts to disrupt TCOs in the2373Caribbean.2374Conclusion2375 The Coast Guard continues to provide tremendous value to the United2376States through our maritime drug interdiction operations. We strive to2377control the maritime border in direct support of President's Trump's2378recent Executive Orders and direction from Homeland Security Secretary2379Noem. We will continue to address surface fleet challenges and2380competing mission demands to ensure the Coast Guard remains well-2381positioned to assist in dismantling TCOs, interdicting illegal2382narcotics, and prosecuting those responsible. The continued success of2383Coast Guard counterdrug operations hinges on continued investment in2384the Service--recruiting motivated people, providing them with the2385proper tools, and empowering them to serve the Nation. Congress'2386continued support will help the world's best Coast Guard meet these2387global demands.2388 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your2389continued support of the Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your2390questions.23912392 Senator Blackburn [presiding]. And, Mr. Miller, you are2393recognized.23942395 STATEMENT OF JONATHAN MILLER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT23962397 COMMISSIONER, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS,23982399 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)24002401 Mr. Miller. Senator Blackburn, Chairman Cruz, Ranking2402Member Cantwell, and distinguished members of the Committee, it2403is an honor to appear before you today on behalf of the men and2404women of Air Marine Operations to discuss our critical role in2405interdicting illicit drugs in U.S. territorial waters and2406maritime approaches as part of U.S. Customs and Border2407Protection's comprehensive approach to border security.2408 While AMO has existed in its current form for less than 202409years its origins trace back to the legacy of U.S. Customs2410Service and we continue to meet a longstanding need for2411specialized air and maritime border security capabilities.2412 Our operators are sworn Federal law enforcement agents with2413a broad range of authorities to conduct counter narcotic2414operations across land, air, and sea domains.2415 Maritime domain presents unique national security2416challenges. Unlike air and land environments, coastal waters2417are vast, less restricted spaces.2418 Countless vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial2419waters every day, making detection of illegal activity and2420apprehending associated smugglers challenging.2421 Many smuggling crafts hide in plain sight amongst2422legitimate traffic while others transit remote areas far2423offshore trying to elude detection altogether.2424 Smugglers also use a variety of vessels tailored to the2425area and amount of contraband they are smuggling to best evade2426detection including modified fishing boats, go-fast vessels,2427pangas, low-profile vessels, and semi submersibles.2428 Vessels are also much faster than they were 20 years ago,2429often leaving law enforcement little time to interdict them2430before reaching our shores.2431 Drug smuggling activity in the maritime environment is a2432perpetual and dangerous threat to U.S. border security. Of the2433234 pounds of drugs AMO seized in Fiscal Year 20242434approximately 76 percent occurred in the maritime environment.2435 In addition to high maritime drug interdiction rates,2436smuggler aggression and violence has also been on the rise.2437Since 2006, AMO has used disabling fire on the engines of2438fleeing smuggling vessels nearly 350 times with more than half2439of those happening in the last 4 years.2440 In November 2022 three of our marine interdiction agents2441were shot and one, Michel Maceda, was tragically killed during2442a vessel stop with smugglers off the coast of Puerto Rico.2443 The threat of illicit maritime activity is persistent and2444dynamic but AMO is dedicated and adaptable. We are continually2445refining our capabilities and adjusting our tactics to stay2446ahead of these ever evolving threats.2447 AMO deploys a fleet of what I believe to be some of the2448most powerful law enforcement marine interceptors in the world.2449Evolving to meet today's threats we have recently repowered2450these vessels and made other modifications to this platform for2451a perfect mix of speed, agility, and agent safety.2452 AMO also maintains a fleet of aircraft functionally2453designed and outfitted for maritime detection and surveillance.2454Our P-3s, DHC-8s, and MQ-9 UAS aircraft provide long-range,2455high-endurance capabilities in remote source and transit zones2456while the Super King Air 350 multi-role enforcement aircraft2457further expands aerial surveillance, closing detection2458enforcement gaps in the littorals of the United States and the2459Caribbean.2460 AMO is heavily invested in a variety of tethered aero stats2461and tactical systems, providing ground-based radar and sensor2462capabilities that significantly increase our domain awareness2463along our littoral borders and the maritime approaches around2464Puerto Rico, south Texas into the Gulf, the Florida straits,2465the U.S. Virgin Islands and the northern border.2466 The scale and complexity of countering drug trafficking in2467the maritime environment requires partnerships and operational2468collaboration.2469 In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, AMO routinely works2470with Federal, state, local, and foreign partners and is one of2471the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint Interagency2472Task Force South, supporting counternarcotics operations in the2473vast 42 million square mile source and transit zones.2474 With a fleet designed for rapid interdiction, airborne and2475ground assets that provide critical domain awareness and agents2476with extensive law enforcement experience, AMO brings a unique2477capability to detect and disrupt smuggling operations before2478they reach our shores.2479 With few exceptions AMO's marine law enforcement authority2480is limited to customs waters, or 12 nautical miles from the2481coastline of the United States. CBP continues to work with2482Congress on legislative changes to extend the Customs' waters2483from 12 to 24 nautical miles.2484 This extension of law enforcement authorities would enable2485AMO to more effectively enforce U.S. laws at sea, expand our2486counternarcotics operations, support our partners, and carry2487out our border security mission.2488 Senator Blackburn, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell,2489and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to2490testify today and I look forward to answering your questions.2491 [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]24922493 Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller,2494 Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and Marine Operations, U.S.2495 Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security2496Introduction2497 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished Members2498of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to2499discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine2500Operations' (AMO) unwavering commitment to enforcing U.S. laws,2501interdicting illegal drugs, and securing our Nation's borders. As a2502frontline law enforcement component of CBP, AMO actively detects,2503deters, and disrupts illicit drug activity at the border and beyond.2504 Born out of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, AMO was established in25052006 as an integral part of CBP's comprehensive border security mission2506and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-2507layered approach to national security. AMO agents are credentialed2508Federal law enforcement officers\1\ with a broad range of authorities2509that enable them to operate in the land, air, and sea domains,2510providing a critical layer of continuity in counternarcotics2511operations.2512---------------------------------------------------------------------------2513 \1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 211(f); 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1589a; 8 U.S.C. Sec. 13572514---------------------------------------------------------------------------2515 AMO's unique positioning--its legal authorities, specialized2516assets, and operational capabilities--allows it to detect and interdict2517illicit drug activity beyond our Nation's border. Operating in source2518and transit zones, between ports of entry, in coastal waters, and2519interior waterways, AMO protects the United States against criminal2520drug smuggling networks, including Mexican cartels, seeking to exploit2521our maritime domain and approaches, among other threats.2522State of the Maritime Border2523 Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to escalate2524their efforts to infiltrate our borders and flooding American2525communities with illegal and deadly drugs. These criminal organizations2526operate with immense capability, capacity, and nearly unlimited2527resources. Their illegal drug production operations are sophisticated,2528and they continually adjust their tactics, techniques, and routes to2529circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement.2530 Illicit activity in the maritime environment is a threat to U.S.2531border security. The maritime domain is generally less restricted than2532the air and land environments and connects to more than 95,000 miles of2533U.S. shoreline. Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S.2534territorial waters every day. While the vast majority operate for2535recreation or legitimate commerce, some engage in smuggling and other2536illegal activity. Detecting illegal activity and apprehending any2537associated smuggling can be challenging, as many smuggling crafts hide2538in plain sight amongst legitimate traffic, while others transit remote2539areas far offshore to try to elude detection. Additionally, smugglers2540use a variety of crafts tailored to the area and amount of contraband2541they are smuggling to best evade detection, including modified fishing2542boats, go-fast vessels, pangas, low profile vessels, and semi-2543submersibles. Vessels are much faster than they were twenty years ago,2544often leaving law enforcement little time to interdict them before2545reaching our shores.2546 AMO continues to encounter increased risk and violence in the2547course of its role in intercepting smugglers in the maritime2548environment. Since its establishment, AMO has used disabling fire on2549the engines of fleeing smuggler vessels nearly 350 times. Additionally,2550in November 2022, three AMO Marine Interdiction Agents were shot, with2551one tragically being killed during a vessel stop with smugglers off the2552coast of Puerto Rico.\2\ Precise engagement and rapid neutralization of2553risk is key to safely resolving water-based law enforcement actions.2554AMO continually refines its maritime interdiction capabilities and2555tactics to meet ever evolving threats.2556---------------------------------------------------------------------------2557 \2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-2558marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico2559---------------------------------------------------------------------------2560AMO's Maritime Counternarcotics Operations2561 AMO remains at the forefront of the Nation's efforts to combat2562maritime drug smuggling and continues to intercept tons of dangerous2563illicit drugs every year, keeping them from reaching our shores and2564communities. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, AMO enforcement efforts led to2565the seizure of 233,662 pounds of drugs.\3\ Approximately 76 percent of2566these seizures occurred in the maritime environment, with AMO2567enforcement actions leading to the seizure of 162,269 pounds of2568cocaine, 15,113 pounds of marijuana, and 172 pounds of methamphetamine.2569---------------------------------------------------------------------------2570 \3\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/2571air-and-marine-operations-statistics2572---------------------------------------------------------------------------2573Maritime Enforcement Authorities2574 Despite AMO's unique cross-domain law enforcement capabilities, in2575the maritime environment, with few exceptions,\4\ AMO's maritime law2576enforcement authority \5\ is generally limited to areas within the2577historical ``customs waters'' \6\--or 12 nautical miles from the2578coastline--of the United States. This geographic constraint challenges2579AMO's ability to effectively counter current and evolving modern2580threats and situations. Specifically, as modern technology continues to2581change and expand rapidly, the performance and speed of maritime2582vessels improves, including those used to violate U.S. law or evade2583U.S. law enforcement, the 12 nautical mile limit no longer provides2584responding law enforcement with sufficient time to interdict such2585vessels. This affects our ability to decide how and where to conduct2586engagement with suspect vessels, often preventing AMO's interdiction of2587vessels in time to prevent their escape, placing our law enforcement2588capability at a significant disadvantage.2589---------------------------------------------------------------------------2590 \4\ In certain circumstances, AMO is authorized to operate on the2591high seas, for instance when enforcing laws on U.S. registered vessels2592(19 C.F.R. Sec. 162.3), hovering vessels (19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(k); 192593U.S.C. Sec. 1587(a)), and vessels subject to hot pursuit (19 U.S.C.2594Sec. 1581(d)). Additionally, beyond the customs waters, AMO may enforce2595the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. Sec. 70501-70502),2596where appropriate.2597 \5\ See, e.g. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1581, 1587, 1589a.2598 \6\ 19 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1401(j), 1709(c).2599---------------------------------------------------------------------------2600 CBP continues to work with Congress on legislative changes to2601extend the customs waters from 12 nautical miles to 24 nautical miles2602consistent with Presidential Proclamation 7219. This extension of law2603enforcement authorities would enable AMO to more effectively enforce2604U.S. laws at sea as well as increasing presence further from shore2605where we have saved lives at sea.2606 AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and continues to2607make investments in its highly trained agents, vessels, aircraft, and2608technological capabilities to advance the effectiveness of its2609operations. These investments support AMO's ongoing ability to2610effectively respond to illegal drug activity in the maritime2611environment, but also contribute to other AMO enforcement actions,2612including those that led to over 1,000 arrests and the seizure of 1,5002613weapons and $12.6 million in U.S. currency in FY 2024.2614Interdiction Assets, Capabilities, and Technology2615 In support of its maritime border security mission, AMO deploys a2616fleet of high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels engineered for rapid2617pursuit and interdiction of non-compliant vessels. These vessels are2618crewed by highly trained agents authorized to use all necessary force,2619including warning shots and disabling fire to stop fleeing vessels.2620 In addition to our maritime interdiction efforts with our marine2621interceptors on the water, we also contribute a significant amount of2622air assets to these operations. AMO's fleet of maritime patrol aircraft2623are functionally designed and outfitted for maritime detection and2624surveillance. The P-3s and DHC-8 aircraft provide long range, high-2625endurance capabilities in remote source and transit zones while the2626Super King Air 350 Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) further expand2627aerial surveillance, closing detection and enforcement gaps in the2628Caribbean. Equipped with advanced sensors, communications, and radar2629systems, these aircraft are credited with the interdiction of 150,3802630pounds of cocaine and 11,670 flight hours within the Western Hemisphere2631Transit Zones in FY 2024, which equated to 13 pounds of narcotics2632interdicted per flight hour.2633 The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the maritime2634environment has also increased AMO's ability to effectively identify,2635detect, monitor, and track conveyances involved in illegal activity. In2636partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate, AMO modified2637two MQ-9s to BigWing variants, significantly increasing fuel capacity2638and flight endurance. In addition to the added operational reach, these2639Big Wing aircraft have the added ability to surveil surface targets2640much longer while awaiting interdiction surface forces to arrive. AMO2641has been employing UAS in the maritime environment since 2020,2642contributing to the seizure of over 81,000 pounds of cocaine and 46,0002643pounds of marijuana.2644 AMO is heavily invested in a variety of ground-based radars and2645sensors increasing maritime domain awareness along our littoral2646borders. We've taken tethered aero stats traditionally used for air2647detection only and integrated maritime surface radars. These have2648illuminated maritime approaches around Puerto Rico, South Texas into2649the Gulf, and the Florida Straits with future sites planned for2650Southern California. Other tower and ground-based radar systems have2651provided additional radar detection around Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin2652Islands, South Florida, and the Great Lakes. Over the last three years,2653these systems have contributed to the seizure of over 17,200 pounds of2654cocaine, 15,600 pounds of fish from illicit fishing practices, and $22655million in U.S. currency.2656 Advanced technology, including the BigPipe real-time video system2657and the Minotaur mission integration system, link AMO's tactical2658assets, aircraft, and vessels, thereby providing AMO with a streamlined2659and efficient information collecting and sharing capability. The Air2660and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) simultaneously tracks, processes,2661and integrates multiple sensor feeds and sources of information to2662provide comprehensive domain awareness in support of CBP's border2663security mission. Artificial intelligence and machine learning2664initiatives at AMO are improving threat detection efforts by processing2665vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. AMO will continue to2666modernize its fleet and sensor systems to enhance its data analysis2667capabilities and operational performance in diverse marine environments2668and increase its ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the2669maritime border and approaches to the United States.2670Operational Coordination2671 AMO leverages its capabilities in the maritime environment by2672forging effective operational partnerships with USCG, the United States2673Navy, and a variety of federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign2674partners. AMO works closely with DHS Joint Task Force East (JTF-E) and2675is one of the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint Interagency2676Task Force South (JIATF-S) supporting counternarcotics operations in2677the vast 42 million square mile source and transit zones spanning the2678Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean areas of operation. Frequent2679cooperation with foreign partners is imperative, and over the last few2680years we've increased focus on the Eastern Caribbean and strengthened2681partnerships with the foreign countries and island nations throughout2682the Lesser Antilles, thus creating a force multiplier of surveillance2683and interdiction assets throughout the Southern approaches to Puerto2684Rico.2685Conclusion2686 AMO's efforts are a cornerstone of CBP's border security mission,2687its capabilities crucial for intercepting contraband and disrupting2688illicit activity before it reaches our shores.2689 Since its creation in 2006, AMO has evolved into a key component of2690the Homeland Security enterprise and one of the largest civilian2691aviation and maritime law enforcement aviation and maritime forces in2692the world. As a critical component of CBP, AMO remains fully engaged in2693safeguarding the Nation by anticipating and confronting security2694threats through aviation and maritime law enforcement, innovative2695capabilities, and partnerships at the border and beyond. This mission2696is achieved by monitoring thousands of miles of air, maritime, and land2697borders around the clock; defending the United States against terrorist2698threats; detecting and deterring illicit trafficking of persons, drugs,2699weapons, money, and other goods; and disrupting criminal networks.2700 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the2701Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.2702 I look forward to answering your questions.27032704 STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,2705 U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE27062707 Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Miller.2708 Ms. Kelly, I want to come to you with my first question. I2709am looking forward to introducing a bill that would reauthorize2710HIDTA at an increased funding level, and in Tennessee I have2711heard from so many of our law enforcement personnel how2712important this is.2713 I want you just to speak for about 30 seconds what would2714happen if we did not have this?2715 Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Blackburn, for your2716support and for the question.2717 I think what we have heard persistently from in particular2718our state and local partners is that the HIDTA program is2719essential for the coordination of Federal, state, local task2720forces.2721 We heard from the first panel how important it is for the2722Federal Government to engage with the partners, the 18,0002723sheriff's departments, and police departments across the Nation2724who otherwise, without the framework and the structure of the2725HIDTA program may not be equipped to share information freely2726to coordinate on these cases and to make sure that we have a2727holistic whole scope of government response to dismantling the2728criminal networks that are trafficking fentanyl from the2729Southwest border all the way through the interior of the United2730States into every state and territory across the country.2731 Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that you all talked about2732our borders and what is coming in in shipping containers from2733China and the--what we are seeing in our ports but in Tennessee2734we have got the Mississippi River and the port in Memphis.2735 And what I would like to hear from you is what we can do,2736how your agencies are working on these inland rivers, and I2737know the FBI put a memo out warning of increased China2738influence on the Mississippi River.2739 So, Mr. Miller, I am going to start with you and just go2740down the line. I would like to hear what you all are doing when2741it comes to our inland waterways.2742 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.2743 So AMO has marine units in the Gulf. I would say the2744biggest impact in terms of our inland waterways is the support2745that we provide to state and local agencies in the area to2746include task forces.2747 We provide aerial surveillance with flight enforcement2748helicopters with specific capabilities to track narcotics2749smugglers or any kind of trafficking that state and local2750agencies are working and we provide greater officer safety2751during buy bust operations or high-risk warrant operations.2752 Senator Blackburn. OK. Admiral?2753 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.2754 Ma'am, we work across the interagency with all our partners2755throughout Homeland, also state, local, Federal and tribal to2756get after a lot of these problems. The Coast Guard is a multi-2757mission service, so many of the same crew members who might be2758doing a search and rescue case one moment could be boarding a2759vessel that is coming in potentially with illegal narcotics.2760 The ability to shift between missions is a critical2761capability of the Coast Guard and that is fed by intelligence.2762 The Coast Guard is a member of the intelligence community2763and we work across the IC to help put our cutters and crews in2764places where we know the worst problems will be so that we can2765effectively respond.2766 Senator Blackburn. Ms. Kelly?2767 Ms. Kelly. I appreciate that my co-panelists have both2768mentioned information sharing. HIDTA, as you know, is a key2769framework for sharing information from our Federal partners2770down through our state and locals who, in many instances, are2771the ones actually enforcing the drug laws, particularly in some2772of our more rural and remote areas.2773 Senator Blackburn. Rear Admiral, I would like to come to2774you on this. I think it is helpful that President Trump has2775identified the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, and2776so as we look at dealing with these cartels is there any2777further authority that the Coast Guard needs in order to2778apprehend and to work in this process with the IC?2779 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.2780 I am very appreciative that the President has designated2781these cartels as terrorist organizations. I think that sends a2782message that we as a government are deadly serious and are2783bringing all of our assets and resources to bear to get after2784this problem.2785 I would be happy to answer the question for the record with2786a list of additional authorities that we might be able to use2787to get at that.2788 Senator Blackburn. That would be very helpful. That is the2789kind of information we need.2790 My time has expired. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized.2791 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to2792the second group of panel witnesses who have been on the front2793lines of fighting this. Very much appreciate your being here2794today.2795 I wanted to start with you, Director Kelly, just in2796comments about the legislation that we introduced last year you2797were supportive of that, which I appreciate.2798 But this whole area of how to build capacity at attacking2799the transportation networks we heard from Spokane Chief Hall2800about why this worked and why it does work, right, in the sense2801of the transportation networks beyond the border.2802 What do you think? You think that you can easily grow that2803capacity within your organization. Is that right? The support2804for our legislation, which requires a stop fentanyl smuggling2805transportation network strategy?2806 Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much for the question, Ranking2807Member Cantwell.2808 And we share your keen interest in ensuring that all2809modalities of our transportation network are secure. That has2810been a particular challenge in the past and we have focused2811increasing efforts on ensuring that we are hitting all points2812through our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and2813securing our parcel systems, also attacking transportation on2814rail, via air, both passenger and cargo.2815 We share your interest as well in a fentanyl strategy.2816Certainly at the Office of National Drug Control Policy2817biannually we prepare the National Drug Control Strategy and2818our next one will be due in 2026.2819 But we certainly appreciate the focus that a fentanyl2820strategy would bring and we are happy to engage with our2821partners at the National Security Council and lead that effort.2822 Senator Cantwell. But once we had that in your authority2823you could plug this into the current system and then just2824leverage this extra local law enforcement effort to go after2825these transportation networks?2826 Ms. Kelly. I think we would have to build out a complete2827plan for this, but certainly that--using the existing framework2828would make great sense.2829 Senator Cantwell. Great. I just wanted to clarify that2830because I feel like you were already somewhat there. But this2831is about growing the capacity to target these transportation2832modes.2833 And did you want to comment anything about the technology--2834the vapor, how important a breakthrough that could be?2835 Ms. Kelly. Absolutely. I think we are very interested in2836ensuring that we are using leading-edge technology when and2837where possible.2838 I would also mention, though, that we want to make sure2839that we maintain robust support for all dimensions of2840interdiction, which would include ensuring that we have2841manpower who are trained appropriately, who are good, well2842equipped at detecting suspicious behavior when they pull2843someone over as part of a roadside interdiction, making sure2844that we are also funding canines.2845 This is a much more basic, foundational effort but in some2846places we are still hearing from state and local agencies that2847they do not have resources like that.2848 So I think we do want to hit it on all fronts with both the2849high-tech solutions but also the more nuts and bolts solutions2850as well.2851 Senator Cantwell. Yes. You are not going to find a bigger2852supporter of the canines than myself. I just--talking to Sea-2853Tac they were, like, people walk in, they see the canines, and2854they turn around and leave. It is a deterrent in and of itself.2855 But the noninvasive technology issue is just a way to say2856to the bus stations, to the airports, to everybody, we are2857going to catch you and hopefully, you know, help us in that2858effort.2859 I wanted to ask Mr. Miller about CBP's use of safe boats,2860their organization in our state, but apparently those--that2861structure works well.2862 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell.2863 Yes, absolutely. The safe boats that we have, and I have2864visited the--where they make them for us in Bremerton multiple2865times.2866 So we have two varieties. We have a center console version2867that we refer to as our coastal interceptor vessel. It is 402868feet. It is custom designed specifically for our needs. And2869then we have a closed cabin version called the all-weather2870interceptor that is--that we use in more of our cold weather2871locations.2872 Both of them have been game changers in our fleet. We used2873to--you know, legacy customs we used go-fast vessels that we2874basically turned into law enforcement vessels.2875 But these are the first ones that are custom tailored for2876law enforcement.2877 Senator Cantwell. But these are helping us on our waterways2878detect the smuggling on our waterways?2879 Mr. Miller. Absolutely. Absolutely.2880 They are--we have recently repowered them. We are doing2881other modifications to make them safer for our agents during2882high-risk pursuits and boardings.2883 Senator Cantwell. Thank you.2884 And I will have something for the record for the Rear2885Admiral to talk about on that, but very much support the Coast2886Guard, increasing capacity for them.2887 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2888 Senator Budd [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.2889 Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony that the Coast2890Guard is using small unmanned aircraft as part of the combined2891force package for drug interdiction.2892 Could you tell me what sort of unmanned vehicles the Coast2893Guard is deploying in its drug interdiction mission and are2894there any other UAS platforms that the Coast Guard is looking2895to deploy but not currently using?2896 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.2897 So I do not use the term game changer a lot but when we2898started employing the ScanEagle unmanned aircraft on the2899national security cutters it did change the game for us.2900 The way that we pursue drug smugglers on the high seas is2901with a package of a cutter with a helicopter that can shoot out2902the engines and then a maritime patrol aircraft that is2903overhead to find them and then cue the cutter to get after that2904with its small boat.2905 When you have an unmanned aircraft and you can launch that2906from the flight deck of the cutter and put that up there then2907you do not have to rely on scarce, long-range aircraft from2908either CBP or Coast Guard or other agencies. So it is, indeed,2909a game changer.2910 Senator Budd. Is that fuel or is that electric or what type2911of propulsion?2912 Rear Admiral Chamie. Sir, I would have to get to the actual2913specs on it.2914 Senator Budd. Yes. No worries.2915 I will continue with you, Admiral. The Aviation Logistics2916Center at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, my home state, is the2917central hub of the Coast Guard's aviation program.2918 In addition to conducting heavy maintenance on the existing2919fleet the ALC is also instrumental in the fleet's transition to2920both the C-130J and the MH-60. As the Coast Guard expands its2921drug and alien migrant interdiction measures, are there2922additional needs in the Coast Guard aviation fleet or at the2923ALC specifically that this committee should be thinking of?2924 Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, Senator, and thank you for your2925support of the Aviation Logistics Center. The work that they2926are doing there to missionize new aircraft and then to do the2927depot maintenance on our 60 aircraft to get them up and flying2928for longer as part of their service life extension program is2929absolutely critical to the organization.2930 Sir, the bigger answer is we need more aircraft. We are2931constrained by the resources that we have, both the fixed wing2932like the C-130Js and, moving forward, we are going to need to2933figure out a way to get more rotary aircraft to deploy on both2934our cutters to get after drug smugglers and also for shore-2935based missions.2936 We need to raise our top line. Sir, we have been saying for2937a while now that we are a $20 billion Coast Guard on a $122938billion budget, and those sort of top line increases will help2939us get after aviation and everything else that we need.2940 Senator Budd. Thank you very much.2941 Mr. Miller, your testimony mentions a November 20222942incident in which three Air and Marine Operations--marine were2943interdiction agents were shot, one tragically being killed.2944 You also reported that AMO enforcement resulted in the2945seizure of more than 1,500 weapons in Fiscal Year 2024. Does2946your office have any record as to how often AMO agents are2947subjected to incoming fire while carrying out their missions?2948 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.2949 Yes, the event in 2022 when Mike was killed was tragic and2950a game changer for Air Marine Operations. We have seen an2951increase in violence in noncompliant boardings and we have2952changed our training significantly.2953 We have outfitted--I mentioned we have outfitted our2954vessels differently with different safety equipment and2955armament. We have also equipped our agents differently as well.2956 So I think you will see the most capable air marine agents2957to date.2958 Senator Budd. Thank you very much.2959 Continue on. Mr. Kelly [sic], your testimony mentions your2960work with the interdiction committee to continue drug2961interdiction efforts across the Federal Government.2962 The DOD has several members on the interdiction committee2963but do you think more direct engagement from the DOD along the2964southern border would be helpful in stopping the flow of2965illegal immigration and illicit drugs, particularly now that2966President Trump has designated many of the cartels as foreign2967terrorist organizations?2968 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.2969 We work very closely with DOD right now, NORTHCOM, JTF-2970North, and we are coordinating with them currently on any kind2971of additional force lay down that may come to the Southwest2972border, and we welcome any assistance in that effort.2973 Senator Budd. Thank you very much.2974 Senator Kim, you are recognized.29752976 STATEMENT OF HON. ANDY KIM,2977 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY29782979 Senator Kim. Thank you.2980 I appreciate all of you coming on out and talking with us.2981 Director Kelly, I think I would like to start with you. You2982know, I think all of us here recognize we want to have a2983comprehensive approach to this. You know, that includes some of2984these efforts, go after the cartels on immigration.2985 But there was also a statistic that I come across, and I2986guess I just wanted to ask you if this was correct. I saw a2987statistic that came across saying that U.S. citizens made up 802988percent of individuals with fentanyl seized at ports of entry2989and I wanted to just ask you, does that sound correct to you,2990roughly?2991 Ms. Kelly. I would certainly defer to our partners at DHS2992which would be the source of that statistic. But yes, it sounds2993generally correct.2994 Senator Kim. I guess I wanted to ask and, you know, to2995whatever extent you know, Mr. Miller, you want to jump in as2996well. But do we have an understanding of who these Americans2997are, you know, in terms of affiliation with, you know, criminal2998operations or other things of that nature?2999 Mr. Miller, I want to just check with you if you have3000thoughts here.3001 Mr. Miller. Yes. Thank you, Senator.3002 So I would definitely say that the cartels are running all3003the narcotics operations on the Southwest border and then they3004will utilize anyone that they can support.3005 Senator Kim. So they are recruiting Americans to help this3006get across the border. Is that what you believe is happening?3007 Mr. Miller. I have no doubt of that, Senator.3008 Senator Kim. OK. I am just thinking through this in terms3009of just what are the different ways we can sort of disrupt this3010operation and kind of engage and understand, you know, how that3011recruitment might be occurring--you know, other types of ways3012in which we can engage.3013 Director Kelly, you know, you talked about the leading edge3014tech that is a component of that and you also mentioned a3015number of other aspects that are important when it comes to3016interdiction.3017 But on the leading edge tech, I guess I wanted to just ask3018you, you know, as I am trying to explain to, you know, the3019people in New Jersey what way we should be putting our3020priorities.3021 You know, I have certainly heard a lot about scanning3022technologies but what are the other types of technology that is3023proven to be best practices and where are we at in terms of3024scaling that to the level that we would need?3025 Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Kim, for the3026question.3027 I think we have two dimensions that we have to consider in3028responding to that. Part of it is developing the technology and3029the other part is making sure that it can be deployed to all of3030the partners that we need.3031 We recognize that we are relying in large part here on the3032work of our 18,000 sheriffs' offices and police departments3033across the country, and so for them this leading edge tech even3034if we have it may never be within reach.3035 So we have to be thinking about what makes sense in terms3036of broad scale investment and then how much of that can be3037actually in the hands of state and local officers.3038 So on the first point, I think I would defer to our experts3039here from the actual border--from CBP, who I know leads a lot3040of the technological development for the Southwest border and3041also for the maritime space.3042 What I think we might want to be thinking about when we are3043talking about state and local deployment, though, may be sort3044of second generation technology where we are thinking about3045handheld scanners, we are thinking about ensuring that they are3046trained so that they can properly question drivers in roadside3047stops so that they are not taking the personal risk--you know,3048if you are thinking about state patrol officers, about pulling3049over a tractor trailer with a hidden compartment and thinking3050about delaying the schedule of commerce in the United States.3051 So I think it is a broad range, depending on whether you3052are talking about the Federal investment directly or whether we3053are talking about something that is deployable to state and3054locals.3055 Senator Kim. And I appreciated earlier that you also just3056raised the importance of just ensuring that we have enough3057canine investment as well.3058 So, you know, I think so often here in Congress we get3059caught up on just the tech but remembering that it is the3060manpower as well as, you know, some of these other types of3061tools.3062 Mr. Miller, I just wanted to turn it over to you if you3063have anything further here. Just help us understand, like, you3064know, where should we be when it comes to this leading edge3065tech and where do you think we are at right now? I want to just3066understand your understanding of the delta.3067 Mr. Miller. Yes. Thank you, Senator.3068 As the assistant director mentioned, at the ports of entry3069technology is vital for sure. I would say in between the ports3070of entry I think any kind of technology that assists in domain3071awareness is critical, whether that is our use of radars,3072aerostats, cameras, our use of artificial intelligence or3073machine learning.3074 Another critical gap that CBP has that we are working3075through and trying to catch up with is the counter UAS threat.3076 So, you know, there is--that is a threat along the border.3077That is a threat to our agents, whether it is surveillance of3078our operations from the south side of the border, flying3079contraband in small loads across the border.3080 We have seen what the cartels do to each other using small3081drones, dropping explosives, and then, of course, with AMO3082collision of risk with aircraft.3083 So, you know, legacy Customs radars along the border were3084historically meant to detect general aviation aircraft and3085ultra lights, and not a meter or less size targets operating3086extremely low or slow.3087 So we are catching up with that technology, deploying tools3088that can detect and mitigate this new emerging threat.3089 Senator Kim. Thank you. I yield back.3090 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Kim.3091 Senator Fischer.30923093 STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,3094 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA30953096 Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Budd.3097 Ms. Kelly, I think a key step in addressing the illicit3098drug threat is ensuring the existing programs within the3099government are working.3100 As you know, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas3101program known as HIDTA is a cornerstone of how we combat3102regional drug trafficking throughout the United States, and I3103have seen firsthand in my state of Nebraska, especially for law3104enforcement in rural areas with fewer local resources, how3105important this is.3106 For example, HIDTA is the primary resource for the winged3107task force that covers 11 of our Panhandle counties. Through3108HIDTA the task force has developed a uniquely cooperative3109investigative program which is helping western Nebraska law3110enforcement more actively manage narcotic and criminal3111investigations.3112 In your view, how would you evaluate HIDTA's effectiveness3113nationwide?3114 Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, Senator Fischer, for your3115support and for the question.3116 Nationwide we are extremely proud of the work that HIDTAs3117are doing. One of the things that we often tout is that for3118every dollar invested in the HIDTA program the rate of return3119is $63 which is a pretty phenomenal testament to the success of3120the program overall.3121 In 2023 HIDTAs collectively disrupted or dismantled more3122than 3,000 drug trafficking organizations or money laundering3123organizations, and collectively they seized more than 2,0003124metric tons of drugs, which I think also completes the3125narrative here.3126 Often when we are talking about drug interdiction we have a3127tendency to focus on the ports of entry and at the borders,3128which is critical to our overall success.3129 But we often like to point to the work of the HIDTAs3130interdicting drugs within the interior of the United States and3131I think the success rate there is phenomenal as well.3132 Senator Fischer. What challenges do you see or that you3133possibly anticipate in the future in meeting your goals that3134you have out there?3135 Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Senator, for asking that question.3136 We do face myriad challenges. In some communities the focus3137on drug trafficking is often subordinate to other threats,3138which is certainly a challenge in terms of making sure that3139there are state and local resources to put on HIDTA task3140forces.3141 I would also say fatigue is a huge element for us and I3142think it is why the focus on border security and interdiction3143at the ports of entry and at the borders is key because I think3144we are asking an awful lot of our state and local task force3145officers when they are being asked to interdict drugs that did3146evade the borders and when they are being asked to investigate3147the types of networks that are directly linked to cartels.3148 That is a huge challenge. It is a training challenge and it3149is a resource challenge for all of our task forces.3150 Senator Fischer. You know, you brought up the border and,3151obviously, that southern border is a major disruption zone. In3152years past we have struggled with all the different agencies3153out there using different intel, using different maps, whether3154it is DEA or FBI or CBP or the Department of Defense as well.3155 I think we have to have a shared map government wide, a3156shared map to identify the threats that we have. In your3157testimony you noted efforts by the Drug Enforcement3158Administration to map out this data comprehensively.3159 Can you speak about that further, please?3160 Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much for that question, Senator3161Fischer.3162 I agree. I think we all agree that a common operating3163picture is imperative, and a big challenge for us too is making3164sure that we are in a place where we can share information3165freely from the IC all the way down to our state and local3166partners.3167 This is where we really rely on the work of our Federal3168agencies to be the bridge so that, as you say, the map--the3169common operating picture can be not just conceived but then3170communicated from top to bottom.3171 Senator Fischer. And how do we achieve that?3172 Ms. Kelly. How we achieve that is a work in progress. It3173is--I will not lie, it is a challenge. It is a challenge both3174in terms of the security levels but it is also a challenge in3175terms of culture and promoting information sharing.3176 We are talking about people who are accustomed to building3177trust with each other as people to share information and3178sometimes when we are working cross-community like that we have3179to figure out not just one bridge but multiple ways to bridge3180that gap.3181 Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.3182 Thank you, Senator Budd.3183 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Fischer.3184 Senator Lujan.31853186 STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,3187 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO31883189 Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3190 Fentanyl is devastating communities across the country and3191stopping it at the border is critical. Advanced technology is3192one of our strongest tools in this fight.3193 Most fentanyl enters land--the United States through land3194ports of entry, which is why I have advocated for getting 1003195percent screening using nonintrusive inspection technology,3196NII.3197 Now, NII has helped CBP intercept massive amounts of3198fentanyl in cargo and vehicles, over 200,000 pounds in the last31993 years.3200 While I know it is outside the jurisdiction of this3201committee we need to further invest in these technologies to3202save lives, strengthen border security and ensure law3203enforcement has the tools they need to fight the fentanyl3204crisis.3205 Now, Mr. Miller, your testimony states that the Air and3206Maritime Operations, AMO, has integrated artificial3207intelligence into its systems to help detect illicit activity3208but that cartels appear to still be exploiting gaps in our3209enforcement capabilities to evade detection and find ways to3210move fentanyl through our waters.3211 AI has the potential to revolutionize interdiction by3212identifying smuggling patterns and improving real-time threat3213detection.3214 What is AMO doing to fully leverage AI and next-generation3215technology to stop traffickers before drugs reach our3216communities?3217 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.3218 Yes. So AI has changed the game when you are--for example,3219if you are--some of our radars when they are tracking targets3220in the maritime approaches some of the areas that are more3221remote just a mere presence in an area is suspicious.3222 Other areas such as the Florida straits, especially3223approaches going into Miami or Fort Lauderdale where you have3224such a high concentration of recreational vessels you need to3225have something else to assist in filtering nefarious from3226recreational, and that is where we use AI machine learning,3227building algorithms that can identify patterns to point out or3228at least lessen the clutter of the sheer volumes of targets on3229the radar.3230 Senator Lujan. And what partnerships exist between CBP and3231entities like DEA, FBI, and DOD to enhance intelligence sharing3232and leverage advanced detection to technologies already3233deployed?3234 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.3235 Yes. Like Assistant Director Kelly mentioned, I think--I do3236not think we have ever had a better common operational picture3237with the partners with the capabilities that we have.3238 We have our Air Marine Operations center, for example, in3239Riverside, California that can ingest all of the radar feeds or3240individual camera feeds or even pictures that agents are taking3241on their cameras, and then share that with a community where3242you literally have a single pane of glass of partners working3243together.3244 Senator Lujan. Just last year the commander for the U.S.3245Northern Command told another Senate committee that as many as32461,000 unmanned drones cross the U.S. southern border every3247month.3248 As I mentioned earlier, DEA data also indicates that most3249shipments of fentanyl come across the border through land ports3250of entry.3251 Yes or no, is the threat coming from the air and our land3252ports of entry?3253 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.3254 You know, as was mentioned earlier, we really do not know3255because we are catching such a small percentage. I will tell3256you that the vast majority of seizures are coming through the3257land ports. We have not seen fentanyl being smuggled in drone3258crossings along the border but that certainly does not mean3259that it is not happening.3260 Senator Lujan. Do you know what percentage of vehicles--3261passenger vehicles are screened that enter the United States3262through the southern border?3263 Mr. Miller. Senator, I do not. I would defer to my partners3264with the office field operations.3265 Senator Lujan. I appreciate that.3266 I can submit that a little bit later. I know that it is not3267100 percent and I do not even think it is 50 percent. Back in32682008-2009 it was, like, 5 percent or something, some3269ridiculously small number.3270 So if 90 percent of the fentanyl that the U.S. is3271interdicting at the southern border is being done in passenger3272vehicles entering the United States and we still randomly look3273at cars and we are still screening a very small percentage of3274them, again, 100 percent screening of inbound and outbound3275passenger vehicles and, I would argue, cargo.3276 And I would point to the water ports as well--that there is3277much more we could be doing with modernizing water ports of3278entry. I am reminded of a report that came out from the3279Department of Homeland Security, I believe, under both3280President Trump's first term and President Biden's term as well3281that suggested that there were precursor chemicals that were3282being intercepted--stolen--after they would get on land--off3283the ship, on land, and then they would be taken to the3284screening facility.3285 Between the water port and the screening facility they were3286getting stolen and then they were being driven to Mexico and3287they were coming back to the United States with fentanyl. How3288in the world is that happening?3289 Hundred percent screening. Stopping what is happening in3290these cargo containers I believe will make a big difference.3291 Now, I have several other questions. My time has already3292run out here. I will submit them into the record. I appreciate3293this important hearing and I certainly hope that there is some3294ways that we can get some of this adopted into good policy and3295get it funded and make sure you have the tools you need.3296 Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.3297 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator.3298 Senator Klobuchar.32993300 STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,3301 U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA33023303 Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, and thank you, all of you,3304for your work. I have been going back and forth between3305Agriculture and Judiciary but I wanted to be here at least for3306the tail end of this because we have had a lot of issues with3307fentanyl in our state.3308 I have worked a lot on the social media side of it with a3309number of other senators to try to cut down on that. As we3310know, a lot of kids especially are purchasing pills that way3311but we also stop--need to stop these illicit drugs and fake3312pills from entering our borders in the first place. I thank you3313for your work.3314 Director Kelly, your written testimony referenced the3315government's efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking through the3316mail including the 3,800 pounds of fentanyl seized by the3317Postal Inspection Service.3318 I lead bipartisan legislation known as the STOP Act 2.03319which builds on the original STOP Act that Senator Portman and3320I did that was enacted by President Trump in 2018.3321 Can I count on ONDCP's support as we work to build on3322legislation to crack down on fentanyl through the mail?3323 Ms. Kelly. Senator Klobuchar, thank you so much for the3324question.3325 We absolutely agree that stopping the flow of fentanyl3326through the U.S. mail is key and we rely heavily on our3327partners from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service to do that3328work.3329 And we would also add that fentanyl flow through express3330consignment carriers, private industry partners like UPS,3331FedEx, and DHL is equally key.3332 Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Also, I just want to note I3333know that Senator Blackburn asked you about the HIDTA program3334and it is very important in our state to our counter narcotics3335efforts. So I appreciate that.3336 I used to be a prosecutor and know--coordination how3337important it is. So I wanted to add to that.3338 Rear Admiral, I know that Coast Guard plays a major role3339here and we love the Coast Guard in Minnesota. We especially3340love ice breakers up on Lake Superior.3341 But could you talk about what you would need in terms of3342Coast Guard cutters to bring down the cocaine that we are3343getting in?3344 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.3345 Yes, ma'am. In short, we need more of them. We are3346currently building new offshore patrol cutters. We are3347finishing up the program for the fast response cutters. We are3348still running our older ships.3349 Ten years ago I was a commanding officer of a cutter that3350was almost 50 years old then and we are still operating it3351today.3352 We have trouble getting parts for those ships and when we3353have a scheduled maintenance period like a dry dock we do not3354even have the funding to be able to take that ship and make3355sure it can continue to operate.3356 I mentioned in my opener we had a ship with a hole in the3357side of it with water rushing in last week and that ship was3358built in the 1980s. So we are running these old ships----3359 Senator Klobuchar. You mean, like, when Cabbage Patch dolls3360and Walkmen were popular with everyone?3361 Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, ma'am. I remember that.3362 And yes, ma'am, those are the ships that we are using and3363we need new ships and new aircraft to replace those so we can3364get after today's threats.3365 Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.3366 Could you talk about how working cooperatively with our3367allies strengthens American law enforcement and national3368security interests?3369 I just always think I am not going to go out to some of the3370issues we are having right now with our allies but I think3371people do not realize sometimes the law enforcement3372coordination that goes on. Could you talk about that?3373 Rear Admiral Chamie. Yes, Senator.3374 I think people probably do not realize that right now we3375have a Dutch ship patrolling in the Caribbean with a U.S. Coast3376Guard law enforcement detachment on board and just in the last33772 weeks they have had two drug interdictions of cocaine, and we3378are able to prosecute those cases because we had a U.S. law3379enforcement detachment make that interdiction.3380 So the U.S. attorney will take the case. We can hold those3381people accountable but more importantly we can get the3382intelligence from that case, use that to feed the intel cycle,3383and then figure out how to dismantle the cartels because of it.3384 Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good. I am going to end a3385little early in deference to my colleagues.3386 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.3387 Senator Klobuchar. So thank you.3388 Senator Budd. Senator Rosen, you are recognized.33893390 STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,3391 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA33923393 Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair Budd, and thank you,3394Senator Klobuchar, for giving me a little bit more of your3395time.3396 Anyway, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. It3397is a really important hearing, and I want to talk about the3398impact of the current administration's actions on your ability3399to do your job.3400 So, Ms. Kelly, I do not need to tell you or any other3401members of this committee how vital the work that you do at3402HIDTA, or I am going to just say what we usually call it,3403HIDTA--how important that program is.3404 In Nevada, we have two High Intensity Drug Trafficking3405Areas, and according to the Southern Nevada Health District3406between 2022--2020 excuse me--and 2023 the number of fentanyl3407overdoses among residents of Clark County, our state's largest3408county, increased by 97 percent. That is why programs like3409HIDTA are needed now more than ever, and I have strongly3410supported their annual appropriation.3411 Unfortunately, according to several reports and lawsuits3412filed by state attorneys generals, both the OMB hiring freeze3413and the subsequent pausing and reallocation of resources have3414impacted funding for the HIDTA program.3415 So, Ms. Kelly, can you talk about how these actions have3416impacted the work that you do, your ability to stop the drugs3417from coming?3418 Are you currently receiving the necessary support and3419funding to carry out your crucial work?3420 Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Senator Rosen, for the question, and3421especially for your support for the HIDTA program. We deeply3422appreciate it.3423 Happily for us, the funding freeze that our grant program3424was subject to was fairly short lived. It was rescinded within3425about 4 hours. So we were in a position that we had to pause3426but it was a very brief pause and we are happy that the HIDTAs3427are back and running as usual.3428 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move on.3429 I know Senator Klobuchar talked a little bit about3430international cooperation--of course, Minnesota on the Canadian3431border there.3432 But I want to talk about SOUTHCOM because I sit on Armed3433Services Committee and in our hearing with SOUTHCOM Commander3434Richardson the general spoke about our Armed Forces' success in3435detecting and seizing maritime drug shipments, including the3436importance of working with partner nations to increase our drug3437seizures.3438 So, Admiral Chamie, how can we work together and leverage3439our international partners, not just with Canada, but to3440improve the detection of precursor chemicals and allowing us to3441shift our interdiction efforts earlier in the fentanyl3442production process? How can we best equip the Coast Guard to do3443that?3444 Rear Admiral Chamie. Good afternoon, Senator.3445 So with SOUTHCOM they have a component command in Florida3446and Key West called the Joint Interagency Task Force South and3447it performs the DOD's detection and monitoring function.3448 Basically, helps get the intel and tells Coast Guard and3449other allied partners where we should be patrolling and where3450we can focus.3451 Under the Indo-Pacific region the INDOPACOM has a component3452for the Joint Interagency Task Force West. They do similar3453functions over there to focus on the larger ships that might be3454bringing fentanyl precursors into the United States and in fact3455just not too long ago they worked and had an interdiction of a3456commercial vessel bringing precursors--fentanyl precursors--3457into Mexico and they were able to work with Mexico to seize3458those precursors when they entered port.3459 Those type of international relationships and working with3460both components for INDOPACOM and SOUTHCOM are critical to us.3461 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate your work there.3462 In the last minute or so I have left I want to talk a3463little bit about our borders and the nonintrusive scanners that3464we can use because last year during a hearing on DHS Fiscal3465Year 2025 budget it was mentioned how critical it was for3466funding to be included for the installation of the new3467nonintrusive scanner technologies like the low energy portal,3468LEP, scanning systems that stop the flow of fentanyl into the3469United States through land ports of entries, which is, of3470course, I think some of the most common ways that fentanyl are3471smuggled across the border into our country.3472 It was also discussed at the time that a number of high-3473tech scanners that have been provided to CBP officers to3474identify and stop fentanyl were sitting unused in warehouses.3475 So, Mr. Miller, are similar scanners being used at maritime3476ports of entry? If so, are they operational? If not, is there a3477way for us to adapt this technology and use every tool in the3478toolbox to stop these deadly drugs from coming in, and tell us3479what you might need, please.3480 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator.3481 I would defer that to the experts that use that technology3482in Customs and Border Protection and the Office of Field3483Operations.3484 I will tell you that is--that nonintrusive inspection3485technology is part of the multi-layered enforcement strategy at3486our borders and to include our ports.3487 The X-ray, gamma ray, and other kind of sensing3488technologies is invaluable in discovering smuggled items. They3489also have mobile systems as well that they will bring along to3490some of the MSSEs that we participate and provide security with3491as well--Super Bowls, events in the NCR, et cetera.3492 Senator Rosen. Thank you.3493 I think it is really important that we use all of these,3494and then I would just want to add that when we do think about3495adding these new technologies we need to add improved Wi-Fi,3496different kinds of space. Make sure that all the surrounding3497infrastructure is there for these capabilities.3498 So thank you for allowing me to go over my time, Senator.3499 Senator Budd. Thank you, Senator Rosen.3500 And, again, I thank each of you all as part of the panel3501today.3502 You know, Mr. Miller in our dialog earlier we used acronyms3503like AMO and incidents, and you referred to Mike having lost3504his life. So, again, we are thankful for him, for his service,3505and we are thankful to his family as well.3506 This is a dangerous business you all are in and we are3507grateful for each and every one of you.3508 Senators will have until close of business on Wednesday,3509March 5 to submit questions for the record. The witnesses will3510have until the end of the day on Wednesday, March 19 to respond3511to those questions.3512 This concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands3513adjourned.3514 [Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]35153516 A P P E N D I X35173518 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to3519 Shannon Kelly3520 Question 1. As the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, you are3521responsible for coordinating interagency efforts to interdict illicit3522drugs from entering the United States. What are some of the ways you3523work with the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and3524other ``boots on the ground'' enforcement agencies to combat illicit3525drug trafficking?3526 Answer. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) U.S.3527Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) plays a crucial role in synchronizing3528efforts among agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs3529and Border Protection (CBP) to combat illicit drug trafficking. The3530USIC's collaborative efforts include the following:35313532 Expert Policy Advisor for the President: As designated by3533 the Director of Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),3534 the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) advises the White3535 House on executive policy that facilitates communication and3536 cooperation among Federal agencies involved in drug3537 interdiction, including the Coast Guard and CBP. This ensures3538 that resources and intelligence are shared effectively to3539 maximize both interdictions and criminal investigations that3540 degrade drug trafficking organizations.35413542 Strategic Planning: The USIC authors applicable portions of3543 the National Drug Control Strategy; national border strategies3544 for the Southwest, Northern, and Caribbean Borders; and the3545 National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). These3546 documents guide the operational activities of the interdiction3547 community, including the Coast Guard and CBP.35483549 Interagency Coordination: Working within the framework of3550 The Interdiction Committee (TIC), the U.S. Interdiction3551 Coordinator (USIC) oversees government-wide efforts to3552 integrate intelligence, detection, monitoring, and law3553 enforcement to maximize the impact of U.S. and partner3554 interdiction efforts. Consisting of the senior executive3555 leadership from its 28 member organizations, The Interdiction3556 Committee (TIC) serves as an empowered and collaborative3557 interagency problem-solving body that resolves issues related3558 to the coordination, oversight, and integration of3559 international, border, and domestic drug interdiction efforts.35603561 Budget oversight: The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)3562 helps align the drug enforcement agencies' efforts with overall3563 national interdiction priorities. The U.S. Interdiction3564 Coordinator (USIC) reviews the National Drug Control Budget for3565 19 Federal departments and agencies to ensure that they have3566 the necessary resources and support to carry out their3567 interdiction functions efficiently and effectively, and in3568 accordance with the President's priorities. When needed, the3569 U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) works to help resolve3570 issues that arise during the coordination of interdiction3571 efforts.35723573 Question 2. What is the impact of the interagency working together3574to address drug trafficking? What results are we seeing from this3575``whole-of-government'' approach?3576 Answer. The ``whole-of-government'' approach to combating drug3577trafficking has a significant impact on drug supply. This collaborative3578approach among federal, state, local, Tribal, territorial, and3579international partners create a multi-layered defense against drug3580trafficking, addressing it from multiple angles. Data regarding3581seizures of drugs like fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine highlight3582the results of these interagency efforts. Beyond drug interdiction, the3583investigative successes of task forces that integrate federal, state,3584local, Tribal and territorial law enforcement are key to dismantling3585criminal networks that produce and traffic illegal drugs. While3586progress is being made, drug production and trafficking remain a3587complex and evolving challenge as new drug types and smuggling methods3588continuously evolve. Regular adaptation and uninterrupted collaboration3589are essential to maintaining and improving the effectiveness of the3590whole-of-government approach. Impacts and results of the whole of3591government approach include the following:35923593 Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Interagency collaboration3594 facilitates the pooling of intelligence from various sources,3595 leading to a more comprehensive understanding of drug3596 trafficking networks. This allows for more targeted and3597 effective interdiction efforts. Information sharing is vital at3598 all levels of interagency cooperation, with two examples being3599 the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)3600 Special Operations Division, and the High Intensity Drug3601 Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) Investigative Support Centers.36023603 Increased Interdiction Effectiveness: By coordinating3604 resources and operations, agencies like the Coast Guard, CBP,3605 DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Homeland3606 Security Investigations (HSI) can disrupt drug trafficking at3607 multiple points, from source to distribution. This results in3608 significant seizures of illicit drugs. An example of this is3609 the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which3610 synthesizes intelligence and operational assets to maximize the3611 ability to interdict United States-bound drugs in international3612 waters.36133614 Dismantling Criminal Networks: Task forces like the3615 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and HIDTA3616 initiatives focus on dismantling entire drug trafficking3617 organizations (DTOs), rather than just seizing individual drug3618 shipments. This has a more long-term impact on reducing the3619 flow of drugs.36203621 Financial Disruption: Agencies like the Treasury Department3622 work to disrupt the financial networks that support drug3623 trafficking, targeting money laundering, and other financial3624 crimes.36253626 Improved International Cooperation: Interagency3627 collaboration extends to international partnerships, allowing3628 for coordinated efforts to combat drug trafficking across3629 borders.36303631 Question 3. A critical aspect of the High Intensity Drug3632Trafficking Areas Program is assistance to federal, state, local, and3633tribal law enforcement entities. What work is the HIDTA program doing3634in the West Texas, South Texas, Houston and Texoma HIDTAs to disrupt3635the market for illegal drugs?3636 Answer. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Programs3637in West Texas, South Texas, Houston, and Texoma play a critical role in3638disrupting the illegal drug market by leveraging multi-agency task3639forces, intelligence-driven operations, and robust information sharing.3640Each High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) tailors its approach3641to regional threats, focusing on interdiction, financial disruption,3642training, and overdose prevention to dismantle DTOs and disrupt the3643market for illicit drugs. All of these regional High Intensity Drug3644Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) HIDTAs employ data-driven investigations,3645enforcement, and interagency collaboration to combat drug trafficking,3646removing billions of dollars in illegal drugs and assets from criminal3647organizations.3648 West Texas HIDTA: West Texas HIDTA encompasses 520 miles of the3649United States' border with Mexico and combats drug trafficking along3650major smuggling corridors. It collaborates with 13 federal, four state,365115 local, and one Tribal agency to target DTOs transporting fentanyl,3652methamphetamine, and cocaine into, and throughout the United States.3653Examples of success include the following:\1\3654---------------------------------------------------------------------------3655 \1\ Accomplishments for each of the HIDTAs are from program year36562023, the most complete dataset currently available. Data for program3657year 2024 will be available later this Spring.36583659 disrupted/dismantled 50 drug trafficking/money laundering3660---------------------------------------------------------------------------3661 organizations, 29 of which were international;36623663 seized 74 kilograms of fentanyl, 1,717 kilograms of3664 methamphetamine, and 971 kilograms of cocaine; and36653666 seized cash and other assets valued at $2.3 million.36673668 South Texas HIDTA: South Texas HIDTA addresses cross-border3669smuggling networks, leveraging 244 agency partnerships to combat DTOs3670and money laundering organizations (MLOs). It also leverages3671intelligence sharing, local prevention efforts, and training to aid3672collaboration and address the needs of partner agencies and local3673communities. Examples of success include the following:36743675 disrupted/dismantled 108 drug trafficking/money laundering3676 organizations, 64 of which were international;36773678 seized 82 kilograms of fentanyl, 7,936.8 kilograms of3679 methamphetamine, and 5,306.2 kilograms of cocaine; and36803681 seized cash and other assets valued at $30.9 million.36823683 Houston HIDTA: Situated in a national trafficking hub, the Houston3684HIDTA targets DTOs involved in drug distribution, weapons trafficking,3685and gang-related violence. The HIDTA supports a range of enforcement3686initiatives, including the HIDTA License Plate Reader (LPR) Platform.3687Examples of success include the following:36883689 disrupted/dismantled 127 drug trafficking/money laundering3690 organizations, 60 of which were international;36913692 seized 86.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 8,512 kilograms of3693 methamphetamine, and 2,519 kilograms of cocaine; and36943695 seized cash and other assets valued at $39.5 million.36963697 Texoma HIDTA: Texoma HIDTA spans North Texas and Oklahoma,3698combating DTOs and MLOs through 28 task forces and financial crime3699investigations. The HIDTA plays a key role in inland seizures, overdose3700reductions, and training. Examples of success include the following:37013702 disrupted/dismantled 74 drug trafficking/money laundering3703 organizations, 21 of which were international;37043705 seized 147.1 kilograms of fentanyl, 2,221.5 kilograms of3706 methamphetamine, and 432.5 kilograms of cocaine; and37073708 seized cash and other assets valued at $16.2 million.3709 ______37103711 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to3712 Shannon Kelly3713 Question 1. Alaska's lack of infrastructure and remote communities3714make interdiction efforts more challenging. What specific steps is3715HIDTA taking to disrupt drug trafficking in isolated areas where law3716enforcement presence is limited?3717 Answer. The Alaska HIDTA is addressing the state's remote geography3718and limited infrastructure by employing intelligence-driven operations,3719targeted interdiction, and enhanced coordination. Through these3720efforts, HIDTA is effectively disrupting DTOs despite Alaska's3721logistical challenges, reducing drug flow into the state's most3722vulnerable areas. Key initiatives include the following:37233724 Targeted Task Forces in Remote Areas: HIDTA supports3725 multiple task forces, including Southeast Alaska Cities Against3726 Drugs Task Force (SEACAD) in Juneau, Fairbanks Area-wide3727 Narcotics Task Force (FANT) in Fairbanks, and Southcentral3728 Area-wide Narcotics Task Force (SCAN) covering Anchorage,3729 Wasilla, Kenai, and Kodiak, which focus on trafficking routes3730 in isolated regions.37313732 Intelligence-Driven Enforcement: The Alaska HIDTA3733 Intelligence Support Center (ISC), co-located with the state's3734 fusion center, provides real-time analysis and deconfliction,3735 allowing law enforcement to effectively track and dismantle3736 DTOs, even in remote areas.37373738 Air and Marine Interdiction: HIDTA partners with Federal and3739 local agencies to monitor trafficking via air travel and marine3740 routes, increasing surveillance and investigations at the Ted3741 Stevens Anchorage International Airport and addressing3742 vulnerabilities in the Alaska Marine Highway System (to include3743 maritime traffic).37443745 Disrupting Financial Networks: Given Alaska's high drug3746 prices, DTOs profit significantly from trafficking. HIDTA3747 targets their money laundering operations to disrupt financial3748 incentives.37493750 Fentanyl-Specific Efforts: With fentanyl as Alaska's primary3751 drug threat, HIDTA-supported task forces seized 18 kilograms of3752 fentanyl and nearly 600,000 fentanyl pills in 2023, focusing on3753 stopping synthetic opioids from reaching rural areas.37543755 Local Law Enforcement Support: HIDTA funds training and3756 intelligence-sharing for law enforcement in isolated3757 communities, strengthening their ability to detect and3758 intercept illicit shipments.37593760 Question 2. What more needs to be done to help combat this issue?3761Specifically, how can HIDTA better bring together local law enforcement3762agencies and non-governmental organizations to deter, detect, and3763interdict the movement of illegal narcotics in Alaska through the air3764and postal systems?3765 Answer. The Alaska HIDTA serves as a primary coordinator of3766federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies3767in the state of Alaska to deter, detect, and interdict illicit3768narcotics. Because interstate and local drug trafficking organizations3769(DTOs) primarily transport illicit drugs into the region through3770parcels and commercial air carriers, the HIDTA has targeted3771initiatives, such as Southcentral Areawide Narcotics (SCAN) Task Force,3772to conduct passenger and parcel interdiction operations at the Ted3773Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The Alaska HIDTA also ensures3774information is shared across all levels of law enforcement through its3775multiagency Investigative Support Center (ISC). The HIDTA has3776identified a need for continued monitoring and intelligence gather to3777identify connections between DTOs operating in the region and3778international criminal organizations, including Mexican cartels. This3779will require continuing close collaboration with law enforcement3780partners at all levels in Alaska and the contiguous United States as3781well as ensuring Federal partners, such as the U.S. Postal Inspection3782Service, are equipped with the necessary investigative tools to address3783the unique challenges related to illicit smuggling via international3784and domestic parcels.3785 ______37863787Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to37883789 Shannon Kelly3790 Question 1. Ms. Kelly, you mentioned in your opening statement that3791while we are facing the worst narcotics crisis in our history there is3792a silver lining in the C-D-C's latest data showing a provisional3793decrease of 23.7 percent in overdose deaths from September 2023 to3794September 2024. What detection and seizure factors do you think are3795responsible for this positive development?3796 Answer. The United States protects its borders through a3797combination of intelligence, law enforcement, technology, and3798infrastructure. This multi-layered system includes diplomatic work with3799countries that produce or act as transshipment points for illegal3800drugs, detection of traffickers approaching the borders, infrastructure3801along the borders and at ports of entry, and through a robust system of3802cooperating law enforcement agencies within the United States. All of3803this is underpinned by intelligence capabilities and professionals who3804support all phases of border protection. Key to our investment is the3805United States' incredible workforce of selfless men and women who put3806their lives on the line to keep America safe. The United States'3807interdiction forces reduce the drug supply, having multiple impacts to3808the country's citizens. First, drug interdiction removes dangerous3809drugs from the supply chain, preventing countless lethal doses of these3810drugs from being available for Americans to use. Moreover,3811interdictions provide the basis of investigations of dangerous criminal3812gangs and international drug producers, allowing the United States to3813degrade and eliminate the networks that threaten the general public.3814 At the border, CBP employs a layered approach that includes3815sophisticated targeting based on advance cargo and traveler data,3816canine units, x-ray and other detection devices, including frontline3817officers and agents. ONDCP defers to CBP on the specifics of their3818programs, on non-invasive or intrusive scanners at ports of entry, to3819increase scanning capabilities. CBP collaborates with industry and3820other government components on enhanced technologies and is continually3821scouting new technologies based on the capability gaps identified in3822the respective environments.3823 In addition, within the United States, there are more than 18,0003824police departments that enforce infractions of drug laws. Programs such3825as HIDTA and OCDETF bring these entities together to work across3826jurisdictions so law enforcement can organize their efforts to degrade3827and destroy the most dangerous criminal networks.38283829 Question 2. Ms. Kelly, technology plays a major role in our efforts3830to effectively intercept narcotics. You mentioned that AI could be a3831useful tool going forward. Is the Office of National Drug Control3832Policy using AI already or is it actively looking into ways to use AI?3833 Answer. Development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools is3834imperative to overcome the challenges in disrupting the supply chain3835and interdiction of narcotics like fentanyl and other synthetic3836opioids. Not only will AI assist our laboratories and scientists in3837predicting the next chemical formulations of synthetics, which3838facilitates awareness of precursor chemicals to watch out for, it will3839significantly advance targeting analytics for high-risk cargo and3840travelers and create efficiencies in supply chains by reducing3841unnecessary inspections. While ONDCP defers to CBP on the specifics of3842their program, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, CBP initiated efforts to test3843AI with non-intrusive inspections production data to determine its3844effectiveness with NII image adjudication at the border, and testing of3845the AI algorithms is on-going.3846 Across CBP the operational use of AI is transforming the agency3847into a data-driven organization. CBP recognizes the importance of3848leveraging cutting-edge technologies, such as AI and Machine Learning3849(ML) to impact multiple mission areas, including the following:38503851 combing through data to find anomalies/items of interest in3852 all data types;38533854 creating efficiencies and reducing redundancies in multiple3855 work areas; and38563857 automating routine tasks performed by our personnel which3858 allows them to focus their critical thinking skills on the3859 important enforcement aspects of our mission.38603861 Currently CBP's Office of Information and Technology (OIT) has3862implemented the enterprise AI Machine Learning Center of Excellence to3863lead strategic transformation, tactical mission operations excellence3864and innovation with data for CBP's daily mission in multiple use cases,3865while seeking to establish commensurate governance and ethical3866oversight approaches in this new, powerful technology.3867 Another example of AI implementation is the HSI Innovation Lab,3868which combines innovative technology, agile development, and industry3869leading design principles to reimagine HSI's current process and3870enhance investigative capabilities across the agency. One such3871capability developed by the Innovation Lab is the Repository of3872Analytics in a Virtualized Environment (RAVEN). RAVEN is a cloud-based3873tool that facilitates large, complex analytical projects to support3874HSI's mission including counter-TCO and counterdrug investigations. At3875its core, RAVEN enables HSI to analyze trends and isolate criminal3876patterns. HSI's use of AI through the RAVEN platform significantly3877enhances its ability to process, analyze, and act on vast amounts of3878data, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its3879criminal investigations, including those targeting narcotics3880trafficking.3881 ______38823883 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to3884 Rear Adm. Adam Chamie3885 Question 1. Senators Cantwell, Sullivan, Baldwin, and I worked hard3886on the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025, which would fix the gaps3887in the Coast Guard's authority to prosecute smugglers using remotely3888operated drug subs like the one we had in the hearing room. Please3889provide a summary view, from the Coast Guard's perspective, of the3890importance of the referenced 2025 CGAA provision for degrading3891transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and for holding drug3892smugglers accountable?3893 Answer. This provision would make an important change to enable the3894prosecution of smugglers attempting to smuggle drugs on vessels subject3895to United States jurisdiction regardless of whether the vessels are3896manned. This change supports the increased targeting of transnational3897criminal organizations and their evolving employment of new3898technologies to circumvent existing laws and is critical to the Coast3899Guard's ability to control the U.S. borders and maritime approaches and3900enforcing Federal laws.39013902 Question 2. Is there anything else that is limiting your ability to3903catch and prosecute drug smuggling criminals?3904 Answer. The Coast Guard thanks the Committee for its support and3905inclusion of section 241 ``Controlled Substances Onboard Vessels'' in3906the Senate's ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025.'' The Coast Guard3907will continue to evaluate additional authorities to enhance its drug3908interdiction mission and will provide any such proposals as part of its3909annual authorization request.39103911 Question 3. Maritime drug trafficking in the Middle East, including3912drugs trafficked on fishing dhows, has been used to finance Iran's3913malign activities. If the Coast Guard discovers illegal narcotics3914aboard a vessel in this region, what happens to the narcotics and the3915crew attempting to traffic them?3916 Answer. The Coast Guard conducts maritime operations across the3917Middle East for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command under Department of3918Defense Title 10 authorities. When illegal narcotics are discovered by3919Coast Guard units in this region, the drugs are seized and destroyed at3920sea. The crew attempting to traffic these drugs are typically released.3921Due to the lack of bilateral agreements with the claimed Flag state or3922lack of communication with certain nations, establishing jurisdiction3923over the people and vessels require lengthy diplomatic engagement that3924would hinder other U.S. Department of Defense-directed operations.39253926 Question 4. Is it fair to say these would-be drug traffickers face3927no other punishment than having their drugs seized?3928 Answer. There have been instances when drug traffickers in this3929region have been detained by the Coast Guard for further transfer to3930U.S. authorities ashore. However, it is accurate to state that3931traffickers encountered in this region generally do not face punishment3932or prosecution from the United States other than the seizure of their3933illicit cargo.39343935 Question 5. The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Congressional3936Justification states failure to achieve counterdrug performance3937measures was due in part to the Coast Guard's major cutters, patrol3938boats, and aircraft providing ``primary support to Migrant Interdiction3939Operations (MIO),'' rather than the counterdrug (CD) mission. How did3940the increase in illegal immigration in the last few years impact your3941ability to stop the drug flows elsewhere?3942 Answer. Coast Guard surface asset reassignment to the alien3943interdiction mission in District Seven to support Operation Vigilant3944Sentry detracted 133 major cutter days from Joint Interagency Task3945Force South during Fiscal Year 2024. In Fiscal Year 2023, Coast Guard3946surface asset and maritime patrol aircraft reassignment to Operation3947Vigilant Sentry detracted 432 major cutter days, 772 patrol boat days,3948and 404 maritime patrol aircraft hours from Joint Interagency Task3949Force South.39503951 Question 6. In 2024, the Coast Guard interdicted over 300 thousand3952pounds of cocaine and other controlled substances, taking over 33953billion dollars' worth of drugs off our streets. What are the Coast3954Guard's drug interdiction results so far in 2025, and how does that3955pace compare to historical interdiction rates?3956 Answer. As of March 12, 2025, the Coast Guard has removed 114.53957metric tons of cocaine. The Coast Guard is on pace to remove3958approximately 150 metric tons of cocaine, pending resource availability3959and competing mission demands for the remainder of the Fiscal Year.3960While the Coast Guard's estimate is significantly higher than cocaine3961removals in Fiscal Year 2023 and Fiscal Year 2024, 150 metric tons of3962cocaine removed would be considered an average year when comparing3963historical drug interdiction rates over the last decade.39643965 Question 7. President Trump has issued several Executive Orders3966related to securing our borders, taking on cartels, and protecting the3967American people. What actions has the Coast Guard taken in response to3968President Trump's directives?3969 Answer. In response to President Trump's Executive Orders, the3970Coast Guard took immediate action to increase its presence along the3971southern border, where the President declared a national emergency, to3972bolster its ability to control, secure, and defend the U.S. border and3973its maritime approaches. Working in close coordination with the U.S.3974Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Defense,3975Coast Guard assets and law enforcement personnel are conducting regular3976patrols of the U.S. border and maritime approaches, focusing on the3977interdiction of illegal aliens and illicit narcotics attempting to be3978smuggled into the U.S. via the maritime domain. Additionally, the Coast3979Guard swiftly repatriates illegal aliens interdicted at sea to their3980country of origin and provides dedicated aircraft to assist other3981Departments and components in the removal of aliens who have entered or3982remained in the U.S. in violation of Federal law.3983 ______39843985 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to3986 Rear Adm. Adam Chamie3987 Question 1. The Coast Guard has suffered from a continuous lack of3988resources for infrastructure and equipment sustainment and3989modernization. This forces the Coast Guard to make investment trades3990that fail to provide the service adequate capabilities to conduct its3991critical drug interdiction missions. The Coast Guard had to reduce the3992safe operational limit of the MH-60 helicopter fleet, resulting in the3993grounding of eight of its helicopters; the service intends to divest3994its C-27J airplanes due to structural fatigue; and its MH-65 helicopter3995fleet is now more than 40 years old, well beyond its intended3996operational life.3997 With the Coast Guard's drug interdiction mission becoming ever more3998critical and readiness declines in both the fixed-wing and rotary-wing3999aviation fleets, does the Coast Guard have the aviation assets required4000to fulfill its drug interdiction missions?4001 Answer. The Coast Guard does not have the requisite aviation assets4002to fulfill the drug and alien migrant interdiction mission and needs4003congressional support for continued recapitalization of both the MH-604004and the HC-130 fleets. The Service requires an increase in the number4005and availability of these multi-mission air assets to execute4006counterdrug operations more effectively while also meeting other4007mission demands. More assets in the Transit Zone would allow the4008Service to target and interdict more traffickers.40094010 Question 2. Given the decades old, and depleted rotary-wing fleet4011shortages, and an unscheduled reduction in fixed-wing assets, how does4012the Coast Guard plan to recapitalize its aviation fleets to meet the4013critical needs of its missions?4014 Answer. With the unprecedented support of the President and the4015continued support of this Committee, the Coast Guard will accelerate4016aviation recapitalization with annual appropriations and any resources4017provided through reconciliation. This includes extending the service4018life of the existing MH-60 fleet, growing both our rotary and fixed4019wing fleets, and investing in new capabilities like Unmanned Aerial4020Systems.40214022 Question 3. Congress has continually highlighted the Coast Guard4023needs a comprehensive strategy to address aviation fleet challenges and4024recapitalization. To that end, Congress required a GAO study and a4025follow-on Coast Guard aviation strategy in the FY23 Coast Guard4026reauthorization.4027 When should we expect to see a Coast Guard aviation strategy?4028 Answer. As required by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022,4029the Service is planning to brief Congress in April 2025.4030 ______40314032Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to40334034 Rear Adm. Adam Chamie4035 Question 1. Stopping drugs while they are moving in bulk is much4036easier than intercepting them at or between ports of entry. How do you4037work with partners to stop drugs while they are bound for the United4038States in vessels?4039 Answer. The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law4040enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas; we share the4041lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with U.S. Customs4042and Border Protection. A global threat such as illicit narcotics4043trafficking requires the collaboration of a network of like-minded4044partners. The Coast Guard works closely with domestic and international4045partners to detect, interdict, and disrupt drug shipments before they4046reach the U.S. As a key member of the Joint Interagency Task Force4047South, the Coast Guard works in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement4048Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of4049Defense, and other Federal agencies to share intelligence, monitor drug4050trafficking routes, and coordinate interdictions. The Coast Guard also4051deploys our Tactical Law Enforcement Teams to U.S. Navy and allied4052naval forces, including the UK Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and4053Dutch Navy, to conduct boardings from these naval forces onto suspected4054drug smuggling vessels. The Coast Guard coordinates with the Department4055of Justice and foreign legal authorities to prosecute criminals and4056dismantle transnational drug networks. As of March 12, 2025, the Coast4057Guard has removed 114.4 metric tons of cocaine in Fiscal Year 2025 and4058has supported the efforts of our domestic and international partners,4059resulting in the removal of much more. We are proud to lead maritime4060counterdrug efforts around the world and with Congressional support to4061accelerate the acquisition of new capabilities we will do so even more4062effectively.40634064 Question 2. Are there additional tools we could give you so that4065operations in the source and transit zones would be more effective?4066 Answer. The best way to bolster the Coast Guard's counter-drug4067capacity is to support the growth of our Service and our ongoing fleet4068recapitalization and modernization efforts. This includes increasing4069our military workforce by at least 15,000 members, recapitalizing our4070surface and aviation assets, increasing unmanned systems capabilities,4071and investing in advanced sensors and technologies that provide our4072boarding teams with a tactical edge against our adversaries.4073 ______40744075 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to4076 Jonathan Miller4077 Question 1. (U) In the Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of40782022, I secured a Tactical Maritime Surveillance System at Coast Guard4079Station South Padre Island. During my last visit to South Padre Island,4080I saw firsthand how this tool is being used to help secure our borders.4081How is CBP employing Tactical Maritime Surveillance Systems to combat4082drug runners, fish poachers, and human traffickers?4083 Answer. (FOUO//LES) The Tactical Maritime Surveillance System,4084callsign ``Argos,'' is an aerostat-borne surveillance system deployed4085at priority U.S. maritime border locations where high numbers of drug4086runners, fish poachers, and migrant smugglers (some of whom may be4087human traffickers) are observed. While the Argos system can carry a4088variety of sensors, the Texas site, specifically, incorporates a4089maritime surface search radar, a long-range day-night camera, and an4090encrypted Automatic Identification System receiver. The radar can4091detect typical illicit vessels at ranges of 50-60 nautical miles and4092the camera provides visual identification out to 25 miles.4093 (FOUO//LES) U.S Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine4094Operations, sends all Argos sensor information from the aerostat to the4095Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California. Two major4096activities occur at the Air and Marine Operations Center: 1) Detection4097Enforcement Officers ``sort'' through the identified maritime and land-4098based traffic in real-time, identify suspicious or illicit activity4099underway, alert local Federal partners of the activity, and provide4100updated target information (location, speed, heading, etc.) to4101responding law enforcement units, as requested; and 2) all Argos sensor4102information is processed and transported through the Minotaur mission4103management system, where the information is merged and correlated with4104other local domain awareness feeds and returned to U.S. Customs and4105Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard Minotaur users, providing an4106unprecedented operational display of nearly all law enforcement assets4107and suspect threats in the region. This information is shared with all4108designated Federal command and control centers. As illicit activities4109and actors change in the region, Air and Marine Operations intends to4110modify technologies on the Argos platform to combat future threats.41114112 Question 2. (U) CBP and the Coast Guard work closely to detect and4113interdict drug trafficking in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and the4114Caribbean. What role do CBP maritime patrol aircraft play in those4115counter-drug missions, and how do these aviation assets increase the4116Coast Guard's ability to detect and interdict vessels?4117 Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection maritime4118patrol aircraft provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance4119capabilities that detect, track, and identify targets of interest4120throughout the maritime environment. Targets of interest range from go-4121fast vessels to self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to aircraft.4122U.S. Customs and Border Protection's maritime patrol aircraft are4123equipped with technologically advanced sensors operated by highly4124trained and experienced agents and officers. The role of U.S. Customs4125and Border Protection's maritime patrol aircraft's in drug interdiction4126operations with our Coast Guard partners is to provide them with4127intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and real4128time information to increase the Coast Guard's domain awareness while4129on patrol so that their law enforcement teams can interdict vessels4130suspected of trafficking drugs and increase the situational awareness4131of the law enforcement teams during interdiction events.41324133 Question 3. (U) The cartels use a wide range of methods to smuggle4134illicit drugs into the United States, such as drug submarines. What4135tactics is CBP AMO using to address these new threat vectors for drug4136smuggling?4137 Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and4138Marine Operations manned and unmanned aircraft systems maritime patrol4139aircraft utilize different patrol patterns and specific sensor settings4140to maximize the detection of semi-submersible and surface narcotics-4141trafficking vessels. U.S. Customs and Border Protection manned and4142unmanned assets have sensor upgrades planned that will improve4143detection of maritime targets. Additionally, the future integration of4144proliferated low-earth orbit satellite connectivity will allow for4145greater unmanned aircraft systems maritime patrol area as well as4146improved information sharing capabilities in critical sections of the4147Eastern Pacific Ocean transit zone that are not covered by traditional4148geostationary satellite communications networks. This change has the4149potential to significantly increase the range and flexibility of U.S.4150Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Coast Guard interdiction assets.4151 ______41524153 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to4154 Jonathan Miller4155 Question 1. (U) To conduct counter-drug operations and border4156patrol missions, CBP currently flies a fleet of around 100 helicopters4157as part of its Light Enforcement Platform (LEP) program. Over the past4158eight years, CBP has replaced about a third of the aging LEP fleet with4159new, modern, and technologically enhanced helicopters, however, the4160replacement progress has not come quickly enough for the scale of the4161border crisis and CBP's needs.4162 Please outline how continuing this investment is critical to CBP's4163drug interdiction mission.4164 Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and4165Marine Operations relies on its Light Enforcement Platform as its4166primary workhorse in its mission to secure the Homeland while executing4167counter-drug operations across the United States and border enforcement4168missions on our borders with Canada and Mexico. As such, these aircraft4169are based at nearly every Air and Marine Operations facility and over4170half of Air and Marine Operation's 95,000 annual flight hours are flown4171by crews in the Light Enforcement Platform which is comprised of 914172aircraft with 5 variants of the Airbus Helicopters ASTAR model. The4173aging portion of this platform in our fleet has been hampering the full4174potential of Air and Marine Operations to more effectively execute4175missions, as compared to a revitalized fleet comprised with newer more4176technologically advanced platforms by a very large margin. Over two-4177thirds of the Light Enforcement Platform fleet has become outmoded both4178in mission technologies and in reliability. Air and Marine Operations4179has had to remove six Light Enforcement Platform aircraft from service4180over the last Fiscal Year due to component availability and increased4181cost of parts. The oldest platforms have accumulated high flight times4182and, due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance requirements, have4183limited operational availability (e.g., the B2 model (oldest) is4184operationally functional 40 percent of the time,\1\ the B3 model (next4185oldest) is operationally functional 52 percent of the time,\2\ and the41862B1 and B3E models are is operationally functional 54 percent of the4187time.\3\) This is in direct contrast to the new H125 model delivering4188about 74 percent readiness rates.\4\ Because of their chronic4189unavailability, these aging platforms, some of which are the oldest in4190operation worldwide, do not meet the needs or expectations of our4191Nation and proves the need for a long-overdue Light Enforcement4192Platform fleet revitalization.4193---------------------------------------------------------------------------4194 \1\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 B2 in Fiscal Year41952023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 20254196 \2\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 B3 in Fiscal Year41972023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 20254198 \3\ Average of Material Availability for AS350 2B1 and B3E in4199Fiscal Year 2023, Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 20254200 \4\ Average of Material Availability for H125 in Fiscal Year 2023,4201Fiscal Year 2024, and Fiscal Year 202542024203 Question 1a. (U) Given the mission requirements, will CBP budget4204for a faster fleet replacement in its FY26 budget and beyond?4205 Answer. (FOUO//LES) The Fiscal Year 2024 Consolidated4206Appropriations Act funded three Light Enforcement Platform aircraft,4207while the Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget requested two and a4208flight training device. Fiscal constraints limit U.S. Customs and4209Border Protection's ability to replace these aircraft at a faster rate4210due to competing operational requirements.4211 ______42124213Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to42144215 Jonathan Miller4216 Question 1. (U) Mr. Miller, I understand that at our maritime ports4217Customs and Border Patrol is only able to inspect less than 5 percent4218of containers coming in on cargo vessels. This percentage is alarmingly4219low given the amount of drugs being smuggled into our country.4220 (U) How are containers selected for screening, and do we need to4221inspect more containers?4222 Answer. (FOUO//LES) The National Threat Analysis Division within4223the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Trade utilizes both4224automated, computer-based targeting and manual targeting. Automated4225targeting leverages specialized computer programs that are integrated4226with relevant trade enforcement data and sophisticated algorithms built4227for identifying container risks. Additionally, data and algorithms help4228generate enforcement profiles to support computer targeting that can4229place automatic holds on suspect containers. Manual targeting leverages4230a variety of methods to identify risk indicators of suspect cargo,4231which include but are not limited to reviews of entry documents and4232physical examinations based on local shipment data. Knowledge and4233experience of the reviewer are critical when identifying shipments to4234review, and officers have discretion determining when to carry out a4235container inspection. Among other U.S. Customs and Border Protection4236programs, the Container Security Initiative serves a notable role in4237increasing resilience of the global supply chain. The Container4238Security Initiative is a customs-to-customs partnership that addresses4239the threat to border security and to global trade posed by the4240potential for terrorist use of maritime containers to deliver a weapon.4241The Container Security Initiative coordinates targeting and information4242sharing regimens to ensure that containers that pose a potential risk4243for terrorism are identified and inspected at participating foreign4244ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United Sates.4245The Container Security Initiative is currently operational at 684246participating seaports in 36 countries, which collectively account for4247approximately 67 percent of the containers destined for the United4248States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has foreign-deployed teams4249of officers working with their host foreign government counterparts4250daily. While their mission is to target and to prescreen containers and4251to develop additional investigative leads related to the terrorist4252threat of cargo destined for the United States, the program has evolved4253to address threats of mutual concern in maritime cargo as well as in4254other modes of transportation. These efforts have resulted in seizure4255of narcotics, weapons and ammunition, stolen vehicles, Intellectual4256Property Rights, cigarette smuggling, Antidumping and Countervailing4257Duties, and other violations.42584259 Question 2. (U) Mr. Miller, in the past several years, Congress has4260provided sufficient funding for non-intrusive inspection equipment4261needed to detect the movement of opioids, methamphetamines, and other4262substances moving illicitly through our ports of entry.4263 (U) Can you tell us why this equipment, when placed in a pre-4264primary position, is considered a ``game changer'' for ports-of-entry?4265 Answer. (FOUO//LES) Screening higher volumes of conveyances at the4266Nation's border is critical to the safety of the American public, as4267passenger and commercial vehicles remain the primary and secondary4268modes Drug Trafficking Organizations use to smuggle narcotics into the4269United States, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection continues to see4270increases in volumes of narcotics being seized.4271 (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection's implementation of4272pre-primary Non-Intrusive Inspection allows officers to examine a4273greater portion of traffic without impact to primary inspection times.4274U.S. Customs and Border Protection has implemented this by placing Non-4275Intrusive Inspection systems in lanes before conveyances reach the4276primary inspection booths, referred to as pre-primary operations. This4277allows a conveyance to be scanned prior to arrival at primary and4278transmits the image to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer to4279review the Non-Intrusive Inspection image. If an anomaly is identified,4280the vehicle is directed to secondary inspection for further Non-4281Intrusive Inspection or physical examination. This model represents a4282change, as historically, Large-Scale systems were primarily utilized in4283secondary inspection, which took much longer to complete a scan.4284 (FOUO//LES) The Non-Intrusive Inspection program will allow U.S.4285Customs and Border Protection to establish mechanisms that further4286automate the inspection. Automation consists of enabling4287interoperability between Non-Intrusive Inspection systems and other4288enforcement tools and integration with other inspection technology.4289U.S. Customs and Border Protection will also employ artificial4290intelligence/machine learning capabilities to aid officers with timely4291image analysis which will further streamline the process. Ultimately,4292this will provide frontline personnel with tools and information that4293enable them to quicky and efficiently identify threats without impeding4294traffic flows, ensuring national security while supporting economic4295prosperity.42964297 Question 2a. (U) Can you describe the year-by-year plan to put the4298recent investment in this technology to use in a smart, efficient way?4299When can we expect the technology to be fully deployed?4300 Answer. (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection is currently4301deploying the new technology procured with appropriated funding in4302Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal Year 2019, which includes 88 Low-Energy4303Portals, 35 Multi-Energy Portals, and 12 High-Energy Rail systems. In4304addition to the 135 systems, there are 11 systems that were deployed4305through the DHS Science & Technology Directorate in the pilot phase. To4306date, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has deployed 64 systems to 274307locations.43084309 Fiscal Year 2021 to Fiscal Year 2022: Deployed 11 systems43104311 Fiscal Year 2023: Deployed 11 systems43124313 Fiscal Year 2024: Deployed 29 systems43144315 Fiscal Year 2025: Deployed 13 systems43164317 In Fiscal Year 2025 and 2026, U.S. Customs and Border4318 Protection will deploy 51 systems which are currently under4319 construction or in active construction planning phase43204321 An additional 31 systems require civil works funding to4322 finalize construction plans43234324 (FOUO//LES) U.S. Customs and Border Protection anticipates that all4325procured systems will be deployed by December 2026.43264327 [all]