Hearings to examine the nomination of Arielle Roth, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.
Meeting•Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation•Mar 27, 2025 · 2:15 PM
Summary
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a meeting on Mar 27, 2025 at 2:15 PM in Russell Senate Office Building, Room 253.
Record
The meeting has its transcript on the record.
Transcript
The transcript runs to 4,477 lines and 247,931 characters, as the Government Publishing Office printed it.
1[Senate Hearing 119-130]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34 S. Hrg. 119-13056 NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:7 THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION89=======================================================================1011 HEARING1213 before the1415 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND16 INNOVATION1718 of the1920 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,21 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION22 UNITED STATES SENATE2324 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2526 FIRST SESSION27 __________2829 MARCH 27, 202530 __________3132 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and33 Transportation3435 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3637 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov38 ______3940 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE414261-288 PDF WASHINGTON : 20254344 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION4546 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS4748 FIRST SESSION4950 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman51JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,52ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking53DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota54JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii55DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts56MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan57TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin58TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois59ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada60JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico61BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado62TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania63SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey64CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware65 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director66 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director67 Liam McKenna, General Counsel68 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director69 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director70 Jonathan Hale, General Counsel7172 ------7374 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION7576JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking77JOHN THUNE, South Dakota JACKY ROSEN, Nevada78TED BUDD, North Carolina JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado79ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania80TIM SHEEHY, Montana ANDY KIM, New Jersey81SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia8283 C O N T E N T S8485 ----------86 Page87Hearing held on March 27, 2025................................... 188Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 189Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 390Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 591Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 792 Letter dated July 10, 2023 to Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton from93 Zephranie Buetow, Assistant Secretary for Legislative94 Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.............. 10695Statement of Senator Budd........................................ 10896Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 11397Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 11598Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 11799Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 119100Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 123101102 Witnesses103104Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairman, National Transportation Safety105 Board (NTSB)................................................... 9106 Prepared statement........................................... 10107Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation108 Administration................................................. 92109 Prepared statement........................................... 93110Brigadier General Matthew Braman, Director of Army Aviation,111 Department of the Army......................................... 94112 Prepared statement........................................... 96113114 Appendix115116Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jennifer Homendy117 by:118 Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 133119 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 133120 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 133121 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 134122 Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 136123Response to written questions submitted to Chris Rocheleau by:124 Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 137125 Hon. John Thune.............................................. 138126 Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 139127 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 140128 Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 143129 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 144130 Hon. Jacky Rosen............................................. 145131Response to written questions submitted to Brigadier General132 Matthew Braman by:133 Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 146134 Hon. Jerry Moran............................................. 146135 Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 148136 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 148137138 NTSB PRELIMINARY REPORT:139 THE DCA MIDAIR COLLISION140141 ----------142143 THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2025144145 U.S. Senate,146 Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation,147 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,148 Washington, DC.149 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in150room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran,151Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.152 Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Cruz, Sullivan, Budd,153Schmitt, Sheehy, Capito, Duckworth, Cantwell, Klobuchar,154Markey, and Hickenlooper.155156 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,157 U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS158159 Senator Moran. The Committee will come to order. The160Subcommittee on Aviation and Space of the United States161Senate's Committee on Commerce convenes today for what I162consider a very important hearing.163 Fifty-seven days ago, our Nation witnessed the first major164U.S. commercial passenger flight crash in nearly 16 years.165Families had their loved ones taken from them in an instant.166Children lost their parents, husbands lost their wives, a167Kansas couple lost their daughter, and a rural community in our168state, called Kiowa, lost a husband and wife, a pillar of the169community, who were traveling to visit their daughter in170college.171 I have taken that American flight before. There were many172Kansans on that flight and several of the members of this173Committee lost constituents on the American Airlines Flight1745342, and the Army's Black Hawk helicopter.175 In addition to the families who are grieving, our first176responders made heroic efforts to find survivors and save177lives, and the investigators have spent nearly 2 months178searching the Potomac River and working to reconstruct wreckage179to find answers.180 It has been a difficult 57 days.181 Sixty-seven lives that were lost on January 29 were taken182prematurely in an accident that, by all indications, should183have been avoided. Now the families of these victims, the184Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation185Safety Board, the U.S. Army, and Congress are tasked with how186to best honor the memory and make certain accidents like this187never happen again.188 I want to highlight NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and NTSB189Board for their diligence and transparency throughout the190investigations. That job obviously is not an easy one, but it191has been done with professionalism and care. It is their work192that brings us here today to review.193 NTSB's preliminary report into the midair collision194provides insight into the events of January 29, but many195questions, certainly in my view, many questions still need to196be answered, not only by the NTSB's investigation but by our197Nation's aviation safety regulator and by the Army.198 The preliminary report provides alarming statistics in199using existing FAA data on the risks at DCA to aviation safety.200That data includes, and NTSB provides, these numbers. In a 13-201year period, not a single month went by without at least one,202quote, ``close call'' between a helicopter and a commercial jet203operating at DCA. Between October 21 and December 24, there204were 85 incidents where the lateral separation between a205commercial jet and a helicopter was less than 1,500 feet and206the vertical separation was less than 200 feet. And during that207same timeframe, there were more 15,000, quote, ``close208proximity events'' between a helicopter and a commercial209airplane, the NTSB findings that it is possible for a210helicopter on Route 4 to have as little as 75 feet of vertical211separation from airplanes on approach to Runway 33.212 I commend the NTSB for issuing urgent safety213recommendations, and I commend the FAA in acting to implement214them, particularly the permanent restriction of nonessential215helicopter operations at DCA. However, I want to know how, with216these statistics in the FAA files, why prior to January 29 the217agency failed to improve safety protocols at Reagan National218Airport?219 This Committee worked tirelessly to pass an FAA220reauthorization bill last Congress that prioritized safety,221enabling our industry to continue innovating and equipping the222FAA with the resources necessary to keep our skies safe. We223need a permanent, confirmed FAA administrator to implement this224important framework for the future of the industry. President225Trump recently nominated Bryan Bedford to lead the FAA, and I226look forward to his testimony before this Committee in the near227future.228 I commend Secretary Duffy for his push to modernize229airspace, and I look forward to this Subcommittee working230together to keep America's traveling public safe and improve231public trust in our air travel system.232 Demand for commercial aviation is expected to grow 4233percent each year over the next two decades, and along with new234technology and commercial spacecraft entering our airspace.235This will further place demands upon our airspace and require236the tools and guidelines to ensure a safe airspace.237 American Airlines Flight 5342 and Priority Air Transport 25238carried innocent civilians, selfless servicemembers, talented239figure skaters, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons240and daughters. And while Congress' response to January 29 ought241to be deliberate and not executed in a knee-jerk fashion,242Congress must make certain that this loss of life occurs never243again.244 In this early investigation, we have many unresolved245questions. Among those for me is why was the ADS-B Out not246transmitting on the Black Hawk? Was it turned off or was there247equipment malfunction? Why had precautions not been taken to248mitigate the risks of collisions between commercial aircraft249and rotor wing near DCA, the statistics I just described? What250is the severity of this issue at other airports where combined251traffic is also high? What explains the discrepancy between the252altitude readings of the crew of the Black Hawk? Why did the253Black Hawk's invalid pressure altitude data influence other254systems that utilized this source? How the use if night vision255goggles may have impacted the Black Hawk helicopter pilots'256line of vision? And finally, how should the FAA evaluate257combining duties of air traffic controllers?258 I am appreciative for our witnesses being here today. I259note they each take this circumstance seriously. I am anxious260to hear the discussion that they have with this Committee, and261the end result should be a better understanding as well as262working to identify and prevent tragedies today and into the263future.264 I now recognize the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee,265Senator Duckworth, the Senator from Illinois, for her opening266remarks.267268 STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,269 U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS270271 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Moran, and thank you272for your continued partnership on aviation safety issues. I273enjoy being your partner on this Subcommittee. And I want to274thank both the Chairman of the Commerce Committee and the275Ranking Member for your work with us, as well.276 I do want to extend, first and foremost, my condolences to277the family members of the victims, some of whom are here with278us today, both on the commercial airliner as well as the family279members who lost the brave soldiers in the Black Hawk280helicopter. These are folks who put on the colors of this great281nation, committed themselves to defending this great nation,282and were at their duty station, training to protect and defend,283as they lost their lives.284 I also want to thank the first responders and everyone at285NTSB for their tireless work to get us the answers that we all286are looking for.287 There is a saying, and many of you have heard it, our288aviation regulations are written in blood. So we have an289obligation to the victims to learn what went wrong and prevent290a collision like this from ever happening again. As a former291Black Hawk pilot myself--and I have flown helicopters out of292very congested airspace at Midway Airport. In fact, I commanded293the Midway unit for a number of years--I know how challenging294this type of mixed-use airspace can be. But a challenging295airspace is no excuse. This should never have happened.296 This collision was horrendous, and it is heartbreaking, but297it was not a surprise. Our alarm bells about potential298collisions have been ringing for years. Coming out of the299pandemic, we saw a frightening rise in close calls and an300erosion of our aviation system's margin of safety. We have301known for years that we need more air traffic controllers and302more safety technology. The warnings have been clear, and in303some cases right here within this Committee, and a bipartisan304consensus on the need to upgrade the equipment and the need to305train more air traffic controllers.306 In November 2023, we held a hearing on close calls. NTSB307Chair Homendy testified, citing staffing shortages, fatigue,308distraction, deviation from FAA regulations, and a lack of309runway safety technology, and she warned, and I quote, ``The310concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign311that the U.S. aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot312wait until a fatal accident forces action. We must act before313there is a tragedy,'' end quote.314 Chairwoman just sadly predicted what was going to happen,315and you said that in 2023.316 At the same hearing, the National Air Traffic Controllers317Association's President told us that staffing shortages were so318bad that many air traffic controllers were working mandatory319overtime, 6-day work weeks, and 10-hour days. He warned, and I320quote, ``Over the long term, this will continue to introduce321unnecessary risks into the system,'' end quote.322 So we passed, in a bipartisan way, FAA reauthorization bill323last year, to help rebuild our aviation workforce and make324critical investments in safety. The FAA is still implementing325that new law, but clearly Congress has more work to do to shore326up aviation safety in this great nation.327 In December 2024, we held another hearing. The GAO told us328that more than 75 percent of our aging air traffic controller329systems are unsustainable, or potentially unsustainable.330 The deadly collision at DCA is not the only aviation safety331incident so far this year. We have seen deadly crashes in332Philadelphia and Alaska, a crash landing in Toronto that333miraculously everyone survived, even after the aircraft flipped334upside down. Earlier this month we saw passengers standing on335the wing of a 737 aircraft in Denver to escape a fire. And near336misses keep happening. In February, a Southwest flight came337within 200 feet of colliding with a Flexjet plane at Midway338Airport.339 At such a dangerous time for aviation safety, when we need340to bolster our workforce and invest in technology, the last341thing we should be doing is making cuts to the FAA. Yet two342weeks after the DCA crash, the Trump administration began343firing hundreds of FAA employees. I say all of this because it344is important context we need to keep in mind during today's345hearing. We need to understand what happened at DCA, but we346also need to understand how this fits into a much larger threat347to aviation safety.348 According to the NTSB, DCA had many close calls in recent349years, between October 2021 and December 2024. As the Chairman350has said, there were more than 15,000 incidences of commercial351aircraft coming close to rotary-wing aircraft. Eighty-five of352those had a vertical separation of less than 200 feet. And last353year there were also two high-profile runway close calls at354DCA.355 NTSB's preliminary report raises several questions, most356notably, how did FAA allow a helicopter route to come within 75357feet of a runway approach? FAA has deconflicted the airspace,358but DCA is not the only airport in the country where airplanes359and helicopters share congested airspace. Several of us raised360this at an earlier briefing, and thankfully FAA is now361evaluating eight cities where this may also be an issue,362including in Chicago.363 We also need to know more about what helicopter pilots knew364about their altitude. Was their equipment working properly?365Voice recordings showed that the pilot and instructor pilot366indicated different altitudes as they approach the Key Bridge,367and NTSB determined that some of the altitude information on368the helicopter's data recorder was invalid.369 There are also questions about ADS-B. Why was the370helicopter not transmitting ADS-B Out? Do commercial aircraft371need to be equipped with ADS-B In? How come so many helicopters372are allowed exemptions from the ADS-B Out requirement at DCA?373 So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I374yield back, Chairman.375 Senator Moran. Ranking Member Duckworth, thank you very376much for your opening statement. She almost called me the377Ranking Member.378 Senator Duckworth. I did.379 Senator Moran. There is no reason to apologize. Senator380Duckworth was the previous Chairman of this Subcommittee, and I381had a great opportunity to work with her as the Ranking Member.382And I would indicate, certainly to Senator Duckworth but to383those in the audience, this is a Subcommittee that will set384partisanship aside, and we will continue to work closely385together to find the answers that we are looking for today, and386beyond finding the answers, making certain that changes are387made to prevent this tragedy.388 We are joined by the Chairman of the full Committee,389Senator Cruz. I appreciate his presence here and his leadership390on this issue from the very beginning. And I now recognize him391for his opening statement.392393 STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,394 U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS395396 Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to397the Ranking Member, as well. I want to thank each of our398witnesses for being here today and I want to extend a399particular welcome to the family members of the 67 crash400victims who are here today for this hearing. I have met with401many of you since the crash and each of you have my very402deepest condolences for your unimaginable loss.403 This crash involving American Airlines Flight 5342 and the404Army Black Hawk helicopter was preventable. It did not have to405happen. And I want you to know I am committed to using the406power of this Committee to determine if any policy failures led407to this crash and making certain that Congress acts to correct408them.409 This accident marks the first time a commercial crash in410the U.S. has led to mass fatalities in over 15 years. While411America's National Airspace System has kept Americans safe for412decades, this critical juncture shows that more action must413take place to enhance the safety of our system.414 The hearing today will examine the factors leading up to415the midair collision 300 feet above the Potomac River, whether416the Army's practice of disabling ADS-B Out is a glaring safety417concern. Whether the FAA missed warning signs with thousands of418instances where helicopters and commercial aircraft at DCA came419too close to colliding. Whether the communications between the420air traffic controller and both the pilots of the American421Airlines flight and the Black Hawk helicopter was inadequate.422 The families of the American Airlines Flight 5342 victims423deserve answers. Congress deserves answers. And the American424flying public deserves answers to these important questions.425 The NTSB does terrific work. I am grateful to Chairman426Jennifer Homendy and her team for their thorough investigation427of this accident. The preliminary report being discussed today428is factual--it does not include analysis nor does it include429findings. It is just one step in what will be a lengthy and430ongoing investigation. This Committee will closely follow how431that investigation proceeds and look forward to the NTSB's full432findings.433 Some actions, however, cannot wait.434 Aviation safety is dependent on what is called the Swiss435cheese model. Each layer of cheese represents a defense against436an identified risk, building redundancy into the system to plug437holes and prevent accidents. After decades of advancements, the438U.S. aviation system has been held up worldwide as the gold439standard of safety. The FAA's Air Traffic Organization depends440on thousands of talented air traffic controllers, hundreds of441millions of dollars in annual investments to sustain442technologies used to operate the air system, and billions more443invested in technologies and facilities across the system.444 Even with these significant investments, the air traffic445system is failing. Facilities, which are falling apart, are446short-staffed, and projections show the shortages will last for447years. Over the weekend, the NOTAM system broke down for a448third time in just two years. Congress has provided tens of449millions of dollars in the past two years to modernize the450NOTAM system, and it has broken down already twice in this451calendar year.452 President Trump and Secretary Duffy have pledged to take453action to improve the air traffic control system. I plan to454lead this Committee in passing legislation to do the same. We455must provide resources for needed short-, medium-, and long-456term improvements that chart the path to success and457sustainment for the air traffic system.458 Earlier this week, I issued a call to aviation stakeholders459for specific ideas to improve the air traffic system. I asked460for concrete proposals--taking nothing off the table461prematurely to make sure that whatever resources and462authorities Congress provides to the Administration will make a463lasting difference. My proposal will complement the Trump464administration's forthcoming plan.465 What the tragedy of Flight 5342 shows us is it is never too466early to act to improve aviation safety. I want to thank the467families of the victims for taking your enormous grief and468channeling it into energy, channeling it into advocacy,469channeling it into standing up and speaking out for other470families, flying on other flights, fighting for them so they471don't have to endure the grief and loss that each of you is472enduring.473 It is my hope we can spend the coming months in the wake of474this tragedy working seriously to plug safety gaps and to475ensure that an accident of this magnitude never happens again.476Thank you.477 Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz, thank you for your opening478remarks, your leadership today, and your leadership into the479future.480 We now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,481the Senator from Washington State, Senator Cantwell.482483 STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,484 U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON485486 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Moran. Thank you487Ranking Member Duckworth. Thank you full Committee Chairman488Cruz. We are here today to examine one of the most devastating489accidents in U.S. history. With 67 lives lost on January 29, we490have a responsibility to not only understand what happened, but491to fix it, so that it never happens again.492 I want to recognize the families who are here with us today493and express my condolences, but also my appreciation for the494diligence that you now are demonstrating by being here today.495Too much of aviation safety in the last several years has been496left to the advocacies of families. We should not have to rely497on you. You should be able to mourn your losses. But we need498you to continue to advocate for these important policies.499 I welcome NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, FAA Acting500Administrator Chris Rocheleau, and Brigadier General Matt501Braman, who is the Director of Army Aviation. You are here to502provide us an update on this collision and why a Black Hawk503helicopter on a training flight collided with this American504Airlines flight.505 As we seek answers, the NTSB's preliminary report has506alarming facts. First, in the 3-year period leading up to the507collision, commercial airplane and helicopters got within 400508feet of each other on 15,214 occasions, within 200 feet on 85509occasions. FAA's air traffic managers approve helicopter route510charts annually, so as the data raised questions about the511safety of these routes, the ball clearly falls into the FAA's512court as to whether to act on this data or make changes where513the helicopters can fly in DCA.514 A helicopter at 200 feet would only have 75 vertical feet515separation from an airplane approaching on Runway 33. These516findings reveal a very systemic issue that demands answers from517our witnesses today. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, I want to518know: Why did the FAA not act on 15,000 reports of dangerous519proximity? How were these helicopter routes allowed to remain520when alarm bells were literally going off in the towers?521 This lack of oversight must change. The Army Black Hawk522helicopter was not transmitting what is known as ADS-B Out523signal, although we do not know why. What we do know is that524the military told our colleague, House Delegate Eleanor Holmes525Norton, in 2023, that the military operates 100 percent of its526flights in the National Capital Region without this safety527technology--100 percent of the time. On March 7, I wrote528Secretary Hegseth about this issue, asking to respond by March52921. I have still heard nothing back. I do not like this530silence. It is deafening.531 General Braman, I have questions about these policies,532especially given the FAA's 2019 rule stating that the533deactivation of the ADS-B Out technology, pursuant to an534exemption, was not to be routine. Well, the Holmes letter says535that not only was it far from routine, 100 percent of the time536they operated with this exemption.537 Acting Administrator Rocheleau, your agency gave government538airspace users a loophole. What we want to know now is why this539was allowed to continue if we had this data and information and540are there any other agencies that are acting with ADS-B Out541that we have not addressed yet?542 The FAA rule needs to change. Chair Homendy, I will be543asking you about ADS-B requirements. In 2010, the FAA said that544it was premature to require this kind of equipment on545operators. Yet, at the same time the FAA made that decision,546just two years earlier, you wrote a letter saying, disagreeing547with them, but saying that, quote, ``the equipage of aircraft548with ADS-B Out in capacity will provide for an immediate,549substantial contribution to safety, especially during550operations in and around airports.''551 Why did we not listen? Fifteen years later, commercial552aircraft are still not operating with this. If the American553Airlines regional jet had been equipped with this ADS-B In, it554would have been able to receive the Black Hawk's transmission,555giving it better intelligence on positioning.556 Tim Lilley, the father of the pilot from the commercial557aircraft, who he himself is also a Black Hawk helicopter pilot,558and his wife Sherri, spent many years working at Gulfstream.559They know a thing or two about aviation. They gave me a list of560actions they hope Congress can take to improve safety.561 Mr. Chairman, we all need to work together on this critical562safety legislation, legislation to close the ADS-B Out563loophole, require more commercial jets to have ADS-B In564capacity when operating near our Nation's busiest airports, and565have stronger information sharing between our military and566civilian authorities.567 This is not just about policy. It is about saving lives. To568my colleagues, I hope that we can work together in a bipartisan569fashion. Since the FAA Reauthorization Act did require NextGen570completion by 2025, we also directed the FAA to develop a plan571for accelerating airline equipage with NextGen technologies and572authorized $17 billion through 2028 to modernize and replace573the FAA ATC systems and infrastructure.574 So, I do want to say, I do not believe in cutting the575services, the benefits, or the training of our air traffic576controllers. We need them, and we need them to do their job. I577supported Senator Cruz's efforts to continue to advance more578training centers to get more air traffic controllers trained.579But now we need to learn this painful lesson. We need to make580sure that we are preventing future accidents from happening. We581must be unwavering in this effort.582 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.583 Senator Moran. Ranking Member Cantwell, thank you for your584opening statement. I will now introduce our panelists who are585here to testify.586 Our first witness Jennifer--I am sorry. I should put a587title before you.588 Our first witness is Chairman Jennifer Homendy of the589National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB is an590independent Federal agency that investigates every civil591aviation accident in the United States and significant events592in other modes of transportation such as rail, transit,593roadway, and pipeline. She has served as the Chairwoman since5942021, and is a member of the NTSB Board since 2018.595 Our second witness is Mr. Chris Rocheleau, Acting596Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr.597Rocheleau has served at the FAA for more than 20 years, in598multiple roles, including as Deputy Associate Administrator for599Aviation Safety.600 And our third witness is Brigadier General Matthew Braman,601Director of Army Aviation for the Headquarters of the602Department of the Army. Throughout his service, General Braman603has deployed over 36 months, supporting overseas contingency604operations. And I thank you, General, for your service.605 I now recognize Chairman Jennifer Homendy to deliver her606opening statement.607608 STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIRMAN,609 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)610611 Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member612Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and members613of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide you with an614update on our investigation of the midair collision that615occurred over the Potomac River near Reagan National Airport on616January 29.617 The NTSB knows tragedy all too well. We experience it every618day, which is why we fight so hard for safety. Yesterday, we619remembered the six lives lost during the collapse of the Key620Bridge in Baltimore a year ago. Today, we once again mourn the62167 lives lost at DCA, the 7 in Philadelphia, 10 in Nome,622Alaska.623 We often talk about safety in terms of numbers, did624accidents, fatalities go up or down. It is important that we625remember today that those who died at DCA and in other626accidents we investigate are not numbers. As you said, these627are mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, wives, husbands,628cousins, best friends, who won't be there with their loved ones629for Easter egg hunts, Passover seders, the end of Ramadan,630Mother's Day, Father's Day, graduation, all of life's631celebrations.632 Their families and friends, whether in person or online,633are here today. I can only imagine what they are going through,634and I want to take a moment to again express our deepest635sympathies to each of them. Please know that we keep you in our636hearts as we diligently work to determine how this tragedy637happened so no one--no one--experiences the deeply significant638loss you must feel today.639 NTSB was on scene that night within an hour of the640collision, and we remained there for over a month. Work641continues to this day, including diving operations to recover642personal effects and any remaining portions of the wreckage.643 On March 11 we released our preliminary report, which644contains only factual information that we have gathered in the645first few weeks, all of which can change throughout the course646of the investigation. It does not include analysis or findings,647nor does it determine probable cause. Those will be in our648final report.649 But we do not wait for a final report to take action if we650uncover critical safety issues that require immediate651attention, which is why, in conjunction with the release of our652preliminary report we also issued two urgent safety653recommendations to the FAA. In both reports, we cited FAA654surveillance data that showed between October 2021 and December6552024, there were over 15,000 close-proximity events between656commercial aircraft and helicopters at DCA.657 In reviewing that and other data, including airport658operations and established helicopter routes, we determined659that the separation distances between helicopter traffic660operating on Route 4 and aircraft using runways 15 and 33 are661insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety.662 As a result, we have recommended that the FAA prohibit663operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Haines Point and664Wilson Bridge when those runways are being used for departures665and arrivals. We also recommended that the FAA designate an666alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate667travel between Haines Point and the Wilson Bridge when that668segment of Route 4 is closed.669 I want to commend Secretary Duffy for his swift acceptance670of our recommendations. The Secretary and the Acting671Administrator and the General have been tremendous partners672throughout the course of this investigation, and I want to673thank them for their commitment to safety.674 I know we are all searching for answers, the right safety675solutions. But the NTSB is the gold standard for accident676investigations for a reason. We are thorough, and we are fact-677based. We leave no stone unturned, and we let the evidence678guide us. Investigations take time. We have a lot of work to do679in this investigation, from interviews to analyses of large680volumes of documents and data to review. To air carrier681operations that we have to review, helicopter operations, air682traffic control, human performance, helicopter air worthiness,683flight recorders, and more. In total, we have about 40 NTSB684experts leading this investigation, in collaboration with the685parties and others, and we are aiming to complete this686investigation within one year, barring, of course, any687unforeseen circumstances.688 I want to close by thanking you for your steadfast support689of the NTSB, and I look forward to answering your questions.690 [The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:]691692 Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chairwoman, National693 Transportation Safety Board694695 Good morning, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members696of the subcommittee. My name is Jennifer Homendy, and I am honored to697serve as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board698(NTSB).\1\ Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to699provide an update regarding the NTSB's investigation the midair700collision involving a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L (under the callsign701PAT25) and PSA Airlines dba American Airlines flight 5342, a Mitsubishi702Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10703(CRJ700) that occurred over the Potomac River in southwest Washington,704DC, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST) on January 29, 2025.705---------------------------------------------------------------------------706 \1\ The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress707with investigating and establishing the facts, circumstances, and cause708or probable cause of all civil aviation accidents and serious incidents709in the United States and defined accidents in all other modes of710transportation, including roadway accidents, grade crossing incidents,711railroad accidents, pipeline accidents, major marine casualties712occurring on or under the navigable waters, internal waters, or the713territorial sea of the United States, and other accidents related to714the transportation of individuals or property when the Board decides715the accident is catastrophic, the accident involves problems of a716recurring character, or the investigation of the accident would carry717out our statutory requirements. In addition, the NTSB carries out718special studies concerning transportation safety and coordinates the719resources of the Federal government and other organizations to aid720victims and their family members impacted by major transportation721disasters.722---------------------------------------------------------------------------723 The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the724airplane and all 3 crewmembers aboard the helicopter were fatally725injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident.726Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of727Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger728flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT),729Wichita, Kansas, to DCA, departing ICT at 1839 EST. PAT25 originated730from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, at 1845 EST731on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for the pilot's annual732standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles. Night733visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the734time of the accident.735 Attached to this testimony are the following: Investigation736Preliminary Report and Urgent Recommendation Report.737 Before I begin, I want to take a moment and recognize the families738and friends of those who lost loved ones in this tragedy. On behalf of739the NTSB, I want to express my deepest condolences and our sympathies740to each of you. Our mission is to determine what happened and why it741happened so no one else experiences the loss you feel today. We keep742you in mind every day, as we carry out our solemn mission to prevent743future tragedy.744 NTSB launched to the accident site that night and investigators745remained at DCA for approximately four weeks. Work still continues on746site, including diving operations to recover personal effects and any747remaining portions of the wreckage.748 As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified749parties to participate in the investigation. These included Federal750Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Army, PSA Airlines, GE751Aerospace, Sikorsky, National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Air752Line Pilots Association, Association of Flight Attendants,753International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Collins754Aerospace, and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.755 The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led756by NTSB group chairs in the areas of Air Carrier Operations and Human757Performance, Airplane Structures, Airplane Systems, Powerplants,758Helicopter Operations and Human Performance, Air Traffic Control and759Human Performance, Helicopter Airworthiness, Survival Factors, and760Flight Recorders. This week, we formed another investigative group761focused on Data Analysis.762 There was a whole of government response to this major event, and I763want to recognize some of the assistance we received in recovering the764victims and wreckage: Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, D.C.765Fire and EMS Department, and other first responders from Virginia and766Maryland, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,767the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage768and Diving (SUPSALV).769 On March 11, the NTSB released the preliminary report for this770investigation, attached in full. It should be emphasized that, as with771all preliminary reports, this document contains only factual772information pertinent to the investigation. This information is773preliminary and subject to change and does not include analysis or a774probable cause of the collision, all of which will be issued at a later775date as we continue to thoroughly investigate wherever the evidence may776lead. There is a lot of work left to be done.777 However, as is always the case with our investigations, NTSB does778not need to wait until we determine a probable cause to take action if779our investigation uncovers facts that demonstrate an intolerable risk780to safety. In such cases, we do not hesitate to take urgent action, and781in this case that is exactly what we have done.782 In conjunction with the release of our preliminary report, we also783issued two urgent safety recommendations (also attached) to the Federal784Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the helicopter routes near785DCA. NTSB urgent recommendations require immediate action to prevent786similar accidents or incidents. When we issue them, we believe a787critical safety issue must be addressed, with no delay.788 In the case of this investigation, while reviewing airport789operations and prior incidents, including near mid-air collision790events, and while reviewing the existing helicopter routes for791helicopter traffic near DCA, NTSB determined that the existing792separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4793and aircraft landing on runway 33 (the route and runway, respectively,794that were in use during the crash) are insufficient, and pose an795intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a796midair collision at DCA. We've therefore issued an urgent797recommendation to the FAA to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4798between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are799being used for departures and arrivals at DCA.800 Recognizing that a total closure of this route when the stated801runways are in use would restrict a vital aviation corridor used for802law enforcement activity, Coast Guard patrols, and continuity of803government operations, and recognizing the potential for increased risk804by adding to air traffic controller workload, we also recommended that805the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to806facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that807segment of Route 4 is closed.808 These recommendations were made because information gathered from809voluntary safety reporting programs and the FAA regarding encounters810between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA showed that, from8112011 through 2024, a vast majority of reported events occurred on812approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least one traffic813alert and collision avoidance system, or TCAS, resolution advisory (RA)814was triggered per month at DCA due to proximity to a helicopter. The815response to TCAS RAs, unlike traffic advisories, or TAs, are816recommended escape maneuvers; for example, climb, descend, or level817off. While a TA is issued when the intruding aircraft is about 20818seconds from the closest point of approach, or 0.3 nautical miles,819whichever occurs first, RA's indicate a collision threat and require820immediate action.821 In over half of the encounters we reviewed, again from 2011 through8222024, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude823restriction. Two-thirds of these events occurred at night.824 We then reviewed commercial operations at DCA and found that,825between October 2021 and December 2024, there were a total of 944,179826commercial operations at DCA. These are instrument flight rules, or827IFR, departures or arrivals. During that time, there were 15,214828occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there829was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nautical mile and830vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events831that involved a lateral separation of less than 1500 ft (or less than8320.3 nautical miles) and vertical separation of less than 200 ft.833 The chart below is a cross-section of the airspace that extends834from Runway 33's centerline, spanning from the runway to the east bank835of the Potomac River. The figure shows the separation distance that836would exist, according to FAA charts, with a helicopter on Route 4 and837an airplane descending on the glideslope to runway 33. At the maximum838altitude of just 200 ft, a helicopter operating over the eastern839shoreline of the Potomac River would have just 75 feet of vertical840separation from an airplane approaching runway 33, and that distance841decreases if the helicopter is operated farther from the shoreline.842843[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]844845 Figure 1. Cross section showing the notional separation between846Route 4 and a PAPI-guided visual approach to runway 33, according to847FAA charts and aerial photogrammetry analysis.848849 As a result of the accident, the FAA, under the leadership of U.S.850Department of Transportation Secretary Duffy took swift action to851ensure safety and restrict helicopter traffic from operating over the852Potomac River near DCA until March 31st, and we commend him for that.853However, as that deadline nears, NTSB remains concerned about the854significant potential for a future midair collision at DCA given the855facts we have uncovered. I am pleased to share with you that the856Secretary has taken our urgent recommendations very seriously, and I857look forward to working with him, Acting Administrator Rocheleau, and858Congress to see them implemented as we move forward with this859investigation.860 Some investigations, understandably, get more public attention than861others, but all of our investigations are critical for improving862transportation safety. We know that we owe it to the families of those863involved, to the communities where events occurred, and to the864traveling public to find out what happened, why it happened, and to865make recommendations to help ensure it never happens again. Our current866investigative workload includes almost 1,250 active investigations in867all 50 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting more than 160868foreign investigations in over 50 countries. Throughout a typical year,869we work on about 2,200 domestic and 450 foreign cases, and we expect870the number of cases annually to remain high and continue to increase in871complexity. Some of our significant ongoing investigations of events872that have occurred this year include:873874 The in-flight structural failure of a Boeing 737-9 MAX875876 The contact of a container ship with the Francis Scott Key877 Bridge, and subsequent bridge collapse, in Baltimore, Maryland878879 A multivehicle work zone collision on Interstate 35 in880 Austin, Texas.881882 A Boeing 737-800 engine fire in Denver, Colorado.883884 A medical transport helicopter crash in Canton, Mississippi.885886 A gas leak and pipeline explosion in Hutchinson, Kansas.887888 A multivehicle crash and postcrash fire on I-80 in Green889 River, Wyoming.890891 A collision between two light rail trains with a derailment892 in Somerville, Massachusetts.893894 A train fire and passenger evacuation in Ridley Park,895 Pennsylvania.896897 A crash of a Bering Air Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Nome,898 Alaska.899900 A Learjet 55 Medevac crash in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.901902 In addition, we continue to investigate other significant events,903including:904905 A multivehicle crash, including a motorcoach carrying906 members of a high school band in Etna, Ohio.907908 A multivehicle crash on the Ohio Turnpike in Swanton, Ohio.909910 A multivehicle crash between a motorcoach and tractor-911 trailers parked along a rest area ramp in Highland, Illinois.912913 A tanker truck rollover and rupture with anhydrous ammonia914 release in Teutopolis, Illinois.915916 A grade-crossing collision in Pecos, Texas.917918 A collision involving a vehicle operating with partial919 driving automation in San Antonio, Texas.920921 A collision between two vehicles resulting in a postcrash922 fire in Carrizo Springs, Texas.923924 Rail employee fatalities and injuries in Illinois, New925 Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.926927 Natural gas-fueled explosions in Youngstown, Ohio, South928 Jordan, Utah, and Jackson, Mississippi.929930 A multivehicle work zone collision and postcrash fire on I-931 95 in Kenly, North Carolina.932933 A train derailment and hazardous materials release in934 Manuelito, New Mexico.935936 A school bus roadway departure and overturn in Millstone,937 West Virginia.938939 A fire aboard a container ship at Port of Newark, New940 Jersey.941942 A vehicle collision with a stopped school bus, fatally943 injuring a student pedestrian, in Excelsior, Wisconsin.944945 We currently have over a thousand open safety recommendations946across all modes as a result of our investigations. In 2024, we issued947132 new safety recommendations and closed 86. Of those closed,948excluding those that were classified reconsidered, no longer949applicable, and superseded, 58 (77 percent) were closed acceptably,950meaning that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the951safety recommendation. This includes actions to enhance aviation safety952by requiring operators to implement safety management systems, to953increase focus on highway bridge maintenance, to help prevent damage to954underwater pipelines, and to help prevent train derailments due to955unexpected weather conditions. This success rate demonstrates the value956of our recommendations. Our recommendations are meaningful, and we957appreciate the efforts of recipients to address them.958 The NTSB is a small agency that plays a vital role in ensuring959public safety and protection of life and property in all that we do. I960appreciate the need to right-size the Federal workforce; in fact, I961strongly agree with that goal. However, the NTSB runs lean; we always962have. We have just 430 employees to carry out our mission and are963authorized by Congress to go up to 450, though we would need964significantly more than that to truly be fully staffed. We punch far965above our weight. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our966mission to make transportation safer. Their hard work, professionalism,967and dedication around the clock is the reason that the NTSB is regarded968as the world's preeminent safety agency. To complete our investigations969and develop recommendations that advance safety changes without delays,970we must meet the challenges that come with increasing growth and971innovation in transportation. Therefore, it is critical for the agency972to have additional resources to respond to events without affecting our973timeliness, the quality of our work, or our independence.974 I want to thank the committee for your support in last year's NTSB975reauthorization bill to increase NTSB's funding for the next 4 years.976As a result of Congress' support, we have been able to make much needed977progress in hiring for the agency. The vast majority of that growth has978been in our investigative offices (Aviation Safety, Highway Safety,979Marine Safety, and Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials980Investigations). Still, despite those efforts, we continue to need981additional investigative staff, as well as staff in the operational982offices where increases have not occurred to the same extent. This983includes staff in General Counsel to work through a backlog of984petitions for reconsideration of investigations and airman, mechanic or985mariner's certificate appeals, as well as party-related issues and986external legal disputes; staff in the Office of the Managing Director987to enhance the agency's overall use of data to improve the NTSB's988effectiveness and innovation; staff in the Office of the Chief989Information Officer to address mandated cybersecurity enhancements and990the backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests; and staff in Human991Capital and Training to support recruitment, hiring, and other actions992critical to developing and retaining a highly-productive workforce.993 The fact is, our greatest asset is our workforce, which accounts994for over 70 percent of our costs. We rely on a staff of highly skilled995individuals with technical expertise in such areas as aerospace,996electrical, and mechanical engineering; chemistry; metallurgy; human997performance; and other specialized fields to conduct accident998investigations and identify life-saving safety improvements. We must999continue to attract and retain talent with expertise in emerging1000technologies and the transportation systems of tomorrow. And without1001our workforce, we will not be able to carry out our congressionally1002mandated mission to protect public safety. Our workforce is highly1003technical, and approximately 25 percent of the employees are retirement1004eligible within 1 year; this number increases to approximately 401005percent over the next 5 years. We need to build a deeper bench now to1006prepare for upcoming attrition.1007 For the NTSB to carry out its mission-critical work, we must have a1008fully trained workforce ready to respond to more than 1300 new1009accidents per year, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and deliver1010comprehensive, timely, and concise investigation outcomes and safety1011recommendations to protect life and property and prevent future1012transportation-related accidents and injuries from occurring.1013 Before I close, I want to thank Senate and House leaders on both1014sides of the aisle, as well as President Trump, Vice President Vance,1015and Secretary Duffy for their tremendous support of the NTSB. As1016examples, we were granted exemptions from the deferred resignation1017program and the Federal hiring freeze, and we currently have 141018critical positions, nearly all investigative roles, posted on USA Jobs.1019The Administration and each of you have been very supportive of our1020work to ensure public safety, and we thank you all for your efforts.1021 I respectfully request that Congress continue to support our1022ability to carry out our critical safety mission now and into the1023future; to recruit, retain, and develop a highly qualified and1024specialized workforce; and to prepare the agency for investigations1025involving emerging transportation technologies and systems to improve1026transportation safety.1027 ______10281029 Attachments10301031[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10321033 Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairwoman.1034 We now recognize Acting Administrator Rocheleau of the FAA1035for 5 minutes.10361037 STATEMENT OF CHRIS ROCHELEAU, ACTING1038 ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION10391040 Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member1041Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, and Ranking Member Cantwell, as well1042as members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity1043to be here today to discuss the NTSB's preliminary report on1044the midair collision of PSA Airlines Flight 5342 and a U.S.1045Army Black Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near1046Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, or DCA.1047 I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies1048to the families and loved ones of those who perished in recent1049accidents, particularly the accident near DCA.1050 The FAA continues to support the ongoing NTSB1051investigations. Our work with the NTSB will help us understand1052the factors that contributed to these accidents, and we will1053use the data to inform future FAA actions.1054 Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. Let me1055repeat that--aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority.1056While flying remains the safest mode of transportation,1057aviation safety is not static. There is always room for1058improvement. The professionals at the FAA take their jobs very1059seriously and strive to ensure safety every day. But the fact1060of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to identify1061trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when1062we put corrective actions in place, we must implement them with1063diligence.1064 I want to thank Chair Homendy and the entire NTSB team for1065their dedication in their ongoing investigation.1066 Earlier this month, the NTSB issued an initial report and1067two urgent safety recommendations. The recommendations align1068with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary Duffy's1069leadership, immediately following the accident, to restrict1070helicopter operations around DCA, eliminating mixed helicopter1071and fixed-wing traffic and carefully developing alternative1072routes.1073 Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took action to1074make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter1075operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement,1076active air defense, or Presidential transport, must operate in1077the flight-restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not1078allowed in that airspace.1079 We are also continuing to analyze other airports that have1080both established helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic.1081The FAA also is also carefully reviewing offshore helicopter1082operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine1083learning and language modeling to scan incident reports and1084explore multiple data sources to find themes and areas of1085concern. We will take immediate action if needed to mitigate1086any identified safety risks. Additionally, I will establish a1087Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation1088stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving1089helicopter and fixed-wing interactions, and all aircraft1090operating in DCA Class B airspace will be required to broadcast1091their position and identification using ADS-B Out, with very1092limited exceptions.1093 We are bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air1094traffic controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic1095controllers play a critical role in keeping the American people1096safe. Right now, we have over 10,750 controllers on the job,1097with over 3,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,0001098controllers this year. We have streamlined the hiring process1099and incentivized hiring with a 30 percent increase in the1100salary of those who qualify to attend the FAA's Academy, and we1101are already seeing positive results from these improvements.1102 During the hiring surge that closed last week, we received1103over 10,000 applications, and more than 8,000 of those were1104referred to testing.1105 We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing1106to ensure the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and1107operations. This oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of1108Boeing's manufacturing practices, maintenance procedures, and1109software updates. We are working closely with Boeing to address1110any safety concerns and to ensure that all required1111modifications and improvements are made to meet the highest1112safety standards.1113 We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we are going to1114make our agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and1115directing all of our resources to safety. And we will continue1116to recruit, train, and retain the best and brightest for the1117FAA team.1118 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also1119thank President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their1120faith in me to lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at1121the FAA is not easy, but it is vitally important to the1122American people. And I am proud to once again be part of the1123FAA team.1124 I look forward to your questions.1125 [The prepared statement of Mr. Rocheleau follows:]11261127 Prepared Statement of Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator,1128 Federal Aviation Administration11291130 Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of the1131Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss1132the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary report on1133the midair collision of PSA Airlines flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black1134Hawk helicopter that occurred in January, near Ronald Reagan Washington1135National Airport, or DCA.1136 I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies to the1137families and loved ones of those who perished in recent accidents,1138including the accident near DCA. The Federal Aviation Administration1139(FAA) continues to support the ongoing NTSB investigations. Our work1140with the NTSB will help us understand the factors that contributed to1141these accidents, and we will use the data to inform future FAA actions.1142 Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While flying1143remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is not1144static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at the1145FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to ensure safety every day.1146But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have to1147identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and when1148we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.1149 I want to thank Chairman Homendy and the entire NTSB team for their1150diligence in the ongoing investigation. Earlier this month, the NTSB1151issued a preliminary report and two urgent safety recommendations. The1152recommendations align with the actions the FAA took, under Secretary1153Duffy's leadership, to restrict helicopter operations around DCA1154immediately following the accident, eliminating mixed helicopter and1155fixed-wing traffic. Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took1156action to make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter1157operations, such as lifesaving medical, active law enforcement, active1158air defense, or presidential transport, must operate in the flight-1159restricted airspace, fixed-wing aircraft are not allowed in that1160airspace.1161 We are continuing to analyze other airports that have both charted1162helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic. The FAA also is1163assessing the Gulf of America, including offshore helicopter1164operations. As part of this analysis, we are using machine learning and1165language modeling to scan incident reports and mine multiple data1166sources to find themes and areas of risk. We will take immediate action1167if needed to mitigate any identified safety risks. In addition, I will1168establish a Safety Risk Management Panel and engage with aviation1169stakeholders to identify additional hazard areas involving helicopter1170and fixed-wing interactions.1171 We're bolstering aviation safety in other ways, too. Air traffic1172controller staffing is a top priority as air traffic controllers play a1173critical role in keeping the American people safe. Right now, we have1174more than 10,750 air traffic controllers on the job with more than11753,000 in training. We intend to hire another 2,000 controller trainees1176this year. Consistent with Secretary Duffy's announcement on1177supercharged air traffic controller hiring, we have streamlined the1178hiring process to improve efficiency by changing the previous 8-step1179process to a 5-step process, which will accelerate the time-to-hire for1180these critical positions by five months or more, bringing new air1181traffic controllers on the job much faster. We've also incentivized1182hiring with a 30 percent increase in the salary of those who qualify to1183attend the FAA's Academy. And we are already seeing positive results1184from these improvements. During the hiring surge that closed last week,1185we received more than 10,000 applications. More than 8,300 of those1186were referred to testing.1187 We also continue to maintain rigorous oversight of Boeing to ensure1188the safety and compliance of its aircraft designs and operations. This1189oversight extends to ongoing monitoring of Boeing's manufacturing1190practices, maintenance procedures, and software updates. We are working1191closely with Boeing to address any safety concerns and to ensure that1192all required modifications and improvements are made to meet the1193highest safety standards.1194 We have a strong foundation at the FAA, and we're going to make our1195agency even stronger. We are refocusing our energy and directing all of1196our resources to safety. And we'll continue to recruit, train, and1197retain the best and brightest for our FAA team.1198 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I also thank1199President Trump and Secretary Duffy for putting their faith in me to1200lead the FAA during this time. The work we do at the FAA isn't easy,1201but it's vitally important. And I'm proud to once again be part of the1202FAA team.12031204 Senator Moran. Thank you, sir.1205 I recognize Brigadier General Matthew Braman for his1206testimony.12071208 STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MATTHEW BRAMAN,1209 DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY12101211 General Braman. Thank you, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member1212Duckworth, Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and1213distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the1214opportunity to come here before you today to speak about the1215midair collision that occurred between an Army Black Hawk1216helicopter, with the call sign PAT 25, and American Airlines1217Flight 5342.1218 First and foremost, on behalf of Army senior leaders, and1219all of our soldiers, I want to pass my continued condolences to1220all those affected by this tragedy. I want to thank the1221professional work of the first responders and the Federal,1222state, and local agencies that responded within minutes to the1223crash site and aided in the recovery. I want to thank Chairman1224Homendy and the NTSB for conducting a thorough investigation1225and facilitating a close and transparent relationship with the1226Army as we conduct our parallel investigations.1227 The NTSB remains lead in the investigation, so I can't1228offer facts and recommendations at this time, but I can offer1229the Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide1230clarifying information on Army helicopter operations, and1231certainly can do that here in the Washington, D.C., area.1232 For context, the PAT 25's unit, the 12th Aviation1233Battalion, falls under the Army Aviation Brigade, or referred1234to as the TAAB, and that unit has the mission to provide1235continuous, responsive aviation support to senior military and1236government leaders to enable continuity of government1237operations and defense support to civil authorities.1238 The TAAB is one of dozens of organizations, both civilian1239and military, that operates helicopters in the D.C. area. Our1240aircraft continue to meet all requirements to operate in the1241National Airspace, in Class B airspace, and in helicopter1242routes in Washington, D.C., and they operate under positive1243control of flight services when within 30 nautical miles of1244DCA.1245 PAC 25 was operating out of Davidson Army Airfield, Fort1246Belvoir. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the1247local area. The Pilot-in-Command, CW2 Andrew Eaves, was an1248instructor pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was a1249qualified pilot-in-command, as well, and the Crew Chief, Staff1250Sergeant Ryan O'Hara, was a standardization flight instructor.1251 The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an1252Annual Proficiency and Readiness Test, or APART. As part of1253that flight was approved to operate at contingency locations1254associated with their directed mission. This has led to1255questions as to whether PAT 25 was transmitting Automatic1256Dependent Surveillance Broadcasts out, or ADS-B Out. The1257specific status of both its operation and functionality is1258something that is under the investigation of the NTSB. The1259crew, however, was approved to operate with that capability1260off, in accordance with Army policy.1261 The aircraft transponder, however, was active, with Mode 31262A/C and Mode S when within the Class B airspace, and was1263emitting all the required information to allow air traffic1264services and traffic collision avoidance systems to detect and1265track the aircraft. Army policy does not permit Transponder Off1266operations in the National Airspace. They do not permit1267Transponder Off operations.1268 There is certainly no shortage of speculation on potential1269causes of the accident. I understand well the desire for1270answers. As the Director of Army Aviation and a senior Army1271aviator, there is nothing more important to me than the1272capability, proficiency, and safety of our air crews and those1273whom they transport and support in defense of this Nation. And1274I am also personally invested in the safety of our commercial1275aviation enterprise, as I live with an airline pilot, and her1276safety and the safety of her passengers is paramount to me, as1277well. Which is why it is essential that we see this1278investigation through to its fruition so we can have well-1279informed, facts-based conclusions to make desired change, when1280needed.1281 But where prudent, the Army is not waiting to take action.1282Immediately after the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion1283paused all operations. They have only recently resumed flights,1284and only outside the 7 nautical mile radius of DCA, with the1285exception of flights directly supporting the Secretary of1286Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and that remains1287true today. The Army continues to fully comply with all FAA1288restrictions on helicopter traffic over the Potomac River near1289DCA.1290 The Army is actively participating, along with other1291military services and agencies, with an FAA-led working group1292to redesign the Route 4 helicopter corridor, as recommended by1293the NTSB in its preliminary report.1294 We have also issued interim guidance to elevate the1295approval authority to operate with ADS-B Off. The Army is fully1296committed to a transparent and collaborative review of the1297events of January 29 and of all operations in the vicinity of1298DCA. We support any and all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as1299this never occurs again.1300 Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this1301Committee, and I look forward to answering your questions.1302 [The prepared statement of General Braman follows:]13031304 Prepared Statement of Brigadier General Matthew W. Braman13051306 INTRODUCTION13071308 Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, distinguished members of1309the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you1310today to discuss the accident that occurred between an Army UH-60 Black1311Hawk helicopter, call sign Priority Air Transport (PAT) 25, and1312American Airlines Flight #5342, operated by PSA Airlines in the1313vicinity of Reagan National Airport.1314 First and foremost, on behalf of Army leadership, and our fellow1315Soldiers, we send our continued condolences to all those affected by1316this tragedy. We thank the professional work of the first responders1317and the countless Federal, State, and local agencies that responded to1318the crash site and aided in the recovery effort. Specifically, I want1319to thank the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for continuing1320to conduct a thorough investigation and facilitating a close and1321transparent working relationship with the Army. I will defer to NTSB on1322questions specific to the ongoing investigation, but I can offer the1323Army perspective on the preliminary report and provide clarifying1324information on Army helicopter operations in the National Capital1325Region (NCR) in general.13261327 TAAB HELICOPTER PROCEDURES13281329 The Army Aviation Brigade (TAAB) operates at Fort Belvoir,1330Virginia, and includes the 12th Aviation Battalion, which provides1331continuous, responsive rotary wing aviation support to senior military1332and government leaders in the NCR to enable continuity of government1333operations and defense support of civil authorities. The unit has1334operated in the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area since 1957, flying1335on average 5,800 hours annually, the bulk of which--80 percent--are1336mission rehearsals, exercises, and individual crew flights to build1337proficiency for their assigned mission.1338 The term ``training flight'' has been frequently used to describe1339PAT 25's mission on January 29th and does appear to be a source of some1340confusion. For clarity, a ``training flight'' in military vernacular is1341a general term used to refer to any flight that is not performing1342directed mission support. For TAAB aircrews, ``training flights'' refer1343to unit-led mission practice, mission validation flights with external1344agencies, and flights to build readiness and proficiency to execute1345TAAB's mission. TAAB training flights may involve operating at1346sensitive locations. New Army pilots learn to fly at Fort Novosel,1347Alabama, where they complete an initial course in a trainer helicopter1348before advancing to graduate level courses in the advanced airframes1349they'll operate when they join their units. Pilots who join TAAB are1350already qualified pilots prior to their arrival to the unit.1351 All TAAB aircrews receive unit-tailored academic and flight1352training to ensure an understanding of routing and zone structure to1353conduct flight duties within the NCR, as well as the Federal Aviation1354Administration (FAA)-required academic training to operate in the1355Washington, D.C. Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA). The regulatory1356requirements are routinely reviewed, and aircrews are tested annually1357to maintain proficiency and currency. It is a mandatory Army1358requirement for aircrews to conduct day, night, and night-vision goggle1359(NVG) flights in the local area to ensure readiness to support TAAB's136024-hour mission. TAAB aircrews are also required to conduct an annual1361proficiency and readiness test (APART) all Army aircrews must complete1362in order to evaluate individual and crew proficiency.1363 All TAAB aircraft meet the requirements to operate within the Class1364B airspace and helicopter routes in the Washington, D.C. SFRA and the1365Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). When operating in the D.C. area, all TAAB1366operations are under positive control by designated FAA facilities1367within the SFRA and FRZ.1368 The Army is one of dozens of organizations that fly helicopters in1369the NCR. A 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on1370Helicopter Noise Concerns (GAO-21-200) found between 2017 and 2019 over137150 helicopter operators conducted approximately 88,000 helicopter1372flights within 30 miles of DCA. Of those, 32,890 (37.4 percent) were1373conducted by the military.13741375 PAT 2513761377 PAT 25 was a UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter assigned to 12th1378Battalion, TAAB, operating at Davidson Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir,1379Virginia. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the local1380area. The Pilot-In-Command, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Eaves, was a1381unit Instructor Pilot. The Co-Pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was also a1382qualified Pilot-In-Command, and the Crew Chief, Staff Sergeant Ryan1383O'Hara, was a Standardization Flight Instructor.1384 The night of January 29, 2025, PAT 25 was conducting an APART on1385Captain Lobach. The flight included operations in and around the D.C.1386Metropolitan area and the aircraft was transiting south to Fort Belvoir1387via the FAA-established helicopter routes when the accident occurred.1388 During an APART, the evaluated crew member could expect to fly1389under day, night unaided, and NVG modes of flight.13901391 ARMY ADS-B POLICY13921393 The use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Out1394transponders is an FAA requirement for operating in Class B airspace1395and all TAAB aircraft are equipped with ADS-B-Out systems. However, due1396to the proliferation over the past decade of flight tracking software1397capable of collecting sensitive flight data available to the public,1398the FAA published an exception, removing its ADS-B transmission1399requirement for sensitive operations conducted by Federal, State, and1400local government entities in matters of national defense, homeland1401security, intelligence, and law enforcement when transmitting would1402compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk1403to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the1404ground.1405 At the time of the accident, Army policy was to restrict ADS-B Out-1406Off operations to sensitive or classified missions and require1407Commanders with moderate risk approval authority--which at the time1408could be delegated to low-risk approval authority--to determine when1409and whether ADS-B Out-Off operations are required. Army policy does not1410authorize ADS-B Out-Off operations for routine, non-sensitive, or non-1411classified missions and always requires aircrews conducting ADS-B Out-1412Off operations to operate their transponder in Mode 3 A/C which emits1413information required by air traffic services but with less identifying1414information. Mode S transponders present similar operational security1415concerns as ADS-B and its use is subject to the same Army policy.1416 Aircraft Operating with ADS-B Out-Off but with Mode 3 A/C On are1417visible to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and other aircraft in the vicinity1418that are equipped with Traffic Collision Awareness Systems (TCAS). NTSB1419is still investigating whether PAT 25's ADS-B-Out system was operating1420as designed, not programmed, or turned off at the time of the accident.14211422 ARMY INTERIM RESPONSE14231424 Immediately following the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion1425paused all operations to allow Army and unit leaders the time required1426to adequately assess mission requirements. On February 10, the 12th1427Aviation Battalion returned to flight operations with Army-emplaced1428limitations on flights around the Pentagon and Reagan National Airport.1429The Army is reviewing NTSB's preliminary report and is currently1430reviewing all Army helicopter operations in the NCR, to include its1431Department of Defense mission requirements.1432 The Army has also issued interim guidance to the force to elevate1433the level of risk approval authority to operate with ADS-B Out-Off and1434will formally update its policy as the NTSB-led investigation1435continues. The Army is also investigating the utilization of the Army's1436current policy by the TAAB to determine the frequency with which the1437unit operated with ADS-B Out-Off and whether the policy was applied1438correctly.14391440 CLOSING14411442 The Army is committed to a transparent and collaborative review of1443the events of January 29th and of helicopter operations in the vicinity1444of Reagan National Airport. I have reviewed NTSB's preliminary report,1445and I assess that implementing its findings and recommendations would1446not negatively affect Army helicopter operations. The Army along with1447other military Services and other agencies that operate helicopters in1448the NCR will participate in an FAA-led working group to develop a new1449helicopter route that supports national security, law enforcement, and1450medical helicopter flight operations. This new route will replace the1451legacy Route 4, enhancing efficiency for critical missions while1452maintaining the highest safety standards as recommended by NTSB in the1453preliminary report.1454 We are working to ensure any actions we take in response to the1455accident are fully informed by fact-based conclusions that come out of1456the investigations which are ongoing. When the NTSB and Army1457investigations are complete, the Army is prepared to evaluate and1458comply where able with future recommendations to mitigate risk while1459operating in the NCR and other areas with congested airspace. We fully1460support all efforts to ensure a tragedy such as this is never repeated.1461 Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before the committee1462and I look forward to answering your questions.14631464 Senator Moran. Thank you, General.1465 Let me begin by asking witnesses questions, and then we1466will rotate, alternate, between Republicans and Democrats,1467based upon time of arrival after the leadership of the1468Committee has their opportunity to ask their questions.1469 Chair Homendy, let me begin with you. First of all, I am1470interested in learning about the occurrences that have been1471described, I described in my opening statement, about near1472misses and occurrences, TCAS advisories that occurred on1473numerous occasions over a long period of time. And what I hope1474you--and I will ask the Administrator of the FAA these1475questions--but I would like to know what did people know, when1476did they know it, and why didn't someone do something about it?1477 In asking you about this topic, is the information that is1478collected by the FAA, that is where these statistics that we1479have each mentioned, that is where they come from. Is that1480true?1481 Ms. Homendy. There were different sources of information,1482some which was FAA, some of which are voluntary safety1483reporting programs.1484 Senator Moran. And those voluntary safety reporting1485programs, it is voluntary reporting to the FAA?1486 Ms. Homendy. Yes.1487 Senator Moran. So I want to give you the chance.1488 Ms. Homendy. Yes.1489 Senator Moran. So the information that has been described1490here about those events over a long period of time, is utilized1491by you but housed at the FAA?1492 Ms. Homendy. I believe through a contractor, but yes.1493 Senator Moran. And do you know at this point whether that1494information was reviewed in a regular manner? Have you1495investigated why information that seems so important did not1496result in changes in policy, rules, or regulations?1497 Ms. Homendy. I do not know why. What I will say is this was1498a data request, came from a data request from the NTSB. We made1499that with the FAA and received information from the Aviation1500Safety Action Program, ASAP, from ATSAP, which is Air Traffic1501Control, from Mandatory Occurrence Reports, and we also1502received information from FAA surveillance data, from radar.1503 But this was a request from us, and that resulted in our1504evaluation of that data and our urgent safety recommendations.1505I do not know if the FAA pulled that data themselves at any1506point, and I would have to defer to the Acting Administrator on1507that.1508 Senator Moran. That information was so valuable, so1509important, so critical, that that is the reason you asked for1510the immediate changes in safety regulations. True?1511 Ms. Homendy. Yes. And, you know, there does seem to be an1512issue with identifying emerging trends. There is a lot of data1513going to FAA, and taking that data and looking at trends and1514not specific issues I think is something not only the IG has1515raised but others have raised, even the Acting Administrator1516has raised, about having to do a better job with analyzing1517those trends.1518 But it is key, because if we can get it after an accident1519occurs, what is key is getting it before and preventing it.1520 Senator Moran. This is the wake-up call that suggests1521whether changes need to be made. Correct?1522 Ms. Homendy. Correct.1523 Senator Moran. Administrator, I am interested in asking you1524the same series of questions. What did the FAA know prior to1525this accident, when did they know it, and why wasn't some1526action taken to encourage and, in fact, increase the safety,1527particularly at an airport like DCA, and maybe others, and the1528proximity between helicopter and commercial air service1529traffic.1530 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. So I am very concerned about what1531we have learned in the subsequent investigation, both from the1532NTSB as well as our own reviews that we immediately took.1533Clearly, something was missed. I would say immediately after1534the event we took the action--again, I referenced earlier,1535under Secretary Duffy's leadership, to restrict air traffic in1536that area, to ensure there was no helicopter traffic as well as1537fixed-wing.1538 Senator Moran. My question is what did not happen at the1539FAA that would have highlighted this problem earlier, at the1540time in which this information is acquired by the FAA, but1541apparently not looked at until the accident?1542 Mr. Rocheleau. So there is an ongoing review all the time1543of the data that is available. As the Chair mentioned, there1544are millions of pieces of data that come in, and I would tell1545you that we have verified every single near-midair collision1546was investigated. But there are certainly those instances where1547the information itself was not identified. And that is why we1548put artificial intelligence and machine learning in place now,1549to ensure that we are able to go through tens of millions of1550pieces of data to identify those trends and act quickly to1551mitigate those risks.1552 Senator Moran. There is no question but had this1553information been utilized by the FAA or others that steps could1554have been taken to make certain that flying, particularly1555again, in the circumstance of helicopters and commercial1556aviation, at a place like Reagan National Airport, there would1557have been an opportunity to do something had that information1558actually been known and acted on. True?1559 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. That is correct.1560 Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Duckworth.1561 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up on1562the Chairman's questions, this is also my first question. Mr.1563Rocheleau, can you tell me if this new methodology, using the1564AI or whatever other methodology you are using to look at the1565aggregate data, is being applied to other airports where there1566is close helicopter traffic in proximity to commercial1567aircraft?1568 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, it is. We have 10 locations1569around the United States, including Alaska, Anchorage, that we1570are looking through right now, what we are referring to as1571hotspots, to look at similar trends, similar activities, as it1572relates to fixed-wing and helicopter operations.1573 Senator Duckworth. Is this methodology of reviewing1574aggregate data going to be applied nationwide, not just in this1575particular area, but to look at the overall trends of near1576misses at other airports, not just between fixed-wing and1577rotary-wing?1578 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am. There are three activities going1579on right now. First, the hotspots I referred to. Second is kind1580of a nationwide use of this review and use of this new1581capability that we have just admitted. And then, of course, the1582ongoing analysis and how we are doing that with our industry1583partners as well as the military.1584 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. According to NTSB, between,1585as you have said, between October 2021 and December 2024, there1586were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft coming1587close to helicopters. Eighty-five of those had vertical1588separation of less than 200 feet.1589 General Braman, do you know how many of those 85 close1590calls involved Army helicopters?1591 General Braman. Ranking Member Duckworth, we do not.1592 Senator Duckworth. Can you tell me why that is?1593 General Braman. That data, in those databases, is currently1594not shared, but certainly the Army is interested in becoming1595part of an opportunity to share data, because that is relevant1596to our safety, as well.1597 Senator Duckworth. Mr. Rocheleau, will the FAA commit to1598sharing that data with the Army?1599 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am, we will.1600 Senator Duckworth. Thank you.1601 Ms. Homendy. We have also asked for that information, and1602we are going to share it as part of our investigation with all1603the parties.1604 Senator Duckworth. And I think this needs to be ongoing1605into the future, so that especially the military aircraft that1606are flying, rotary-wing, within close vicinity--these folks1607should be getting this data, and we can do that, moving1608forward.1609 General Braman, can you explain the Army's rationale for1610its policy that gives commanders discretion to determine how1611many crew chiefs are needed for a particular mission? I think1612it is important. I do not think that the civilian population1613understands the extent to which the Army does risk assessment1614and risk mitigation and risk analysis and that process. I think1615it would be important. And how are you going to be implementing1616that process, moving forward?1617 General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. I1618realize that I have broad authority as the Army Aviation1619Regulation proponent to direct how every aircraft and every1620operator conducts their mission. And I am not afraid to take1621that authority and use it, when appropriate. The reality is the1622best individuals we have to assess the risk of every single1623flight are our unit commanders, because we hold them1624responsible. They have the authority, the responsibility, and1625we hold them responsible to take any mission that they1626authorize, look at the factors involved, understand the people1627assigned to their organization, and adapt that crew to meet1628those requirements. And certainly that is something that will1629be looked at in this investigation--do we do that? And we will1630hold commanders accountable if they fail to uphold that1631responsibility.1632 Senator Duckworth. Can you speak to, if a risk assessment1633for a particular mission comes in at medium or high risk, how1634the approval authority of that changes? Because you mentioned1635approval authority for the DCA area has been raised higher for1636ADS-B Out. Correct?1637 General Braman. Yes, Senator. All missions go through an1638initial approval process. So a commander has to authorize a1639reason for an aircraft to fly. At the completion of that1640authorization the crew then assesses all the known and expected1641risks associated with the mission they have been tasked to do.1642That discussion involves a third party, a senior officer, a1643senior aviator within the organization, and then assesses that1644risk and directs the crew to make any changes to mitigate1645anything that either that briefing officer understands, based1646on their experience. And then when those things are implemented1647it goes back to a commander, who must authorize every single1648flight.1649 So in the occurrence of things like ADS-B Out operations,1650that authority resides with a medium-risk authority. So a1651battalion commander must approve that mission, in particular,1652and in this case the policy allowed that to be delegated down1653to a company commander, and they must approve that it meets the1654standards of the policy completely.1655 We have not elevated that risk to high risk. That requires1656an O6 commander to approve any mission that has ADS-B Off.1657 Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask your1658indulgence for an extra 30 seconds, because my next question I1659think applies to everybody here, and I think people will be1660interested.1661 Senator Moran. Please proceed.1662 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. This is for the FAA. I am1663hearing that there is a backlog of air traffic controllers1664waiting to get their FAA medicals approved so that they can1665return to duty. And we have an air traffic controller shortage1666right now. I think in the Chicagoland area there is about a1667dozen air traffic controllers who are waiting for, you know,1668they got new medication, whatever it is. But they are waiting1669as long as 12 to 18 months to get an appointment or to get a1670ruling from the FAA medical office so that they can actually1671get back on the job. And they are just sitting there, not able1672to do their job.1673 And I think this is problem at all of the major airports1674around the country. I am sure every one of us has air traffic1675controllers waiting to be put back onto duty, and they can't1676because of the backlog with the FAA medical system. Can you1677speak to that? And if I give you a list of my air traffic1678controllers who have been waiting, will you take a look at1679those folks and make sure that their medical issues are1680addressed, so we can get them back on the job?1681 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, I commit to that.1682 Senator Moran. Chairman Cruz.1683 Chairman Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On March 1,1684multiple commercial aircraft landing at DCA reported receiving1685a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, TCAS Resolution1686Advisories, as they were preparing to land, advising pilots of1687an impending threat from above, and in some cases directing the1688crews to take evasive action by descending. I think we were all1689alarmed that just a few weeks after the tragedy, commercial1690pilots were being told they were at imminent risk of a deadly1691midair collision.1692 It has now come to my attention that these warnings were1693caused by the Secret Service and the U.S. Navy improperly1694testing counter-drone technology at DCA. Apparently, the Navy1695was using the same spectrum band as TCAS, causing the1696interference and faulty resolution advisories, even though the1697FAA had previously warned the Navy and the Secret Service1698against using that specific spectrum band due to interference1699risks.1700 Acting Administrator Rocheleau, is that correct?1701 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, that is correct.1702 Chairman Cruz. Let me just say this is deeply disturbing1703that just a month after 67 people died while on approach to DCA1704that the Secret Service and Pentagon would inadvertently cause1705multiple flights to receive urgent cockpit alerts recommending1706evasive action. It is inappropriate for such testing to occur1707at DCA, given the facts of what occurred, and I expect this1708Committee to investigate why precisely that happened.1709 General Braman, I want to turn to your testimony. On March171011, Chairman Moran and I sent you a letter asking a series of1711very specific questions. This week, the Army responded with a1712one-page information paper. However, there were specific1713questions in the letter that were not answered. I want to turn1714to them now.1715 We asked you specifically how frequently does the Army turn1716of ADS-B Out transmission?1717 General Braman. Chairman Cruz, as I stated in the1718discussion about how we approve the missions, a mission would1719have to fall into the category, as defined in the Federal1720regulation and Army policy. It must have national security1721implications and be sensitive in nature to be able to do that1722mission.1723 Chairman Cruz. General, you are not answering my question.1724My question is how frequently is ADS-B Out turned off? I wasn't1725asking what the standard is. I was asking the frequency.1726 General Braman. I can take the number for record, Senator.1727But I can tell you the types of missions and the majority of1728the missions they fly are missions associated with that1729national security mission.1730 Chairman Cruz. Is it accurate that ADS-B Out is turned off1731for 100 percent of missions flown by the Army Air Brigade at1732Fort Belvoir?1733 General Braman. Senator, I think you are referring to the1734June 8th letter from the Joint Staff to Representative Norton.1735In the context of missions, meaning the operations that the173612th Aviation supports in their mission requirements, I would1737say that is an accurate statement. I would not say that is an1738accurate statement of 100 percent of the flights being flown by1739that organization.1740 Chairman Cruz. OK. So I want to understand what you mean by1741``missions.'' Does ``missions'' capture training flights?1742 General Braman. Only training flights that would have been1743operating in a location that is sensitive, as part of their1744continuity of government operations.1745 Chairman Cruz. Well, that would be all of them around DCA.1746Is that correct?1747 General Braman. Only specific sites that are part of that1748continuity of government operation.1749 Chairman Cruz. In your one-pager you said 75 percent of the1750flights are mission rehearsal readiness flights. Are those1751operated with ADS-B Out?1752 General Braman. They are, Senator, yes.1753 Chairman Cruz. So right now, today, the Army is flying1754helicopters in and around DCA airport with ADS-B Out turned1755off. Is that correct?1756 General Braman. When conducting their NORTHCOM-directed1757mission, that is correct.1758 Chairman Cruz. I have to say, I find that shocking and1759deeply unacceptable. And I want to encourage the Army right now1760to revisit that policy, and to revisit that policy today. And I1761can tell you, if the Army chooses not to, I have a high level1762of confidence that Congress will pass legislation mandating1763that you revisit the policy. If today another accident occurs1764over DCA, with another helicopter that has ADS-B Out turned1765off, the Army will have very direct responsibility for that.1766And I am at a loss to come up with any justification for1767risking the lives of the traveling public with that decision.1768You cannot change the decisions made yesterday, but you can1769change decisions made forward.1770 It is my understanding the Army has a memo, August 9, 2024,1771entitled, ``ADS-B Out Off operations in the National1772Airspace.'' My staff requested that memo from you, and my1773understanding is your team declined to provide it. That is also1774unacceptable. I want to ask you at this hearing, will you1775commit to providing that memo to this Committee?1776 General Braman. Senator, I will commit to reviewing the1777information and getting what we can to you, absolutely.1778 Chairman Cruz. That answer needs to be a yes, that you will1779provide that memo to this Committee.1780 General Braman. Senator, I will review that and we will1781look at the ability to give it to the Committee, absolutely.1782 Chairman Cruz. If it is not provided to this Committee1783within 24 hours, I am confident that you will have a senior1784commanding officer give you a direct order to provide that memo1785to this Committee.1786 And I just want to underscore there is no reason the Army1787has to wait for the conclusion of the NTSB report to revisit1788your policy on ADS-B Out. You can do so right now. And I have1789got to tell you, I spent this morning looking in the eyes of1790family members who lost family members. I do not know how I1791would do it tomorrow, to another room of family members who1792lost loved ones, because yet another helicopter was flying with1793ADS-B Out. And so I cannot urge you more strongly, change that1794policy right now.1795 Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell.1796 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too have1797asked for the same memo, so I want to follow on in the same1798line as Senator Cruz. I also want to associate myself with the1799information you are requesting on spectrum interference. This1800is one of the reasons why I think spectrum and spectrum fights1801are so important is because I think the agencies with adjacency1802and issues, we cannot leave this up to the flying public.1803 But I want to go back, because Brigadier General, you1804mentioned in your testimony we now have the additive dialogue1805that we just heard, but you said it is not allowed. You are1806saying it is not allowed. ADS-B Out was not allowed. That is1807what you said earlier. Is that in your testimony? In addition1808to the Holmes letter, you basically stated that using ADS-B1809Out, it was not allowed.1810 General Braman. Army policy is ADS-B Out is not to be used1811for routine use.1812 Senator Cantwell. OK. So Acting Administrator, did you know1813this? Did the FAA know this? Did the FAA know and understand1814and absorb this? Did you know that you were allowing a flight1815to go within 75 feet of each other and there was no signaling1816message that we have already identified as a safety measure, is1817something that we have had as a requirement?1818 Mr. Rocheleau. So I understand the FAA was aware of this.1819We have an existing memorandum of agreement with the Department1820of Defense----1821 Senator Cantwell. Did you know it was 100 percent, as the1822Eleanor Holmes Norton and as--the Brigadier General is pretty1823clear this morning, we don't allow it, even to the point of not1824answering Senator Cruz when they are going to change it.1825Because I am pretty sure their attitude is going to be, ``We1826don't allow it.'' He is going to say he would rather have a1827route somewhere where he can fly without it. That is what he is1828going to say. And so, you know, that is a separate issue over1829here.1830 Our job, though, is the FAA oversight, and you cannot give1831exemptions to things that you do not understand. So he, in1832their application, kind of made it sound like, well, it is not1833going to be that routine. But he is very clear, they are never1834turning it on if they do not have to. They are never turning it1835on.1836 So what I do not understand is why the FAA did not1837understand that? Why you would allow this design--this is the1838wrong design. Whoever said you could fly in this airspace this1839close together, without a safety feature that was already being1840required by the FAA, and then giving them an exemption makes no1841sense. So why did you allow it to happen?1842 Mr. Rocheleau. So I cannot speak to why the previous1843administration may have allowed for that memorandum of1844agreement, which is why we, effective today, will require, in1845any DCA Class B airspace, ADS-B Out to be turned on, except in1846very limited circumstances.1847 Senator Cantwell. What are those other limited1848circumstances? Other agencies? Is there any other agency that1849is doing this?1850 Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 46 different helicopter operators1851within the National Capital Region, but again, DCA Class B1852airspace will now require ADS-B On to be out.1853 Senator Cantwell. What other agencies are operating this1854way?1855 Mr. Rocheleau. So we have certainly a number of military1856units. We have local law enforcement. We certainly have the1857Department of Justice and FBI. We have a number of different1858agencies that fly, the Park Police, and those are the entities1859that we are working with closely now, to make sure, first and1860foremost, they understand the new restrictions that we have in1861the airspace.1862 Senator Cantwell. Do they have exemptions?1863 Mr. Rocheleau. Some of them do.1864 Senator Cantwell. Are you concerned about this?1865 Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely, which is why we immediately put1866in place the requirement to have ADS-B Out on.1867 Senator Cantwell. And so you think they are operating that1868way?1869 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.1870 Senator Cantwell. You think that Homeland Security is1871operating that way?1872 Mr. Rocheleau. Effective today, they will be operating with1873ADS-B On.1874 Senator Cantwell. Effective today?1875 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, ma'am.1876 Senator Cantwell. So over the last month you have known, as1877I am going to submit for the record, a letter from the1878Department of Homeland Security, that basically says under the1879Federal Aviation waiver, all U.S. Customs and Border Protection1880air and marine operations in the Capital Region basically have1881this exemption, as well.1882 [The information referred to follows:]18831884 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]18851886 Mr. Rocheleau. So they haven't had----1887 Senator Cantwell. So I want to understand if people were1888still flying in this airspace, we all fly in and out of this1889airspace. Do we now have to worry about other operators in this1890airspace that may be doing the same thing as happened with the1891military? And now you are telling me you are going to take1892action today?1893 Mr. Rocheleau. I should clarify. Immediately after the1894accident we put the restrictions in place so that no mixed1895traffic could occur--no helicopters and fixed-wing in the same1896airspace. Today, we are requiring the ADS-B Out to be on. So1897previous to this day, the fixed-wing as well as helicopters1898were not allowed in the airspace. So we cleared the complexity1899of that area.1900 Senator Cantwell. Now today you are going to say to1901Homeland Security you have to have ADS-B, basically the1902Automatic Surveillance Broadcast System has to be on. You are1903going to make that today?1904 Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct.1905 Senator Cantwell. Well, I would----1906 Mr. Rocheleau. Or any or the Class B airspace that you can1907see in the graphic, in that red airspace, that is required.1908 Senator Cantwell. Acting Administrator, you are not1909building faith in this system of oversight of the FAA if you1910are telling me that we now have a bunch of other operators in1911this airspace that you now said after the accident were1912prohibited. But now you are going to turn it back on, and if1913they meet this requirement. And we have letters from them,1914thinking that they are exempted. I want to see this rule. This1915would have been a great debate with Mr. Bradbury before the1916Committee.1917 Because the American people, these poor families have lost1918loved ones. This is not their day job. It is your day job. It1919is the day job of the FAA not to allow these exemptions to1920become prolific and everybody use them, and then us have to sit1921here and figure out how to do our oversight job of you, to make1922sure that these details are exposed, when we cannot even get a1923memo from some of these agencies.1924 So, Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but I will1925come for a second round with the witnesses, because I think it1926is clear. The NTSB has been very clear on the requirements for1927ADS-B In, and in this case if they would have listened to1928them--it is $40,000 to equip--I am sorry, it is $20,000 to1929equip one plane. You could probably equip the whole fleet of1930aviation for $100 million. I guarantee you their lives, the1931family lives are worth that.1932 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1933 Senator Moran. Before recognizing Senator Budd, does the1934FAA, Mr. Rocheleau, does it have the authority to supersede the1935operations of the Army and these other agencies in the airspace1936around airports? We have not gotten the Army to say they are1937going to do this with their own policy, but you say you are1938mandating it. Do we know that the Army and others have to1939follow your mandate?1940 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, they do.1941 Senator Moran. OK. Senator Budd.19421943 STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,1944 U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA19451946 Senator Budd. Thank you. First and foremost, I want to1947offer my condolences and prayers to all the families that are1948here today. I am saddened that so many North Carolinians were1949lost in this accident, including Captain Rebecca Lobach and the1950four members of 5342's Charlotte-based flight crew: Samuel1951Lilly, Jonathan Campos, Danasia Elder, and Ian Epstein. Senator1952Moran, I am sorry for the loss of so many Kansans, as well, in1953this incident, and I want to thank you for organizing this1954hearing.1955 Chair Homendy, thanks for your work so far. On page 9 of1956the preliminary report it states that the MPFR, the1957multifunction flight recorder's reading for pressure altitude1958conflicted with other altitude's readings. Ultimately, this1959conflict led your team to invalidate the pressure altitude1960reading provided by the recorder.1961 Can you provide any details on the differing altitude1962readings, and do you have any update on whether this1963conflicting data was limited to the MPFR or if that was1964provided to the flight crew and perhaps was a confusing factor?1965 Ms. Homendy. We are still looking into that and doing some1966testing. What I will say is the pressure altitude was1967determined invalid on the Black Hawk because we would expect1968that to be somewhat similar to the CRJ. But it was much lower,1969so we determined that that was invalid, and it could not be1970used to calculate the barometric altitude. We would need two1971sets of data, which was pressure altitude and barometric1972pressure setting. We had the pressure setting. We do not have1973the pressure altitude data for that. So we were not able to1974determine from that what the barometric altitude was of the1975Black Hawk. However, we are looking at other data.1976 Senator Budd. OK. Thank you. General Braman, PAT 25 was1977operating out of Davidson Army Airfield on a pilot annual1978standardization mission at the time of the collision. Given the1979concentration of senior military and civilian officials1980surrounding DCA, how vital are these missions to readiness for1981continuity of government operations?1982 General Braman. Senator, they are extremely vital. To go1983back to Senator Cruz's question about how many flights, 751984percent of the missions flown by the 12th Aviation Battalion1985are in direct support of the continuity of government1986rehearsals, exercises, and making sure crews are familiar with1987how to get that mission accomplished. And they stand ready1988every single day in a 15-minute alert stream to do that1989mission.1990 Senator Budd. Thank you, General. Can the Army continue to1991fulfill its priority air transport missions without access to1992Route 1 and Route 4?1993 General Braman. The Army, the fact that we are in the1994working groups will allow us to help influence routing, that1995will allow us to continue to do that mission, and I am1996confident we can do that.1997 Senator Budd. Thank you. Chair Homendy again, in your view,1998is the permanent closure of Route 4 the only solution that1999allows for continued operations of both rotary and fixed-wing2000aircraft around DCA?2001 Ms. Homendy. And it is permanent closure when Runway 15 and2002Runway 33 are in use. That was our recommendation to the FAA.2003 Senator Budd. Thank you. Administrator Rocheleau, the2004aviation investigation report from the NTSB shows that the2005separation between aircraft on approach to Runway 33 would have2006a mere 75 feet of separation from a helicopter operating on2007Route 4 and hugging the shoreline of the east bank of the2008Potomac. Was the FAA aware of this conflict prior to January200929, and given the insufficient vertical separation that we are2010talking about, was the FAA relying solely on controllers in the2011DCA tower to deconflict the approach to Runway 33?2012 Mr. Rocheleau. So the FAA was aware of the design of that2013airspace in advance of December [sic] 29th. I would say that is2014one of the reasons why we immediately restricted that airspace2015after the incident, to review the circumstances around the2016airspace itself. In addition to that, it is one of the reasons2017why we are looking at hotspots or mixed traffic areas around2018the nation, whether that is Boston, Dallas, L.A., and2019Anchorage.2020 Senator Budd. Thank you.2021 Ms. Homendy. Senator, can I----2022 Senator Budd. Please.2023 Ms. Homendy. There is a D.C. Helicopter Working Group that2024we have been trying to figure out who is part of the working2025group and get minutes and get documents from that working group2026to see what information was shared and what was discussed over2027the years. We have not been able to attain that yet, and I hope2028we can, from FAA and others.2029 Senator Budd. Are you a part of that working group?2030 Ms. Homendy. We are not part of that working group.2031 Senator Budd. But you have access to it, and they are2032willing to provide what they find.2033 Ms. Homendy. We have requested information. We have not2034even been able to identify who is part of the working group2035firmly and get documents as part of that working group. We have2036requested all of that information because we do want to2037evaluate what was discussed. We are also going to interview the2038FAA cartographers on how this route was mapped, because that 752039feet is max. That is the maximum. It goes down from there as2040commercial aircraft approach Runway 33.2041 Senator Budd. Thank you.2042 Senator Moran. So let me see if I can help Senator Homendy,2043Chairman Homendy.2044 Ms. Homendy. That is a very hard job.2045 Senator Moran. You are very good at public relations with2046Senators, but we recognize the challenges you face.2047 So do either one of you belong to this working group? Does2048the Army or the FAA participate, and can you answer that so the2049NTSB can pursue information?2050 Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is the FAA's working group.2051 Senator Moran. It is the FAA's working group. All right.2052Mr. Rocheleau, what is the problem here?2053 Mr. Rocheleau. I am happy to work with the Chair. We have2054been working extremely closely together on this investigation,2055and I am happy to work with the Chair and understand why she2056has not received that information, and make sure we follow up2057on that.2058 Senator Moran. Can you think of any reason that the NTSB2059should not be a part of that information, Mr. Rocheleau?2060 Mr. Rocheleau. Off the top of my head I cannot. I do not2061know why they would be restricted in that, and I certainly will2062talk to my folks when we get back.2063 Senator Moran. Thank you.2064 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.2065 Senator Moran. Should we ask, is the Army part of this2066working group, as well?2067 General Braman. The Army is part of the working group. Yes,2068Senator.2069 Ms. Homendy. There are apparently 17 entities that are part2070of the working group. We just have not been able to verify who2071all the entities are.2072 Senator Moran. Surely the FAA is in charge and they can2073help you.2074 Mr. Rocheleau. Surely I would have been happy to understand2075that before today.2076 Senator Moran. General, do you know any reasons that the2077working group's efforts cannot be known by NTSB?2078 General Braman. Absolutely not.2079 Senator Moran. Thank you. Let me follow up. Mr. Rocheleau2080indicated that the FAA does have the authority to require ADS-B2081Out. Do you agree with that assessment that the FAA can make2082this decision, and if you do not follow the FAA policies then2083you are precluded from the airspace?2084 General Braman. Chairman, the Army operates 100 percent2085under FAA authority.2086 Senator Moran. Very good. Let me turn to perhaps the next2087steps or new information, and to this I will go to Chair2088Homendy. Since the report that we are discussing here today is20892 weeks old, what has transpired, if anything, in those 22090weeks? Have you discovered any new and relevant information2091that you can share with us?2092 Ms. Homendy. Where would you like me to begin? One thing I2093can say on ADS-B Out Off, that is policy of the Army. But we2094are still looking at installation programming and potential for2095equipment malfunction. And the reason I mention this is because2096the accident helicopter, for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B2097data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days2098prior to the accident. And that was abnormal.2099 So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion. The2100battalion had 25 helicopters, that includes this particular2101helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were2102transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned on, because we2103have to verify that it is working.2104 There were 16 Limas, including the accident helicopter,2105which we are still looking at. But 7 were transmitting when2106ADS-B Out was turned on, 8 were not, and stopped doing so2107sometime between May and November 2023. We do not know why.2108Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified2109the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the2110reason.2111 So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out2112on, but you also have to make sure that it is working.2113 Senator Moran. You indicated working with the Army, but2114there are other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing2115it to the Army as if something is necessarily wrong there, or2116more broadly there is a problem in receiving the information?2117 Ms. Homendy. For this, for the ADS-B Out on, we wanted to2118look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion, to see whether2119ADS-B Out on, when turned on, was actually transmitting data.2120Because we did think it was abnormal that for the helicopter2121involved in the accident, it was not transmitting data for so2122long.2123 Senator Moran. Any explanation, General?2124 General Braman. Chairman, this exactly is what the value of2125the investigation is. There are things that you would not2126normally look at that are being determined here, and that is2127certainly going to help us drive policy and any changes that we2128need to do as a result of the investigation, and certainly the2129NTSB has the expertise to do that.2130 Senator Moran. So what we are hearing from Chair Homendy is2131that it may be transmitting, it may be on, but there is no2132receipt, there are, I don't know, technical problems in the2133process by which it is--it is not providing the information it2134is supposed to provide, right?2135 General Braman. Chairman, obviously the functionality of2136any Army equipment, and certainly Army aviation equipment, is2137important to me. So if we are discovering there is a challenge2138there, we will take direct action, absolutely.2139 Senator Moran. This is not an inconsequential thing, right?2140 Ms. Homendy. It is not, and I think for the public2141watching, because I think there are a lot of people watching,2142is ADS-B Out broadcast latitude, longitude, altitude, and2143velocity once per second. It updates once per second versus 42144to 6 seconds for radar, which is significant when you have2145converging aircraft.2146 Senator Moran. Mr. Rocheleau, you indicated as of today2147there is a change in policy at FAA. I would be interested in2148knowing if that change in policy is only related to DCA2149airspace, or you are putting those requirements in place for2150other airports?2151 Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator. So the requirements that2152I announced today are effective for the D.C. Class B airspace2153immediately. Part of our ongoing work, as I related earlier,2154with respect to hotspots and the mixed traffic that we have2155seen that could be problematic are areas where we are looking2156at kind of adding that requirement in. It seems premature2157simply along the lines of the way airspace is structured in2158different locations that we need to focus before acting too2159quickly.2160 So we want to make sure that as we are looking at the2161different airspaces and how they are constructed that we are2162taking kind of intentional, careful action.2163 Senator Moran. And that intentional action is underway.2164 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.2165 Senator Moran. You are doing that at other airports today.2166 Mr. Rocheleau. Absolutely. And wherever we find a risk, we2167will mitigate that risk immediately.2168 Senator Moran. Chairman Homendy, I asked you a question and2169I interrupted you, and it sounded like your answer would be2170lengthy, of the things you have learned in the last 2 weeks. I2171will come back to you after recognizing the two Senators to my2172left.2173 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to2174follow up on what Chairwoman Homendy is talking about, testing2175the ADS-B Out, whether it is actually transmitting data because2176the data was not received. Will we be able to check that with2177all of the other rotary wing operators that are in this region2178as well? Is that something that FAA should be mandating, that2179they could do that? I mean, you are not looking at the other2180operators because they are not part of this accident. Correct?2181So then my question for Mr. Rocheleau is, will the FAA be2182directing all of the other helicopter operators, whether it is2183Homeland Security, local law enforcement, who have this2184exemption to ADS-B Out? Will you be directing that they2185actually test their equipment to make sure that it is actually2186transmitting the data that can be received?2187 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator. I think that is part of our2188ongoing work and the collaboration between those operators and2189how we make sure they first and foremost understand the2190requirement, and second, that their equipment is functional.2191 Senator Duckworth. OK. Thank you. I wanted to also follow2192up on my earlier questioning about the FAA's air traffic2193controller workforce. You had committed to looking at the list2194of names I gave you, that I will be giving you, for the air2195traffic controllers who are waiting for medical review. I would2196like for you to commit to reporting back to me in writing about2197how many controllers around the country are waiting for medical2198clearances so that they can return to work, and what the FAA is2199doing to make sure these medical reviews are happening in a2200timely manner.2201 Mr. Rocheleau. I will commit to that.2202 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. In the race to hire more air2203traffic controllers--and the staffing was adequate on that2204evening but we could have used more air traffic controllers,2205obviously--and in the race to hire more air traffic2206controllers, I want to make sure the FAA does not lower your2207long-standing high standards for air traffic controllers. There2208could be a temptation to sacrifice effectiveness for2209efficiency, but the FAA must stick to its stringent standards2210to protect safety.2211 Can you assure this Committee that as the administration2212works to hire more air traffic controllers you will not, in any2213way, lower the high standards that are currently required for2214individuals to become certified air traffic controllers? And2215there are plenty of places, a lot of them are in, actually,2216Kansas, that have the expertise to help us train air traffic2217controllers, as long as we keep those high standards.2218 Mr. Rocheleau. One hundred percent. Part of our ongoing2219activity to surge in air traffic controller hiring is to look2220for the best and the brightest, and that is exactly what we are2221going to continue to do.2222 Senator Duckworth. Thank you.2223 Senator Moran. To follow up on Senator Duckworth, you2224should look to Kansas, and we welcome you.2225 I am going to turn to Senator Schmitt in just one second.2226General, the Senator from Illinois was asking about routine2227maintenance and determining whether equipment is working. Do2228you have a standard in place? What Chairwoman Homendy said does2229not make sense to me that you would not know there were2230problems with the transmission or the equipment. Do you have a2231protocol in place, and is that equipment inspected on a2232continuing basis?2233 General Braman. Certainly, Chairman, generally the aviation2234operations we have protocols for the status of aircraft. I will2235have to get back to you, take it for the record, on what the2236protocol is to ensure that ADS-B Out transmissions outside of2237the aircraft are being received. It is something I will have to2238look at, on how do we do that.2239 Senator Moran. And whether protocol is being followed?2240 General Braman. Absolutely.2241 Senator Moran. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.22422243 STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT,2244 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI22452246 Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my2247friend from Illinois would agree. I certainly do not want to2248see us reduce standards. I guess in following in that same2249spirit, with Mr. Rocheleau, can you commit that no hiring2250decisions will be made based on race?2251 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, we are looking for the best2252and the brightest, and we are prioritizing those who are best2253qualified.2254 Senator Schmitt. Because as you know, there is a lawsuit by2255about a thousand folks who are claiming that they did not get a2256job because of their race, at the FAA.2257 Mr. Rocheleau. We are all about making sure the best and2258the brightest are there, and we do that through a grading2259mechanism.2260 Senator Schmitt. That is great to hear. I did want to ask,2261General--and again, I apologize if this has been asked before.2262They are running us in and out of here, different committee2263hearings, Armed Services. I did want to ask, this was a very2264strong crew in the Black Hawk. Is it typical, I guess, is it a2265problem--is it typical and is it a problem to have someone who2266is a lower rank as the--and this is my understanding, that the2267evaluator was a lower rank than the pilot. Is that a typical2268situation? Is that problematic? Is that not a problem? Do you2269think it contributed in any way? I just wanted to get your2270assessment.2271 General Braman. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is2272extremely typical in Army aviation because the preponderance of2273our force is our warrant officers, and they are our2274professional aviators. That is what they do for their entire2275career. So they are instructor pilots, they are maintenance2276test pilots, safety officers, and our commissioned officers2277fill roles of leadership within the organization. So it is very2278routine to have a senior member being evaluated by a junior2279member.2280 Senator Schmitt. OK. And I am sure you have gone through2281this analysis. I just feel like in the spirit of making sure we2282are getting this right, moving forward, that you do not think2283there is a systemic problem associated with maybe somebody with2284a lower rank saying something to somebody of a higher rank in2285those kinds of situations. You have gone through that analysis,2286I am assuming?2287 General Braman. Absolutely. And the personalities of crew2288members and capabilities is something that is considered in2289that risk brief process for every single flight. Is it the2290right crew? Is the crew mixed properly? Commanders would know2291if there are issues with, as simple as they do not get along,2292and commanders will take that into account before approving any2293fight.2294 Senator Schmitt. And I guess for the FAA--and again, maybe2295you have been asked this before--clearly in the Chairman's2296opening statement and a number of the Committee members, just2297the report, the statistics of the number of near misses between2298helicopters and aircraft landing at DCA, that, you know, those2299operations now have been halted. Can you just explain to the2300American people why that did not happen before?2301 Mr. Rocheleau. So, again, I will say that the reports that2302came in previously were certainly analyzed, but something was2303missed. And since that time, we have been using new tools2304available to us, artificial intelligence, machine learning, to2305be able to scan the tens of millions of data points, to be able2306to do that analysis in a more proactive and ideally at some2307point here, predictive way, to identify risks earlier and to2308mitigate that risk.2309 Senator Schmitt. But this was not a new issue at DCA,2310right? This is an issue that had been a longstanding concern.2311Is that accurate?2312 Mr. Rocheleau. It is accurate. There were a number of2313reports that came in, and I would say that we, as I mentioned2314earlier, we investigate every single near-midair collision, and2315even as we talk about spectrum issues, Chairman Cruz mentioned,2316we have teams that go out and assess the airspace itself,2317making sure that we are working with partners, whether it is on2318counter-UAS technology, to make sure that airspace is as clean2319as possible from interference.2320 Senator Schmitt. And so moving forward, obviously as a2321response to the tragedy that happened--and I would be remiss2322not to express my condolences to the families who are here. I2323know everyone has, and it is devastating for each and every one2324of you, including some folks from back home. So your advocacy2325does matter, and it will carry beyond today. This is important.2326 So I ask in the spirit of that. Moving forward then, is2327that how you see things, that the state of play as it is2328currently now will continue?2329 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. We will continue to use the latest2330tools we have to be able to assess that data and work with the2331industry, with the aviation ecosystem, if you will, to identify2332that risk early and to mitigate that risk immediately.2333 Senator Schmitt. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2334 Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Mr. Rocheleau,2335at the moment, whether it is on or off is irrelevant because2336there are no flights--you are announcing something that does2337not, at the moment matter because you have not lifted the ban2338on the flights. Is that true?2339 Mr. Rocheleau. So it is helpful if I can just point to the2340graphic. In the graphic I can explain that in the yellow-2341sectioned area, the graphic there, that is where there is no2342mixed traffic--no helicopters, no fixed-wing--except for those2343very few circumstances where we have emergency, national2344security type of traffic.2345 In the red section, in that red airspace, is where ADS-B2346Out--so DCA Class B airspace is now required.2347 You will also notice where, based on the NTSB2348recommendations, where we have eliminated Route 4, going north2349to south on the Potomac, as well as Route 6, that formerly, you2350can see on the left side of the graphic, was in effect from the2351west to the east, where Bolling Air Force Base is.2352 Senator Moran. I will have to think about that. Yes, sir.2353 Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just for the2354record, because I see we have several colleagues----2355 Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized.2356 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify2357on your point, Acting Administrator, we still have a rule that2358says they have an exemption, all sensitive. So I know you are2359making a declaration today, but I do not think that supersedes2360the rule. Now, maybe President Trump is going to call all these2361agencies and tell them to stand down, but legally, whatever the2362FAA is doing today, does not take precedent over that rule. So2363when I come back for a second round----2364 Senator Duckworth. I believe the FAA has control over that2365airspace and they can say----2366 Senator Cantwell. They can definitely shut it down. But as2367it relates to the rule, his decision just to say that you now2368have this requirement, that a rule gave them an exemption to.2369 Senator Duckworth. I think you can issue an emergency2370directive. Is that correct?2371 Mr. Rocheleau. So the agreement we have in place with the2372helicopter operations that fly without ADS-B Out is an actual2373memorandum of agreement. It is not a formal rule. So it is an2374agreement we have with the Department of Defense and the other2375helicopter operators in the D.C. area.2376 Senator Cantwell. And we can get a copy of that, the MOU?2377 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.2378 Senator Cantwell. Thank you.2379 Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper.23802381 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,2382 U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO23832384 Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Rocheleau,2385you earlier testified that you have looked at the airports with2386higher volumes of mixed traffic. I think you mentioned Boston,2387Dallas, Anchorage. Is that assessment--have you gone through2388all the airports? I mean, does that mean that other airports in2389other large cities, or where we have a fair amount of mixed2390traffic, are OK?2391 Mr. Rocheleau. So we have 10 locations, a total of 212392airports. So we are doing this hotspot review, this mixed2393traffic review across the nation, including in the Anchorage2394area. So we are reviewing all the airspace designs to see where2395we may have this indicator of risk with mixed traffic, so2396helicopter operations as well as fixed wing.2397 Senator Hickenlooper. And so you mentioned Boston, Dallas,2398and Anchorage. That is not the full list, I assume.2399 Mr. Rocheleau. That is correct, sir.2400 Senator Hickenlooper. And so when will this be done?2401 Mr. Rocheleau. So obviously 21 locations, I am receiving2402regular updates. I anticipate that activity being concluded in2403the next couple of weeks. I will tell you that our teams, they2404are being very intentional about how they go through that2405airspace, because it has been built over time as it relates to2406helicopter routes and other approaches and departure routes.2407 So we are being very intentional, very careful. We do not2408want to move quickly, with inducing additional risk.2409 Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that. But obviously time2410is of the essence in a situation like this, making sure that2411even a preliminary warning as part of that assessment would be2412pretty valuable.2413 Mr. Rocheleau. And any indicator that there is an emerging2414risk, we would take immediate action.2415 Senator Hickenlooper. Ms. Homendy, you have, in the past2416talked about workforce and making sure that you are fully2417staffed, and I think this is a direct follow up on that. Are we2418fully staffed? I mean, you are going to look at this entire2419incident, and it is going to take the typical year and a half2420or two years, which, again, drives a lot of my constituents2421crazy. Do you have a timeline for when you will finish the full2422incident report, or whatever the legal description is, when2423that will happen?2424 Ms. Homendy. We have committed to 1 year, barring any2425unforeseen circumstances, but one year.2426 Senator Hickenlooper. And you have enough staffing on that?2427 Ms. Homendy. We have 40 experts at the NTSB that are2428currently leading this investigation. It is a high workload2429because it is not their only investigation that they are2430focused on. But they are very committed to this one. And then2431we have an entire agency that supports them.2432 Senator Hickenlooper. All right. We had an array of past2433reports. It varies dramatically. But I appreciate the fact that2434you are trying to accelerate this. I think it frustrates a lot2435of people that it takes so long--I mean, how long does it take2436to gather the facts?2437 Ms. Homendy. I mean, it is a complex investigation, and our2438investigations are very broad, and there is a lot of2439information that can change over time, and we are very fact-2440based, following the evidence. So that is our credibility, so2441we want to be exact when we issue something.2442 I will say I do have to congratulate our workforce because2443when I came on as Chair we had well over 400, close to 5002444reports that were 2, 3, 4 years old, and they are now below 2.2445So that is significant.2446 But the complexity of investigations, and then the fact2447that some things we do not have control over, like if we cannot2448get access to evidence because a district attorney or law2449enforcement is prohibiting us in a certain situation, with a2450highway crash. That can extend the timeline.2451 Senator Hickenlooper. Sure. No, no, I have seen that. But I2452think on something like this, where time is of the essence, I2453appreciate you guys making the effort, and glad to hear that2454you have the workforce.2455 Mr. Rocheleau, in your testimony you highlighted some of2456the recent changes in hiring, and also especially in the2457training processes, to make sure we have more qualified air2458traffic controllers but full workforce. I know you are working2459with local colleges all over the country on that.2460 Is that effective? Is that working? I mean, I think if we2461can accelerate that--Metro State in Denver is a place where2462they are turning out some of these members. Is that something2463you can ramp up?2464 Mr. Rocheleau. I am very interested, and the Secretary has2465been very clear, with the public as well as with me, that we2466need to surge this hiring and do it well, again, back to the2467testing, the surge, bringing people in. As it relates to2468additional college initiatives, we have an Enhanced College2469Training Initiative, ECTIs, that we are using in I believe four2470universities right now. We are working with them, with respect2471to advanced simulators and the like, to make sure that we can2472get more what we will call throughput, but more controllers2473through those schools, and get them out to the local2474facilities, centers, towers, TRACONs.2475 Senator Hickenlooper. Great. I am out of time. I yield back2476to the Chair. Thank you all.2477 Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan.24782479 STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,2480 U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA24812482 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me start2483by saying that my heart goes out to the families and loved ones2484of the victims lost in the American Airlines Flight 53422485disaster at DCA, and not long after that, unfortunately, as2486well, the Bering Air crash near Unalakleet and Nome, Alaska,2487flying over the Norton Sound area. And I am thankful for the2488Chairman for holding this hearing and appreciate the NTSB, and2489FAA, and DoD focusing on the after actions, so this does not2490happen again, either here in D.C. or in my state.2491 And I do want to focus a little bit on my state, the great2492state of Alaska, because as I think all three of you know, we2493have very high rates of airplane crashes, highest in the2494country, and airplane crash fatalities, which is why we2495launched, with the NTSB's good work in 2020, and the FAA's good2496work in 2020, the FAA Alaska Safety Initiative, called FAASI.2497And in last year's FAA reauthorization I was able to include a2498number of provisions with the goal of reducing the rate of2499fatal aircraft accidents by 90 percent--that is a very2500ambitious goal--and require the FAA to improve maintenance of2501weather equipment.2502 So, Mr. Administrator, I want to get into that topic a2503little bit. I was just home. It came up a lot, how there might2504be cancellations of weather operations and infrastructure and2505reporting, which makes zero sense to me. I hope our Federal2506Government is not doing that. But one of the things in the FAA2507bill, I was able to include requirements for systematic2508improvements to the maintenance of our weather systems and2509advancing new technologies, and this includes a mandate for the2510FAA to take necessary actions to restore full connectivity of2511weather systems that are unable to disseminate information due2512to a telecommunications failure. We have telecommunications2513challenges in a state the size of mine.2514 So you can you talk to that, Administrator Rocheleau? And2515then I would like to get an update from your perspective on2516where we are on the FAASI initiative. As you know, the2517Secretary of Transportation, in our press conference that we2518all did together--and again, I appreciate everybody2519participating in that--has made this a very top priority of2520his, and yet as we saw in Alaska we had a fatal crash that2521hopefully we are going to learn from.2522 Can I ask you on the data link, telecoms, weather2523reporting, which is a big deal for my state?2524 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. I appreciate that. And I2525appreciate the opportunity to talk a little bit more, based on2526our previous conversation, your leadership. As a result of that2527and your request I did travel recently to Alaska to go and2528understand more. I met with the NTSB lead investigator along2529with my investigators as it related to the Bering Air tragedy.2530 Senator Sullivan. By the way, thank you both for coming up2531to Alaska. I know it is not the easiest, closest state to get2532to from Washington, D.C., but it is important that you are2533showing my constituents that it matters.2534 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I agree. It is very important,2535I understand having been there a number of times, the unique2536nature of Alaska, certainly its topography as well as the need2537for safe aviation operations.2538 So related to, again, reauthorization and the commitment to2539work to have better communications throughout Alaska, one of2540the initiatives, one of the reasons I went to Anchorage was to2541understand more about how the maintenance issues, the2542connectivity issues, whether that is on the telco side or2543satellite. And one of the things we are doing right now, and I2544met with our own technical operations people in the area, to2545test Starlink, so satellite. Because of the unique nature of2546it, and the difficulty with telco, we needed another solution.2547And one of the ways we believe we can do that is using2548satellite-based technology. So that is what we are2549experimenting with right now.2550 Senator Sullivan. Well, by the way, I really appreciate--2551you know, the press here kind of went crazy, and oh, Starlink.2552I mean, that is actually really helpful for us. And we2553appreciated the Secretary called me and said, ``Hey, we are2554going to connect some of these terminals through Starlink,2555because that is the most effective way to do it.'' So I2556appreciated that you guys were working it.2557 Can you give me an update, or Madam Chair, an update on the2558FAASI Initiative, and then any preliminary findings you are2559seeing from the NTSB preliminary report on the Bering Air2560crash?2561 Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, this needs to be your last2562question.2563 Senator Sullivan. It is, Mr. Chairman.2564 Ms. Homendy. We are still working on that investigation, of2565course. The preliminary report was issued and did find that the2566aircraft was over 1,000 pounds overweight. But we also are2567going to look at the center of gravity on that airplane and see2568how that factored in. And then we are really focused in on2569weather that day, as well. As you noted, weather infrastructure2570is critical for Alaska, and we have a number of recommendations2571on weather observing stations and also the importance of pilot2572reports and having air traffic control when a pilot reports2573weather conditions, to pass that information along to other2574pilots in the area. And that is something we are looking at as2575part of this investigation, in particular.2576 Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.2577Chairman.2578 Senator Moran. Senator Sullivan, thank you. I do not want2579to diminish the circumstances that Alaskans faced and the2580circumstance you, as their Senator, represent. We are trying to2581get everybody's questions in before the vote closes, and I2582recognize Senator Klobuchar.25832584 STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,2585 U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA25862587 Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Chairman. Thank2588you. And to the families, such a tragedy, and I know there are2589those watching at home as well, including the family of Wendy2590Jo Schaffer, a Minnesotan, mom, two little kids, and husband,2591and we lost her.2592 So, Chair, I want to thank you for your work. I know how2593complicated these investigations are. And could you just2594briefly talk about any open recommendations on communications2595that do not come out of this, that the NTSB--I know you have2596over 1,000 open safety recommendations. And while this2597investigation is ongoing, just open recommendations related to2598technology and anything that would improve communication?2599 Ms. Homendy. Related to this investigation?2600 Senator Klobuchar. Not related.2601 Ms. Homendy. Oh, not related. We have a number of2602recommendations that remain open, including a number of2603recommendations issued to the FAA. On communications, in2604particular, I mean one thing I will mention, that we have not2605talked about, that we are looking at as part of this2606investigation, is our long-standing belief that ADS-B In also2607needs to be mandated by the FAA. We do not know what relevance2608that has to this investigation yet. However, it is a long-2609standing position of the NTSB. It will provide key information2610to pilots. And in 2008, in our comments for Notice of Proposed2611Rulemaking to FAA, where they decided not to require it, we2612said equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will provide2613an immediate and substantial contribution to safety.2614 Just a couple of years ago, and we just talked about2615Alaska, we investigated a midair collision in Ketchikan, and we2616reiterated--and this is the statement--that NTSB remains2617concerned that without a requirement to install and use ADS-B2618supported airborne traffic advisory systems, midair collisions2619will continue to occur. And that was in 2019. So we will look2620at that as part of this investigation.2621 Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. We all know full funding2622of the FAA could not be more important. Last year, we passed2623the bipartisan FAA Bill to improve aviation, workforce2624training. And actually Senator Braun, then-Senator Braun, now2625Governor, and I had the bill to require the FAA to conduct2626maximum hiring of air traffic controllers at the FAA Academy.2627And I guess I would ask you, Acting Director Rocheleau, you2628discussed in your testimony the efforts that Secretary Duffy2629and the FAA have taken to bolster the air traffic workforce. I2630think 91 percent of the air traffic control facilities operate2631below recommended staffing levels. I think they are 3,000-some2632short. This I got from some of the people who do this work.2633 Can you talk to the current state of staffing and how do2634you plan to maintain recruiting levels? We did have an2635increase, I believe, last year.2636 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, Senator, and thank you for the2637question. This is a very important issue for the Secretary and2638myself, as we look at the safety of the national airspace2639system, in general, but certainly as we are looking to bring2640the best and brightest controllers into the airspace system, to2641make sure that we are providing that safety for Americans as2642they travel through the air.2643 I would say that as a result of this surge we had over264410,000 applications. Over 8,000 of those have now been referred2645to testing. We have streamlined the process, cut roughly 52646months off that process. So going forward we intend to have no2647empty seat at any upcoming Academy classes.2648 I would also say that we expect our partnerships with other2649schools, universities, to be able to bring more people into the2650career field itself. It is an exciting career. And even2651incentivizing students to come to Oklahoma City, with an2652additional 30 percent. We have kind of put all our focus on2653this effort in addition to the many other things we have got2654going on. But controller hiring is of paramount importance.2655 Senator Klobuchar. Very good. As you know, we have very2656active airports in Minnesota, a major hub. I would ask you to2657look at the Duluth air traffic control tower, just because it2658is the third-oldest in the Nation. And Secretary Duffy is aware2659of it. It has had flooding, and it is a major air base up2660there, as well, for the Guard.2661 Mr. Rocheleau. Thank you, Senator.2662 Senator Klobuchar. Yes. And Representative Stauber and I2663have been working together on that.2664 Anyway, last question is just the importance of fully2665funding the FAA. Quickly for both of you, or all three of you--2666--2667 Ms. Homendy. I can talk about fully funding the NTSB.2668 Senator Klobuchar. Yes, please do.2669 Ms. Homendy. I mean, you are important, but we did get an2670increase in funding that I do want to thank you for, to 145 in2671the CR. It was an anomaly. But for fully staffing the NTSB,2672right now we are at 427. We went down in the last couple of2673months because people left. We will be able to go up to 450.2674But fully staffing the NTSB to accomplish our mission would2675require hiring between 485 and 500 personnel, which requires2676resources. So as you consider Fiscal Year 2026, it would be2677helpful.2678 Senator Klobuchar. That is very helpful.2679 Mr. Rocheleau. And I certainly echo those sentiments. Fully2680funding the FAA is critical, not just for the workforce but for2681our facilities and equipment. The situation is quite concerning2682to me, as I review over 30 percent of our facilities being2683unsustainable going forward. We have to invest in that2684infrastructure going forward.2685 Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I know that is no solace to2686the families, but knowing that you are stepping back and2687looking at all of this right now, so other tragedies can be2688avoided. It could not be more important. So thank you very2689much.2690 Senator Moran. It gives me an opportunity to editorialize.2691We need to pass appropriation bills and not continue to utilize2692continuing resolutions. That is directed at not necessarily at2693my colleagues here, but my colleagues generally.2694 Senator Duckworth.2695 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with2696your last statement. I just have two quick questions. General2697Braman, I have never had a warrant officer be afraid to tell me2698when I was doing something wrong in the aircraft, and I prefer2699to have them as a pilot-in-command to myself. Speak a little2700bit to crew resource management and how it works in an air2701crew, and speaking to Senator Schmitt's question, not just2702about between the two pilots but also the role of the crew2703chief, and do they have the ability to speak up, as well?2704 General Braman. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth. There2705is nothing more important in the air crew than crew resource2706management, and that is taught from day one, and everyone has2707an equal voice. Obviously, the pilot-in-command is the one that2708is designated with the authority to command that aircraft, but2709I have never been in an aircraft that was ever in an2710environment where all members were not a valued member of the2711team, and we rely on all those members to accomplish the2712missions we are doing.2713 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am just going to wrap up by2714saying how important it is to fund and resource the NTSB. You2715guys do amazing work. You, yourself, Chairwoman, oftentimes I2716will call you when something happens, whether it was a door2717plug incident or something, and you were already on the ground2718or in the air, on your way there. And you need the resources to2719do your work. And as we are seeing from this investigation, how2720critically important that is, not just to find out what2721happened, but to prevent future accidents. So I could not agree2722with you more that we should be funding you.2723 Mr. Rocheleau, I think we also need to look at the2724facilities at FAA, and we need to talk to that. I would love to2725get your commitment to come out and tour the facilities in the2726Chicagoland area and see the condition of this repair that they2727are in.2728 Mr. Rocheleau. I commit to that. Thank you, Senator.2729 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And with that I am going to2730turn it back over to the Chairman, who has been very generous.2731 Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. I am going to2732ask just a couple of tidbits--I hope they are important2733questions more than tidbits--but I hope they will be short so I2734can go vote, and I think that Senator Duckworth will close out2735the hearing in my absence.2736 First of all, the fact that ADS-B Out, there is evidence2737that transmissions were not received. And apparently the Army2738does not know that they were not received. Why doesn't the FAA2739know they are not received?2740 Mr. Rocheleau. I am not aware of that. I know it is part of2741the ongoing investigation. I do not believe that we receive any2742helicopter information from the Army.2743 Senator Moran. But somebody has to be reporting that they2744were sent but not received. Who do they report that to?2745 Mr. Rocheleau. Again, I think that is part of the2746investigation. My assumption would be the Army.2747 Senator Moran. OK.2748 Senator Duckworth. Well, no. The Army could have it turned2749on but I think what the Chairwoman is saying is that the2750receiving stations got no data, so the Army has got it turned2751on and they do not know that it is not receiving. So this is,2752again, this communication issue between the different agencies.2753 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth was speaking on my behalf.2754She said it exactly right.2755 Senator Duckworth. I said you were generous.2756 Senator Moran. I think this is my concluding question, and2757then I recognize Senator Markey. This is to you, Mr. Rocheleau.2758What is the current state of operations at DCA? How are they2759different today than they were on January 29?2760 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Again, I appreciate the2761opportunity to explain. So immediately after January 29, we2762restricted the airspace in the yellow boxes I showed in the2763previous graphic for mixed traffic. So no helicopters or fixed-2764wing will be in that box, if you will.2765 Senator Moran. The yellow.2766 Mr. Rocheleau. The yellow box, going forward. In the red2767section----2768 Senator Moran. That is still true today.2769 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and that is permanent. We have2770made that permanent. We have also eliminated Route 4 and Route27716, the crossing that goes over to Bolling Air Force Base from2772DCA.2773 Senator Moran. Any other changes? I would ask about number2774of flights. It appears to me, and my understanding is there are2775fewer flights utilizing Reagan National Airport?2776 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir. Thank you. So in the aftermath we2777reduced the arrival rate. A lot of that was to support the NTSB2778ongoing investigation and the emergency response work. Today we2779are running at what we call a 30 rate, so 30 arrivals an hour.2780And we are doing that largely in partnership--I mean, we have2781received great information from the NTSB regarding some2782feedback they were receiving during their preliminary2783investigation, regarding the workload on the controllers2784themselves. Obviously, a tragic event has an effect. I mean,2785these people come to work every day. They care about what they2786do. And so we reduced the rate down to 26. Slowly we moved back2787to now we are at 30 rate.2788 Senator Moran. And will stay constant or change in the2789future?2790 Mr. Rocheleau. Right now that is constant. That is staying.2791We are continuing to monitor that.2792 Senator Moran. For the foreseeable future, the 30--is it279332?--30?2794 Mr. Rocheleau. It can go to 32, but right now we are at 30,2795and we plan to maintain that until such time as we assess the2796safety and being able to go to a higher rate.2797 Senator Moran. Senator Markey, are you OK if I continue2798just a moment? I often, almost without exception, when I am2799chairing a hearing, ask the witnesses at the end, at the2800conclusion of the hearing, is there anything that you want to2801correct that you did not say, as you wish to say it, something2802you want to make sure we hear. And then I will turn the2803conducting this hearing over to Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?2804 Ms. Homendy. That is when all my staff cringe when I chime2805in. On this one, I would say I know there is a lot of focus on2806the FAA right now. I do think they are very focused on safety.2807We have an excellent relationship and have been in2808communication constantly since this accident.2809 I would say one area we are really looking at also is how2810the Army evaluates when there is reporting of close calls. Do2811they get those reports, the Army I am talking about, and how do2812they communicate? At the battalion level, how do they2813communicate and talk about safety? How do they evaluate safety?2814Are they getting reports? Are they monitoring their own2815helicopters that might exceed altitude levels?2816 We have found so far that a lot of the conversation and2817safety discussion at the battalion level is really focused on2818OSHA's slips, trips, and falls. There is a disconnect on some2819of the discussion around safety and safety assurance from the2820Army as a whole versus the battalion level. So we are really2821looking at that.2822 Senator Moran. Please answer this question, but just in my2823absence.2824 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the opportunity.2825I just want to make it crystal clear that something was missed2826at the DCA crash. I take that seriously. I take that upon2827myself. I returned to the FAA just two months ago because I2828care about the National Airspace system and the safety and the2829workforce, and I am dedicated to continuing that work. And I2830will continue to review what I mentioned before with respect to2831the hotspots, working closely with NTSB, to learn what happened2832here, and to make sure it never happens again.2833 Senator Duckworth [presiding]. General, I am going to ask2834you to suspend so Mr. Markey can ask his questions, because he2835is going to miss a roll call vote if he doesn't get to. I2836recognize Senator Markey.28372838 STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,2839 U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS28402841 Senator Markey. Thank you so much, and thank you, Mr.2842Chairman, Ranking Member. I want to take a moment to express my2843deepest condolences to the families who lost loved ones in the2844tragic crash in January. Your pain is unimaginable, and your2845presence here today is a powerful reminder of the lives that2846were so suddenly and unfairly taken.2847 I want to specifically note the individuals from the2848Skating Club of Boston who passed away in this crash: Spencer2849Lane, Christine Lane, Jinna Han, Jin Han, Evgenia Shishkova,2850Vadim Naumov.2851 We had a similar plane crash in 1961 that devastated the2852Skating Club of Boston. The trauma for the City of Boston and2853for your families is great. So please know that we grieve with2854you, and we are committed to finding answers and accountability2855in honor of those who you have lost.2856 Chair Homendy, thank you and the entire NTSB team for your2857work to investigate this crash. I want to discuss the altitude2858of the Black Hawk helicopter. NTSB's preliminary report notes2859that a few minutes before the crash the pilot indicated that2860the helicopter was flying at an altitude of 300 feet, while the2861instructor pilot said it was at 400 feet. The report also found2862that helicopters may have been above the altitude restriction2863in over half of near misses that triggered an advisory on the2864plane's traffic alert and collision avoidance system.2865 In your experience, are altitude discrepancies like this2866common, and are you concerned that Black Hawk altimeters may2867have a systemic problem?2868 Ms. Homendy. This barometric altimeter, we have done2869substantial examination on it. We do not think we are going to2870get much from this altimeter because there was such damage. We2871are going to have to look at other data.2872 But I think it is too early to really say what the2873discrepancy was or whether it was a discrepancy. There was no2874information other than 1.1 nautical miles west of the Key2875Bridge when the pilot flying said, ``I'm at 300,'' and the2876pilot instructor said, ``I have you at 4.'' There was no2877further discussion of why. So there is a lot of work that still2878has to be done.2879 Senator Markey. OK. Administrator Rocheleau, on a related2880issue, Elon Musk recently made alarmist claims about the FAA's2881air traffic control communications system. He said, ``The FAA2882assessment is single-digit months to catastrophic failure,2883putting air traffic safety at serious risk. The situation is2884extremely dire.'' Elon Musk is in charge of all the2885investigations into every single Federal agency. That is scary.2886 This is at the same time that he may be pushing for2887Starlink, his own company, to take over the contract to upgrade2888the communication system. And one month ago, the FAA announced2889it was deploying multiple Starlink terminals across the2890country.2891 Given these systems critical importance to our aviation2892system, these developments raise serious questions about2893aviation safety. So I would like you to set the record straight2894on this issue of he said basically we have single-digit months2895to catastrophic failure, putting air traffic safety at serious2896risk. Is that tweet accurate?2897 Mr. Rocheleau. I would say that the circumstances around2898our air traffic system are in great need of renewal. We need to2899modernize----2900 Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. The public needs to2901hear this. Are we within single-digit months to catastrophic2902failure, putting air traffic safety at serious risk?2903 Mr. Rocheleau. I know we need new air traffic control2904facilities. I know we need that. I know----2905 Senator Markey. So you are saying we are at risk. Is that2906what you are saying? Are you agreeing with him that we are?2907 Mr. Rocheleau. I am saying our air traffic system needs2908modernization as soon as possible.2909 Senator Markey. You understand, we cannot have people2910heading for airports all across the country right now with Elon2911Musk, the ear of the President, saying that we are within2912single-digit months of catastrophic failure. Can you assure2913people that that is not the case right now?2914 Mr. Rocheleau. I can assure you, to the flying public, to2915fly is safe. We have the safest, most complex system in the2916world, and it is safe to fly. I would also say the air traffic2917system is in dire need of upgrade, and it is something the2918Secretary and I have been working on intensely.2919 Senator Markey. Well, so you are saying that this is not2920right, we are not within months of a catastrophic failure.2921Because I do not think anyone wants to put a family member on a2922plane right now with this kind of assessment. Have you made the2923assessment that we are within single-digit months of2924catastrophic failure? Have you made that assessment?2925 Mr. Rocheleau. I have reviewed assessments in the last two2926months and understand that our equipment needs to be upgraded.2927 Senator Markey. I did not ask you that. Is the existing2928equipment safe?2929 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes.2930 Senator Markey. Is the existing equipment putting traveler2931safety at serious risk? Yes or no.2932 Mr. Rocheleau. The existing system is safe.2933 Senator Markey. Is safe. All right. We need to know that.2934Are any SpaceX employees serving as special government2935employees at the FAA right now?2936 Mr. Rocheleau. We had three special government employees2937from SpaceX. We are only in contact with one at this point. I2938would make it very clear they did not do any air traffic--they2939did not plug into any of the equipment. They came in to observe2940our operations and provided expertise along the lines of2941software and computer systems.2942 Senator Markey. Did any employee have any involvement in2943the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals in February?2944 Mr. Rocheleau. I am sorry, if you could just repeat that2945question.2946 Senator Markey. Did any of those DOGE employees have any2947involvement in the FAA's decision to deploy Starlink terminals2948in February?2949 Mr. Rocheleau. There were no DOGE employees in that2950decision. Starlink is being tested at a number of our2951facilities, only tested and not plugged into any air traffic2952systems.2953 Senator Markey. Are any of these employees involved in the2954decisionmaking process around the deployment of additional2955Starlink terminals?2956 Mr. Rocheleau. No, sir.2957 Senator Markey. OK. So I recognize that Starlink terminals2958may be an effective communications tool in remote areas, and I2959am sure Starlink engineers think highly of their potential. We2960just need to be extremely careful----2961 Mr. Rocheleau. Yes, sir.2962 Senator Markey.--in making these life-and-death decisions2963that they are not based on any pre-existing professional biases2964or financial conflicts. That is your job. You have got to make2965sure this is the way we operate, because we are going to have2966hearings on this as this year and next year unfold.2967 So I thank you, and I thank you, Madam Chair.2968 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I want to return to General2969Braman so he can conclude his remarks.2970 General Braman. Thank you, Senator. I do want to clarify2971two quick points, one on the memo requested by the Chairman,2972both Chairmen. It can be made available. However, it is part of2973the investigation. That is the unit's memo that discusses how2974they utilize ADS-B Out Off. It is their policy letter. It is in2975the purview of the investigation. That is why it is not2976currently releasable. But certainly when the NTSB and the other2977investigations have done their due diligence we can look to2978make that available to the Committee.2979 Senator Duckworth. Ms. Homendy?2980 Ms. Homendy. For the NTSB, if the policy existed prior to2981the collision, you can provide it. That can be provided.2982 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. What is your second point,2983General?2984 General Braman. And the second one, talking about whether2985we are willing to change the policy, the Army's policy. The2986Army is always willing to review its policy. Am I prepared to2987make a decision on ADS-B Out right now. No, Senator, but I want2988to do that informed by the facts that we have and this2989investigation, and those will drive policy changes. And that is2990not the Army policy. That is DOD policy, and the Army certainly2991has a vested interest in getting it right.2992 At the end of the day, what I am most concerned about is2993the rigid application of that policy, that it is being done2994correctly, and not being abused. And that is part of this2995investigation, as well.2996 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Cantwell.2997 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wanted to just2998go back to this process, how it is set up in the FAA, and how2999we rectify these issues in the future. But, Chairwoman Homendy,3000I think you are saying, in your earlier testimony, that even if3001the Black Hawk helicopter had hugged the shoreline as3002originally described, that even that route that is outlined is3003insufficient, your investigation showed that even that is3004insufficient.3005 Ms. Homendy. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.3006 Senator Cantwell. OK. Intolerable risk to aviation safety.3007So Acting Administrator, how did we get to a point where we3008have a route, that is allowed and mapped, that the military is3009flying, that is interfacing with commercial aviation, that as3010by the very definition the NTSB is saying, even if they flew3011the correct path, was an intolerable risk. I think you are3012saying that because the difference in separation was just too3013small. Too small.3014 Ms. Homendy. There was virtually no margin of error.3015 Senator Cantwell. No margin of error. How are you defining3016margin of error?3017 Ms. Homendy. I mean, just looking at this--and I think you3018have the printout in front of you, hopefully, or staff has it,3019that we provided. This is not for the public. This is in our3020preliminary report and for those behind me. But the charts,3021when we mapped the glide slope and we looked at the helicopter3022route, which has no lateral boundaries, it is 75 feet max if3023you are hugging the shoreline.3024 The collision actually occurred to the right and slightly3025above the dashed line, right here. And just so you know, pilots3026landing on Runway 33 do not have to be on this dashed line.3027They can be above or below. But it occurred about to the right.3028 Senator Cantwell. You are saying----3029 Ms. Homendy. They were not on this route. They were3030slightly over.3031 Senator Cantwell. You are saying under this route. They3032could have been below or above this line. But you are now3033saying that 75 feet is not enough separation.3034 Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is the max. Because there3035are no lateral boundaries on this route it goes down as you3036come over. So helicopters are not always on that eastern3037shoreline, which is where the 75 feet is marked, and they were3038not in this situation. They were actually to the right of this3039gray-shaded area, which indicates the route that has no3040boundaries.3041 Senator Cantwell. But I thought your analysis, even if they3042were on that route, it is still an intolerable risk----3043 Ms. Homendy. Correct.3044 Senator Cantwell.--because there is not enough separation.3045 Ms. Homendy. Seventy-five feet is very small.3046 Senator Cantwell. Right. So how did we get to this point,3047is my question? How did we get to this point? It is like it is3048a series of errors here, a series of errors. And so I am just3049trying to understand, Acting Administrator, what office is3050responsible for this? What office is responsible for the3051exemption to the rule, which just made it worse? But what3052office said this is a safe pathway, in agreement, when the NTSB3053is telling us today it never really was safe? It was not. It3054was an intolerable risk.3055 Mr. Rocheleau. And certainly I understand today, and even3056after the preliminary report that was the assessment. I can3057tell you that--and I am sure we will learn more over time as to3058how the airspace was redesigned. I know that as a result of3059previous incidents that we have talked about earlier today3060there were changes over time with respect to that airspace. But3061it is one of the reasons why we immediately terminated those3062types of operations after the event. So Route 4, Route 6, no3063mixed traffic into the airspace. Those are the things that we3064put in place immediately.3065 I think when you talk about how did we get there, I think3066we are going to learn more of that through the investigation.3067Again, I can confidently say, without knowing specifically what3068is in the investigation, that over time those routes, that3069airspace, was designed--it is one of the reasons why we have3070gone back to the hotspots now throughout the Nation to3071understand the circumstances by which we move traffic safely3072and efficiently.3073 Senator Cantwell. What office of the FAA has oversight of3074this issue, as it relates to this area?3075 Mr. Rocheleau. So the Air Traffic Organization builds out3076the airspace, and there is an Aviation Safety Office that3077reports directly to me, that oversees the Air Traffic3078Organization.3079 Senator Cantwell. And did that office ever bring up any of3080this data or information or have input from anybody that said,3081``We don't like this scenario. There are too many close calls,3082too much interface, too complex, too hard to deal with''?3083 Mr. Rocheleau. On this specific route I am not aware of3084that. I know that when we are presented with those, and we have3085been--that is how airspace changes--when we are presented with3086those circumstances, situations, near midair collisions, we3087investigate them and we put mitigations in place.3088 Senator Cantwell. Well, I am questioning whether anybody3089was investigating? I mean, that is the issue. You had an alarm3090going off once a month. You had the data. You are saying maybe3091people were not looking at it. And while I get that AI is this3092very new and interesting technology, it is no substitute for3093the FAA having an oversight over this level of traffic.3094 So as my colleague, the Chair of this hearing, mentioned,3095now we want to know, do we have other problems in other3096airspaces? I mean, we are very focused on DCA, but now we want3097to know, we have big military complexes, 10 military3098installations in the state of Washington. I am sure Chicago has3099a lot. We want to know, do we have to worry about this3100somewhere else because the FAA is not looking, and does not3101have an organization that is overseeing this information?3102 Mr. Rocheleau. I agree 100 percent with you. This is of3103utmost concern to me, not just in the DCA area, which again, we3104have put measures in place to reduce the risk and to make the3105airspace less complex. This is one of the reasons why we have a3106task force working on what we are calling hotspots, to ensure3107that we are looking at airspace design wherever we have mixed3108traffic, in 10 locations, I believe it is a total of 20, 213109airports specifically, to see where similar traffic like this3110needs mitigation.3111 Senator Cantwell. So you say this office reports directly3112to you, and you say they oversee these areas and the interface.3113 Mr. Rocheleau. Let me be clear about that. The office that3114oversees air traffic reports directly to me. The task force,3115the group of people that are looking at these hotspots3116specifically are multiple parts of the agency--air traffic,3117aviation safety, airports. So we have a number of people as3118part of that effort to make sure that we are looking at the3119airspace design, and if we find risk, we react.3120 Senator Cantwell. Well, there was risk, for sure. There was3121risk. It was being sounded in an alarm, and it was not being3122addressed. So now we have to figure out why that was not being3123addressed. There is a lot of information here that says very3124high risk, very high risk. So why was that ignored, or was no3125one looking at it? So we need an answer.3126 I think this Committee did very good work, in my opinion,3127after the Columbia accident, and set up more safety offices to3128make sure that we never miss something like that again. And I3129feel like that is the issue we are asking you today. So we need3130to understand what you think is in place, and why, if it was in3131place, did we miss this, because little pieces of the3132responsibility were delegated to various parts of the3133organization and nobody had a holistic approach, or data, lots3134of data, and it is being ignored.3135 But this is clear--clear--that this was an unacceptable3136design. It is just unacceptable, and I do not know how we got3137there.3138 I do want to ask you, are you now supportive of ADS-B In as3139a requirement, making sure that carriers, like this regional3140jet--again, I mentioned earlier it is $20,000 or so per plane--3141why can't we just say we are going to do this?3142 Mr. Rocheleau. I did understand from the Chair earlier that3143it has been an ongoing recommendation. I have not personally3144looked into that in the last two months as to what the3145expectations are on ADS-B In. I know that equipage on aircraft3146throughout the system can be challenging, but I certainly will3147take that back and look into it, to figure out what3148specifically ADS-B In, what would be required to mandate that.3149Certainly if Congress passes a law we would, as we did with----3150 Senator Cantwell. Well, we already did, by the way. We3151already did. It was called the Reauthorization Bill. And as I3152said in my opening statement, we basically authorized spending3153for this through the equipage program. And you can discuss how3154this actually gets deployed, but I am pretty sure the consumer3155ends up paying for it, regardless, in some way.3156 So the point is, NTSB has been recommending this. Is that3157right, Chairwoman?3158 Ms. Homendy. That is correct.3159 Senator Cantwell. You have recommended this since 2008?3160 Ms. Homendy. And I have to look, but I think we actually3161have recommendations on ADS-B In that precedes that. Those were3162comments, and if I may, may I add our 2008 comments to the3163hearing record.3164 Senator Duckworth. Without objection.3165 [The information referred to follows:]31663167 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]31683169 Senator Cantwell. So I think, Acting Administrator, I think3170we need to hear from the Department of Transportation and the3171FAA that they understand that these recommendations have been3172on the table, and you need to respond to them.3173 We do not want to keep doing this, which is having one3174organization, who has to investigate all the accidents, deal3175with all the families, deal with the grief and emotion, and3176then have an FAA that gets too cozy with industry and gives3177them exemptions. We do not want that.3178 So what we want is you to listen to the NTSB. And I know3179this is historic. I am not blaming any administration. It is3180historic. It is historic. It has been there since the beginning3181of the big crashes that we have had, way before the Max, where3182the FAA makes safety recommendations, and then they are ignored3183for like, oh, I don't know, sometimes a decade, and then people3184finally say, ``Oh, OK.'' But we owe it to these families. We3185owe it to them now. It is not that hard to get this done.3186 So I hope that you will take this back to the Secretary,3187have an internal discussion, and basically agree it is time to3188get this done.3189 Ms. Homendy. And if I may add, and we are going to look at3190this as part of our investigation to see how it could have3191factored in, but the CRJ had ADS-B Out. It did not have ADS-B3192In. So we are going to look at what that information could have3193provided to that flight crew and how it could have made a3194difference. We have seen that in other investigations, which is3195why we have these recommendations.3196 Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair.3197 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I do think that a nationwide3198look is important, and I am glad that FAA is looking at the3199hotspots. I understand that many of these routes, it is not3200just the military that is flying them. It is local law3201enforcement. It is Federal law enforcement. It is hospitals3202that are all flying them, as well. But I do think beyond a very3203local, hyper-local look, a national look is really important.3204 Thank you all for coming. Again, my condolences to the3205family members. And I just want to say again, thank you again3206to Chairwoman Homendy, thank you, Mr. Rocheleau. I know you3207have only been the Acting for a couple of months. We have been3208without an FAA Administrator for three years prior to your3209immediate predecessor. And again, General Braman, thank you for3210being here.3211 Thank you to all the witnesses for their important3212testimony today. Senators will have until the close of business3213on Thursday, April 3, to submit questions for the record. The3214witnesses will have until the close of business on Thursday,3215April 17, to respond to those questions.3216 And this concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands3217adjourned.3218 [Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]32193220 A P P E N D I X32213222 Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to3223 Hon. Jennifer Homendy32243225 Question. You described the findings of your investigation related3226to the ADS-B Out transmissions of the battalion, indicating that of the322716 Lima model Blackhawks, seven were transmitting ADS-B Out when turned3228on, and eight were not. Five of those eight began transmitting since3229the NTSB identified the issue. Since you shared this with the3230Subcommittee, has your investigation been able to isolate the reason as3231to why those aircraft ADS-B Out equipment were not transmitting?3232 Answer. Our initial review of the transponders' configuration on3233the helicopters that were not transmitting ADS-B Out revealed that a3234setting not normally manipulated by the crew was set incorrectly after3235the ADS-B equipment was installed.3236 ______32373238Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to3239 Hon. Jennifer Homendy32403241 Question 1. Chair Homendy, I appreciate all of your and the NTSB's3242dedication to finding the answers. The aircraft pilot gets the T-CAS3243warning of ``traffic! Traffic! traffic!'' then hears the tower say go3244for visual separation and then the helicopter possibly mixes up the3245aircraft with one by the Wilson bridge and 19 seconds later the3246collision happens.3247 Is visual separation typically requested at such a huge distance or3248would the chopper have known that that ATC request should mean a plane3249only a few hundred feet away?3250 Answer. It is common at DCA for helicopters to request visual3251separation at varied distances when operating throughout the DCA class3252B airspace.3253 The first time the helicopter crew reported having traffic in sight3254and asked to maintain visual separation occurred when the distance3255between the two aircraft was about 6.5 nautical miles.3256 About a minute and a half later, the tower asked the helicopter3257crew if the CRJ was in sight. The crew indicated that traffic was3258visible and again requested visual separation. This is when the crew of3259flight 5342 received the TCAS advisory. At this time, the aircraft were3260about 0.95 nautical miles apart.32613262 Question 2. I know that the tower was able to communicate to both3263the helicopter and the plane and that they could both hear the message3264about visual separation after the ``Traffic! Traffic! Traffic!'' T-CAS3265warning went off in the plane. I know there are plenty of reasons why3266aircraft should not be able to communicate directly with one another3267such as talking over each other but in an instance where the3268``Traffic!'' warning is blaring in the flight deck would it make sense3269for there to be a communication channel between those two flights?3270 Answer. It is certainly preferable for pilots to be on the same3271frequency as ATC and able to hear all transmissions from other aircraft3272as well as from ATC. However, aural alerts that are internal to the3273flight deck, such as a TCAS advisory, would not be audible to other3274aircraft or to ATC.3275 ______32763277 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to3278 Hon. Jennifer Homendy32793280 Question 1. Surface Awareness Initiative. As part of FAA's response3281to preventing close calls, the FAA took it upon itself to fast-track3282the deployment of certain technologies at airports to improve air and3283ground traffic visibility, such as the Surface Awareness Initiative3284(SAI) system at airports. Notably, FAA is deploying the cheaper SAI3285system at airports that do not have airport surface surveillance3286systems such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) or3287a similar tool known as ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability3288(ASSC).3289 What key capabilities does the Surface Awareness Initiative system3290lack compared to systems like ASDE-X or ASSC?3291 Answer. SAI does not have an associated active ground radar, so it3292relies solely on ADS-B for its aircraft and vehicle tracking. In3293addition, unlike ASDE-X and ASSC, it does not currently alert3294controllers of potential conflicts and provide conflict resolution3295instructions.32963297 Does the deployment of the SAI system satisfy NTSB recommendations3298for installing airport surface surveillance systems at more airports3299across the U.S.? Why or why not?3300 Answer. In our report for the February 4, 2023, Austin, Texas,3301runway incursion, we stated that we believe the SAI system could3302potentially satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation A-24-10, but,3303because the system has not been deployed at any airports, we cannot3304accurately assess if it would address all elements of the3305recommendation.3306 The FAA has not yet responded to this recommendation, which was3307issued on June 18, 2024; however, our recommendation was that the3308equipment should alert controllers of potential conflicts, which is not3309currently the case with SAI.33103311 Question 2. Is FAA's installation of the cheaper SAI system over3312more advanced systems like ASDE-X or ASSC enhancing visibility of3313airport surface environments for air traffic controllers?3314 Answer. For those towers that previously did not have surface3315detection capability, SAI provides greater awareness of aircraft and3316vehicles operating on the airport surface.33173318 In NTSB's view, is FAA making the right choice by prioritizing the3319installation of the cheaper SAI system at airports that do not already3320have airport surface surveillance systems over installing ASDE-X or3321ASSC?3322 Answer. With SAI's reduced cost of installation, the FAA can3323provide more airports with some level of surface detection capability.3324However, in its current state, we do not feel SAI is a direct3325replacement for aging ASDE-X or ASSC systems that are already3326installed, and it would actually reduce capabilities at those airports3327if it were used as a direct replacement for those systems.3328 ______33293330 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to3331 Hon. Jennifer Homendy33323333 Question 1. Close calls and runway incursions keep happening,3334including a particularly scary one in February at Chicago Midway where3335a landing Southwest flight came within 200 feet of striking a Flexjet3336that had mistakenly entered the runway that the Southwest flight was3337using to land. The Department of Transportation's Inspector General3338recently reviewed FAA's work to mitigate runway incursions and3339concluded that FAA's efforts to analyze runway incursion data and3340develop broader mitigation strategies was hindered by FAA not sharing3341data between organizations--and FAA's tendency to focus on issues at3342particular airports rather than looking for system-wide causes.3343 What would NTSB like to see FAA do to better address runway3344incursions?3345 Answer. In 2024, the NTSB issued 15 new recommendations to the FAA3346to address safety issues identified in our investigations of runway3347incursions in New York and Austin, Texas. They are provided below.33483349------------------------------------------------------------------------3350 Recommendation Overall Status Recommendation3351------------------------------------------------------------------------3352A-24-2 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3353 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title3354 14 Code of Federal Regulations3355 Part 91K, 135, and 121 operators3356 to incorporate into their3357 standard operating procedures a3358 procedural crosscheck that3359 requires flight crews to3360 verbalize the number of a runway3361 they are about to cross, as3362 indicated by runway signs, unless3363 an installed automated system3364 already provides an aural3365 advisory.3366A-24-3 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3367 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Encourage Title3368 14 Code of Federal Regulations3369 Part 121 operators to use their3370 safety management system to3371 identify flight crew surface3372 navigation errors resulting from3373 the performance of concurrent3374 tasks during taxi and develop and3375 implement effective risk3376 mitigation strategies considering3377 human factors principles.3378A-24-4 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3379 Response ADMINISTRATION: Collaborate with3380 aircraft and avionics3381 manufacturers and software3382 designers to develop the3383 technology for a flight deck3384 system that would provide visual3385 and aural alerts to flight crews3386 of traffic on a runway or taxiway3387 and traffic on approach to land.3388 (Supersedes A-00-66)3389A-24-5 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3390 Response ADMINISTRATION: Require that the3391 technology developed in response3392 to Safety Recommendation A-24-43393 be installed in all newly3394 certificated transport-category3395 airplanes. (Supersedes A-00-66)3396A-24-6 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3397 Response ADMINISTRATION: Require that3398 existing transport-category3399 airplanes be retrofitted with the3400 technology developed in response3401 to Safety Recommendation A-24-4.3402 (Supersedes A-00-66)3403A-24-7 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3404 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Evaluate the3405 effectiveness of the activation3406 logic for the runway status light3407 system considering the3408 circumstances of this incident.3409A-24-8 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3410 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Using the3411 findings of the evaluation3412 conducted in response to Safety3413 Recommendation A-24-7, update the3414 runway status light system3415 activation logic as necessary to3416 improve system effectiveness.3417A-24-9 Open--Unacceptable TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3418 Response ADMINISTRATION: Require retrofit3419 of all cockpit voice recorders3420 (CVR) on all airplanes required3421 to carry both a CVR and a flight3422 data recorder with a CVR capable3423 of recording the last 25 hours of3424 audio. (Supersedes A-18-31)3425A-24-10 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3426 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: For airports that3427 are certificated under Title 143428 Code of Federal Regulations Part3429 139 and are currently not3430 equipped with airport surface3431 detection equipment, model X or3432 airport surface surveillance3433 capability, implement surface3434 detection equipment that3435 tracks the movement of3436 arriving and departing aircraft,3437 determines the proximity3438 between those aircraft, and3439 provides air traffic3440 controllers with visual and aural3441 cues of surface movements to aid3442 in their decision making3443 processes.3444A-24-11 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3445 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Require air3446 traffic controllers to3447 advise pilots, through3448 direct communication and3449 automatic terminal information3450 system broadcasts, when visual3451 contact with aircraft operating3452 on taxiways and runways cannot be3453 established or maintained and3454 instruct pilots to3455 provide accurate position reports3456 to aid the controller in3457 determining an aircraft's3458 location in such conditions.3459A-24-12 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3460 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Brief all air3461 traffic controllers about the3462 circumstances of this incident,3463 emphasizing the effect that3464 certain conditions might have on3465 a pilot's ability to begin a3466 takeoff in a timely manner,3467 including3468 low-visibility weather3469 conditions, such as fog;3470 ambient conditions, such3471 as temperature; and3472 surface conditions, such3473 as ice, snow, and other3474 precipitation, as noted in Order3475 7110.65, Air Traffic Control,3476 paragraph 5-8-4, Departure and3477 Arrival.3478A-24-13 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3479 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Amend the3480 Aeronautical Information Manual3481 so that it instructs pilots to3482 inform controllers, before3483 entering an active runway with3484 the intent to depart, when they3485 need time on the runway for any3486 reason before beginning the3487 takeoff roll.3488A-24-14 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3489 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Require all3490 airports with a Surface Movement3491 Guidance and Control System plan3492 to ensure that their plans and3493 the associated letters of3494 agreement correspond with each3495 other and the stakeholder duties3496 and responsibilities described in3497 Advisory Circular 120-57, Surface3498 Movement Guidance and Control3499 System.3500A-24-15 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3501 Response Received ADMINISTRATION: Direct training3502 administrators at airports with a3503 Surface Movement Guidance and3504 Control System plan to require3505 initial and annual refresher3506 training for all stakeholders,3507 including air traffic controllers3508 and airport operations personnel,3509 on the information in the3510 airport's plan.3511A-24-16 Open--Initial TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION3512 Response Received ADMINISTRATION:3513 Require training administrators at3514 all operating air traffic control3515 towers to conduct annual3516 refresher training on low-3517 visibility operations.3518------------------------------------------------------------------------35193520 Question 2. NTSB's preliminary report documented some inconsistent3521information about the helicopter's altitude readings and determined3522that some of the altitude information on the helicopter's data recorder3523was invalid.3524 As NTSB continues its investigation, what will it do to learn what3525the helicopter pilots knew about their altitude and whether their3526equipment was working properly?3527 Answer. Numerous components from the Black Hawk will be examined,3528including the barometric altimeters, air data/pitot static system,3529radio altimeters and their antennas, transponder, and electronic3530standby instrument system. The examinations will look for any anomalies3531with the instruments/components, witness marks, and nonvolatile memory.3532In addition, flight data recorder (FDR) information will continue to be3533reviewed and compared with any additional data obtained from follow-up3534examinations in an effort to better understand the invalid pressure3535altitude recorded on the FDR.3536 ______35373538 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to3539 Hon. Jennifer Homendy35403541 Question 1. Aviation professionals are only as effective as the3542infrastructure and technology they rely on. According to the FY243543President's Budget, the average age of an FAA Air Traffic Control3544facility is 61 years old, and more than 50 percent of terminal3545facilities are more than 40 years old. These facilities regularly3546operate with degraded technology systems, resulting in a lack of3547accurate wind speed and direction calculations, the failure of radio3548frequencies within congested airspace, and the malfunctioning of runway3549lights, just to name a few. Many airports also lack functioning radar3550systems used to track airborne and taxiing planes, meaning that some3551controllers have no visual awareness of the aircraft they are3552directing, especially in poor weather conditions.3553 In lieu of functioning radar systems in Air Traffic Control3554facilities, many controllers are resorting to using public flight-3555tracking websites that aren't approved by the FAA to fill the gaps.3556 Perhaps most alarming are the reports that the FAA lacks the3557funding to install runway warning systems to help prevent runway3558collisions. Only 43 of the Nation's more than 500 airports serving3559commercial flights have runway collision-avoidance systems. This is3560simply not good enough.3561 Chair Homendy how can we improve the existing technology and3562infrastructure utilized by air traffic controllers and aviation3563professionals to reduce potential risk and manage congested airports3564and complicated airspace at our Nation's airports?3565 Answer. In 2024, we recommended that, for major airports that do3566not have runway surveillance systems such as ASDE-X or ASSC, the FAA3567should implement surface detection equipment that:35683569 tracks the movement of arriving and departing aircraft,35703571 determines the proximity between those aircraft, and35723573 provides air traffic controllers with visual and aural cues3574 of surface movements to aid in their decision-making processes.35753576 The FAA's Surface Safety Portfolio, which includes SAI, Approach3577Runway Verification (ARV), and Runway Incursion Devices (RID), has the3578potential to improve safety--particularly the SAI, which is providing3579enhanced situational awareness for controllers at those airports that3580previously had no surface detection capability. However, efforts should3581be made to incorporate aural and visual alerting and conflict3582resolution to be more on par with what ASDE-X/ASSC systems deliver3583today.3584 In addition, the NTSB has long believed in the safety benefits of3585ADS-B Out and In. ADS-B Out enables an aircraft to broadcast its three-3586dimensional position (latitude, longitude, and altitude) to other ADS-3587B-equipped aircraft and to ADS-B ground stations. ADS-B In enables an3588aircraft to receive traffic messages from ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft3589and from ADS-B ground stations. Although the FAA requires ADS-B Out for3590aircraft operating in certain classes of airspace, with certain3591exceptions for national security reasons, it does not require ADS-B In.3592The NTSB believes that equipping aircraft with ADS-B In capability3593would immediately and substantially contribute to safety, especially3594during operations in and around airports.3595 ______35963597 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to3598 Chris Rocheleau35993600 Question 1. On March 27, 2025, you sent letters to the Department3601of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the3602Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security,3603clarifying the FAA's ADS-B Out requirements and the exceptions for3604missions critical to national security. Section 829 of the FAA3605Reauthorization Act of 2024 prohibits enforcement action based3606exclusively on ADS-B data. What authorities does the FAA have to3607enforce the ADS-B Out equipage and transmission requirements?3608 Answer. The FAA has retained its authority to enforce ADS-B Out3609equipage and transmission requirements. However, the FAA's practical3610ability to enforce those requirements has been significantly impeded by3611the limitation in section 829 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.3612Pub. L. No. 118-63, Sec. 829 (2024). Section 829 prohibits the FAA from3613initiating an investigation (other than a criminal investigation) based3614exclusively on ADS-B data. Prior to the enactment of section 829, the3615FAA's primary method of identifying noncompliance with ADS-B Out3616equipage and transmission requirements was reviewing ADS-B data, which,3617when combined with radar data, can allow for the identification of3618aircraft operating without properly functioning ADS-B Out equipment.3619The FAA could then investigate those operations, communicating with3620aircraft owners to ensure that their ADS-B Out equipment was returned3621to a functional state or, less commonly, taking enforcement action3622where appropriate (e.g., where an investigation determined that an3623operator was intentionally operating without ADS-B Out equipment turned3624on). Under section 829, these investigations are no longer possible.3625Nor are the enforcement actions that could result from those3626investigations.3627 Subject to the significant restrictions imposed by section 829, the3628FAA does retain the authority to enforce ADS-B Out requirements. For3629example, if a hotline complaint is submitted to the FAA about an3630illegal charter operation or an FAA inspector personally observes a low3631flight, ADS-B data may be consulted in the course of those3632investigations, which could reveal that the aircraft did not meet ADS-B3633Out equipage and transmission requirements. Or a report might be3634submitted to the FAA specifically about an ADS-B Out violation, which3635the FAA could then use ADS-B Out data to confirm. In these uncommon3636scenarios, the FAA would be able to take an enforcement action against3637an operator using its authority under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44709 or363846301.36393640 Question 2. During the hearing on March 27, 2025, questions were3641raised regarding the FAA's ability to override the exemption in the3642NDAA which allowed for exceptions to the FAA's ADS-B Out transmission3643requirements. Does the FAA have the authority to rescind any exemption3644from the ADS-B mandate for the U.S. military?3645 Answer. The FAA has full authority ``to operate air traffic control3646services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight3647and the efficient use of airspace,'' to include terminating any3648authorization to deviate from regulatory requirements concerning ADS-B3649Out transmission and equipage or revising the Memorandum of Agreement3650(MOA) it has with DOD concerning the provision of air traffic services3651to DOD aircraft that are not transmitting or equipped with ADS-B. See3652Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(c) (2018) (providing3653that nothing in section 1046 limits the FAA's authority to operate air3654traffic control services to ensure the safe minimum separation of3655aircraft in flight and the efficient use of airspace).3656 Under section 1046(a) of division A, title X, of the John S. McCain3657National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Secretary3658of Transportation may not require DOD to equip certain aircraft with3659ADS-B, deny air traffic control services for such aircraft on the basis3660that they are not equipped, or restrict or limit access to airspace3661based upon equipage. Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X, Sec. 1046(a)3662(2018). FAA and DOD have an MOA, which sets out the process for3663accommodating aircraft that are not equipped with ADS-B and providing3664necessary air traffic control services to such aircraft to maintain3665safety in the NAS. Accordingly, the prohibitive language in section36661046(a) is no longer effective, as provided in section 1046(b).3667 Even if section 1046(a) were effective, the FAA retains full3668authority to revise the MOA as required to operate air traffic control3669services to ensure the safe minimum separation of aircraft in flight3670and the efficient use of airspace under section 1046(c), and the FAA is3671currently working with DOD to revise the MOA following the DCA3672accident.3673 As for the ADS-B Out transmission requirement, 14 CFR3674Sec. 91.225(f)(1) allows the FAA to authorize a deviation from the3675transmission requirement for aircraft ``performing a sensitive3676government mission for national defense, homeland security,3677intelligence or law enforcement purposes and transmitting would3678compromise the operations security of the mission or pose a safety risk3679to the aircraft, crew, or people and property in the air or on the3680ground'' when authorized by the FAA. The FAA retains discretion to3681terminate an authorization to deviate from the ADS-B Out transmission3682requirement. Section 1046(a) of Pub. L. No. 115-232, div. A, title X3683only addressed the equipage requirement. As mentioned above, we are3684working with DOD to revise the MOA as it concerns authorization to3685deviate from the ADS-B transmission requirement.3686 ______36873688 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to3689 Chris Rocheleau36903691 Question 1. Consistent with the mandate in the 2024 FAA3692reauthorization, can you describe what steps the FAA is taking to3693address air traffic controller hiring shortfalls?3694 Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement3695processes, as well as FAA Academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure3696our selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for3697the Air Traffic Control Specialist profession. To ensure we meet or3698exceed our hiring goals, we have:36993700 Supercharged hiring--Streamlined the hiring process and3701 built in efficiencies that will reduce the time to complete the3702 process by as much as five months.37033704 Increased the starting salary rate of Track 1 entry-level3705 hires by 30 percent while attending the FAA Academy.37063707 Offered financial incentives to retain our most experienced3708 controllers who are eligible to retire. Certified professional3709 controllers in this group will receive a lump sum payment of 203710 percent of their basic pay for each year they continue to work.37113712 Established the Enhanced Collegiate Training Initiative (E-3713 CTI), which gives qualifying colleges the opportunity to teach3714 the same curriculum provided by the FAA Academy. Upon3715 graduation, with a successful result on the Air Traffic Skills3716 Assessment (ATSA), students who clear all pre-employment3717 requirements (medical, security) are placed directly at a field3718 tower facility.37193720 Increased the frequency of Track 1 entry-level (no aviation3721 experience required) job announcements. Typically, the FAA3722 publishes the Track 1 announcement once per year, and this year3723 we have advertised the position three times in the past 123724 months. This effort has increased the pipeline by approximately3725 30 percent, placing us on track to meet the FY25 goal of hiring3726 2,000 ATCs.37273728 Authorized on-the-spot hiring (similar to direct hire3729 authority for most other government agencies) for Track 23730 entry-level positions (ATC experience required) and utilized an3731 open continuous announcement to garner applicants year-round.3732 Previously, the FAA only announced these positions twice per3733 year--once in the Spring and once in the Fall.37343735 Implemented Pre-Employment Processing Centers (PEPC) to3736 expedite clearances, providing a ``one-stop-shop'' for pre-3737 employment requirements. The FAA established PEPCs in New York,3738 Georgia, Texas, and California to reach the largest applicant3739 geographical locations across the Nation.37403741 Question 2. Can you describe what actions the FAA is taking to3742streamline the implementation of new technologies and improve safety of3743the Nation's ATC system?3744 Answer. Recognizing the need for advanced technologies to keep pace3745with innovation and modernize the air traffic control system, the ATO3746has begun to replace or deploy new infrastructure to maintain the3747safety and efficiency of the national airspace system (NAS):37483749 Implementation of the Surface Safety Portfolio:3750 Expands surface situational awareness for air traffic3751 controllers at airports without existing surface3752 surveillance capabilities.37533754 Improvement of telecommunications reliability--including3755 fiber, wireless, and satellite.37563757 Implementation of cloud services to transition the NAS to a3758 secure, scalable, and centrally managed enterprise cloud3759 environment.37603761 NOTAM modernization efforts to replace the U.S. NOTAM System3762 and Federal NOTAM System.37633764 Modernizing this system is crucial to enhance its3765 reliability, accessibility, and user-friendliness. The3766 system will be securely hosted in the cloud and have a3767 scalable and resilient architecture. We expect delivery by3768 July 2025 and are targeting operational deployment of the3769 modernized system by September 2025.3770 ______37713772 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to3773 Chris Rocheleau37743775 Question 1. According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and3776December 2024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial3777aircraft coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 853778had vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 853779events involved military helicopters? How many of those close call3780events involved U.S. Army helicopters?3781 Answer. We understand the NTSB likely was referring to narrative3782reports that pilots may voluntarily submit. We do not have granular3783information on the dataset the NTSB was referring to, but we3784acknowledge that changes were necessary related to procedures and3785helicopter routes that would have allowed helicopters and fixed-wing3786aircraft to be in close proximity. To that end, the FAA has eliminated3787mixed traffic immediately around DCA, eliminated a portion of3788Helicopter Route 4, and eliminated the use of visual separation within37895 miles of the airport.37903791 Question 1a. What factors contributed to the FAA's dilatory3792identification of these alarming data and lack of action to mitigate3793dangerous conditions in the airspace prior to the January 29th3794collision?3795 Answer. Successful safety assurance and hazard identification3796require analyzing large amounts of data from various sources to3797understand the presence of risk within the system. We are making3798improvements both in data sharing across the agency and through the use3799of advanced technological tools, including advanced models for the3800analysis of safety reports, capabilities that enable the automated3801identification and ranking of high potential risk encounters,3802capabilities that fuse contextual datasets to translate information on3803potential risk to actual risk, and collision risk models that use3804simulations and artificial intelligence (AI) to identify specific3805operations that do not meet collision risk targets.38063807 Question 1b. Please describe the process by which the FAA shares3808information--including the data recalled above--with entities3809conducting aviation operations in the National Capital Region airspace.3810Is this information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?3811 Answer. Any agency may request data specific to its fleet from the3812FAA, and we process those requests as described in FAA Orders JO1030.3B3813and JO7200.20B. We also provide information to industry via the3814Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system (ASIAS).38153816 Question 2. Please describe the ``D.C. Helicopter Working Group''.3817 Answer. The DC Helicopter Working Group is a mixture of FAA and3818users of the airspace around DCA who convened for the purpose of3819development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports3820national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight3821operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy3822Route 4 (on the Baltimore Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing3823efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety3824standards.38253826 Question 2a. Who are the entities participating in this working3827group? Chairwoman Homendy described there to be 17 entities taking part3828in this working group.3829 Answer. The following entities participated in the working group:38303831 1. Prince George's County Police38323833 2. Fairfax County Police38343835 3. Metro Police38363837 4. US Army38383839 5. US Air Force38403841 6. MD State Police38423843 7. US Coast Guard38443845 8. US Marine Corps38463847 9. Medstar38483849 Question 2b. Describe the parameters for which this working group3850is studying.3851 Answer. As noted in response to question 2 above, the parameters3852are the development of a new helicopter route or corridor that supports3853national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight3854operations. This published route or corridor will replace the legacy3855Route 4 (on the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart), enhancing3856efficiency for critical missions while maintaining the highest safety3857standards.38583859 Question 2c. Is this working group analyzing the other 463860helicopter operators in the National Capital Region?3861 Answer. The task the group is focused on is meant to support how3862national security, law enforcement, and medical helicopter flight3863operations occur within the National Capital Region.38643865 Question 3. Is a flyover of Arlington National Cemetery considered3866an essential operation?3867 Answer. Flyovers are operations that we normally coordinate with3868the Department of Defense (DOD). We are refining our coordination3869procedures with DOD for military operations in the Washington, D.C.3870area.38713872 Question 4. Do you think the FAA's tolerance for risk was too high3873prior to January 29th?3874 Answer. Aviation safety is the FAA's number one priority. While3875flying remains the safest mode of transportation, aviation safety is3876not static. There is always room for improvement. The professionals at3877the FAA take their jobs seriously and strive to maintain safety every3878day. But the fact of the matter is that we have to do better. We have3879to identify trends, we have to get smarter about how we use data, and3880when we put corrective actions in place, we must execute them.38813882 Question 5. Please describe the advanced technological tools the3883FAA is utilizing to aggregate data to better analyze the airspace3884operations at the high mixed-traffic airports.3885 Answer. The FAA's ASIAS program is utilizing advanced technological3886tools, including advanced models for the analysis of safety reports,3887capabilities that enable the automated identification and ranking of3888high potential risk encounters, capabilities that fuse contextual3889datasets to translate information on potential risk to actual risk, and3890collision risk models that use simulations and AI to identify specific3891operations that do not meet collision risk targets.3892 Predictive software, coupled with AI textual data large language3893modeling applications, will provide a clearer holistic picture of the3894collision risk by fusing both voluntarily submitted information with3895Flight Operational Quality Assurance data.3896 ______38973898Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to3899 Chris Rocheleau39003901 Question 1. Acting Administrator Rocheleau, there has been a focus3902on how many pilots voluntarily reported close calls to the FAA's safety3903reporting system--these calls averaged at least one per month for more3904than a decade. Were these reports by pilots investigated?3905 Answer. The FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety3906reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential3907safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national3908airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.39093910 Question 1a. What changes can be expected to be made when a3911considerable number of reports like these are made?3912 Answer. If the FAA identifies an increase in the number of reports3913involving close calls, we conduct an analysis to determine whether the3914increase in reports equates to an identification of new or increased3915risk. If a risk is identified, appropriate mitigations will be3916developed and implemented, to include ensuring that the performance and3917effectiveness of the safety risk controls meet or exceed the safety3918objective of driving down the risk to an acceptable level in accordance3919with FAA's safety risk management processes.3920 The FAA implements specific corrective actions based on the safety3921issue or event to mitigate the identified safety risk. In addition,3922when a significant event occurs or a substantial number of reports are3923received, the FAA conducts a thorough review of current controller3924training programs. This evaluation not only helps to derive insights3925from the reports but also ensures that future controller training3926initiatives are aligned with the goal of continuing to equip3927controllers with the skills necessary to prevent similar situations.3928The aim is to continually enhance training effectiveness.39293930 Question 1b. Have these pilot reports not only for DCA but for3931other airports been thoroughly reviewed?3932 Answer. Yes, the FAA thoroughly investigates all voluntary safety3933reports submitted by a pilot and shared with the FAA. If a potential3934safety risk is identified, whether to the operation or the national3935airspace system, the FAA implements corrective actions, as appropriate.39363937 Question 1c. Can you provide the number for how many reports have3938been made relating to West Virginia airports in the last 5 years?3939 Answer. The ASIAS database contains active reporting for the3940primary commercial service airports in West Virginia: Charleson-CRW,3941Clarksburg-CKB, Huntington-HTS, and Lewisburg-LWB. There are no Near3942Mid Air Collisions (NMAC) reports in the last 5 years at these3943airports.39443945 Question 2. Please tell us more about the voluntary safety3946reporting system. Does the system account for specific NTSB style data3947points or is it a pilot saying I came within approximately this many3948feet of a helicopter?3949 Answer. The primary objective of voluntary safety programs is to3950identify hazards and unsafe conditions in the NAS so that corrective3951action can be taken to eliminate or reduce the hazards or unsafe3952conditions. The FAA reviews the data from these reports to identify3953causal or contributing factors, which support event categorization,3954risk analysis, and data trending. This information can provide context3955to understand a problem or emerging risk in the system.3956 For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) captures3957specific data points concerning the pilot, the aircraft, the airspace,3958location, and weather conditions, but also allows the pilot to provide3959a narrative to clarify and provide additional details about the event.3960ASRS reports are confidential. ASRS analyzes the safety data, de-3961identifies it, and disseminates vital information to the aviation3962community.39633964 Question 3. In your testimony you mentioned the Safety Panel you3965have put together in response to the collision and how the FAA is using3966AI to see if other safety concerns have been overlooked. Does that3967extend only to fixed-wing and rotorcraft incidents or other types of3968safety incidents?3969 Answer. The effort included a review of operations (not incidents)3970between fixed-wing to helicopters and fixed-wing to fixed-wing to3971determine if there were any safety concerns.39723973[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]39743975 Question 4. In the preliminary report there is a map of all the3976helicopter routes in the area (see above). Route 6 goes across the3977airport and the runways East and West. Has that route had close calls3978reported to it as well or was Route 4 the only one?3979 Answer. For Route 6, there were four (4) reported operations (1/1/39802021-1/31/2025) in which fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters had a3981closest proximity of less than the required 500' vertical separation.3982The portion of Route 6 in the vicinity of DCA has been closed and3983removed from the published helicopter charts to mitigate any potential3984risk.39853986 Question 5. We have heard that there are not specific lateral3987boundaries to any of these helicopter routes, but there are vertical3988boundaries. My fear is that with such loose designations for these3989routes it would be easy for a helicopter to easily go wide and deviate.3990DC has the most sensitive airspace in the country but what recourse or3991discipline is there if a chopper deviates and ends up in the ultra-3992restricted air space above the National Mall or takes one of these3993routes wide or at too high of an altitude?3994 Answer. Helicopters, like other aircraft, are required to comply3995with the FAA's safety regulations, including 14 C.F.R. Sec. 91.123,3996which requires compliance with ATC clearances and instructions. For a3997civilian aircraft, the FAA may address deviations from ATC clearances3998or instructions with compliance action, including remedial training, or3999enforcement action, including the suspension of an individual's pilot4000certificate, as authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44709(b)(1)(A). For any4001violation of the DC Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) and DC Flight4002Restricted Zone (FRZ), as described in Part 93, subpart V, the FAA may4003similarly suspend or revoke a pilot's airman certificates or impose4004civil penalties. 14 CFR Sec. 93.333. For violations committed by4005members of the armed forces while performing official duties for the4006Department of Defense, the FAA refers the violation to the appropriate4007branch of the military pursuant to the military referral process4008required under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46101(b).4009 Additionally, if a pilot knowingly or willfully violates national4010defense airspace established pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3),4011including the DC SFRA and DC FRZ, the pilot may be subject to criminal4012prosecution, including a fine under title 18, or imprisonment for not4013more than one year, or both. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46307. The FAA refers such4014criminal conduct to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) or to the4015Department of Justice, if appropriate, for criminal investigation under40165 U.S.C. app. 3.40174018 Question 6. In your testimony you mentioned that only some4019emergency and special helicopter traffic will continue in the vicinity4020of DCA and only when that air space is closed to planes. Can you4021quantify how many of these operations are still occurring? Is it twice4022a day or more frequently on average?4023 Answer. For the period February 19, 2025 through April 30, 2025 (714024days), there were 45 special helicopter operations, averaging a little4025more than half of 1 (0.63) special helicopter operation per day, within4026this airspace operating at or below 1500 feet.4027 Regarding the number of operations that are still occurring,4028between May 1, 2025 and May 20, 2025 (20 days), there have been 234029special helicopter operations, averaging a little more than 1 (1.15)4030special helicopter operation per day.40314032 Question 6a. How much of a boundary between that airspace is there4033and how long is the fixed-wing traffic halted?4034 Answer. On average, presidential-related operations may pause4035traffic for 9 to 12 minutes, while lifesaving medical-related4036operations may cause a 5-to-7-minute pause to fixed-wing traffic.4037Active law enforcement and/or air defense missions are more fluid.4038 ______40394040 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to4041 Chris Rocheleau40424043 Question 1. On Friday, March 28, 2025, a U.S. Air Force jet flew4044within 500 feet of a Delta Airlines passenger jet departing Reagan4045National Airport to Minnesota. What is the status of investigations4046into this incident?4047 Answer. The FAA has completed its preliminary investigation into4048the March 28 event at Reagan National Airport. Through our Safety4049Management System, we continue to identify hazards and implement safety4050measures at the airport and across the National Airspace System.40514052 Question 1a. How is the FAA and Department of Defense working to4053ensure similar incidents do not happen in the future?4054 Answer. The FAA is working on refining coordination procedures4055between air traffic facilities, and internal to air traffic facilities,4056for military operations in the Washington D.C. area. This includes4057specific, clear communication for stopping arriving and departing4058traffic from Reagan Washington National (DCA) to accommodate those4059operations when necessary. The FAA is also taking steps to ensure4060controllers are briefed and have required, specific information prior4061to scheduled aerial flyovers, including routes of flight and timing.4062Collaboratively, the FAA and military partners are addressing pertinent4063Letters of Agreement (LOA) and communication surrounding aerial4064flyovers to ensure all entities have the same expectations and4065operations can be conducted safely in the area.40664067 Question 2. There has been an alarming number of close calls on4068runways in the past couple of years. Just last month, there were close4069calls involving landing aircraft at Chicago Midway Airport and DCA. I4070led a provision in the FAA reauthorization bill to ensure planes are4071equipped with technology that alerts pilots of nearby planes on the4072runway to help them avoid collisions.4073 Can you provide an update on the implementation of this provision4074and adoption of this technology?4075 Answer. Section 347 in the 2024 FAA Reauthorization required the4076FAA to establish the Runway Safety Council and identify both surface4077surveillance equipment and equipment on aircraft that ``may improve4078onboard situational awareness for flight crewmembers, including4079technologies for use in an aircraft.'' The section then directs4080deployment of surface surveillance technologies over 5 years.4081 Regarding technologies on aircraft, while the section does not4082establish equipage requirements or direct the FAA to establish equipage4083requirements, it does note that the FAA should identify technologies4084and systems that would enhance safety and onboard situational4085 awareness. Consistent with that direction, we have tasked the4086Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to seek4087recommendations on cockpit alerting technologies designed to reduce4088runway safety events.4089 That ARC, comprised of government and industry stakeholders, has4090been meeting, and we will review recommendations when that work is4091complete.40924093 Question 3. The primary NOTAM system experienced outages on4094February 1 and March 22 that each lasted multiple hours. Last year, I4095worked with Senators Moran and Capito to pass the NOTAM Improvement Act4096directing the FAA to immediately upgrade this system. While the backup4097system is now in place and was activated to respond to recent outages,4098more work must be done to make all necessary upgrades.4099 Can you provide any information on this outage and where things4100stand with the NOTAM Task Force?4101 Answer. The recent Notice to Airman (NOTAM) outages were caused by4102hardware failures on the motherboards of the United States NOTAM System4103(USNS) servers. The system's architecture is over 30 years old, with4104the current hardware having been in continuous operation for4105approximately 15 years. On February 1, 2025, the hardware failure4106rendered the USNS system unrecoverable. Within an hour, the technical4107team determined that equipment recovery was not possible and initiated4108failover procedures. Due to the age and design of the system, the4109failover process takes a minimum of four hours, and the full4110restoration of the system took approximately 12 hours. To mitigate4111future outages, the team took immediate steps following the February 1,41122025, event by staging spare servers and developing a rapid hardware4113swap process. As a result, when a similar motherboard failure occurred4114on March 22, 2025, the team was able to return the system to full4115functionality in less than four hours, without needing to activate the4116Candidate NOTAM Contingency System (CNCS). USNS resumed processing4117NOTAMs within two hours.4118 In August 2024, the FAA pivoted to complete NOTAM Modernization4119utilizing a Challenge-Based Acquisition strategy to develop an4120innovative solution that leverages advancements in technology, high-4121availability architecture, and resilient infrastructure. The FAA4122selected the vendor to work on this modernization in April 2025, and4123the new NOTAM service is on track for delivery in July 2025 and4124deployment by September 2025. The FAA is also looking to accelerate4125user transition. This enables the FAA to implement our digitalization4126strategy by transitioning from the current legacy NOTAM system to an4127integrated NOTAM Management Service (NMS).4128 The NOTAM Task Force submitted recommendations, now under review,4129in accordance with Pub. L. 118-4 (NOTAM Improvement Act) and NTSB4130Safety Recommendation A-18-024.4131 ______41324133 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to4134 Chris Rocheleau41354136 Question 1. There is no question that there is an air traffic4137controller shortage and that we need to do more to address it. As we4138discussed in the hearing, there may be certified air traffic4139controllers are ready and able to return to work--but are just waiting4140on medical clearances. How many controllers around the country are4141waiting for medical clearances to return to work?4142 Answer. As of May 8, 103 air traffic controllers are awaiting4143medical clearance to return to work. Of those 103 controllers,4144approximately 80 percent have a medical condition that requires further4145evaluation from their own physician, which they must provide to us4146before we can make a determination concerning their medical clearance.41474148 Question 1a. What is FAA doing to make sure these medical reviews4149are happening in a timely manner?4150 Answer. FAA Order 3930.3C requires the Office of Aerospace Medicine4151to complete a medical clearance within 20 days of receiving of all4152medical documents. Over the last year, the national average has been41539.9 calendar days. We have identified efficiencies and engaged in4154effective management oversight to ensure our review is completed in a4155timely manner.41564157 Question 2. In October, the Department of Transportation Inspector4158General reported that shortly before the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout,4159individuals within FAA wanted to delegate airplane airworthiness4160inspection authority back to Boeing without any criteria by which to4161assess whether Boeing could be trusted to properly carry out these4162inspections. When Boeing last had this authority for the 737 MAX,4163Boeing abused it. Boeing knowingly and repeatedly produced 737 MAX4164aircraft with nonfunctioning Angle of Attack Disagree alerts--in4165blatant violation of the plane's approved type design.4166 Will FAA commit to NOT delegating airworthiness inspection4167authority back to Boeing until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of4168Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 20244169report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving4170Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?4171 Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a4172determination regarding airworthiness inspection authority. Safety has4173no timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.41744175 Question 3. Following the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout, FAA imposed4176a cap of 38 airplanes per month on Boeing's 737 MAX production. Will4177FAA commit to NOT raising the monthly cap on 737 MAX aircraft4178production until FAA has implemented all 16 Department of4179Transportation Inspector General Recommendations in its October 9, 20244180report, ``FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving4181Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective''?4182 Answer. The FAA will utilize all relevant safety data when making a4183determination regarding Boeing's production rates. Safety has no4184timeline, and the FAA will continue to hold Boeing accountable.4185 ______41864187 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jacky Rosen to4188 Chris Rocheleau41894190 Question 1. In response to this crash, Secretary Duffy announced a4191plan to boost air traffic control hiring with 30 percent salary4192increases for newly hired controller trainees entering FAA's Air4193Traffic Control Academy.4194 Mr. Rocheleau, my team has heard from our air traffic controllers4195that these increases are only temporary, and compensation resets to the4196lower level once training for new controllers is complete. Is this4197correct? And could you provide an update on the progress of this effort4198and any promising data you have seen on this front?4199 Answer. Effective March 9, 2025, all current trainees enrolled in4200the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Academy's Air Traffic Control4201(ATC) entry-level training program, along with individuals enrolled on4202or after that date, received a 30 percent salary increase. This4203adjustment applies specifically to newly hired and existing ATC4204trainees during their time at the FAA Academy and raises their annual4205salary--including locality pay--to $47,763.4206 Upon successful completion of academy training, these trainees--who4207are initially appointed under temporary status--are converted to4208permanent positions and assigned to an en-route or terminal facility.4209At that point, their base compensation is determined in accordance with4210the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Collective4211Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under the Air Traffic Specialized Pay Plan4212(ATSPP).4213 In all cases, upon graduation, these trainees become academy4214graduates and are paid in accordance with the CBA. The salary of an4215academy graduate is higher than what they are paid as students, though4216the exact amount varies according to locality.42174218 Question 2. Can you discuss the challenges in hiring process for4219air traffic controllers, any other recent changes that have been made4220to the process, and any ways you are planning to improve the process to4221hire more controllers?4222 Answer. The FAA is reviewing our hiring, training, and placement4223processes, as well as academy withdrawals and failures, to ensure our4224selection methods effectively identify candidates best suited for the4225Air Traffic Control Specialist profession.4226 We have identified certain challenges in the controller hiring4227process including:42284229 Identifying candidates who possess the necessary aptitude4230 for the position and can meet the medical requirements. In4231 recent years, over 50 percent of our ATC applicants have4232 encountered health issues, with conditions more commonly4233 associated with older adults than with the targeted age4234 demographic of 18-30 years.42354236 A growing number of applicants with issues that can affect4237 the processing of security clearances. For example, they may4238 not understand that Federal law is different from state law4239 regarding the use of marijuana or be unaware that financial4240 difficulties may hinder eligibility for employment or security4241 clearances.42424243 To enhance efficiency, we have streamlined hiring by automating4244qualification assessments, enabling applicants to progress at their own4245pace while medical and security evaluations are conducted concurrently.4246These improvements are designed to accelerate the hiring process while4247effectively identifying candidates best suited for the Air Traffic4248Control profession.4249 Enhanced Air Traffic-Collegiate Training Initiative (Enhanced AT-4250CTI): In April 2024, the FAA introduced Enhanced AT-CTI to create an4251additional pipeline for air traffic controllers by authorizing4252institutions to provide the same comprehensive curriculum offered at4253the FAA Academy.4254 ______42554256 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to4257 Brigadier General Matthew Braman42584259 Question 1. Prior to our hearing where you testified, my staff was4260made aware of a memo which I understand outlines the policies and4261procedures for the Army's use of ADS-B in the National Capital Region.4262This memo was previously denied to my staff. On the day of the hearing,4263you promised to review the information and look at providing it to the4264Commerce Committee. Will you commit to immediately produce an4265unredacted copy of the memo ``ADS-B Out Off Operations in the National4266Airspace'' for the Commerce Committee staff?4267 Answer. On April 2nd, 2025 the memo along with applicable4268background material was released to the HASC and SASC.42694270 Question 2. During the hearing, you were asked how frequently ADS-B4271Out is turned off. You committed to answering this in questions for the4272record. How frequently does the U.S. Army disable ADS-B Out during4273flights? Please specifically include data to justify your answer. If4274you choose to use a term of art to describe differing categories of4275missions or flights, please give data for those categories of flights4276as both a numerator and denominator.4277 Answer. The Army's policy on utilization of Automatic Dependent4278Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is in accordance with the4279Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the4280Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The U.S. Army Aviation Brigade's4281(TAAB) previous adherence to Army policy regarding ADS-B is part of the4282Army's ongoing investigation of the January 29 accident near Reagan4283National Airport (DCA). At the conclusion of the investigation,4284releasable information will be made available to the Committee.4285 ______42864287 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jerry Moran to4288 Brigadier General Matthew Braman42894290 Question 1.According to the NTSB, between October 2021 and December42912024, there were more than 15,000 instances of commercial aircraft4292coming in close proximity to helicopters. Of those events, 85 had4293vertical separation of less than 200 feet. How many of those 85 events4294involved military helicopters?4295 Answer. The data used to inform the National Transportation Safety4296Board's (NTSB) preliminary report resides with the Federal Aviation4297Administration (FAA) and subsequently the NTSB. The Army has requested4298to examine the data.42994300 Question 1a. Please describe the process by which the Army shares4301information regarding aviation safety with the FAA. Is this4302information-sharing regime consistent across the NAS?4303 Answer. The entry point for the Army is the OSD led Policy Board on4304Federal Aviation (PBFA) to address multi-Service aviation related4305issues with the FAA. Department of the Army Representatives (DAR)4306interact daily with FAA officials on a wide spectrum of aviation topics4307including: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) airspace access; airspace4308proposals; environmental impacts; 5G impacts to aviation; and4309adjudicating pilot deviations among many other functions.4310 The Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) database is4311the database of record for mishap, near miss, hazards, inspections, and4312safety and occupational health (SOH) management. The Army has no formal4313mechanism to share data from ASMIS with the FAA. DARs receive Mandatory4314Occurrence Reports (MOR) from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization. MORs4315record reportable events that occur in the national airspace. DARs4316process and ensure Army adjudications of any pilot deviation reported4317in the MOR. MORs are captured in FAA databases that the Army does not4318have access to. The Army is committed to supporting any effort to4319mitigate risk in the national airspace to include improving data4320sharing between the Department of Defense (DOD) and FAA.43214322 Question 2. The NTSB's report indicates that the PAT25 pilots4323reported discrepant altitude readings on repeated occasions in the4324leadup to the crash, but based on the NTSB's preliminary report, at no4325point were those discrepant readings reconciled. How do Army Aviation4326crews typically reconcile discrepant altitude readings? Are discrepant4327altitude readings internal to a crew standard for Army Aviation4328missions? What would typically account for discrepant altitude readings4329internal to an Army Aviation crew?4330 Answer. Discrepant altitude readings internal to a crew are4331atypical for Army Aviation missions. Crews utilize the coordination4332elements, basic qualities, and objectives found in the Army Aircrew4333Coordination Training Program to effectively share tasks and4334information to resolve an unforeseen event such as diagnosing a4335potential discrepant altitude reading. The NTSB investigation has not4336yet determined the reason for the crewmembers of PAT25 stating4337different altitudes, their subsequent actions, or the actual instrument4338readings at that time.4339 Discrepant altitude readings could potentially result from4340crewmembers looking at different altimeters (barometric versus radar),4341incorrect or different altimeter settings dialed into the Kollsman4342window on the two independent barometric altimeter systems in the UH-434360L, or actual maintenance faults. In addition, each barometric4344altimeter has an allowable margin of error of plus or minus 75 feet4345which is consistent with the FAA standard.43464347 Question 3. Do you have a standard in place for The Army Aviation4348Brigade to conduct routine maintenance and testing to determine whether4349equipment, i.e., ADS-B Out, is working?4350 Answer. At the time of the hearing, there was no scheduled4351maintenance or formal inspection ADS-B Out operations. Since that time,4352the Army established testing and maintenance tracking procedures to4353ensure the functionality and use of ADS-B Out. The maintenance actions4354are codified in an Aviation Safety Action Memo (ASAM) and will be4355directed for use in a Department of the Army order.4356 Monthly, the FAA sends the Program Executive Office Aviation (PEO4357AVN) a spreadsheet identifying Army aircraft with ADS-B Out4358transmission issues. PEO AVN alerts the unit of the aircraft issues for4359resolution. The process was not formalized and as a result of the4360information the NTSB and Army investigators have identified in their4361preliminary findings has driven the Army to formalize this process.43624363 Question 3a. Please describe that protocol.4364 Answer. Scheduled maintenance takes place anytime an aircraft4365phase, preventive maintenance service, or scheduled component4366replacement is conducted.4367 An unscheduled maintenance requirement occurs when an aircraft4368experiences an unexpected malfunction, premature component breakdown,4369or battle damage.4370 Regarding the ASAM, units will be required to train personnel on4371the testing, functionality, and repair criteria. Units will document4372the testing and validate the serviceability of the equipment.43734374 Question 3b. How often does that routine maintenance testing occur?4375 Answer. The ASAM release re-baselines the functionality of all ADS-4376B systems. The Army is codifying a policy to validate use and function4377of the system before each flight to include internal test procedures4378and FAA ATC stations to validate transmissions.43794380 Question 3c. What occurs following the routine maintenance should a4381piece of equipment not be operating correctly? How is that documented4382and reported up the chain of command?4383 Answer. If a piece of equipment is found to be inoperable, the4384flight crew or maintenance personnel will enter the fault into the4385Aircraft Inspection and Maintenance Record. Aircraft maintenance4386personnel will conduct troubleshooting procedures in accordance with4387the aircraft Electronic Technical Manual. Once the corrective4388maintenance is complete, the equipment will receive a Maintenance4389Operational Check or Maintenance Test Flight to confirm proper4390function.4391 When aircraft equipment repair or malfunction is cause for an4392aircraft to be non-flyable, this is reported through the Daily Status4393Report to the command.43944395 Question 3d. Is that information reported to the Federal Aviation4396Administration?4397 Answer. The Army does not report maintenance status of aircraft or4398systems to the FAA. However, Army aircraft must meet communications4399requirements to operate in the National Airspace. Army crews are not4400authorized to operate in FAA airspace if they are unable to meet the4401equipment requirements. Adherence to this requirement is within the4402scope of the concurrent NTSB and AR 15-6 investigations.4403 Note: BG Braman indicated he would reply to this in the QFRs during4404the hearing.4405 ______44064407Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to4408 Brigadier General Matthew Braman44094410 Question 1. Brigadier General Braman, in your testimony you4411mentioned that Night Vision goggle training is required for readiness4412in the area. By most accounts operating with these goggles in an urban4413environment means a limited sight range and washed out vision due to4414all the light.4415 What are the benefits to training in a congested urban environment4416with night vision goggles?4417 Answer. The Army Aviation Brigade's (TAAB) mission to provide 24-4418hour responsive rotary wing support to senior government and military4419officials for continuity of government operations requires its aircrews4420to operate and train in the National Capital Region (NCR) during day4421and night hours. Flying at night at low altitudes under NVGs is the4422standard for Army Aircrews and has been validated as the principle4423method for flight operations in the National Airspace and in combat in4424urban, rural and overwater environments. All Army aviators are trained4425to operate utilizing night vision goggles for nighttime flying because4426of the exponential increase in situational awareness. Army aviators4427have the authority to remove their goggles if they deem it advantageous4428due to very high light levels or other factors when normal scanning4429techniques are not sufficient. However normal scanning techniques using4430peripheral vision with googles on is still the most effective means for4431optimal vision at night in all environments especially urban.44324433 Question 1a. Are night vision goggles still being used on the4434limited number of Army flights in the region?4435 Answer. Yes, night vision goggles provide pilots with an unmatched4436capability to improve situational awareness for nighttime flying as4437stated above.4438 ______44394440 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to4441 Brigadier General Matthew Braman44424443 Question 1. Black Hawk crewmember requirements. Army Regulation4444(AR) 95-1 requires two-pilot operations as the standard for night4445vision goggle (NVG) flights, with at least one pilot being NVG-4446qualified and current. In addition, a non-pilot crewmember, such as a4447crew chief, is required to be onboard to help with maintaining4448situational awareness.4449 Would a requirement for a 4th crewmember have made a difference in4450promoting situational awareness for the Black Hawk's flight crew? Why4451or why not?4452 Answer. Army Regulation 95-1 does not mandate minimum crewmember4453requirements specific to night vision goggle flights. The minimum4454aircrew requirement by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two4455pilots. In this instance there were three crewmembers.4456 The specific circumstances that led to the accident will be4457determined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) during4458its ongoing investigation. However, the Army has determined in the4459course of its safety investigation into the accident that PAT25's crew4460chief was seated on the left side of the aircraft, which was the same4461side American Airlines Flight 5342 approached from.44624463 Question 2. Should the Army consider revising its minimum crew4464requirements for Black Hawk helicopter operations like that performed4465by the 12th Army Aviation Brigade?4466 Answer. The Army will review all regulations and policies and will4467take appropriate action based on the facts and recommendations of the4468ongoing investigations when complete. The minimum aircrew requirement4469by the UH-60L Black Hawk operator manual is two pilots. The unit4470commander and pilot in command determine the size of the crew based on4471factors associated with each mission, the environment, and an4472assessment of the crew. Should the NTSB determine the number of4473aircrews assigned to PAT25 to be a causal factor in the accident, the4474Army will review its minimum crew requirements for Black Hawk4475helicopter operations and take appropriate action.44764477 [all]