“Unlocking Government Efficiency Through IT Modernization”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                          SECURING THE SKIES:5                        ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED6                        DRONE ACTIVITY OVER U.S.7                         MILITARY INSTALLATIONS89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY16                          AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS1718                                 OF THE1920                         COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT21                         AND GOVERNMENT REFORM2223                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2425                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2627                             FIRST SESSION2829                               __________3031                             APRIL 29, 20253233                               __________3435                           Serial No. 119-223637                               __________3839Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform4041[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4243                       Available on: govinfo.gov44                         oversight.house.gov or45                             docs.house.gov4647                              __________4849                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE5060-196 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20255152-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5354              COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM5556                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman5758Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia,59Mike Turner, Ohio                        Ranking Minority Member60Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of61Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Columbia62Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts63Michael Cloud, Texas                 Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois64Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Ro Khanna, California65Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Kweisi Mfume, Maryland66Pete Sessions, Texas                 Shontel Brown, Ohio67Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico68Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Robert Garcia, California69Pat Fallon, Texas                    Maxwell Frost, Florida70Byron Donalds, Florida               Summer Lee, Pennsylvania71Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Greg Casar, Texas72William Timmons, South Carolina      Jasmine Crockett, Texas73Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Emily Randall, Washington74Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia75Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Yassamin Ansari, Arizona76Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Wesley Bell, Missouri77Nick Langworthy, New York            Lateefah Simon, California78Eric Burlison, Missouri              Dave Min, California79Eli Crane, Arizona                   Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts80Brian Jack, Georgia                  Rashida Tlaib, Michigan81John McGuire, Virginia82Brandon Gill, Texas8384                                 ------8586                       Mark Marin, Staff Director87                   James Rust, Deputy Staff Director88                     Mitch Benzine, General Counsel89               Kaity Wolfe, Deputy Director for Oversight90         Grayson Westmoreland, Senior Professional Staff Member91                 Alex Phares, Professional Staff Member92      Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk9394                      Contact Number: 202-225-50749596                  Jamie Smith, Minority Staff Director9798                      Contact Number: 202-225-505199                                 ------100101              Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs102103               William Timmons, South Carolina, Chairman104Michael Turner, Ohio                 Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia105Michael Cloud, Texas                     Ranking Member106Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Stephen Lynch, Massachusetts107Byron Donalds, Florida               Kweisi Mfume, Maryland108Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Robert Garcia, California109Eli Crane, Arizona                   Greg Casar, Texas110John McGuire, Virginia               Vacancy111112                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S113114                              ----------115116                                                                   Page117118Hearing held on April 29, 2025...................................     1119120                               Witnesses121122                              ----------123124Rear Admiral Paul Spedero, Jr., Vice Director for Operations, J3,125  Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)126Oral Statement...................................................     5127128Mr. M. Roosevelt Ditlevson, Acting Assistant Secretary of129  Defense, Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, U.S.130  Department of Defense (DoD)131Oral Statement...................................................     6132133Written opening statements and bios are available on the U.S.134  House of Representatives Document Repository at:135  docs.house.gov.136137                           Index of Documents138139                              ----------140141  * Article, Markets and Markets, ``Autonomous Ascent, How AI is142  Reshaping the Future of UAV Industry''; submitted by Rep.143  Biggs.144145  * Article, The Wall Street Journal, ``Mystery Drones Swarmed a146  U.S. Military Base for 17 Days''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.147148  * Article, The Washington Times, ``What We Know About the149  Langley Air Force Base Drone Incident''; submitted by Rep.150  Biggs.151152  * Advisory,`` Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition153  and Use of Technology to Detect Mitigate UAS''; submitted by154  Rep. McGuire.155156Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.157158                          ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS159160                              ----------161162  * Questions for the Record: to Mr. Arel; submitted by Rep.163    Timmons.164165  * Questions for the Record: to Rear Admiral Spedero; submitted166    by Rep. Crane.167168  * Questions for the Record: to Rear Admiral Spedero; submitted169    by Rep. McGuire.170171These documents were submitted after the hearing, and may be172  available upon request.173174                          SECURING THE SKIES:175                        ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED176                        DRONE ACTIVITY OVER U.S.177                         MILITARY INSTALLATIONS178179                              ----------180181                        Tuesday, April 29, 2025182183                     U.S. House of Representatives184185              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform186187              Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs188189                                                   Washington, D.C.190191    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m.,192Room HVC-210, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. William193Timmons, [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.194    Present: Representatives Timmons, Cloud, Biggs, Luna,195McGuire, Subramanyam, and Lynch.196    Mr. Timmons. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Military197and Foreign Affairs will come to order. I would like to welcome198everyone. Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at199any time. I recognize myself for the purpose of making an200opening statement.201    Thank you for joining us today as we discuss one of the202most complex and serious threats to our national security, the203unauthorized use of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, over U.S.204military installations and sensitive sites. In recent years, we205have seen a surge in drone incursions over military206installations across the country.207    In 2024, the Department of Defense stated that there are208more than one million drones registered in the United States209and estimated that there are more than 8,500 drones flown210legally across the country every day. I have even seen some of211these drone incursions firsthand during my time in the South212Carolina Air National Guard.213    However, these incursions are not from hobbyists being214blown off course. The multitude of drones reported flying over215bases in the past several years revealed a coordinated effort216by our adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and217surveillance of some of our most sensitive military equipment.218    These incursions often are designed to disrupt important219trainings and create chaos for a number of reasons. No. 1, base220commanders have inadequate or nonexistent monitoring221capabilities; two, a near total lack of counter-drone222capabilities; three, unclear standard operating procedures to223guide base commanders' responses and decisionmaking; and224finally, four, ambiguous legal authorities both on and off225base.226    This threat is magnified by the complex regulatory and227prosecutorial framework that was patched together by the228previous Administration in what I would argue is a poor attempt229to address this issue. Right now, the Department of Defense,230Federal Aviation Administration, Intelligence Community,231Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security are232all involved in some aspects of the counter-UAS efforts. As a233result, there is no agency with primary authority on countering234drone incursions, leading to confusion and, more importantly,235gaps on how to identify and mitigate this threat.236    This interagency failure was on full display last winter237when hundreds of drones were spotted in the skies above New238Jersey and other parts of the Northeast. After several239temporary flight restrictions and mass confusion among state,240local, and Federal partners, the Biden Administration provided241the public no answers to what was happening above them.242However, with only a few weeks of the current Administration243taking office, they revealed that the drones over New Jersey244were actually authorized by the FAA. This instance raises245multiple questions as to why the previous Administration left246the American people in the dark for over a month when they knew247the simple truth.248    Another notable incident occurred at Langley Air Force Base249in December 2023. Over 17 days, unidentified drones repeatedly250breached our sensitive military airspace, one of America's251critical installations. The F-22 Raptor squadrons were moved to252alternate bases to lessen exposure, and discussions were253initiated on installing physical countermeasures.254    These are not isolated incidents. In February, the255Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM testified to Congress that256there were over 350 detections of drones at 100 different257military installations last year alone. Additionally, since2582023, two Chinese nationals have been arrested for illegally259flying drones over military installations to conduct260surveillance. One of these individuals was caught attempting to261flee the U.S. and return to China with sensitive footage he had262recorded.263    Today, this Committee will hear from officials from the264Department of Defense on what the Trump Administration is doing265to help combat this issue and bring an end to these illegal266drone incursions. We must demand full accountability, expedited267technological upgrades, and enhanced oversight to safeguard our268sovereignty and ensure that our military remains unexposed to269foreign surveillance and potential threats. I am hopeful that270our witnesses here today have suggestions on how Congress can271help empower the right Federal agencies to combat this problem272and secure the skies above our military bases.273    I now recognize Ranking Member Subramanyam for the purpose274of making an opening statement.275    Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for276holding this important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses277for being here today and for your service to our country and to278making our airspace safe.279    It is clear that UAS is an issue right now. It is the280future of warfare from the war in Ukraine to our own military281bases in the continental United States. We are seeing real time282that UAS are redefining how battles are fought and how283intelligence is gathered. I believe it has been 350 drones that284have been reported in the last year, over 100 different285military installations. That is 350 different potential286national security breaches that we know of. These include287highly sensitive sites such as nuclear facilities and major288military bases, and that is a huge threat to our national289security and the lives of our service members. And290unfortunately, you know, our lack of coordinated effective291response needs to be addressed immediately. And I know everyone292here today wants to work on it and is planning on working on293it.294    And so, we are familiar with this issue in my home state,295in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In December 2023, service296members at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia saw drones297hovering over their airspace for 17 days. And Langley, for298those who do not know, is home to key national security assets299like the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, and it plays an important300role in keeping us safe here in our Nation's capital. And so,301we also have some important naval assets in that area too.302    And, you know, these drones demonstrated complicated aerial303maneuvers and did not just broadcast on known frequencies,304suggesting that they were not just a local hobbyist making an305innocent mistake. As far as we can tell in Congress, there was306and still is not a cohesive or coordinated plan for how we are307going to deal with this, but maybe we can learn more today308about what is happening now and what we can do moving forward.309    You know, our job on this Committee is to find answers to310questions, and I have a lot. You know, who was piloting these311drones, for instance? Were these criminal actors? Are these312foreign adversaries? Are they simply local hobbyists with313advanced capabilities? I am not sure about that, but maybe that314is the case. And what are they doing? Are they gathering315intelligence? Are they probing for weaknesses? Are they316planning an attack? And finally, what is our plan for dealing317with them safely and effectively because these UAS are a clear318and present danger to our national security, and we need to319have a plan to counter them.320    There are several areas I would like to focus on today. The321first is counter-drone authorities. Right now, the U.S. law322allows the Department of Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland323Security to detect and respond to drone activities in certain324situations such as nuclear facilities, for instance, missile325defense assets, or other covered facilities, but only around326half of all military installations actually fall under this327definition of covered facility, which is why I think this may328be something we should look at for change.329    The second is counter-drone technologies. You know, it is330not just as simple as shooting them down, as we know. You know,331there are homes and businesses and parks near bases like332Langley, and people live there. Children play there. Shooting333down drones could endanger people in these communities,334especially if we do not know what payloads the drones may335carry. And a missed shot could also pose a threat to commercial336air traffic as well. And so, you know, we need to find a way to337safely counter some of these incursions.338    And we have other technologies at our disposal like jamming339and disrupting and even taking over unknown or hostile drones,340but there is a lot of work to do to develop these capabilities.341And some of that work actually takes place in my district in342northern Virginia.343    And, you know, with that said, I do not know of a silver344bullet, and so it is going to take a coordinated effort, I345think, at the state, local, and Federal level, and so we are346all going to have to work together because everyone has got347different jurisdictions. And I would like to, on that front,348see if we can work together and maybe have some sort of task349force in place so that information is easily gathered and where350everyone is up to date on the latest technology, as well as the351best practices.352    And so, this is a very timely hearing on an important353issue, and I want to work with my colleagues on both sides of354the aisle to come up with a plan to protect our military bases355and protect the American people, so I yield back.356    Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.357    I am pleased to welcome an expert panel of witnesses for358today's discussion. I would first like to welcome Rear Admiral359Paul Spedero, the Vice Director for Operations, or J3, for the360Joint Chiefs of Staff.361    I would also like to welcome Mr. Mark Ditlevson, who is the362current Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland363Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.364    Due to unforeseen circumstances, the FAA is no longer365testifying at today's hearing, but they have committed to366answering in writing any questions that our Members have. If367any Member has questions they would like to submit to the FAA368following this hearing, please get them to staff for the FAA to369answer.370    Now, we are going to administer the oath to the witnesses.371Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please372stand and raise their right hand.373    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you374are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing375but the truth, so help you God?376    [Chorus of ayes.]377    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. Please take your seat. Let the378record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.379    We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your380testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that we will have read381your written statement, and it will appear in full in the382hearing record. Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes.383    As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in384front of you so that it is on and the Members can hear you.385When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn386green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the387red light comes on, your 5 minutes have expired, and we would388ask that you please wrap up.389    I now recognize Rear Admiral Spedero for his opening390statement.391392               STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL SPEDERO JR.393394                    VICE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J3395396                      JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)397398                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)399400    Admiral Spedero. Good afternoon, Chairman Timmons, Ranking401Member Subramanyam, Committee Members, ladies and gentlemen.402Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and thank you403for your support and your oversight. Admittedly, several of my404opening comments will echo those of the Chairman and the405Ranking Member.406    The rapid emergence, proliferation, and employment of407unmanned systems has fundamentally changed the way that both408professional militaries, as well as terrorist organizations,409conduct warfare. Over the last few years, we have seen the410employment of unmanned systems, in particular unmanned aerial411systems, in every major conflict, from the Russia-Ukraine war412to Iran's attacks on Israel and attacks against U.S. bases and413ships across the Middle East. And most tragically, an Iranian-414supported militant group successfully employed a one-way attack415drone on Tower 22 in Jordan, killing three U.S. service416members, and wounding 40, on January 27, 2024.417    Here in the homeland, as Assistant Secretary Ditlevson will418note in his opening remarks, the mass drone incursions over419Joint Base Langley-Eustis in December 2023 reminded us that the420homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And should our adversary421choose to employ drones for surveillance or even attack, we422would not be prepared to adequately defend our homeland and423only marginally capable to defend our military installations.424The incursions over Joint Base Langley-Eustis were not the425first, they have not been the last, but they were the longest426and the largest series of incursions that we have seen to date.427    In the comprehensive review of that event, as well as in428the actions we took in follow-on incursions like those that429occurred over Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, and over430Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle in New431Jersey, have resulted in improvements. But more action is432needed, and the Joint Force has made counter-UAS our priority433line of effort.434    We are now better prepared to respond to incursions with435the designation of Commander of U.S. Northern Command and436Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command as the operational437synchronizers in their respective areas of responsibility. Last438year and within weeks of being assigned this role, General439Guillot, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, released a440comprehensive commander's assessment that has served as a441roadmap to building the necessary command and control and442standard operating procedures to address the drone threat.443    Over the last year, we have also invested in education and444training against this threat. NORTHCOM has been a central445driving force for the work being done by several organizations446in partnership with industry to deliver the domain awareness447and counter-UAS systems that we require. And last, we are448progressing well in our completion of the counter-UAS tasks449assigned to us in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA.450    We appreciate your continued support and your oversight.451Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I will now452pass to Secretary Ditlevson.453454                 STATEMENT OF MARK ROOSEVELT DITLEVSON455456                 ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE457458                HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS459460                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)461462    Mr. Ditlevson. Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member463Subramanyam, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank464you for the opportunity to speak here today. The events of465December 2023 at Joint Base Langley-Eustis served to focus and466energize DoD's counter-small UAS efforts in the homeland.467During the event, DoD struggled to address the incursions in a468timely and effective fashion, owing at least in part to469challenges within the DoD and our ability to implement a470relatively untested interagency coordination process. To some471extent, those challenges from JBLE still exist. However, we472have worked since then to improve and refine our processes and473coordination efforts, and we have seen improvements in474subsequent responses.475    I can assure the Committee that the Department is as476frustrated by these events as you are. However, we cannot477simply focus on looking back and waste precious resources. As a478department, we act, we review that action, we adjust, and we479move out. Today, I am here to tell you that we are continuing480to move out. I am confident that we are in a stronger position481to defend DoD installations today than we were in December4822023.483    We are fighting this threat on three fronts, internal484process reviews, generating better domain awareness, and485clarifying commanders' authority in legislation. Internally, we486must focus on the ability to provide response at the speed of487relevance. The designation of USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM late488last year as the counter-UAS operational synchronizers in their489respective areas of the homeland was an essential step. We have490developed more streamlined interagency coordination consistent491with section 130i.492    We are also conducting a comprehensive review, as requested493in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA section 925 and, where necessary,494consolidating and updating DoD policy. This is an effort long495overdue, and it provides us with direction and momentum.496    Last, working with our interagency partners, like our497colleagues from the FAA, we have enabled DoD to sponsor498facilities which provide a critical mission to DoD but are not499directly DoD facilities or assets.500    Second, generating better domain awareness is essential to501developing an understanding of what is flying in our airspace502and how to separate the negligent from the nefarious. This is503the fundamental issue we saw at Langley in New Jersey. DoD is504working through venues like the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,505the JRAC, to rapidly acquire the right equipment and to give506commanders better tools to understand the operating environment507and the ability to effectively conduct non-kinetic and kinetic508mitigations. The Commander of USNORTHCOM phrased it this way in509his posture hearing in February: ``You cannot defeat what you510cannot see.''511    On the legislative front, we continue to engage with512Members of Congress to seek modest but important refinements to513DoD's counter-UAS authorities under section 130i. Our514legislative proposal is intended to allow the Department to515protect additional locations and missions, add greater516stability for long-term planning and resource allocation within517the Department, and facilitate improved understanding and518cooperation among the U.S. interagency and local partners.519    Ultimately, I believe we need to address all these issues520with end users in mind, our installation commanders and the521security personnel charged with the duties to protect our522installations, our operations, and ultimately our personnel.523    Last, the President of the United States has issued several524executive orders directing the Department of Defense to take525all appropriate and lawful measures to ensure the complete526operational control of the border. The Department, in turn, is527responding by preparing the path for employment of counter-sUAS528activities along the border, both in support of DoD interests529and in support of DHS as the lead Federal agency. As the530operational environment, legislation, and threats evolve,531policy must adapt to ensure DoD's ability to continue to532advance our national defense objectives remains.533    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Subramanyam, and distinguished534Members of the Committee, in conclusion, the homeland continues535to face increased and evolving threats from UAS. To address536these challenges requires a whole-of-government approach and a537unified effort. We must modernize the ability to assess the538threat, determine its weaknesses, and acquire and deploy539countermeasures. Thank you for the support of Congress and for540your continued commitment in support of the Department of541Defense. I look forward to your questions.542    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize myself for 5543minutes.544    Rear Admiral Spedero, how many drone incursions have taken545place over U.S. military installations over the past 2 years?546We got the number last time we had a briefing of 350, but have547they grown? Or what is the current data you are willing to548share?549    Admiral Spedero. Yes, so the exact number I would be happy550to share in a classified setting, but I can tell you that it551has grown.552    Mr. Timmons. I am actually curious. Why did we get the 350553number in an unclassified setting? That was one of the554questions I had.555    Admiral Spedero. It is a great question, sir.556    Mr. Timmons. OK.557    Admiral Spedero. Yes.558    Mr. Timmons. Fair enough. All right. Well, let us do this.559Can you discuss procedures that DoD has in place for a base560commander when the base commander gets reports of an561unauthorized drone incursion?562    Admiral Spedero. Yes, so currently, there is a standard563operating procedure that has been published by the Commander of564U.S. Northern Command. So, each base has been provided that565standard operating procedure. The expectation is they will566respond in accordance with that.567    Mr. Timmons. When was that created?568    Admiral Spedero. It was just published here recently,569within the last month.570    Mr. Timmons. OK.571    Admiral Spedero. It was finalized and published.572    Mr. Timmons. So, what percent of base commanders have any573technology to actually track drones as opposed to just, ooh, I574saw a drone, and then you report it?575    Admiral Spedero. Yes, so the capabilities at each base is576varied. Again, the specifics for the individual locations would577be better in a classified setting, but it is not comprehensive,578I can tell you that. It is not sufficient and, again, varies579from base to base, from very little to somewhat more580comprehensive.581    Mr. Timmons. Is that something that Congress can help with582authorizations and appropriations to get additional resources?583I would feel that most bases should have, at the very least,584the ability to track. Whether they have countermeasures is a585different thing. But is that something that you all need? You586need additional money?587    Admiral Spedero. Yes, sir, absolutely. I think the588development fielding the acquisition distribution of domain589awareness sensors is the critical first step. It is not the590only thing. Obviously, we need a method to exert command and591control so that we can build a common operating picture because592it will take layers of different sensors because one sensor may593be better against certain UAVs and certain flight profiles, and594you may have to rely on different sensors to round out the595picture. So, being able to fuse all that together to get the596complete picture will be necessary. And then, as you mentioned,597getting to a point where we can actually respond, that is an598entirely next investment that needs to be made.599    So, yes, we do need more sensors. We are addressing the600shortfall right now with the fielding of flyaway kits. So,601these will be kits that will be available for bases that have602very limited capability to detect on their own and build domain603awareness. And should they have an incursion that they are604unable to resolve, they would solicit the help from Commander605of the U.S. Northern Command, and this flyaway kit, as well as606expertise and additional resources that would be required would607be immediately deployed to that location.608    Mr. Timmons. So, I guess, resources are probably fairly609easy, and you all are going to work on telling us what you610actually need from a technology perspective, but the other side611is the authority. So, I mean, does a base commander have clear612authorities, what they can and cannot do relative to whether613the drone is in their airspace or just outside the airspace?614And is that as big or bigger of a problem?615    Admiral Spedero. So, all of our installations have the616authority that is afforded them under the standing rules of617engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. You618know, in those rules, if they are--can establish that there is619hostile intent or hostile act--then they not only have the620authority, but they have the absolute right and responsibility621to respond appropriately to protect themselves, forces, as well622as DoD property. So, those are standing rules that they have.623    Now, being able to discern hostile intent and hostile act,624as referred to in the opening comments, may be very625challenging. Is this negligent activity being conducted by626someone just flying a drone irresponsibly, whether that is a627recreational enthusiast or it is someone that is using a drone628for commercial aspects? So, it can be a challenge here in the629homeland to determine that.630    Mr. Timmons. So, a base commander has the authority to, for631example, arrest a Chinese national that is a quarter mile off632base?633    Admiral Spedero. He does not have the authority to detain634someone that is off base. He would have to coordinate with635local law enforcement to apprehend someone that is operating a636drone outside of the base. Now, I know Secretary Ditlevson will637talk about 130i authorities, which is something that we really638do want to talk about today because I think it is important.639But under 130i authorities, there is some additional room to640respond. For a covered facility, merely the presence of that641drone conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected of642conducting unauthorized surveillance or interfering with643operations, as you referred to in your opening statement, about644the interference with F-22 operations, that would meet the645standard for a response rather than having to determine hostile646intent or hostile act.647    Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. My time has expired.648    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.649Subramanyam, for 5 minutes.650    Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.651    I wanted to go back to something I mentioned a couple of652times, which is what is a covered facility and a not covered653facility? And Rear Admiral Spedero, if you are not a covered654facility, what does that mean? Does that impair your ability to655respond? And what do covered facilities have that noncovered656ones do not?657    Admiral Spedero. Yes, so if you are not covered, you can658request to be covered, but you would have to meet the criteria659to become a covered facility, and that is one of the problems660with the 130i authorization is meeting the criteria for661covered. An example of this would be Luke Air Force Base where662F-35 training takes place for roughly three-quarters of those663that fly F-35s, and it is not a covered facility because664training facilities are not covered. So, it would be665problematic to actually get approval for Luke Air Force Base to666be a 130i.667    Now, as I mentioned earlier, under 130i, if a drone is668conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected even of669conducting authorized surveillance, then the base commander670would be able to respond to that. Unauthorized surveillance may671or may not meet the criteria of hostile intent, which would672give you the authority to respond under the standing rules of673engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. So, it674relieves some of the burden on that base commander to determine675that there is an imminent threat. If this is interfering with676our operations, if this is giving the potential adversary a677look at our base and our sensitive activities, then we have the678authority to respond.679    Mr. Subramanyam. And you mentioned before having to reach680out to local jurisdictions if someone is operating UAS outside681of a base. And what kind of coordination is currently being682done with state and local jurisdictions? Is it sort of ad hoc,683or is there like a process in place right now? And does Federal684law limit the extent of engagement with state and local? And685how can we make that better?686    Admiral Spedero. Yes, thank you for that question. So, each687base commander, one of his imperatives is to build688relationships with the local community. That would include law689enforcement agencies. It is covered extensively in all of the690base commander courses. So, their part of their training and691their education program, before they assume command, is692building, is how to build those relationships, the importance,693what the limitations of those are. So, each individual base694commander is responsible.695    There are additional lessons learned and protocols and best696practices about how to engage law enforcement on this697particular threat, but those occur at our bases and did occur698at Joint Base Langley-Eustis. They had a very, very tight699relationship with local law enforcement, with sheriffs, police700departments, as well as other Federal agencies, law enforcement701agencies that have capability in that area. And they did702respond in concert together to try to apprehend individuals703that were responsible for that drone activity over the base.704So, that--it does occur, and it is very important.705    Mr. Subramanyam. And as far as technology and mitigation,706what--and I do not know if maybe this is the right forum for707this, but broadly, do you think there is technology gaps708currently? And do you think that there is progress being made709toward kind of filling those gaps? And what can we do, both in710Congress, as well as the private industry, to help kind of fill711the gaps when it comes to technology if we are trying to712address both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions?713    Admiral Spedero. Yes, in general, the technology to field714systems has far outpaced the technology to defeat those715systems. It is a much wider, broader, deeper market for drone716application for commercial and recreational purposes, so hence,717that technology has evolved very quickly from radio-controlled718drones to now fully autonomous drones that may or may not even719rely on reception of a GPS signal, which would make it very720challenging to intercept. So, on the counter-drone activity,721you know, you have to come back to agencies that would be722interested in that like Department of Defense, Department of723Homeland Security, FBI, you know, law enforcement agencies. So,724we have to partner and we have to create that demand within725industry to get technology back on pace to counter this ever-726increasing emergence of drone technology.727    Mr. Subramanyam. Do you feel like we have the personnel728right now and the expertise in the country to be able to do729this?730    Admiral Spedero. I think we have seen a good response. I731will defer to Secretary Ditlevson. He can talk about DIU and732other organizations that have really made a solid partnership733with industry to advance this technology.734    Mr. Ditlevson. Thank you, Admiral. Yes, there are several735different organizations within the DoD that are looking at this736issue and moving out rapidly to acquire new capabilities such737as the JRAC, the Joint Counter-UAS Office, and DIU. All of738those, this is a focus area and one of their primary lines of739effort.740    Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you. I yield back.741    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from742Virginia, Mr. McGuire, for 5 minutes.743    Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our744witnesses.745    Admiral, thanks for your service.746    I want a yes or no from both of you. Are you aware of the747August 2020 advisory? It is an advisory on the application of748Federal laws to the application and use of technologies to749detect and mitigate unmanned aircraft systems. Are you two750aware of that?751    Admiral Spedero. No, sir, I am not specifically aware of752that.753    Mr. Ditlevson. No, sir.754    Mr. McGuire. If and when appropriate, I have a copy, and I755would like to admit that into the record.756    Mr. Timmons. Without objection, so ordered.757    Mr. McGuire. So, I believe that is the source of a lot of758the problems that we have. In the military, we have something759called paralysis by analysis. Obviously, the commanders at760Langley and other bases have seen drones, and they fail to act761because--and I believe the source of those problems is this762August 2020 advisory.763    And I think I have a solution for it. I was recently at the764southern border where I met with Tom Homan. I met with border765control, ICE agents, mayors, sheriffs, business owners, 10th766Mountain Division folks that are protecting our border from San767Diego all the way to Texas, and I asked them, are you seeing768drones come across the southern border and surveying our769troops? And the answer was yes. And I said, is 130i working for770you right now? And I know what they said, but Admiral, what do771you think? Is 130i right now working for us?772    Admiral Spedero. So, they do not have 130i. That is the773first piece.774    Mr. McGuire. OK. That----775    Admiral Spedero. And we are working to resolve that. So,776for instance, in the national defense areas that have just been777established as an annex, does not have 130i. Now----778    Mr. McGuire. I get it. I just am going to get to a point.779    Admiral Spedero. Yes.780    Mr. McGuire. And how about do you have an opinion on 130i781right now as of today?782    Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman. If we can get 130i783implemented in these areas where a joint task force southwest784border is operating, it should enable the commanders on the785ground to have those expanded authorities that allow them to786interdict and mitigate these UAS threats.787    Mr. McGuire. And I know you said you are working with788Congress on legislation, so I would like to talk to you about789an idea on a piece of legislation. It may be something that790involves Judiciary and FAA, but let me run this across you.791    So, we currently have troops on the border facing the792cartels and our critical infrastructure. Now, of course, we793have got Langley Air Force Base and other critical794infrastructure as well, and, of course, we have got bad actors795that have bought land next to our military bases, and they are796surveilling us on a daily basis. And it is only a matter of797time until we have our next 9/11 terrorist attack. The problem798is bureaucracy prevents action, but this time we know about it799and we can fix it. And right now, with 130i, the way it is800proposed, you have to be observed or attacked and then ask for801permission, and that takes delays.802    I have got an idea that might speed that up. Eighteen U.S.803Code 32 is treating remote-control airplanes, which I call a804drone--so 18 U.S.C. 32 is treating remote-control airplanes or805drones as if they are passenger airplanes, and they are not.806Basically, the problem is the government has created complex807statutes to let a few bad actors possibly take action if you808jump through a thousand hoops, 130i. This is not good enough.809We owe it to our military and our citizens to fix this. The810United States provides better protection from UAS to Saudi811Arabia than we do to our own citizens.812    And so, my idea for a bill is you change the word from813aircraft to manned aircraft because I think every commander is814afraid that if I shoot down a remote-control airplane or a815drone, no one is going to back me up. I think I remember816hearing the Langley commander say, are you guys going to back817me up? Are you guys going to back me up? And no one answered.818That may not be 100 percent true, but Admiral, do you have any819comments on that idea?820    Admiral Spedero. Yes, this is the burden of command. And821you need to understand that if there is something that is822assessed as a threat to your forces or your installation, then,823again, you not only have the authority but the responsibility824to act.825    I would counter that they have authority right now on the826southwest border to engage UAS. We have in the last few days827alone reaffirmed that under the standing rules of engagement828and the standing rules of use of force, when you take in the829totality of the facts and the circumstances at the time, you830have the authority.831    We know that cartels have used UAS for unauthorized832surveillance to assess our troop size, our movements, to833solicit and enable attacks from other vectors. We know that834they have used drones and kinetic attacks against Mexican----835    Mr. McGuire. Well, Admiral, with all due respect----836    Admiral Spedero [continuing]. Military authorities.837    Mr. McGuire [continuing]. I just returned from the southern838border, and I asked the commander from Texas to San Diego if he839has authority to shoot down drones that he is looking at that840is looking at his troops, and he still is not sure. I just left841the southern border, and I think it goes back to that advisory.842That advisory has created a stigma, and I think that we can843mitigate or overcome that if we just change the word from844aircraft to manned aircraft, and then they will not have such a845huge penalty if they shoot down a drone. And certainly, if846someone wants to prosecute somebody for shooting down private847property, there are plenty of laws on the books for that.848    But with that, I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr.849Chairman. I yield back.850    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from851Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes.852    Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to853thank the witnesses for helping the Committee with its work.854    I do have to say that I would prefer that we were reviewing855the facts of the signal chats that were conducted by Secretary856Hegseth and the Trump leadership team in order to get to the857bottom of that. However, I will, at a later date in full858Committee, enter a resolution of inquiry to ask the859administration to provide information to this Committee, to the860Oversight Committee, regarding how that happened.861    It was bad enough that the last time we were here, we just862knew that the initial signal chat had happened and that863inadvertently they had included the editor of The Atlantic, who864was not approved for clearance, and that the chat included865specific information about those attacks against Yemen, which866could have put our sons and daughters in uniform at grave risk.867    Now, that was then. Now we know that this chat also went to868Secretary Hegseth's brother, his sister. I do not think his mom869was in on it. She is about the only one in the family who was870not in on it. And then the family attorney was in on it as871well. So, that is a whole set of people who were not authorized872to be on that chat, again, that disclosed, you know, classified873information and actionable intelligence about an impending U.S.874attack in Yemen.875    And then beyond that, now we find out that Secretary876Hegseth is using his Gmail account and using a phone that was877listed on his sports betting app and available to the public.878So, this just keeps getting worse.879    I know that is not the fault of these witnesses, and they880probably cannot illuminate the circumstances, but I will be881filing that resolution of inquiry asking for the White House to882provide that information because that is important. It is not883partisan politics. It is just what the Oversight Committee884should be doing to keep our military personnel safe, like what885we are doing here. We are having a hearing on drones, you know,886being flown in the area of, you know, U.S. bases, and that887presents a danger to our sons and daughters. Well, so does, you888know, using a non-secure platform to discuss actionable889intelligence against our enemy who has anti-aircraft and anti-890naval vessel capability. That is really important, too, and891that presents a clear and present danger.892    I know that there were reports in the press that the White893House said that was childish, that was childish that Secretary894Hegseth did that. I agree with that assessment. I think it was895totally immature, and it demonstrates an unfitness and a lack896of seriousness about protecting our sons and daughters in897uniform.898    You know, we all nominate young men and women from our899district to the Military Academy at West Point and to the Naval900Academy, and dear God, you cannot, you know, put a family in901that position, put one of our best and brightest in that902position, and then leak information to our enemies while they903are going into battle.904    OK. So, this Committee, myself included, investigated an905attack, a 2020 attack by al-Shabaab at Manda Bay in Kenya. That906was a drone attack. Several recent base attacks overseas, in907fact, have involved the use of drones. So, Admiral, how has our908profile, you know, countermeasures against drones, how has that909changed since those initial attacks back in 2020 that resulted910in U.S. casualties?911    Admiral Spedero. Yes, so since that time, we have fielded a912number of new systems across a variety of the spectrum,913electromagnetic as well as electro-optical and infrared sensors914to build our domain awareness. We have also fielded a number of915kinetic systems that shoot interceptors or use some sort of916munition, and they are deployed at our most vulnerable and most917likely to be attacked facilities overseas. That is where the918bulk of our counter-UAS capability is actually located is919overseas, and hence, the problem here on the homeland is we920have very limited and sparse and distributed capability across,921you know, the multitude of installations we have.922    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Admiral.923    Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.924    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from925Arizona, Mr. Biggs, for 5 minutes.926    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.927    I just want to briefly comment about the previous928questioner, once again, going with the woke media story and not929bothering to mention the success of the strikes which restored930freedom of navigation, protected shipping lanes, and kept931Americans safe, nor did he bother to mention that the encrypted932service that was being used was one recommended by the previous933Administration, by DHS guidance.934    But my questions with regard to this topic is for both of935you, and this is the context. So, do we have the technology to936discover that there is UAVs in the neighborhood of our bases?937    Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman, we do.938    Mr. Biggs. OK. If a UAV is there, can we track it? Do we939have the technology to track it?940    Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman.941    Mr. Biggs. OK. And then you could interdict it if you chose942to at every base?943    Mr. Ditlevson. We have different options for interdiction,944Congressman, across a spectrum----945    Mr. Biggs. Right.946    Mr. Ditlevson [continuing]. For the commander to use their947best judgment.948    Mr. Biggs. But you could interdict if you chose, if you so949chose. And you have authorities under 130i, perhaps, depending950on the commanding chain there, right? I mean, you could make951that point, right?952    Mr. Ditlevson. Depending upon the installation, whether it953is a covered installation, Congressman, you would have the 130i954additional authorities. But, as the Admiral has said, there is955always the ability to respond if there is hostile intent for956that base commander.957    Mr. Biggs. But you have to determine hostile intent, and958that is the problem, right?959    Admiral Spedero, could you explain how unauthorized drone960activity, even when it is caused by recreational or commercial961users, diverts critical security resources away from responding962to legitimate national security threats, please?963    Admiral Spedero. Yes, Congressman, thank you for your964question. If we go back to New Jersey and, you know, that965activity, once the FAA put the temporary flight restrictions in966place and there was, you know, very broad and comprehensive967coverage of that by the media, many of you spoke about it, many968of the Members of Congress talked about the anxiety that was969building in the community due to the high level of sightings.970Once that word got out, that public messaging about responsible971drone use, once the word got out about the flight restrictions,972we saw a rapid decline in the number of sightings. The drone973activity essentially went away. And we do not want to get to974the point where we have to do that every time.975    If we can message to the public that responsible commercial976and recreational application of your drone is an imperative to977prevent diverting our attention and our resources both from978investment, training, and response, we are going to be better979at defending the homeland. But if we have to continually be980aware of negligent drones flying into our base, it is going to981divert attention.982    That is not to say that we do not need to address this983threat because, as was brought up by this Committee and we984agree with, our adversary has demonstrated that they will use985this type of activity for unauthorized surveillance, for986espionage.987    Mr. Biggs. Yes, and let us add to that for a second, and988that is the coupling of AI, which is moving rapidly forward and989providing autonomous navigation, obstacle avoidance, deep990learning, computer vision, easier to become weaponized, real-991time image recognition, target identification. So, I would992like, briefly, if you could, either one of you want to talk993about the threat of AI, coupled with drone technology, to994become actually an exponentially increased threat to our995national security.996    Mr. Ditlevson. Congressman, it is a great question. Thank997you for that. On the policy side, we need to make sure that our998regulations internally at the DoD are streamlined to the extent999that we stay at pace with the threat that we face outside the1000fence line of our installations. We need to make sure that we1001are giving the commanders on the ground clarity on what they1002have for authority and providing them the capabilities to1003counter those threats.1004    Now, I think the Admiral can speak better as far as what is1005actually being developed at this time and how far ahead we are1006in counter-UAS technologies, but as far as the policy purview1007is concerned, I know from the Secretary of Defense front office1008down, we need to give the warfighter every capability they need1009to keep our service members safe.1010    Mr. Biggs. I know that I am not going to have time to hear1011your answer, Admiral, sorry, but with regard to the policy, I1012would ask that you work with the Chairman of the Subcommittee1013on policies that need to be rewritten, perhaps through1014legislation, that we can do to facilitate defending against1015this combination of AI and drone technology, which is advancing1016very rapidly.1017    Mr. Chairman, to that extent, I have some unanimous consent1018requests, if possible.1019    Mr. Timmons. Yes.1020    Mr. Biggs. Yes, the first one is ``Autonomous Ascent: How1021AI is Reshaping the Future of the UAV Industry.'' Another1022piece, ``Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 171023days.'' The next one, ``What We Know About the Langley Air1024Force Base Drone Incident.''1025    Mr. Timmons. Without objection, so ordered.1026    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1027    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from1028Texas, Mr. Cloud, for 5 minutes.1029    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for bringing up1030this very important topic that is very timely. And thank you,1031Admiral, especially for your service and those in uniform1032behind you for what you do to protect and serve our country.1033    It occurs to me that we are discussing this issue, but it1034seems to me like it is as much a system of some of the bigger1035issues we have seen at the Pentagon regarding our stance just1036on the world stage in the sense that, you know, I wish we were1037talking today about how advanced we are and how forward-1038thinking we have thought about this and that we have invested1039in these new technologies and that we are leading the world in1040it when we look at drones and drone incursions. But yet, for1041me, you know, I have considered that funding our defense is our1042No. 1 constitutional duty in Congress.1043    My biggest concerns have been that sometimes we are funding1044legacy systems that are outdated as opposed to investing into1045where the puck is going, so to speak. And while the funding for1046this is in lots of different buckets, my analysis, looking1047through a bunch of this, it seems like we are spending about1048$22 billion-ish in the last budget on fighter jets and maybe $11049billion on drone and counter-drone technology together. That1050may be off a bit because, again, it is in a lot of different1051pockets.1052    But it is that that concerns me in the sense of, you know,1053we are talking about military incursions over our base. We are1054talking about one drone coming and what we can or cannot do1055about it. I think from the American taxpayer who is sitting at1056home going, we are spending $800 billion roughly on defense,1057and we cannot shoot a drone down, it is just a frustrating1058experience because we want to think that we can do that.1059    So, as has been mentioned, us needing to do our job to make1060sure that you have the capabilities to do it, but I would also1061wonder how much of this is a little bit of a reactive stance in1062command being more concerned about CYA, so to speak, as opposed1063to protecting the assets and the intelligence and the1064information that is available on that base.1065    You mentioned that you recently developed the SOP, I guess,1066about a month ago. That was news to me. Could we get a copy of1067that sent to this Committee?1068    Admiral Spedero. Yes, sir. I do not see a problem with1069that. I will coordinate with the Commander, U.S. Northern1070Command.1071    Mr. Cloud. OK. That would be much appreciated.1072    And, you know, we all remember, what I would call, Biden's1073balloon blunder where we had this balloon come across. We sat1074here and watched it for days. I went to a meteorologist at one1075of the local news stations, and he was tracking it and1076predicting where it was going to go, and yet we were watching1077it go over bases and not doing anything about it. How much of1078this is just not the will to act versus legitimately you being1079prohibited legally from doing things? There is a difference1080between not having a clear authority and being prohibited from1081doing something, I guess is what I am trying to draw on.1082    Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman. That is a great question.1083For us on the policy side, we seek to clarify the authorities1084for base commanders so that they understand exactly what they1085are able to do. And, as you pointed out, sometimes there may be1086a little bit of confusion because of how the language is given1087out or guidance is pushed down to the lower levels.1088    During our review of counter-UAS policies, as prescribed in1089section 925 of the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, we have gone back and1090we have reviewed all of our counter-UAS documentation. For1091example, section 130i, it was at about 130 pages. We have cut1092that down to 20 pages now. So, we are looking to streamline our1093processes as much----1094    Mr. Cloud. Yes.1095    Mr. Ditlevson [continuing]. As possible so commanders1096understand what they have for authorities.1097    Mr. Cloud. That is certainly very helpful. I guess, you1098know, if I could convey kind of the angst of the American1099people, you know, we are looking at this and thinking, OK,1100there is drone incursion into the United States. You know,1101there are bad actors within our borders now who have the1102ability to even attack infrastructure. And we are talking1103military bases, but it could be electric powerlines, it could1104be pipelines, it could be anything at this point, and we seem1105very--like we are approaching this from a very bureaucratic1106standpoint as opposed to something that literally could be a1107problem next week. And I am wondering what we can do, and what1108we can help you do, in the sense of the sense of urgency that1109could be needed.1110    Again, we have bad actors even at the state level within1111our borders because, you know, we had open borders for the last11124 years, so the terrorist activity that is now in our country1113and bad actors from other states that do not have the best1114interest of our country in mind are here with this kind of1115capability. And what can we do to speed up this process so that1116it is handled with the urgency as opposed to kind of, like,1117this curious bureaucratic question that needs to be resolved?1118    That is a question. What can we do to speed it up both from1119DoD and from Congress' standpoint to support what you need?1120    Mr. Ditlevson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. We1121have a legislative proposal working through the Pentagon right1122now focused on three areas where we could improve section 130i.1123In the Department's opinion, we do not want this provision to1124sunset. We want to make sure that the authorities continue1125forward. There is an expiration date on 130i authorities next1126year.1127    We also want to expand the locations and missions covered1128under 130i. As we have discussed today, the bases are not all1129covered. Not all installations qualify as one of the nine1130mission areas under 130i, so we would like to expand that to1131cover all installations.1132    And then we would also like to facilitate data sharing1133because, right now, data sharing from the DoD side is limited1134only in the pursuit of a legal case against a particular1135individual or group. We are not able to share data with our1136interagency partners to improve our tactics, techniques, or1137procedures. And to your point, Congressman, earlier about1138driving cost efficiencies, being able to share data to produce1139better technology would help us be more efficient with taxpayer1140money.1141    Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. The gentleman's time has1142expired.1143    The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.1144Luna, for 5 minutes.1145    Ms. Luna. Thank you, Chairman.1146    Here is what every American needs to know that is watching1147this currently. In 2024 alone, 350 drones were detected flying1148over our military installations, over 100 to be exact, and that1149came straight out of the mouth of General Gregory Guillot,1150Commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. These were not1151just toys. These were intelligence-gathering, signal-jamming,1152and potentially weaponized drones. These incursions happened1153while the Biden Administration sat on their hands allowing1154bureaucracy and interagency dysfunction to run the show. I see1155a lot of military here right now. You guys all know that1156bureaucracy, many times, can be our worst enemy.1157    Now that President Trump is back in office, thank God, we1158finally have strong leadership again, but cleaning up Biden's1159national security blunder is no small task. Our military1160installations are still extremely vulnerable. As hearing just1161sitting here from some of my colleagues, we have the CCP,1162Iranian proxies, Mexican cartels, they all know this.1163    We are here today to fix that. And let me be crystal clear.1164As I am sure many of you would agree, if you are flying1165unauthorized drones over military installations, you should1166expect it to be shot down. Do not expect Uncle Sam to pay for1167it either. My opinion is play stupid games, win stupid prizes.1168    Now, Admiral Spedero, I have heard directly from General1169Guillot, in February, 350 drone incursions over 100 military1170installations in 1 year. I know that this is not your fault1171directly, but this is a massive security gap and utter failure.1172Under current authorities, what is preventing base commanders1173from neutralizing these immediately, in my opinion, going out1174there with a shotgun and shooting these things down?1175    Admiral Spedero. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. I wish1176it were as simple as shooting it with a shotgun, but it is not.1177    Ms. Luna. Depending on elevation. But what is stopping it?1178Is it still the bureaucratic red tape and sign-offs? Because in1179my opinion, if you are flying something like this that can jam1180communications, maybe carry explosives, collect surveillance on1181classified systems, I do not think that you should have to be1182required to make a phone call. I think that if you see it, you1183should shoot it down.1184    Admiral Spedero. Yes, under 130i, unauthorized surveillance1185would meet the standard for engagement. If it were interfering1186with your operations, it would meet the standard for1187engagement. If you are not at 130i, then again, back to the1188rules of engagement and establishing hostile intent or hostile1189act. But you may get there, so just the presence of that drone1190over your base may meet hostile intent or hostile act. There is1191not a set of circumstances I can tell you in every case and go1192down a checklist, OK, you have met it, go ahead and shoot.1193    Ms. Luna. Sir, I mean, I think you might agree. If you are1194flying a drone in any capacity, I do not care if it is civilian1195or not, over a military installation, I do not even think you1196should have to go to a checklist. I think that it should1197automatically be taken down.1198    Admiral Spedero. Yes, and that is the preference to invoke1199130i is to relieve that burden because we do agree that1200unauthorized access to our bases poses a threat. Even if there1201are not sensitive activities, it does provide surveillance of1202our force posture, our weak points, our vulnerabilities, you1203know, descriptions, geographic details of the base.1204    Ms. Luna. All of the information, right?1205    Admiral Spedero. They can gather intelligence piece by1206piece by any means necessary, so we do want 130i protection1207because we would like to relieve that burden. Now, engagement1208still needs to meet the standard, the responsible standard, and1209you have to do a collateral damage assessment before you can1210engage anywhere.1211    Ms. Luna. Well, I have a feeling with this Administration1212and the Members on this panel, I think that you will probably1213get there. So, help is on the way in that regard.1214    Mr. Ditlevson--hopefully, I said that OK--do you believe1215that foreign adversaries like China and Iran exploit the1216jurisdictional chaos under the previous Administration to1217increase their drone activity over U.S. territories?1218    Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congresswoman. I think our adversaries1219take advantage of every weakness that we have in our system,1220and they are constantly probing, trying to find an entry point.1221    Ms. Luna. OK. Well, let me just be crystal clear for the1222record. If you fly a drone over an American military base, it1223should be blown out of the sky. I do not think that this is a1224controversial perspective to have. No phone calls, no1225paperwork, no permission slips. But under the Biden message, I1226think it was more or less the message of fly wherever you want,1227we will kind of deal with it later. But be crystal clear, under1228this Administration, the message is FAFO. For decorum's sake,1229we will not interpret that, but just mess around, find out. You1230guys all know what that means.1231    We have the technology, we have the capability, but what we1232have lacked up until now is the courage to act without apology.1233This is not about drones. It is about deterrence. It is about1234restoring the kind of unapologetic strength that keeps our1235enemies at bay and our warfighters safe.1236    I yield my time. Thank you guys so much for being here1237today. You guys look great in uniform, and you do too, ladies.1238    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. In closing, I want to thank our1239witnesses once again for their testimony today.1240    I now yield to Ranking Member Subramanyam for closing1241remarks.1242    Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think I will keep1243it brief.1244    I think we have some good ideas that we can maybe turn into1245legislation, and we can hopefully make sure that we empower1246bases to both have the right technologies to address this, as1247well as to make sure more military installations are covered1248under statute potentially, make sure there is better1249coordination with state, local, and Federal, and make sure that1250overall we have a workforce and the capacity to be able to1251address these challenges. So, I am glad we are all on the same1252page on that front, and I look forward to working on this1253together.1254    Thank you. I yield back.1255    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize myself for closing1256remarks.1257    It seems that we are a bit paralyzed here in Congress to1258deal with emerging technology. I have been working on1259cybersecurity legislation for the last six-plus years, and the1260bill that we need, a comprehensive bill would have to go1261through at least ten, maybe more, committees of jurisdiction to1262get it right in the House and probably another five-plus in the1263Senate. And we are just unable to do what we need to do to1264address real national security issues in the realm of1265cybersecurity. And I fear that it is going to take some tragedy1266to cause us to act in that capacity on cybersecurity.1267    I do not think drones are much different both because of1268the complexity, the challenges that we face from a legislative1269perspective, whether it is authorizing and appropriating the1270money to purchase the necessary technology to monitor, to then1271engage with and disarm drones that are posing a threat, or1272whether it is the authority side to address the legal concerns1273that are very real. And it is probably not going to get done in1274one bill. It is going to probably be a number of bills, and,1275you know, there is going to be a lot of interest surrounding1276how we do it.1277    You know, as I think about this issue, the Chinese New Year1278drone was one of the most amazing things I have ever seen, and1279it also was very troubling. That display of--I mean, I guess it1280was an AI-enabled drone swarm that was basically providing1281entertainment. But while it was very entertaining, it is also1282terrifying. And I think that the capabilities of our1283adversaries and seeing how war has evolved in Ukraine and how1284the Russians and the Ukraine military are largely relying on1285drones, I mean, a huge portion of that conflict is being used1286as technology as opposed to traditional warfare.1287    So, we have got to get moving on this. We have to enhance1288our capacity. Congress has to act, but a lot of this is the1289private sector getting up to speed. A lot of this is our1290Defense Department telling us exactly what they need. And we do1291not have time to waste. We have spent enormous amounts of1292resources to make sure that we have a 24/7, 365 air alert1293mission for fighter jets to be deployed. And I am not sure how1294good that capacity is right now, considering that a couple1295dozen drones could severely impede our ability to get jets off1296the ground. So, I mean, this is a huge, huge challenge, and we1297need to act before it is too late.1298    I appreciate you all taking the time to come here today. It1299seems that we are moving in the right direction, and I1300appreciate your work to help get us where we need to be. And I1301look forward to working with my friend, the Ranking Member, to1302craft some legislation.1303    And with that, I will yield back. Thank you again for being1304here today.1305    Without objection, all Members have five legislative days1306within which to submit materials and additional written1307questions for the witnesses, which will be forwarded to the1308witnesses. If there is no further business, without objection,1309the Subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you.1310    [Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]13111312                                 [all]